Optosafe Limited & Anor v John Mark Robertson

The Service Agreement was entered into on 31 July 2020. The parties to it are the first claimant and the defendant. It was signed by Guy Other (a director and CEO) on behalf of the first claimant and by the defendant himself, with each of their signatures being witnessed by others. Under the Service Agreement, the defendant was employed to serve the first claimant “as Managing Director of the Optosafe division or such other role as the Company considers appropriate” (clause 4.1). Among other benefits, the consideration the defendant received under the Service Agreement was “an initial salary of £120,000 per annum” (clause 7.1). The Service Agreement is the contract of employment under which the defendant provided his services to the first claimant, as Managing Director, for more than eight months.

On terminating his employment on 4 June 2021, the defendant entered into a severance agreement with the first claimant: the Settlement Deed. The Settlement Deed was signed by the defendant and by the second claimant (a director and CEO) on behalf of the first claimant, each of whose signatures were independently witnessed. An independent legal adviser, Kenny Scott of MacRoberts LLP, confirmed that he had given the defendant legal advice on the terms and effect of the Settlement Deed, in accordance with clause 5.3 and Schedule 2. Among other benefits, the first claimant agreed to make a one-off termination payment to the defendant of £30,000 (clause 3.1). Mr Robertson was paid more than he was contractually entitled to upon his resignation in recognition that he was leaving on good terms and cooperating with a handover.

The defendant has no pleaded case that the Service Agreement or Settlement Deed, or any term of either contract, is invalid or unenforceable. He sought on the first day of trial to apply for permission to make an application to re-amend the Amended Defence to plead that the Service Agreement and the Settlement Deed are not enforceable as deeds as they were not validly delivered. I refused that application as it was made fatally late and, in any event, lacked merit. Nonetheless, the defendant pursued it in his closing submissions.

First, the lack of a pleaded case is fatal. The defendant cannot rely on his mere general denial of the claims as enabling him to put forward, for the first time at trial, a positive case that the Service Agreement or the Settlement Deed is invalid or unenforceable.

Secondly, in any event irrespective of whether the Service Agreement and Settlement Deed were duly delivered as deeds, each is a valid and enforceable contract. There can be no sensible argument but that the basic contractual ingredients of offer, acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal relations were present. The defendant himself states in his witness statement that it was pursuant to the Service Agreement that he signed that he transitioned to become Managing Director of Optosafe on 31 July 2020. He refers to the execution of the Settlement Agreement and associated Share Buyback Agreement, both signed on 4 June 2021, as being the documents that “formalised the end of [his] employment and board role within the Orbis group”. The claim is for breach of contract. It does not matter whether the contracts also happen to be validly executed and delivered deeds.

Thirdly, the only basis on which the defendant contends that the Service Agreement and Settlement Deed were not delivered is that the copies in the trial bundle are undated. However, the copies attached to the Particulars of Claim were duly dated “31 July 2020” and “4 June 2021”, respectively. The Service Agreement states, “This agreement has been entered into as a deed on the date stated at the beginning of it.” The Settlement Deed states, “This document has been executed as a deed and is delivered and takes effect on the date stated at the beginning of it.” For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) of s.46 of the Companies Act 2006, “a document is presumed to be delivered upon its being executed, unless a contrary intention is proved”. The contrary has not been proved in respect of either contract.

Under the heading “Restrictive covenants”, clause 23.1.6 of the Service Agreement provides:

“23.1

In order to protect the Confidential Information and business connections of the Company and each Group Company to which he has access as a result of the Appointment, the Employee covenants with the Company (for itself and as trustee and agent for each Group Company) that he shall not:

…

23.1.6

at any time after Termination, represent himself as connected with the Company or any Group Company in any Capacity, other than as a former employee, or use any registered business names or trading names associated with the Company or any Group Company.” (‘the Non-Representation Clause’)

The first claimant is “the Company”. “Group Company” is defined in clause 1.1 of the Service Agreement as:

“the Company, its Subsidiaries or Holding Companies from time to time and any Subsidiary of any Holding Company from time to time.”

Under the heading “Restrictive covenants”, clause 11 of the Settlement Deed provides:

“Notwithstanding clause 13 [the entire agreement clause], you acknowledge that the post-termination restrictions in clause 23 of your contract with us dated 31 July 2020 will continue to apply after the Termination Date.”

Clause 12.4 of the Settlement Deed provides:

“You shall not make any adverse or derogatory comment about us, or our officers, employees or workers and you shall not do anything which shall, or may, bring us or our officers, employees or workers into disrepute. We shall use reasonable endeavours to ensure that our officers, employees and workers shall not make any adverse or derogatory comment about you or do anything that shall, or may, bring you into disrepute. This clause is subject to clause 12.5, clause 12.6 and clause 12.7.” (‘the Non-Disparagement Clause’)

Clause 12.6 provides:

“Nothing in this clause 12 shall prevent you or any of our officers, employees, workers or agents from making a protected disclosure under section 43A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.”

The defendant contends that the Non-Disparagement Clause is designed to preclude a worker from making a protected disclosure and so it is rendered void by s.43J of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA 1996’). Section 43J(1) provides:

“Any provision in an agreement to which this section applies is void in so far as it purports to preclude the worker from making a protected disclosure.”

Section 43A of the ERA 1996 provides:

“In this Act a ‘protected disclosure’ means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H.”

The Non-Disparagement Clause does not purport to preclude the defendant from making a protected disclosure within the meaning of s.43A of the ERA 1996. Clause 12.4 is expressly subject to clause 12.6 which refers in terms to the right under s.43A. Thus paragraph 6(b) of the interim injunction provided:

“For the avoidance of any doubt nothing in paragraph 4 above prevents:

…

(b)

The Defendant making any disclosure, report or similar concerning the Claimants or any individual represented by the Second Claimant directly to any law enforcement, regulatory or other relevant public authority or body through the channels that authority or body provides for disclosures or reports; that is provided that the Defendant does not otherwise publish or publicize any such disclosure, report or similar including but without limitation post the same on LinkedIn or on any other social media platform or website.”

Thus, without breaching the interim injunction (or the Non-Disparagement Clause), the defendant has made numerous reports about the claimants to public bodies including the Financial Conduct Authority, the Police, the Serious Fraud Office and the Security Industry Authority.

Accordingly, I reject the defendant’s submission that the Non-Disparagement Clause is void or unenforceable.

The first alleged breach of the Non-Representation Clause is that on 4 August 2023, the defendant published a post on LinkedIn in which he created caricatures of what he labelled “The Gang”. The post is in evidence. In a text box next to a picture of a man being assaulted by men wearing suits and bearing knives, the defendant wrote:

“Name: John MR Optosafe Robertson

Age: 40s

Weight: legendweight

Crimes: none

Traits: Fearless, gets shit done, never gives up

Father, son, brother. Would help anyone out a tight spot.

Stabbed in the back and left to bleed out by bloodthirsty millionaires.” (Underlining added)

Mr Barnes contends, on behalf of the first claimant, that this is an obvious breach of the Non-Representation Clause. Mr Robertson contends that this is a trivial allegation which has not been properly pleaded. Further, he alleges that it is a nickname descriptive of a past association with the company rather than a representation of a current connection.

I reject the suggestion that the allegation has not been properly pleaded. Paragraph 29 of the Amended Particulars of Claim states:

“On other occasions, including but not limited to 4 August 2023 (as to which §22.6 above is repeated), in further breach/es of the non-representation term, D has referred to himself as being connected with the Company in terms such as ‘John MR Optosafe Robertson’.”

Paragraph 22.6 of the Amended Particulars of Claim referred to LinkedIn posts published by the defendant on 4 August 2023, to one of which the defendant attached a document titled “The Gang” containing seven caricature profiles. The pleading states, “The final ‘caricature’ profile is of D, in which he gives himself the nickname ‘John MR Optosafe Robertson’.” It is clear that the specific instance of use of the name “Mr Optosafe” on 4 August 2023 was pleaded.

LinkedIn is an online professional networking site which is public by default. By calling himself “Mr Optosafe”, in a LinkedIn post, the defendant was both representing himself as connected with Optosafe and he was using a registered business name associated with Optosafe. This was an obvious breach of the Non-Representation Clause. The first claimant has not shown there were other occasions on which the defendant used that name, but it is evident that he regards it as a nickname that he is entitled to use and would be likely to continue using if not restrained.

The second alleged breach of the Non-Representation Clause is that on 3 October 2023 the defendant incorporated a company called “Sitex Orbis Fraud Investigations Limited”, of which he is the sole director and shareholder. That he did so is shown by a document from Companies House and was not disputed. In LinkedIn posts thereafter the defendant described himself as “Managing Director at Sitex Orbis Fraud Investigations” (e.g. LinkedIn post of 11 October 2023).

A certificate from Companies House shows that Orbis was formerly called SitexOrbis Limited from 31 March 2009 until 9 May 2014. In addition, I accept Mr Howard’s evidence (to which I have referred above) that seven companies within the Orbis group (and thus within the definition of “Group Company” in the Service Agreement) have used the name “SitexOrbis” (probably, as for SitexOrbis Ltd, without a space). None of the Orbis group uses that name anymore because through an acquisition by a competitor, VPS, about a decade ago, VPS acquired the name Sitex while Orbis retained the name Orbis. Nevertheless, I accept Mr Howard’s evidence that “Sitex Orbis is most definitely a name that is associated with Orbis, as a group of companies”, and of course part of that name remains Orbis’s registered business name. Indeed, I have no doubt that it is precisely because of the obvious association and connection to the Orbis group that the defendant chose the name he did for the company he incorporated. In my judgment, it was a breach of the Non-Representation Clause.

The details set out below in respect of the harassment claim demonstrate that the defendant has frequently made adverse and derogatory comments about Orbis, its officers and employees in a manner designed to bring them into disrepute. In particular, he has done so in numerous posts published on LinkedIn, a professional networking site on which his posts were publicly accessible.

At this stage, I will give just one example, addressing the remaining instances in chronological order in the context of the harassment claim. On 11 September 2023, the defendant published a post on LinkedIn in which he wrote:

“Around this time tomorrow I will be exposing details of a highly illegal fraud carried out by the following individuals. Which Im sure anyone in fraud investigations will confirm is a breach of the Fraud Act 2006:

I Give you.

Ben Howard – Orbis CEO

Andy Ball – Northedge Capital

Ben Snow – Synova

Guy Other – Skegness Beach” (Footnote: ²)

The defendant attached to this message caricatures of each of the named individuals: a picture of a clown is labelled “Ben Coward”; a picture of a fox wearing a suit, while picking up and surrounded by money, is labelled “Sly Other”; a bald man with a fat, bare stomach standing before piles of money is labelled “Andrew No Balls”; and a wooden toy man, holding and surrounded by money, is labelled “Ben Pinnochisnow”.

To take just one example, in this message, the defendant expressly accused Mr Howard, who he identified as the CEO of Orbis, of “highly illegal fraud”, and caricatured him in a derogatory way as a clown. Mr Howard is one of the officers and employees protected by the Non-Disparagement Clause. The defendant’s public message was designed to bring Mr Howard and Orbis into disrepute. It plainly was not a protected disclosure within the meaning of s.43A of the ERA 1996. It was not directed to any responsible public body or regulatory authority. Nor did it disclose any evidence of wrongdoing. It was merely a taunting public threat.

The first claimant’s contention that the defendant has breached the Non-Disparagement Clause has been established beyond any sensible argument by the primary evidence in the form of the numerous derogatory posts he has published on LinkedIn.

Accordingly, the first claimant has established its claim for breach of contract.

The second claimant’s pleaded case is that the defendant has pursued a course of conduct amounting to harassment of him and those of whom his situation is representative, between 4 February 2023 and 10 January 2024, contrary to s.1(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (‘the 1997 Act’). The defendant’s pleaded case is that (i) his conduct did not amount to harassment within the meaning of ss.1(1) and 7(2) because it was not used to alarm; (ii) he relies on the s.1(3)(a) defence that his course of conduct was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime (namely the activities which were the subject of the Security Industry Authority (‘SIA’) investigation and the Police Scotland investigation); and (iii) he relies on the s.1(3)(c) defence that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable because it was designed to encourage whistleblowers to come forward to the SIA and Police Scotland, and it was investigative journalism in respect of serious criminal matters which were a matter of public interest. See Optosafe Ltd v Robertson [2025] EWHC 2733 (KB), [24]-[26].

Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (‘the 1997 Act’) provides, so far as material:

“(1)

A person must not pursue a course of conduct-

(a)

which amounts to harassment of another, and

(b)

which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.

…

(2)

For the purposes of this section …, the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to or involves harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.

(3)

Subsection (1) … does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows-

(a)

that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime,

(b)

…, or

(c)

that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.”

An actual or apprehended breach of s.1(1) of the PHA may be the subject of a civil claim by “the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question” (s.3(1) PHA).

