Amar Lodhia v Twelve Management Company (Bromley-by-Bow) Limited & Ors

The chronology is that Mr Lodhia was made bankrupt on 10 June 2024. The trustees in bankruptcy (“the Trustees”) were Begbies Traynor. As noted above, the Newsletter was published on 6 March 2025. The Claim Form was stamped as filed on 30 April 2025 and issued on 15 May 2025. Mr Lodhia was automatically discharged from bankruptcy on 10 June 2025.

In the course of the proceedings Mr Lodhia has produced various letters which are on Begbies Traynor headed notepaper, and which purport to deal with the question whether they consent to his acting in/bringing these proceedings and on what basis. These letters say different things and the authenticity of some of them is questioned by the Defendants (hence the proposed directions in this regard: see, further, below). For present purposes it is sufficient to note that:

I note that no reference to the letters of 30 April or 29 November is made by Ms Cramphorn in her covering email, and nor does she explain how these letters came to be written.

At 19:30 on 7 May 2026 (i.e after the hearing) Mr Lodhia emailed to the court further submissions and evidence which touched on the recall of the 11 December 2025 Begbies Traynor letter. I have considered these documents and, for the time being, as I have said, I will approach the bankruptcy point and the costs issues on the assumption that there has been no misconduct by Mr Lodhia in this regard. Whether there has been can be revisited in the light of the evidence which results from the directions which I propose to make: see, further, below.

Mr Lodhia’s submission under this heading was not entirely clear. It is apparent from the correspondence that, throughout the proceedings, he has been taking the position that (despite the position of Begbies Traynor in the second letter of 11 December 2025 referred to above) he is not personally liable for any adverse costs order and that such liability would attach to the estate in bankruptcy. He also has asserted this position vigorously in without prejudice negotiations. His skeleton argument adopted the same position and referred to sections 283 and 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986, Heath v Tang [1993] 1 WLR 1421 and Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty v Todd & Others (No 2) [2004] UKPC 39 with a view to submitting that the Trustees should be given the opportunity to respond to what he called “the potential non-party costs order”. His written submissions of 5 May 2026 addressed the authorities relied on by the Defendants and submitted that these supported his contention that the malicious falsehood claim was a chose in action which vested in the trustee in bankruptcy and that the neutral position of Begbies Traynor meant that they would comply with an adverse costs order against the estate.

However, when I pointed out to Mr Lodhia that the Defendants were not seeking any order for costs against the Trustees – they were seeking an order against him personally – he appeared to accept that it was open to them to do so and that his argument did not prevent them from doing so. However, he said that the Trustees “could not have their cake and eat it”. They could not consent to him bringing the Claim on the basis that they were entitled to the fruits of the litigation if it was successful but would not be subject to any adverse costs order if it was unsuccessful. If a costs order were made against him they should therefore also be liable. He thought that they would therefore want the opportunity to respond to the Defendants’ applications for costs and they should therefore have been served.

In my view, Mr Lodhia’s arguments under this heading do not prevent me from determining the issues as to costs which are currently before the court. Any order against him which I make is not a bankruptcy debt or liability for the purposes of section 382 of the Insolvency Act or Part 14 of the Insolvency Rules 2016 given that there was no relevant “obligation incurred before the commencement of the bankruptcy” (section 382(1)(b)). The Newsletter was not written until after his bankruptcy, and any order which I might make would be made long after the bankruptcy and, indeed, his being discharged from it: see, also, In re Nortel GmBH (in administration) [2013] UKSC 52, [2014] AC 206.

In any event, the Trustees have been aware of these proceedings for some time and have not expressed any wish to participate or make representations or otherwise be involved. Their view, which I share, is that Mr Lodhia is liable in respect of any order for costs against him and they are not. If Mr Lodhia thought that they should be before the court it was open to him to take steps to bring this about. If he considers that the Trustees are liable in costs as a result of any order which I make against him, he will have to take this up with them.

I also note, because it is relevant to the issue of directions for further evidence, that Mr Lodhia did not rely on the “detailed judgment” of Master Dagnall to which the first 11 December Begbies Traynor letter refers. He also relied on this “judgment” in his correspondence with the Defendants’ solicitors as establishing that he was immune from any order for costs. He had been asked by rradar for a copy, as it could not be found, but he refused to provide it. When I asked him, in the context of the question of further directions, whether he would be willing for me to direct that he provide it he said that it was not a judgment, it was a minute or note of the hearing before the Master on 13 August 2025. He was, however, prepared to provide a copy.

At 17:09 on 7 May 2026 (again, after the hearing) Mr Lodhia then sent through Master Dagnall’s Order, dated 2 October 2025, in three other (apparently unrelated) cases in which Mr Lodhia was a claimant (QB-2022-000089, 001776 & 001965). It appears from this Order that his claims had been struck out for failure to comply with an Unless Order dated 27 June 2023 (i.e. before the bankruptcy). He was ordered to pay the Defendants’ costs but section 281 of the Insolvency Act 1986 was held to apply and the costs were held to be a provable debt in the bankruptcy. Mr Lodhia also enclosed a 2 page minute of the hearing on 2 October 2025 (not 13 August 2025) which he had made.

These documents do not have a bearing on the issue which I have to decide in the present case. However, the fact that there is no actual judgment came as something of a surprise given that this is how it was described in the correspondence, given the terms of the 11 December letter and given, for example, that when, on 15 December 2025, rradar wrote to Ms Cramphorn asking for a copy of the judgment, Mr Lodhia told them that he had asked Ms Cramphorn not to reply: “The judgment can be obtained from the High Court KBD which you are clearly aware of.” He was asked again for a copy of the judgment and he again said that such requests should be directed to the High Court: “Continued attempts to extract this from us unnecessarily increase both my firm’s costs and my own. We will not be responding to further correspondence on this issue”. The 6 May hearing appears to have been the first time that he admitted that there was in fact no judgment which Begbies Traynor could have seen for the purposes of its first/draft letter of 11 December 2025.

Mr Lodhia told me that he had entered into a LPA with his father in respect of his property and financial affairs. He argued that his father should therefore have been served in accordance with CPR Rules 6.13 (service of the claim form on children and protected parties) and 6.25 (service of an application for an order appointing a litigation friend). In his skeleton argument he wrote:

“The Mental Capacity Act 2005 grants the attorney full authority over the donor’s financial matters. This has been in place for the Claimant since shortly after his tragic accident in October 2023, which left him disabled with a brain injury.”

Mr Lodhia submitted that this is a case in which SG v Hewitt [2012] EWCA Civ 1053 (actually a case about the operation of CPR Part 36 in the context of an application for approval of a settlement of a brain injury claim on behalf of a child and therefore irrelevant to the present case) applies. In the light of Hewitt it would be procedurally unfair to deal with matters today without service on his father and without representation by Counsel.

I asked Mr Lodhia to show me a copy of the LPA and he said that it was not in any of the bundles. I asked him whether this issue had been raised earlier in the litigation and he said that it had. I asked him why the claim was not brought by a litigation friend and why neither he nor JSC Chambers had previously indicated that he needed one if, as he appeared to be suggesting, he was a “protected party” to whom CPR Rule 21 applies i.e. a person who lacks capacity to conduct the proceedings within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. He said that he did not need a litigation friend because he had the consent of the trustees in bankruptcy. I asked him whether his father was aware of the litigation and he said that he was; so I asked why his father was not at the hearing. I was told that his father was in hospital. When I asked how long he had been in hospital, Mr Lodhia indicated that he was only in hospital for the day.

