Cardiff University v Persons Unknown

This is my judgment in the case. The claimant is the University of Cardiff. It applies for injunctive relief to protect areas of land edged blue on Plan 2 accompanying the draft injunction order. There is also a claim for possession in respect of areas of land edged red on Plan 1 accompanying the application. The claimant no longer seeks a possession order as to the land subjected to an encampment, which was vacated following service of the claim; nor does it seek possession in respect of the other land covered by the possession claim plan. The claimant, however, invites this court to adjourn the possession aspects of the claim generally at this stage, given the nature of the threat, to which I shall make reference later.

Ms Stacey, King’s Counsel, who appears on behalf of the claimant, submits that if possession should in future be needed in respect of the land, then the course proposed saves having to start again from scratch. That in turn will save costs. I consider that this submission is sound. The possession claim is, accordingly, adjourned generally.

In terms of the injunction, the claimant seeks to prohibit the defendants from carrying out the following acts without “consent;” a term which is defined in the draft order as meaning permission given by the University under the Code, (as to which I shall have more to say in due course), or under other express permission. The acts in question are, first, entering, occupying or remaining upon the injunction land for the purposes of protest without consent. Secondly, directly blocking, obstructing or interfering with the access of any individual to the injunction land, with the intention of stopping that individual accessing that land. Thirdly, erecting or placing any structure, including, for example, tents, gazebos or other sleeping equipment, on the injunction land.

The claimant submits that the claim is similar to the recent cases of University of London v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 2895 (Ch) and University of Cambridge v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 724. In both of those cases injunctive relief was sought and obtained against student protestors taking direct action on what is said to be related grounds. Importantly, however, I must decide the present application specifically by reference to the facts of this case. Further, the fact that other applications of an apparently similar nature have been granted in no way affects the legal position. In particular, the applicant must meet a high threshold for granting relief in cases of this kind.

It is necessary to say a little bit about the claimant. The University is a Russell Group University. It is said to have a global reputation. Its main campus is in Cathays Park in Cardiff city centre. The campus is home to a substantial number of the University’s buildings, as well as hosting key events in the University calendar. Two such categories of events are important in the present case. They are graduation celebrations and open days. The University currently has in the region of 33,000 students. It also employs something in the region of 6,900 staff. It has what is said in the evidence to be a diverse community, with students coming from over 100 countries. When students accept an offer to study at the University, they agree to abide by the University’s charter, statutes, ordnances and regulations. These include the Student Conduct Regulations, which require students to act in accordance with the University’s regulations and policies. Secondly, there is the Student Conduct Procedure. This requires students to treat others with dignity and respect, not to behave in a manner which disrupts University activities or which obstructs any student, member of staff or visitor in the performance of their study work; and to respect other people’s right to enjoyment of their property, including that of the University itself. Third, there is the Code of Practice on Freedom of Speech. This sets out the University's principles in relation to freedom of speech and contains a procedure for organising events such as protests on University land and which involves securing the University’s specific consent. I shall have a good deal more to say about the Code of Practice, or “the Code”, as I shall refer to it.

The defendants comprise persons unknown, who are protesting in relation to the Israel/Palestine conflict and the University’s response or, as the protestors would say, lack of response to that conflict. The methods employed by the defendants have included disruptive direct action protests which have been targeted at the University. They have included an unauthorised occupation of land and buildings belonging to the University, blocking, obstructing or interfering with access to the University’s buildings and taking over land by setting up structures, including tents and other things of the kind described in the draft injunction order.

The University has been unable positively to identify any of the individuals. This is because they have been deliberately concealing their identities. However, as will appear from the witness evidence, the protestors appear to be associated with groups known as Caerdydd Students for Palestine, Stop the War Coalition, Black Lives Matter Cardiff and Stand up 4 Palestine. The leadership of the protestors is unclear. However, media output of Caerdydd Students for Palestine suggests they are the most prominent group involved. Both in 2024 and 2025, the group issued demands as part of a campaign directed against the University. The demands published in May 2024 included disclosing University accounts and maintaining full transparency as to investments and donations, divesting from companies that are active in what is said to be genocide, as to which certain corporate organisations are mentioned, reinvesting in Palestinian education programmes in response to what is said to be the scholasticide of Gaza and supporting Palestinian students and faculty who have suffered as a result of the genocide, as well as protecting students and faculty who hold or act upon pro-Palestinian beliefs.

It is important to emphasise that this court is not required or, indeed, permitted to pass any view as to the merits or otherwise of the protest. The demands are relevant, so the claimant submits, insofar as they may show a continuing threat to engage in direct action of a kind which the draft injunction order seeks to prohibit. The defendants are, accordingly, categorised as persons unknown. That materially impacts the nature of the application, as I shall explain.

Mr Lawrence has submitted handwritten and typewritten submissions in connection with the application. It does not appear that he has been involved in any direct action to date, nor that he has any intention of doing so. Notwithstanding that the nature of the injunction sought is one involving a contra mundum category of persons, I do not consider that it is in all the circumstances appropriate for Mr Lawrence to be joined as a defendant. He stands rather in the position of an interested party. I am grateful to him for his submissions and can confirm that I have had regard to them.

On 10 June 2025 the European Legal Support Centre or ELSC, as I shall refer to it, applied for an order authorising it to intervene in the present proceedings. Having considered the matter, I granted the order sought on that day. In consequence, written submissions on behalf of the ELSC were prepared by Mr Grant Kynaston of counsel and filed and served on 11^th June 2025. Along with those written submissions was a witness statement to which I shall make reference in due course. I am grateful to ELSC for its submissions. I shall make extensive reference to them in the course of this judgment. They have also helpfully provided a bundle of authorities that supplements the authorities provided by the claimant.

I need now to consider in some detail the witness evidence of the claimant. Ms Natalie Gilbert has filed a witness statement with exhibits. She is a solicitor in England and Wales and is the Interim Head of Legal Services at the University. Ms Gilbert describes in detail the nature of the Cathays Park Campus and the buildings and other land in respect of which the injunction is sought. She says that the campus is home to many of the University’s academic buildings, including the Main Building at Park Place and the Glamorgan Building on King Edward VII Avenue. The Main Building is described often as the centre of the campus. It is the flagship building for the University. It houses the Vice Chancellor’s office and key administrative functions of the University. It is a Grade II listed building. It regularly hosts conferences and exhibitions, as well having teaching and research facilities, a lecture theatre and science library. The University is the leasehold owner of the Main Building.

The Glamorgan Building is a Grade I listed building. It hosts the University’s School of Social Sciences. It also includes a formal Council Chamber and committee rooms, which are used for various events and social occasions. The rooms are also available for public hire. The University is the freehold owner of the Glamorgan Building. The Glamorgan Building has, she says, been recently targeted and subject to an unauthorised occupation.