A claim under s.1(1) gives rise to three issues on which the claimant bears the burden of proof, namely, (i) did the defendant engage in a course of conduct? (ii) did any such course of conduct amount to harassment? And (iii) did the defendant know, or should he have known, that the conduct amounted to harassment? See Hourani v Thomson [2017 EWHC 432 (QB), Warby J, [129]. If the second claimant succeeds on each of these issues, then it will be necessary to consider the two defences on which the defendant relies, provided by s.1(3)(a) and (c), on which he bears the burden of proof.

With respect to question (i), the 1997 Act specifies that a “course of conduct” must involve “conduct on at least two occasions in relation to that person” (s.7(3)(a)), and that “conduct” includes speech (s.7(4)). That is a threshold requirement. This first issue involves asking not whether there was harassment but whether the conduct complained of amounts to a “course of conduct”. That is “largely a question of fact and degree”: Hourani, Warby J, [132]. Whether the pleaded instances can be classified as a “course of conduct” depends on such factors as “how similar they are in character, the extent to which they are linked, how closely in time they may have occurred, and so on”: Hourani, [132].

The course of conduct must be targeted at someone. Conduct which, however alarming or distressing, is not aimed or directed at anyone is excluded. The claimant must show he is a “victim” of the relevant course of conduct, but it is sufficient if the course of conduct was targeted at another or others and the claimant is “foreseeably likely to be directly alarmed or distressed by it”: Hibbert v Hall [2024] EWHC 2677 (KB), [149].

As regards issue (ii), “harassment” is an ordinary English word which is left undefined in the 1997 Act. Section 7(2) provides that references to harassing a person “include alarming the person or causing the person distress”, but this is “merely guidance as to one element” of the tort, not a definition, and it is not “an exhaustive statement of the consequences that harassment may involve”: Hourani, [138]. In addition, bearing in mind that the court is concerned with conduct that is a criminal offence (s.2(1)) as well as a civil wrong (s.3(1)), “section 1 is confined to serious cases”: Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 [2013] 1 WLR 935, Lord Sumption JSC (giving the judgment of the majority), [1].

Harassment is “a persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct, targeted at another person, which is calculated to and does cause that person alarm, fear or distress”: Hayes v Willoughby, [1]. The conduct relied upon must cross “the boundary between conduct which is unattractive, even unreasonable, and conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable. To cross the boundary from the regrettable to the unacceptable the gravity of the misconduct must be of an order which would sustain criminal liability under section 2”: Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224, Lord Nicholls, [30]; Hayes v Willoughby, [12].

The course of conduct, viewed as a whole, must be assessed objectively. It is not necessary for each individual act that comprises the course of conduct to be oppressive and unacceptable. Individual acts which, viewed in isolation, appear fairly innocuous, may take on a different complexion when viewed as part of a bigger picture: Hibbert v Hall, [152].

Any claim of harassment by speech is likely to engage the defendant’s right to freedom of expression, which is protected by the common law and article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights: see s.1 of and Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998. The Court’s assessment of whether the conduct crosses the boundary from the unattractive, even unreasonable, to oppressive and unacceptable must pay due regard to the importance of freedom of expression and the need for any restrictions upon the right to be necessary, proportionate and established convincingly: Hayden v Dickenson [2020] EWHC 3291 (QB), [44(viii)].

The context and way the information is published are all-important. The harassing element of oppression is likely to come more from the manner in which the words are published than their content. The truth or falsity of the words is unlikely to be determinative. The Court should take account of the extent to which the coverage complained of is repetitious and taunting, as opposed to being new, and prompted by some newsworthy event. See Hayden v Dickenson, [44] and Bukhari v Bukhari [2025] EWHC 2391 (KB), [122].

As Aidan Eardley KC (sitting as Deputy High Court Judge) observed in Bukhari at [123]:

“Where the publications are of journalistic material, nothing short of a conscious or negligent abuse of media freedom will justify a finding of harassment. Such cases will be rare and exceptional: Hayden principle (xii). Journalistic material “is to be identified by its subject matter, not its author, nor the process by which it comes to be published”: McNally v Saunders [2021] EWHC 2012 (QB), [2022] EMLR 3 at [74] (Chamberlain J). Blog posts and social media publications may therefore qualify in an appropriate case.”

Question (iii) (identified in paragraph ‎50 above) reflects s.1(1)(b) of the 1997 Act in comprising the question whether the defendant actually knew his course of conduct amounted to or involved harassment (which concerns the defendant’s subjective state of mind), or ought to have known that (which is to be judged objectively). The focus of attention is on whether the defendant knew or ought to have known that the course of conduct in which he engaged would have a harassing effect on the claimants, without prejudice to the issue of whether the conduct in question was “reasonable” within s.1(3)(c): Hourani, [154].

Warby J addressed the “preventing or detecting crime” defence in Hourani at [177]:

“The sole requirement of this defence is to show that the otherwise harassing conduct was engaged in for one or other of the specified public interest purposes. The defence is available to a private person as well as to a police force or other public authority. It is not necessary to show a crime has been committed or is imminent. There is no requirement of reasonableness. The test is subjective. All these points are established by EDO MGM Technology v Axworthy [2005] EWHC 2490 (QB) and Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 [2013] 1 WLR 937. But as Lord Sumption explained in Hayes at [15]:-

‘Before an alleged harasser can be said to have had the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, he must have sufficiently applied his mind to the matter. He must have thought rationally about the material suggesting the possibility of criminality and formed the view that the conduct said to constitute harassment was appropriate for the purpose of preventing or detecting it. If he has done these things, then he has the relevant purpose. The court will not test his conclusions by reference to the view which a hypothetical reasonable man in his position would have formed. If, on the other hand, he has not engaged in these minimum mental processes necessary to acquire the relevant state of mind, but proceeds anyway on the footing that he is acting to prevent or detect crime, then he acts irrationally… The effects of applying a test of rationality to the question of purpose is to enable the court to apply to private persons a test which would in any event apply to public authorities engaged in the prevention or detection of crime as a matter of public law. It is not a demanding test, and it is hard to imagine that Parliament can have intended anything less.’

Moreover, this defence is available only if the purpose of prevention or detection of crime is the ‘dominant’ purpose of the course of conduct: Hayes [17].”

The s.1(3)(c) defence raises some of the same issues as the threshold test for harassment since a course of conduct is unlikely to amount to harassment unless it is at least prima facie unreasonable. The test is objective. In a publication case it must be applied, like the test for harassment itself, in a manner that avoids disproportionate interference with the defendant’s freedom of speech: Bukhari, [124].

In Hourani, the claim against the principal defendant, who was responsible for “all aspects of the campaign”, was brought only in harassment, the limitation period for libel having expired ([4], [12(1)]), whereas both libel and harassment claims were brought against the other defendants. Warby J observed that the exercise that the court is engaged in when determining whether a course of conduct is “reasonable” for the purposes of the s.1(3)(c) defence “has some similarities with the evaluation of a public interest defence under s.4 of the Defamation Act 2013”: Hourani [213]. Although the exercises are not the same, he noted that,

“213.

… they do involve overlapping considerations. The same outward behaviour by a defendant may, as here, give rise to claims in defamation and in harassment. The interests protected by the two torts are different, and that will affect the approach. But claims of both kinds are likely to engage the Convention right under Article 8, though they may not always do so. The burden of proving each of these defences lies on the defendant. …

214.

The public interest defence to defamation extends protection to circumstances where the defendant has published defamatory imputations of fact which cannot be proved to be true. Defendants who have done that by making a statement on a matter of public interest, reasonably believing the publication of that statement to be in the public interest, are immune from liability. The question of whether a belief is reasonable for these purposes brings in considerations to which I have alluded already: bearing in mind the subject-matter, the words used, the nature of the allegations, and the role of the particular defendant, did the defendant conduct such enquiries as it is reasonable to expect of them, in all the circumstances?

215.

Those considerations would seem to be relevant, albeit not necessarily conclusive, when assessing whether the same publication is actionable as harassment. A defendant who meets the requirements of the defamation defence might expect to be acquitted of harassment, unless there is something about the element of harassment that makes it necessary to interfere with the Article 10 right nonetheless. Defendants who do not believe that the publication of the offending statements was in the public interest, or had no reasonable belief that this was so, may well find those factors weigh against them in the overall assessment.”

On 3 February 2023, the defendant posted the following on LinkedIn:

“… I was the victim of a serious and very complex fraud, which defrauded me of several million pounds along with several other laws being broken … I sold my company to a group of companies where the toxic and corrupt nature within the management has had a seriously detrimental effect on several peoples lives… I now find myself being ‘the whistleblower’ as I’ve had enough. so recently I reported Orbis Protect Ltd, Optosafe Ltd, Project Cube Topco Ltd, Northedge Capital, Ben Howard and Guy Other to the serious fraud office who are now investigating these individuals/companies and bring them to justice. Obviously this is now a police matter so I won’t be commenting on it again until it concludes…”

Beneath his post the defendant placed a screenshot of part of a Serious Fraud Office (SFO) form, with a green tick marked “Success”, indicating that he had made a report to the SFO about the companies and individuals he had identified.

Also on 3 February 2023, the defendant sent an email to Ben Howard, Shaun Wilcock, Liesle Bond, Michael Kelly and a NorthEdge email address. The email was addressed to “Ben” (i.e. Mr Howard). The defendant wrote:

“I write to you as the time has now come to take some action after reflecting on the events of the past and the now continual breaches of the settlement agreement which I have stringently adhered to, it seems you, your partners and staff have not and in the consequential world that we live in. you have had your fun, now its time for mine.

…

Firstly i was supposed to be divorced this morning, however Santander have started sending me confidential banking information regarding my old companies over the last 2 months to my old address which has led my soon to be ex wife thinking that i pulled the wool over her eyes and her lawyers are now pulling the divorce apart asking for financial statements. … you think that settlement agreement protects you from me(chuckle). So please tell whoever’s balls this up to fix it and i will also be adding my lawyers fees and damages to the claim which I will go into later in this email (:D)

the next point id like to address is that the actions and subsequent lack of action by your staff has rendered me completely unemployable in my chosen field, due to my very heavily protected medical history now apparently being socialised amongst general security industry of which i now have solid proof the information was leaked by Orbis staff members. Apart from being morally bankrupt and inconsiderate of me or my family- this is a criminal offence

Next on the agenda is the behaviour of you and Guy Other on or around the time of my exit of the company. You specifically told an Orbis Director the reason i left the company is due to the fact i found out i was HIV+. Recently that person made contact and told me my own medical history which left me feeling suicidal now faced with the cold hard truth that a secret and a disease I’ve kept at bay for 15 years is now out in the open. And I now have to face the reality i will have to tell my children about my disease before someone else does. You and Guy will answer to me alone for this. My stance on the reason you said this was to cover up the act of fraud you were in the process of committing.

I have had several meetings and calls with MacRoberts to which they outlined apart from the criminal behaviour which i have outlined above, really the only way around the settlement agreement is if there# is evidence of Fraud. which I now have(smiley face) therefore next Thursday i have a meeting due with the serious fraud office which will lead to you and your cronies being under oath and will have to commit perjury to get out o the fact that you all knew about my medical history before my constructive dismissal, which led to you breaching the equality act and the disability discrimination act and several others defrauding me of several million pounds. So after the criminal case is out of the way just so we are clear i will be taking action for damages against Optosafe LTD, Orbis Protect Ltd, Northedge Capital LLP, Ben Howard and Guy other.

again as you think I’ve never walked this walk before and you think I’m an idiot, don’t bother sending the 1 pager from your lawyer refuting my claims and outlining the ramifications of my actions blah blah blah as il wipe my arse with it. Hit me with everything you have – I dare you – because I’m coming after you and it will not go away. And for the record on this one we are going al the way. …” (Emphasis added.)

Despite stating on 3 February that he would not be commenting again, on 4 February 2023 the defendant posted on LinkedIn:

“As I patiently await my gagging order from my old friends I’d like to tell you all a story. …these individuals are just corporate bullies who treat human beings like pieces on a chess board and hide behind settlement agreements while scheming over their next victim. they have broken the terms of my settlement agreement many times over, they have committed criminal acts…where are these bullies today???? hiding behind lawyers….too scared to speak to me incase I broadcast the conversation on LinkedIn so everyone can see them the way I see them. Cowards, pathetic cowards who less than an hour ago threatened me with bankruptcy for only letting the world know the truth … very soon His Majesty’s serious fraud office will be seizing computers and dragging them out of their offices whether I am bankrupt or not. … I made contact with an ex employee this morning and told him…I’m so sorry I sacked you for no other reason than I was told to and Ben Howard told me…..He’s white, he’s heterosexual, he has no rights, get him out the door…..this is absolutely disgusting and again illegal behaviour. one of my last exchanges with Guy Other was where he called my on a Saturday night pissed and accused me of spending £250k that I genially never spent…” (Emphasis added.)

On 6 February 2023, solicitors for the claimants, Orbis Protect and Guy Other, Brabners, sent the defendant a letter before claim. Among other causes of action, they alleged harassment, stating the “wording used by you is aggressive and threatening” and that it was “clear from the wording itself that this was your intention”.

