Dr Malay Haldar & Anor v Dawn Crook & Anor

What I have technically before me is an application(s), made both in hard copy on 7 August 2025 and repeated in electronic copy by 10 August 2025, from the claimants in claim number KB-2024-000065 for interim payments to be made by the defendants.

Those applications came before me without notice to the defendants on Thursday, 7 August 2025. I considered that such applications could not be dealt with in any substantive way without notice to the defendants; and, further, that there was a preliminary set of potential and problems with them, namely, that it seemed to me, at least provisionally, that the relevant claim, KB-2024-000065, which I will call the “2024 claim”, had already been struck out as had a predecessor claim, KB-2022-003534, which I will call the “2022 claim”.

In the circumstances owing to the absence of court time, and also to give me some ability to refamiliarize myself with the circumstances of the cases, I adjourned the hearing to 2 o’clock today, 11 August 2025, and the claimants have again attended before me in person. Ms Kavanagh of counsel appearing for Barclays Bank plc has also attended in person; although she has effectively taken the role of an observer and has remained neutral in relation to the matters which are before me, which are in fact in relation to the 2022 claim and 2024 claim, and to neither of which is Barclays Bank a party although they are a party to other litigation to which I will come.

The claimants have appeared before me in person with the first claimant, Dr Malay Haldar, conducting the majority of the submissions on this hearing. I have borne in mind throughout the overriding objective and Civil Procedure Rule (“CPR”) 1.1, which reads as follows:

These Rules are a procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.

Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable –

ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings, and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence;

saving expense;

dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate –

to the amount of money involved;

to the importance of the case;

to the complexity of the issues; and

to the financial position of each party;

ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;

allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases;

promoting or using alternative dispute resolution; and

enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.”

I have borne in mind civil procedure rule 3.1A which reads:

This rule applies in any proceedings where at least one party is unrepresented.

When the court is exercising any powers of case management, it must have regard to the fact that at least one party is unrepresented.

Both the parties and the court must, when drafting case management directions in the multi-track, intermediate track and fast track, take as their starting point any relevant standard directions which can be found online at www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil and adapt them as appropriate to the circumstances of the case.

The court must adopt such procedure at any hearing as it considers appropriate to further the overriding objective….”

I note that it requires me to have regard to the fact that a party is unrepresented, as the claimants are, when making case management decisions; although I also note the Supreme Court’s decision in Barton v Wright-Hassall [2018] UKSC 12 which sets out that a litigant in person is under the same and equivalent requirements as a represented party to comply with rules, practice directions and orders.

I have also borne in mind civil procedure rule 1.6 which reads:

I have borne in mind fully civil procedure rule practice direction 1A in circumstances where it seems to me that as a matter of matters relating to language and possibly history, but also the emotional and psychological effect on them of this litigation and its history, the claimants are at least potentially vulnerable; and I have sought to give them a full hearing in order to seek to understand and to enable them to make their various points.

As far as the history of this matter is concerned, I bear in mind that I am essentially concerned at this point with the questions as to whether either or both of the 2022 claim and the 2024 claim have been struck out. However, in order to understand and put in context the claimants’ submissions it is appropriate for me to review the history to a degree generally, even though it does not seem to me that I need to be making specific decisions in relation to most of it at this hearing.

The claimants are both doctors. Dr Malay Haldar was engaged in some sort of proceedings brought against him in the Medical Practitioners Tribunal (which I will call “the Tribunal”) by the General Medical Council. Dr Malay Haldar has indicated to me a considerable dispute with the General Medical Council as to what those proceedings were about and what was their status. He asserts that the General Medical Council had failed to licence him properly to practice with the result that he says that the proceedings effectively lacked any validity. He has, however, shown me, although only on his mobile phone (although I do have a recollection of seeing an electronic version of this), a judgment or, he would say, purported judgment of the Tribunal which reviewed various allegations of misconduct against him in relation to patients and operations, made findings against him and directed his initial suspension from and then erasure from the medical register.

