Peter Aston v United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy

The Claimant is a group analytic psychotherapist who has worked in the NHS and private practice for 30 years.

On 27^th October the Claimant issued a claim against the Defendant challenging an interim suspension order (“the ISO”) imposed on the Claimant on 10^th September and affirmed on 1^st October 2025 by an Interim Orders Panel (“the Panel”) of the Defendant. The effect of the order was to suspend the Applicant’s registration for 12 months or the earlier determination of a disciplinary hearing the “Adjudication Hearing”.

By way of interim relief through an injunction the Claimant seeks an order reinstating him to the register without restrictions pending the Adjudication Hearing which is likely to be listed in the middle of January 2026.

Psychotherapy offers confidential assistance to individuals with a wide variety and complexity of issues include anxiety, depression, bereavement, relationship difficulties, suicidality, physical and sexual abuse, self-harm, borderline personality disorder, grief, loss, and work-related stress. It follows that individuals may be very vulnerable when they visit a Psychotherapist.

Psychotherapists are not regulated by statute. Rather there is a system of voluntary regulation. The Claimant has been registered with the Defendant, the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (“UKCP”) since 2012 as a full clinical member. The UKCP, a charity, is the leading professional body responsible for the education, training, accreditation, and regulation of psychotherapists and psychotherapeutic counsellors in the United Kingdom. Its remit includes protecting the public and maintaining confidence in the profession it regulates. It has a membership of 9,000.

The relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is contractual. The Claimant pays a sum of £286 a year to remain a registered member and agrees to be bound by express terms contained in

The ethical principles set out the following under the rubric “best interest of client”;

“As a practitioner you must not have a sexual relationship with clients.”

and

“(you)

Must not exploit or abuse your relationship with clients (current or past) for any purpose including your emotional or sexual gain.”

These rules reflect the nature of psychotherapy and the power imbalance which is referred to under professionalism;

“Be aware of the power imbalance between the practitioner and client and avoid duel or multiple relationships which risk confusing an existing relationship and may impact adversely on a client.”

and

“Exercise all reasonable care before entering into a personal or business relationship with former clients, taking into account the time that elapsed since your therapy ended. Should such a relationship prove to be the detriment of the former client, you may be called to answer an allegation of misusing your former position.”

Under “trust and confidence” it is stated;

“Challenge questionable practise in yourself or others, reporting to the UK CP potential breaches of this code…”

Complaints and Conduct Process Policy states as follows;

I turn to the relevant facts

On 10^th November 2023 the Claimant commenced therapy sessions with Ms. Danuta McNee (the client). The therapy spanned 20 months. Ms McNee presented with anger issues in relation to ex-husband.

In the final weeks of therapy, and after a mutual decision to end the sessions, Ms McNee suggested to the Claimant that they should meet for walks in Hyde Park; see paragraph 4.2 of the Particulars of Claim ( “PoC”). They did meet and the Claimant stated within his witness statement for the panel

“the walks were entirely innocuous, we had friendly conversations about life, family and travel.”

Ms McNee stated that

“My internal motivation for suggesting the walks was that I felt a connection with Peter and wanted to see how our interaction felt outside of the therapy room, as I knew therapy itself was already coming to an end. At that stage, there was no romantic or physical elements to our contact.”

She also stated that she did not regard the walks as crossing professional boundaries (although this was not her profession) and to her they felt like two people who formed a good rapport talking in a more relaxed environment.

The Claimant has reflected on these walks and stated (to panel)

“I acknowledge that meeting outside the consulting room can be perceived as a crossing of professional boundaries, even when no intimacy occurs. I have reflected carefully on this and recognise that what I considered at the time to be harmless can be misinterpreted. I would not permit such meetings again.”

On 17^th July 2025 the therapy sessions ended following the conclusion the Claimant and Ms McNee remained in contact and messaged each other. As the Claimant stated in his witness statement “a few weeks after therapy ended”, they met again and “shared a hug”

In “early” August 2025 the Claimant met Ms. McNee socially at a festival and a consensual relationship commenced.

On 22^nd August 2025 the Claimant disclosed the relationship to his clinical practice. “Change of Harley Street Clinic” (“CoHS”) and was summarily dismissed for gross misconduct. His clients were informed of the dismissal (this was before any complaint was made to UKCP).

As the Panel was to note the Clinical lead at CoHS stated that the Claimant had told him on the 22nd of August of the two walks and there were “intense erotic feelings expressed between both him and Ms McNee but no physical contact or sexual contact.” The Claimant denies that he said this.

On 26^th August CoHS reported the Claimant’s conduct to the Defendant.

By September 2025 the Claimant and Ms. McNee were cohabiting.