On 14 February 2023, Mr Howard and Ms Bond spoke to the defendant on the video platform Teams, in a prearranged meeting. The defendant covertly recorded the call and then, later in the year, he posted the video of the call, and excerpts of it, on LinkedIn. The transcript derived from the defendant’s recording shows that Mr Howard said he was getting in touch because “I wanted you to stop”; “I want you to stop for us. I want you to stop for you.” The conversation was a reasonably amicable one in which the defendant said he would be leaving matters to the police or SFO and not posting any more.

For several months, the defendant refrained from publishing further posts about or sending emails to the second claimant. On 2 August 2023, the defendant published posts on LinkedIn with excerpts from the covertly recorded Teams conversation, stating:

“video 1 of 2 – Here we have another barrage of lies and cover up where my backing vocalist completely dismisses that there was any targeted behaviour to force me out of my own company and when challenged about a proven factual statement, for the 1^st time in his life is speechless – enjoy the silence”

“Video 2 of 2 - … I was pushed out the door because I have HIV! this is a disgrace and all involved should be ashamed of themselves

….Fraud is a criminal offence in the UK

…

According to the Fraud Act 2006, fraud occurs when a person dishonestly makes a false representation in order to gain for themselves or cause loss to another…

Now with most criminal offences if you want to find the answer you follow the money. I will let you make your own mind up where the money went…. the man who is never lost for words is lost for words”.

On 4 August 2023, the defendant published the following on LinkedIn:

“So this will probably be one of my last posts before my injunction kicks in and i would like to say a few things:

Brabners LLP – you have been reported to the solicitors regulation authority as of a few mins ago and you will now answer for your representatives lies.

Synova – Please believe me when i say if you think im an issue today. your about to get hit with a tsunami and of course i can confirm when it happens- it was definitely me. However do know that I have just finished my last interview with the police and they have confirmed I’ve been the victim of a sexual offence and criminal proceedings take precedence over your injunction.

Perma Staff – please pay special attention to your new chairman Guy Soon to be in bother Other. this is all his mess that unfortunately we as his victims have to sweep up.

These people will be interviewed by the police next week. And i will not stop until every single one of them pays for the victimisation my innocent 2 child receive and their only crime is being my children. Please repost, share, help me (please!) stop these people everyone. I will never give up till this is done”.

Attached to this post the defendant published a document headed “The Gang”. I have referred to the final caricature, of the defendant himself, in paragraph ‎35 above. The other six caricatures each consisted of a picture and text box. The caricature for Ben Snow comprised a picture of Snow-White grabbing money, and the text box stated:

“Name: Ben Snow White

Age: 50s

Weight: Strawweight

Crimes: Sexual Offences act 2003, Section 22

Traits: Coward, steals from the poor and gives to the rich

Consequential owner of a licenced security company and has never been subjected to a fit and proper person test, Instructed a law firm to coverup HIV discrimination.”

The caricature of Mr Howard comprised a picture of a clown and a text box which stated:

“Name: Ben Coward

Age: 50s

Weight: Pussyweight

Crimes: Sexual Offences act 2003, Section 22 and others TBC

Traits: Coward, Extortionist, Serial Liar,

Has Covered up by way of compromise agreements: Homophobia, HIV discrimination, Employment law breaches, Ageism, Sexism”.

The caricature of Mr Other comprised a picture of a horned beast in a suit, surrounded by skulls and money, and the text box stated:

“Name: Guy Soon to be in Bother Other

Age: 50s

Weight: Thinks he’s a heavyweight

Crimes: Sexual Offences act 2003, Section 22 and others TBC

Traits: Coward, fraudster, Conman, Jabroni

Has Covered up by way of compromise agreements: Homophobia, HIV discrimination, Employment law breaches, Ageism, Sexism and some more serious TBC”.

The caricature of Mr Wilcock comprised a picture of a chess pawn, on a chess board, with a coiled snake on it, and the text box stated:

“Name: Shaun the Pawn Wilcock

Age: 40s

Weight: unknown

Crimes: Sexual Offences act 2003, Section 22

Traits: liar, corrupted, serial bullshitter

Backed the wrong horse in a 2 horse race

Still has an opportunity to tell the truth”.

The caricature of Mr Mann comprised a picture of a fat man showing a bare stomach, with food and money scattered on a table before him, and the text box stated:

“Name: Dave not a real Mann

Age: 40s

Weight: Super Heavyweight

Crimes: Sexual Offences act 2003, Section 22

Traits: liar, corrupted,

Still has an opportunity to tell the truth

Forgot how he got to where he is today”.

The caricature of Mr Ramsey comprised a picture of a man (surrounded by a crowd), standing before a table with money scattered across it, and the text box stated:

“Name: Dave del boy Ramsey

Age: 50s

Weight: Snowflakeweight

Crimes: Sexual Offences act 2003, Section 22

Traits: liar, corrupted,

Stabbed his mentor in the back.

Forgot how he got to where he is today”.

In a further post on LinkedIn the same day, 4 August 2023, the defendant wrote “Apparently today I will be served with an injunction and sued for £50,000 simply for exposing a bunch of criminals who have ruined my life…” He stated that he “stupidly sold my company to a bunch of con men”, describing them as “monsters” who had turned his staff against him. He concluded the post: “I am not afraid of these people and they don’t give a toss about me, but they will soon. For the chaps at Synova – Stop with the hollow threats – Hit me”.

Two weeks later, the defendant posted on LinkedIn:

“A lot of people will be very relieved to know. I’m standing down my assault as of now and removing my posts… And to be clear not because I have been forced to, because I choose to. The material I was going to post last night would have had real world consequences on the employees and caused no end of damage… on my return I will fight Ben Coward etc in their own back yard under their rules, all in closed court …”

The defendant said this was his “last post before I disappear from social media”.

On 22 August 2023, the defendant published on LinkedIn emails that Mr Howard had sent in March 2021, before the defendant had resigned.

On 23 August 2023, the defendant published on LinkedIn:

“…I will have 4 more posts today and then I will be leaving my ex-employer alone and chasing them through via the authorities which thankfully is underway.”

On 24 August 2023, the defendant published a post on LinkedIn headed “SEXUAL PREDATORS”. The defendant wrote:

“…I gladly await a letter from the lawyers of Orbis Protect Ltd refuting what is already in the public domain. but in this letter please explain why:

Guy Other – Former CEO

Ben Howard – Current CEO

Liesle Bond – Head of HR

Please explain to all my readers why these 3 individuals support sexual predators and allow them to be in a position to be alone with vulnerable people. Please throw everything you have at me on this as this one also goes all the way”.

On 30 August 2023, the defendant posted on LinkedIn:

“I’m aware that not everyone knows who I am identifying as the individuals who collectively defrauded myself and others, therefore I would like to display the following presentation …”

There then followed caricatures of “Sly Other” (as a money-grabbing fox), “Ben Coward” (as a clown), “Andrew No Balls” (as a money-grabbing fat man with a bare paunch) and “Ben Pinnochisnow” (as a money-grabbing toy man).

On 7 September 2023, the defendant published a long post on LinkedIn in which he wrote “I am going all the way on this” and concluded:

“The real reason I am in this predicament I hope you will take the time to read about today. Im willing to stake my freedom on this so:

Ben Howard

Andrew Balls

Guy Other

Ben Snow

Louis Fordham

Enjoy your last day of work. And your last days of freedom. Today is the day you find out who I really am.”

The same day the defendant sent direct text messages to Mr Wilcock:

“Morning bud, can we have a quick chat, 100% off the record…. Today Ben goes down…. I promise… And when you read it you will be chocked… Im going to give you an out… So call me plz… I’ve deleted any recordings of you..

You have my word this is not part of the game …”

On Saturday 9 September 2023, the defendant published the following post on LinkedIn, labelling it “JR is coming for you”:

“Tonight id like to announce that 2 years and 363 days after a bizarre set of circumstances where my future was unfairly ripped out from under me. Monday is the day I start to take it all back.

I would like to thank everyone who has even dared believe this crazy tale and the obscene lengths these complete arseholes have went to attack me. When you get to learn the full size and scope of this thing you will need a lie down after it.

Monday isn’t far away chaps, enjoy your Sunday because on Monday it’s over!

In an attachment to this LinkedIn post, the defendant wrote that “altering management accounts to present them falsely to a third party can be considered an offense [sic] under various laws”, and then listed “potential offenses” under the Fraud Act 2006, Companies Act 2006, Theft Act 1968 and Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, observing that if found guilty individuals may potentially face imprisonment. On the same page of the post, the defendant incorporated next to a photograph of a clown (with a cooking pot and books) a box containing the following words:

“Ladies and gentlemen please gather round. For tonight for the last time ever, Ben Coward, a qualified accountant and joke CEO will be cooking the books for the last ever time.

Please wish him well as I take my life back from him and his crooked pals. The only upside for him is that he no longer has to get bested day after day by myself.”

The following evening, Sunday 10 September 2023, the defendant sent a long email to dozens of people. The recipients included Messrs Howard, Snow and Wilcock, more than 20 people at Synova (one of the investors in the first claimant’s group), and others. On the same day, he posted the email on LinkedIn with the following message:

“Evening everyone,

This email has now been sent to news outlets accross the country. There was never any circumstances where their crimes will go unpunished or be hidden. Its now up to you Synova to finally do the right thing, but I wont hold my breath”.

The defendant opened the email with the words, “Some of you on this email do not know me, some of you know me very well…” He continued:

“A criminal investigation opens up tomorrow am and I will make sure at a very minimum Ben Howard and Guy Other serve custodial sentences. They will tell anyone that will listen that this is a stunt I’m pulling to get cash from the people copied on this mail. To confirm I have no deal with any of the news outlets copied on this mail, this is not about money, and I hope this proves the point that you all have to face up to what you have let happen and you now have to deal with it. I will deal with Howard, Other, Ball and Snow, its up to you now to clear up the debris and make this right., its clear that although you are scared of me you will never do the right thing…

For those in the media I have been collectively embarrassing these people for months via social media with the thing they are most scared of, their own actions, and not once have they made a genuine effort investigate…”

The defendant then wrote “I allege that” followed by a long list of allegations of corruption, extortion, providing false and misleading evidence, presenting fraudulent accounts, devising a scheme to defraud him, constructively dismissing and stealing £250,000 from him and hacking his personal emails, as well as matters concerning his girlfriend and mother. Many of the allegations were expressly directed at the CEO of Orbis, that is, Mr Howard. The defendant closed the email:

“Do not mistake me for an idiot and do take this seriously

JR

p.s. the 1^st right thing to do is suspend Ben Howard under investigation.”

Also on the same day, 10 September 2023, the defendant posted on LinkedIn a message which read, “Theres only so much I can do, if you wont allow me to help you. time to speak up”, “Optosafe and Orbis Protect Staff Please read”, together with a two-page “Statement to all my former staff and colleagues”. He stated:

“Over the last few months, I have been subjected to a campaign of character assassination and serious doubt put on the condition of my mental health. This has been an act to achieve the only goal that would allow me to put this to bed. Which is Ben Howard and Guy Other being brought to justice for what they have done to me and others. The odds have been stacked so heavily against me. That I had to come up with this plan, which I have been advised against by various people, but I felt it was the only way I would ever get to the point of bringing arrests.”

In the statement published on LinkedIn, the defendant alleged the commission of “a very serious crime”, criticised the failure to suspend Mr Howard, encouraged others to “call the whistleblower line” or “raise an investigation on the SIA website”, and said “I am Relentless as you have seen but I am no monster”.

The following evening, Monday 11 September 2023, the defendant sent an email to 13 recipients, all members of staff at Orbis, including Messrs Howard, Other, Wilcock, Ramsey, Mann and Ms Bond. The defendant wrote:

“I am only sending 1 communication on this matter as I’m sure your Mr Coward will claim I’m trying to harass the staff and cause distress etc etc etc and claim as usual that I am a ‘madman’ and I’m unnegotiable.

No Ben I just wont negotiate with you because you are a compulsive liar, your days are soon to be numbered and instead of trying to butch up in front of your staff you should be working on prison etiquette.

I have today offered a complete stand down of all hostilities to Bens ultimate boss on the basis he throws this piece of crap under the bus.

Now please know this, once Ben realises his days are numbered he will push any blame whatsoever onto anyone else as he has done with his old master Sly Other and thrown him right under the bus.

…

The one staff member who is just about as dirty as him in all this is Shaun, however as Shaun is as naïve as they come and thought he was doing the right thing, I will be delivering to him via an alternate route a video shortly which will definitely get him a cell next door to Ben

…

Now for Sly Other enjoy your last game at villa park and also be advised to brush up on your prison etiquette for the PO PO is coming your way

The only thing these two are scared of is me standing in front of a judge, that it the reason why they are scared to call the police.

Never in the history of the world has anyone taken such abuse online and stood there like he was innocent, the fact is he actually believes his own lies

… Ben/Guy the worst punishment I could ever give you is to show your children who you really are.

Regards

John

Shaun do the right thing

Liesle stop bullshitting please” (Emphasis added.)