I have further had provided to me, I think by the claimants during the history of this litigation, a form N161, appellant’s notice, issued by the Administrative Court (which operates as a somewhat separate court from the rest of the King’s Bench Division although technically being part of it), in which appeal notice Doctor Malay Haldar appears to seek to challenge the finding and directions of the Tribunal of 29 October 2020 and to assert that the relevant proceedings were invalid for a number of reasons.

That appellant’s notice bears the Administrative Court seal, although it does not contain any appeal number. Dr Malay Haldar has contended to me that an appeal was not what he was seeking to advance, but rather that he was seeking some determination, or even damages remedy, against the General Medical Council for improperly acting against him. However, the form N161 does appear to have been treated by the Administrative Court as being an attempt to appeal against the Tribunal’s determination under the relevant appeal provisions of section 40 of the Medical Act 1983.

On that basis the various orders of the Administrative Court have been entitled, “In the matter of statutory appeal pursuant to section 40 of the Medical Act 1983” and a number was given to those proceedings, CO-4644-2020, which I will call the Administrative Court proceedings. The Administrative Court proceedings proceeded through a number of hearings including in front of Lang J but also in front of Ellenbogen J.

On 4 May 2021 there was something of a lengthy hearing before Ellenbogen J at a point where Dr Malay Haldar had made what he called an application for summary judgment against the Tribunal and the General Medical Council. I have a transcript of the argument before Ellenbogen J but not of any judgment. Dr Malay Haldar contends in relation here and more importantly elsewhere that an order of the Administrative Court is not valid unless there is some written judgment which has been published in some way, in particular on the national archives find caselaw site or the Bailii website. He contends that a judgment is not valid unless it is public and it can only be made public by being so published.

It seems to me that that is a misunderstanding of the legal situation. Judgments can be delivered either orally, as this judgment is being delivered, or in writing. If a judgment is delivered orally, it remains an oral judgment. In consequence it is not published as such in any way, it is simply delivered in open court, and just as this one is being delivered.

A judgment may, however, appear in writing in one of two ways. Firstly, it may have been originally written by the judge and handed down, again, at a public hearing. The second way is that it may have been an oral judgment which was delivered orally, but then either a party requests under civil procedure rule 39.9, paying the appropriate fee, or a court directs, that a transcript should be produced. If that occurs, the written transcript is then produced, revised by the judge and approved.

In either of those two circumstances of there being a written judgment, it is for the judge to decide as to whether or not it should be published on a public website, although the judge will invariably direct that it be sent to the parties. Usually under modern procedures the judge will direct that it be published on the public website and cause it to be sent and uploaded to the National Archives; and possibly also cause it to be sent to others such as Bailii; although those at Bailii and elsewhere will tend to review what appears on the National Archives and to often republish such material. In such various manners, the judgment is brought to the attention of the public. It was, however, always a public judgment; having been originally delivered, whether orally or by handing down of a written document, at a public hearing.

Dr Malay Haldar contends, at least, that the judgment is not valid if it is not reduced to writing and published on a public website in one or more of the ways in which I have identified. That, however, does not seem to be right to me for the reasons I have given. The judgment is delivered at a public hearing. Such a judgment may never appear on a public website; either because it was delivered orally and no one ever requested or directed a transcript or because it was delivered or reduced to writing but no one ever sent it to a public website. Nevertheless, the judgment, having been delivered by the judge, is a perfectly valid and operative judgment; albeit, like all other judgments (with particular statutory exceptions), potentially subject to some form of application to set it aside under CPR3.1(7) or, more usually, potential appeal.

When any form of judgment has been delivered the court will make an order which will generally be reduced to writing and then sealed by the court. When the judge states what the order is and that it is being made, the order technically comes into existence; but it is important that all orders should be sealed, since that then makes clear to the world that the relevant order exists and has been made by the court. CPR40.2(2) makes clear that every judgment or order must bear the date on which it is given or made and be sealed by the court.