On the 4^th September 2025 the Claimant contacted the Defendant, enquired about self- reporting and was advised to submit a form. He attempted to send a form but mistyped the e-mail address (the form was received on the 8^th September).

On 5^th September 2025 the Defendant received an anonymous complaint referring to the relationship between the Claimant and Ms McNee.

On 7^th September 2025 the clinical lead of CoHS wrote to the UKCP.

On 8^th September 25 the Defendant received the Claimant’s referral form which stated;

“I am writing to formally acknowledge that I have breached a significant boundary in my psychotherapy practise by entering into relationship with an ex patient. I recognise the gravity of this violation and the impact it may have had on both professional standards and trust in the therapeutic relationship.”

On 10^th September 2025 the Defendant’s Interim Orders Panel (“the September Panel”) imposed an Interim Suspension Order for a period of 12 months. The Claimant said that he was working as a coach on that day and did not attend the hearing. His legal representative did and applied for an adjournment and when this was refused left as he had no further instructions. The September Panel recognised that its role was not to fact find but to assess risk. It decided that an ISO was necessary to protect the public, was otherwise in the public interest and was also in the Applicant’s interest. It stated reasoning was;

“The fact that the Registrant had made such serious errors in maintaining boundaries with a client inevitably questioned whether other clients, current or future, would be at risk of therapeutic harm caused by the Registrant’s boundary issues.”;

and

“Suggests a course of conduct that can be described as calculated and intentional with regards to Client A and demonstrates an ongoing risk to patient safety.”;

The September Panel determined that it was also in the Applicant’s own interests as there was the potential for the Applicant to “suffer harm were he to attempt to continue to provide therapy to others in the immediate future”.

The Defendant agreed to review the ISO following the receipt of evidence from the Claimant. This included a witness statement from Ms McNee

On 1^st October 2025 the Interim Orders Panel reviewed the Interim Suspension Order and continued it for the period of 12 months. This Panel;

On 27^th October 2025 the Claim form was issued

On 20^th November 2025 it was determined by the Defendant that the concerns raised regarding the Claimant met the realistic prospects test and the matters should be referred to an Adjudication Panel. An “allegations and hearings questionnaire” was issued with aiming for 13^th -16^th January 2026 as a date for the hearing (the Defendant is required to give a minimum of 6 weeks’ notice of an Adjudication Panel hearing).

The evidence for this hearing consisted of..

As I have set out the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant was contractual.

The right to impose an interim order is further addressed in the following paragraphs of the Defendant’s Indicative Sanctions Guidance (“the Guidance”).

In addition to the express terms referred to above the Claimant relies in this claim upon implied terms as identified by the Supreme Court in Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd and another [2015] UKSC 17. In Braganza the court established that decisions made under a contractual discretion must satisfy the following principles derived from public law standards of rationality:

The exercise of a contractual discretion is now to be judged by the same principles as the exercise of public law discretion.

Although the Defendant’s power to does not derive from statute, Mr Butler referred to the decision in R (Shiekh) v General Dental Council [2007] EWHC 2972 (Admin) in respect of the “public interest” in the regulation of healthcare and associated professions. Davis J (as he then was) reviewed the principles and held as follows;

“15.

As a matter of strict language, no grammatical interpolation of the word "necessary" falls to be applied to the phrase "or is otherwise in the public interest". But that is not the end of the matter because it does seem to me that if "the public interest" is to be invoked in this context, under the statute, then that, to my mind, does at least carry some implication of necessity; and certainly it at least carries with it the implication of desirability. I think it is of some note in this context that the statute was amended, as I gather, to introduce a power to impose interim suspension or conditions where it was in the public interest in the aftermath of the Shipman case. It seems to have been the case that the General Dental Council, and indeed the General Medical Council, did not feel the need for such a public interest power before that happened; although Mr Bradly did make the point that it may be that they simply had been prepared to tolerate a not very satisfactory position.

16.

At all events, in the context of imposing an interim suspension order, on this particular basis, it does seem to me, adopting the words of Mr Winter, that the bar is set high; and I think that, in the ordinary case at least, necessity is an appropriate yardstick. That is so because of reasons of proportionality. It is a very serious thing indeed for a dentist or a doctor to be suspended. It is serious in many cases just because of the impact on that person's right to earn a living. It is serious in all cases because of the detriment to him in reputational terms. Accordingly, it is, in my view, likely to be a relatively rare case where a suspension order will be made on an interim basis on the ground that it is in the public interest. I do not use the words "an exceptional case" because such language is easily capable of being twisted and exploited in subsequent cases; but I do think, as I say, it is likely to be a relatively rare case. Ultimately, of course, all these things have to be decided on the facts of each particular case.”

