CJ Jones Solicitors LLP v John Sapsford

The claimant has brought proceedings for defamation and malicious falsehood against the defendant in respect of six emails sent by the defendant to various people between 4 April and 13 April 2024.

Master Dagnall directed a preliminary hearing which has taken place before me in order to determine:

The claimant is a firm of solicitors. The defendant was a long-standing client of the firm. His main contact there was a partner called Stephen Fairburn. Fairburn and the defendant had been friends even before Fairburn joined the claimant.

Fairburn owned a flat in Gloucester Terrace in Bayswater and in 2021 the defendant invested in it by buying a half share. Disputes arose between them about the management and expenses of the flat.

There was also a dispute about a loan with an acquaintance of the defendant called Jeff Woodward. The defendant’s case is that the loan was between Woodward and Film Financial Consultants Ltd (FFC) and that, first, any legal fees were owed by FFC not the defendant and, second, the retainer of the claimant was limited and had ceased and been paid for. The claimant’s case is that it was instructed by the defendant personally and that it was entitled to charge for work done.

On 31 March 2023 the claimant sent the defendant an invoice for £34,512.50 in respect of emails in the period 18 October 2018 to 31 March 2023. The hourly rate charged was £275 per hour, and the emails were said to number 1,255. The defendant suggests (in paragraph 7 of his Re-Amended Defence) that the charge was constructed by assuming 10 minutes of chargeable time per email.

The defendant denies that he had ever agreed that chargeable work should be done in respect of these emails. His case is that the claimant was not entitled to render the charges claimed in the invoice, and that the claimant knew it was not so entitled (para 7.i. of his Re-Amended Defence). He alleges that Fairburn raised the invoice “out of spite” because of the falling out between them at the time (para 11.a. of the Re-Amended Defence).

As soon as he got the invoice, the defendant said that it was (to use his word) “fraudulent”.

He made this point, and other points, in a number of emails, six of which are the basis for the present proceedings. The recipient of the first email was the Legal Services Ombudsman, although it was copied to others as well. The recipients of the other emails were mostly mutual friends or acquaintances of both Fairburn and the defendant, although they also included two other partners in the claimant and two family members of the defendant.

The action for defamation is brought in respect of the following Statements:

The applicable law is well-known and uncontroversial between the parties.

The principles to be applied when determining meaning were summarised by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2020] 4 WLR 25, [2019] EWHC 48 (QB) at para 12, approved by the Court of Appeal in Millett v Corbyn [2021] EMLR 19 at para 8.

“i)

The governing principle is reasonableness.

ii)

The intention of the publisher is irrelevant.

iii)

The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve.

iv)

Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task.

v)

Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties.

vi)

Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected.

vii)

It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense.

viii)

The publication must be read as a whole, and any 'bane and antidote' taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic "rogues' gallery" case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases).

ix)

In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication.

x)

No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning.

xi)

The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership.

xii)

Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader.

xiii)

In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant's pleaded meaning).”

On how I should approach the meaning of “fraudulent”, a word which is frequently used by the defendant in the Statements, I have been referred to Packham v Wightman [2022] EWHC 482 (QB) (on meaning) and [2023] EWHC 1256 (KB) (after trial). At para 27 of the judgment of trial, Johnson J said:

“In a case such as the present, where the common theme is a serious allegation of dishonesty on the part of the claimant (through knowingly false representations being made in his public statements), a defendant seeking to prove the substantial truth of such allegations needs to focus with some care on what exactly has to be proved by him as to the claimant's state of mind. I underline this point because during the trial and in evidence D1 and D2 approached the dishonesty allegation as if it were a purely objective question – where the focus is on whether it was reasonable for Mr Packham to have made the statements. That is not the correct approach. When dishonesty is alleged a court must first ascertain the actual and subjective state of the claimant's knowledge or belief as to the facts he represented. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief may be a matter of evidence going to whether he held the belief. So, a person who makes statements which appear to be objectively irrational may have some difficulty in showing that they were made with a belief in their truth, but in a dishonesty case the first relevant question always remains a subjective matter as to what the claimant honestly believed. To borrow a principle from the common law of deceit, a statement honestly believed to be true, however implausible it may be, is not capable of amounting to fraud: see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (23rd Edition) at [17.19].”

On the question of whether the Statements are defamatory of the claimant at common law (leaving aside the “serious harm” test in section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, with which I am not concerned), I have been referred to Corbyn v Millett [2021] EWCA Civ 567; [2021] EMLR 19 at para 9:

“At common law, a meaning is defamatory and therefore actionable if it satisfies two requirements. The first, known as “the consensus requirement”, is that the meaning must be one that “tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally.” The Judge has to determine “whether the behaviour or views that the off ending statement attributes to a claimant are contrary to common, shared values of our society”: Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 68 [51]. The second requirement is known as the “threshold of seriousness”. To be defamatory, the imputation must be one that would tend to have a “substantially adverse effect” on the way that people would treat the claimant: Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB), [2011] 1 WLR 1985 [98] (Tugendhat J).”

See also Blake v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000 at para 27:

“27.

