Appeal case No: KA-2023-000208
County Court no. H01CL377
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before :
MR JUSTICE SOOLE
Between :
HEATHER FRENCH | Appellant/ Claimant |
- and – | |
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS | Respondent/ Defendant |
The Appellant in person
Mr Adam Clemens (instructed by Weightmans LLP) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 18 June 2026
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on Tuesday 14 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
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MR JUSTICE SOOLE :
Pursuant to the Order of Martin Spencer J dated 28 January 2026, this is the hearing of the Appellant’s application dated 1 May 2025 ‘to set aside and/or declare void ab initio’ the Order of Ritchie J dated 10 April 2025 by which he dismissed grounds 2-5 of the Appellant’s renewed application for permission to appeal the Order of HHJ Freeland KC dated 3 October 2023. The Appellant is a litigant in person. The Respondent contends that the Court has no jurisdiction to set aside the Order; and that in any event the application should be dismissed.
The background to the issue
By this claim which was issued in 2019 and transferred to the County Court at Central London, the Appellant Ms Heather French alleges a range of unlawful conduct by the Metropolitan Police between 2015 and 2018.
On 5 May 2022, HHJ Freeland made an order for directions including standard disclosure. The Appellant considered the Respondent’s resulting disclosure to be deficient and on 7 October 2022 applied for an Unless Order in that respect. A hearing took place on 20 April 2023 at which the Respondent was unrepresented. The application was adjourned and ultimately relisted for 3 October 2023.
At the hearing on 3 October 2023, HHJ Freeland dismissed the Appellant’s application for an Unless Order and ordered her to pay the Respondent’s costs of the application, summarily assessed at £2566.60. He made no order as to the costs of the abortive hearing on 20 April 2023 and directed a Costs and Case Management Conference to be listed and reserved to himself.
By Appellant’s Notice dated 23 October 2023, the Appellant appealed that Order. By Ground 1, she alleged actual or apparent bias on grounds which included that HHJ Freeland’s wife, Ms Anne Studd KC, had ‘for decades… represented the defendant, to the highest degree.’ By the remaining Grounds 2-5, the Appellant otherwise challenged on various bases the decision to refuse the application for an Unless Order and the orders for costs made in respect of the two hearings.
By Order dated 5 February 2025, on a paper consideration of the application for permission to appeal, Sheldon J granted permission to appeal on Ground 1 ‘but only in respect of the contention that there was apparent bias based on the connection between the learned judge’s wife and the Respondent.’ Permission was refused on the balance of Ground 1 and on Grounds 2-5.
The Appellant exercised her right to renew, at an oral hearing, the application on the Grounds for which permission had been refused. The renewed application came before Ritchie J on 10 April 2025. By error, the hearing was listed as an appeal hearing. Indeed, from the transcript it appears that Ritchie J initially understood it to be the substantive hearing of the appeal on that part of Ground 1 for which permission had been granted. The true position having become clear, the hearing proceeded on the renewed application for permission to appeal.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Ritchie J gave an oral judgment which dismissed the renewed application. A transcript has been obtained and approved.
On 1 May 2025, the Appellant issued the present application to set aside and/or declare void the Order of Ritchie J. For one reason or another there was a delay in the consideration of the application; and indeed it was not served by the Court on the Respondent until 28 January 2026. That was the date of a directions hearing in respect of the substantive appeal on the relevant part of Ground 1 and which was listed before Martin Spencer J.
At that hearing the Respondent, appearing by Mr Adam Clemens, first became aware of the application dated 1 May 2025. Mr Clemens thereupon questioned whether the Court had jurisdiction to consider such an application. In consequence, Martin Spencer J made directions towards the hearing of the application.
Pursuant to those directions, by skeleton argument dated 17 February 2026 the Respondent confirmed its pursuit of a jurisdictional challenge to the application. As permitted by the order of 28 January 2026, the Respondent has served a further skeleton argument on the jurisdiction issue dated 15 June 2026.
The Appellant’s case on the jurisdiction issue is set out in a skeleton argument dated 16 June 2026. The application is supported by her witness statements dated 1 May 2025, 17 December 2025 and 16 June 2026.