In Sandler v General Medical Council [2010] EWHC 1029 (Admin), Nicol J stated:

“There was some debate at the hearing as to whether the IOP could only suspend Dr Sandler on public interest grounds if this was ‘necessary’. In my judgment, the Legal Adviser was plainly right to observe that, while the statute allows suspension on public protection grounds only if this is necessary, there is no such qualification to the public interest limb. In Sheikh at [15] Davis J. thought that nonetheless ‘if the public interest is to be invoked in this context under the statute, then that to my mind, does at least carry some implication of necessity; and certainly it at least carries with it the implication of desirability.’ He added at [16] ‘At all events, in the context of imposing an interim suspension order, on this particular basis, it does seem to me, adopting the words of Mr Winter [counsel for the Claimant], that the bar is set high; and I think that, in the ordinary case at least, necessity is an appropriate yardstick. That is so because of reasons of proportionality.’ I certainly agree that a doctor could not be the subject of interim suspension unless this was at least desirable in the public interest. I also agree that the Panel must consider very carefully the proportionality of their measure (weighing the significance of any harm to the public interest in not suspending the doctor against the damage to him by preventing him from practising), but I do, with respect, think that the Court must be cautious about superimposing additional tests over and above those which Parliament has set.”

In Houshian v General Medical Council [2012] EWHC 3458 (QB), King J provided guidance on the principle of proportionality:

Turning to the principles concerning the grant of injunctive relief, these are well settled. The purpose of interim injunctive relief is to protect an applicant against injury by a future (perhaps also ongoing) violation of its right for which it could not be adequately compensated in damages if the applicant were to succeed at trial. The principles ordinarily to applied are to be found in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Limited[1975] A.C. 396 at p 406-9. The Court asks:

Taking the questions in turn establishing a serious issue to be tried does not require the applicant to show a prima facie case on the merits. Rather a serious issue to be tried has the same meaning as "real prospect of success" in the summary judgment context. The test is not a demanding one and serves only to exclude those cases where the claim is frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise demonstrably bad. When addressing the test, the court should not attempt to resolve conflicts of fact on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend (by conducting a mini-trial), or difficult points of law (which call for detailed argument and mature considerations); these are matters for trial.

If a serious issue to be tried has been established then the Court should go on to the second stage and consider whether, if the Claimant were to succeed at trial and establish a right to a permanent injunction, the Claimant would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss sustained as a result the Defendant continuing to do what it should be prevented from doing. If damages would be an adequate remedy for the Claimant, and the Defendant would be in a financial position to pay, then ordinarily no injunction should be granted. If, however, damages would not adequately compensate the Claimant for the pre-trial damage, and the Claimant is in a financial position to give a satisfactory undertaking as to damages, and also an award of damages would adequately compensate the Defendant in the event of the Defendant succeeding at trial, then an interim injunction may be granted. It is only where damages are inadequate on both sides that the Court proceeds to consider the balance of convenience. The factors informing the balance of convenience vary case by case

The issue under balance if convenience is: "Which course carries the lower risk of injustice?". This because the court has to engage in trying to predict whether, and to what extent, the granting or withholding an injunction is likely to cause irremediable prejudice

Where the interim injunction may be finally determinative of the matters in dispute between the parties, it is appropriate for the court to assess the likelihood of the Claimant succeeding when assessing the balance of convenience and to make "some sort of assessment" of the merits: see Lansing Linde Ltd v. Kerr[1991] 1 WLR 251,

Where matters are evenly balanced, it is prudent to take such steps as are calculated to preserve the status quo.

Mr Butler submitted that the decision of the Panel was unreasonable and irrational. The two bases for imposing the ISO were that it was “necessary for the protection of the public” and “otherwise in the public interest”. As regards the protection of the public Mr Butler submitted that it was incumbent upon the Panel to consider the seriousness of the allegations and the likelihood of any further incident during the relevant period. There was no allegation or evidence of any pattern of sexualized behaviour towards clients; quite the reverse; the Claimant had an “unblemished record” over many years. Unsurprisingly the Panel determined that the risk of the Claimant behaving in the same manner as he did with Ms McNee towards other clients was “low”. Also Ms. McNee, who was not vulnerable, had provided a witness statement confirming that she had entered into a consensual relationship with the Claimant. As a result the Panel was incorrect in concluding that an ISO was necessary for public protection. The Panel's determination that there was a "real risk" to clients, colleagues, or other members of the public if an order was not made, in circumstances where there was a “low” risk of repetition, was manifestly wrong. There was no evidence before the Panel of the Applicant breaching other professional boundaries. The decision of the Panel that there was a need to protect the public was unreasonable and irrational.