A fourth relevant aspect of defamation law is the principle that "mere vulgar abuse" is not actionable. The law is summarised in Gatley on Libel and Slander 13th ed at para 3-037:

"Insults or abuse which convey no defamatory imputation are not actionable as defamation. Even if the words, taken literally and out of context, might be defamatory, the circumstances in which they are uttered may make it plain to the hearers that they cannot regard it as reflecting on the claimant's character so as to affect his reputation because they are spoken in the 'heat of passion, or accompanied by a number of non-actionable, but scurrilous epithets, e.g. a blackguard, rascal, scoundrel, villain, etc.' for the 'manner in which the words were pronounced may explain the meaning of the words.'"

This can be seen as a logical consequence of the law's concentration on the impact a statement would have on the ordinary reasonable reader and the way they would treat the claimant, and a reflection of the importance attributed to context and medium.”

As to whether the Statements are of fact or opinion, I was referred to Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2020] 4 WLR 25, [2019] EWHC 48 (QB) at para 16.

“…there is no dispute as to the principles to be applied. Drawn from Grech v Odhams Press Ltd [1958] 2 QB 275, Branson v Bower [2001] EWCA Civ 791; [2001] EMLR 32, Lowe v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 320 (QB); [2007] QB 580, Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53; [2011] 1 AC 852, British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2010] EWCA Civ 350; [2011] 1 WLR 133, Yeo v Times Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [2014] EWHC 2853 (QB); [2015] 1 WLR 971, paras 88–89, Wasserman v Freilich [2016] EWHC 312 (QB), Morgan v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2018] EWHC 1850 (QB) at [13] and Zarb-Cousin v Association of British Bookmakers [2018] EWHC 2240 (QB), when determining whether the words complained of contain allegations of fact or opinion, the court will be guided by the following points:

(i)

The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact.

(ii)

Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc.

(iii)

The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion.

(iv)

Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, i e the statement is a bare comment.

(v)

Whether an allegation that someone has acted “dishonestly” or “criminally” is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact.”

Per Warby LJ in Blake v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000 at paras 23-24:

“23.

Opinion is synonymous with “comment”. It is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation or the like. As with meaning, the court deciding whether a statement is one of fact or opinion looks only at the words complained of and their immediate context, and the ultimate question for the court is the objective question of “how the words would strike the ordinary reasonable reader”. This question may be considered after the meaning has been decided, or at the same time, or in the reverse order, which is common practice.

24.

This is a highly fact-sensitive process that focuses on the particular statement at issue. One factor for consideration is whether the statement contains any indication of the basis on which it is made. At common law a statement that contains no indication of or reference to any supporting facts is liable to be treated as a statement of fact. The second condition for the statutory defence of honest opinion is “that the statement complained of indicated whether in general or specific terms the basis of the opinion”: s 3(3) of the 2013 Act. Beyond these extreme cases, “[t]he more clearly a statement indicates that it is based on some extraneous material, the more likely it is to strike the reader as an expression of opinion”.”

In accordance with usual practice, I read all six emails, not limited to the passages complained of, before considering the submissions about meaning set out in the pleadings and other written submissions, and before hearing the submissions made to me at the hearing. This allowed me to form my own initial impression, before considering those submissions and reaching my final conclusions on meaning.

It was common ground that I should answer the three questions set for the preliminary issue hearing (by the order of Master Dagnall) in respect of each of the Statements separately (even if in some cases the answers should turn out to be the same).

The first of the six emails complained of (Email 1) was sent by the defendant to the Legal Ombudsman on 4 April 2023. It was copied to Jeff Woodward, Mark Bishop (a partner in the claimant), John van – (his full surname has not been given to me) and Peter Refahi (another partner in the claimant). The subject line of the email was “COMPLAINT Re CJ Jones Solicitors”.

The email consisted of two sentences, of which the first sentence is said to be actionable (“Statement 1”), namely:

“I have been subject to fraudulent charges of £40k by this firm regarding Jeff Woodward cc’d above who is responsible for legal costs in transactions between ourselves.”

The claimant’s case is that this meant “C, a law firm, had dishonestly charged D in circumstances where it had no lawful right to do so, to the extent that a formal complaint to the Legal Ombudsman was merited.” (Particulars of Claim, Schedule A). The claimant argues, by way of Part 18 Further Information dated 22 November 2024, that “dishonestly” needs no further explanation or analysis but that it, and the other Statements, bore both a subjective and an objective meaning, in that the claimant had done something that any honest and reasonable person would regard as dishonest and that the claimant subjectively knew and appreciated that what it has done was dishonest.

The claimant’s case is that this was a statement of fact, not opinion, and that it was defamatory at common law.

The defendant’s case (Re-Amended Defence para 7.c) is that Statement 1 meant that the claimant “had dishonestly claimed fees from the defendant, their client, when it had no proper basis for doing so”. The defendant denies that it means that a formal complaint to the Ombudsman was merited (para 12.5.b).

The defendant’s case is that this was a statement of opinion, not fact. The defendant concedes that the defendant’s proposed meaning was defamatory (Re-Amended Defence para 12.5.c).

When deciding meaning myself, I start by reminding myself that Email 1 has no context provided by the other emails, because they had not yet been sent or read. The recipient of Email 1 (the Legal Ombudsman) had no prior knowledge of the case or of the persons mentioned. It is not alleged that the other recipients had any relevant prior knowledge, save that it is common ground that they knew that Fairburn was a partner in the claimant firm.

The meaning of the words must therefore be taken from the words themselves in the context of the short email as a whole, and of the fact that it was being sent to the Legal Ombudsman.