The Appellant’s application
The application notice dated 1 May 2025 asks in Box 3 that the Order of Ritchie J be ‘set aside &/or declared void ab initio’ on the grounds of ‘Maladministration, discrimination, exceeded jurisdiction, abuse of process, pre-judgment & attempt to pre-dispose of Appeal, followed by “irregular” disposal of renewal hearing, no genuine reasons to support rejection of remaining grounds.’
The evidence in Box 10 includes that ‘The court has inherent jurisdiction to correct its own mistakes and give directions, without the need for this formal application’. It continues with the complaints that in particular: (1) the appellant was informed that the renewal hearing had been set down on 10 April 2025 for the ‘inexplicably inadequately’ time of one hour; and (2) the hearing was then ‘inexplicably’ recorded on the Daily Cause List as the appeal hearing. The appellant then criticises Ritchie J’s conduct of the hearing in a range of ways, alleging that he ‘exercised discrimination, pre-judgment and bias’ against her and that the hearing was a ‘pre-determined sham’.
The appellant’s supporting witness statement dated 1 May 2025 elaborates on these allegations and concludes with the contention that Ritchie J’s Order was ‘invalid and void ab initio’.
The challenge to jurisdiction
Section 54 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 is headed ‘Permission to appeal’ and includes ‘(4) No appeal may be made against a decision of a court under this section to give or refuse permission (but this subsection does not affect any right under rules of court to make a further application for permission to the same or another court)’.CPR 52.3 then imposes the requirement for permission to appeal from a decision in the County Court or the High Court.
Under the heading ‘Reopening of final appeals’, CPR 52.30 makes provision for the reopening of a final determination of an appeal; and for that purpose an ‘appeal’ includes an application for permission to appeal. The Appellant has made no such application.
The rule provides as material:
‘(1) The Court of Appeal or the High Court will not reopen a final determination of any appeal unless – (a) it is necessary to do so in order to avoid real injustice; (b) the circumstances are exceptional and make it appropriate to reopen the appeal; and (c) there is no alternative effective remedy.
In paragraphs (1), (3), (4) and (6), “appeal” includes an application for permission to appeal.
…(5) There is no right to an oral hearing of an application for permission unless, exceptionally, the judge so directs.
The judge must not grant permission without directing the application to be served on the other party to the original appeal and giving that party an opportunity to make representations.
There is no right of appeal or review from the decision of the judge on the application for permission, which is final.
…
By CPR 3.1(7): ‘A power of the court under these Rules to make an order includes a power to vary or revoke the order.’
By CPR 3.1(2)(p), the court may ‘take any other step or make any further order for the purpose of managing the case and furthering the overriding objective, including hearing an Early Neutral Evaluation with the aim of helping the parties settle the case.’
By her application notice the Appellant makes this application pursuant to ‘the inherent jurisdiction’. By her other supporting documents she also relies on CPR 3.1(7), 3.1(2)(p) and the overriding objective.
On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Clemens in his written argument submitted that (i) CPR 3.1(7) had no application, in law or fact; (ii) the only route for challenge would be the residual jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to set aside such orders. However, there was equally no basis for that jurisdiction to be exercised. These arguments made no reference to CPR 52.30.
Residual jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal
Mr Clemens observed that this residual jurisdiction was originally identified in the context of appeals under the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996: see CGU International Insurance plc v. AstraZeneca Insurance Co Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1340: Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v. Emmott [2015] EWCA Civ 1285; but also applies to ordinary non-statutory appeals: Patel v. Mussa [2015] EWCA Civ 434 at [16]; see also the White Book at Vol.1, p.1820 para. 52.3.6.
In Patel the residual discretion to set aside such orders was said to be exercisable in cases of misconduct or unfairness ‘…where the judge in truth never reached a decision at all, whether as a result of bias, chance, whimsy or personal interest’: [13]. Whether categorised as misconduct or unfairness, it had to have affected the integrity of the decision-making process; and thus ‘does not directly involve an attack on the decision itself’ [13]. It was necessary to draw a distinction on the merits (against which no appeal lies) and a decision affected by unfairness (in respect of which the residual discretion may be involved). However the unfairness must be of such a quality that it invalidates the decision [14]. It must be a decision ‘so flawed by unfairness of one kind or another that it cannot be regarded as a proper decision at all’ [15].