As for the public interest Mr Butler submitted that it was not properly open to the panel to conclude that a fair-minded member of the public, appraised of the facts in this matter, would be offended by the Claimant continuing to practise pending the final hearing. This is particularly evident when considering the witness statement of Ms. McNee, the Claimant’s professional record, and the various character references provided to the Defendant by female clients and colleagues. The Panel was plainly incorrect in concluding that the public would be shocked and appalled if the Claimant were to be permitted to practise without restriction. As Davis J emphasised in Shiekh that the bar is set high. In the ordinary case at least, necessity is an appropriate yardstick. That is so because of reasons of proportionality. As Davis J stated it is likely to be a relatively rare case where a suspension order will be made on an interim basis on the ground that it is in the public interest.

Mr Butler also argued within his skeleton that the Panel did not consider the imposition of conditions as a reasonable and proportionate response

As regards proportionality Mr Butler submitted that the imposition of the ISOs was out of all proportion to the impact on the Claimant pending the final hearing. The allegation did not concern serious offences such as rape, sexual assault, or sexual abuse. There was no predatory behaviour in seeking and establishing the relationship with a vulnerable client and there was no evidence of a pattern of sexually motivated behaviour towards clients. Also the Panel failed to attach adequate weight to the Claimant’s evidence that;

Given these matters Mr Butler the Claimant had not just established a serious issue to be tried, but that he had a very strong case that the imposition of the ISO was a breach of contract.

Mr Butler also submitted that

Ms Mauladad KC’s main submissions can be set out shortly at this stage.

Ms Mauladad KC submitted that once a significant boundary had been breached, as was admitted by the Claimant in this case, it was open and necessary for the Panel to consider whether the Claimant would breach other professional boundaries if he thought it appropriate to do so. The Claimant’s lack of insight as to the potential impact of his misconduct and his failure to anticipate the way in which things developed and to seek advice or guidance in supervisionwere obviously relevant to the potential for future breaches, which was relevant to the protection of the public. It was also clearly open to the Panel to conclude on the evidence before it that there would be serious damage to public confidence in the profession if the Claimant’s practice was not restricted while matters were investigated.

Ms Mauladad KC also submitted that the Claimant would suffer minimal prejudice if the injunction was not granted. His dismissal from CoHS and consequential loss of reptation occurred prior to the UKCP’s involvement and he can still work. Further, the Adjudication Panel hearing could be listed in mid-January 2016. On the other hand granting the injunction would cause irremediable prejudice to the Defendant. The risk of undermining UKCP’s ability to fulfil its public-interest function is not compensable in damages and outweighs the Claimant’s purely financial or reputational concerns.

The first question to be addressed is whether there a serious issue to be tried.

The interim decision was the exercise of regulatory discretion but it is arguable that the Panel fell into error in imposing an interim suspension. Ms Mauladad KC did not seek to persuade me otherwise given the relatively low threshold to be applied. However she addressed the various allegations set out within the Particulars of Claim within her submissions as to the balance of convenience and I shall return to her submissions in detail in due course.

Ms Mauladad KC submitted that the relevant period for the consideration of the adequacy of damages was up to 13^th -16^th January 2026; the first dates offered to the Claimant for the Adjudication hearing ( given the necessary period of notice before a hearing date) and not the date of 6^th February which Mr Butler said was a date which he was able to do as the Claimant’s Counsel. He submitted that it was unreasonable to require the Claimant to change Counsel. I agree given the short delay. However ultimately nothing turns on this point.

Mr Butler said that the Claimant would suffer financial and reputational loss if the interim suspension was to continue whereas the Defendant would suffer no loss (and as a consequence no undertaking as to damages was necessary).

The Claimant, who is able continue to work as a coach to psychotherapists, stated;

“Prior to the interim suspension order, my monthly income from clinical practice is approximately £15,000. Since the order took effect, this is reduced to under £2000 per month. This represents an ongoing and substantial loss of income, which over a 12 month period will cause me severe financial hardship” (underlining added)

Ms Mauladad KC submitted that the Claimant would have suffered a significant loss of earnings due to his dismissal in any event (this being prior to the referral to the Defendant) and he did not claim that he would suffer severe financial hardship within a relatively short period, such as that before the adjudication hearing ( as opposed to over a 12 month period) given that he continued to earn through coaching. He could be compensated for his financial loss were a Court to conclude in due course that an injunction was wrongly imposed and the Defendant was able to meet any award of damages. Ms Mauladad KC also submitted that the Claimant had already suffered reputational loss from his dismissal as all his clients with CoHS had been notified of his dismissal and that as the Claimant could be compensated by damages no injunction should be granted.