The reference to “fraudulent charges” does not clearly explain why they are said to be fraudulent. In particular, the natural and ordinary meaning does not convey that they are fraudulent because, or only because, they were charged to the defendant rather than Woodward, notwithstanding the explanation that Woodward was copied in and was “responsible for legal costs in transactions between ourselves”. It is a bald statement– that the defendant (“I”) has been charged £40,000 by CJ Jones Solicitors (the Subject line of the email is “COMPLAINT RE CJ Jones Solicitors” and the body of the email refers to charges “by this firm”) and that these charges are “fraudulent”.

“Fraudulent” conveys dishonesty, and in this email it conveys that the dishonesty is deliberate – not merely that the charges were unwarranted but that a deliberate fraud was being practised by claiming these charges. A deliberate fraud must mean a fraud which the firm making the charge knew was a fraud (it was not merely a mistake or a misjudgment). The nature of the fraud, and of the dishonesty, is that a charge was made which the firm knew it was not entitled to make.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 1 in Email 1 is that the claimant firm of solicitors had charged the defendant approximately £40,000 fraudulently, that is, dishonestly and in the knowledge that it had no proper basis for doing so.

This is an assertion made without context or explanation and it is addressed to the Legal Ombudsman. In context, and on its face, it is a statement of fact, not an expression of opinion.

It is defamatory.

The second email (Email 2) was sent by the defendant to Stephen Fairburn and dated 6 April 2023. It was copied to Chris Beasley. It was a response to an email of the same date from Stephen Fairburn, also copied to Chris Beasley, about utilities bills at the flat which the defendant had queried or not agreed to pay. Email 2 was, substantively, about this dispute and about the flat, but it began with a sentence (“Statement 2”), which is said to be actionable, namely:

“Before reading this I just emailed Chris asking if he would prefer me to stop cc’ing him – though I don’t think he is a fraudster and would start charging £33 an email.”

In context, “Chris” is obviously Chris Beasley, who is copied in (although the email itself is addressed to Fairburn).

Beasley was not one of the people to whom Email 1 had been copied. No relevant context is said to have been known to Beasley, save that Fairburn was a partner in the claimant firm of solicitors.

The subject line of Email 2 was “Re: Market Appraisal confirmation with Benham & Reeves on Wednesday 05^th April 2023 at 5.30PM”. However, that was carried over from previous emails in the chain and was not particularly apt either to Email 2 itself or the email immediately preceding it in the chain.

The claimant’s case is that Statement 2 in Email 2 means that Fairburn, a partner in the claimant, is a fraudster who dishonestly charged the defendant for reading emails in circumstances where he had no lawful right to do so (Particulars of Claim Schedule A; see also the gloss on “dishonestly” in the Further Information I have already referred to). The claimant’s case is that this is a statement of fact, not opinion, and that it is defamatory.

The Re-Amended Defence pleads no case on meaning specific to Statement 2 in Email 2. In oral argument, it was submitted that it is a sardonic remark, in the context of an email which is about the property and not the legal fees, and this remark adds nothing to the series of emails in which the defendant is discussing a variety of monetary issues and disputes, and expressing concern that he has been charged fees dishonestly. The Re-Amended Defence and the oral argument maintain, on behalf of the defendant, that this and indeed all the Statements were expressions of opinion and not statements of fact (Re-Amended Defence para 15).

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 2 in Email 2 is that Beesley, unlike Fairburn, is not in the defendant’s opinion a fraudster who would fraudulently and dishonestly and knowing that he could not justify it charge the defendant for sending him an email. It follows that the ordinary and natural meaning is that Fairburn (whom Beesley knew to be a partner in the claimant firm) is in the defendant’s opinion a fraudster in that he would fraudulently and dishonestly and knowing that he could not justify it charge the defendant for sending him an email.

It is a jocular although snide remark made by way of throwaway line at the start of an email in a chain about something else entirely. Therefore, although it lacks context (it does not explain the basis upon which it is made), it is not a statement of fact but an expression of opinion. However, it is expressed in such a way as to be defamatory at common law, and not just banter. It is not mere vulgar abuse. It appears to be said with feeling and to convey a serious imputation about the character of Fairburn, who is a partner in the claimant. It is an imputation which would, both because of its meaning and because it appears to be seriously and literally meant, tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would regard and treat the person responsible.

It is less obvious in the case of this Statement than in the case of some others that it is defamatory of the claimant firm, as distinct from Fairburn, because it refers, explicitly, only to Fairburn. That is an issue between the parties which both parties ask me not to decide at this stage, and I therefore do not decide it. One reason for the parties’ willingness to defer the question is that it was only today that I gave permission for the Re-Amended Defence to stand in its present form, and had I not done so the defendant would not have been able to argue the question of defamatory effect (as a result of an “unless” order made by Master Dagnall after a hearing on 6 August 2025, at para 9). The issue therefore needs to be the subject of further consideration and preparation before it can fairly be decided either way.

The third email (Email 3) was sent by the defendant to Stephen Fairburn and dated 9 April 2023. It was copied to Peter Refahi and Chris Beasley. It was in response to an email from Stephen Fairburn. The body of Email 3 is, again, about bills and about use of the flat.