Mr Lodhia then sent through a copy of the LPA to my clerk in the lunchtime adjournment on 6 May. This document is dated 23 February 2024 and it appears to show that both of his parents had been appointed as attorneys.

I am afraid that Mr Lodhia’s arguments based on the LPA do not make any sense. When he was asked by rradar, on 20 April 2026, for a copy of the LPA so that it could be included in the bundle for the hearing he told them “We reiterate our earlier position. The Lasting Power of Attorney is not relevant to the issues before the Court and we are not obliged to provide access to it. That request should now cease.” He was right that the LPA is irrelevant to the issues which I have to determine, but it raises the question why, then, he put forward these arguments at the hearing on 6 May.

There is no evidence before me that Mr Lodhia lacks capacity (i.e.is unable to make a decision for himself because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain) or has lacked capacity at any stage of this litigation. His Particulars of Claim and other documents in the proceedings boast in some detail of his alleged public profile, abilities and successes. As noted above, he says that he works as a legal consultant at JSC, that he is responsible for the day to day handling of leaseholder disputes with TTMC and Urang, that he has had considerable success in “pre action litigation” and that he has brought at least 2 other claims in his own name.

It is true that Mr Lodhia also describes himself as disabled and vulnerable. He has submitted some evidence in support of this claim in the form of “to whom it may concern” letters from a Dr Myrto Tsakopoulou of East London NHS Foundation Trust. Dr Tsakopoulou was at the material times a Complex Emotional Needs and Complex Trauma Lead Psychologist. She says that Mr Lodhia has complex post-traumatic stress disorder and is receiving treatment from her for complex trauma. On 17 July 2025, she said that, by way of reasonable adjustments to these proceedings, Mr Lodhia would need information to be shared in a clear and concise manner, and communication to be slowed down so as to ensure that he understands. He would need breaks if he became overwhelmed and (per a separate undated letter) breaks of 20-30 minutes every 90 minutes or so. Dr Tsakopoulou also implied that Mr Lodhia has “difficulties with concentration, information processing, and managing stress in high-pressure environments”.

Dr Tsakopoulou, who was specifically addressing the question of reasonable adjustments for the purposed of these proceedings, does not suggest that Mr Lodhia lacks capacity to conduct the proceedings and her evidence falls a very long way short of establishing this. Indeed, even making allowances for the fact that the types of symptoms described by Dr Tsakopoulou are not always obvious, and for her greater relevant expertise, the other evidence which I have seen – Mr Lodhia’s letters to rradar and the court, his multiple witness statements, his written arguments and the speed with which they were prepared, as well as his performance at the hearing on 6 May - cast real doubt on whether Mr Lodhia continues to experience the impairments identified by Dr Tsakopoulou. It may be that he has recovered or, at least, his symptoms have improved since she wrote her letters: the last one was dated 10 February 2026 and he was apparently undergoing treatment at that time which would come to an end on 2 April. But I saw no sign at all of the difficulties which Dr Tsakopoulou describes: quite the contrary. Nor did Mr Lodhia indicate that he was experiencing any of these difficulties at any stage of the hearing.

I therefore reject Mr Lodhia’s arguments in relation to the LPA.

As is very well known, costs are in the discretion of the court: see CPR Rule 44.2. Rule 44.2(2) provides that the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party but that the court may make a different order.

Rule 44.2(4) provides:

“(4)

In deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court will have regard to all the circumstances, including –

(a)

the conduct of all the parties;

(b)

whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if that party has not been wholly successful; and

(c)

any admissible offer to settle made by a party which is drawn to the court’s attention, and which is not an offer to which costs consequences under Part 36 apply.”

Under Rule 44.2(5) the conduct of the parties includes:

“(a)

conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings and in particular the extent to which the parties followed the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct or any relevant pre-action protocol;

(b)

whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue;

(c)

the manner in which a party has pursued or defended its case or a particular allegation or issue;

(d)

whether a claimant who has succeeded in the claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated its claim; and

(e)

whether a party failed to comply with an order for alternative dispute resolution, or unreasonably failed to engage in alternative dispute resolution.”

Rule 44.3 deals with the basis for assessment, and Rule 44.4 deals with the factors which are relevant in deciding the amount of costs. These include, at 44.4(3):

“(a)

the conduct of all the parties, including in particular –

(i)

conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings; and

(ii)

the efforts made, if any, before and during the proceedings in order to try to resolve the dispute;

(b)

the amount or value of any money or property involved;

(c)

the importance of the matter to all the parties;

(d)

the particular complexity of the matter or the difficulty or novelty of the questions raised;

(e)

the skill, effort, specialised knowledge and responsibility involved;

(f)

the time spent on the case;…”

In relation to discontinuance, Rule 36.8(1) provides that:

“Unless the court ordersotherwise, a claimant who discontinues is liable for the costs which a defendant against whom the claimant discontinues incurred on or before the date on which notice of discontinuance was served on the defendant.” (emphasis added)

The applicable principles in relation to this provision were helpfully set out by Moore-Bick LJ in Brookes v HSBC Bank plc [2011] EWCA Civ 354 at [6] as follows:

“(1)

when a claimant discontinues the proceedings, there is a presumption by reason of CPR 38.6 that the defendant should recover his costs; the burden is on the claimant to show a good reason for departing from that position;

(2)

the fact that the claimant would or might well have succeeded at trial is not itself a sufficient reason for doing so;

(3)

however, if it is plain that the claim would have failed, that is an additional factor in favour of applying the presumption;

(4)

the mere fact that the claimant’s decision to discontinue may have been motivated by practical, pragmatic or financial reasons as opposed to a lack of confidence in the merits of the case will not suffice to displace the presumption;

(5)

if the claimant is to succeed in displacing the presumption he will usually need to show a change of circumstances to which he has not himself contributed;

(6)

however, no change in circumstances is likely to suffice unless it has been brought about by some form of unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant which in all the circumstances provides a good reason for departing from the rule.”

At [10] Moore-Bick LJ said:

“10.

It is clear, therefore, from the terms of the rule itself and from the authorities that a claimant who seeks to persuade the court to depart from the normal position must provide cogent reasons for doing so and is unlikely to satisfy that requirement save in unusual circumstances.”

Mr Lodhia also referred to Nelson’s Yard Management Co v Ezieful [2013] EWCA Civ 235 at [14] where these principles were cited with approval. At [15] Beatson LJ said that:

“the context for the Court's mandatory consideration of all the circumstances under CPR 44.3 is the determination of whether there is a good reason to depart from the presumption imposed by CPR 38.6 ”.

Mr Lodhia emphasised the caveat to Rule 38.6 which I have highlighted at [41] above. He submitted, and I accept, that unreasonable conduct which takes the form of failure to comply with pre action protocols or to respond to, or engage with, pre action correspondence, may provide a good reason to depart from the Rule 38.6 presumption. He also referred to Scheinberg v Van Doorn & Others [2019] EWHC 3220 at [41]-[52] where such a failure was taken into account in displacing the presumption. In the light of the approach taken by the Master in Scheinberg I also propose to proceed on the assumption that, whether or not there has been a change of circumstances, in considering the consequences of discontinuance under Rule 38.6 it is open to me to disallow the Defendants’ costs in whole or in part or, indeed, to make an order in Mr Lodhia’s favour, if there has been unreasonable conduct on the Defendants’ side. I was not addressed on this question in any detail by either of the parties and therefore make this assumption for present purposes only.