There is force in Ms Mauladad KC’s argument that the effects of the Claimant’ s dismissal must not be air-brushed out of the picture. Prior to the referral to the Defendant the Claimant will have suffered a significant loss of income and some loss of reputation. The question is whether the additional losses caused by interim suspension could be compensated by damages. In respect of the financial losses the answer in my view is in the affirmative; the more difficult issue is the effect on reputation. It is somewhat surprising that the Claimant continues to work as a coach to psychotherapists and has not specifically stated that such work has been negatively impacted by the interim suspension (indeed the Panel believed that he could increase the amount of this type of work).

The Claimant stated that he has suspended all new referrals, closed his existing caseload, taken down his website and that

“the order has also had a profound emotional and reputational effect. I built my career over more than 30 years, becoming known for handling complex and challenging cases with sensitivity and skill. That work has now been brought to an abrupt halt. The sense of professional loss has been overwhelming and I am devastated at not being able to continue serving my patients, many of whom benefited substantially from my support,”

I also note that The Panel believed that it was likely that the Claimant would continue to suffer reputational harm as a result of the suspension.

Although damages only have to be an adequate as opposed to a perfect remedy I recognise the difficulty in compensating for the reputational damage caused to the Claimant and also the emotional impact (distress and inconvenience falling short of recognisable psychiatric harm). After some hesitation I am of the view that damages would not be a wholly adequate remedy for the Claimant.

Ms Mauladad KC submitted that the Defendant could not be compensated by an award of damages whatever the Claimant’s means (which rather cut across her submission that an injunction should not be granted as the Claimant had not offered an undertaking in damages). She referred the decision of the Court of Appeal in British Standards Institution -v-The King on the application of RRR Manufacturing Pty Limited-v-the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency [2024] EWCA Civ 530 (“RRR Manufacturing”) Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing stated;

“104.

Ground 1 concerns the approach of the Administrative Court to the grant of interim relief in the form of a normal (prohibitory) injunction. In private law cases the three-stage approach of the Court to the grant of an interim injunction has been settled since American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 …

105.

Public law disputes are of course rather different. Those who exercise public law functions do not do so in their own commercial interests but in the public interest. This is seldom capable of being quantified in money. Two things follow. First, as the Judge recognised, damages will rarely be an adequate remedy in the context of judicial review claims, and (assuming the case meets the threshold at the first stage) the grant or withholding of relief will turn on the balance of convenience. Second, in assessing the balance of convenience the risk of detriment to the public interest is seldom capable of being directly measured against the risk of prejudice to the claimant as the two are essentially incommensurable. These points were well expressed by Cranston J in the Medical Justice case at [12] as follows:

"In judicial review, this consideration [i.e. the balance of convenience] varies from its application in private law, because generally speaking damages will not be payable in the event of an unlawful administrative act, nor will a public authority suffer financial loss from being prevented from implementing its policy. The public interest is strong in permitting a public authority to continue to apply its policy when ex hypothesi it is acting in the public interest. That wider public interest cannot be measured simply in terms of the financial or individual consequences to the parties, a point made by Browne LJ in his judgment in Smith v Inner London Education Authority [ie [1978] 1 All ER 411 ] at page 422h."

Ms Mauladad KC submitted that the present case; whilst not involving an action against a public authority; was closely analogous to such a claim. Mr Butler submitted that the Defendant’s position was not analogous to a public authority and the principles set out in RRR Manufacturing were of no relevance. He submitted that the Defendant would suffer no financial or other loss (and so no undertaking in damages was necessary).

In my view Ms Mauladad KC’s submission is correct as regards the approach the Court should take to the adequacy of damages in the case and also, as I shall set out in due course, relevant to the consideration of the balance of convenience.

The Defendant is comparable in important relevant respects to a public authority and this claim cannot sensibly be viewed as private commercial dispute albeit that it is contractual in nature. The sole raison d'être of the Defendant (a charity and company limited by guarantee) is to advance the use, effectiveness and safety of psychotherapy and psychotherapeutic counselling. Its articles of association set out its objects as;

“(1)

To promote the art and science of psychotherapy and psychotherapeutic counselling for the public benefit;

(2)

to promote research in psychotherapy and psychotherapeutic counselling and to disseminate the results of any such research;

(3)

to promote high standards of education and training a practice in psychotherapy and psychotherapeutic counselling

(4)

to promote the wider provision of psychotherapy and psychotherapy counselling for all sections of the public.”