Once the court makes an order, that order is binding unless and until it is set aside or varied. That was recently stated by the Supreme Court in R on the application of Majera v Secretary of State [2021] UKSC 46 at paragraphs 27 to 56 but in particular in paragraphs 54 to 56 which read as follows:

Another recent example is the case of Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council v KW (No 2)[2015] EWCA Civ 1054; [2016] 1 WLR 198, where a judge of the Family Division took the view that a decision of the Court of Appeal was ultra vires. Lord Dyson MR, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, stated at para 22:

A further example is the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Kirby (John Martin)[2019] EWCA Crim 321; [2019] 4 WLR 131, which concerned convictions for the breach of a non-molestation order that was subsequently set aside because of a procedural irregularity. The convictions were upheld. Singh LJ, giving the judgment of the court, based the decision on “a long-standing principle of our law that there is an obligation to obey an apparently valid order of a court unless and until that order is set aside. This is a crucial feature of a civilized society which has respect for the rule of law” (para 13). In that regard, Singh LJ cited Chuck v Cremer, Hadkinson v Hadkinson, Isaacs v Robertson and M v Home Office, among other authorities, and followed Director of Public Prosecutions v T in distinguishing the case of Boddington.

In the light of this consistent body of authority stretching back to 1846, it is apparent that the alleged invalidity of the order made by the First-tier Tribunal had no bearing on the challenge to the decision of the Secretary of State. Even assuming that the order was invalid, the Secretary of State was nevertheless obliged to comply with it, unless and until it was varied or set aside. The allegation that the order was invalid was not, therefore, a relevant defence to the application for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision. As there was no other basis on which the Court of Appeal reversed the Upper Tribunal, and the Secretary of State does not ask the court to dismiss the appeal on other grounds, it follows that the appeal should be allowed.”

I have before me the order sealed by the Administrative Court on 4 May 2021 of Ellenbogen J dated 4 May 2021. By paragraph 1 of that order the judge provided that Dr Malay Haldar’s application for summary judgment was refused. The order contained a set of other directions with regards to “the appeal”. It seems to me to be clear that that order was carrying into effect a judgment delivered by the judge to the effect that the summary judgment application was refused and that there was an appeal and it was to be heard following further directions being complied with.

I next have before me an order sealed by the Administrative Court on 11 June 2021, dated 9 June 2021, again made by Ellenbogen J. That order recites that it had been made upon hearing the appellant, that is to say Dr Malay Haldar, in person and counsel, the barrister, for the second respondent, that is the General Medical Council, the Tribunal not attending and not being represented. The order provides in paragraph 1 that Dr Haldar’s third application for summary judgment was refused. In paragraph 2 that the applications which had been made by Sreela Haldar, the second claimant before me, were refused. In the third paragraph that the Tribunal was removed as a respondent to the appeal. In the fourth paragraph, “All grounds of the appellants” – that is to say Dr Malay Haldar’s appeal – “made pursuant to section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 are dismissed”. There were then some provisions with regards to costs.

Dr Malay Haldar supported, I think, by Sreela Halder contends before me that this document is of no validity or effect in the light of, firstly, his saying that Ellenbogen J was in some way or other acting improperly. Secondly, that there is no published judgment on Bailii or the national archives or elsewhere (Footnote: ¹).

I next have before me an order of the Court of Appeal made by Master Meacher as effectively registrar of the Court of Appeal on appeal from the Administrative Court proceedings. That order was that the relevant matter should stand dismissed with costs. The statement of reasons explains that the appellant was Dr Malay Haldar who is seeking to appeal the order of Ellenbogen J dated 9 June 2021 dismissing his statutory appeal under section 40 of the Medical Act 1983 from a decision of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal. The order goes on to recite a history which Master Meacher regarded as unsatisfactory, including what was said to be various non-compliances by Dr Malay Haldar with directions of the Court of Appeal; and concludes with a statement that Dr Haldar has applied for and paid for a transcript of Ellenbogen J’s judgment and had been provided with a copy of an approved judgment but that Dr Haldar had refused to accept the validity of the approved judgment and had not been prepared to comply with the Court of Appeal’s directions; and that for all those reasons the matter should stand dismissed with costs.

I have not gone through every aspect of this matter with Dr Haldar as a result of considerations of time. It may well be that Dr Haldar would dispute various of the statements and various of the reasons given by Master Meacher. What is though, it seems to me quite clearly, the position is that there is an order of the Administrative Court by Ellenbogen J dismissing Dr Haldar’s attempts to challenge the Tribunal’s decision, and that Dr Haldar has sought to challenge that order in the Court of Appeal and had failed with his appeal being dismissed.