Rule 44.2(8) provides that:

“(8)

Where the court orders a party to pay costs subject to detailed assessment, it will order that party to pay a reasonable sum on account of costs, unless there is good reason not to do so.”

In Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc & Others [2015] EWHC 566 (Comm) at [22]-[24] Christopher Clarke LJ said that any figure ordered to be paid on account of costs pursuant to Rule 44.2(8) need not be “the irreducible minimum” in terms of what was likely to be recovered on a detailed assessment:

“23.

What is a reasonable amount will depend on the circumstances, the chief of which is that there will, by definition, have been no detailed assessment and thus an element of uncertainty, the extent of which may differ widely from case to case as to what will be allowed on detailed assessment. Any sum will have to be an estimate. A reasonable sum would often be one that was an estimate of the likely level of recovery subject….to an appropriate margin to allow for error in the estimation. This can be done by taking the lowest figure in a likely range or making a deduction from a single estimated figure or perhaps from the lowest figure in the range if the range itself is not very broad.

24.

In determining whether to order any payment and its amount, account needs to be taken of all relevant factors including the likelihood (if it can be assessed) of the [receiving party] being awarded the costs that they seek or a lesser and if so what proportion of them; the difficulty, if any, that may be faced in recovering those costs; the likelihood of a successful appeal; the means of the parties; the imminence of any assessment; any relevant delay and whether the paying party will have any difficulty in recovery in the case of any overpayment.”

Mr Price’s position in his skeleton argument appeared implicitly to be that in a case of discontinuance Rule 38.6 operates to resolve any outstanding costs issues in relation to applications made in the course of the proceedings, in favour of the defendant. Certainly, his skeleton did not consider the costs issues in relation to the summary disposal application, the applications to postpone etc on their merits. At the hearing, I understood him to modify his position so that he was submitting that this was the starting point, and the context in which Mr Lodhia’s arguments in relation to these issues should be examined. In effect, those arguments were that I should “order otherwise” for the purposes of Rule 38.6. Mr Price said that he was not aware of any law on this question and nor did Mr Lodhia draw attention to any. From an abundance of caution I therefore propose to consider what orders would have been made in relation to each of these items assuming that Mr Lodhia had not discontinued the claim on 30 April 2026. I will then deal with the costs consequences of the notice to discontinue.

Finally, in fairness to Mr Lodhia, save where the contrary is expressly stated, in relation to all of the issues on costs I will assume (for present purposes only) that all of the concerns about the veracity/authenticity of aspects of his evidence which are addressed in Steyn J’s Order of 29 April 2026, and in the further directions which I intend to make, are unfounded and will in due course be allayed by the further evidence which is produced.

On 15 July 2025, the TTMC Defendants applied for the following in relation to Mr Lodhia’s Claim as then pleaded:

The summary disposal application was supported by witness statements from each of the Third to Fifth Defendants who explained their roles in relation to TTMC and the Newsletter.

Mr Lodhia vigorously resisted this application in written submissions dated 20 August 2025 and thereafter until Sunday 11 January 2026 when he served an application to amend the Particulars of Claim pursuant to CPR r. 17.1(2)(b) (“the amendment application”). The draft Amended Particulars of Claim (“APoC”) included significant changes to Mr Lodhia’s case but they were not opposed by the Defendants. Of particular significance in relation to costs, however, there were the following proposed amendments:

In other words, Mr Lodhia now conceded the summary disposal application in its entirety and narrowed his case further than that application required.

In his application notice in January, Mr Lodhia sought the dismissal of the summary disposal application on the ground that it was “otiose” in the light of the proposed amendments to the Particulars of Claim, as indeed it now was. He also sought his costs of that application and the amendment application on the basis that the Defendants had failed to comply with the Pre-Action Protocol for Media and Communications Claims (“the PAP”).

The amendment application was supported by Mr Lodhia’s fourth witness statement, dated 10 January 2026. In this statement he said that he had sent a letter to the solicitors for the TTMC on 6 March 2025 which complied with the PAP. He had then sent a further letter of claim to TTMC and Urang on 7 March, by first class post, which he exhibited. This letter threatened a claim in defamation and asked for all persons involved in the authorship, editing and publication of the Newsletter to be identified. “No Defendant responded at all to either Letter of Claim. There was no acknowledgement, no substantive response, and no engagement of any kind with the Protocol.” and so he had issued proceedings on 15 May 2025. As he had no factual confirmation as to which individual Defendants authorised, edited, approved or authored the Newsletter he was forced to plead on the basis of reasonable inference from the fact of the publication, the corporate roles of the Defendants and the manner of dissemination of the Newsletter. He had sought further information in July 2025 but had not received it until he read the witness statements which supported the summary disposal application. The Defendants should therefore pay his costs.

Before me, Mr Lodhia’s position remained that I should order the Defendants to pay his costs of the summary disposal application and his application to amend, as the Defendants’ alleged breaches of the PAP had caused him to incur unnecessary costs. In the alternative, he submitted that the costs should be in the case. The Defendants’ position was that there was no breach of the PAP, nor any failure to engage in the course of the pre-action correspondence. The amendment application conceded the summary disposal application and discontinued against the Fourth and Fifth Defendants. It followed that Mr Lodhia should pay the costs of the summary disposal application and/or the costs thrown away by reason of the amendments regardless of the outcome of the application for costs on the subsequent discontinuance of the proceedings as a whole.

I agree that, even assuming no subsequent discontinuance of the Claim as a whole, Mr Lodhia should pay the Defendants’ costs of the summary disposal application, the discontinuance against the Fourth and Fifth Defendants and the amendment application in any event. Essentially, this is because I do not accept that there was any breach of the PAP by the Defendants, nor any failure to engage reasonably with Mr Lodhia in correspondence. But, even if this is wrong, I do not accept that this made any difference to Mr Lodhia’s approach to starting, pleading and pursuing his case. His approach in the correspondence to the arguments which subsequently formed the basis of the summary disposal application was also unreasonable and directly gave rise to the need to make that application.

As to the first point, the PAP does not specifically require a prospective claimant (or defendant) to identify who authorised, edited, approved or authored the publication and nor does it require the potential defendant to do so. Nor does CPR Practice Direction 53B specifically require these matters to be pleaded: the principal target of the claim in defamation is the publisher of the statements complained of. In this case the publisher was TTMC, as was apparent on the face of the Newsletter and as Mr Lodhia was therefore well aware.

As far as cooperation in the context of the pre action correspondence and causation of the costs in issue are concerned, first, there is an issue as to whether Mr Lodhia actually asked who authorised, edited, approved or authored the Newsletter prior to commencing proceedings. In the 6 March 2025 pre action letter which threatened a claim in defamation against TTMC on the basis that it, through its representatives, was the publisher of the Newsletter, the furthest he went was to seek “a written explanation of how these defamatory statements were approved for publication and by whom”.

