Patrick Martins v The London Borough of Brent & Ors

The Defendants in the Claimant’s claim against the London Borough of Brent and others (“the Brent claim”) apply for an order striking out the claims against them pursuant to CPR 3.4 on the basis that the Particulars of Claim disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing the claims. The Defendants in the claim against the National Youth Advocacy Service and others (“the NYAS claim”) apply for the same order and/or reverse summary judgment against the Claimant.

I heard these two applications separately. However, given that the factual background to both claims is the same, and very similar issues arise on these applications, it is convenient to give one, composite judgment on the applications.

The Claimant has brought a number of other claims against various other bodies and individuals to which I will refer below. Three of the Defendants in the NYAS claim also apply for a Civil Restraint Order.

I take the following brief account of the background facts from the Order of Ms Justice Henke dated 26 July 2024 in the proceedings in the family court (FA-2024-000188):

“3.

It appears from the papers before me that the Applicant [the Claimant in these proceedings] and the First Respondent [the Claimant’s ex-partner] separated on 14 July 2023 when the First Respondent and the subject child were asked to leave the family home by the police, following an escalation of alleged aggressive behaviour by the Applicant. Following the First Respondent’s departure from the family home, the Applicant applied to the High Court on 18 July 2023 for Location and Passport Orders alleging abduction. On 25 July 2023 the First Respondent applied for a without notice non-molestation order and Occupation Order at Wandsworth Family Court. The Court granted a non-molestation order on 4 August 2023 without notice to the Applicant. At a return hearing on 11 August 2023 that order was discharged by consent as the parties gave cross-undertakings and agreed to share occupation of the family home. Following an incident at the family home on 13 August 2023 which the police attended, the First Respondent applies again for a non-molestation order on 18 August 2023 at the Central Family Court. A without notice order was granted, and a return hearing listed on 8 September 2023, when the non-molestation order was discharged but the First Respondent was permitted to pursue her application and the court deemed an application for an occupation order to have been made.

4.

On 1 December 2023 the lower court determined that the First Respondent’s occupation order should be heard separately before the Child Arrangement Application made by the Applicant. A finding of fact hearing had been considered necessary in the Child Arrangement proceedings and that hearing has been listed in March 2025. The application for non-molestation and occupation orders needed to be heard before that date. A formal application for a non-molestation and occupation order was made in March 2024 by the First Respondent. That application was listed before HHJ Oliver on 11 April 2024. On that date HHJ Oliver adjourned the application to enable him to receive financial disclosure from both parties. The adjourned hearing came before HHJ Oliver on 8 July 2024 when, having heard submissions on behalf of both parties, he made an occupation order ordering the Applicant to vacate the family home, namely [address] to enable the First and Second Respondent to move in.”

In those family proceedings NYAS, which is a registered charity, was appointed as Legal Guardian to the child and attended the hearing on 8 July 2024 referred to in the above extract in that capacity. The Fourth NYAS Defendant is a barrister who was instructed to attend that hearing on behalf of NYAS. However, from documents produced by the NYAS Defendants, it is apparent that the NYAS Defendants took no position on the occupation order made by HHJ Oliver on that date and did not make any oral representations at the hearing.

The Claimant applied for permission to appeal HHJ Oliver’s order of 8 July 2024. Ms Justice Henke dismissed the application. The passage quoted above is from her written reasons dismissing the application for permission to appeal. In those reasons she also stated, amongst other matters, that the hearing on 8 July 2024 had been fair. She certified the Claimant’s application for permission to appeal as being totally without merit.

Following the dismissal of his application for permission, the Claimant complained to NYAS about the conduct of the Fourth Defendant and NYAS employees, alleging that they had engaged in “latent corruption and mafia-like practices”; that the Fourth Defendant had committed crimes and had been aware of a fraud upon the court; that the Judge had lied and was guilty of “blatant corruption”, as well as other allegations (email of 24 October 2024).

On 1 December 2024 District Judge Cassidy ordered that an investigation be carried out pursuant to section 37 of theChildren Act 1989. Following the section 37 report, District Judge Barrie gave directions for the management of the family case through to trial. The Claimant sought permission to appeal that order. That application was refused by HHJ Lewis. He decided that that application for permission to appeal was also totally without merit.