In such a case, the application to invoke the residual discretion is an appeal and therefore requires the grant of permission by the Court of Appeal: Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd. Mr Clemens contends that there would be no basis for the Court of Appeal to grant such permission.
CPR 3.1(7)
Mr Clemens focussed on the leading authority of Tibbles v. SIG plc [2012] EWCA Civ 518; [2012] 1 WLR 2591, where Rix LJ summarised the jurisprudence on this rule at [39]. This includes:
‘(i) Despite occasional references to a possible distinction between jurisdiction and discretion in the operation of CPR 3.1(7) there is in all probability no line to be drawn between the two. The rule is apparently broad and unfettered, but considerations of finality, the undesirability of allowing litigants to have two bites at the cherry, and the need to avoid undermining the concept of appeal, all push towards a principled curtailment of an otherwise apparently open discretion. Whether that curtailment goes even further in the case of a final order does not arise in this appeal.
The cases all warn against an attempt at an exhaustive definition of the circumstances in which the discretion may, as a matter of principle, be appropriately exercised, namely normally only (a) where there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made, or (b) where the facts on which the original decision was made were (innocently or otherwise) misstated.
…(vii) The cases considered above suggest that the successful implication of the rule is rare. Exceptional is a dangerous and sometimes misleading word: however, such is the interest of justice in the finality of a court’s order that it ought normally to take something out of the ordinary to lead to variation or revocation of an order, especially in the absence of a change of circumstances in an interlocutory situation.’
Mr Clemens submitted that there is no basis in this case for the application of CPR 3.1(7). By reference to Tibbles at [39(ii)], it was not suggested in the application that there had been any change of circumstances since the decision of 10 April 2025, nor that there had been any misstatement of the facts upon which that decision was made.
Interplay with CPR 52.30
In my preparation for the hearing I considered that it was necessary also to take account of the jurisdiction to re-open appeals/applications for permission to appeal under CPR 52.30. At the hearing I drew the parties’ attention to Ceredigion Recycling & Furniture Team v. Pope and Cann [2022] EWCA Civ 22.
That case concerned an appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal. On the paper consideration of the appellant’s application for permission to appeal, the single Lord Justice refused permission to appeal. The appellant Mr Pope applied to re-open the application pursuant to both CPR 52.30 and ‘this Court’s inherent jurisdiction’ [1]. As to the latter, the appellant submitted that the Court had an inherent supervisory jurisdiction to review the decision of the single Lord or Lady Justice and that this was borne out by the provisions of CPR 3.1(7): [26], [42]. Conversely, the respondent contended that the jurisdiction to re-open an appeal or application for permission to appeal was circumscribed by CPR 52.30.
The Court concluded at [41]-[43]:
’41. Ingenious though Mr Adams’ submissions were, they proceeded on the fundamental misapprehension that this Court has some inherent jurisdiction to review a decision by a single Lord or Lady Justice to refuse permission to appeal if the issue raised on appeal was an arguable one, so that the decision to refuse permission was “wrong”. Such supposed jurisdiction would be completely contrary to CPR 52.30(1) and (2) which make it clear that it is only if the criteria set out in that rule are satisfied that the Court of Appeal will reopen a refusal of permission to appeal. It would also contradict a number of decisions of this Court on 52.30 which make it clear that it is never enough under that rule to demonstrate that the refusal of permission was arguably wrong. This is stated most clearly in the judgment of the Court (Sir Terence Etherton MR, McCombe and Lindblom LJJ) in R (Goring on Thames Parish Council) v South Oxfordshire District Council [2018] EWCA Civ 860; [2018] 1 WLR 5161 at [29]:
“The court's jurisdiction under CPR 52.30 is, as we have said, a tightly constrained jurisdiction. It is rightly described in the authorities as "exceptional". It is "exceptional" in the sense that it will be engaged only where some obvious and egregious error has occurred in the underlying proceedings and that error has vitiated – or corrupted – the very process itself. It follows that the CPR 52.30 jurisdiction will never be engaged simply because it might plausibly or even cogently be suggested that the decision of the court in the underlying proceedings, whether it be a decision on a substantive appeal or a decision on an application for permission to appeal, was wrong. The question of whether the decision in the underlying proceedings was wrong is only secondary to the prior question of whether the process itself has been vitiated. But even if that prior question is answered "Yes", the decision will only be re-opened if the court is satisfied that there is a powerful probability that it was wrong.”
