HSX v Daniel Ryan & Ors

The hearing before me today is the Return Date built into an Order which Farbey J made, after an urgent without notice telephone hearing on Saturday 18 July 2026. That Order was, in accordance with its terms, published on 21 July 2026 on the Judiciary website (as “HSX” and also “HXS”), except for the contents of a Confidential Schedule which were withheld. The terms of the Order which Farbey J made are therefore in the public domain. The Practice Guidance (Interim Non-Disclosure Orders) [2012] 1 WLR 1003 addresses s.12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (freedom of expression and injunctions to restrain publication), and also open justice, due process, and model terms for court orders.

After hearing submissions on open justice issues, I am discharging the postponed reporting restrictions made by Farbey J in the Order (§17). An anonymity order and restrictions on access to documents from the court files remain in place (§§3-4). But leaving aside anonymity, there is no other reporting restriction. This is a public hearing. My judgment will be published, as will the Court’s substantive Order. The Defendants have already been named in Farbey J’s published Order. No applications have been made by the press, or any defendant or any person affected.

After hearing submissions, I am proceeding in the absence of the Defendants. There has been no appearance by or on behalf of the Defendants and no communication from them in relation to the hearing or the continuation of the Order. I have been brought right up to date by Mr Wolanski KC who has shown me the further emails sent to the Defendants, giving them further notice of the hearing today, including its rescheduled 2pm start time. I have been reminded by Mr Wolanski KC of the terms of CPR 23.11 which deals with proceeding in the absence of a party. He also showed me the observations – in a different context of a hearing where there was the prospect of a determination of the merits – in Pirtek v Jackson [2017] EWHC 2834 (QB) at §§19-22. The injunction ordered by Farbey J by its terms (§9) expires at “the conclusion of the Return Date hearing” unless continued by the court. The Court needs to do something, at this hearing today…

Before we move to excluding a member of the public from the court-room, I am going to give this final warning. I have now needed to pause this hearing twice. This is a public hearing and members of the public are entitled to be present in the courtroom if they sit at the back of the court and listen quietly. If this member of the public chooses to sit at the back of the court and listen quietly they will be able to stay. If they choose not to sit at the back of the court and listen quietly, security will remove them. They are not entitled to interrupt the hearing, raise objections, or ask questions of the Judge. Questions of anonymity have been properly explored and any locus of any member of the public to address the Court has been exhausted.

I will resume the ruling that I was in the middle of delivering. I am not going to schedule another hearing. I am entirely satisfied that it is appropriate to proceed. I am satisfied that the Defendants have been served with the court papers and notified of this hearing. Service was effected in accordance with the terms of the Order, and it has been followed up. The evidence is that the First Defendant and the Second Defendant have both, on being process-served originally, confirmed their identity; and that the WhatsApp number ending 6872, attributed to the Third Defendant, initially responded when the Order was first served. No Defendant has indicated: any wish to participate at this hearing; or any contention being made for consideration at this hearing; or any difficulty in participating. Any continuation Order which I make will have within it a liberty to apply to vary or discharge the Order. That stands as an appropriate safeguard. It guarantees fairness and full protection.

Having heard submissions from Mr Wolanski KC, the position is as follows. I am satisfied that it is necessary and appropriate to make a continuation Order in this case, to continue the Order made by Farbey J. However, that is subject to some points of detail which Mr Wolanski KC was able to raise with me, and some which I was able to raise with him. These will involve some reworking of the draft order currently before the Court. The upshot is this. I will be making a replacement Order tomorrow, making my decision on the papers without a further hearing, and then delivering my Judgment in its completed form.

That leaves an important loose end. It arises because of the particular way in which the Order which Farbey J was invited to make was crafted. The wording of the injunction did not say it took effect “until further order of the Court”. Instead, the injunction was expressed to be “until the conclusion of the Return Date hearing … or further Order of the Court”. That makes it important to avoid a vacuum, in the time between “the conclusion of the Return Date hearing”, and the making of the finalised continuation Order tomorrow. It is also important to avoid any perceived vacuum, or lack of certainty. The solution is this. I will make a very short Order today. It will simply order, subject to the decision I made to discharge reporting restrictions, that the Order of Farbey J dated 20 July 2026 shall continue in full effect until replaced by further order of this Court. That short vacuum-filling Order will be drawn and can be sealed and served by the Claimant’s legal representatives on the Defendants today. The replacement Order I anticipate will follow soon afterwards, namely tomorrow. I see no necessity for today’s Order to be published on the Judiciary website.

Since my Order (29 July 2026) will be published on the Judiciary website, I will give paragraph references below to paragraphs within the Order.

This is not a trial and I am not making findings of fact. The evidence placed before the Court supports the following picture and sequence of events. The claimant is a New York based businessman. He created a profile on the “Seeking” dating website. He received communications which purportedly came from a 23 year old woman whose photo was clearly that of an adult woman. Communications continued, on the dating website and then on Telegram accounts. The Claimant provided photographs of himself. Intimate messages of a sexual nature were exchanged. Within days, the Claimant was receiving threats. They came from a source who had identified him from his photos. The source was showing an awareness of information about the Claimant, about his wife and about her sister. The source was threatening to disclose the contents of the intimate messages. They were also threatening to make false allegations about the Claimant having sought to have sexual relations with a child. Various communications were received by the Claimant. Various bank account details were provided, for him to transfer money. The Claimant transferred £39,000, in response to the threats, and in return for the deletion of the messages. After a week’s respite, the threats started again, and escalated. Now, a further £100,000 was demanded. The threatened disclosures were due to be carried out on Monday 20 July 2026. Farbey J’s injunction Order was made in order to prohibit that disclosure from happening. The Order was served, using the various means of communications including WhatsApp, email and process servers. The prohibition appears to have been effective.