As set out in Ms Yates’ fifth witness statement and Mr Price’s skeleton argument there is an issue as to whether the second pre action letter of 7 March 2025, on which Mr Lodhia relied in his fourth witness statement, was really sent. Why did Mr Lodhia decide to send a further PAP letter the next day and why by post only, and not by email as well as post? Ms Yates’ evidence is also that the 7 March letter was not received although the 6 March letter was, albeit on 12 March.

I note that in his fourth witness statement Mr Lodhia says that the 7 March letter was sent to TTMC and Urang. He does not suggest that letters were sent to the Third to Fifth Defendants separately. Mr Price showed me, in Mr Lodhia’s bundle served the day before the hearing, individual second letters of claim which were dated 6 March and addressed to each of the Third to Fifth Defendants. These letters all threatened a claim in defamation and asked for all persons involved in the authorship, editing and publication of the Newsletter to be identified. There is also a series of certificates of service of the 6 and 7 March letters in that bundle. I was told that this was the first time in the litigation that the individual letters or the certificates of service had been produced or referred to by Mr Lodhia. Mr Price also pointed out that the certificates of service all purport to have been signed by Mr Lodhia on 7 March 2025. However, they bear the case number for these proceedings which were not issued until more than 2 months later; they therefore cannot have been completed until after 15 May. In response to this point, Mr Lodhia told me that he believed that the right approach to the certificates was to backdate them, and that he would produce receipts to show that the letters were posted by first class post. He denied that they had been sent by recorded delivery when I said that I had understood that this was his position. These issues are the subject of directions below.

I am prepared to assume, for present purposes only, that the 7 March letter was posted to TTMC and Urang as Mr Lodhia alleges. I will make no assumption or finding one way or other at this stage in relation to the individual letters to the Third to Fifth Defendants. However, I see no reason why I should reject Ms Yates’ evidence that the 7 March letter was not received.

Even if the letter of 7 March was received, I do not accept that there was a failure to engage or a breach of the PAP on the part of the Defendants, nor that this had any bearing on Mr Lodhia’s approach to the Claim. Contrary to Mr Lodhia’s fourth witness statement, Rradar did respond to the 6 March letter to TTMC on 20 March 2025. They pointed out (correctly) that Mr Lodhia’s letter did not comply with the PAP in that it did not identify the specific statements complained of or give details of the serious harm alleged, whereas this information was needed if they were to respond substantively. That day, instead of providing the information requested by rradar, Mr Lodhia then set a deadline of 24 March for various demands to be met. The correspondence continued including, on 21 March, Mr Lodhia announcing by email that proceedings were being prepared against TTMC and personally against the Third to Fifth Defendants. On 24 March, he stated that the proceedings had now been prepared and a further email on this date informed rradar that proceedings had been issued on CE File and that a sealed version of the claim form would be served in due course. This was despite the fact that Mr Lodhia was not under any limitation pressure. Moreover, it does not appear that any lack of information held him back or caused him to hesitate.

Indeed, the original Particulars of Claim, which are dated 25 March 2025, correctly plead, at [4], that Mr Squires was the principal author and/or editor of the Newsletter (see also [59]-[64]). At [5] and [6] it is pleaded that the Fourth and Fifth Defendants are directors with decision making oversight in relation to TTMC residents and therefore jointly liable for the publication and its consequences. The original Particulars of Claim (at [51]-[58]) contend that the corporate veil should be pierced in relation to the Defendants who were directors, and particulars of the case that they were not acting as agents of TTMC are pleaded. The case against the Fourth and Fifth Defendants therefore is not pleaded simply on the basis that they were authors of the Newsletters. This is not a case in which the pleader based his case on an allegation that they were authors in circumstances where the true position had not been revealed to him in correspondence, and then discontinued that case when the true position became apparent.

Although the Claim Form was apparently sent to the court (see also Mr Lodhia’s email of 26 March 2025) there were apparently “technical issues in sealing the claim form” (see his email of 13 April 2025). The stamp on the Claim Form states that it was filed on 30 April and issued on 15 May as I have said. It was then served on 21 May 2025.

On 13 June 2025, a letter from rradar to Mr Lodhia told him in terms that he was right to plead that Mr Squires was the author of the Newsletter but argued that there was no viable case against the Fourth and Fifth Defendants (see [8]-[13] of that letter). The terms of section 10 of the Defamation Act 2013 were set out, as were the flaws in Mr Lodhia’s case in this regard. The difficulties with piercing the corporate veil were also pointed out. He was invited to discontinue against the Fourth and Fifth Defendants and told that an application would be made to the court if he did not do so.

He did not do so. Instead, Mr Lodhia continued robustly and somewhat high handedly to dismiss rradar’s arguments in relation to the Fourth and Fifth Defendants, to assert that they were personally liable for the actions of Mr Squires and to contest other aspects of the Defendants’ position, including in relation to malicious falsehood and meaning. On 26 June 2025, rradar wrote to him again, repeating the arguments which subsequently formed the basis for the summary disposal application and stating that, if he persisted in his stance, they would seek instructions to make that application. They also pointed out that they would need to make any application by 15 July 2025 as that was the deadline for their clients’ Defences. There was a further attempt to persuade Mr Lodhia to see sense by letter dated 30 June 2025, but he continued to dismiss the Defendants’ arguments in the course of multiple emails to rradar up to and including 15 July 2025.

The facts are therefore not quite as Mr Lodhia presented them in his fourth witness statement. I also reject his argument that there was unreasonable conduct by the Defendants or any of them prior to the issuing of the summary disposal application. He was given every opportunity to make concessions which would avoid the need for an application to the court, but he did not do so. If anyone was unreasonable it was Mr Lodhia in filing his claim so soon and then failing to engage with the Defendants’ arguments in relation to the claims in malicious falsehood and against the Fourth and Fifth Defendants which were clearly explained to him but ignored. Nor do I accept that any actions of the Defendants caused him to plead the case in the way that he did.

As to causation, in addition to the points made above, Mr Lodhia accepts that the position was clear from the witness statements served in support of the summary disposal application. However, this did not cause him to reflect or alter his approach or his tone. On the contrary, on 15 July 2025 he immediately responded that the Defendants’ arguments under section 10 of the 2013 Act were “misconceived” and that the Third and Fifth Defendants had made “fatal” admissions in their witness statements. On 20 August 2025, Mr Lodhia filed and served a formal “Claimant’s Response to Jurisdiction, Strike out and Summary Judgment Application” which again described the summary disposal application as “misconceived” and continued to assert his claims as pleaded. The pattern of multiple and robust communications from him continued and, as I have noted, it was not until 11 January 2026 that he indicated, in effect, that he wished to concede the summary disposal application.

When I asked Mr Lodhia why, if the information which he said he sought in the letters of 6 and 7 March 2025 was critical, he did not discontinue shortly after 15 July when he had this information, he told me that he was a litigant in person and that he understood that he had been ordered or required to resist the summary disposal application. When I asked what he was referring to he showed me [5] of Master Armstrong’s Order of 16 December 2025. This required him to file and serve “any” evidence in response within 21 days. He said that he now appreciated (he appeared to suggest that this was for the first time when we looked at [5] of the Order together) that the Order did not require him to resist the application, but he did not realise this at the time.

