MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Before :
MR JUSTICE CAVANAGH
Between :
NEDA RANAIE | Claimant |
- and - | |
JOHN NEIL WARLAND | Defendant |
David Hirst (Direct Access) for the Claimant
Clare Wisson (instructed by Bindmans) for the Defendant
JUDGMENT
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30 am on 17th December 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and by release to the National Archives.
Mr Justice Cavanagh:
Introduction
These are proceedings for defamation. The Claimant and the Defendant are (or, at least, were) next door neighbours who fell out. The claim concerns an email which the Defendant sent to Ms Madeleine Fortescue, the Chief People Officer (head of human resources), at a company called Moving Brands Ltd on 10 March 2023. At the time, the Claimant was employed as Chief Financial Officer at Moving Brands Ltd. The Claimant alleges that the contents of the email were libellous. On 14 April 2023, the Claimant was dismissed by Moving Brands Ltd with immediate effect and was given a payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant contends that her dismissal was the direct consequence of the email that was sent by the Defendant to Ms Fortescue. The Claimant claims damages for libel, including aggravated damages and special damages, and also seeks an injunction to restrain the Defendant or anyone acting on his behalf from publishing or republishing the same or similar imputations as those that the Claimant contends are to be derived from the email.
In a Written Notice of Case, the Defendant denies that the contents of the email are defamatory, and contends that some parts of the email about which the Claimant complains are statements of opinion rather than fact. If they are statements of opinion, then this would open up the possibility of relying upon the “honest opinion” defence in section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013. In written submissions the Defendant qualified the position in the Written Notice of Case by accepting that imputations regarding alleged tortious / criminal misconduct were defamatory at common law. The Defendant otherwise maintained that the email was not defamatory at common law.
The parties agreed that there should be a Trial of Preliminary Issues (“TPI”) in this case, pursuant to CPR 3.1(2)(i) and (k) and CPR PD53B, paragraph 6. The parties further agreed that the issues should be determined by a judge of the Media and Communications List, on paper. In accordance with this agreement, Master Brown ordered a TPI in an Order dated 19 December 2024.
The preliminary issues are as follows:
The natural and ordinary and/or inferential meaning(s) of the words complained of by the Claimant (“the Words Complained Of”); and
Whether the meaning(s) of the Words Complained Of: (i) are defamatory of the Claimant at common law; (ii) are statements of fact or expressions of opinion; and (iii) in so far as they contain an expression of opinion or expressions of opinion, whether the Words Complained Of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion(s).
The email
The email was sent by the Defendant to Ms Fortescue on 10 March 2023 at 10.54 am. It was sent from the Defendant’s personal email address to Ms Fortescue’s business address at Moving Brands Ltd. The subject heading of the email said, “CONFIDENTIAL: Ms Neda Renaie”.
The contents of the email were as follows:
“Hello Madeleine,
Apologies for the contact out of the blue, but I thought it appropriate to raise our concerns over the increasingly erratic behaviour of your CFO Ms Neda Ranaie.
We have been neighbours with Neda in Richmond for several years now, and have generally got on very amenably.
Unfortunately lockdown and a recent planning application appear to have been a trigger in the long term breakdown of this relationship. The change to working from home has obviously increased any likelihood of friction in this regard.
This has recently culminated in Neda repeatedly trespassing onto our property and conducting criminal damage to our roof. Please see image attached image of Neda allegedly damaging our roof on 7th Feb @ 0930hrs as witnessed by our contractors.
These events and the ongoing harassment are being dealt with through both criminal and civil procedure, but the reason for my email is to ensure that you are aware of the situation and can provide suitable duty of care to your employee whilst now primarily working from home.
We have received numerous messages from Neda over the last 2 years expressing severe stress and anxiety, with regards to both our deteriorating relationship as neighbours and the long hours she had been working to secure the financial health of Moving Brands.
I did recommend reaching out to a professional organisation such as MIND to help manage these symptoms, but this was strongly rebuffed as inappropriate.
Our communication with Neda is now only through professional third parties, due to us blocking her digital channels, so our ability to reach out has been curtailed.
As her employer I believe that you will have the same safeguarding responsibilities for ‘work from home’ employees as any office-based role. I’m hoping that Neda has already made you aware of the escalation in events, and that you have been able to assess and make suitable provisions for her welfare. I understand these usually take the form of stress risk assessments, the offer of occupational support, and monitoring of health and safety as appropriate.
I apologise for not contacting you earlier, but we were hoping that post-pandemic working practices may see the status quo returned.
It is likely that with pending criminal and civil action (Including a cease & desist notice and/or restraining order sought to prevent further trespass) we can only see this issue exacerbating and creating severe stress and anxiety for all parties concerned.