I have not been provided with a copy of any final order in the family court proceedings and I have not been told of the final outcome, if there is one at this point.

The claims in both actions were issued on the same day, 5 February 2025. In the Brent claim, the Claimant claims £250,000 in damages, specifying in this claim form that he is seeking £100,000 against Brent Social Services and £50,000 against each of the Second to Fourth Defendants.

On the claim form the claims are specified as arising in “severe negligence, defamation, and violations of human rights”. The Claimant states that there has been “harm to the child” as well as “harm to the applicant”. He also refers to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and states that: “The biased and inaccurate reports disrupted my relationship with my [child] and failed to protect [their] safety.” It appears from these assertions that the Claimant is seeking relief in respect of alleged harm to his child, as well as to himself.

On 12 February 2025 Master Eastman made an order staying the claim until further order. The Order stated that “The Claim is improperly formulated in respect of the Claimant’s [child]. The Claimant should seek legal advice.” The Claimant wrote to the Court stating that the claim concerned only his “personal rights”, and not his child’s. The stay was then lifted on 13 March 2025. On 16 April 2025 the Claimant filed “updated” Particulars of Claim and on 24 April 2025 he was notified by the Court that Master Eastman had given permission for these Particulars of Claim to be filed.

A Defence on behalf of all Defendants in the Brent claim was served on or about 27 May 2025. On 8 July 2025 the Brent Defendants made an application for summary judgment and to strike out the claims. This was supported by a witness statement from Ms Sally Wood, a solicitor employed by the First Brent Defendant.

On 26 September 2025 the Claimant responded to that application by issuing an application for an order dismissing the Brent Defendants’ application “as abusive and inconsistent” and directing Ms Sally Wood to amend “her misleading witness statement”. Master Eastman dismissed that application on the papers on 1 October 2025, on the basis that, “This is not a proper way to respond to a Defendant’s application which will in due course be dealt with at a hearing on its merits”. The learned Master certified the application as being wholly without merit. The Claimant appears to have made an application dated 13 March 2026, several months out of time, to appeal the Master’s certification of his application as being wholly without merit, on the basis that he did not “fully appreciate the procedural implications of the certification”. As far as I am aware, that application has not yet been dealt with.

The Brent Defendants’ strike out application was originally heard by me on 11 March 2026. Before the hearing, I had noted that the Brent Defendants did not appear to have obtained an order from the family court permitting disclosure of information from the children proceedings into these proceedings, and the witness statement of Ms Wood might possibly reveal information about underlying proceedings relating to the maintenance or upbringing of a child and, if it did, its disclosure would be a contempt of court as a result of the provisions of section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. I therefore did not read the statement before the hearing, pending confirmation at the hearing from the Brent Defendants that the statement did not disclose such information. At the hearing, Mr Barras, solicitor for the Brent Defendants, informed me that some of the information in the statement possibly might fall outside the disclosures that are permitted by s.12 but it was borderline, and I directed that, out of caution, I would adjourn the hearing until 28 April 2026 to allow the Brent Defendants to properly consider the contents of the statement and if necessary serve an amended version excluding any material that might not be permissible as a result of s.12.

At that hearing, I also noted that the claim might reveal information over which the Claimant’s child had privacy rights, and following submissions I directed that the child should not be identified in these proceedings, but that Claimant himself could be named. These directions were set out in my order of 16 March 2026.

Following the hearing, the Brent Defendants duly served an amended version of the witness statement. On 2 April 2026 the Claimant issued an application for a determination whether the amended witness statement complied with my order of 16 March 2026 and an order excluding the witness statement if it did not comply (“the Claimant’s witness statement application”). I informed the parties by email that I would deal with this application at the adjourned hearing on 24 April 2026.

The procedural history of the NYAS claim is similar. The claim form issued on 5 February 2025 also claimed a total of £250,000 in damages, apportioned as £100,000 claimed against the Second Defendant, an individual, and £50,000 against NYAS and the other two individual Defendants. The claim was said to arise from “the negligence, bias, and procedural misconduct by NYAS (National Youth Advocacy Service) and its representatives”. This was detailed in the claim form as:

“The submission of biased, contradictory, and incomplete reports that disregarded critical evidence and misrepresented facts, thereby influencing judicial decisions unfairly.

Non-compliance with court orders and failure to follow their mandated responsibilities, including investigating key allegations and ensuring the child’s best interests.