The second sentence of the first paragraph is said to be actionable (“Statement 3”). It says:

“I will not agree to airbnb under any circumstances until our other disagreements are resolved, including the CJJ fraudulent charges.”

In the penultimate paragraph, which is part of a discussion about how bills should be managed between the defendant and Stephen Fairburn, the defendant says “I have cc’d Chris B solely so that he can see I am being reasonable as opposed to any false things you may say!”.

The claimant’s case is that the ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 3 is that the claimant, a law firm, had dishonestly imposed charges on the defendant in circumstances where it had no lawful right to do so. The claimant’s case is that this is a statement of fact and defamatory at common law.

The defendant’s case is that Statement 3 means that the claimant had issued charges of £40,000 when it knew or ought to have known that it had no contractual entitlement to issue such charges (Re-Amended Defence para 21.b.). The defendant’s case is that this was an expression of opinion (para 21.b.) and that it was not defamatory at common law of the claimant (para 12.5.a) although it was conceded in oral argument that it is defamatory. It is argued that the context provided by Email 3 as a whole, which consisted (after the first paragraph) of 5 paragraphs about wifi and electricity bills, and about use of the flat by Fairburn and by friends of the defendant on different occasions and allocating charges for that, and so forth, shows that the defendant recognised that there were multiple matters in contention between him and Fairburn, and was not purporting to state an open and shut case of fact, as opposed to opinion.

Statement 3 refers to a variety of disagreements between the defendant and Fairburn (“I will not agree under any circumstances until our other disagreements are resolved”) before referring, specifically, to “the CJJ fraudulent charges”. The heading adds nothing to the meaning, because it is carried over from an earlier email as “Re: Airbnb” and is irrelevant to the matters underlying the reference to “CJJ fraudulent charges”.

The reference to CJJ fraudulent charges is given no context or explanation in Email 3; it is a bald statement that there had been “fraudulent charges” by “CJJ”.

The only recipients of Email 3 (apart from Fairburn himself) were Peter Refahi, who was a partner in the claimant, and Beasley, who it is conceded knew that Fairburn was a partner in the claimant. Therefore, all the recipients will have understood “CJJ” to refer to the claimant firm of solicitors.

All the recipients of Email 3 (Fairburn, Refahi and Beasley) had also received Email 1 (and Beasley, although not Refahi, had also received Email 2). Therefore, the ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 3 in Email 3 was that there had been “CJJ fraudulent charges” in the sense conveyed by Email 1. Email 1 was dated only a few days before Email 3 (4 April, and 9 April, respectively) and the allegation in Email 1 was striking, simple and, therefore, memorable.

Consequently, I conclude that the ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 3 in Email 3 is that the claimant had charged the defendant approximately £40,000 fraudulently, that is, dishonestly and in the knowledge that it had no proper basis for doing so.

This is stated baldly and without more context than had been provided by Email 1 (which added only the context that the fees were substantial, namely in the region of £40,000, and that the defendant had notified the Legal Ombudsman that they were “fraudulent charges”). It is a statement of fact not an expression of opinion.

It refers to CJJ and not just Fairburn. It is defamatory of the claimant at common law.

The fourth email (Email 4) was sent by the defendant to Stephen Fairburn and dated 12 April 2023. It was copied to Peter Refahi, Chloe Sapsford, Danielle Sapsford, David Wallace, Harry Chapman, Jim Groves, Mark Pierson, Chris McDonagh, Barry Reuter (known as Beastie), John van - , and Neville Raschid. These were all mutual friends or business acquaintances of the claimant and the defendant, except for Refahi (another partner in the claimant) and Chloe and Danielle Sapsford (who were members of the defendant’s family).

Email 4 is part of an email chain but has been given the new subject line “Re: CJJ FEES AND OTHER NONSENSE”.

Email 4 forwards to the recipients an earlier email dated 9 April 2023 from Fairburn to the defendant, interspersed with comments in response from the defendant which are in a different colour which demonstrates what is written by the defendant as opposed to what had been written by Fairburn.

Four statements by the defendant within this earlier email are complained of. They are labelled A, B, C and D in the schedule to the Particulars of Claim. I will refer to them as Statements 4A, 4B, 4C and 4D accordingly.

In the second paragraph, Fairburn says he has accepted an offer from the defendant to the defendant having 30% of revenue from letting the flat through Airbnb (an online short and long term lettings agency). The defendant disputes this, saying they have no agreed contract for Airbnb. He then makes Statement 4A which is:

“I have told you in writing that I will not even consider Airbnb until we resolve the other issues, including the fraudulent claim made against me personally when it is the company Film Financial Consultants Ltd that is the party Jeff owes the money to that you were cc’d on with instructions to do nothing at all. FFC will also claim it as fraudulent should CJJ issue an invoice to the correct entity.”

In the third paragraph, Fairburn says “Please stop making threats and defamatory remarks, particularly, if you are going to copy my colleagues and friends” and goes on to say

“The CJJ invoice is not fraudulent, it represents work the firm has carried out on your behalf for which it has not been paid. You cannot seriously believe that the firm should undertake the consideration of 1255 emails and several hundred attachments, without full and proper payment.”

In response to this, the defendant says that “For the cc’s to you re his [i.e. Jeff’s] debts, you were instructed no need to read or do anything.” He goes on to say “Jeff in this case is responsible for the legal fees” and then makes Statement 4B which is:

“I have asked Jeff if he is prepared to pay these fees and he shares my opinion that the charge is fraudulent and is not prepared to pay it.”