Also to further its objects the Defendant’s has express powers;

“To create and maintain registers and listings of properly qualified psychotherapeutic practitioners for the benefit of the general public;

….”

and

“To publish guidelines for ethics and codes of practice, and to establish processes for the practice of psychotherapy and psychotherapeutic counselling for the protection of the public” (the Defendant has produced the “UKCP Code of Ethics and Professional Practice” which it expects all practitioners to follow;”

Ms Thakore stated;

“Our register of more than 9000 individual psychotherapists/psychotherapeutic counsellors is accredited by the professional standards authority for health and social care and aims to protect the public and provide confidence in the psychotherapy profession that we regulate.”

and

“(the Defendant) Exists with the purpose of providing professional support for our members, protecting the public by promoting high standards of education, training and practice and working too advanced psychotherapies for the benefit of all…”

Private companies can be considered public authorities if they are contracted to provide a public function or perform tasks for the public interest. As set out in De Smith (9^th Edition)

“..in recent times, governance is said to be “multi-level” and “fragmented”, with interventions from central and local government, actions by the voluntary sector (charities) and much practical delivery of public services contracted out to business enterprises. It is therefore unsurprising that a wide range of public authorities and other organisations carrying out public functions find themselves subject to judicial review claims.”

I need go no further for the purposes of this judgment that to conclude that, as regards an interim injunction, the Defendant can properly be viewed as in an analogous position to that of a public authority. Interference in the exercise of its functions will seldom be capable of being quantified in money. To a degree Mr Butler’s submission that the Defendant will suffer no financial loss backfires as it recognizes that there can be no compensation in damages. This is because what would be “harmed” is the Defendant’s public standing in that it was prevented from providing sufficient public protection and form promoting the public interest in the interim period up to an Adjudication Panel to the extent that it thought appropriate.

Given that damages are not an adequate remedy for the Defendant it is necessary to move to the balance of convenience.

By definition once the Court’s analysis has reached the stage of what has long been referred to as the balance of convenience, the decision, either way, will inevitably involve some impact to one or the other side which damages cannot compensate. It is an exercise of balancing prejudice and the risks of injustice. With all due respect to Lord Diplock and the eminent Judges who had used the phrase before his seminal analysis, and that not that it matters to the approach to be taken, I have always believed that it could be better described as the balance of inconvenience.

As Lord Diplock stated in Cyanamid;

“It would be unwise to attempt even to list all the various matters which may need to be taken into consideration in deciding where the balance lies, let alone to suggest the relative weight to be attached to them. These will vary from case to case.”

In their submissions Mr Butler and Ms Mauladad KC referred back to the factors that they had prayed in aid of the argument that damages for their client would not be an adequate remedy and also an overview of the merits of the claim; both submitting that the evidence before the court strongly supported their client’s case.

I start with the arguments as to the impact of the interim suspension. As I have already set out given the fact that the Claimant is still able to earn significant income as a coach, damages for direct financial loss (being the loss after taking into account the dismissal from Change of Harley Street) can be adequately compensated by damages. Further the Claimant will have suffered some reputational harm before the suspension given his dismissal for gross misconduct. The harm that cannot be compensated for by damages will also be relatively limited given the timeframe between the decision to suspend and the Adjudication. As regards the Defendant’s position I accept that there is a wider and strong public interest in permitting the interim order of a specialist regulatory body, whose aims included ensuring public safety and promotion of the public interest, to remain in force pending a final hearing.

The length of time before the Adjudication hearing is not only relevant to the adequacy of damages it is relevant to the matters to be addressed under the balance of convenience. As I stated during submissions the practical reality (given a number of factors) is that it is very difficult indeed to see how a final hearing could be listed before the hearing date before the Adjudication Panel (and for obvious reasons the closer to the date the less important the final hearing becomes). Neither Counsel demurred. This means that effectively there will be no final hearing of whether an injunction should be granted or not; my judgment will effectively determinative of the issue (although a claim for damages could be pursued for improper interim suspension). As a result it is necessary to have some regard to the relative merits of the parties’ cases.

An important overarching point concerns the panel’s approach to the facts. It is my view that the inability of the panel to determine facts substantially undermined important elements of Mr Butler’s submissions as to the merits of the Claimant’s case. As Ms Mauladad KC correctly submitted an interim panel cannot and should not seek to decide the credibility or merits of a disputed allegation and at most can satisfy itself that there is a prima facie case that an allegation is well founded ( see generally the judgment of Mr Justice Underhill (as he then was) in Kumar-v-GMC [2013] EWHC 452 at paragraph 27)

Importantly the Panel stated;

“The panel, reminding itself that it is not tasked with making findings of fact, needed to consider the evidence before it of the concern raised. It took into account the following..

“(c)

Prior to the therapy ending, the registrant and client X went for two walks together in a park near to the location of the therapy rooms. The clinical lead at change of Harley Street wrote to the institute of group analysis the registrants had told him (on the 22nd of August 2025 see below) of the two walks ; the letter from the clinical lead goes on to say that the registrant told him “that there were intense erotic feelings expressed between both him and Mrs X but no physical contact or sexual contact made during these walks. As set out in the skeleton argument on behalf of the registrant, the registrants instruction is that “at no stage in the therapy, including during the walks, were there any erotic conversations or romantic behaviour of any kind”. This is also set out in the registrants statement to the panel.”