Horseshoe Drive was until very recently the subject of unauthorised occupation. This is in front of the Main Building and is an area of green space. It sits at the heart of the University campus and is a central location for students, staff members and visitors. It is surrounded by various other buildings, including the Sir Martyn Evans Building, the Tower Building and the Centre for Student Life.

Ms Gilbert makes reference to previous direct action. The very recent encampment at Horseshoe Drive was not the first instance of that area being unlawfully occupied by persons unknown; nor is it the first time the University has been subject to direct action involving trespass and nuisance, causing what she says is significant disruption to the University community. Some of those incidents are described in detail by Ms Gilbert. On 14^th November 2023, persons unknown held a pro-Palestinian protest inside the University’s John Percival Building, where a member of the Welsh Conservative Party was speaking. It was necessary for security to intervene and escort her to safety. On or around 8^th March 2024 a group then called Cymru Students for Palestine (now called Caerdydd Students for Palestine) held a sit-in at the University’s Centre for Student Life building. The Centre for Student Life is a landmark facility, according to Ms Gilbert, designed to enhance the student experience by centralising support services and providing modern learning and social space. It is located across the road from the Main Building at the heart of the campus.

On 23^rd April 2024, unknown individuals held a pro-Palestinian protest outside the Julian Hodge Lecture Theatre, where Mr Jacob Rees-Mogg was speaking. University security and police had to be called to assist due to the resulting disturbance. Some of the protestors attempted to gain access to the building and a security staff member was injured by a protestor, having been hit with a megaphone. On 14^th May 2024 the group then called Cymru Students for Palestine held a demonstration which was not approved by the University. According to Ms Gilbert, this went further than a peaceful protest and led to persons unknown setting up an encampment and occupying and remaining without consent on the land at Horseshoe Drive. The group posted several videos and Instagrams confirming their intention to occupy the area for the purpose of protesting and approximately 30 tents were erected on Horseshoe Drive.

On 19^th May 2024, the group wrote an open letter to the University, making various demands in connection with the group’s opposition to Israel’s action. On 29^th May 2024, the Vice Chancellor responded to those demands by way of an open statement to all students. On 25^th May 2024 approximately 270 people attended the unauthorised encampment after a rally in Cardiff City Centre. The encampment was, according to Ms Gilbert, being used at that time as an end point for protest marches by external groups. On 30^th May 2024, University management met with persons unknown in order to discuss the University’s increasing concerns about the unauthorised encampment. On 1^st June 2024, people entered the encampment after a march on behalf of Palestine and in respect of Sudan. Many of these were considered not to be members of the University. On 12^th June 2024, an Israeli flag was displayed at Horseshoe Drive with a message “Wipe your feet”, apparently referring to the flag.

On 17^th June 2024, complaints were received concerning what appeared to be homeless people who had set up a tent in the vicinity of the encampment. On 20^th June 2024, another meeting took place between members of the group and the University’s Major Incident Team. After the conclusion of the meeting the University management were informed that the group had defaced had the University’s Centre of Student Life building and pavement. On or around 28^th June 2024, a number of protestors sat in a line blocking the main entrance to the Main Building, holding banners and placards. Whilst the first encampment was in place at Horseshoe Drive a number of unknown individuals believed to form part of or to be involved with the encampment defaced the University’s land on or around Horseshoe Drive by writing various phrases and slogans in chalk on the pavement and the roadway. On 9^th July 2024 a group of individuals blocked the road outside the Centre for Student Life on Park Place. During that period various discussions were taking place between the University and persons unknown, notably regarding the University’s relationship with third parties in the defence industry.

Eventually the University reached agreement for future dialogue and the encampment was disbanded. However, before that occurred on 13^th July 2024, the group announced on Instagram that they would be holding an encampment party on 14^th July and the Instagram message encouraged people to join that. On 17^th July, two members of the encampment entered the Main Building and gained access to its roof. During that incursion a window restrictor was ripped from the window. A Palestinian flag was then raised from the flagpole of the roof of the Main Building. Ms Gilbert says this is similar to what more recently occurred at the Glamorgan Building on 7^th May 2025.

Despite the disbandment in 2024 of the Horse Shoe Drive encampment, Ms Gilbert says that the group continued to engage in direct action on University land throughout the remainder of 2024 and into early 2025. On 14^th October 2024, what is described as a particularly disruptive protest involving direct action took place on University land that resulted in the suspension of two students, due to unacceptable behaviour. It also resulted in the cessation of the University’s engagement with the group. A University spokesman said that although the University supported the right to peaceful and lawful protest, actions that breach behaviour expectations or dignity at work and study policies and which resulted in disruption to the wider University community would not be tolerated.

On or around 19^th February 2025, members of the group blocked the road outside the Centre for Student Life. Masked individuals carrying banners and banging drums blocked the road and a van which attempted to gain access to the premises could not do so. The incident led to the police being called. According to a post of 20^th February 2025, the group accepted responsibility for what had happened. On 18^th April 2025, a pro-Palestinian protest was held outside the SPARK Building. This was due to what was perceived as the presence of AirBus at the AirBus Centre of Excellence located within that building.

Dr Paula Sanderson is the Chief Operating Officer and University Secretary for the University. She has filed and served a witness statement with exhibits. She describes a Major Incident Plan which is operated by the University. It concerns anything defined as any significant incident that threatens people, buildings, the operational structure or the University’s reputation and which requires special measures to restore matters to normal. When major incidents such as unauthorised occupation of land occur, the University convenes a Major Incident Team. This comprises leads from all the relevant professional service areas of the University, chaired by Dr Sanderson. The Major Incident Team has delegated authority for decision making in respect of such incidents. Decision making regarding legal action is sub-delegated to a smaller group of professional services leads, again chaired by Dr Sanderson. There were small group meetings of the Major Incident Team on 13^th May, 14^th May, 16^th May, 19^th May, 21^st May and 22^nd May 2025.

I have already made reference to the University regulations. These are exhibited by Dr Sanderson. So too is the Code of Practice on Freedom of Speech. This is, in my view, a highly important policy document. At paragraph 3 we see it stated:

“The principles of freedom of speech, freedom of expression and academic freedom are important to universities because they define their role as being one where debate is positively encouraged, and where a range of ideas can be considered, examined and dissected both in academic programmes and in the wider life of the institution”.

Freedom of speech under section 43 of the Education Act 1986 is of fundamental importance for universities. It imposes a positive and proactive legal duty. Freedom of speech is not, however, unrestricted. As set out in the Human Rights Act 1998, the principles of freedom of speech and expression must be exercised with regard to other relevant legal requirements with which the University must comply.