I regret to say that I do not regard these answers as truthful, not just because Master Armstrong’s Order did not require him to do any such thing but also because the Order postdates, by a number of months, his decision to take the position that the summary disposal application was “misconceived” and to file submissions accordingly. That Order cannot have caused him to take the stance which he took.

For all of these reasons, I am quite satisfied that Mr Lodhia should pay the costs of the summary disposal application given that the Defendants were wholly successful in relation to this application. He should also pay the Fourth and Fifth Defendants’ costs of the proceedings given that he discontinued against them: there was no change of circumstances and nor was there any unreasonable conduct on their part which would lead me to conclude that he should do otherwise. And he should pay the costs thrown away by reason of his application to amend given that the need to amend to make his concessions arose through his approach to the proceedings, and in any event. The need for his change of approach in relation to the number of statements complained of and other aspects of his pleaded case was also entirely the result of decisions which he took, rather than the actions of the Defendants or any of them.

In coming to this conclusion I have considered the without prejudice steps taken by Mr Lodhia and the offers of settlement made by him but, for reasons I will explain below, they do not suggest that the outcome on costs in relation to these items would have been, or should now be, different. This is not a case, for example, in which, when Mr Lodhia appreciated that there was a need to amend he sought to reach agreement to this course on a reasonable basis but was rebuffed unreasonably by the Defendants. On the contrary, his volte face was unheralded and his application of 11 January included the unreasonable contention that the Defendants should pay his costs.

As noted above, on 13 November 2025 the summary disposal application was listed for hearing with the trial of preliminary issues (“the Combined Hearing”) for 21 and 22 January 2026 by order of Steyn J.

The application to postpone this hearing was made by Mr Lodhia on Thursday 15 January 2026 and granted by order of Collins Rice J on Monday 19 January 2026. She commented that the late postponement was unfortunate as preparations were necessarily well advanced, but she attached particular weight to medical evidence which was supplied with the application notice in the form of a letter from Dr Tsakopoulou dated 15 January 2026. This said that Mr Lodhia had been clinically reviewed in December and a decision was made that his treatment would be extended to the end of February. As part of this treatment plan he was required to attend hospital in Mile End every Thursday between 1 and 2pm. One of the days of the hearing was a Thursday.

By the time of the 6 May hearing there was an issue as to the authenticity of Dr Tsakopoulou’s letter given that, until his application on 15 January 2026, the basis for Mr Lodhia saying that a postponement was required was the non- availability of his Counsel of choice (Mr Chiffers, although Mr Lodhia conducted the correspondence and made the application). Before this, Mr Lodhia did not mention the need to attend hospital although the Defendants say that he must have been aware of it in December. Further directions in this regard are discussed below.

Although I understand why the Defendants raise this issue, I am willing to assume for present purposes that the 15 January 2026 letter is entirely genuine. Even on this assumption, however, Mr Lodhia should pay the costs of the first application to postpone.

The just course was and is to order that Mr Lodhia pay any costs thrown away by reason of the postponement and, in any event, he could not have hoped to have done better than an order that costs would be in the case. This is relevant in the context of the 30 April notice of discontinuance: see further below.

On 12 February 2026 there was a listing appointment to relist the adjourned January hearing. Mr Lodhia failed to attend this appointment and it was relisted for 6 and 7 May 2026.

On 19 February 2026, Mr Lodhia applied to postpone the May hearing on the grounds that Mr Chiffers was not available. On 4 April 2026 he then issued an application to stay the proceedings until 30 September 2026 so as to facilitate mediation.

On 17 April 2026, both applications were refused by Steyn J. She referred to the 15 January application to postpone and noted that the Mr Lodhia had then failed to attend the listing appointment. She found that he had no reasonable excuse for failing to do so, particularly given that the hearing was being relisted at his request. She noted that there had been delay in the proceedings and that Mr Lodhia had had plenty of time to instruct alternative counsel or, alternatively, he could represent himself given that the issues were not particularly complex. She noted that the Defendants were willing in principle to engage in mediation but agreed with them that this did not mean that the proceedings should be stayed given the delays which there had been.

Steyn J reserved the costs of the second postponement application and the application for a stay to the May hearing. I am quite satisfied that they should be borne by Mr Lodhia given that both applications failed. Indeed, ultimately I did not understand him to argue otherwise.

On 29 April 2026, Mr Lodhia filed a further application to postpone the May hearing. This application was supported by his tenth witness statement, dated 24 April 2026, and the application notice appears to have been signed by Mr Chiffers as his representative although Mr Lodhia conducted the correspondence. Mr Lodhia’s tenth witness statement explained that, on 21 April 2026, he had become aware that he was required to attend oral assessments in criminal law and contract law, as part of his course at the University of Law, on 6 and 7 May 2026 respectively. He had attempted to reschedule these assessments but had been told by the University of Law Programme Lead, Ms Salome Verrell, that they could not be rescheduled. In these circumstances he asked for the May hearing to be vacated.

In response, Ms Yates filed her sixth witness statement, dated 29 April 2026. Bluntly, this cast doubt on the veracity of what Mr Lodhia had said in his tenth witness statement. She also questioned, at the very least, the completeness of the documents which he had exhibited.

Mr Lodhia then submitted an eleventh witness statement which was dated 29 April 2026. This explained that, on 29 April, he had been told that the oral assessment on 6 May could be rescheduled and he was therefore able to attend on that day but not on 7 May. His position was now that the preliminary issues as to meaning could be determined but that the issues as to costs should be postponed.

On 29 April 2026, Steyn J refused Mr Lodhia’s application as framed when it was made but, in the light of his eleventh witness statement, ordered that the Combined Hearing would take place on 6 May 2026 starting at 10am. She expressly refused Mr Lodhia’s request to postpone the hearing of the issues in relation to costs. The costs of Mr Lodhia’s application were reserved to the 6 May hearing.

The Defendants resisted Mr Lodhia’s application to vacate the hearing and argued that one day would not be sufficient to dispose of all of the issues given Mr Lodhia’s need for breaks. On this basis, Mr Lodhia argues that his application was successful and the Defendants should pay the costs. In my view his application was not successful in that the hearing was not vacated, as he originally asked. He did then modify his application but unsuccessfully argued that it should not deal with the issue of costs. On balance I take the view that he should pay the costs of this application but in any event the best he could have hoped for was an order for costs in the case. There is no justification for ordering that the Defendants pay his costs.

Steyn J also had concerns as to the veracity of Mr Lodhia’s claims about his exam timetable and the authenticity and completeness of the documents which he had submitted in support of his 29 April application. These concerns are explained in the Reasons for her Order which she gave. As she explained, she therefore made orders which were intended to give Mr Lodhia an opportunity to allay those concerns. In summary, she ordered:

The University of Law legal services department then sent Mr Lodhia a letter dated 30 April 2026 which was provided to the court. It appeared from this letter that Mr Lodhia had provided Ms Verrell with “an unsealed word version of an Order” rather than the sealed Order made by Steyn J which had been a pdf. The letter said that it was unclear whether this was a genuine order and that the University was unaware of the proceedings and did not understand why Ms Verrell was being asked to provide a witness statement (although this was apparent on the face of the sealed Order). It also appeared that Mr Lodhia had sent Ms Verrell a draft witness statement for her to approve, but the letter said that she had not had any discussion with him about the content of the draft and she wished to make clear that it was not her witness evidence. The letter requested a copy of any sealed order and indicated that the deadline for compliance was too tight.