In the next paragraph, Fairburn says “The file shows clear instructions in writing from you. The invoice represents work RE: Jeff Woodward and your commercial dealings with him.”

The defendant responds by saying “Please show the “clear instructions”” and then makes Statement 4C which is:

“You admit that I instructed you to do nothing re the debts to FFC so confused how that instruction gives you the right to come up with fraudulent charges.”

Further down in the email, Fairburn says:

“You have been invited to explain your complaint to Peter [presumably Peter Refahi, a partner in the claimant] so he can investigate but you have not done so. I expect that he and others are astonished by the threats of fraud / TV / Law Society / striking off etc but are perfectly capable of establishing whether there is any merit in what you say. If you are right then no doubt the firm will issue a credit note. Personally, I will be fascinated to hear your justification for expecting such extensive free legal services and your allegation that you did not instruct me.”

The defendant’s response includes Statement 4D which I have highlighted in bold:

“I have explained to Peter re the nonsense about the 1255 emails and requested copies You accept that I instructed you not to spend time on the emails re Jeffs debts to FFC but came up with the feeble excuse. Please show proof of any alleged instruction. Another solicitor friend says that if you really had simply looked at the emails he would estimate £2,500. Given the instruction not to look at many of them and that your firm has already charged fees re the others he doesn't think you have a leg to stand on. Jeff Woodward’s solicitor, takes the same view. He has recommended that we complain to the Solicitors Regulation Authority and we will do this next week when I am back from Manchester if your firm’s bogus fees are not withdrawn. Once Peter sends copies of the 1255 emails requested Jeff is hiring FFC to review and analyse them. He has asked FFC to invoice your firm which I will gladly do. Obviously will take a lot more time than you just looking at them. I will charge the estimated fees in advance.”

The claimant’s case is that the ordinary and natural meaning of Statements 4A, B, and C is that the claimant (a law firm) and Fairburn (a partner in the firm) had dishonestly claimed money from the defendant, their client, in circumstances where they had no lawful right to do so. The claimant’s case is that the ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 4D is that the actions of the claimant and Fairburn, in dishonestly claiming fees that they had no lawful right to claim, amounted to a serious breach of their professional code of conduct and merited a complaint to their regulatory body.

The defendant draws attention to an observation by the defendant in the first paragraph of Email 4, explaining why he was copying emails in to others apart from Fairburn:

“The assumption otherwise is that we are both partly in the wrong so the only way for them to judge is by seeing what has and hasn’t been said/agreed. (…) It might be that my friends think I am over reacting so I might get a different perspective. I would be surprised.”

The defendant’s case is that the Statements in Email 4 referred only to Fairburn and not to the claimant (Re-Amended Defence para 12.5.a.), were statements of opinion (para 15) and, because of the context, were not defamatory.

The defendant does not plead a specific meaning for the Statements in Email 4.

These four Statements are in the single email and it is agreed that I should state the meaning that they convey when read together and in the context of the whole email into which they have been inserted.

Not all the recipients had received the earlier emails, and it is agreed that the meaning is the same for all recipients. There is plenty of context to provide a self-contained meaning (that is, a meaning which derives from the context of this email alone, without requiring knowledge of the contents of earlier emails).

Email 4 is headed “CJJ FEES AND OTHER NONSENSE”. Statement 4A includes the phrase “FFC will also claim it as fraudulent should CJJ issue an invoice to the correct entity”. Statement 4D includes the phrase “if your firm’s bogus fees are not withdrawn”. Therefore, the Statements in Email 4 refer expressly to the claimant CJJ Law as well as to Fairburn, a partner in that firm.

Email 4 (unlike, for example, Email 1) does not indicate the amount of the fees in question.

Statement 4A introduces as a fact that the defendant has been invoiced personally by Fairburn on behalf of the claimant firm and that this is “fraudulent” because Fairburn was instructed to do nothing at all and in any event it was FFC and not the defendant, if anyone, who would have the obligation to pay. Statement 4B reiterates that “the charge is fraudulent”. Statement 4C states that “you” (Fairburn) came up with fraudulent charges, having been instructed to do nothing at all. Statement 4D refers to “your firm’s bogus fees”.

Statement 4D also states that a complaint to the Solicitors Regulation Authority has been recommended by Woodward’s solicitor and will be made the following week if the fees are not withdrawn. Whether or not this would succeed, however, was obviously something that only time would tell, and it was clear from the rest of Email 4 that Fairburn had a reasoned case to present, and materials which he intended to rely upon to support it, in opposition to the complaint. The outcome would therefore appear to the reader as uncertain, with something to be said on both sides. Even the defendant was suggesting that the materials referred to by Fairburn would have to be reviewed.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statements 4A, B, C and D in Email 4 is that Stephen Fairburn, a partner in the claimant firm, fraudulently charged the defendant personally with bogus legal fees, that is, dishonestly, and in the knowledge that he had no proper basis for doing so, because he had been instructed by the defendant to do no work, and also because any fees would have been payable by FFC in any event.

This is defamatory.

The difference between these Statements and the earlier ones is that Statements 4A, 4B, 4C and 4D are highly contextualised. They show that there are two sides to the fees dispute, and the other side (Fairburn’s side) is just as prominent as the defendant’s side. Indeed, the defendant’s Statements are all responses to Fairburn and by way of a conversation with him.