The Code then sets out a process for gaining permission to hold an event on the University campus. The provisions are described in detail by Dr Sanderson. Importantly, paragraph 4.1 the Code confirms that the University will not unreasonably refuse to allow events to be held on its premises unless a conflicting legal provision is identified as a reason to refuse or restrict events. This, therefore, means, according to Dr Sanderson, that there is a presumption in favour of consent being granted for events. Thus, Dr Sanderson considers that the protestors in the present case have ample means to lawfully protest within the scope of the Code. Instead, however, they have chosen unlawfully to occupy University land to the exclusion of others.

There is some degree of overlap concerning events attested by Dr Sanderson, as compared with Ms Gilbert. Nevertheless, it is important to record certain matters to which she deposes. On 6^th May 2025, ten people entered and occupied parts of the Glamorgan Building for approximately 24 hours. During their occupation, they entered what was described as a condemned room; condemned because, as I understand it, of the presence of black mould. They also gained access to an unsafe attic space. One individual scaled the building in order to raise a Palestinian flag from the flagpole on the roof of the Glamorgan Building. On 9^th May 2025, tents were erected on Horseshoe Drive. Protestors displayed banners and flags, including an address to the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Larner whose resignation is being sought by the group. Because the protestors covered their faces, their identity has not been ascertained. Dr Sanderson considers, however, that the protestors are a mix of students and members of the public that are associated with groups such as Caerdydd Students for Palestine, Stop the War Coalition, Black Lives Matter Cardiff and Stand Up 4 Palestine. The University security team have made several attempts to identify the protestors. However, when asked to identify themselves by the team they get no response.

The Student Union has also attempted to engage with the occupants of the encampment set up in 2025, but they have not been able to identify any specific individual who was actually in occupation. During weekends, the illegal occupation site at Horseshoe Drive swelled, it being inferred that a larger proportion of protestors were not students during that time. Importantly, Dr Sanderson has this to say about the effects of the direct action:

“In my experience, this type of conduct fosters a culture of tension and unease, particularly when masked individuals stand in groups or chant slogans, which can be intimidating for others. This may have a negative impact on others present on campus, particularly those who may hold differing views or simply wish to go about their studies or business without being confronted by such conduct or masked individuals”.

The University has, according to Dr Sanderson, suffered harm resulting from the past direct action. Due to the unauthorised encampment in 2024, the University took a pre-emptive decision to move its summer examinations away from the Main Building prior to the encampment of 2025. That was motivated by a desire to reduce disruption for students. The Main Building had, however, been the traditional setting for examinations for some time before and is well set up for mass examinations. It is also particularly useful for students who require reasonable adjustments; for example, those who have disabilities and who require a personal invigilator or a far smaller examination group. It is also a case that at the Main Building there is specialist equipment to support disabled students, as well as there being sophisticated IT infrastructure. Alternative sites are not as well equipped or appropriate.

On 7^th May 2025, the University took the decision to close Glamorgan Building as a result of its occupation. The Glamorgan Building is regularly let for commercial events. Dr Sanderson makes reference to the incident on 16^th May 2025, when a banner was held across Park Place, the Park Place entrance to the Main Building, preventing access for vehicles and pedestrians. After the group refused to engage with the University’s security team, police had to be called in order to maintain access and egress. The protestors in fact dispersed prior to the arrival of the police. Disruption was caused to the running of the Main Building as a result of what is described as this blockade. During the summer months, the University holds exhibitions on the lawn of Horseshoe Drive, but that would not be possible if there were an unauthorised settlement. The Main Building also serves some 300 students from the School of Chemistry and the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences. It is the administrative centre of the University, as Ms Gilbert has pointed out.

Dr Sanderson testifies that the persistence of the protestors caused concern and distress to the University’s Jewish community. Concerns have been received from both the Jewish Society of Students and a Jewish member of staff. Dr Sanderson understand that members of staff whose names may be considered to be traditionally Jewish have removed their nameplates from their doors in the Glamorgan Building over concern for their safety.

Dr Sanderson makes reference to graduation. She describes this as an exceptionally important day for a student and their family. She was concerned that the presence of the encampment might negatively affect the experience for the graduating class of 2025. In addition to this, as a result of the encampment the University has had to take on extra security personnel at considerable cost. There has also been the cost of supplying Portaloos for the encampment in order to ensure health and safety. The encampment on Horseshoe Drive meant that it could not be used in connection with the graduation celebration. I shall deal later with the issue of graduation celebrations in the course of 2025, in the context of the encampment at Horseshoe Drive now having ceased.

Dr Sanderson says that on 16^th May 2025 the University served a notice to vacate upon the occupiers at the encampment at Horseshoe Drive. On 22^nd May 2025, a so-called die-in protest was held outside the Centre for Student Life Building. This involved unknown persons lying on the ground, covered in blankets and fake blood whilst protestors used a megaphone.

Again, there is some overlap between the evidence of Ms Gilbert and Dr Sanderson concerning the various buildings and other land which are sought to be the subject of the injunction. Nevertheless, it is necessary to cover Dr Sanderson’s evidence in some detail owing to the importance of ensuring that any injunction that may be granted covers only land and buildings in respect of which there is a compelling need for protection.

She describes the Main Building in similar terms to Ms Gilbert. The Glamorgan Building is similarly described. There is then reference to the Bute Building on King Edward VII Avenue. This includes, according to Dr Sanderson, a car parking area located between Bute Building and Glamorgan Building. Bute Building is a Grade II listed building that hosts the University’s Welsh School of Architecture. It is directly adjacent to the Glamorgan Building and Dr Sanderson considers it to be at high risk of displacement in the event of the encampment at Horseshoe Drive ceasing.

The Centre for Student Life is located across the road from the Main Building and is at the heart of the campus. It is the venue that graduates attend on their arrival at their graduation ceremony for the process of gowning. The Centre for Student Life has been a regular target for direct action. 50 to 51 Park Place is a University property that hosts certain examinations. It is in close proximity to the Centre for Student Life and is, therefore, considered to be an obvious location for the defendants to move to if they were required to leave that area and it is therefore at high risk of displacement. It can be readily accessed and is a visible location on the main road. It is also a key thoroughfare for students and staff taking shortcuts to other buildings, as well as being used by members of the public.