The panel identified an issue of fact which it could not determine. That issue was of real significance in that the walks took place whilst therapy was ongoing. It was also at time when Ms McNee stated in her statement that;

“My internal motivation for suggesting the walks was then I felt a connection with Peter I wanted to see how our interaction felt outside the therapy room…”

The Panel noted that the relationship appeared;

“on the accounts of the registrant and (Ms McNee), to have developed very swiftly from the end of the therapy…”

and Mr Butler conceded as a matter of common sense the mutual attraction did not develop overnight in the days following the end of the therapy.

As I suggested during submissions it must surely be viewed as a much more serious breach of professional standards than the Claimant has conceded to date (he conceded only that the walks/ meetings could be perceived as a crossing of a boundary and what at the time he considered at the time to be harmless could be misinterpreted) if there were erotic conversations whilst therapy was still ongoing and in the context of physical attraction and a power imbalance.

Mr Butler’s response was to point out that the Claimant and Ms McNee had denied any erotic conversations took place and the suggestion that there had been such conversations was implausible. This response entirely misses the point that this is a matter for the fact finding tribunal. It would only be if there was conclusive evidence in relation to a contested issue of fact e.g. a recording or film, that the interim panel could properly proceed solely on the factual basis put forward by a person before it. Here the information came from the Chair of the Board of Trustees and clinical lead of CoHS who is a Psychotherapist and group analyst. Also as Mr Butler conceded that, save for the one sentence, all the other facts which he set out were correct (objectively underpinning both credibility and accuracy). Given that CoHS appears to have proceeded on the basis that there were two way erotic discussions during therapy it is not very surprising that the contract with the Claimant was terminated (described as him being dismissed for gross misconduct).

Mr Butler focused heavily on the finding of the Panel that the likelihood of repetition of the Claimant entering a sexual relationship with another client (or recent ex-client) was low. In light of this finding he argued that the decision to suspension was Wednesbury unreasonable. The flaw with Mr Butler’s submission is that it fails to properly engage with the Panel’s reasoning set out immediately after the finding that about that specific risk;

“However, the panel is concerned about the likelihood of repetition of the registrant breaching professional boundaries and failing to take seriously his possession of responsibility and power. The panel has not received substantive evidence about insight. The panel noted that the registrant has not given any account about seeking advice-in June and July 2025 about the blurring of boundaries when asked for a hug by this client, and when he went for walks with her-either in supervision or otherwise. There is no evidence of his having anticipated in anyway the situation which was clearly developing”.

The Panel set out a wider concern about the Claimant breaching professional boundaries and failing to take seriously his position of responsibility and power, and not just a narrower concern about engaging in a further sexual relationship. By way of example a mutual erotic discussion would be a breach of a boundaries even if no sexual relationship developed ( although the Client may not necessarily see it as such). As I stated during submissions it is my understanding that a psychotherapist should be as blank a canvas as possible and the session/treatment should solely focus on the client’s history and issues. A psychotherapist talking about his /her own feelings a fortiori sexual ones would be a breach of a professional boundary. The Panel also properly recognized the power imbalance, and as a result the responsibility placed upon a Psychotherapist as a professional who has explored, often in great depth e.g. the 20 months in this professional relationship, issues in a person’s life and difficulties he/she has faced/faces ( the existence of difficulties being the usual reason lay clients attend a psychotherapist), whereas the Client should know very little about the Psychotherapist. The panel also recognised that this power imbalance does not “equalize “after the last session. It had been submitted to the panel that;

“a personal relationship with a former client is a clear breach of the standards. The power imbalance continues after the therapy has ended. Reliance on consent does not assist the registrant; it is not the determining factor. A client during or also immediately after therapy is not always in a position to judge exploitation”

The Panel was clearly entitled to be concerned , given it was acknowledged by the Claimant that he had “breached a significant boundary”, that the Claimant either had no adequate insight that he was about to cross, or had crossed, a boundary or knew full well about the breach of a boundary but went on nevertheless as it was in his self-interest because he was attracted to the Ms McNee. The Claimant has stated;

“This is the first and only occasion in my career were a personal relationship with a former patient has arisen. I had never envisaged such a situation arising, and it is not something I would ordinarily permit. I fully recognise the importance of maintaining professional boundaries and the reasons why such safeguards exist. The circumstances here are wholly exceptional, because I'm now in a committed relationship with Dana, there is no prospect of any repetition.”