Concealment of crucial evidence, failure to act impartially, and prioritising the mother’s interests over those of the child and the claimant.”

In the claim form the Claimant stated, amongst other things, that he was “in a dangerous position due to the sensitive information [he holds] regarding the mother’s involvement in criminal activities, including human trafficking and financial misconduct” and alleged that there was a significant risk to his safety that the court needed to recognise. At no point has the Claimant provided any evidence of any such risk to his safety.

The First to Third NYAS Defendants served a Defence on 12 June 2025. On 16 June 2025, within the time limited for service of the her defence, the Fourth Defendant sought an extension of time for the defence, because she needed to obtain permission to use information from the underlying family proceedings in this claim. The Claimant opposed the application for an extension of time, writing to the Fourth Defendant’s solicitors stating that they were “attempting to obscure the gravity of the crimes committed by the barrister you represent” (email of 9 June 2025) and that there was no legal barrier to disclosing the information.

On 1 July 2025 the Fourth NYAS Defendant made an application for strike out/summary judgment and a similar application was made on 2 July by the First to Third NYAS Defendants.

On 26 September 2025, the same date on which he had made a similar application in the Brent claim, the Claimant made an application in response to the NYAS applications, seeking: (a) dismissal of the Defendants’ strike-out applications; (b) default judgment against the Fourth Defendant; (c) permission to amend the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim to add three defendants; (d) directions; (e) damages for “the abusive applications”; and (f) “order NYAS to explain its disclosure of Family Court documents”. The Claimant served draft Amended Particulars of Claim on the same date but no draft amended Claim Form.

On 1 October 2025 Master Eastman made the same order in the NYAS claim as he did in the Brent claim, dismissing the Claimant’s application and certifying it as being wholly without merit, on the basis that the application was not a proper way to respond to the Defendants’ strike-out application.

Two days earlier, on 29 September 2025, HHJ Sapnara in the Central Family Court had made an order granting the Fourth Defendant permission to disclose certain documents from the family proceedings into the NYAS claim.

The NYAS Defendants’ strike out applications came before me on 12 March 2026. As in the Brent claim, as a preliminary matter I made an order anonymising the child.

I note that on 15 July 2025 the Family Court made an Extended Civil Restraint Order (“the ECRO”) against the Claimant dated 15 July 2025, ordering that the Claimant must not make any application in any Family Court concerning any matter involving the family court proceedings, on the basis that the Claimant had “persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit”. The Court noted “the continued unacceptable behaviour of the father in harassing almost every professional connected with these proceedings and those involved in the child’s life ... he has been bombarding the court with repeated unjustified complaints, allegations and communications (including baseless letters before civil action) which creates confusion and expends valuable court resources unnecessarily).”

The two claims with which I am concerned were issued in February 2025 before the ECRO was made. The Claimant has also issued other claims in the King’s Bench Division.

On 11 August 2025 the Claimant made a claim against HM Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) for alleged breach of his human rights. On 23 December 2025 Master Le-Thornett dismissed this claim as an abuse of process, stating: “It is very clear that this is an attempt to use civil proceedings, wrongly couched as if a damages claim, to mount a collateral attack on the procedure of another court. The concept that HMCTS might be a defendant in such circumstances is without any legal foundation in any event.”

The day after issuing his claim against HMCTS, the Claimant issued proceedings against one Silvia Angarano. The claim is for £250,000 and said to arise from “the Defendant’s submission of a false email dated 24 June 2024”, although no cause of action is specified on the claim form. On 30 October 2025 Master Le-Thornett dismissed this claim as an abuse of process, for the same reasons that he struck out the case against HMCTS, and also because: “The concept that a witness might be a defendant in such circumstances is without any legal foundation. If the Claimant thinks that another court process was affected by (mis)conduct, then his redress is in those proceedings.”

The Claimant applied to set aside the Master’s order and this application has been listed for 23 June 2026.

I do not know if the Claimant has issued other claims in any other court other than the Family Court and the King’s Bench Division. The total amount of damages claimed by the Claimant across these various claims in the KBD is about £1 million. They all appear to relate to the conduct of, or events occurring in, the proceedings concerning the welfare of the Claimant’s child.