Although Statements 4A, B, C and D maintain the defendant’s position about the fees being “fraudulent” and “bogus”, they are less bald and dogmatic than the earlier Statements. They are couched as a position taken in the context of a genuine dispute which will have to be resolved elsewhere. They even ask for evidence so that the defendant and others can consider the position further (“Please show proof of any alleged instruction”; and “Once Peter sends copies of the 1255 emails requested Jeff is hiring FFC to review and analyse them”).

They are, in view of this, expressed as opinions and not statements of fact. Indeed, Statement 4B includes the phrase “I have asked Jeff if he is prepared to pay these fees and he shares my opinion that the charge is fraudulent”.

The fifth email in question (Email 5) was sent at 15.37 on 13 April 2023 by the defendant to Neville Raschid and Chris Beasley, copied to Stephen Fairburn and Jeff Woodward.

Email 5 is in a chain with an earlier email of the same day in which the defendant thanks Chris Beasley and Neville Raschid for their “kind words” and being “willing to mediate”. In this earlier email the defendant says that he is happy to abide by their directions and findings and will pay them for their time.

Email 5 then follows, with the subject line “Re: Offer to Mediate” and consists of the following two paragraphs including Statement 5, which I have indicated in bold:

“I think all the issues re the flat are in the email so no need for anything apart from your comments as I have already requested. Also confirm to Fairburn that I obviously have not agreed to airbnb. He seems to struggle to understand that and fabricates stuff.

Similarly re the CJJ fees really. Jeff is happy to go to court as am I. Jeff would use his solicitor and would need to agree re the mediation as he is liable for legal costs re the debts. At the moment CJJ has invoiced me when the services to Jeff were undertaken by Film Financial Consultants Limited so I assume it would be thrown out as the wrong entity is being named in the invoice. Chris?”

The claimant’s case is that Statement 5 in Email 5 means that the claimant (a law firm) and Fairburn (a partner in the firm) had fabricated a dishonest claim for legal fees when they had no lawful right to do so. The claimant’s case is that this is a statement of fact, not an expression of opinion, and that it is defamatory.

The defendant’s case is that the pronoun is “he” and the reference is to Fairburn and not the firm. The defendant’s case is that “fabricates” is colourful language which does no more than reflect a dispute between the defendant and Fairburn. No specific meaning is pleaded but it is denied that the Statement is defamatory and asserted that it is an expression of opinion, not a statement of fact.

The subject line of Email 5 (“Offer to mediate”) and the context of the email as a whole and of the previous email in the chain demonstrates that the defendant is referring to a dispute which is being referred to others. The first paragraph is about “the issues re the flat” including “airbnb”. It is not about legal fees. The last two sentences of the first paragraph go together, which means that in the last sentence the defendant is saying that Fairburn struggles to understand that the defendant has not agreed to airbnb “and fabricates stuff”. That is strong language but no specific fabrication is mentioned or even implied; it is an insulting word which conveys general abuse, not a specific allegation of fact. It means no more than that Fairburn thinks that the defendant might be open to airbnb letting of the flat and is deluded about that. It is derogatory but not defamatory.

The second paragraph is a change of subject, to “the CJJ fees”. All the recipients would understand that this referred to fees payable to the claimant. Later in the second paragraph of Email 5, the defendant says “CJJ has invoiced me” but the whole of that paragraph disputes the invoice on the basis that it should not have been issued to the defendant rather than Film Financial Consultants Ltd who undertook the services to “Jeff” (Woodward). The defendant expresses a view “I assume it would be thrown out (…) Chris?” but thereby indicates that he will listen to the opinions of others.

The opening sentence of the second paragraph – “Similarly re the CJJ fees really” is not explicit about what the similarity is, but in context the ordinary and natural meaning is that the similarity is that “the CJJ fees” are in dispute (and should be part of the mediation) just as the airbnb agreement is. This sentence does not convey that there has been any “fabrication” in relation to the CJJ fees, save and insofar as Fairburn maintains they are due when the defendant’s position is that they are not due, because if anyone was liable to pay it was Film Financial Consultants and not the defendant. This is neither said nor implied to be fraudulent. The word “fraudulent” is not used; nor is the word “bogus”. There is no implication of dishonesty in Email 5 in relation to the CJJ fees.

Statement 5 is an expression of opinion. The essential basis for the dispute is stated, and it is being submitted in the context of an offer to mediate, with the outcome to be determined by those entrusted with the (apparently informal) mediation.

Statement 5 is not defamatory. It identifies a dispute, and it is not defamatory of a person to say that one is in dispute with them. The remark “fabricates stuff” is derogatory, but not defamatory, for the reasons I have given.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 5 is that the defendant is in dispute with Fairburn about the flat and about CJJ legal fees and that this is to be informally mediated by others. This is a statement of fact but it is not defamatory. The defendant indicates that he believes himself to be in the right but that is an expression of opinion. That is not defamatory either.

Email 6 is an email from Stephen Fairburn to the defendant (copied to Chris Beasley) on 11 April 2023 which was on 13 April 2023 copied by the defendant to Peter Refahi, Chris Beasley, Chris McDonagh, Alex Jones, Jeff Woodward, Neville Raschid, Beverley Darrah, Chloe Sapsford, Danielle Sapsford, David Wallace, Harry Chapman, Jim Groves, Mark Pierson, Natasha Sapsford, John van – and Barry Reuter (“Beastie”).