The same day, 11 September 2023, the defendant published on LinkedIn the post I have referred to in paragraphs ‎43-‎44 above, threatening to expose details “this time tomorrow” of “a highly illegal fraud” of which he accused Messrs Howard, Ball, Snow and Other, each of whom he again caricatured as “Ben Coward”, “Andrew No Balls”, “Ben Pinnochisnow” and “Sly Other”. He also sent a direct WhatsApp message to Mr Wilcock: “Please pass this message onto Ben …it’s showtime”.

On 12 September 2023, the defendant sent Mr Howard a direct email:

“I found it. Its over. If you had just told the truth I would have been ok with it. Everything that happens after today is on you”.

The same day, he published an “Apology Statement” on LinkedIn, addressed to his “friends, followers and supporters”, in which he said, “I want to assure you all that I am of sound mind and have taken appropriate steps to address the situation. … Moving forward, my focus will be on assisting the criminal investigation and preparing for my upcoming employment tribunal”. (The defendant submitted a claim to the Glasgow Employment Tribunal on 14 September 2023.)

On 18 September 2023, the defendant published on LinkedIn a “Statement for Social Media to the Metropolitan Police”, marked for the “Attention: Metropolitan Police”, with the “Subject: Allegations against Ben Howard, CEO of Orbis Protect Ltd, under the Fraud Act 2006”. In the post, the defendant made allegations of “fraudulent behaviour”, “deceptive practices”, “potential financial misconduct” and “misrepresentation of financial information”, against Mr Howard. He stated that Mr Howard has “3 live fraud investigations against him” and that “To prove Mr Howard is not a first-time offender I can signpost other fraudulent activities Mr Howard has taken part of and received no punishment, namely the collapse of Carillion Plc…”

On 27 September 2023, the defendant posted on LinkedIn:

“… I can now proceed on with the ‘Big’ ones. It will be a few days to get everything ready for disclosure. I am currently relocating my mother to a secure location away from harm. And then Mr Howard and I will have our final dance.”

On 30 September 2023, the defendant published a letter he wrote to the Procurator Fiscal alleging “a crime against the very fabric of democracy”. The letter targeted Messrs Howard, Other and Fordham and Mr Fordham’s daughter. In the post, the defendant wrote:

“In addition, I will be sending and disclosing communications to the Solicitors Regulation Authority, outlining major breaches in their code committed by Brabners LLP and Rosenblatt.”

Both were solicitors’ firms instructed at different times in 2023 to advise the first claimant. On the same day, the defendant posted on LinkedIn a copy of the complaint against Guy Lancefield of Brabners that he had made to the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA).

On 3 October 2023, the defendant published a post on LinkedIn in which he claimed:

“If I am proven right, I will have exposed the existence of an OCG [Organised Crime Group] operating in plain sight that has committed offence after offence and never once questioned or held accountable, and its more than likely I will take a bullet or 2 in this process.

…ask yourself this question by the time we come to Friday, why haven’t they raised proceedings for injunctive relief against this madman.

The reason I am making these details public is that I will not allow any circumstances in where the 4 ringleaders of this OCG cut a deal and are allowed to carry on like nothing has happened.”

The defendant attached to this post a copy of the Settlement Deed in which he had fully redacted his own address and the name, address and occupation of the person who witnessed his signature, but left partially visible the name of Mr Howard’s wife (who had witnessed his signature), and left fully visible her postcode and occupation.

On 5 October 2023, the defendant posted on LinkedIn a long document in which he wrote, “If my former employer wishes to enforce that agreement, they are within their rights to, and I will take great pleasure in breaking that agreement in London surrounded by all my friends old and new”. He wrote, “The crimes I disclose this week will move things up several notches and it will get very serious very quickly.”

On 7 October 23, the defendant published on LinkedIn a post entitled “Showtime”. He wrote that the “£55Million claim they have been laughing at day by day will become more and more relevant” and made various allegations, including of breach of modern slavery laws “to defraud HS2”.

On 7 October 2023, the defendant sent a long direct email to Messrs Howard, Other, Snow and Ball, copying in solicitors at Rosenblatt and Brabners. The defendant wrote:

“Evening fellas,

If you don’t know or yet fully understand the position you are actually in. then you are clearly not as smart/informed or have as much influence as you think you do. Going after my mother I promise you is the worst mistake you have ever made in your lives. Whether directly or indirectly involved, your actions in 2021 led us to here. Your lack of any respect for my family shows the type of people you are, and therefore I will show your families the same respect, none. And before you all start pissing your pants, phoning the police saying I’m threatening you I am not, I will take much more pleasure in sending you all to jail. So I’m just letting you know what lies ahead till midnight Sunday. … I told you on day 1 this goes all the way, and yet again you massively underestimated me. …

Shortly I will be filing an updated submission to the FCA and SFO surrounding Northedge with several major financial crimes listed – Andy your done at that point.

Next I am doing a new submission to the SRA and the Met Police surrounding Orbis and Brabners…

On Sunday I will be firstly detailing the massive amount of data I have on central security and the widespread fraud and corruption between Ben/Guy and Aaron McClenaghan and the side arrangement to sink them to cover up modern slavery. …

Then we take a very deep dive into Rosenblatt …

… all of this goes online this weekend and on Monday I submit the back up evidence to the relevant parties. …

The measures you have put in place to contain me have all failed. And to be clear none of you are under any threat of violence form me, you do not even register any threat to me whatsoever. Who you all need to be scared of is my followers …” (Emphasis added.)

The defendant posted his email of 7 October on LinkedIn the following day Sunday 8 October 2023, labelling it “The Fantastic 4” (who were identified by the defendant, who published their email addresses, as Messrs Howard, Other, Snow and Ball). The defendant wrote in the post:

“I emailed the fantastic 4 last night and copied their legal representatives in to let them know exactly what I am doing today. The email is probably the most unproffessional communication I have ever sent and any legitamite company director or business owner would have taken direct action no questions asked. What should have happened is within hours I should have been arrested and very heavily cautioned or received a phone call from someone telling me the way the world works…

Ladies and Gentlemen I present to you the most morally bunkrupt, unethical and deluded individuals operating as legitamite businessmen I have ever had the misfortune to have been involved with.”

On 11 October 2023, the defendant published a post on LinkedIn in which he identified himself as “Managing Director at Sitex Orbis Fraud Investigations” and claimed protection under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. The defendant attached a statement headed “The Henchman”:

“So I will point out 2 illegal activities which are being reported later tonight along with others…

I’m very aware that as the numerous people I accuse of heinous crimes that for some unknown reason just will not sue me or report me directly to any authorities, however they are all super sneaky and compulsive liars and that they will use anything I do they see in anyway wrong to try and have me detained or rubbished.”

The defendant referred to Mr Howard planning to leave the business “next may” and said, “I plan that exit to be in a police vehicle”.

On 12 October 2023, the defendant published a statement on LinkedIn with the subject heading “Activities of Orbis Protect Limited and Concerns Related to Modern Slavery Scheme and Fraudulent Practices”. The statement is in the form of a letter which, from its content, appears to have been addressed to the SFO. The defendant accused Mr Other and Mr Howard of, among other matters, acting as “a catalyst for a modern slavery scheme and multiple counts of fraud”.

On 15 October 2023, the defendant published a post on LinkedIn in which he referred to his “£55 Million GBP Employment tribunal”, and described Mr Howard in the following terms:

“Ben Howard – Former FD of Costain - booted out for financial mismanagement, human rights abuser, modern slavery sponser, more counts of fraud than Mr Ponzi himself and HIV discriminator”.

In the same post, correspondingly adverse and derogatory comments were directed at Guy Other and Shaun Wilcock.

On 16 October 2023, the defendant published a post on LinkedIn in which he claimed to have been confronted by “Machete Mike” and wrote, “I wonder how Ben Howard would feel if people came up to him with machetes, he would call the police and it would be swiftly dealt with”, whereas the defendant said, “due to the amazing profiling work Ben and his gang have done on me to the police, they think I’m a loon”.

On 17 October 2023, the claimants’ solicitors, Proskauer Rose, wrote to the defendant that by bringing a claim in the employment tribunal he had breached the Settlement Deed. The letter indicated that the Partner dealing with the matter was Dorothy Murray. In the same letter, Proskauer Rose wrote, “In addition, your lengthy and continued campaign of harassment against the Company and its employees are a breach of other terms of the Settlement Deed. We will write to you on this matter under separate cover.” In response, on 18 October 2023, the defendant published a post on LinkedIn stating:

“I have been told that if I do not cancel all my court actions and quit my reign of terror and harassment of the fantastic 4. They will sue me via a separate legal entity for £90k, this is outlandish, uncalled for and I have never felt quite so insulted in my life.

To have your talents undervalued like that cuts very deep, however submitting false numbers seems to be the done thing for Mr Howard…”

In another post on LinkedIn published on 18 October 2023, the defendant wrote:

“So its official Dorothy and I will go head to head. I will be respectful but not gentle. Its sad to think I wont be able to perform the old routines with my old dance partners, who would ever forget the rendition Glyn [a solicitor from Rosenblatt] and I did to ‘tell me lies’ or the one that had everyone cheering with Simon [a solicitor from Brabners] and I ‘the gambler’. As they still do not know when to fold, I can announce that at the very end I will be doing a number with the now soon to be famous Fantastic 4 where we will perform in harmony ‘Jailhouse Rock’.”

The defendant posted on LinkedIn a two-page letter to Ms Murray of Proskauer Rose, addressed to “Dorothy”, and headed “My New Dance Partner”.

On 19 October 2023, the defendant sent an email to Mr Howard, copied to Mr Wilcock, Ms Bond and two others. In the subject line the defendant wrote: “JR is back!!!!!” The defendant published it on LinkedIn the following day with a message to Proskauer Rose to “send me the worst you have. the most prolific assassin you have. Because your firm is at risk. defend it”. In the email to Mr Howard, the defendant wrote:

“I am just writing to you to let you know I believe I am not letting you enter into a fair fight. The argument your new counsel put forward is weak, pathetic and not worth my time. If I am to battle in an open court with anyone it would be unfair on everyone to watch me battle with an amateur. Based on the arguments put forward I was going to ask my son to represent me, but his primary school teacher would not allow him the time off. If you are hell bent on seeing me decapitated in public at least send someone that can. She will need counselling after this and that is on you.

If this is the level of opponent you are sending me, I may as well order your jail togs right now. … If you wish to even have a chance of staying out of jail you need to send King Kong after me… Give Dorothy some red slippers and tell her there’s no place like home.

P.S. you owe me £55Million GBP and once I get re-instated as Managing Director of Optosafe, I’m calling a board meeting, Shaun get the viscounts ready and 1 sugar in my coffee please!

I bet when you all lied to me you never thought I was capable of this, you are about to find out the consequences of your actions. …”

In a LinkedIn post on 21 October 2023, the defendant published a lengthy update in which he claimed he would be “pushing for a figure around £150Million GBP” and claiming, “It’s actually a £205Million GBP suit you are trying to defend…”

On 30 October 2023, the SFO informed the defendant they would not be launching an investigation. On 3 November 2023, he posted on LinkedIn a photograph of himself outside the SFO with the message:

“…I’m down in the big smoke telling loads of interesting parties about my crooked pal Ben Coward…”

On 13 November 2023, the defendant sent a direct email to Mr Howard and Mr Wilcock, copied to Ms Bond and one other. With reference to a hearing before the employment tribunal the next day, the defendant wrote:

“I cannot express how excited I am to be given the opportunity to show the world how pathetic and corrupt you really are, and to confirm it will be me personally ask you questions…”

The defendant called Mr Howard a “little wet blanket”, said he would be “pulling down Ben Snows and Andy Balls pants in court”, and that “Grant Thornton have been investigating you for months due to me (lol)”. The defendant wrote, “I told you from day 1 this goes all the way and did you listen. Nope!”

On 15 November 2023, the defendant sent an email to Mr Howard and Mr Snow, copied to Ms Bond and another, in which he asked “Having fun yet chaps?”, told Mr Snow to “just continue on being the pussy you are”, and asserted “I have more than enough to send you all to jail”.

The same day, the defendant posted on LinkedIn “Lets reflect on wee dotty”, alleging “you are acting for people who did order a murder so maybe your incompetence is what they deserve”.

On 16 November 2023, Proskauer Rose sent a letter before claim in respect of this litigation, alleging harassment and breaches of contract. The defendant responded by email the same day to Ms Murray, copying in Mr Howard and Mr Snow:

“If you think any of that legal crap you sent me this morning even registers with me you have no idea who I am. I have never lost and I don’t intend losing to a rank amateur like you. So the stage is mines solidly for the next 12 hours. You can clean up the mess because I’m just about to set it on fire.

See what’s left to sell after I finish Bens”.

On the same day, the defendant published on LinkedIn a post presenting “tonight’s feature performance…”, in which he described Mr Howard as “The Wet Blanket – Ben Coward (ORBIS)” and Mr Snow, Mr Ball, Mr Other, Mr Fordham and Mr Wilcock in similarly derogatory terms.