As set out above, I heard the applications in these claims on three separate dates. As explained above the hearing of the application in the Brent claim was heard over two dates because I adjourned the matter to allow the Brent Defendants to amend the witness statement that they relied on in support of their application, if it was necessary to do so. An amended witness statement was filed and served. Before the adjourned hearing the Claimant applied for an order excluding the revised witness statement on various bases. At the hearing I dismissed that application and gave a short oral judgment giving my reasons. I informed the parties that I had not read the original witness statement.

In the course of his submissions on the Brent Defendants’ application, the Claimant stated that I had read the original witness statement. When I reminded him that I had told the parties that I had not read the original witness statement, he responded by stating, “I am entitled to believe that you did”. There was no basis for this accusation that I had lied, which could only have been prompted by suspicion and hostility to the Court and a general deep distrust of professional people dealing with his legal matters.

In both claims, the various causes of action are set out in vague and generalised ways, such that it is very difficult to tell what the actual conduct alleged to be unlawful was, or who or when was responsible for it. For example, in the Brent claim the Claimant alleges that the Brent Defendant violated his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. One of the particulars of the alleged breach are that the Defendants refused “to share court-directed reports and assessments”. What reports and assessments he refers to, or why failing to “share” those documents could be a breach of the Claimant’s human rights, is not stated.

Similarly, in support of his claim in negligence, he asserts that the Defendants breached their duty of care towards him by “failing to act upon the Claimant’s concerns about the mother’s drug use, mental health, criminal activities and unsafe housing conditions (raised on 29 September 2023)”. The Claimant does not say why the Defendants’ alleged failure to act was negligent, or what they did, or what they should have done instead.

This problem with the Particulars of Claim in both actions is particularly acute in relation to the Defendants who are natural persons, because the Particulars of Claim in both claims fail to set out what each of the individual Defendants is said to have done that was unlawful. Indeed, in neither the Particulars of Claim in the Brent claim nor those in the NYAS claim does the Claimant even set out what the role and involvement of the defendants who are natural persons was in the family matter. The Second to Fourth Brent Defendants are referred to in the Claim Form only as “three professionals” whose actions “have caused significant harm” to the Claimant and his child. Similarly, the NYAS Particulars of Claim disclose no information as to the alleged position or role of each individual defendant.

The Particulars refer to “the Defendants” having committed unlawful acts. But, even assuming it is correct that the named individual Defendants who are natural persons were professional people who were at some point involved in the welfare proceedings in relation to the child, it is inherently extremely unlikely that they were all responsible for all the misconduct alleged. For example, in the Brent claim, in relation to the claim in negligence, it is pleaded that “As a public authority exercising functions under the Children Act 1989, the Defendants owed duties to the child” and that they breached those duties by (amongst other things): “Failing to act upon the Claimant’s concerns about the mother’s drug use, mental health, criminal activities and unsafe housing conditions (raised on 29 September 2023)”. The Defendants who are natural persons in the Brent claim are clearly not “a public authority”. Furthermore, it is not asserted that the concerns the Claimant states he raised were expressed to each individual defendant, or that that particular individual owed the Claimant a duty to act upon such concerns.

Similarly, under the claim for defamation in the Brent claim it is pleaded that “The Defendants published statements in official documents asserting that the Claimant: was a ‘perpetrator’ of domestic abuse; was involved in drug trafficking; was planning to abduct the child; had threatened to throw acid on the mother’s face”. This is a wholly inadequate pleading of a claim in defamation for a number of reasons, which I will return to later, but including that it is not said whether or on what basis each individual Defendant was responsible for the publication of each of the statements such alleged document.

The same generic form of pleading is used in the Particulars of Claim in the NYAS claim. No separate claim is made against any of the Second to Fourth Defendants, despite that fact that, as has become apparent in the proceedings but is not specified in the Particulars of Claim, the Fourth Defendant, being a barrister in independent practice, is not an employee of NYAS and therefore in an entirely distinct legal and factual position from the Second and Third Defendants. There is no attempt to discriminate between each individual Defendant. For example, it is alleged that “the Defendants knowingly obstructed the Claimant’s access to fair proceedings by: failing to disclose critical documents and position statements to the Court …”. No details of the allegedly critical documents are identified; nor is it said when and to whom they should have been disclosed. Further, it is not said why it was the duty of each of the individuals who have been sued to give such disclosure. It is normally not the responsibility of counsel to give disclosure to the Court.