Furthermore, contrary to Mr Adams’ submission, the jurisdiction for which he contends cannot be derived nor does it receive any support from the power given in CPR 3.1(7). In Tibbles v SIG plc [2012] EWCA Civ 518; [2012] 1 WLR 2591, this Court made clear that, whilst an exhaustive definition of the circumstances in which the discretion could be exercised was not possible, as a matter of principle it may normally only be exercised: (a) where there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made or (b) where the facts on which the original decision was made were (innocently or otherwise) misstated: see per Rix LJ at [39]. Mr Adams had not addressed this principle in his opening submissions and really had no answer in reply to the point made by the Court that he could not bring this case within it.
In other words, rule 3.1(7) will not avail the first defendant and any application to reopen the appeal can only be made under CPR 52.30. The “implicit” or “residual” jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to correct injustice recognised by this Court in Taylor v Lawrence [2003] QB 528 was subsumed into what was rule 52.17 (now 52.30) which, as the note in the White Book at 52.30.1 states, was the procedure formulated by the Civil Procedure Rules Committee to regulate the exercise of the jurisdiction identified in Taylor v Lawrence. There is simply no other inherent jurisdiction to which the first defendant can have resort.’
Mr Clemens submitted that this passage supports the proposition that the High Court’s power to review its decision on an appeal or application for permission to appeal was confined to the provisions of CPR 52.30. The High Court had no other jurisdiction to do so, whether pursuant to CPR 3.1(7) or otherwise. In the alternative, if the effect of the final sentence of Ceredigion Recycling at [42] was only that the application did not in fact satisfy either of the Tibbles categories (a) and (b), that was equally so in the present case.
Further authorities on the interplay of CPR 52.30 and 3.1(7)
Following the hearing I identified two further authorities which appeared to be relevant: The Queen on the application of Gregory v. City University London [2016] EWCA Civ 898; and Vodafone Group plc v. Ipcom [2023] EWCA Civ 113). In a note to the parties dated 19 June 2026 I expressed the provisional view that these authorities supported the proposition that CPR 3.1(7) either cannot or should not be used as an alternative route to that afforded by CPR 52.30. I sought and received further written submissions.
In Gregory the appellant applied under CPR 3.1(7) to strike out the paper decision of the single Lady Justice which had dismissed the appellant’s application for permission to appeal the refusal of the Divisional Court to grant permission to apply for judicial review. In the Court of Appeal Master Meacher struck out the application. At that time CPR 52.17, the predecessor to CPR 52.30, was in force.
In upholding the Master’s decision Briggs LJ, with whom Moore-Bick LJ agreed, stated:
‘10. In my judgment, Master Meacher was clearly right to strike out Mr Gregory’s application. Arden LJ’s order was, as it said on its face, a final order of this court, finally disposing both of Mr Gregory’s appeal and the underlying judicial review proceedings. The question today is not whether this court has the power to set aside Arden’s LJ order but whether the application that it should do so could possibly be seen as raising matters falling within the narrow circumstances in which that power can be exercised or whether it was in reality just an abuse of the process.
The Roult (Footnote: 1) and Tibbles cases give valuable general guidance about the ambit of the power in Part 3.1(7). The Roult case was about an order at first instance approving a settlement of proceedings. The Tibbles case was about a case management order made by a District Judge. Nothing in those cases sets out any elucidation of the circumstances which might justify an application to set aside an order by this court finally determining an application for permission to appeal and prohibiting oral renewal on the grounds that it was totally without merit.
By contrast, CPR 52.17, the relevant parts of which I have read out and which embodies the Taylor v Lawrence jurisdiction in the rules, does that in express terms. I reject Mr Butler’s submission that the totally without merit part of Arden LJ’s order can somehow be treated as separate from her refusal of permission to appeal so as to permit a more generous application of Part 3.1(7) than is permitted by Part 52.17. In my judgment, the opening words of part 52.17, and sub-rule (2) in particular, make it quite clear that it applies with full force to the order made by Arden LJ, which was an order which finally determined an appeal by way of a refusal of permission to appeal.