The Sir Martin Evans Building, Cardiff, is a series of prominent University buildings, which includes the Cardiff School of Biosciences, the School of Psychology, Tower Building and Law Building. Dr Sanderson considers that these buildings are at further risk of further trespass and nuisance because they are all publicly accessible without a key card and include facilities such as toilets and are an ideal site for protest occupation, being located so close to the Main Building and Centre for Student Life. Protest occupation in those buildings would be damaging in terms of reputation to the University as they are prominent buildings and visible to visitors, in particular those attending the graduation celebrations or open days.

The Music Building at Corbett Road, Cathays, is said to be a building open to the public and there is a high value statue situated on the lawn outside. The lawn is one of the only other open patches of ground beyond the Horseshoe in close proximity to the Main Building. The lawn is, therefore, a highly visible campus location and there is considered to be a risk that the law will be attractive to protestors as another place to occupy.

Abacws is the University’s School of Computer Science and Informatics. It is openly accessible and so an easy target. It also, importantly, has close ties with Airbus’s Centre of Excellence which formed the subject of a previous protest at the SPARK Building. These close ties are public knowledge.

Trevithick Building on Newport Road is a library and information hub for engineering, physics and astronomy. It is considered to be particularly vulnerable because it is part of a complex of buildings that together comprise the Queen’s Buildings and both Trevithick and Queen’s Schools. It also has ties to the organisations mentioned earlier.

Queen’s Buildings on The Parade house the University’s School of Engineering. This has close research links with a number of entities with which the occupants of the encampment at Horseshoe Drive are demanding that the University sever its links. This building has been targeted previously, so that the University had to relocate a particular event from it in October 2024.

The SPARK Building on Maindy Road hosts the University’s Social Science Research Park and has also been a target for direct action protest.

Dr Sanderson says that each of the buildings referred to has been assessed by the Major Incident Team and carefully considered for the purposes of the proposed application for an injunction. The buildings are specifically identified as being particularly vulnerable to incidents of unauthorised occupation or encampment or direct action protest and to be at high risk of displacement. The University is not, however, seeking an injunction order in respect of a number of other buildings where there have previously been protests. Rather, it has identified the buildings just mentioned as being at higher risk of a target of future occupations due to their location and visibility. It is said that the properties only form a small proportion of the University’s campus and land ownership. They have been carefully selected as requiring protection.

The University has, according to Dr Sanderson, been particularly conscious of the need to ensure that any injunction is kept as tight as possible in terms of geographical area. Dr Sanderson confirms that the University is the freehold or leasehold owner of each of the buildings and land. Documentation to support that is exhibited.

Turning to the issue of urgency, Dr Sanderson points out that open days are due to commence on 27^th and 28^th June 2025 and graduation ceremonies are to take place around 14^th to 18^th July 2025. There are also open days later in the year, in September and October. All of these are, she says, crucial events in the University calendar and for the University community. The University relies on open days to attract the best candidates to study at the University and enjoy all that it has to offer. She also says: “It hardly needs saying that Graduation is the single most important event in a student’s degree course”. She testifies that there are significant safeguarding issues, as students and staff have reported feeling intimidated and fearful of the individuals who have been taking direct action. She refers to the recent occupation of the Glamorgan Building when protestors put their own lives at risk by climbing on to the roof to fly a flag.

Mr Jonathan Bayley is the Security Operations Manager (Interim) of the Campus Security Team at the University. He has supplied a witness statement with exhibits. He also testifies to events in May 2025 concerning the Glamorgan Building. He also notes that on 7^th May 2025 a post was uploaded with a video of a masked occupant inside that building. The video stated that the Caerdydd Students for Palestine had “liberated the Glamorgan Building”. Upon ending the occupation, Mr Bayley says that a post was put up saying that the occupation of the Glamorgan Building had ended after 24 hours, which was its planned time. This was in order to show the University that “we are still here and to launch our new demands for 2025 … This is not the end. It is just the beginning. See you at graduation”. The post was accompanied by photographs of 12 masked individuals, whose identities had thus been concealed. Mr Bayley makes further detailed reference to videos and other social media communications from the protestors. He refers, as do the other witnesses, to the blocking of the entrance to the Main Building on 15^th May 2025. He confirms that it has not been possible to identify the protestors owing to them concealing their identities. He says that this is commonly achieved by the protestors wearing keffiyehs, scarves, masks or other cloth covering over the lower part of the face, in some cases completely obscuring the nose and mouth. Accordingly, the identity of the protestors cannot be established.

Despite every effort having been made by the security team to repeatedly seek engagement, there has been no positive engagement during this year. Currently, security staff are having to undertake ID checks at the entrances to the University buildings to ensure the safety of staff and students. This has required additional officer support at a cost to the University. The cost is said to be significant. Something in the region of £200,000 was expended last year.

I am satisfied from the evidence that the claimant has been unable to identify those who have carried out the protests and occupation.

As the defendants are persons unknown, notice of the application has, I am satisfied, not been possible. See in this regard Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2024] AC 983. Rather, the claimant must take reasonable steps to draw the application to the attention of persons likely to be affected by the injunction sought or with some other genuine and proper interest in the application, as to which see paragraph 226 of Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers. I am satisfied that the claimant has done so by taking the following steps in relation to the claim form. It has affixed copies of the notice to vacate at prominent locations and attempted to effect personal service. It has affixed copies of the claim form, application notice and evidence support on the injunction land. That occurred on 30^th May 2025. It has uploaded copies of the documents to a website. It has sent an email to the email address associated with the defendants; that is, Cymru Students for Palestine, stating that a claim has been brought. It has affixed the notice in prominent locations on the injunction land setting out where the documents can be found and obtain a hard copy. Those steps were completed on 4^th June 2025, as to which I have regard to the witness statement of Mr Martin Edwards, solicitor on behalf of the claimant, and also the certificate of a process service, Mr Wayne Reynolds.

Steps were repeated in respect of the amended notice of hearing on 5^th June as to which I have regard to the second witness statement of Mr Edwards and the process server. As such, I am satisfied that even though the requirements in CPR 23.71 and section 12(2)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 may not technically apply, they have been complied with in spirit, as to which see London City Airport v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 255 7 KB.

The law relating to injunctions against persons unknown was clarified by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton. It is convenient to have regard to the headnote to the report of the case in [2024] AC 983. There, it is recorded that the Supreme Court held that it was in principle a legitimate extension of the court’s practice to allow both interim and final injunctions against “newcomers”; that is, persons who at the time of the grant of the injunction were neither defendants nor identifiable and who were described in the injunction only as “persons unknown”. However, as the headnote records:

“Such an injunction was only likely to be justified as a novel exercise of the court’s equitable discretionary power if the applicant:

(1)

demonstrated a compelling need for the protection of civil rights or the enforcement of public law not adequately met by any other available remedies (including statutory remedies);

(2)

Built into the application and the injunction sought, procedural protection for the rights (including Convention rights) of those persons unknown who might be affected by it;

(3)

complied in full with the disclosure duty which attached to the making of without notice application; and

(4)

showed that, on the particular facts, it was just and convenient in all the circumstances that the injunction sought should be made.