The absence of any specific pleading in relation to any of the individual Defendants means that the claims against the individuals in both claims fall to be struck out as failing to disclose any reasonable grounds for bringing a claim against them.

A further, important point arises in relation to the Fourth Defendant in the NYAS claim. A barrister is immune from suit in respect of anything done or said in court or in the course of submissions to the court (except to the limited extent that an advocate can be liable to his or her client for the negligent conduct of proceedings, which does not apply here). This longstanding principle was recently reaffirmed in XGY v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2025] EWC (Civ) 1230. It applies even in cases where dishonesty or bad faith can be established against the advocate.

Although the alleged unlawful conduct of the Fourth Defendant in the NYAS claim is not identified, it appeared from the Claimant’s submissions to arise in connection with her representation of NYAS at the 8 July 2025 hearing and/or in written submissions made by her in the course of the case, and therefore to be connected with advocacy in the case. The Fourth Defendant has immunity in respect of that advocacy. The claim against the Fourth NYAS Defendant should be struck out on that basis alone.

More generally, the Defendants in both actions submit that the claims against them constitute an abuse of process, being a collateral attack on the determinations of the Family Court in relation to the child. The Claimant disputes that submission, stating that he does not seek to overturn, vary or otherwise challenge any order of the Family Court or invite this Court to reconsider the welfare determinations made in the Family Court proceedings.

It may be, but is not necessarily, an abuse of process to initiate proceedings for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a previous decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, when the claimant had a full opportunity to contest the decision in the court in which it was made. The law on this issue was recently examined by the Court of Appeal in Allsop v Banner Jones Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 7. In each case, the Court must consider, upon an intense focus on the facts of the particular case, whether, if the proceedings were to continue, that would result in manifest unfairness to the defendant in those proceedings or bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

I therefore need to look carefully at the nature of the claims and the relief the Claimant is seeking in both claims. In the Brent claim, the £250,000 sought in damages is stated in the claim form is in respect of “harm to the child” and causing the child to be left “in an unsafe environment”; and also “harm to [the Claimant]”, on the basis that false allegations have damaged his reputation and caused emotional distress and “obstructed [his] parental rights”. It is also said that false reports submitted by the Defendant “resulted in the Claimant being unjustly portrayed as unfit and inappropriately recommended for supervised contact” and caused the Claimant to be “unjustly deprived of any meaningful contact with his [child]”.

Although this is not very clear, it seems to me that there are two aspects of the harm alleged and the relief claimed: damages for distress or emotional harm caused to the Claimant and to the Claimant’s child following the determinations of the Family Court that limited the Claimant’s contact with his child (although exactly how and to what extent contact was limited is in no place in the Particulars of Claim set out); and damages for alleged harm to the Claimant’s reputation. In relation to the first aspect, it is clear to me that, firstly, the Claimant may not claim any damages in respect of emotional or other harm to his child; and, secondly, this claim is an attempt to re-litigate the Family Court proceedings and establish that the Family Court’s decision(s) were wrong. The Claimant’s implicit claim is that the Family Court was led into error as a result of the Defendants’ conduct and that error caused him and his child unjustifiable harm. In order to litigate that claim, the Court trying the Brent claim would not only have to determine whether each of the Defendants acted unlawfully, but also whether, but for such wrongful acts, the Family Court would and should have reached a different conclusion.

To permit a court in the KBD to relitigate matters concerning the welfare of the Claimant’s child would highly undesirable. Such decisions are sensitive balancing acts best conducted by the family courts following well-established procedures and involving multiple agencies, focussing always on the best interests of the child. The only proper venue for the reconsideration of decisions as to the child’s welfare is the family court or in an appeal from the family court. Moreover re-opening these issues could be destabilising to the child. To permit the relitigation of the question of the Claimant’s contact with his child in the KBD because the father is unhappy with the conduct of various participants in that process and with the decision of the family court, would in my judgment bring the administration of justice into disrepute. I therefore consider this claim to be an abuse of process.