Indeed, to accept Mr Butler’s submission would, in my view, negate the whole point of Part 52.3(4A) (Footnote: 2), which is to make the refusal of permission to appeal on the papers final where it is certified as having been made totally without merit. I also reject Mr Butler’s submission that Part 3.1(7) has some separate application to a situation to which Part 52.17 applies. It is fair to say that the language of Part 52.17 is not the language creating a jurisdiction but rather the language setting out the conditions within which that jurisdiction may be exercised.
For my part, I have had no difficulty in concluding that the power might be found in Part 3.1(7), but in no circumstances, in relation to an order of this kind, could it be exercised otherwise than in conformity with the very strict framework and conditions imposed by Part 52.17. Nor did Mr Butler advance any change of circumstances or fresh evidence going to the merits of his appeal, still less any explanation why such matters, if there were any, had not been deployed at the proper time; that is, on the original paper application for permission to appeal, which Arden LJ refused.
It is nothing to the point that the Divisional Court may not itself have certified the application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings as totally without merit. Plainly, Arden LJ did so certify in relation to the application for permission to appeal against the Divisional Court’s refusal. In my judgment, an attempt to set aside a final order of this kind without putting forward the very special grounds identified in Part 52.17 and amplified in Taylor v Lawrence is an abuse of process. Here Mr Gregory’s application came nowhere near even asserting such grounds and nor were any such grounds disclosed by his witness statement.
In relation to final orders of that kind, Part 52.17 does cover the ground and there is no room for some wider application of Part 3.1(7). As Master Meacher rightly appreciated, it is part of the Master’s role to strike out abusive applications of this kind…’
In Vodafone, the appellant applied under CPR 3.1(7) to revoke or vary a final order of the Court of Appeal and of the judge below. No application was made pursuant to CPR 52.30. In dismissing the application the Court’s consideration of CPR 3.1(7) began:
‘35. CPR rule 3.1 (7) appears in a part of the rule headed “Case management.” One would not expect a rule intended to deal with case management to apply to final orders. Nevertheless, there is no authority which absolutely precludes the invocation of CPR rule 3.1 (7) in relation to final orders.’
The Court then considered a large number of authorities including Gregory, Ceridigion Recycling, and McWilliam v. Norton Finance UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 818. In McWilliam the Court of Appeal had granted the appellant company (Norton Finance) permission to appeal. The appellant had then gone into administration; and the appeal had then been dismissed by consent. When the company passed into liquidation, an application was made under CPR 52.30 to re-open the appeal. In granting the application the Court considered that there had not been a final determination of the claim and stated that ‘The strict constraints which part [52.30] imposes do not apply directly under CPR part 3. The case for inviting the court to revoke its previous order by consent is reasonably compelling.’ However it appeared that the Court had not been referred to any authority on the ambit of CPR 3.1(7): see Vodafone per Lewison LJ at [48].
At [52] Lewison LJ observed that the decision in Ceredigion Recycling ‘…seems to me to have greatly weakened such authority as McWilliam may have. But in so far as there is a conflict between Ceredigion Recycling and McWilliam, we are free to choose between them. In my judgment, Ceredigion Recycling is to be preferred.’
At [53], Lewison LJ then considered the question of sealing of orders. Thus: ‘The order that Vodafone seeks to set aside or vary is contained in this court’s final order which has, of course, been sealed. Does the fact of sealing make any difference? This question was considered (obiter and without any citation of relevant authority on the scope of CPR rule 3.1 (7)) in Re L (Children) (Preliminary Finding: Power to Reverse) [2013] UKSC 8, [2013] 1 WLR 634. That case concerned findings of fact in a fact-finding trial held as a preliminary to the making of a welfare order under the Children Act 1989. In care proceedings, as Lady Hale pointed out, it is well-settled that the fact-finding judge is entitled to revisit findings at the welfare stage if that is warranted. At [372] she briefly mentioned CPR rule 3.1 (7), although she did so by saying that the court’s wide “case management powers” under the CPR include the power to “vary or revoke their previous case management orders.” (Emphasis added) It was in that context that she said that there was “no magic” in the sealing of the order. I do not consider that this can be taken as a considered view on the variation or revocation of a sealed final order in civil proceedings: see AIC Ltd v Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria[2022] UKSC 16, [2022] 1 WLR 3223 at [18] to [28].