I am entirely satisfied that continuation of the injunction is justified as necessary and proportionate. That includes the non-molestation aspects of the injunction, prohibiting contact with the Claimant, his family, friends or associates; but allowing contact with the Claimant’s legal representatives (Order §4c-d). On the evidence before the Court, the following are all substantiated and uncontroverted. The threats are serious. The payments made and demanded are substantial. The Claimant has already suffered significant harm as a result of the threats. The threatened disclosure would manifestly affect the Claimant’s family life. The information by its nature gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Claimant is not a public figure. There is no right to public the information. There is evidence that disclosure will happen unless restraint, including if the restraint presently imposed is lifted. A blackmailer cannot claim any significant Article 10 rights to freedom of expression. No legitimate interests in disclosure are identifiable. Damages are not a solution. The Claimant is giving a cross-undertaking in damages and has provided evidence of substantial resources. The Defendants have had a full and fair opportunity to identify a defence, or viable defence, or a legitimate interest, or point to any relevant harm to them.

I have considered the provisions of s.12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the guidance in Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2004] UKHL 44 [2005] 1 AC 253. The s.12(1) trigger is whether the remedy “might” affect the exercise of freedom of expression. On that premise, my assessment is that the Claimant is likely to succeed at trial. In my assessment, he is “likely to establish that publication should not” in law “be allowed” (s.12(3)). Understandably, the law affords little if any weight to a blackmailer’s freedom of speech: YXB v TNO [2015] EWHC 826 (QB) at §17; LJY v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 3230 (QB) [2018] EMLR 19 at §§24-29. I ventilated with Mr Wolanski KC whether there is a point of law about extra-territoriality: about the Article 8 harm to private and family life being enjoyed only in the United States. I can see that an argument might be raised. But there is strong evidence that the Defendants are in the UK, are making threats and demands from here, and that the receipt of actual or putative transfers of money is into UK bank accounts. Mr Wolanski KC says that places the “misuse” of the “private information” squarely here and, in any event, a blackmailer has no legitimate Article 10 rights which Article 8 private or family life interests need to come in and outweigh. I find it very difficult to suppose that the domestic tort of misuse of private information would allow civil law impunity in a case like this. The stringent merits threshold is crossed.

It has been of assistance to be able to put this case alongside the proceedings in the case of RXE (reference KB-2026-002349). In RXE, Ellenbogen J made an order for an interim injunction on 30 June 2026, at a public hearing but with anonymity and postponed reporting, on 3 July 2026. That Order was published on the Judiciary website on 30 June 2026. The First and Second Defendants are the same individuals who were named in that Order in RXE. The Third Defendant was then added to that Order in RXE, at the Return Date hearing on 3 July 2026, when Murray J continued the injunction at another public hearing. That Order was also to be published on the Judiciary website. RXE was also a blackmail case involving another US-based businessman and intimate details, again arising from an online meeting with a purported woman on a dating website. The evidence before me clearly indicates an overlap between RXE and this case. The evidence suggests the activities of a blackmailing gang, at least two of whose members are located in the UK, in Manchester.

The title to this case (see p.1 of this Judgment) describes the Fourth Defendant in a way which gives a lot of relevant details about the present case: a hotmail address; mobile phone numbers; Telegram accounts; and bank accounts. There is no need for me to repeat the details here. The Revolut account and hotmail address are linked to the First Defendant. The Wise account is linked to the Second Defendant. The number ending 6872 is linked to the Third Defendant. The links to the UK are conspicuous. UK phone numbers have been used, a voice message was left by someone with a British accent, the Revolut account has a UK IBAN, payment was demanded and made in pounds sterling. An investigator in the RXE case linked the hotmail address attributed to the First Defendant to a Manchester residential address. They traced the Second Defendant to another Manchester residential address, together with a UK phone number. The First and Second Defendants have both been process-served in these proceedings, at those addresses in Manchester, in circumstances which confirmed their identities.

I am satisfied that the injunction in this case must remain in force (§4). The duty to disclose information remains necessary and proportionate (§§5-6). The provisions as to anonymity, access to documents from the court records, protection of hearing papers, and provision of documents and information to third parties, will all be continued (§§2-3, 7-10)). They are all justified as necessary and proportionate.

In the design of the Order, redrafting has allowed the Order to work as a freestanding source, not by reference to Farbey J’s Order. In the description of the Fourth Defendant (page 1 of the Order) limbs (a) to (g) stand individually and are non-cumulative. A new deadline date is set for the mandatory duty to provide information, to promote the clarity and enforceability of my mandatory Order (§5). It proved unnecessary to have a “Confidential” Schedule, which means the whole Order can be published (§12). The standard injunction wording was reordered for greater clarity (§4a). The provision on variation by agreement between the parties was qualified to avoid bilateral further derogation from open justice, without permission of the Court (§17).