At the hearing of these applications the Claimant stated more than once that if he was not entitled to claim damages for his child’s distress in these claims, he could and would simply join his child to the action(s) and act as his child’s Litigation Friend. This showed a misunderstanding of the role of a Litigation Friend, which is to act in the child’s best interests. A Litigation Friend should not bring a claim in a child’s name for the purpose of furthering the Litigation Friend’s own legal or personal objectives, and certainly not as a workaround to deal with the deficiencies in his own claim.

The second aspect of the harm alleged and relief claimed, reputational harm and damages for damages for reputational harm, is different. It is in theory possible that the Defendants or any of them might have published statements in the course of the family proceedings or in the course of their professional dealings with the Claimant that caused serious reputational harm distinct from any reputational harm resulting from the Family Court determination(s). If that were the case, the Claimant might have a claim in relation to the harm caused by such publication.

But if that is the Claimant’s case, he should have specified in his Particulars of Claim clearly which statement or statements he complains about, setting out the words used and the form in which they were published; who published such statements, to whom, when, in what form, what imputations such statement(s) bore and whether and why they caused serious harm to his reputation: see CPR PD 53B paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2, which codify long-established requirements of pleading in a defamation case. Not one of these requirements of pleading a claim for defamation are met. There is not even a basic attempt to identify any document or documents that the Claimant objects to, or to state to whom such document was published or why it resulted in unjustifiable reputational harm. In these circumstances it appears to me that the reference to defamation in this action is not in reality a separate claim in defamation at all, but only a different way of mounting a generalised attack on the actions of bodies and professional people involved in the family proceedings and on judicial decisions in the family proceedings. For reasons already stated, that attack on the outcome of the family proceedings is an abuse of process.

The relief claimed in the NYAS claim is very similar. The harm for which damages are claimed is set out in the claim form as being actions that resulted in (inter alia) “influencing judicial decisions unfairly, non-compliance with court orders”; “concealment of crucial evidence, failure to act impartially, and prioritizing the mother’s interests over those of the child and the claimant”. These matters are said to have caused “significant emotional distress, reputational harm”. I note however that, despite the reference to reputational harm, unlike in the Brent claim, defamation is not one of the causes of action listed in the Particulars of Claim.

For the same reasons as set out above in relation to the Brent claim, the NYAS action seems to me to be clearly an attempt to relitigate the family proceedings and to establish that decisions reached in those proceedings that affected the Claimant’s contact with his child were wrong, and should not be permitted to proceed.

For those reasons I would strike out both actions as abuses of process even if it were not for the following matters.

I have already alluded to the fact that the Particulars of Claim in both claims are pleaded in vague and inadequate ways. In his submissions the Claimant repeatedly sought to rely on the fact that Master Eastman had permitted the Particulars of Claim in both actions to be served, in support of his submission that the Particulars of Claim were in proper form and should not be struck out. But the Master did not make any judgment on the merits of the Defendants’ strike out applications, which had not, by that stage, even been issued.

The Claimant also submitted that, if there was any problem with the way his claim was pleaded, he should be allowed to amend. He stated that he was “sure” the Court would allow an amendment. It is correct that a court will often allow an amendment to cure a technical deficiency with a statement of case, in order to ensure that a party is not shut out of relief to which they may be entitled because of a procedural or other error. But in this case, the defects are not in my view capable of being remedied by amendments. It appears to me that the various causes of action pleaded, even against the organisational Defendants, Brent Social Services and NYAS, have no real prospect of success.

In the Brent action, the Claimant’s causes of action are: breach of Article 8, breach of Article 6, negligence and defamation.

The matters alleged against the Defendants in relation to breach of Article 8 are not matters that engage the Claimant’s Article 8 rights to respect for privacy and family life, because they do not meet the threshold of severity; for example, “denying the Claimant participation in safeguarding meetings” is not a matter that could cause a significant detrimental impact on his family life. These are not matters that constitute an actual interference by a public authority with the Claimant’s family life. Furthermore, in so far as the Claimant is complaining about the fact that his contact with his child has been limited (“Endorsing the mother’s obstruction of contact without lawful basis”; “alienating the father-child relationship over an extended period”), that is the consequence of decisions by the Family Court. It is the Family Court that has placed the child in the care of his mother, and not the Brent Defendants.

Furthermore, pursuant to section 6 of the Human Rights Act, claims for breaches of the ECHR may be brought against public authorities only, and therefore, although these causes of action are pleaded against all the Brent Defendants, they are not sustainable against the Second to Fourth Brent Defendants, who are individuals.