At [54] and [56] Lewison LJ concluded: ‘54. The overwhelming thrust of the authorities is that the court’s power under CPR rule 3.1 (7) to vary or revoke orders either cannot or should not be used to discharge a sealed final order. The only limited exception thus far even contemplated in civil proceedings is the case of a continuing order (such as a final injunction)…56.I would hold, therefore, that Vodafone’s only available route to challenging the final order made by this court is either through CPR rule 52.30 or by an appeal to the Supreme Court.’
Mr Clemens submits that the effect of the authorities – in particular Gregory, Ceredigion Recycling and Vodafone - is that the High Court has no jurisdiction under CPR 3.1(7) to set aside or vary the Order of Ritchie J. It is a sealed final order. The only possible route of challenge was by CPR 52.30; or potentially by appeal to the Court of Appeal under its residual jurisdiction.
The Appellant’s response
By her skeleton argument dated 16 June 2026, the appellant draws a central distinction between a decision which is wrong and a decision which is void. She contends that the hearing before Ritchie J “…suffered from defects so fundamental that the resulting order lacks the necessary characteristics of a valid judicial determination”, thus rendering the resulting Order a nullity.
Ms French continues that the principle of finality protects a valid decision but not a void decision. The Court must therefore ask itself a fundamental anterior question: ‘does the Order represent a lawful exercise of the judicial function, or is it a nullity arising from a fundamental procedural irregularity’.
As examples of authorities which distinguish an irregularity and a nullity, Ms French cited Craig v. Kanssen [1943] 1 KB 256 and MacFoy v. United Africa Co. Ltd [1962] AC 152. In Craig, invalid service of process rendered the resulting judgment a nullity; with the consequence that it had to be set aside. In MacFoy, the service of a statement of claim in the vacation was an irregularity. The plaintiff’s subsequent judgment in default was not set aside. Ms French further cited Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 in respect of ‘defects going to the existence and validity of the determination itself’. In contending that the Order of Ritchie J was a nullity, Ms French said that it was thus wrong to characterise her application as solely a challenge to a refusal of permission.
Turning to her particular complaints about the renewal hearing and decision, Ms French under the heading ‘Cumulative effect’ submits that she ‘…does not rely on any single irregularity in isolation. Viewed cumulatively, the proceedings demonstrate a pattern comprising: the initial mischaracterisation of the hearing as a substantive appeal; listing anomalies; excessive time pressure preventing full argument; the omission of key issues (including disclosure and ACRO evidence); reliance on inaccurate factual premises; and a judgment that fails to engage with the authorities advanced. Considered together, these matters raise a legitimate question as to whether the renewed application received the independent and procedurally fair consideration required by law. The concern extends beyond the correctness of the outcome to the integrity of the process itself.’ Ms French also speculates about the use of AI in the judgment.
Ms French concluded in her written argumentthat the Court should ‘exercise its inherent jurisdiction and case management powers under CPR 3.1(2)(p) (Footnote: 3) and 3.1(7)’ and order a fresh oral renewal permission hearing ‘to properly determine the arguability of the grounds refused on 10 April 2025’.
Ms French submitted that there must be an inherent jurisdiction in the High Court to set aside the Order. She should not be required to apply to the Court of Appeal. In this respect she made complaint about problems with the handling of her bundles in the High Court and said that the High Court, not the Court of Appeal, would be in a better position to ensure that the correct bundles were before the Court. She also pointed to a decision in previous litigation whereby her application to the Court of Appeal, for permission to appeal the refusal of a High Court Judge to grant permission to appeal, resulted in the single Lady Justice remitting the application for permission for reconsideration by the same Judge: Heather French v. Carter Lemon Camerons LLP; see the reference in the judgment of Patterson J in [2014] EWHC 2771 (QB) at [13]-[14].
As to CPR 3.1(7) and Tibbles, Ms French submitted that the identified constraints on the exercise of the discretion under that rule would not apply where the core question was whether a valid judicial determination was ever produced. She observed that ‘a nullity has no finality to protect’.