I have not based these conclusions on Master Meacher’s statement that Dr Malay Haldar has in fact been provided with an approved transcript of Ellenbogen J’s oral judgment. However, if the Claimants are to seek to continue to raise these various challenges and matters it seems to me that Dr Haldar is going to have to explain what the situation is and as to how Master Meacher came to make that statement (Footnote: ²).

The claimants then issued the 2022 proceedings by a claim form supported by what they contended were proper particulars of claim. Particulars of Claim have to accompany a CPR Part 7 claim form and have to comply with the civil procedure rules and the general law. The most relevant civil procedure rule is CPR 16.4 which starts:

Particulars of claim must include—

The matter was referred by a court officer to me as the assigned Master under paragraph 2 of practice direction 3A to the CPR which reads:

If a court officer is asked to issue a claim form which they believe may fall within rule 3.4(2)(a) or (b) they should issue it, but may then consult a judge (under rule 3.2) before returning the claim form to the claimant or taking any other step to serve the defendant. The judge may on they own initiative make an immediate order designed to ensure that the claim is disposed of or proceeds in a way that accords with the rules.

The judge may allow the claimant a hearing before deciding whether to make such an order.

Orders the judge may make include:

an order that the claim be stayed until further order,

an order that the claim form be retained by the court and not served until the stay is lifted,

an order that no application by the claimant to lift the stay be heard unless they file such further documents (for example a witness statement or an amended claim form or particulars of claim) as may be specified in the order.

Where the judge makes any such order or, subsequently, an order lifting the stay they may give directions about the service on the defendant of the order and any other documents on the court file.

The fact that a judge allows a claim referred to them by a court officer to proceed does not prejudice the right of any party to apply for any order against the claimant.”

I note that that that paragraph gives the judge, here me as the Master, a specific power to consider whether to allow the claim to proceed and to make appropriate directions. I further bear in mind that the court will consider not merely whether the particulars of claim comply with CPR 16.4: but also the matters set out in CPR 3.4(2) which reads:

The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court –

that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;

that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings;

that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order…”

I note that that rule enables the court to strike out a case if it fails to disclose reasonable grounds for bringing it or it is an abuse of process or there are contraventions of rules, practice directions or orders.

It seemed to me that potentially those rules were all in point; both because I was concerned as to whether CPR 16.4 had been complied with and also because at first sight the claim appeared to be a challenge to the Administrative Court’s decisions. What it sought to do was to in some way or other claim damages against Ms Crook and Mr Brown, who are officers, respectively, of the Tribunal and the General Medical Council, as a result of the steps which had been taken by them against Dr Malay Haldar; but where the Administrative Court had rejected the appeal against the Tribunal’s decision to strike-off Dr Malay Haldar.

I therefore made an order of 20 October 2022 staying the claim; retaining the claim form with the court so that it could not be served; and requiring appropriate proposed particulars of claim to be provided; and including directions as to what needed to be included within those proposed particulars of claim, both to seek to advance whatever claim the claimants were making and for them to explain why in effect the claim was not inconsistent with the Administrative Court’s rejection of the appeal against the Tribunal’s determination.

The claimants then sought to issue an application notice of 10 October 2022 which was entitled, “In the Royal Courts of Justice, claim number CO-4644-2020”, that being the title of the Administrative Court proceedings. The defendant’s name was stated to be “Case Progression at Administrative Court.justice.gov.uk.”, being, seemingly, a reference to the Administrative Court. What was sought was, amongst other things, a court order on the claimants’ summary judgment application of 24 February 2021. What that appeared to be was an attempt to remake the summary judgment applications which had already been rejected by Ellenbogen J.

As the application notice appeared to be issued in the Administrative Court proceedings, and not in the King’s Bench Division general list and not in the 2022 proceedings which were then before me, I stated to the court staff that it should be referred to the Administrative Court; and they informed the claimants that this was occurring and therefore that the claimants would need to deal with the Administrative Court about it.

