Pan-NOx Emissions Group Litigation (Funding Information and Disclosure Hearing 21 November 2025)

This brief Judgment deals with the various applications for costs following the substantive hearing, the judgment in respect of which is found at [2025] EWHC 3116 (KB) concerning applications made in respect of funding information. The Court has considered the written submissions and the oral submissions at the hearing on 21 November 2025 ('the Funding Information Hearing').

All Applicants issued Applications in respect of the PG Claimants' Funding.  PG, and various entities within the Gramercy group ('the Gramercy Entities'), initially denied that the Gramercy Entities fell within the scope of CPR25.28 for the purposes of security for costs. It was on this basis that applications for funding information were made.

Latterly, PG and the Gramercy Entities accepted that they did fall within the scope of CPR25.28 so the need to seek inspection of information fell away. Shortly before skeletons were to be served for the Funding Information Hearing, the PG Claimants conceded liability for costs incurred insofar as those costs relate to the issue of whether disclosure of funding information was necessary to determine whether the Gramercy Entities fell within the ambit of CPR25.28. What Mr Williams KC contends, on behalf of the PG Claimants, should be excluded, as a matter of principle, are those costs related to the parties’ interactions as to the adequacy of ATE insurance. 

I disagree. That is because the question of the adequacy of ATE insurance only arose at this stage by way of defence to the Applications. The PG Claimants relied upon the existence of ATE insurance to contend that there would be no requirement to give security for costs (in due course) and by extension, no need to provide the funding information. The point having been raised, it was not open to the Applicants not to engage in the question of the adequacy of the proposed ATE insurance. If the PG Claimants’ position on ATE insurance had been vindicated in the context of a contested funding information application, the Applicants would have lost. There is therefore no basis to depart from the ordinary rule that (all the reasonable) costs follow the event. Whilst, at this stage, the Court will leave the parties to seek to agree what those costs should be (and in respect of which the Court notes with gratitude that the parties have previously engaged successfully so that no summary assessment has been required), the Court also observes that it did not find Mr Williams KC's submissions about either the length or content of Mr Boddy's witness statement persuasive. Had the applications been fought, the relationship between the Gramercy Entities and PG would be under the microscope (it is that part in respect of which Mr Williams KC was most critical). It is not possible to say that the matters Mr Boddy raised were not at least arguably relevant to how the Court might perceive matters. The Court would therefore be unlikely to make reductions to costs claimed on account of the length or content of that statement. 

The same point of principle arises and the same answer prevails.

Venus legal conceded that they must pay the relevant Applicant's costs.

Mr Williams KC accepted that the JLG Claimants were unambiguously unsuccessful up to 7 November 2025, after which he contends the debate was principally focussed on the adequacy of the ATE insurance. Ms Greaney KC submitted that the Applicants were the successful parties: they obtained more security than had been offered, and Ms Greaney KC also pointed to the staged increase point made in correspondence, which was not responded to but the principle of which was reflected in part by the order made by the Court, albeit in a modified way. I consider that Ms Greaney KC's submission more accurately characterises the assessment of relative success between the JLG Applicants and the Respondents save that, in order to do justice between the parties, (1) some deduction to the costs of attendance at the Funding Information Hearing itself ought be made to reflect the measure of success achieved by the JLG Claimants’ submissions as to the level of ATE insurance and cut off date; and (2) some further deduction to the recovery by PCD and Vauxhall ought to be made to reflect the JLG Applicants' success in respect of the issue relating to the wording of the ATE insurance policy.

I consider that the appropriate order, therefore, is that:

The parties are to endeavour to agree the amounts summarily payable pursuant to the foregoing Orders on the basis of the Costs Schedules provided in advance of the Funding Information Hearing. Only if costs cannot be agreed are those areas of disagreement to be resolved by the Court on the papers. If any such determination is necessary, the parties are to provide a single electronic bundle in respect of each relevant Applicant containing the relevant schedule and brief written submissions from each side.

The parties are to draw up an Order reflecting the foregoing following the agreements or determinations referred to at paragraph 9 above.