In answer to my question as to whether – subject to her primary positions - she was seeking to rely on the bases for intervention which were particularly identified in Tibbles at [39(ii)], Ms French submitted that:
there had been a change of circumstance since the Order of Ritchie J because, through her researches and consideration of the matter, she had come to understand the defects in the process and the absence of a true and valid decision; and
facts had been misstated by Ritchie J in his judgment, namely: (i) referring to the amount of her claim as £89,000, rather than the correct £890,000; (ii) focussing on the loss of the contents of her home, when her primary loss was her dispossession from her home; (iii) misdescribing her friend Ms Nesbitt, who was assisting her in court, through reference to the witness statements from ‘Messrs North and Moore and Nesbitt’.
In answer to my enquiry as to why she had made no application under CPR 52.30, Ms French stated that she had been given to understand that this remedy was not available in circumstances where the application for permission to appeal had been refused not only on the papers but also after an oral hearing of a renewed application
Further submissions on Gregory and Vodafone
The Respondent
In his further note dated 29 June 2026, Mr Clemens submitted that, together with Ceredigion, the effect of these two authorities was to establish that: (i) CPR 3.1(7) does not have a separate application to a situation to which CPR 52.30 applies; (ii) the power under CPR 3.1(7) could only be exercised in conformity with the very strict framework and conditions imposed by CPR 52.30; (iii) where CPR 52.30 is (even) potentially engaged, there is little if any room for the exercise of a power under CPR 3.1(7). Further, the power under CPR 52.30 is only to be exercised in exceptional, rare, cases.
He continues that the starting point is that the permission to appeal mechanism in CPR 52.4 – paper consideration and (subject to sub-rule (3)) oral renewal – is intended to provide finality and certainty. The Order of Ritchie J was a final order. The use of CPR 3.1(7) to set aside such orders would offend that principle. It could not be used as an alternative route to that provided by CPR 52.30: see also Ceredigion at [41].
Thus the jurisdiction under CPR 3.1(7) did not fall to be exercised in circumstances where in truth the application was yet another attempt at an appeal. It did not matter whether the issue was viewed in terms of jurisdiction or of a discretion which would never be exercised.
In any event, even if there were any jurisdiction to make an order or a discretion to be exercised, there is no basis to do so in the present case. When pressed at the hearing the appellant had been unable to identify any change of circumstance or misstatement of fact within the meaning of the two categories in Tibbles.
Ms French
Ms French’s cover letter dated 6 July and accompanying submissions and annex totalled some 30 pages included reference to Ceredigion, but did not address the two authorities (Gregory and Vodafone) on which I had sought submissions.
Ms French reiterated that, aside from CPR 1.1, 3.1(7) and 3.1(2)(p), she relied on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to declare an order void ab initio where the judge had acted without jurisdiction or in fundamental excess of jurisdiction. She submitted that the inherent jurisdiction existed independently and could not be extinguished by procedural rules. Thus if (contrary to her submissions) the CPR provisions were held to be inapplicable, the inherent jurisdiction remained.
As to CPR 3.1(7) and the authority of Tibbles, Ms French pointed in particular to paragraphs [41] and [53] of that decision. At [41] Rix LJ observed: ‘41. Thus it may well be that there is room within CPR 3.1(7) for a prompt recourse back to a court to deal with a matter which ought to have been dealt with in an order but which in genuine error was overlooked (by parties and the court) and which the purposes behind the overriding objective, above all the interests of justice and the effective management of litigation, would favour giving proper consideration to on the materials already before the court…’ Ms French submitted, by reference to her various complaints about the decision, that there were matters which had been overlooked by the court and which could be remedied through CPR 3.1(7).
At [53], and in the context of the slip rule (CPR 40.12), Rix LJ stated: ‘It may be, however, that in the past it was used more expansively to put right a defect in an order due to “an accidental omission of counsel or solicitor to ask for, or of the court to provide for, something which ought to have been provided for” (see Re In Inchcape (Earl of) [1942] Ch 394 at 398, where Morton J referred back to Fritz v Hobson (1880) 14 Ch D 542 (Fry J) and applied its learning…That may be stretching the slip rule, but, as I have ventured to suggest above, in an appropriate case, and on prompt application, and in the absence of prejudice, it may well be the sort of case in which CPR 3.1(7) would be available today, even though there was no misleading or misunderstanding. Since the court has asserted this power since 1880, it may be doubtful whether it would be opening the door to wide to find it now within CPR 3.1(7).’ Ms French submitted that the power to correct genuine errors continued under CPR 3.1(7).