The original email from Stephen Fairburn is his encapsulation of various disputes between him and the defendant about the flat and about legal advice. This is interspersed (in text distinguishable by its different colour) with responses from the defendant, and within these responses are the three statements complained of (Statements 6A, 6B and 6C).

Statement 6A is:

“IT RELATES TO FRAUDULENT CHARGES MADE AFTER OUR FRIENDSHIP CEASED.”

Statement 6B is:

“I EVEN DID IT THE WEEK YOU SENT THE FRAUDULENT CHARGES AS I DID NOT WANT TO BE PETTY AND SPITEFUL.”

Statement 6C is the next sentence after 6B and says:

“ONE COPYHOLDER SAID I WAS STUPPID AND TOO GENEROUS GIVEN YOUR NASTY EMAILS AND FRAUDULENT CHARGES MADE A COUPLE OF DAYS EARLIER.”

The wider context of Statements 6A, 6B and 6C is a passage in Stephen Fairburn’s email in which he poses questions (numbered 7 to 17) about the disputed invoices. The defendant’s responses were all in capital letters. I have put Statements 6A, 6B and 6C in bold, for ease of reference:

7.

Do you agree that the JW matter relates to a business transaction? IT RELATES TO FRAUDULENT CHARGES MADE AFTER OUR FRIENDSHIP CEASED.

8 Have you and JW sent me over 1000 emails relating to your business dealings?

NO IDEA. JEFF IS STILL AWAITING TO SEE YOUR 1255 EMAILS. YOU ACCEPT YOU WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO LOOK AT ANY RELATED TO JEFF'S DEBTS TO FFC BUT 5 YEARS DOWN THE ROAD CAME UP WITH A FEEBLE EXCUSE THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE TOLD ME WHEN I INSTRUCTED YOU NOT TO DO ANYTHING. YOUR TIME CHARGED SIMPLY TO LOOK AT THE EMAILS IS ABSURD.

9.

Did you expect me to read the emails and the attachments sent with many of them?

CAN ONLY COMMENT ONCE I SEE THEM

10.

Did you discuss any of them with me? NOT ANY WHERE YOU WERE COPIED AND TOLD NOT TO DO ANYTHING. CAN'T COMMENT ON OTHERS UNTIL I SEE WHAT THEY REFER TO.

11.

Did you ask me to prepare for legal action against JW? I TOLD YOU THAT I WAS CONSIDERING IT BUT NEVER INSTRUCTED YOU TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT OR PREPARE FOR IT.

12.

Did you seek any advice regarding the appointment of a Receiver?

I SAID I WAS CONSIDERING APPOINTING A RECEIVER BUT NEVER ASKED YOU TO DO ANYTHING REGARDING AN APPOINTMENT. I WOULD HAVE GONE TO MY ACCOUNTANTS.

13.

Did you send another 1000 or so emails relating to your personal complaints; family matters and estate etc?

NO IDEA. SEND ME COPIES. THESE WOULD OBVIOUSLY INCLUDE SOCIAL EMAILS BETWEEN US I ASSUME.

14.

Was I expected to read them?

CAN’T COMMENT UNTIL I SEE THEM. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SMALL MATTERS THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN ADVICE AS A FRIEND BUT NEVER WITH AN INSTRUCTION FOR YOUR FIRM TO BE INVOLVED OR CHARGED. SIMILAR TO ME GIVING ADVICE TO PEOPLE RE MOVIES/ACCOUNTING ETC

15.

Was I expected to give an opinion?

ABOUT WHAT

16.

Why is my firm not entitled to charge you for this service? SOME ITEMS WERE JUST BETWEEN YOU AND I AS FRIENDS AND NO FORMAL INSTRUCTION OR SUGGESTION THAT YOUR FIRM WOULD BE INVOLVED

17.

Why would any work be free? ACTUAL WORK WOULD NOT BE FOR FREE BUT CHARGING TWICE FOR A SERVICE AND FOR ALLEGEDLY DOING STUFF WHEN YOU WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO DO ANYTHING IS NOT CHARGEABLE. SIMILARLY GIVING ADVICE AS A FRIEND THAT DOESN’T TAKE LONG AND FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO INTENT TO INVOLVE YOUR FIRM ISN'T SOMETHING I WOULD EXPECT TO BE CHARGED FOR. SIMILAR TO THE ADVICE I GIVE TO CHRIS McD RE THINGS EG, WHEN HE WAS REFUSED ENTRY TO THE GAME IN SEVILLE (?) THAT TIME. YOU HELPED HIM OU P TOO AS A FRIEND I BELIEVE. I DIDN'T CHARGE HIM AND ASSUME YOU DIDN'T EITHER. FRIENDS HELP FRIENDS. I HAVE FOR YEARS GIVEN YOU FREE ACCESS TO MY MAN UTD LEAGUE GAMES WHEN I COULDN'T MAKE GAMES. I EVEN DID IT THE WEEK YOU SENT THE FRAUDULENT CHARGES AS I DID NOT WANT TO BE PETTY AND SPITEFUL. ONE COPYHOLDER SAID I WAS STUPID AND TOO GENEROUS GIVEN YOUR NASTY EMAILS AND FRAUDULENT CHARGES MADE A COUPLE OF DAYS EARLIER. I EVEN GAVE YOU MY OWN TICKET FOR WEMBLEY A FEW YEARS BACK AS YOU ARE MORE A UTD FAN THAN I AM. THAT'S WHAT FRIENDS DO.”