Also on the same day, the defendant responded to the letter before claim:

“Dorothy,

I really don’t think you have the brain power to work out the gravity of your situation. So for the thick I will explain:

[The defendant set out a list of allegations including, “Your client ordered a murder”]

So Anyways the plan was always for Ben Coward to serve me with an injunction and I would break it and end up in front of a judge with all my evidence

So lets not dilly dally around anymore as it taken you this long here’s a wee very derogatory statement about our pal Ben Coward to set things off.

One day when I was in the office in Uxbridge I walked into the toilets and Ben coward was having intercourse with a jam jar which had a picture of gary glitter on it, and after he finished the deed he drank the contents of said jar.

Stop messing about and get your job done dotty. Let me know when the injunction is in place and I will be breaking it surrounded by reporters with all my gay, bi and transsexual friends.”

The defendant sent a further email to Mr Howard and 28 other recipients the same day, consisting of 13 lines of “ahaha…” then,

“Come and get me

I promise you this. The guilty will all now go to jail and there is nothing you can do to stop the justice system.”

On 17 November 2023, the defendant sent a direct email to seven of the first claimant’s employees, including Ms Bond, Mr Wilcock and Mr Fordham, but not Mr Howard, and copying the email to Ms Murray of Proskauer Rose. The defendant described Mr Howard as “pathetic”, alleging “he lies to you all about your futures”. The defendant also accused Ms Murray of corruption and incompetence. The same day he posted on LinkedIn four complaints to the SRA that he submitted, alleging that solicitors at Proskauer Rose helped to cover up murder, modern slavery, fraud and extortion. The defendant’s LinkedIn post made clear that he thought his complaints against the claimants’ solicitors would result in them being conflicted and having to recuse themselves.

On 20 November 2023, the defendant sent Ms Murray an email which he published on LinkedIn in which he referred to the:

“god like power that I hold over your firm and your client…My ‘campaign of harassment’ as you call it is nothing to do with you, your firm or any of the weasels sitting at 100 Bishopsgate. My campaign is a promotional tour to show these organisations what I am capable of…”

The defendant included a hyperlink to a vacancy for a customer assistant at Morrisons, and suggested to Ms Murray that it “may be of interest to you very soon”, and “trust me it is better that you bow out now because it will move up a notch soon and not be enjoyable to participate in”.

On 9 December 2023, the defendant sent an email to Mr Howard:

“How much does it suck to be you right now? Time is nearly up pal, one of the happiest days of my life will be facing you in court and watching your bottom lip whimper as go under oath.”

On 10 December 2023, the defendant posted on LinkedIn a statement that “this will be my last communication for a while”. Contemporaneously, he sent an email to Ms Murray claiming that his alleged campaign of harassment “is now over”. The defendant wrote to Ms Murray, “I’ve made you answer to me, and you all failed miserably” and he threatened “… from now you get ruthless, vicious and business JR…”

The defendant removed his posts regarding the Orbis group, and its employees from LinkedIn, but in a letter to Ms Murray dated 13 December 2023, the defendant wrote, “I reserve the right to pick up where I left off as the Lord Mayor of Crazy Town and if need be will take great pride in breaking any injunction”.

On 28 December 2023, the defendant published on LinkedIn:

“These are the 6 individuals I will make damn sure get prosecuted for their crimes, next I will be releasing a slide with OCG enablers followed by an individual profile of each outlining their crimes and then a timeline highlight how why and where…”

Beneath these words, labelled “The OCG” and “‘The Ridiculous 6’”, the defendant published photographs of six named (and nicknamed) individuals, including Mr Howard. Several subsequent posts published the same day included photographs labelling solicitors and others as “Enablers” of “The OCG”, and derogatory profiles of Messrs Howard, Snow, Wilcock and Fordham. For example, the defendant’s profile of Mr Howard included a photograph of him, listed various directorships and qualifications, then stated:

“Traits: Dishonest, Compulsive liar, Corrupted, Promotes Extortion, Virtue Signaller, Narcissist, Gaslighter, Looks like a mutant, Cooker of books

Crimes:

•

Perverting the course of Justice

•

Misrepresentation

•

identity theft

•

Operating a fraudulent business

•

Obtaining corporate finance by submitting fraudulent accounts

•

Modern slavery

•

HIV discrimination

•

OCG founder

•

Failure to prevent Fraud

•

Corruption sponsor

•

SIA non front line license holder and several crimes under PSIA 2001”

In further posts on LinkedIn on or about 31 December 2023 or 1 January 2024, the defendant again published excerpts from the covertly recorded Teams call with Mr Howard on 14 February 2023, repeatedly referring to him as “Ben Coward” and accusing him of perjury.

On 1 January 2024, the defendant sent an email to Messrs Howard, Fordham, Wilcock, Snow, Ball and Other, copied to eight others, including Ms Murray, addressing them as “Ladies”, and stating:

“…you all crossed a line with me years ago and now you will pay for that mistake.

Any retribution you think is required…. bring it, whatever attack you have planned feel free

…

Your mistake was underestimating me.”

On 2 January 2024, the defendant posted on LinkedIn a letter addressed to Police Scotland, the Serious Fraud Office, the National Crime Agency, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Security Industry Authority, with the subject “Serious organised crime activities by an OCG I call ‘The Ridiculous 6’”. The defendant named Messrs Howard, Other, Ball, Snow, Wilcock and Fordham, alleging their involvement in “a web of extortion, corruption, murder and continuous wrongdoing”.

The defendant published more than a dozen further LinkedIn posts over the course of 3-10 January 2024, in a similar vein, including excerpts from the covertly recorded Teams call, and accusing the claimants of arson.

There can be no doubt that this constitutes a “course of conduct” for the purposes of the 1997 Act. The defendant’s activities consisted of sending emails and publishing numerous posts on LinkedIn. The emails and posts over the course of the period from 3 February 2023 to 10 January 2024 were targeted, most obviously at those the defendant labelled “the Fantastic 4” and “the Ridiculous 6”, that is Messrs Howard, Other, Ball, Snow, Wilcock and Fordham, but also at others such as Mr Ramsey, Mr Mann and Ms Bond. The messages were closely linked by their character, tone and subject matter. Although the defendant denies harassment, he himself described what he did as a “campaign” and “a promotional tour to show these organisations what I am capable of” (paragraph ‎120 above).

The only question may be whether the course of conduct began in February 2023, given the break of several months before the defendant resumed emailing and posting in August 2023. In my judgment, the February messages are part of the course of conduct. That is because the character of the messages is consistent, despite the gap in time, as was the way in which the defendant used direct emails and LinkedIn posts, and because the defendant’s conduct in covertly recording the Teams call on 14 February 2023 was used on numerous occasions in his LinkedIn posts later that year and in early 2024. In any event, it would be of no consequence if the course of conduct began in August rather than February 2023.

Leaving aside, at this stage, the defences that he relies on, the defendant’s responses to the contention that his course of conduct amounted to harassment were, first, that his posts were published into his “echo chamber” in which he had very few followers; secondly, Mr Howard and those he represents did not see his messages because they were quarantined; thirdly, he contended that many of his allegations were merely directed to “cartoon characters”; and, fourthly, he claimed that what he wrote was true. The evidence and submissions regarding the impact on Mr Howard – and in particular, the defendant’s contention that he suffered no alarm or distress – go to damages, and I address them in that context.

The “echo chamber” point is of no relevance to the defendant’s emails which were sent directly to those he targeted. The defendant’s evidence as to the extent of publication of his LinkedIn posts was not consistent with his contemporaneous posts, and it was a nonsense for him to claim that he effectively used LinkedIn as a way of making notes for himself. The defendant’s posts were clearly address to an outside audience. He encouraged others to “like, comment and share” his posts. On 3 October 2023, he stated that he had built a list of contacts on LinkedIn; four days later he asserted that “Today I have 740 connections, over 100 of them are fairly important figures in the media and press”; and on 13 December 2023 he said he had “a reasonable following on LinkedIn”. Given the nature of LinkedIn as a professional network, it is likely that many of the defendant’s connections would have been professional contacts working in the same industry as the claimants. The defendant’s posts were published in an online public forum, not into an “echo chamber”, whatever he may have meant by that phrase.

In any event, the extent of publication of his LinkedIn posts is of little relevance in the context of this claim for harassment. What matters is that by publishing them on a public professional networking site online, his posts were designed and liable to come to the attention of those the defendant targeted. It is clear from Mr Howard’s unchallenged evidence that the posts did, in fact, come to his attention. The defendant submitted that Mr Howard was not on LinkedIn. That was not his evidence: Mr Howard’s unchallenged evidence was that he does not “actively use LinkedIn” but many of his colleagues and professional contacts do, and Orbis, Synova and NorthEdge all have corporate profiles on LinkedIn. He did not need to be an active user of LinkedIn to be aware of the defendant’s LinkedIn campaign.

The “quarantine” point derives from the fact that on 11 September 2023 Mr Howard sought advice from Fleishman Hillard, a communications firm, on an appropriate message to send staff in light of the email that the defendant had sent to them that evening (see paragraph ‎90 above). Mr Howard said, “We will look to block him from contacting staff directly by email.” Fleishman Hillard advised Mr Howard that it would be preferable if the defendant’s emails could be “quarantined so we can still see what John is saying without the team receiving those emails”. The claimants quite properly took steps to protect staff by quarantining the defendant’s emails. But Mr Howard, as the CEO of Orbis, could not be protected from the defendant’s emails, as he needed to be aware of what the defendant was writing about (and to) the Orbis group, its officers and staff. He plainly had read the defendant’s emails, and he was not challenged on his evidence that he had seen them. Further, the quarantine point is only of any relevance in respect of the emails as the claimants had no ability to “quarantine” the defendant’s LinkedIn posts.

There is no merit in the defendant’s repeated contention in cross-examination that the caricatures he posted on LinkedIn merely involved him making allegations against “cartoon characters”, and that no one would have known that they related to any human being. Just as it was obvious that “John MR Optosafe Robertson” was a reference to the defendant, John Robertson – and he did not contend otherwise – so, too, the identity of the other individuals the defendant caricatured was also obvious, not least to those who were targeted, their colleagues and professional contacts, even before the defendant himself expressly drew the link. The alterations to their names were transparent and did nothing to disguise the identity of those against whom the defendant made allegations. When the defendant first published the caricatures, he did so in a post in which he had referred to Brabners, Synova and a company that Mr Other was associated with, very shortly after he had posted excerpts of the Teams call with Mr Howard.

Although the defendant claimed his allegations were true, there were many that he could not even attempt to justify having made. For example, the defendant publicly accused Messrs Howard, Snow, Other, Wilcock, Mann and Ramsey of having committed offences contrary to s.22 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. That section is an interpretation provision concerning abuse of trust in respect of sexual offences against children. The defendant does not contend there is, or that he has ever had, any basis whatsoever for accusing any of these individuals of any sexual offence, still less any offence involving children.

The defendant’s explanation was that as a result of an answer generated by artificial intelligence, he believed that the (alleged) “releasing of my HIV was covered under the sexual offences act”. Nothing in his post in which he accused them of the commission of such offences would have indicated to the reader that his allegation concerned the alleged failure properly to protect information as to his HIV positive status. The defendant claimed repeatedly in evidence that there is not, in fact, any such legislative provision as s.22 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. He had made the same assertion in correspondence when telling Ms Murray that “so far 3 top grade UK law firms have missed” that this legislation “simply does not exist”, telling her that it “holds as much water as me saying I allege that Dorothy from Proskauer Rose has breached the Crap lawyers Act 2023”. The defendant’s hubristic belief was unfounded. Section 22 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is on the statute book, and is in force, as would have been apparent to the defendant if he had taken the trouble to look up the statute and the provision he cited before accusing others of such serious crimes.

The defendant posted on LinkedIn that Proskauer Rose were “acting for people who did order a murder” and accused Messrs Howard, Other, Ball, Snow, Wilcock and Fordham of involvement in murder. Again, this is a baseless allegation. It appears to stem from the fact that a man called George McMillan, who had a link to Orbis via a subcontractor, was convicted of murder. Orbis had a contract with Police Scotland and provided them with a list of all subcontractors they would be using. The list included Style Builders, which was Mr McMillan’s business. At the time when the list was presented to Police Scotland, for them to vet, the director was Mr McMillan’s mother. She then resigned and Mr McMillan became a director. Orbis duly notified Police Scotland of the change of director. If Police Scotland had undertaken further vetting checks, they would likely have picked up that Mr McMillan had a criminal record. Subsequently, Mr McMillan was arrested and later convicted of murder. There is no evidence of any wrongdoing by the claimants, or any of the individuals accused by the defendant, in relation to this matter, and the defendant has manifestly never had any basis whatsoever for accusing any of them ordering, or being complicit in, a murder.

As regards alleged fraud, it is clear that the defendant entered into the Settlement Deed having taken independent legal advice, and having been advised by Mr Howard to postpone his resignation because by leaving when he did the “bad leaver” provision resulted in him receiving less for his shares than would have been the case if he had remained until after NorthEdge’s partial exit and Synova’s investment. Mr Howard ensured that the defendant was in fact paid £200,000 more than he would have been contractually entitled to receive for his shares. In the Teams call on 14 February 2023 the defendant agreed that Mr Howard tried to get him to stay, and he told Mr Howard and Ms Bond that his lawyers advised him “not to sign it” because it was a “horrible deal”. He nevertheless chose to sign it.