I am unclear as to what, if anything, next happened with regards to that application. I do have something of a belief that the Administrative Court may have mislaid Ellenbogen J’s order of 9 June 2021 (as eventually that was only located in the Court of Appeal’s electronic file, and not in that of Administrative Court) but, in any event, that application notice was a matter for the claimants to pursue with the Administrative Court.

The claimants submit to me that they were effectively prevented from pursuing this litigation because the Administrative Court has not dealt with their application notice. I have no evidence before me as to what attempts they have made with the Administrative Court to pursue their application notice; although, at first sight, it would clearly simply fail as a result of it simply being effectively a further attempt to make a set of applications which Ellenbogen J has already rejected. However, that is a matter between the claimants and the Administrative Court. It does not seem to me to particularly impact on what I have to decide.

The claimants supplied further material in the form of what was said to be proposed particulars of claim to me.

On 7 November 2022 I made an order which stated that I was of the provisional view that those documents simply did not comply with my previous order or the CPR; in particular as they did not contain any concise statement of facts relied on, were impossible to understand, lacked a factual history or an explanation as to what had happened in the Tribunal or the Administrative Court or as to why the claim was not some sort of collateral challenge to those particular matters. I added that the claim did not identify why it was brought against the individuals, and did not identify as to why the matter was not within the remit of the Administrative Court rather than the general King’s Bench Division. I set all such matters out in detail in the recitals to the order so that the claimants would be clear as to what they needed to do in the future to correct the situation. I determined in the order that the proposed particulars of claim did not satisfy the terms of the 20 October 2022 order and that the stay would continue.

I added by subparagraph (3) of the order of 7 November 2022, “The claimants may apply to have the stay lifted and for the claim form to be released by filing further proposed particulars of claim which comply with the CPR and paragraph 3 of the October order with the November requirements by 4.30 pm on 10 January 2023. But if the claimants do not do so then the claim shall be struck out”.

The claimants did not supply further proposed particulars of claim. What instead they did was they made repeated communications to the court seeking default judgments. Default judgments can be sought in a CPR Part 7 claim under CPR Part 12 but only where a claim form has been served and the defendant has failed to file an acknowledgement of service or a defence within the prescribed times. A default judgment could not be sought in the 2022 proceedings because the claim form had not been released for service and therefore could not have been served and which is a necessary precursor for time to start running for the filing of an acknowledgment of service or a defence. Further, and in any event, the claim had been stayed, and so nothing could happen in it apart from what was directed by orders of the court.

I made that clear in recitals to an order of 11 November 2022 in which I stated that the request for default judgments were refused and certified to be totally without merit. I further made limitations in it as to how the claimants should communicate with court staff, since they were continually sending communications which seemed to be unfairly burdening the court staff. In its subparagraph (4), I made clear that any application had to be made by application notice supported by either witness statement evidence or, if it was an application to lift the stay, with proposed particulars of claim which complied with the 7 November 2022 order.

No further proposed particulars of claim were supplied at that particular point, and it therefore seemed to me that under the unless order provisions of sub-paragraph (3) of the 7 November 2022 order, the 2022 proceedings were simply automatically struck out.

At around this point in time, Barclays Bank plc had sought to enforce the mortgage which existed over the claimants’ home, 40 Newlands Road, IG8 0RU. The claimants have said to me, in effect, that the reason why the mortgage payments were not being met was because they could not work as doctors in consequence of the General Medical Council’s and the Tribunal’s various proceedings and determinations. That it seems to me is likely to have been and to be the case.

An order for possession was made on 13 January 2022. That order took considerable time to enforce, but a warrant of possession was obtained from the County Court where the proceedings were issued and located, and which resulted in the eviction on 10 November 2022. The claimants, however, and notwithstanding the eviction, reoccupied the property.

There was then some confusion: both because the claimants brought proceedings in the High Court under KB-2022-005042 seeking to challenge the eviction, which were not assigned to me but were rather dealt with by Master Stevens and Master McCloud; and because, at one point, the County Court made an order transferring the order for the possession to the High Court for enforcement, but which transfer effectively fell into abeyance owing to the fact that the warrant for possession procedure had been used and resulted in an eviction, and so the appropriate further order to be sought was not a writ of restitution to be issued by the High Court but a warrant of restitution to be issued by the County Court.