As to Ceredigion, she submitted that that decision had no application to the present case. That decision concerned the reopening of an appeal by the Court of Appeal under CPR 52.30, not the inherent power of the High Court to correct its own nullity, i.e. its power, as she put it, ‘to recognise that one of its own orders never came into existence’.
The submissions otherwise largely comprise criticisms of the hearing before Ritchie J, its reasoning and conclusion; and further elaboration of rehearsal of the arguments that the purported Order was a nullity and/or should otherwise be set aside.
Annex X to her submission then sets out ‘a pragmatic, technical analysis of how AI and automated systems embedded in HMCTS infrastructure may have contributed to the procedural failures in this case. It covers both inadvertent interference (system-generated errors) and user-mediated interference (where human operator’s use of AI tools affects outcomes)’.
Conclusions
There is no basis for the contention that the Order of Ritchie J was a nullity; and no support for that proposition is found from the authorities cited by the appellant. The Order is an entirely regular order whereby, following the oral hearing of the appellant’s renewed application for permission to appeal on the grounds which had been refused on paper, the application was refused.
The Order of Ritchie J is a final order, refusing permission to appeal on the grounds for which permission was refused by Sheldon J on paper. The order has been sealed.
The inherent jurisdiction in both the Court of Appeal and the High Court, to review a decision to refuse permission to appeal from a lower court, is based on the decision in Taylor v. Lawrence. That inherent jurisdiction has subsequently been subsumed into what is now CPR 52.30. There is no other inherent jurisdiction in the High Court to which such an appellant can resort. The reasoning in Ceredigion at [43] applies to the decision of a High Court Judge, just as it does to the decision of a single Lord or Lady Justice refusing permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The authority of Ceredigion was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Vodafone at [52].
The power to revoke or vary an order pursuant to CPR 3.1(7) cannot be exercised in a way which circumvents CPR 52.30, i.e. otherwise than in conformity with the strict requirements of that rule: Gregory at [14]; see also Vodafone at [45] and [54]. The various authorities cited by Ms French (including Tibbles at [41] and [53]) provide no support for the contrary. I add that CPR 52.30 of course applies to the refusal of an application for permission to appeal made after an oral renewal hearing.
It must follow that an applicant can be in no better position to circumvent CPR 52.30 by reliance on any other provision of the CPR, such as CPR 1.1 or 3.1(2)(p).
Ms French having made no application pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction subsumed within CPR 52.30, I conclude that there is no other ‘inherent jurisdiction’ for the Court to entertain this application.
Equally, in the absence of any application pursuant to CPR 52.30, I conclude that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application under CPR 3.1(7), CPR 3.1(2)(p) nor any other provision of the CPR.
Alternatively, if the Court does have technical jurisdiction under CPR 3.1(7), I consider that, in the absence of an application made pursuant to CPR 52.30, the Court is bound to refuse to exercise its discretion: see Vodafone at [54]. In this respect, see also Tibbles at [39(i)] where the Court found that in all probability there was no line to be drawn between jurisdiction and discretion.
For these reasons I also conclude that the present application is an abuse of process. At the level of the High Court, the only possible route for review of the decision of Ritchie J would have been by application pursuant to CPR 52.30. Such an application has to be made in proper form and is subject to its particular and stringent requirements. Thus, e.g., the principle that there is no right to an oral hearing of the application ‘unless, exceptionally, the judge so directs’ (52.30(5)) cannot be sidestepped by making an application such as the present.
For completeness, I should add that the evidence in any event would have provided no basis for the Court to set aside the Order on the basis of a change of circumstance and/or misstatement of facts: Tibbles at [39(ii)]. There has been no change of circumstance. There has been no misstatement of facts which could possibly provide a basis to set aside the order.
Given the conclusions I have reached, I think it unnecessary to consider the residual jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.
Accordingly, the application dated 1 May 2025 must be dismissed. Pursuant to the Order of Martin Spencer J, I will now hear the parties on directions for the substantive appeal hearing on that part of Ground 1 for which Sheldon J gave permission.