The defendant has reported numerous allegations against Mr Howard and others to the Police, the SFO, the FCA, the SIA, the Procurator Fiscal and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) over the course of several years since early 2023. The claimants have only been contacted by the ICO, who confirmed after review, as Mr Howard explained, that “we had complied with everything we needed to, from the many DSARs that Mr Robertson has given to us”, and by the SIA who found no breaches save for some signage at one of Orbis’ properties which needed to be, and was, taken down. Mr Howard said, “I can only assume Mr Robertson hasn’t been able to provide any of those organisations with any shred of evidence”. He has categorically denied any wrongdoing, civil or criminal.

Nevertheless, in circumstances where some of the investigations appear to be open, I approach the question whether the defendant’s course of conduct amounted to harassment on the assumption that some of the matters he has raised may have a factual foundation. Even if that is so, a review of the emails that the defendant sent, and the posts that he published, as detailed above, leads inexorably to the conclusion that his course of conduct amounted to harassment. His course of conduct had all the additional elements of oppression, persistence and unpleasantness which render a plea that his allegations are true insufficient to avoid the conclusion that it amounted to harassment.

The defendant’s LinkedIn campaign, combined with direct emails, bears all the hallmarks of a course of conduct amounting to harassment. The volume of messages and posts was high. In just over five months from August 2023 the second claimant, and the others targeted by the defendant, were bombarded with about 80 messages, many of them lengthy. The posts were repetitive, with the defendant caricaturing individuals in the same way over and over again, and making the same allegations on numerous occasions.

The defendant’s tone was frequently taunting and mocking (see e.g. “having fun yet”, “JR is back!!!!!”, “showtime”, accusing Mr Howard and others “pissing your pants”. and the caricatures). His messages were often aggressive, threatening and designed to cause distress and anxiety (see e.g. “I’m coming after you and it will not go away”; “JR is coming for you”; “I will show your families the same respect, none”; “Today is the day you find out who I really am”; “I’m just letting you know what lies ahead till midnight Sunday”; and “Who you all need to scared of is my followers”).

As the defendant himself recognised when saying, with reference to Mr Howard, that “never in the history of the world has anyone taken such abuse online”, the defendant’s posts were frequently abusive. His messages were littered with bare insults (e.g. “coward”, “liar”, “criminal”, “crooked”, “wet blanket” and “pussy”). He made vulgar assertions that he knew to be untrue for no other reason than to be provocative and cause distress (see e.g. paragraph ‎117 above).

Having seen the defendant over the course of the trial (and pre-trial review), making submissions, cross-examining and giving evidence, and having considered the extensive contemporaneous evidence, my assessment is that the defendant knew that his conduct amounted to harassment.

The defendant was warned by Brabners on 6 February 2023 that his conduct constituted harassment, in a letter in which they pointed out the aggressive and threatening nature of the words he had used. In the Teams call on 14 February 2023, the defendant said that his own lawyer “demanded” of him “stop the LinkedIn. Stop this now because it’s gonna be horrible for me explaining in front of a judge. So stop. Which I have done.” The defendant said, “after this call, as I say, I’m downing tools with all that stuff”, which he did for several months. Mr Howard told the defendant on that call that he had to protect employees and that “anything that can be deemed harassment or anything like that, again I have to act up.” The defendant responded, “Yeah, I know.” Mr Howard asked the defendant on that call to desist, and the defendant’s responses show he understood his behaviour had been harassing.

The defendant did not lose that insight into his conduct when he began harassing Mr Howard and others again in August 2023, and he was told on 17 October 2023, by Proskauer Rose, that his conduct constituted a campaign of harassment.

The language used by the defendant shows his understanding that his conduct was likely to have an adverse impact on those he targeted (see e.g. “How much does it suck to be you right now?”; “I should have been arrested and very heavily cautioned” (for his own email of 7 October 2023); “I have been collectively embarrassing these people for months via social media”; he expressed his awareness, when writing to Orbis staff, that his email would be likely to prompt a “claim I’m trying to harass the staff and cause distress etc etc etc”; and noted that he had subjected Mr Howard to “such abuse online”). The defendant knew that the nature of his conduct was such that he was liable to be injuncted. Indeed, he tried to goad those he targeted into taking action against him (see e.g. his pleas to “Hit me”, his references to awaiting a “gagging order” and to having had to “come up with a plan”; and his claim that his plan had “always” been for Mr Howard to “serve me with an injunction”).

The detrimental impact was deliberate. The defendant’s primary aim was to obtain vengeance by punishing those he perceived as having wronged him (see e.g. “i will not stop until every single one of them pay”; “I will never give up till this is done”; “you will pay for that mistake”; “your mistake was underestimating me”; “I bet … you never thought I was capable of this, you are about to find out the consequences of your actions”; “I am Relentless as you have seen”). Forcing the claimants to take him to court, by engaging in a relentless campaign of harassment, was itself a means that the defendant used to exact retribution, as is evident, for example, from his expressed disappointment that Proskauer Rose’s estimated costs undervalued how much trouble he would cause their client (see paragraph ‎106 above).

The defendant relished what he regarded as his “god like power” over the claimants. He delighted in accusing “numerous people … of heinous crimes” and in making up what he described as “a wee very derogatory statement” about Mr Howard. He toyed with those he targeted by stating, on many occasions, that he was “standing down [his] assault” (or words to similar effect), removing his LinkedIn posts, and would allow the law to take its course, only to then resume his campaign, often just days later. This behaviour, together with the many occasions (often timed for the weekend) on which his posts foreshadowed unspecified matters that he would be disclosing or reporting in the next day or two, was manifestly a deliberate ploy to maximise the anxiety caused by his conduct.

In cross-examination, the defendant apologised for his email of 16 November 2023 to Ms Murray (paragraph ‎117 above). Save for a couple of admissions that an email or post was unpleasant or would have made the recipient feel uncomfortable, the defendant did not accept that the numerous posts and emails to which he was taken were unreasonable, oppressive, threatening, aggressive, taunting or unpleasant. However, as I have said, he often evaded the question by asserting, for example, that the targets were “cartoon characters”, or that no one read his emails, or that Mr Howard’s claim to have been distressed was “theatre”. For the reasons I have given, my assessment is that the defendant deliberately engaged in a campaign of harassment against Mr Howard (and others), and he knew full well that his campaign was persistent, oppressive and unreasonable, often including posts and emails that were taunting, threatening aggressive, unpleasant and abusive, and that it amounted to harassment.

In any event, it would suffice to meet this criterion if the defendant ought to have known that his conduct amounted to harassment. If, contrary to my conclusion, I had found that the defendant did not know his conduct amounted to harassment, I would, in any event, have had no hesitation in concluding that a reasonable person in possession of the same information as him (as outlined above) would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of Mr Howard (and others). Therefore, the defendant ought to have known his course of conduct amounted to harassment.

As explained above, the burden is on the defendant to establish that he pursued the course of conduct that I have described for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. He must show that he thought rationally about the material suggesting the possibility of criminality, formed the view that the conduct said to constitute harassment was appropriate for the purpose of preventing or detecting it, and that was his dominant purpose.

In the Amended Defence, the defendant asserted that “his communications and actions” were for the legitimate purpose of exposing “serious criminal activities being undertaken by C1, C2 and other associated individuals and entities” (as well as for the purposes outlined in respect of the s.1(3)(c) defence).

The defendant’s evidence was that his LinkedIn post on 3 February 2023 in which he described “a serious and complex fraud”, without naming individuals, “marked the beginning of my effort to expose what had taken place”. The only occasion in his oral evidence when the defendant asserted that he had sent and published a communication “to prevent crime” was when he was taken to his 10 September 2023 post, attaching an email to numerous individuals at Synova (paragraphs ‎86-‎88 above).

In cross-examination, the defendant acknowledged that he did not publish his LinkedIn posts on 4 August 2023 (paragraphs ‎69-‎75 above) or 9 September 2023 (paragraphs ‎84-‎85 above), in which he made his most explicit allegations of crimes contrary to various identified Acts, for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, claiming these were merely cartoon characters. When it was put to him that he did not publish his 24 August 2023 post (paragraph ‎80 above) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime he did not disagree. His answer to the same question in respect of the post published on 15 October 2023 (paragraph ‎104 above) was “I’m posting it to my echo chamber”.

The defendant did not otherwise address in his witness statement or oral evidence his thought process. He gave no evidence capable of founding a conclusion that he thought rationally about any material that might suggest the possibility of criminality and formed the view that his email and LinkedIn campaign was appropriate for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. In my judgment, he clearly did not do so, but has sought subsequently to latch onto a potential defence.

In any event, the defendant has failed to satisfy me that his predominant motive in acting as he did was to prevent or detect crime. On the contrary, it is readily apparent that his predominant purpose was retaliation, with the aim of punishing those he believed had done him wrong. His secondary motive was to compel his former employer to re-open the Settlement Deed. He was advised that in the absence of fraud that was not possible, and so he alleged fraud. Although the defendant claimed in cross-examination, “It’s never been about money”, and I find his primary motivation was revenge, it is readily apparent from the increasingly extraordinary amounts he claimed, and his efforts to make the litigation more costly for the claimants, that one of his aims was financial.

In the Amended Defence, the defendant asserted that “his communications and actions” were reasonable in the circumstances because they constituted investigative journalism and because he acted as he did for the legitimate purpose of encouraging whistleblowers to come forward. In his witness statement, the defendant asserted that his “disclosures were grounded in evidence, made in the public interest, and supported by documentation”; and he described his actions as whistleblowing.

In cross-examination, the defendant asserted that his post of 24 August 2023 (paragraph ‎80 above) was whistleblowing and investigative journalism on the basis that if he had gone “to the papers with this, it would have been reported on”. When it was put to him that his post of 9 September 2023 (paragraphs ‎84-‎85 above) was not reasonable, he responded “this is directed to a cartoon character”; “this is a caricature in my own echo chamber going absolutely nowhere”. Nonetheless, he also asserted that it was whistleblowing and investigative journalism because he had “broadcast the fact that there’s a fraud going on” in a “£130 million company”, which he said was “quite newsworthy”. The defendant stated that his post of 10 September 2023 (paragraphs ‎86-‎88 above) was investigative journalism, whistleblowing and that it was “proportionate to getting whistleblowers to come forward”.

Similarly, in respect of his 30 September 2023 post (paragraph ‎96 above), he said that it was posted into his “echo chamber” which he used as a “sort of note app”, while claiming that it prompted other whistleblowers to come forward and it was a way of communicating with others with similar life experiences as the algorithm would connect him with others who had been victims of fraud. In respect of his 15 October 2023 post (paragraph ‎104 above), when it was put to him that this was not whistleblowing the defendant responded that he was merely “posting into an echo chamber”, nonetheless he claimed that it was investigative journalism.

The defendant described what he was doing in his email of 3 February 2023 and his posts of 16 October and 28 December 2023 as “basically venting” (paragraphs ‎64, ‎105 and ‎124-‎125 above). The defendant did not seek to defend his post of 4 August 2023 (paragraphs ‎69-‎75 above) as whistleblowing or investigative journalism, saying rather that “these are cartoon caricatures that are posted in my own little echo chamber” and that he was “venting on caricatures that mean nothing to anyone, that no one’s seen, in an echo chamber”. When it was put to him that his email of 11 September 2023 (paragraph ‎90 above) was not whistleblowing or investigative journalism, the defendant said that it was “a cry for help”, and he disagreed that it was unreasonable or oppressive. When asked about his post of 11 October 2023, the defendant said, “I can’t speak for my intentions at the time. It’s a long time ago.”

In my judgment, the defendant’s reliance on the s.1(3)(c) defence has no merit. For the reasons that I have given in addressing the question whether the course of conduct amounted to harassment, I consider that the overwhelming picture is of a wholly unreasonable campaign targeted against Mr Howard and others. Even if the defendant perceived some of his posts as whistleblowing or journalism, the way in which he acted, by relentlessly posting on a public forum in vitriolic terms, as well as sending many emails to his targets, was not reasonable in the circumstances.

Accordingly, the second claimant has established his claim for harassment, in his own capacity and as a representative claimant.

The first claimant has succeeded in its claim for breach of contract both in respect of the Non-Representation and Non-Disparagement Clauses. The Court will readily compel the observance of negative obligations in a contract, including in an employment contract, by injunction: see Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268, 282F and Attorney General v Barker [1990] 3 All ER 257, 260b-c.

The defendant has complied with the positive obligation in paragraph 5(b) of the interim injunction to change the name of Sitex Orbis Fraud Investigations Ltd, so no such obligation is required to be repeated in a final injunction. But his behaviour, and vain efforts to argue that his insertion of a space between Sitex and Orbis eradicated the association with the Orbis group, and that referring to himself as “Mr Optosafe” merely indicates a past association, demonstrate that if the injunction were removed the defendant would engage in further breaches of the Non-Representation Clause. I conclude that the first claimant should be granted a final injunction to enforce compliance with the Non-Representation Clause, as well as the Non-Disparagement Clause. Paragraphs 4(a) and 4(d) of the interim injunction prohibit the defendant from acting in ways which would be in breach of the Non-Representation and Non-Disparagement Clauses. Those provisions remain necessary and should be incorporated into a final injunction.