The claim for alleged breaches of Article 6 of the ECHR is similarly hopeless. Parties participating in legal proceedings have no obligation under the Human Rights Act or the ECHR to ensure that the proceedings are fair; that is an obligation that rests on the Court. An Article 6 complaint lies only against the part of the state concerned with procedural fairness in court. In the case of the family proceedings concerning the Claimant’s child, the Brent Defendants were not even parties. Even if an action did lie against the Brent Defendants for Article 6 breaches, the Claimant’s disagreement with the contents of reports, or alleged professional bias by participants in the court process, do not of themselves establish a violation of the Claimant’s Article 6 rights.

As to the claim in negligence, the Claimant has not pleaded the basis of any duty of care alleged to be owed by any of the Defendants to him. The duties of a local authority under theChildren Act 1989 do not create any statutory cause of action, and Supreme Court authority establishes that local authorities do not generally owe a common law duty of care in relation to the performance of their functions under the Children Act 1989, unless there are particular circumstances which would impose such a duty, e.g. the authority has assumed a responsibility to protect the child from harm: Poole Borough Council v GN [2019] UKSC 25. In the instant case, no circumstances are pleaded that could properly give rise to a duty of care on the part of any of the Brent Defendants vis-à-vis the child. Still less is there any material pleaded to give rise to a duty of care owed to the Claimant, who is not a child. The claim in negligence is bound to fail.

I have already dealt with the point that the Particulars of Claim in the Brent claim disclose no cause of action for defamation against the Brent Defendants. I have no reason to believe that this could or would be remedied by amendment. The Particulars of Claim do not identify the publications complained about, nor did the Claimant in his evidence produce any document that he alleges contained libellous statements about him or any evidence of any reputational harm. Despite the references to reputational harm in the Claimant’s documents, there is no indication or evidence that the real purpose of this claim is to protect the Claimant’s reputation.

For all the reasons above, none of the causes of action in Brent claim have any real prospect of success.

The NYAS claim is very similar. The causes of action are stated to be breaches of Article 6, Article 8, negligence, complicity in fraud upon the Court, bias and discrimination.

The claims in respect of alleged breaches of Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR must fail for the same reasons the similar claims made against the Brent Defendants must fail. The claim in negligence has no prospect of success because there is no pleaded or other basis upon which the NYAS Defendants can be said to have owed a duty of care to the Claimant.

It is impossible to understand the claim for “complicity in fraud upon the Court”. It is well established law that any allegation of fraud must be clearly and properly pleaded, including setting out exactly what the alleged false statement was, who made it, why it was false, why the defendant knew it was false, and how it caused loss to the claimant. The particulars must disclose a prima facie case that the defendant was dishonest, and not merely careless or negligent. None of these matters are set out. A very serious allegation of this kind ought not to have been made against professional people without proper grounds and a sufficient evidential basis. Neither appear to be present in this case.

The claim for “bias and discrimination” is pleaded in a similarly vague way, alleging that the Defendants acted with “manifest bias” in favour of the mother. Neither bias nor discrimination are causes of action.

I referred above to the fact that on 26 September 2025 the Claimant served an amended version of the Particulars of Claim in the NYAS claim. These new draft Particulars purport to plead cases against three additional defendants and also seek to add new particulars of the existing causes of action. No application has been made to join these individuals as parties to the claim, or to amend the Particulars of Claim in the form of the draft amended Particulars. I have however considered the draft amended Particulars of Claim in order to see if they cure any of the defects in the claim that I have identified above. The new Particulars of Claim do add some detail as to what the Third Defendant, Ms Owolawi, is alleged to have done, but again in vague terms. It is alleged that she produced a report that was inaccurate. However, it is not clear which cause of action the production of the allegedly inaccurate report goes to. None of the other additional material cures the fundamental problems with the claim that I have identified above.

The Particulars of Claim in both claims are struck out. Further, for the reasons set out above, none of the claims made in those Particulars of Claim appear to me to have any real prospect of success and it would be futile to permit the Claimant an opportunity to amend. These claims appear to me to be a continuation of the pattern of conduct identified by HHJ Sapnara when making the ECRO against the Claimant in the Family Court, that is, a pattern of “harassing almost every professional connected with these proceedings and those involved in the child’s life”.