In the light of this, on 30 April Steyn J extended the deadlines for compliance with her 29 April Order as follows: the deadline for Mr Lodhia’s witness statement was now 4.30pm on Tuesday 5 May, and the deadline for the witness statement of Ms Verrell was Friday 15 May 2026. Steyn J also caused a copy of her Order of 29 April and Mr Lodhia’s tenth and eleventh witness statements and their exhibits to be sent directly to Ms Verrell and the University by email given that it appeared that Mr Lodhia had not provided them with these documents as required by the 29 April Order.

Following Steyn J’s 29 April Order, on 30 April:

Mr Lodhia argued that the usual consequences of discontinuing proceedings, as set out in Rule 38.6, should not follow in this case. He put forward a number of reasons why the presumption identified in this Rule was rebutted and/or the Defendants’ costs should be disallowed. I have considered them all (including the arguments and evidence which he submitted after the hearing on 6 May) but they do not, individually or cumulatively, amount to a relevant change of circumstances and/or one which has been brought about by some form of unreasonable conduct on the part of the Defendants which in all the circumstances provides a good reason for departing from the Rule. Nor do they amount to unreasonable conduct on the part of the Defendants or any of them which would cause me, in the exercise of my discretion, to disallow their costs in whole or in part.

A number of Mr Lodhia’s arguments are, I am afraid, hopeless and I therefore do not intend to spend time on them. Examples include his argument that he should not be required to pay twice given that part of the service charges which he pays in respect of residence in the Maltings goes towards TTMC’s budget for legal expenses, and his argument that the doctrine of estoppel/approbation/reprobation applies to prevent TTMC from recovering its costs of this litigation given that it has elected to recover its costs through the service charge. Obviously, TTMC is entitled both to levy service charges and to claim its costs of these proceedings against Mr Lhodia: there is no inconsistency between these two positions and no question of double recovery or other unfairness in its doing so.

I will, however, briefly address Mr Lodhia’s key arguments in turn, although I have also had regard to their cumulative effect.

The first was that there had been late disclosure of information as to the authorship, editorship and publisher details in relation to the Newsletter, breaches of the PAP and failure to engage with the issues in correspondence. I have already dealt with this topic: see [54] - [73] above. Insofar as the service of the statements of the Third to Fifth in support of the summary disposal application was a relevant change of circumstances (which it was not) it occurred more than 9 months before discontinuance. For the reasons which I have given, nor was there unreasonableness on the part of the Defendants in this regard.

Second, Mr Lodhia alleged that the Defendants’ position on meaning had shifted in relation to two of the six statements complained of, and that this added to the costs of the preliminary trial as to meaning. There is nothing in this point and I note that Mr Lodhia did not develop it orally. The Defendants’ position did not materially shift and in any event their approach had no significant impact on costs. It was Mr Lodhia’s approach to pleading the statements complained of – i.e. to complain of eleven statements and then reduce this to six several months later and shortly before the trial of the issues as to meaning - which unnecessarily increased the costs in this regard.

Third, Mr Lodhia relied on Mr Squires’ alleged defamatory statements in relation to him at the 29 April AGM. It appears that Mr Squires referred to this litigation and made uncomplimentary remarks which, Mr Lodhia argues, were implicitly about him. These included implying that he was a rat, or comparing him to one, that he was pretending to be lawyer and that he was cynically exploiting leaseholders at the Maltings for personal financial gain (i.e. arguably continuing the themes of the Newsletter). Mr Squires is also alleged to have said that “someone may end up bankrupt at the end of it” but he could not say who. Mr Lodhia says that this was a reference to him which was intended to intimidate him and undermine him in the eyes of the community which he serves professionally although, of course, he must have already appreciated the potential costs consequences of the proceedings which he had launched.

Assuming for present purposes that Mr Lodhia’s account and interpretation of what Mr Squires said are accurate I accept that this was a recent development but I do not regard it as a relevant change of circumstances. Mr Squires remarks were a reason for Mr Lodhia to continue with the Claim rather than discontinue. Whatever Mr Squires said or implied on 29 April did not, in my view, cause Mr Lodhia to discontinue and his skeleton argument does not suggest that it did. Rather, having decided that he wanted out of the litigation he alighted on this as a lever to use in an attempt to secure a drop hands settlement by threatening further proceedings if settlement could not be reached, and/or to avoid paying the costs of the proceedings. Even if Mr Squires’ conduct was unreasonable, this was not unreasonable conduct of the litigation and, in any event, it had no bearing on the costs of the proceedings.

Fourth, Mr Lodhia relied on the fact that the Defendants are insured in relation to this litigation.

Fifth, Mr Lodhia relied on the alleged insolvency of TTMC of which he implied that he had first become aware from a report of a NC Makin on 9 December 2025. This, he said, was a change of circumstances. It also meant that TTMC would not be able to satisfy any adverse costs order made against it in these proceedings. In fact, Mr Lodhia had a report from Mr Makin (chartered accountant) dated 2 August 2025 which said that TTMC was insolvent, was not trading and would shortly become entirely defunct (I note that this is not accepted by TTMC). Mr Lodhia relied on this report in, and exhibited it to, his 20 August 2025 submissions resisting the summary disposal application and seeking to continue the litigation on all fronts. In my view the insolvency issue was not a relevant change of circumstances and it had no bearing on Mr Lodhia’s decision to discontinue or on the costs of the litigation. TTMC was insured against any liabilities in damages or costs in respect of these proceedings and, in any event, as Mr Lodhia himself said at the 6 May hearing, he could recover against the other Defendants.

Having said this, at 1.40pm on Friday 8 May 2026 (i.e. after the hearing) Mr Lodhia submitted his eighteenth witness statement, dated 8 May 2026, in which he sought to demonstrate that the Defendants other than TTMC might not, individually or collectively, have been good for the money in the event that he had succeeded in his claim for damages and/or costs were awarded in his favour. He now said that this was a factor in his decision to discontinue. I decline to admit this statement in evidence for the purposes of this issue coming, as it did, after the 6 May hearing so that the Defendants have not had an opportunity to respond to it. I note that, in addition to what Mr Lodhia said at the hearing, before his eighteenth witness statement the pages and pages of statements and submissions which he put in did not suggest that the alleged impecuniosity of the Defendants other than TTMC caused him to discontinue. In any event, Mr Lodhia’s eighteenth witness statement does not suggest that the financial positions of the Defendants were something which he only became aware of shortly before 30 April or could not reasonably have been aware of at all material times. Nor do they amount to a relevant change of circumstances or unreasonable conduct on the part of the Defendants or provide any basis on which to displace the presumption under Rule 38.6.

Sixth, Mr Lodhia relied on the fact that he was discharged from bankruptcy after proceedings were issued. I have dealt with the bankruptcy issue above. Mr Lodhia’s discharge was not a relevant change of circumstances and did not amount to unreasonable conduct on the part of the Defendants or any of them.