Master Stevens and Master McCloud, and on appeal Hill J, made various orders dismissing the claimants’ applications in the High Court; and eventually the County Court was to issue a first warrant of restitution and then a second warrant of restitution on 23 May 2025. That resulted in an application being made to me by the Claimants on Thursday of last week; but which I simply rejected on the basis that it was an application for a stay relating to a County Court warrant of restitution and therefore not for the High Court at all. I do not know what has happened subsequently, but it does not seem to me that it is relevant for today.

In the meantime, the claimants had issued a further set of proceedings in the High Court being the 2024 claim. These were issued against the Case Progression Office of the Administrative Court itself, an NHS Trust, the General Medical Council and the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service. Again, they sought damages in the claim form.

The matter was assigned to me, and I again reviewed the matter under paragraph 2 of practice direction 3A. It seemed to me again that what was being advanced appeared to be both incoherent and not in compliance with CPR 16.4; but also to be subject to challenge under the various subrules of CPR 3.4(2) for a number of reasons including, firstly, that the first defendant was not a legal entity at all. Secondly, that the court itself is immune from suit except (possibly) in relation to certain types of claim under the Human Rights Act, as to which there would be certain time limits which would appear to have expired. Thirdly, that again what was being sought appeared to be a collateral challenge to the Administrative Court’s previous decisions.

I made an order on 18 January 2024 providing that the claim against the first defendant would be struck out. I further provided that the claim against the other defendants would be stayed, and that the claimants were to have until 11 April 2024 to provide proper proposed particulars of claim which I would then be able to review to consider whether or not the claim should be allowed to proceed. In the meantime, the 2024 claim would remain stayed with the claim form not being released for service.

On 6 June 2024 and then on 14 June 2024, and due to changes in court staff, I changed the email address to which any communications to the court had to be sent.

On 15 July 2024 Sheldon J dismissed further applications which the claimants were making in the KB-2022-005042 proceedings.

The claimants then supplied further documents which they said were proposed particulars of claim in the 2024 Claim. I considered them, and came to the conclusion that they simply did not satisfy my previous orders.

I made an order as a result dated 30 July 2024 providing that the 2024 Claim would be and was struck out; and added, in accordance with the rules, a paragraph that, “Any party may apply to have this order set aside or varied within 21 days of service of it upon them and such an application must be made by application notice in this claim, KB-2024-000065, supported by a witness statement giving grounds”. I also declared that the claim and the claimants’ application to pursue it were each certified to be totally without merit. I set out in detail and precisely, the reasons why I had come to those various conclusions.

No application notice was issued to seek to set that order aside within 21 days of service of the order on the claimants or indeed subsequently.

However, the claimants have continually sought to make communications to court staff and to lodge documents through the court electronic CE file, but without, until very recently, issuing any application notice. That has imposed a serious burden on court staff and court resources. Further, the claimants have continually contended to court staff, and also by email to numerous different judges and bodies, assertions that they are entitled to default judgment in these claims, and that these claims are continuing notwithstanding my orders striking them out.

Invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court to safeguard the integrity of the process and the administration of justice, on 8 January 2025, I made an order, bearing a penal notice directed to the claimants, requiring them Not, except by an application notice supported by witness evidence: (1) to maintain to anyone that either the 2022 claim or the 2024 claim still existed, and (2) to communicate with the court, that is the King’s Bench Division, apart from the Administrative Court, other than by use of a specific email or telephone number, and (3) since they at one point threatened this, to seek to have any member of the court, that is the King’s Bench Division apart from the Administrative Court, staff arrested or prosecuted. I included a permission to apply to set aside within 14 days of that order and made clear that as far as the Administrative Court was concerned it was for it to seek to defend itself and its staff if it regarded that as being appropriate.

Notwithstanding that order, further communications were made by the claimants in apparent breach of it. I therefore made a further order of 21 March 2025 repeating the previous order and its directions, but also stating, in view of the burden on the court’s electronic CE file and on the court staff processing what was sent to it, that any application notice from the claimants, which was the only document or communication that they were permitted to file, was, with its supporting witness statement (and proposed particulars of claim), to be delivered in hard copy.