The claimant’s case is that the ordinary and natural meaning of the Statements 6A, 6B and 6C is that the claimant (a law firm) and Fairburn (a partner in the firm) had dishonestly claimed money from the defendant, their client, in circumstances where they had no lawful right to do so. Their case is that this is a statement of fact, and defamatory at common law.

The defendant’s case is that Statements 6A, 6B and 6C mean that the claimant firm had dishonestly claimed fees from the defendant, their client, when it had no proper basis for doing so (Re-Amended Defence para 12.c.). The defendant’s case is that this was an expression of opinion and not a statement of fact (Re-Amended Defence para 15). The defendant concedes that it is defamatory (para 12.c.).

There is a great deal of context in Email 6 but the three Statements complained of say essentially only that Fairburn has sent the defendant “fraudulent charges” without, within those statements, stating why they were fraudulent. It is the rest of the email which shows that there is a lively dispute between Fairburn and the defendant about whether the charges were properly due or not, and Fairburn’s case is set out forensically and in some detail, which substantially blunts the attack on “fraudulent charges” in Statements 6A, B and C read in isolation. However, the defendant is stoutly maintaining his characterisation of the charges as “fraudulent” notwithstanding the contrary arguments being presented by Fairburn, and this demonstrates that he is maintaining his position that the charges were, not merely misconceived, but actually fraudulent, which is to say, in this context, dishonest. Indeed, some examples of alleged dishonesty are given by the defendant, such as “charging twice for a service and for allegedly doing stuff when you were instructed not to do anything”. The attack is personally directed at Fairburn (“giving advice as a friend that doesn’t take long and for which there was no intent to involve your firm isn’t something I would expect to be charged for”) but all the email recipients knew that he was a partner in the claimant firm.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statements 6A, 6B and 6C taken together (and Statements 6B and 6C are in consecutive sentences with nothing between them) is that Stephen Fairburn (whom the email recipients knew to be a partner in the claimant firm) had charged the defendant with legal fees fraudulently, that is, dishonestly and in the knowledge that he had no proper basis for doing so.

This is undoubtedly defamatory at common law.

As to whether these are statements of fact or expressions of opinion, there is context, because the arguments on both sides are set out in the form of the dialogue within the email. But, on the other hand, Statements 6A, 6B and 6C by the defendant himself in Email 6 are expressed as emphatic statements of fact, buttressed with reasons, which indicate the defendant’s view that no reasonable person could doubt that the charges were “fraudulent”. This is clear from the withering and dismissive tone adopted by the defendant throughout his comments in Email 6, but a good example comes at the end, when he says “I have not said anything that is untruthful. Yours [i.e. your messages] are nastier than mine! I think I have been very reasonable given the false interpretations and refusal to provide support for claims you make”. The defendant does not suggest to the reasonable and impartial reader that there are really two sides to this dispute; the defendant asserts that his position, including his claims that Fairburn has sent him “fraudulent charges”, is the only one grounded in truth and fact and there is no room for disagreement. Consequently, Statements 6A, 6B and 6C are statements of fact not expressions of opinion.

For these reasons I conclude, in summary, as follows.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 1 in Email 1 is that the claimant firm of solicitors had charged the defendant approximately £40,000 fraudulently, that is, dishonestly and in the knowledge that it had no proper basis for doing so. This is a statement of fact, not an expression of opinion. It is defamatory of the claimant at common law.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 2 in Email 2 is that Stephen Fairburn (whom Beesley knew to be a partner in the claimant firm) is in the defendant’s opinion a fraudster in that he would fraudulently and dishonestly and knowing that he could not justify it charge the defendant for sending him an email. It is an expression of opinion about Fairburn and not a statement of fact. It is defamatory at common law.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 3 in Email 3 is that the claimant had charged the defendant approximately £40,000 fraudulently, that is, dishonestly and in the knowledge that it had no proper basis for doing so. This is a statement of fact and not an expression of opinion. It is defamatory of the claimant at common law.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statements 4A, 4B, 4C and 4D in Email 4 is that Stephen Fairburn, a partner in the claimant firm, fraudulently charged the defendant personally with bogus legal fees, that is, dishonestly, and in the knowledge that he had no proper basis for doing so, because he had been instructed by the defendant to do no work, and also because any fees would have been payable by FFC in any event. This is an expression of opinion. It is defamatory of the claimant at common law.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statement 5 is that the defendant is in dispute with Stephen Fairburn about the flat and about CJJ legal fees and that this is to be informally mediated by others. This is a statement of fact but it is not defamatory. The defendant indicates that he believes himself to be in the right but that is an expression of opinion. That is not defamatory either.

The ordinary and natural meaning of Statements 6A, 6B and 6C is that Stephen Fairburn (whom the email recipients knew to be a partner in the claimant firm) had charged the defendant with legal fees fraudulently, that is, dishonestly and in the knowledge that he had no proper basis for doing so. This is a statement of fact, not an expression of opinion. It is defamatory of the claimant at common law.