Seventh, he relied on the Defendants’ refusal to accept various offers of settlement which he made and/or their alleged refusal to engage constructively with his proposals for mediation or other negotiation and/or to narrow the issues. The short answer to these arguments, having considered the without prejudice materials, is that Mr Lodhia has not done better in these proceedings than any offer to settle which he made, whether purportedly under Part 36 or by way of a Calderbank offer or otherwise. He has recovered nothing in these proceedings and is, instead, liable to pay substantial costs even leaving aside the effect of his 30 April notice of discontinuance. On the other hand, the Defendants did make a “without prejudice save as to costs” offer of settlement on 13 June 2025 which Mr Lodhia has failed to beat. They have also been prepared to engage in alternative dispute resolution through mediation. They engaged with Mr Lodhia’s proposals in this regard but it did not prove possible to reach agreement as to the terms of the mediation, let alone the terms of any settlement. There was no relevant change of circumstances in relation to this topic and nor was there unreasonable conduct on the part of the Defendants such as would lead to any of their costs being disallowed.

Eighth, Mr Lodhia relied on a complaint which he has made to the Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”) about a point which Ms Yates makes in her fourth witness statement. Although this will ultimately be a matter for the SRA to determine, there appears to be nothing in the point. In this statement Ms Yates was raising understandable (in the light of the evidence which I have seen) questions about what, precisely, the role of Mr Chiffers was in this litigation and whether he was supervising Mr Lodhia as alleged and, if so, how closely he was supervising him. The context was Mr Lodhia’s 19 February 2026 application to postpone the May hearing on the grounds of Mr Chiffers’ unavailability. In any event, Mr Lodhia’s complaint and Ms Yates’ witness statement are not a relevant change of circumstance and do not amount to unreasonable conduct on the part of the Defendants such as would lead me to disallow their costs.

In written submissions received at 7.30pm on 7 May (i.e. after the hearing) “JSC Chambers” (author unidentified) makes further criticisms of Ms Yates in relation to her seventh witness statement, dated 5 May. None of this has any bearing on the Rule 38.6 question given that the notice of discontinuance of the proceedings is dated 5 days earlier.

I will therefore order that Mr Lodhia will pay the costs of the proceedings up to the date of service of the notice of discontinuance. Those costs will be assessed on the standard basis, if not agreed, pending the responses to Steyn J’s 29 April Order and my directions below, and there will be liberty to apply in the light of that evidence. The liberty to apply will extend to permitting the TTMC Defendants to apply to vary my Order if I have misunderstood their Statement of Costs: see, further, below.

Mr Lodhia did not advance any reason to depart from the presumption under Rule 44.2(8). His arguments were that no order for costs should be made in favour of the Defendants and that, in any event, their Statements of Costs claimed disproportionately and unreasonably large sums. In my view there is no good reason why an interim payment on account of costs should not be ordered in the case of both sets of the Defendants’ legal representatives.

As to quantum, as I understand TTMC’s Statement of Costs dated 5 May 2026, the figure of £112,779 plus VAT includes the costs of the 6 May hearing rather than being limited to the costs to the service of the notice of discontinuance. In fairness to Mr Lodhia the question whether he should pay TTMC’s costs of the 6 May hearing has not been the subject of submissions. I will therefore give him an opportunity, if he wishes, to put in written submissions, limited to 5 pages of A4, as to why he should not pay those costs and Urang’s costs of the hearing. I will then determine this matter on paper. In the meantime, I will also work on the rough and ready basis that c£25,000 of the £112,779 is in respect of the 7 May hearing so that c£90,000 relates to the costs to service of the notice of discontinuance which I will treat as 30 April 2026.

In the light of these considerations, and applying the guidance given by Christopher Clarke LJ in the Excalibur case, to which I have referred, doing the best I can I consider that a reasonable sum at this stage in respect of the costs to 30 April is £55,000 plus VAT. Although this was not a legally complex case it was made more complex and expensive by Mr Lodhia’s approach, aspects of which I have touched on above. There were multiple emails, letters and witness statements from him generating voluminous material which required to be considered and responded to as appropriate. There were also the applications referred to above which generated additional costs, and there was the late postponement of the hearing in January. These considerations mean that the TTMC Defendants may well recover significantly more than £55,000 on a detailed assessment.

As for Urang’s costs, Mr Lodhia’s submission was that Lazarev Cleaver LLP had not been sufficiently involved to justify the figure of £7,364 plus VAT which was claimed. Nil should be awarded.

Mr Lazarev explained, and I accept, that in fact Urang’s costs could have been significantly higher. They instructed Counsel to advise them and thereafter had a watching brief in the sense that they were content for rradar and the TTMC Defendants to “make the going” rather than duplicate their efforts. Urang’s costs relate principally to consideration of Mr Lodhia’s correspondence and witness statements etc. I therefore reject Mr Lodhia’s argument that Urang should not recover any of its costs.

Adopting the approach which I have taken in relation to the TTMC Defendants, as I understand Urang’s Statement of Costs their costs to 30 April 2026 are in the order of £6,000 plus VAT. In my view, a reasonable sum at this stage in respect of those costs assuming assessment on a standard basis is £3,600 plus VAT.

The costs of the 6 May hearing will be considered separately in the manner indicated above.

As I have noted, Mr Price’s skeleton argument indicated that there were areas of Mr Lodhia’s evidence in respect of which the Defendants sought directions for the production of further evidence. I have touched on these items already but will deal briefly with them by way of explanation. The relevant parts of my Order will be annexed to this judgement so that what precisely is required will be easily accessible and need not be repeated in this section of my judgment.

I explained to Mr Lodhia, so that there can be no misunderstanding and so that he can seek legal advice, that Steyn J’s 29 April Order and these directions are not just relevant to the question whether costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis. Depending on what the evidence in response says, consideration might in due course be given to the question of proceedings for contempt of court.

First, the flurry of documents from Mr Lodhia before the 6 May hearing did not include any witness statement from him which purported to comply with Steyn J’s Order of 29 April. When I pointed out to him that he was in breach he said, for the first time, that he wished apply to set aside or vary her Order so that more limited information was required to be produced. He also confirmed, when asked, that he was no longer suggesting that the Order was “academic”, that it was not possible for the University of Law to comply with it or that “the Court’s concerns recorded in the Order….are addressed by withdrawal” as had remained his position in his written submissions of 5 May (see [23] and [24]).

I declined to discharge or vary Steyn J’s Orders. In my respectful view they were and remain justified for the reasons which she gave. Far from subsequent events casting doubt on her reasons, they have increased the court’s level of concern. It is notable that Mr Lodhia responded to scrutiny of his tenth witness statement by withdrawing it and attempting to argue that this meant that there was no longer any cause for concern or need to comply with the 29 April Order and that, shortly after that Order, he discontinued his Claim. The way in which he appears to have dealt with the University of Law in relation to compliance with the Order (i.e. apparently by failing to show the University the documents which he was ordered to show Ms Verrell and providing a draft witness statement to her which he had written without any input from her) also increased the need for compliance with Steyn J’s Order.

I note that on 7 May Mr Lodhia made a seventeenth statement (filed on 8 May) which apologises for what he says are errors in relation to his tenth and eleventh witness statements which, he says, resulted from his use of artificial intelligence. His evidence is that he filed AI generated drafts of these statements by mistake when he intended to file versions of those drafts which he had amended so that their contents were true and accurate. This is the first time that this explanation has been given by him. On 15 May, Ms Verrell filed her witness statement which is very much at odds with Mr Lodhia’s accounts. I have not taken the contents of these witness statements into account in reaching my decision on the issues at the 6 May hearing. What, precisely, happened, and whether Mr Lodhia has complied with the Order of Steyn J, will be for consideration in due course.