I hope that by making you aware of these events, you may be able to provide suitable provision and support for Neda to work from home in a safe and professional environment. I also hope that the forthcoming completion of our building works will offer some peace of mind for her moving forward.
Always happy to discuss further on the phone or in person, and if you require any additional information then please just let me know.
If you could confirm receipt of this email, that would be much appreciated.
Many thanks,
John”
The photograph that was attached to the email showed a person in a blue coat with long blonde hair, crouched or sitting on a flat roof on a structure that had been constructed between two properties. It is not possible to see the face of the person, or to see what, if anything, the person was doing to the fabric of the roof. It is common ground between the parties that the photograph is part of the context in which the contents of the email should be reviewed.
The pleaded defamatory meanings, and the Defendant’s response
In the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant contends that the email carries the following defamatory meanings:
In their natural and ordinary meanings, the Words Complained Of meant and were understood to mean that:
The Claimant has repeatedly trespassed on the Defendant’s property without due cause;
The Claimant has caused criminal damage to the roof of the Defendant’s property;
The Claimant is responsible for ongoing harassment of the Defendant and his wife; and
The Claimant’s harassment has become the subject of legal action in the civil courts and criminal prosecution resulting in a cease and desist notice and a restraining order to curb the Claimant’s conduct.
Further or alternatively, the words complained of conveyed the additional natural and ordinary inferential meanings:
“The Claimant's behaviour has, as a result of (i) the long hours she has spent working toward the financial success of her employer together with (ii) doing so within the unmonitored environment of post-pandemic working from home, had in her relations with the Defendant
and his wife become erratic, unhinged and harassing, to the extent that she needs professional third party treatment and support and occupational health and welfare monitoring from her employer for her mental health and wellbeing and, until receiving such interventions, is unlikely to perform her work duties and function in her employment in a normal, professional and risk-free manner but liable to behave at work in the same way as she behaved towards the Defendant and his wife.”
So far as the additional inferential meanings in sub-paragraph (2) are concerned, the Claimant contends that the text that is underlined consists of a defamatory expression of opinion by the Defendant, and the non-underlined text contains the alleged facts referable to the opinion.
In the Defendant’s Written Notice of Case, the Defendant asserts that the natural, ordinary and/or inferential meaning of the email was the following:
“The Claimant’s erratic conduct in a neighbour dispute, including alleged trespass and criminal damage, has resulted in legal proceedings which are ongoing and in which the Defendant seeks to obtain relief such as a restraining order and/or a cease and desist notice. These legal proceedings are likely to cause considerable further distress and anxiety for all parties. As such, the Claimant’s employer should make provisions
to support her welfare”
The underlined passage represents what the Defendant says is a statement of opinion, rather than fact. The Defendant avers that the Claimant’s conduct and the ongoing litigation are statements of fact, whereas the likely impact of litigation and the need for welfare support are expressions of the Defendant’s opinion.
The relevant law
The relevant law in relation to meaning and the difference between fact and opinion is well-settled and there is no significant dispute between the parties about it, though they each place particular emphasis on certain principles. The law has helpfully been set out by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB); [2020] 4 WLR 25, at paragraph 12, by Warby LJ in Blake v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000, at paragraphs 19-21, and by Steyn J in Vine v Barton [2024] EWHC 1268 (KB) at paragraphs 7-15. I have taken into account all of the principles that are set out in these cases and in the other leading authorities in this field, but it is not necessary for me to quote extensively from the judgments. Principles that are of particular potential application to the present case include the following:
Meaning
The court’s task is to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, which is the single meaning the words would convey to the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader (Blake v Fox, at para 19);
In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning more injurious than the claimant’s pleaded meaning) (Koutsogiannis, para 16, though some doubt has been expressed about this);
What words mean is not limited to their literal meaning, but extends to inference and insinuation which a reasonable reader guided not by special but only by general knowledge and not fettered by any strict rules of legal construction would draw from the words (Gatley on Libel and Slander, 14th Ed, para 3-018). In other words, the ordinary meaning of words includes what the reasonable reader would read into them (the inferential meaning) (Allen v Times Newspapers [2019] EWHC 1235 (QB) 28, per Warby J);
Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take too literal an approach to the task (Koutsogiannis, para 16);
Any meaning that emerges as the product of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected (Koutsogiannis, para 16);
That meaning is to be determined objectively by reference to the words themselves. No other evidence is admissible, but the medium of expression and the context in which the words complained of appear are both important (Blake v Fox, para 19);
The author’s intention is irrelevant (Blake v Fox, para 19)
The judge deciding the meaning at first instance should have regard to the impression the words make upon them. The judge should read or watch the offending publication to capture an initial reaction before reading or hearing argument (Blake v Fox, para 20). That is what I have done in this case;
The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he or she is not unduly suspicious. They can read between the lines. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unconscionable because it would be naïve (Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17; [2020] AC 593, at paras 35-37);