(5)

that, if so justified, any injunction made by the court had to:

(i)

spell out clearly and in everyday terms the full extent of the acts it was prohibiting, corresponding as closely as possible to the actual or threatened unlawful conduct,

(ii)

extend no further than the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was granted,

(iii)

be subject to strict temporal and territorial limits,

(iv)

be actively publicised by the applicant so as to draw it to the attention of all actual and potential respondents and

(v)

include generous liberty to any person affected by its terms to apply to vary or discharge the whole or any part of the injunction”.

As will be seen, this approach has been influential in the development of the law as regards “persons unknown” who, as in the present case, are protestors, rather than gypsies and travellers whose presence on land is sought to be prevented. This is so, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court said at paragraph 235 of the judgment in Wolverhampton that:

“… nothing we have said should be taken as prescriptive in relation to newcomer injunctions in other cases, such as those directed at protestors who engage in direct action”.

The other aspect of the Wolverhampton case that is relevant for present purposes concerns interim as opposed to final injunctions. At paragraph 137, the court regarded it as “unrealistic” in the present context to categorise an interim injunction as temporary relief intended to hold the position until trial and to distinguish this from the position where the trial has taken place and the rights of the parties have been determined, following which the litigation is at an end.

At paragraph 139 the court said this:

“… this constant focus upon the duality of interim and final injunctions is ultimately unhelpful as an analytical tool for solving the problem of injunctions against newcomers. In our view the injunction, in its operation upon newcomers, is typically neither interim nor final, at least in substance. Rather it is, against newcomers, what is now called a without notice (i.e. in the old jargon ex parte) injunction, that is an injunction which, at the time when it is ordered, operates against a person who has not been served in due time with the application so as to be able to oppose it, who may have had no notice (even informal) of the intended application to court for the grant of it, and who may not at that stage even be a defendant served with the proceedings in which the injunction is sought. This is so regardless of whether the injunction is in form interim or final”.

In Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 134 (Ch) Ritchie J distilled a list of requirements that must be met in the case of proposed injunctions against persons unknown who are protestors. In doing so, he drew on Wolverhampton and on propositions articulated by the Court of Appeal in Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown [2021] WLR 2802 which Ritchie J held to remain good law following the judgment in Wolverhampton:

“58 There must be a civil cause of action identified in the claim form and particulars of claim. The usual quia timet (since he fears) action relates to the fear of torts such as trespass, damage to property, private or public nuisance, tortious interference with trade contracts, conspiracy with consequential damage and on-site criminal activity”.

Under heading (3) “Sufficient evidence to prove the claim,” Ritchie J articulated what is in effect the test for establishing a case for summary judgment; namely, that there is no realistic prospect of a defence succeeding. This is plain from paragraph 48 of his judgment, where he set out the law on summary judgment.

For the claimant in the present case, Ms Stacey in paragraph 8.13 of her skeleton argument accepts that she must meet that threshold. I shall return to this in the context of the fact that the ELSC has filed a witness statement from a member of the University’s academic staff. I should also at this point mention that Ms Stacey accepts for the purposes of this application that the claimant must satisfy section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

The witness statement to which I have just made reference is from Dr Joseph Whitfield. He is a Senior Lecturer in Hispanic Studies at the University. He has been employed there since 2017 and is active in the Cardiff Branch of the Universities and Colleges Union. He says that he has participated in numerous protests and demonstrations on and around the campus since 2017. At no point has he ever been aware of any requirement for protestors to have sought the consent of the University to organise or attend these events. He contends that it is simply never standard practice for the University to require this. Dr Whitfield says he is concerned about the broad scope of the order and the potential chilling effect that it may have. He is concerned in particular that it has the potential negatively to impact and prevent trade union activity. He also says he has attended many of the recent Palestine protests and has never found the behaviour of the protesters to be violent or unsafe. He says the statement is true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Having set out the evidence and the core legal principles, I shall now address that evidence by reference to the factors identified in Valero. First, cause of action. In respect of trespass, a landowner whose title is not disputed is prima facie entitled to an injunction to restrain a threatened or apprehended trespass of the land (see High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd v Four Categories of Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 2360 at paragraph 74). It is also well established that an entitlement to exclusive possession or actual possession itself is not required where possession is sought against trespassers (see Manchester Airport Plc v Dutton [2000] 1 QB 133). All that needs to be demonstrated by the claimant is a better right to possession than the occupiers (see Laws LJ at 150B to 152A of Dutton). The same rationale applies to injunctive relief (see paragraph 77 of HS2).

In the present case I have no doubt that the University has a better right to possession of the land sought to be protected by the injunction than do the defendants. The University is the freehold and leasehold owner of all of the injunction land, as detailed in paragraphs 10 to 13 of the particulars of claim. The University’s title documentation for the land is exhibited in the evidence. In any event, the claimant is in control of those areas of land and there can be no realistic argument that the defendants have a better title to it. No member of the public has been granted a licence to be on the land. Insofar as those involved are students, none of the events detailed in the particulars of claim has been notified to the University or approved in accordance with the Code. They, therefore, constituted trespass upon the University’s land. Indeed, I consider that the fact that the defendants have gone to such lengths to conceal their identity whilst unlawfully occupying the land shows full well that they know they have no right to be there.

The essence of the claim for private nuisance is that the acts of the defendants have wrongfully interfered with the claimant’s use and/or enjoyment of its property. An unlawful interference with a claimant’s right of access to its land via the public highway where the land adjoins a public highway can constitute a private nuisance (see HS2 in paragraph 86).

ELSC submits that the terms of the proposed injunction go beyond what is appropriate in respect of access to the claimant’s land and public highway. The claimant will, says ELSC, only have an action in private nuisance where there is a “serious and unreasonable interference” with its right of access to the land (see Queen v Rimmington [2006] 1 AC 459). Not every protest which blocks the land, even intentionally, will be unreasonable. The example given is of a five minute prayer vigil on the edge of the land. ELSC also says that the claimant has a remedy in criminal law.

I am not satisfied that these objections have substance. In University of Cambridge v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 724 Soole J said this at paragraph 92:

“As to private nuisance, I consider it necessary and proportionate to include an order which prevents people from deliberately blocking the access of individuals to these sites. I am not persuaded that this limited restraint of use of the public highway is unjustified. On the contrary, given the nature of the campaign and the imminence of the risk, I consider it to be a necessary adjunct to the injunction against trespass. As to vigils and the like, there are ample other places for these to be carried out. I do not accept that in this or any respect the proposed injunction has the chilling effect which is alleged. Nor do I consider that the simple wearing of supportive and/or emblematic badges or clothing would put anyone at risk of breach of the proposed injunction”.