The second claimant has succeeded in his harassment claim. At the end of his closing submissions, the defendant offered an undertaking to Mr Howard alone. That offer was too little, too late. Paragraphs 4(b) and (c) of the interim injunction prohibit the defendant from acting in a way which would constitute further harassment of the second claimant (and those of whom his situation is representative). At a minimum, it is clearly necessary to include those provisions in a final injunction, not least having regard to the fact that the defendant clearly considers his conduct to have been justified, and bearing in mind the way he has acted since the interim injunction was imposed.

However, on behalf of the claimants, Mr Barnes submits that the final injunction should be widened by the removal of the caveat in paragraph 6(b) of the interim injunction which states:

“For the avoidance of any doubt nothing in paragraph 4 above prevents:

…

(b)

The Defendant making any disclosure, report or similar concerning the Claimants or any individual represented by the Second Claimant directly to any law enforcement, regulatory or other relevant public authority or body through the channels that authority or body provides for disclosures or reports; that is provided that the Defendant does not otherwise publish or publicize any such disclosure, report or similar including but without limitation post the same on LinkedIn or on any other social media platform or website.”

Mr Barnes submits, first, that the caveat is no longer necessary. The defendant has had plenty of time to make all the complaints to regulators and public bodies that he could conceivably wish to make. As set out in Schedule 2 to Mr Howard’s third statement, the defendant has reported the claimants (including some of those of whom Mr Howard is representative) on at least 20 occasions, to the SFO, Police Scotland, the FCA, the Procurator Fiscal, East Ayrshire Council, the SIA, the NCA and Nottinghamshire Police (including multiple reports to many of those bodies). Secondly, Mr Barnes contends that if the caveat is allowed to remain, the defendant will use it to continue his campaign of harassment.

In support of the latter proposition, the claimants submit that the defendant’s behaviour since the interim injunction shows that, while for the most part he complied with the interim injunction, at the same time he continued his harassing conduct by re-manoeuvring to focus his attention on individuals and companies connected to the claimants but not themselves protected by the interim injunction. Mr Howard explained that the defendant has targeted (among others):

“a.

NorthEdge Capital LLP (NorthEdge) and Synova LLP (Synova), being the advisers of funds who are ultimate institutional shareholders of Orbis, as well as several of their individual partners and their other portfolio companies unrelated to Orbis (including companies called Direct Healthcare Group and Qbitus);

b.

Advisors to the First Claimant and Orbis or to counterparties in related transactions – including, Grant Thornton UK LLP L.E.K. Consulting, Deloitte LLP (Deloitte) and Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP (PwC);

c.

Solicitors who advise, or have advised, the Claimants or related parties – including Proskauer Rose (London) LLP (Proskauer), who represent the Claimants in these proceedings, Rosenblatt LLP (who advised Synova up to around early 2025), Browne Jacobson LLP (Browne Jacobson, who acted for Orbis in connection with its purchase of the First Claimant), and Brabners LLP (Brabners, who advised the First Claimant and Orbis at the preliminary stages of the Defendant’s campaign of harassment in early 2023);

d.

Individual lawyers at those firms, including Ms Dorothy Murray of Proskauer, the partner with conduct of this matter for the Claimants, Proskauer’s Ms Kelly McMullon, Special International Labor, Employment & Data Protection Council and Proskauer’s Compliance Officer for Legal Practice (COLP), Mr Gavin Hadfield;

e.

Mr Graham Dunlop, of Terrafirma Chambers, the barrister who represents the First Claimant in the Scottish employment proceedings …; and

f.

The lender to Orbis, Ardian Investment UK Limited (Ardian).”

Mr Howard has given detailed and unchallenged evidence of the defendant’s conduct in relation to each of these companies and individuals. In cross-examination Mr Howard said, when referring to the defendant’s reporting of the claimants’ accountants, Grant Thornton, to the ICAEW, “I think his motivation is to try and continue to make me and the company toxic, that people don’t want to be associated with us, because it’s just too difficult”.

In my judgment, the defendant has continued his campaign by focusing on connected individuals and companies that are not protected by the interim injunction. I consider it unnecessary to detail his conduct towards each of these individuals, companies and firms. It is sufficient to outline some of his conduct towards the claimants’ current solicitors, and in particular towards Ms Murray.

The defendant has filed at least 13 complaints with the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) about fee earners of Proskauer Rose, eight of which relate to Ms Murray (many of which he has posted on LinkedIn). He has also sought to refer Ms Murray to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal and has threatened claims against Ms Murray and Mr Hadfield personally. This is part of a pattern. He has also referred solicitors from Brabners and Rosenblatt to the SRA.

I have already referred to some of the defendant’s communications with Ms Murray. The way he has behaved towards her has been particularly vile and misogynistic. For example, the defendant referred to Ms Murray as “wee dotty”, “a little girl”, his “work wife”, “wifey”; and told her she should “get your hair done”, book in “for a cut and blowdry”, referenced “our 1 year anniversary” and said (with respect to her LinkedIn profile) “loving the red look btw”. The defendant constantly derided Ms Murray’s professional ability (e.g. calling her a “rank amateur”, “unprofessional”, “incompetent”, “dumb”, “idiot”; grading her work and writing “Back to school for you!”), condescendingly offered to “educate” or “mentor” her, and repeatedly suggested her next job should be as a cleaner or shop assistant. The defendant has also regularly accused Ms Murray of professional misconduct, lack of ethics and morals and threatened her (e.g. “Your career will be tarnished…” “Dorothy, your career is headed for the toilet”, “you are probably one of the worst lawyers ive ever had the misfortune of enduing [sic] their careers, but I will take great pleasure in ending yours as I hear there are vacancies at the local Morrison’s near you”).

On 16 January 2024, the defendant wrote to Ms Murray:

“I believe you have been corrupted and with your continual lies I feel obligated as a parent to inform […] Infants and Nursery School that you are not a fit and proper person to be a School Governor … So I will be writing to your school and demand they remove you from post as you are not a fit and proper person to hold such a position of responsibility …”

He then sent emails to the school of which she is a governor, on 16 and 19 January 2024, alleging (among other matters) that she “has connections to sponsors of modern slavery”, is involved in “supporting racism and individuals with criminal intent” and “may support individuals involved in paedophilia”.

In cross-examination, the defendant acknowledged that his emails to the school of which Ms Murray is a governor were retaliatory, designed to drive a wedge between her and the school, and intended to cause her to reconsider whether she could continue carrying out her professional duty by representing the claimants. The defendant said, “I agree that there’s no excuse for this, so I apologise”. While the defendant apologised on a couple of occasions for specific communications to or about Ms Murray, there was no acknowledgement nor apology for the fact that the entirety of his conduct towards her over a prolonged period was reprehensible.

In my judgment, the defendant sought to find means to continue his campaign of harassment against Mr Howard and others which were not precluded by the terms of the interim injunction. To this end, he has used the caveat which enables him to make complaints and reports to the police, regulators and other public bodies, and he has sought to make it so unpleasant for solicitors, accountants, investors and others to retain any connection with the claimants that they would drop them.

The defendant claimed that he has no intention of making any further complaints or reports to regulators, the police, the SFO or other such bodies. He insisted that when the current investigations, and the fresh claim which he filed recently, conclude, that will be the end of the matter. However, he has made repeated claims to the same effect over the years, none of which have proved true. In my judgment, it is necessary for the Court to act to prevent further harassing conduct by not including the caveat referred to in paragraph ‎169 above in the final injunction.

However, as discussed with Mr Barnes during the course of the hearing, it will be necessary to include wording which enables the defendant to provide a response in the event that any of the bodies to which he has submitted reports or complaints, and which have ongoing investigations, seek information from him.

The only claim for damages which is pursued is that made by the second claimant for harassment. The first claimant does not claim damages in respect of the breaches of contract and nor is any claim for damages for harassment made by those whose position is represented by the second claimant.

Damages for harassment under the 1997 Act are to compensate a claimant for distress and injury to feelings: ZAM v CFW [2013] EWHC 662 (QB), [2013] EMLR 27, [59] (Tugendhat J). It is well established that in determining the amount to award in claims under the 1997 Act, the courts may draw on the so-called Vento bands for compensation for injured feelings: Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Vento(No.2) [2002] EWCA Civ 1871, [2003] ICR 318. Those guidelines were formulated, and apply directly, in employment discrimination cases. In assessing damages for harassment, I bear in mind that compensation for discrimination necessarily involves an award for the humiliation of being treated differently on impermissible grounds, which is not a necessary feature of a harassment claim.

The claimants’ skeleton refers to the figures as updated for inflation by the Eighth Addendum to the Presidential Guidance originally issued on 5 September 2017. However, having regard to the date of issue of this claim, the relevant Vento bands are those given in the Sixth Addendum published on 24 March 2023:

The defendant contends that Mr Howard has suffered no distress. In part this contention is based on his submission that Mr Howard did not see the LinkedIn posts because he was not on LinkedIn and did not see the emails because they were quarantined. For the reasons I have given, I have found that Mr Howard saw the posts and emails around the time they were sent and published.

The defendant also bases his submission on two aspects of the evidence regarding Mr Howard’s reaction. The first is that on 11 September 2023 Mr Howard sought advice from a communications consultancy, Fleishman Hillard, on an appropriate message to send to staff, and was advised to send a short message to the recipients of the email saying “sorry you’re receiving these messaging, I know they can be disconcerting”, and advising them not to engage with the defendant or his posts. The defendant contends that Mr Howard’s response shows that he was not distressed, he was merely engaging in a “public relations exercise”.

The second matter the defendant relies on is Mr Howard’s behaviour following the report that Mr Howard made to the West Midlands police about the defendant’s conduct on 12 October 2023. A police investigation report records that the officer in the case subsequently made several attempts to contact Mr Howard, and left messages, but these were not responded to and so the investigation was closed. (Footnote: ³) The defendant contends that giving a statement to the police was a performative act.

In cross-examination, Mr Howard explained that he reported the matter to the police, and made a statement to them, because there had been several things that he and his family had “found particularly threatening, and physically threatening”. One was the posting of the Settlement Deed with his wife’s name partially visible, and her occupation and their postcode fully visible. Although they had in fact moved house, Mr Howard believed that the defendant would not have known that. He found it particularly threatening that these details were published only a few days before the defendant posted on LinkedIn:

“along the lines of, ‘Who you [meaning me] need to be really worried about is my supporters.’ … I found that extremely threatening, and almost as a kind of call to arms. So I found that very, very distressing, and my wife found that very distressing.

So that was, along with other posts … talking about my family. You know, I think some, … along the lines of, ‘You’ve shown my family no respect and I’ll treat yours in exactly the same way’. I just find – and that’s kind of two examples, but I found that incredibly upsetting, incredibly frightening, frankly, as did my wife and my family.”

(See paragraphs ‎95 and ‎98: “I will show your families the same respect, none.” “Who you all need to be scared of is my followers.”)

Mr Howard said:

“So I did report the matters to West Midlands Police, and I did that with the intention that should things continue to escalate or escalate further, and should Mr Robertson physically threaten me or turn up at my home or turn up at my place of work, then the police were informed and were notified of what had been happening, so they wouldn’t – it wouldn’t be cold.”

Mr Howard said that he spoke at length to someone at his local police station and explained his purpose in reporting the matter. He found it rather frustrating that about a week later an officer followed up and asked, “What would you like us to do?” He said he repeated his motivation for notifying the police, so that they were aware if the matter escalated. He was contacted again about a week or 10 days later and informed the matter had been passed to Police Scotland because that is where the defendant was living. Mr Howard did not recall West Midlands Police contacting him again and leaving voice messages. He acknowledged that they may well have done, but that would have been after he had given a statement, twice explained his reasons for contacting them, and the matter had been passed to Police Scotland.

The defendant challenged Mr Howard’s evidence that he felt physically threatened by him. The defendant placed heavy reliance on the transcript of the hearing before Chamberlain J which shows that, after referring to the message regarding machetes (paragraph ‎105 above), Mr Barnes said, “Let me be fair to Mr Robertson. There is not an allegation of any sort of physical element to this.” Mr Howard responded in cross-examination:

“… there are multiple occasions that I have felt very fearful of Mr Robertson. I think, you know, there’s – when somebody makes a threat against you, or even more so, your family and says things about your family. Excuse me. That’s, you know, that’s difficult to deal with on, you know, many levels.

The thing that I think really worried me at the time, even more than anything, was the frequency of the things that Mr Robertson was saying also the things that he was posting about and saying regarding what I would judge to be erratic behaviour more generally.