The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who read the publication in question (Koutsogiannis, para 16);
Context has considerable importance. This includes the circumstances in which the statement was made, and the way in which the words were presented (Stocker v Stocker at para 40);
A matter can be treated as part of the context if it is sufficiently closely connected in time, content or otherwise that it is likely to have been in the hypothetical reader’s view, or in their mind, at the time they read the words complained of (Monroe v Hopkins [2018] EWHC 433 (QB) at para 38, per Warby J),
The judge can take judicial notice of particular characteristics of a given readership if these are matters of common knowledge, but should beware of impressionistic assessments of these characteristics (Blake v Fox, para 20);
The Court of Appeal in Chase v News Group Newspapers [2002] EWCA Civ 1772, at para 45, identified three levels of defamatory allegation, broadly (1) the claimant is guilty of the act; (2) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant is guilty of the act; and (3) there are grounds to investigate whether the claimant has committed the act, but these categories should not be regarded as a straitjacket;
Fact or opinion
Whether a statement is one of fact or opinion is a highly fact-sensitive process that focuses on the particular statements at issue. A statement that contains no indication of or reference to any supporting facts is liable to be treated as a statement of fact (Blake v Fox, para 24);
The ultimate determinant is how the statement would strike the ordinary reader, i.e. whether it is discernibly comment (Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 933, para 39);
A statement may imply a comment (Swan v Associated Newspapers [2020] EWHC 1312 (QB), at 26);
The rest of this guidance is taken from Koutsogiannis, para 16, approved by the Court of Appeal in Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567, at para 12;
In order to be opinion, the statement must be recognised as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact. Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation etc;
The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion;
Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance, opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that the claimant has done something but does not indicate what the something is, i.e. the statement is a bare comment; and
Whether an allegation that someone has acted “dishonestly” or “criminally” is an allegation of fact or an expression of opinion will very much depend on context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact;
Indication of the basis of the opinion
In order to meet the conditions for the defence of honest opinion in section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013, the statement complained of must indicate, in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion. The basis may be apparent by implication (Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53; [2011] 1 AC 852, para 105);
Defamatory at common law
A statement is defamatory at common law if (a) it attributes to the claimant behaviour or views that are contrary to the common, shared, values of our society (the consensus requirement); and (b) would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would treat the claimant (Blake v Fox, para 26).
Discussion
Natural and ordinary meaning and/or inferential meaning
I find that the ordinary and natural meaning of the email includes the following:
The Claimant has repeatedly trespassed on the Defendant’s property without due cause;
The Claimant has caused criminal damage to the roof of the Defendant’s property; and
The Claimant is responsible for ongoing harassment of the Defendant and his wife.
Each of these meanings is consistent with the literal and ordinary meaning of words in the email. The meaning that the Claimant has caused criminal damage to the roof of the Defendant’s property is supported by the context consisting of the photograph which was attached to the email. It is plain that the inclusion of the photograph was intended to convey that it showed the Claimant up on the roof of the Defendant’s property, doing something with her hands that was causing damage to the Defendant’s property. In the circumstances, the use of the word “allegedly” in the email does not serve so as to undermine the meaning of the email, taken as a whole, that there is no doubt or qualification in relation to the Claimant damaging the Defendant’s roof in a way that amounts to criminal damage.
The email also contains the following additional natural and ordinary meanings:
There is a pending criminal investigation into the Claimant’s actions for harassment, triggered by a complaint made by the Defendant and his wife, through which the Defendant and his wife are seeking relief including a restraining order; and
There are pending civil proceedings that have been brought by the Defendant and his wife against the Claimant for harassment, in which the Defendant and his wife are seeking injunctive relief and a restraining order to prevent the Claimant from continuing to harass them.
These are at Chase level 1. In the context, it is clear that the Defendant is asserting that the Claimant has been guilty of harassment which amounts both to a criminal offence and a civil wrong.
The above are statements of fact.
In addition, the email contains, inferentially, the following statements of opinion:
“Unless she is provided with appropriate support and assistance, it is likely that the Claimant’s behaviour will be increasingly erratic, and that she will behave in the future in a way that will cause severe stress and anxiety for her employer and work colleagues, and for the Defendant and his wife.”
The Words Complained of in the email contain, in general and specific terms, the basis for the opinion. In particular, the basis for the opinion is the Defendant’s description of the erratic way that the Claimant has behaved towards him and his wife, including harassment, including damage to his property, and the alleged fact that the Claimant had been expressing stress and anxiety about the difficulties in her relationship with the Defendant and his wife and about the long hours that she was working.
My conclusion that this is a statement of opinion takes account of the context, which is that this statement was set out in an email which was sent to a single recipient, the head of human resources at the Claimant’s employer.
The statements of fact and opinion stated above are defamatory of the Claimant at common law.