I have dealt with the explanation for this item at [60] and [61] above. Mr Lodhia did not resist directions which were designed to enable him to explain these matters and he expressed confidence that he would be able to show that the letters were posted by first class post at the beginning of March 2025.

I have dealt with the explanation for this item at [18] – [19] and [25] – [27], above. Again, Mr Lodhia did not object to directions for clarification of the position. After the hearing he sent through an email exchange between him and Mr David Robertson of Begbies Traynor in December 2025. However, this did not resolve the matter.

The need for clarification has been explained at [75] – [78] above. But, in addition to this I note that at 18:19 on 5 May 2026 Mr Lodhia sent my clerk an email dated 10 February 2026 which appeared to be from Dr Tsakopoulou. This enclosed a letter of 10 February in similar terms to the letter of 15 January 2026 except that this letter said that “Following clinical review, a decision was made in January 2026 to extend the course of treatment until 2 April (his last scheduled session)”. I note that this is not necessarily inconsistent with the letter of 15 January 2026 which said that a decision had been made in December 2025 to extend treatment until the end of February.

At 13:54 on 6 May, Mr Lodhia then sent me an email to him from Dr Tsakopoulou at 13:44 on 15 January 2026 which attached an unsigned pdf of her 15 January 2026 letter “too”. The copy exhibited to his witness statement in support of his application to postpone the January 2026 hearing was signed. It is not clear why she was sending him more than one copy of the letter or an unsigned version as well as a signed one. Again, this is not necessarily suspicious but, on the basis of the evidence overall, clarification from Dr Tsakopoulou would be helpful. In any event, I did not understand Mr Lodhia to object to this.

The need for clarification of the role of Mr Chiffers arises because his precise role in this litigation and in relation to Mr Lodhia as his supervisor is elusive on the evidence for the reasons explained in Ms Yates’ fourth witness statement dated 24 February 2026. His unavailability has been relied on as the basis for applications for two hearings to be postponed and yet attempts by rradar to communicate with him directly – when they were told that JSC Chambers were acting on behalf of Mr Lodhia - have not met with a response from him. It is not clear that there has been any written communication to rradar from him or written by him in the course of the proceedings despite the multiple emails and letters from the Claimant’s side.

At the same time, Mr Lodhia’s Statement of Costs dated 5 May 2026 claims £10,000 (40 hours work) in respect of Mr Chiffers’ fees which Mr Lodhia told me he had paid. He also told me that he had paid Mr Chiffers for advice on 17 September 2025. The £10,000 figure stands in contrast to the figure of £2,750 (11 hours’ work) in his Statement of Costs dated 8 April 2026. The total figure for costs at that stage was also £29,549, in contrast to the figure of £70,302 in the 5 May Statement.

In the light of what Mr Lodhia told me about the LPA I raised with him the possibility of his father providing a witness statement which explained his role in relation to Mr Lodhia’s property and financial affairs, and his awareness and knowledge of these proceedings, and which confirmed that he was unable to attend on 6 May because he was in hospital. Ironically, Mr Lodhia resisted this on the basis that his father was aged 80 (in fact he appears to be 74) and should not be drawn into these proceedings. In the light of this I will not go further than to direct that if any point is to be taken on the failure to serve his father or his mother, any application should be made within 7 days of my Order and supported by, at least, a witness statement from his father which explains these matters.

Mr Lodhia’s submission was that he should provide to the witnesses the Order which I propose to make and communicate the responses to the court, although he was willing for the Defendants to be copied in. He said that this was because he had the relationship with the witnesses. This was opposed by Mr Price who applied for a direction that the Order be served by the Defendants and any response set via them to the court.

I agree with Mr Price. The experience in relation to Steyn J’s 29 April Order, and Mr Lodhia’s dealings with the University of Law in relation to that Order, tends to demonstrate that it will be “cleaner” for him not to be involved in the various witnesses’ compliance with my Order. As I pointed out to Mr Lodhia, in the circumstances it may also be in his interests for the matter to be approached in this way so that there is transparency and therefore confidence in relation to the reliability of the responses which are received.s

For all of these reasons I will make the orders indicated above. My directions for further evidence are extracted at Annex 1 below.

By 4.30pm on 19 May 2026, the solicitors for the TTMC Defendants will serve a copy of the judgment of the court dated 18 May 2026 by email on Ms Kerri Cramphorn of Begbies Traynor together with a copy of this Order, drawing attention to the relevant paragraphs of each.

By 4.30pm on 2 June 2026 Kerri Cramphorn, or alternatively an individual at Begbies Traynor with oversight of the Claimant’s matter with them, will make a witness statement, signed with a statement of truth in the form required by paragraph 2.2 of Practice Direction 22 – Statements of Truth:

The relevant individual at Begbies Traynor is to serve the statement and any accompanying exhibit simultaneously on:

The TTMC Defendants are responsible for filing the witness statement and accompanying exhibit with the Court via CE-file.

By 4.30pm on 19 May 2026, the solicitors for the TTMC Defendants will serve a copy of the judgment of the court dated 18 May 2026 by email on Dr Myrto Tsakopoulou together with a copy of this Order, drawing attention to the relevant paragraphs of each.

By 4.30pm on 2 June 2026, Dr Tsakopoulou is to make a witness statement, signed with a statement of truth in the form required by paragraph 2.2 of Practice Direction 22 – Statements of Truth:

Dr Tsakopoulou is to serve the statement and any accompanying exhibit simultaneously on:

The TTMC Defendants are responsible for filing Dr Tsakopoulou’s witness statement and accompanying exhibit with the Court via CE-file.

By no later than 4.30pm on 1 June 2026, the Claimant is to:

By 4.30pm on 19 May 2026, the solicitors for the TTMC Defendants will serve a copy of the judgment of the court dated 18 May 2026 by email on Mr Joseph Chiffers of JSC Chambers together with a copy of this Order, drawing attention to the relevant paragraphs of each.

By no later than 4.30pm on 2 June 2026, Mr Chiffers will file and serve a witness statement, signed with a Statement of Truth in the form required by paragraph 2.2 of Practice Direction 22 – Statements of Truth:

By 4.30pm on 2 June 2026 the Claimant will file and serve any evidence in reply to the witness statement of Ms Saloumeh Verrell dated 15 May 2026.

Insofar as the Claimant or his father wish to make any application in relation to the Lasting Power of Attorney on which he relied at the 6 May 2026 hearing he must do so by no later than 4.30pm on Friday 22 May 2026 and any such application must be supported by a witness statement made by the Claimant’s father which includes an explanation of why he did not attend the hearing on 6 May and exhibits any relevant documentary evidence.

By 4.30pm on 9 June 2026, the parties will file and serve statements of their positions in the light of the responses to the Order of Steyn J dated 29 April 2026, and [1] to [13] above, and any application(s) which they wish to make. Such statements and applications should be marked “for the attention of Linden J”.

This Order has been made without giving Begbies Traynor, Dr Tsakopoulou and Mr Chiffers an opportunity to make representations. Accordingly, they may apply to vary, set aside or stay this order so far as it affects them, any such application to be made upon 72 hours’ written notice to the parties.

The TTMC Defendants are responsible for serving this Order on all the named persons and all the parties to these proceedings.