The Claimants have now made the application(s) for interim payments which is before me; and which was made in hard copy; and I have therefore considered them.

In the light of this history, I have raised with the claimants the preliminary point as to their claims having being seemingly struck out by my previous orders; that is to say that the 2022 claim was struck out by reason of non-compliance with my 7 November 2022 order, and that the 2024 claim was struck out by my order of 30 July 2024, and which would mean that the claims do not presently exist and so that no order for interim payments could be made.

The claimants have made submissions to me at length in relation to the history, including challenging Ellenbogen J’s previous orders and asserting that the matter is for the Administrative Court to deal with following my referring their application notice of 10 October 2022 to the Administrative Court. They said that they have been effectively left destitute by what has occurred. They submitted that what has occurred so far is simply of no validity or effect at all because it has not been dealt with publicly; and that what has been done by judges previously has been just simply wrong contrary to law and effectively as a result of some conspiracy between judges involved and potentially also the General Medical Council and/or the Tribunal, and should simply be regarded as being void.

They say that these claims are still live, should be allowed to be pursued and that I should be granting substantial interim payments against the defendants.

It seems to me that I can and should deal with this on a very simple basis.

I have previously made orders which have had the effect of striking out the 2022 claim (the order of 7 November 2022 which was not complied with and so as to trigger the automatic strike-out provision contained in it by way of unless order) and the 2024 claim. In one sense, only the 2024 claim is the subject matter of the application notice before me, but that claim was struck out against its first defendant by paragraph 1 of my order of 18 January 2024, and was struck out generally insofar as it continued to exist against other defendants by paragraph 1 of my order of 30 July 2024. No application notice was ever issued within the times provided by those various orders to set aside or vary any of such orders; and, accordingly, each and all of those claims have been and stand as simply struck out.

For an application to be made to restore any of those claims would require a freestanding application notice to an appropriate effect supported by appropriate evidence and, indeed, appropriate proposed particulars of claim; and there is none of such before me.

Accordingly, it seems to me that the claims are simply struck out and so presently no application can be made within them.

Further, it seems to me that I have already declared twice that such claims have been struck out, that is to say in both my order of 8 January 2025 which specifically stated that in its recitals and in my order of 21 March 2025.

In all the circumstances it seems to me that the claims are and have been simply struck out; and therefore the present application should be dismissed as an interim payment could only ever be ordered in a live claim and not in one which is and has been struck out.

Technically speaking it is possible for an application still to be made for one or both of the 2022 claim and the 2024 claim to be reinstated. No such application is before me. If any such application were made, and as I have said, it would have to deal with numerous matters including the question of any transcript of Ellenbogen J’s judgments.

I have, however, also on various occasions declared that applications made by the claimants were totally without merit and it seems to me that I should in all these circumstances declare that this application is made totally without merit.

That raises the question as to whether I should make a civil restraint order. It seems to me in all the circumstances that a civil restraint order may well be appropriate, but I should not make it. In all the circumstances of these cases and this litigation, and where there have been various breaches of my orders at first sight, including orders which bear penal notices, it seems to me that what I should do is to refer the matters to Lambert J as Judge in Charge of the King’s Bench Division Lists to consider whether any civil restraint order or other relief or other order should be made. It will be a matter for her or whoever she assigns at High Court judge level to decide whether or not to take that aspect forward. If, of course, such an aspect is taken forward the claimants will, I would assume, have an ability to be heard during such process. However, that is all that it seems to me to be appropriate to do today.

For all those reasons, therefore, I am ordering and declaring that the 2022 claim and the 2024 claim have been struck out, and I am dismissing the applications before me and determining that my January 2025 and March 2025 orders will remain in effect. The applications before me are declared to be wholly without merit and I am referring the matter to Lambert J.

I am not presently proposing to make any orders about costs because it seems to me that Ms Kavanagh is simply attending as an observer and is almost in a position as a member of the public who is watching these proceedings. As Barclays Bank are not a party to these particular hearings, at first sight it does not seem to me that she would be entitled to any costs order. However, that is only a provisional view, and Ms Kavanagh can try to persuade me to make a costs order if she regards that as an appropriate course.