So when Mr Robertson, on a number of occasions would post that he had been invited to meetings under false pretences because people were wanting to section him under the Mental Health Act … or when Mr Robertson posted a toxicology report that says that he had tested positive for amphetamines. …

When you have somebody who is threatening you, threatening your family and demonstrating that level of erratic behaviour that makes it all the worse, which is the reason why I took, and have taken, significant precautions at home at significant cost, significant precautions at places of work. Mr Robertson frequently started taking selfies outside the offices of our lawyers, outside the offices of my investors. You know, again, I consider that to be threatening behaviour in the context of everything else that is happening.”

In my judgment, Mr Howard is a strong, resilient character who was able to cope better than many might have done with the defendant’s harassing conduct. Nonetheless, it is clear to me that his evidence of his distress and fearfulness for his family above all, as well as for himself, was sincere. His instruction of Fleishman Hillard is not inconsistent with this finding. Mr Howard was the CEO of Orbis, with responsibility towards members of staff who had received a disturbing email from the defendant. It was natural for him to seek advice on how to reassure and protect his staff. Nor was there anything disingenuous about his report to the police. Someone else in his position might have pressed for the defendant to be charged or cautioned. The fact that Mr Howard sought only to ensure the police were informed in the event the defendant’s conduct escalated is not evidence that his action was performative. It shows only that he was measured in his response and sought to avoid action that might trigger worse behaviour from the defendant.

Mr Barnes’ acknowledgement before Chamberlain J that there was no “physical element” meant no more than that there was no suggestion of any physical assault, and no physical interactions with the defendant were relied on by the claimants. In the statement that he relied on before Chamberlain J, Mr Howard had explained that there is “an underlying threat of violence in some of his posts and messages”. His evidence to that effect has been consistent. In his third statement Mr Howard said (and I accept his evidence):

“I also still feel that there is an underlying threat of violence in some of his interactions. While he has never, to my knowledge, behaved in a violent way to anyone involved in this case, he clearly associates the Claimants with violence, for example when he alleges arson and attempted murder, and regularly uses violent language and imagery himself. On 14 July 2024, following the hearing in front of Deputy Master Marzec on 11 July, he emailed the Court, copied to Ms Murray, to inform the recipients that he had a ‘sizeable screwdriver’ in his bag at the hearing and inferred it could have been used for ‘intimidation or violence’.

I recall his mental health assessment (which he posted about in September 2023) and October 2023, his positive drug test for amphetamines and methamphetamine (which he himself posted about on LinkedIn on 7 November 2023), his repeated belief that drones [are] watching him, his insistence that a man using a walking stick near the mill was threatening him with a machete… and his repeated assertions that he can and will defend himself. … I worry about his delusions and what that says about the state of his mental health. I worry that his apparent perception of the Claimants and Orbis being violent towards him (and his accusing me of extremely violent acts) is laying the foundation for future physical harassment by him, potentially even in perceived ‘self-defence’, or by others encouraged by him…”

I have borne in mind the need to retain a sense of proportion when fixing the appropriate sum for damages. This is a serious case, but not so serious as to put it into the higher Vento band. In my judgment, an appropriate award to compensate Mr Howard for the distress and injury to feelings that he has suffered as a result of the defendant’s harassment campaign would be £25,000.

However, I note that in the claim form the damages are valued at £10,000. CPR 16.3(7) provides that, “The statement of value in the claim form does not limit the power of the court to give judgment for the amount which it finds the claimant is entitled to.” In Harrath v Stand for Peace Ltd [2017] EWHC 653 (QB), the claimant had issued his defamation claim for no more than £10,000, but he made clear that he was willing to pay any additional fee, if necessary, and Sir David Eady found that the appropriate award was £140,000 ([22]-[23]). As this was not an issue that was discussed during the hearing, I consider that the appropriate course is to give the claimants an opportunity to amend the statement of value in the claim form (and pay any additional court fee). If they do so, the award to the second claimant will be in the sum of £25,000. If they prefer not to amend, as may be the case if they are concerned about enforcement, the damages will be capped at the lower level of £10,000.

The rationale underlying the making of a civil restraint order is that a litigant who makes claims or applications which have absolutely no merit harms the administration of justice by wasting the limited time and resources of the courts. Such claims and applications consume public funds and divert the court from dealing with cases which have real merit. There is a strong public interest in protecting the court system from abuse by imposing an additional restraint on their use of the court’s resources: see Society of Lloyd's v Noel [2015] 1 WLR 4393 at [29].

A civil restraint order does not prohibit access to the courts. It requires a person who has repeatedly made unmeritorious claims or applications to have any new claim or application which falls within the scope of the order reviewed by a judge at the outset to determine whether it should be permitted to proceed: see Noel at [29]. Provided that the right of access to the court is not extinguished, the making of a civil restraint order is not contrary to article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court is entitled to regulate its affairs to protect its process and the interests of other parties against whom unmeritorious litigation is brought: see Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484.

There are three types of civil restraint order. A limited civil restraint order restrains the party against whom the order is made “from making any further applications in the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order” (Practice Direction 3C, paragraph 2.2(1)). A limited civil restraint order may be made where a party has made two or more applications which are totally without merit (PD3C, paragraph 2.1).

Where an extended civil restraint order is made by a judge of the High Court, it restrains the party against whom the order is made from issuing claims or making applications in the High Court or the county court “concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order” (PD3C, paragraph 3.2). An extended civil restraint order may be made where “a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit” (PD3C, paragraph 3.1). In Bhamjee v Forsdick (Practice Note) [2004] 1 WLR 88Lord Philips identified at [42]:

“We do not include the word ‘habitual’ among the necessary criteria for an extended civil restraint order, but there has to be an element of persistence in the irrational refusal to take ‘no’ for an answer before an order of this type can be made.”

If the precondition for an extended civil restraint order is met, the court has a residual discretion whether to make the order: paragraph 3.1 of PD3C provides that the court “may” make an order. In Noel, Lewis J gave the following guidance at [47]:

“In exercising that discretion, the court must have regard to the purpose underlying the making of such civil restraint orders, namely that such orders should be made if, but only if, it is necessary to protect the administration of justice from abuse. That involves an assessment of the risk that the individual litigant will, unless restrained, make further applications or claims which are totally without merit and which will waste the time and resources of the courts, thereby consuming public funds and diverting the courts from dealing with other cases. The making, and the terms, of any order should reflect a proportionate response to the level of risk of future, unmeritorious proceedings. The exercise of discretion will, generally, involve an assessment of the level of risk that the individual poses of making further, unmeritorious applications in future. In considering that issue, as Legatt J. observed at paragraph 69 of his judgment in Nowak v Nursing and Midwifery Council and others [2013] EWHC 1932 (QB):

‘The fact that the litigant has repeatedly issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit will itself almost inevitably demonstrate the existence of such a risk. But in considering the extent of the risk it may also be relevant to consider other factors, such as any statements of the litigant's future intentions, other aspects of the litigant's conduct and whether the circumstances which have generated the hopeless claims or applications are continuing or likely to continue.’”

A general civil restraint order may be made “where the party against whom the order is made persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate” (PD3C, paragraph 4.1). Where a general civil restraint order is made by a judge of the High Court, it restrains the party against whom the order is made from issuing any claim or making any application in the High Court or the county court, unless the court decides to make it less prohibitive, without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order.

An extended civil restraint order or a general civil restraint order “will be made for a specified period not exceeding three years” (PD3C, paragraphs 3.9 and 4.9). The duration may be extended by a period no greater than three years on any given occasion (PD3C, paragraph 3.10 and 4.10).

Where an order of the court records that a claim or application was totally without merit, it is not necessary or appropriate for a judge who is subsequently considering whether to make a civil restraint order to re-examine that question (Nowak at [67]). However, the court is not restricted to considering proceedings and applications where there was at the time an express finding of a total lack of merit. In Kumar [2006] EWCA Civ 990, Brook LJ held at [67] to [68]:

“It is of course correct that para 1 of Practice Direction C imposes an obligation on courts to ensure that their orders record that a statement of case or application was totally without merit, but the absence of this mantra on the face of an order does not oblige a later court, when convinced that a statement of case or application must have been treated as being totally without merit, to correct the earlier order under the slip rule or to send it back to the original court for correction under that rule. This would be to elevate form over substance in a very undesirable way.

68.

But if the earlier order does not speak for itself, a rather more detailed examination of the earlier litigation history must be undertaken...”

In Kumar, Brooke LJ observed at [60] that the power to make a general civil restraint order:

“…is apt to cover a situation in which one of these litigants adopts a scattergun approach to litigation on a number of different grievances without necessarily exhibiting such an obsessive approach to a single topic that an extended CRO can appropriately be made against him/her.”

The first question when considering whether to make an extended or general civil restraint order is whether the litigant has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit. Second, the court must ask itself what risk there is that if unrestrained or not further restrained where some form of civil restraint order has already been imposed, the litigant will issue further claims or make further applications which are an abuse of the court’s process. Third, the court should determine what is the least restrictive form of order shown to be required. When determining whether to impose a general civil restraint order, this encompasses the question posed by paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 3C whether an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate.

By an order dated 4 March 2025 (sealed on 6 March), Jay J certified that the defendant’s application dated 1 February 2025 seeking Mr Howard’s committal for contempt and, separately, his application dated 22 January 2025 to vary or discharge the interim injunction, were both totally without merit. Jay J observed that “Mr Robertson is actuated by a vindictive desire to pursue his objectives by whatever means he can and it is part and parcel really of the same campaign of harassment which at least on an interim basis was established in January 2024”. That campaign of harassment has now been established following a trial and I agree with Jay J’s observation that the defendant’s conduct in the litigation was a vindictive continuation of the same campaign. Jay J made a limited civil restraint order. The defendant was refused permission to appeal against Jay J’s order by Warby LJ on 3 November 2025.

By an order dated 1 July 2025 (sealed on 3 July), Master Armstrong certified that two separate applications for non-party disclosure, made by the defendant on 24 January 2025 against Grant Thornton and NorthEdge, were totally without merit. In my judgment, those applications were made with a view to making others (in this instance, an accountant and an investor) view the claimants and the Orbis group as “toxic” (as Mr Howard put it) because the defendant’s actions made it so difficult to work with them. They were a continuation of the defendant’s campaign of harassment.

On 5 November 2025, Warby LJ refused the defendant’s application for permission to appeal against my order of 24 October 2025 (made by an Appellant’s Notice dated 29 October 2025) and an application notice dated 5 November 2025 by which he sought to rely on fresh evidence, amended grounds of appeal and an amended skeleton argument. Warby LJ certified both sets of applications as totally without merit.

Mr Robertson’s claim for constructive dismissal and discrimination was struck out by the Glasgow Employment Tribunal (EAT) on 7 February 2024. His appeal to the Employment Appeals Tribunal was dismissed and certified as an abuse of process and totally without merit on 30 September 2024. He unsuccessfully attempted to appeal to the Court of Session against the EAT’s order.

It follows that, so far as I am aware, seven applications that the defendant has made have been formally certified as totally without merit.

In addition, the effect of the limited civil restraint order has been that some of the applications the defendant has made, which might otherwise have been certified as totally without merit, he has been refused permission to pursue. By an order sealed on 15 October 2025, Jay J refused the defendant permission to issue a witness summons against Mr Other or Mr Wilcock, observing the application “is made too late and has the flavour of being vexatious and oppressive”. On the first day of trial, I refused the defendant permission to apply to amend his Amended Defence, and in doing so made clear that I would, in any event, have refused the application and certified it as totally without merit: see Optosafe v Robertson [2025] EWHC 3393 (KB). Further, in my order of 24 October 2025, I observed that the defendant’s submission that an application made by the claimants should be certified as totally without merit was itself totally without merit.

This history shows that the defendant has persistently made applications which are totally without merit.

This litigation is now concluding and so the limited civil restraint order will imminently cease to have any protective effect. The defendant issued a claim against the first claimant, Orbis, Conic and Project Cube on 2 October 2025. In that claim he pursues various causes of action, including misuse of private information, negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation and rescission of the Settlement Deed. In light of the defendant’s conduct over the past three years, I consider that, if unrestrained, there is a high risk that he will issue further applications, and a real risk he will issue further claims, which are an abuse of the court’s process. Given the defendant’s behaviour, the Court can have no confidence in his protestation that, once the current investigations and claim conclude, that will be an end of the matter.

What is the least restrictive form of order shown to be required? In my judgment, an extended civil restraint order would be inadequate. The defendant has used litigation as a means of continuing to harass Mr Howard and others. When certain means of harassing them are blocked, as they were by the interim injunction, the defendant has found other ways to continue his campaign by acting oppressively and unreasonably against those connected with Mr Howard. The defendant’s conduct shows that there is a real risk of him bringing claims and applications which are an abuse of the court’s process against others, such as the claimants’ lawyers, accountants and investors, or public bodies and regulators, which in many instances would not be subject to the requirement of permission imposed by an extended civil restraint order.

Accordingly, I will impose a general civil restraint order on Mr Robertson for a period of three years.

The claimants have succeeded in establishing their claims for breach of contract and harassment. I will grant a final injunction and award damages to the second claimant for harassment. I will also make a general civil restraint order for a period of three years against Mr Robertson.