Within this paragraph the Claimant appears to seek to justify his breach of professional boundaries becauseat present (four months into the relationship) all is well. However that conflates the extent/culpability of the breach with the extent of the damage caused. As Ms Mauladad KC pointed out the breach could have gone on to cause significant damage ( indeed still could cause damage in the future, particularly given that the therapy concerned Ms McNee’s continued feelings of anger towards a former partner) .The phrase “not something I would ordinarily permit” also underpins a concern that the Claimant will breach a professional boundaries again if he considers it appropriate to do so and/or the circumstances are, in his view, exceptional.

I accept Ms Mauladad KC’s submission that, given the evidence before it (including as to the erotic discussions) it is strongly arguable that the Panel was entitled to reach the conclusion that;

“there is a real risk to clients, colleagues or other members of the public if an order is not made. In circumstances were there is a real risk of repetition of breach of boundaries, a suspension order is…necessary not merely desirable.”

It will be for the Adjudication Panel, after it has made findings of fact, to evaluate what the Claimant knew about when, and to what extent, boundaries were being crossed.

As for proportionality the panel stated that it kept proportionality, and the possibility of hardship, at the forefront of its mind and considered the weight of the risks identified and the concerns about the harm to the registrant and on balance concluded that the interim suspension was proportionate.

The Claimant has stated that he recognised that

“...some form of restriction may have been appropriate and proportionate”.

and

“...Permitting me to practise under suitable conditions poses no real risk of harm to the public..”

Mr Butler argued that the panel had failed to consider steps short or suspension such as only allowing the Claimant to have male patients.

Ms Mauladad KC submitted that this allegation not been pleaded in the Particulars of Claim, so should not be considered in the assessment of merits. She also submitted that conditions lower/less than suspension were not available at the interim stage.

Whilst there is no mention of the ability to impose conditions/restrictions less than suspension in the Complaints and Conduct Process, which given the contractual status, arguably as a comprehensive code, may give difficulty with implication of a power to take lesser steps, I found this, at first blush, a somewhat surprising position. However a Court would need to have evidence and argument on the point and there is justification in Ms Mauladad KC’s complaint that Claimant has pleaded his case and this allegation has not formed part of it. The fact that it had not been pleaded meant that it did not need to be directly addressed in evidence for hearing of the application for an interim injunction. I am conscious that Mr Butler stated that the Defendant could convene panels very quickly, (the January date is indeed a quick date) and that may form part of the rationale for not creating a power to impose conditions/restrictions that, as Ms Mauladad KC submitted would need monitoring.

In any event given the findings of the panel related to breaching professional boundaries and failing to take seriously the position of responsibility and power it is difficult to see how an adequate condition/restriction less than suspension would work. Mr Butler referred as possibility a requirement that the Claimant only work with male clients; but in so doing he was throwing the focus back on the likelihood of a sexual relationship.

The panel also considered the public interest in maintaining professional standards and confidence in the regulatory process. I accept Ms Mauladad KC’s submission that it is strongly arguable that the Panel was entitled to reach the conclusion that an order was in the public interest as it is necessary for those seeking and undergoing therapy to know that boundaries, and in particular sexual boundaries will be upheld, so that they can have confidence in the profession.

Mr Butler submitted that the Panel’s view (agreeing with the analysis of the September Panel) that;

“the public would be shocked and appalled that a Registrant was free to practice without restriction given the admission made”;

was untenable and an exaggeration. However, the Claimant was well aware of the seriousness with which his breach of a “significant boundary” (his phrase) would be viewed by those concerned with ensuring the protection/wellbeing of clients and public confidence in psychotherapy. He stated;

“I was fully aware the disclosure carried a significant risk to my position, including dismissal…”

And

“I fully accept the importance of upholding public confidence in the profession and that some form of restriction may have been appropriate and proportionate…”

The Claimant was dismissed by CoHS for gross misconduct ( although this may not have been the correct terminology given that it was a contract for the provision of services), and as well as the Claimant’s self referral the Defendant received a further complaint from a counsellor ( on 5^th September) that the Claimant had “ crossed an ethical boundary” ( the panel noted that this complaint was disputed). These reactions are in line with the views of the Panel as to the seriousness of the transgression. In my judgment on the degree of analysis appropriate at this stage there is obvious force and sense in the Panel’s conclusion and I reject the submission that it is obviously unsupportable.

The final assessment of the appropriate sanction will depend on the factual findings made. At this stage, and taking into account the full “case” against the Claimant the merits of the arguments favour the conclusion that the interim suspension order was properly made.

Taking all the relevant factors together they are not evenly balanced and weigh significantly in favour of refusing an in interim injunction.

As a result of the matters set out above the application for an injunction fails.