The relevant wording of the proposed injunction in the present case is “directly block, obstruct or interfere with the access of any individual to the land with the intention of stopping that individual accessing the land”. The words “directly”, “intention” and “stopping” are, in my view, sufficient to exclude interference which is other than serious and unreasonable. Moreover, the court will have power to prevent any application for contempt that it considers to be justified. This is because of paragraph 12 of the proposed order.

The claimant contends that it has made full and frank disclosure. ELSC disputes this. At paragraph 8.21 of the claimant’s skeleton argument we see this:

“The University Land is private land. Articles 10 and 11 include no right to trespass upon private land and thereby override the rights of private landowners: Ineos Upstream v Persons Unknown [2019] 4 WLR 100, §36 (Longmore LJ); Director of Public Prosecutions v Cuciurean [2022] 3 WLR 446 (DC), §§40 to 50 (Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ) and London City Airport v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 2557, §8 (Knowles J)”.

Paragraph 8.21.2 then says:

“In any event, any purported interference with Article 10 and 11 rights (by virtue of the sought injunction) would be justified and proportionate”.

Reasons are then given.

The ELSC submits that paragraph 8.21.1 is wrong in law. It relies on the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Rex v Hallam [2025] 4 WLR 33 at paragraphs 34 to 36:

“34.

Articles 10 and 11 did not confer on the appellants a right of entry to private property: see Appleby v United Kingdom (2003) Application No. 44306/98. Moreover, disrupting traffic has been held not to be at the core of Articles 10 and 11: see Kudrevicius v Lithuania (2015) 62 E.H.R.R. 34, at 91. However, we were not referred to any case in which the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has decided that a protester who commits an act of trespass thereby automatically loses their rights under Article 10 or 11 altogether. On the contrary, Steel v United Kingdom (1998) 23 September was a case involving "a protest against the extension of a motorway involving a forcible entry into the construction site and climbing into the trees to be felled and onto machinery in order to impede the construction works" (see the description in Taranenko v Russia (2014) Application No. 19554/05 (Taranenko), at §70). The expression of opinion was found to be protected by Article 10.

35.

We do not consider that DPP v Cuciurean [2022] EWHC 736 (Admin); [2022] QB 888 (Cuciurean) at [39] to [50] assists us on this point. Cuciurean, which involved a challenge to prosecution and conviction (not sentence) for aggravated trespass, contrary to s. 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, did not determine the question of whether Articles 10 and 11 were engaged.

36.

Although the appellants' activities were not at the core of Articles 10 and 11, we do not consider that their acts of trespass removed them completely from the scope of Articles 10 and 11. Rather, as in Trowland (at [74] and [75]), the fact that the appellants' expressions of opinioninvolved criminal trespass significantly weakened the protections afforded by Articles 10 and 11 (and so the weight to be attached to those protections when considering proportionality of sentence).”

The ELSC’s case is that this alleged breach of the duty of disclosure is so serious that the claimant should in any event be denied the relief it seeks. I do not accept this proposition. It is the case that Articles 10 and 11 do not confer a positive right of protest on private land. So much was held in Cuciurean. At paragraph 45, the Divisional Court acknowledged that where denying access would destroy the effective exercise of rights under Article 10 and 11, then the possibility could not be excluded of a State being obliged to protect those rights by regulating property rights. Despite what is said at paragraph 35 of Hallam, there is, in my view, little actual practical difference between the two cases. The central point is that Articles 10 and 11 are not excluded even if the action involves trespass.

Paragraphs 40 to 50 of Cuciurean were cited in the claimant’s skeleton and paragraph 45 is reproduced at page 111 of the claimant’s authorities. It is perhaps the case that the opening words “in any event” in paragraph 8.21.2 might have been better phrased, but I was in no doubt, having read the claimant’s skeleton argument and authorities before I had seen the submissions of the ELSC, that the claimant would need to meet the case at its highest for the purposes of this hearing and that the claimant would have to deal with the issue of whether the proposed injunction would disproportionately interfere with the defendant’s Article 10 and Article 11 rights. I shall return to the issue of proportionality.

The evidence of Ms Gilbert, Mr Bayley and Dr Sanderson, in my view, shows clearly that there have been repeated incidents of unlawful direct action. I can summarise these as follows. There was a particularly disruptive protest on 14^th October 2024 which, as I have said, resulted in the suspension of students. That, importantly, has not deterred others from further direct action. On 19^th February 2025, masked protestors blocked the road outside the Centre for Student Life and the Main Building. On 6^th May 2025, protestors entered the Glamorgan Building and unlawfully occupied part of that building and concealed their identities and refused to identify themselves. They said they had done so as a protest at various alleged actions that remained ongoing and to remind Cardiff University that one could not stop the Movement for Palestine and that the group would not stop nor rest until Palestine was liberated. During the occupation, unauthorised access to the roof was effected in order to raise a Palestinian flag.

On 9^th May 2025, the defendants set up, again, as in the previous year, an unauthorised encampment at Horseshoe Drive. They raised banners that made it difficult to gain access. As in 2024, the recent encampment at Horseshoe Drive has become a draw from external protests and individuals who I am satisfied are not members of the University. There have been reported exhortations in May 2025 for persons to join the protests. The defendants waited until the University had issued and served the present proceedings on 30^th May 2025 before disbanding the encampment. However, on 1^st June 2025, the defendants demonstrated what I consider to be their defiance by gaining unauthorised access to the Main Building, again to raise a Palestinian flag. On 2^nd June, they announced that this was not the end, but, rather, that the group was more energised and committed than ever. They said, “See you over the summer”. Also, importantly, I refer to paragraph 10 of Mr Bayley’s statement which records a post by the protestors who said, “See you at graduation”.

The claimants acknowledge that the disbanding of the camp at Horseshoe Drive following the commencement of the present proceedings could be said to show there is no need for injunctive relief. The ELSC submits just that. I consider, however, that there is at present a real and imminent risk of future unlawful direct action being undertaken by the defendants. The reasons for my conclusion are as follows. There remains a real and imminent risk of future unlawful action, because the present position needs to be looked at in the light of the previous incidents in 2023 and 2024, which involved the flouting of the Code and the Student Conduct Procedure. The actions in 2025, again, reveal a complete disregard for the Code. It is apparent that the conflict in Gaza remains ongoing. It is also apparent that the defendants perceive that the claimant has failed to meet the defendants’ demands. There have been recent statements that the campaign is ongoing, with specific reference being made to the summer and to graduation. The defendants continue to conceal their true identities. There has been no positive engagement possible with the defendants this year, in contrast to last year. The defendants have announced that they are more energised and committed than ever before and continue to issue calls for support on social media and elsewhere.

Leaving aside the important issue of human rights, to which I shall return shortly, I find that there is no defence with a real prospect of success. The stark fact is that the defendants have no right to set up an encampment on the claimant’s private land and engage in unlawful direct action and dangerous activities, such as climbing on rooves and blocking access to the claimant’s land. I have taken account of Dr Whitfield’s statement filed by the ELSC. His statement that he has not been aware of any requirement for a protestor to seek the consent of the University to organise the actions just mentioned is, in my view, frankly, surprising. But even assuming that is his view, it is plainly contradicted by the witness statements of those who are officers of the University which are before me and who have specific responsibilities for matters concerning the running of the University and ensuring the safety of all who are on its premises. Dr Whitfield is understandably only able to speak from his own perspective as an academic. He is not, unlike the claimant’s witnesses, concerned in the University’s management. I do not, therefore, need to conduct any “mini trial” in order to conclude that the Code and the Student Conduct Procedure exist and are of direct and important relevance. I do not consider that there is any basis for the claim that the injunctions, if granted, would materially impact on trade union activities. There is nothing to suggest that the claimant would not give its express consent to any legitimate activities of this kind which were to take place on its land. But, in the highly unlikely event that this proved not to be the case, then there is a liberty to apply.

The defendants cannot be heard to say that because the claimant has tried and recently failed to engage with the protestors by other means, the Code has become a dead letter. I accept the submission that it is because the claimant values freedom of expression that it has taken until now to seek to enforce its rights in the interests of the University, its staff and students as a whole. I have taken into account the submission of the ELSC that others may be interested in supplying witness statements. The defendants have, however, been on notice of the application for the injunction since 30^th May, albeit that the ELSC only became aware of the matter on 9^th June. This court is not prepared to speculate as to what such statements, if they materialise, might say, but there is in any event an important safeguard built into the draft order which is directly relevant to this issue. Paragraph 3 of the draft gives any person served with or notified of the order the right on notice to apply to vary or discharge the order. Accordingly, if evidence were to come to light which the ELSC or anyone else considered to be relevant to the continuation of the injunction, they can seek to have it varied or, indeed, discharged

I consider the balance of convenience to be clear. If the injunction is not granted there is a real risk that the claimant will face more of what has happened in 2024 and earlier this year. For example, the graduation celebrations could not be held at Horseshoe Drive in 2024. They had to be moved to a new location. As well as financial costs, I am satisfied that that was disruptive and unfair to the University community. Open days were also disrupted in 2024. I accept the evidence that this raises serious reputational implications and may deter students of high quality from applying to study at the University. This has a significant reputational risk. Exams have had to be changed at short notice. From the evidence, it is manifest that the Main Building has facilities that are preferable to those which might be available at any alternative site.

The encampment at Horseshoe Drive in 2024 and 2025 has raised health and safety concerns, including for the occupants in terms of sanitation, but there have also been incidents involving the presence of others from outside the University. The occupation of the Glamorgan Building prevented access for others to use rooms within that building. Blocking entrances to the University’s buildings has caused operational disruption and harm, as well as raising health and safety issues. Certain members of staff have had to take action in response to what they consider to be concerns for their personal safety. There has been a significant financial impact upon the University as a result of the unlawful actions.

I consider that the graduation days due to take place between July and October 2025 are of particular concern, given the statements of the protestors. A graduation event which includes, importantly, the celebration with family and friends following the actual degree ceremony is a hugely important day in the life of the student and, indeed, of the student’s family. I shall have more to say about this aspect when I come to address the geographic extent of the proposed injunction. There are also open days planned for the next few months, as I have mentioned. These are also at risk if the injunction is not to be made. An open day is an opportunity to encourage the brightest and best to the University and, therefore, to uphold and maintain its reputation.

What then lies on the other side of the balance? Like Thompsell J in University of London v Clark and Others [2024] EWHC 2895 at paragraph 52, on the facts of the present case I find that there is no real detriment to the defendants. The Code means the protest gatherings will need to be planned in advance and permission obtained, but that is merely to require the protestors to act in a way designed to balance their right to express their views with the interests of others on the University’s land. I also note the witness evidence that there are other places in central Cardiff where demonstrations and the like could and, indeed, have been held.

An important point about the Code is that consent for a meeting or other event is expressly stated not to be unreasonably withheld. One way of challenging an unreasonable refusal would be by way of judicial review. However, like Thompsell J, in the present case there exists, in my view, a much simpler and effective means of challenge; namely, for a defendant or the ELSC to come back to this court to request a variation or discharge of the injunction. Thus, the balance of convenience lies decisively in favour of granting the injunction.

I accept the submission that damages would not be an adequate remedy. The claimant’s submission is that the financial loss that has already been suffered is substantial and there is no realistic prospect of recovery from persons unknown. The health and safety risks posed by repetition could potentially cause serious harm, for which damages would not be a full remedy. The reputational damage to the University and potential risk to education/examinations cannot be adequately compensated on monetary terms, nor, importantly, could the adverse effect on students or potential students if graduation ceremonies or open days were to be disrupted.

I approach this issue on the basis that the claimant must show that any reliance by the defendants upon ECHR Articles 10 and 11 would be bound to fail, because the proposed interference is justified and proportionate in all the circumstances of the case. In so doing, I apply the principles set out in DPP v Ziegler [2022] AC 403. So far as justification is concerned, it is manifest that the restrictions would be prescribed by law. This would be as a result of the court ordering them, pursuant to the exercise of its powers under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The restriction would also be in pursuit of a legitimate aim; that is to say, protecting the claimant’s property rights, as well as the rights and interests of the wider University community who are lawfully entitled to use the land.

So far as proportionality is concerned, I refer to what I have already said regarding the defendants’ ability to operate through the mechanism of the Code, the potential to use places that are not on campus for the purposes of protest and the safeguards that would be available if the defendants consider that the Code is not being properly applied. I bear in mind that the meetings etc which the defendants might wish to hold would be directly critical of the University’s stance in relation to the protestors’ demands. That includes calling for the resignation of the University’s Vice-Chancellor. Ms Stacey was able to tell me on instruction that these were not factors that could be expected to result in consent being unreasonably refused.

I have already referred to the witness evidence, which demonstrates there is, in effect, a presumption in favour of grant, when the mechanism of the Code is invoked. But if that should turn out not to be the case, then, again, the appropriate safeguards exist. I also take account of the fact that the protestors can and, indeed, have made significant use of social media, including the use of video messages such as those adduced in evidence at this hearing.

I have considered whether there are other less intrusive measures that could be taken, without resorting to an injunction. The ELSC submits that the claimant could and should have resorted to the Code. However, the obvious response to this is that it would not have been practicable to do so, given that the defendants have gone to great lengths to conceal their identities. The ELSC says that the notice to vacate Horseshoe Drive appears to be the full extent of what it describes as the claimant’s self-help. The response to this is that it is no answer to an application for a quia timet injunction to say that the claimant should suffer the harm occasioned by an unlawful occupation and then seek to remedy it by means of possession proceedings. As for any suggestion that disturbances that threaten public order or access to land can be dealt with by the police, it is again no answer to suggest that the police should be called only after the harm in question has occurred.

I therefore conclude that there is a compelling need for the injunction and that there is no realistic defence based on the contention that the grant of an injunction would not be lawful and proportionate in terms of Articles 10 and 11.

I turn to the procedural requirements.

As I have repeatedly emphasised, the protestors have gone to extensive lengths to avoid being identified. Accordingly, the claimant has been unable positively to identify any defendant by name. In terms of persons unknown, this has not been possible as they have not yet carried out the threatened acts and it is not known who may attempt to do so in the future. The claim therefore identifies the persons unknown by reference to their tortuous conduct. The defendants are further defined by reference to geographical boundaries.

The terms of the proposed injunction which identify the direct action are, in my view, clear and precise. Prohibitions are set out in plain words. They avoid using legal or technical language. They do not prohibit conduct which is lawful, nor do they prohibit lawful protest.

I am satisfied that the prohibitions match the feared torts, as pleaded in the particulars of claim (see Canada Goose). I also refer to what I have said regarding the issue of private nuisance arising from action taking place on the public highway.

I have had close regard to the need for the injunction to cover only the land in respect of which the requirements for the making of an injunction of this kind can be manifestly established. I have taken account of the submissions made by ELSC regarding the Music Building, the Abacws Building, the Trevithick Building and the Queen’s Building. ELSC said that none of these buildings should be included. The starting point is that, in contrast to at least some other cases, including those concerning university injunctions, the claimant in the present case has expressly determined not to seek an injunction over the whole of the campus. I refer to the witness evidence. In part, I consider that this reflects the geographic reality of the Cathays Campus, which has a close physical relationship with the city of Cardiff. Some eleven buildings and associated land are sought to be made the subject of the injunction. This represents less than 20% of the total buildings of the University.

There must, nevertheless, be a real and immediate need, even in respect of these buildings. On the basis of the evidence of Dr Sanderson which I have set out at length and which I see no reason not to accept, I am satisfied with one exception that a case has been made for the inclusion of the buildings and related land. The case is made out on the basis that the buildings or land in question have either been the subject of unlawful occupation or other trespass, with the resulting harm described by the witnesses and with the obvious risk of repetition, given what I have said about risk; or that the building or land is so adjacent as to be at real risk of illegal displacement activity if other land is covered by the injunction; or that the building or land if occupied would materially impact upon graduation ceremonies and open days because of its proximity to the sites of those events; or that the land has real connections with organisations which are regarded by the protestors as linked with activities to which the protestors plainly take serious exception.

The land at Horseshoe Drive and the area between the Bute Building and the Glamorgan Building have particular importance for the graduation ceremony gatherings, to which I have referred earlier. Students, families and friends congregate on the area and use the backdrop of the main building for photography from Horseshoe Drive. The students robe for their graduation ceremonies at the Centre for Student Life.

The one exception is the Music Building. I agree with ELSC that this building should not be covered by the injunction. I ascertained at the hearing that it was included because of the grassed area in front of it. That area is considered to be at real risk of occupation, such as occurred last year and this year at Horseshoe Drive. It was considered by the claimant that there might be overspill from the occupiers of that grassed area into the Music Building. Unlike, however, the other overspill concerns, to which I have made reference, I do not consider that there can be said to be a serious risk of the Music Building being subject to occupation, given its nature and location, provided that the grassed area in front with its high value statue is included within the injunction. Therefore, the Music Building, but not the grassed area in front, should be excluded from the plan accompanying the proposed injunction.

The claimant invites this court to grant an injunction to last until the end of the 2025/2026 academic year. That would be 31^st July 2026. This submission is made on the basis that it is the period which can presently be shown to be reasonably necessary in order to protect the claimant’s legal rights. The claimant submits that it is an appropriate duration in the context of the present case, having regard in particular to (1) the history of past direct action; (2) the nature and context of the underlying protest cause which is ongoing; (3) the future feared tortious activity which is directed towards University operations; (4) the volume and frequency of unlawful direct action; (5) the length of time that tortious acts have persisted; (6) the pattern of behaviour and the need to ensure that protection is in place during particularly vulnerable times of the year such as exam periods, graduations and open days; (7) the threats made in respect of future direct action unless all of the “demands” are met; (8) the serious and irreparable harm posed by a risk of repetition; and (9) the need to provide an adequate period of time of respite for the University community.

The University suggests that express provision should be included for the order to be reviewed prior to the expiry of that period in order to determine whether protection remained necessary at that stage. This would be in line with paragraph 217 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton. ELSC submits that if an injunction is to be made it should be strictly time limited and it should cover only a very short period by way of interim relief until evidence in rebuttal can be mustered. I have already explained why I am not persuaded by that last point. The claimant has made out a case for a “final” order, always, importantly, remembering, as Ritchie J pointed out in Valero, that in this category of case a final order is never in fact in truth final. It will be time limited and subject to earlier termination if the court sees fit.

I consider that in these circumstances the order should expire on 31^st July 2026, that being the end of the next academic year. That period reflects the pattern of protests over the past academic year and the threat to graduation ceremonies and open days over the summer.

The requirement to give effective notice as opposed to service was identified by the Supreme Court at paragraphs 167 and 230 to 231 of Wolverhampton. The draft order sets out, at paragraphs 6 to 11, the steps which are proposed to be taken to notify and bring to the attention of the defendants any order made and further documents in the proceedings. I consider those steps to be appropriate.

I do consider that an express provision for review must be included in the order, as the claimants now suggest. I invite the claimant to provide a draft provision to this effect. On a related matter, I also require the recitals to the order to be amended in order to add an express reference to the claimants’ obligation to the court to bring to the court’s attention any material change of circumstances concerning matters within the scope of the injunction.

I am informed that the claimant is willing and able if necessary to provide a cross-undertaking in damages. I consider that such an undertaking should be given.

This concludes my judgment.