HM Attorney General v Paul Richards

The relevant statutory provision

"If, on an application made by the Attorney General under this section, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground -

instituted vexatious civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or in the Family Court or any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; or

made vexatious applications in any civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or in the Family Court or any inferior court, and whether instituted by him or another,

…

the court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a civil proceedings order, a criminal proceedings order or an all proceedings order."

Then (1A) provides:

The materials and evidence satisfying the preconditions to make an order

So far as is material, there are witness statements on behalf of the Attorney General from Ms Kiera Vyvyan-Robinson as well as from Mr Ayodele Adeyemo, both from the Government Legal Department. We also have the benefit of a skeleton argument on behalf of the Attorney General.

As far as Mr Parkin is concerned, he had put in a defence which was effectively in the form of a witness statement. He put in further statements from persons who have not been called and he had also put in a skeleton argument.

The evidence shows that it is common ground between the applicant and respondent, so between His Majesty's Attorney General and Mr Parkin, that Mr Parkin has used the names or been known by the names of Mr Paul Richards, Mr John Deeds and Mr Gary Parkin. On that basis, the evidence shows that Mr Parkin has commenced some 24 cases which were identified by Ms Vyvyan-Robinson, together with some 57 cases, which were transferred from Doncaster having started at the County Court Money Claims Centre. Mr Adeyemo identified that some 20 new claims were filed by Mr Parkin since 2023. There is further evidence from Romford County Court that a substantial number of additional claims had been made in the name of Mr Parkin. There have been, since the proceedings were last before the Divisional Court on 29 January 2025 when an adjournment was granted, at least five applications which were made by Mr Parkin, four applications to proceed and two applications to the County Court.

So far as the evidence shows, the vast majority of the claims made by Mr Parkin, either in the name of Mr Parkin, Mr Paul Richards, and Mr John Deeds, were either for repayment of monies in relation for non-delivery of mobile phones or a failure to repair mobile phones. There have been references to failure to repair notices and there have been numerous different defendants that have been named as defendant to the actions, including a number of different mobile phone providers.

The evidence shows that Mr Parkin has a number of previous convictions, some 57 previous convictions for fraudulent behaviour, and he has adopted different names. Mr Parkin makes the point that he has changed his name on a number of occasions because of his involvement in a serious case (to which it is not necessary to refer in this judgment) and that there is nothing to be gained by looking at those changes in names.

The evidence before us shows, therefore, that Mr Parkin has habitually and persistently commenced litigation in either the name of Mr Parkin, or in the name of Mr Deeds, or in the name of Mr Richards for claims that have been dealt with by the courts. The evidence also shows that there have been no reasonable grounds for those claims to be made because, so far as it has been possible to track them, the proceedings have been struck out or have failed in other ways. The material shows that only one claim seems to have got to a trial, where the claim was dismissed, and permission to appeal was refused.

So far as whether these are vexatious proceedings, there is some guidance in the jurisprudence which shows that the hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is that it has little or no basis in law and its intention is to cause the defendant inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue and involves an abuse of process. These claims all appear to be small claims which have been made where the costs of defending them, one infers, are out of proportion to the sums at stake, so that the claimant might hope for a payment which is not justified.

So far as whether these have been proceedings in the High Court or the Family Court or any inferior court, the litigation has been in the County Court which it is well-known is an inferior court.

In those circumstances the evidence before us, and to be fair to Mr Parkin, the evidence which he accepts, shows that the preconditions for making an order in section 42 are satisfied. We record expressly that Mr Parkin did not say either in his witness statement, in his skeleton argument or in his submissions before us today that any of the claims were proceedings that had a reasonable basis for it. It is, however, common ground there is an exercise of discretion for the court to undertake to consider all the circumstances about whether an order ought to be made.

The following matters can be identified as relevant to the exercise of the discretion. First of all, the making of an order under section 42 is draconian. Secondly, this court cannot go behind previous orders or certifications that have been made, for example, that proceedings have been totally without merit. Thirdly, the authorities also show that these orders can be necessary where there has been persistent abuse of the court process. Fourthly these orders are compatible with the Human Rights Act, because there is a filter which prevents litigation but the order does not stifle justifiable litigation because, if there is a proper basis for the litigation, the court can grant leave. We take these propositions from: Attorney General v Barker [2001] 1 FLR 759; Ewing v Department of Constitutional Affairs [2006] EWHC 504; [2006] 2 All ER 993;and Attorney General v Vaidya [2017] EWHC 2152.

The authorities also show that there three main advantages of civil proceedings orders. The first is that they can be made without limit of time. The second advantage is that they will be published in the Gazette, bringing them to the attention of relevant persons. The third advantage is that the process for challenging refusals of permission to bring a claim is streamlined.

We turn to address some points that have been raised by Mr Parkin. Mr Parkin’s first point was that he is already subject to a Serious Crime Prevention Order, and he is subject to an injunction that was made by the Divisional Court when it adjourned matters last time. There is, therefore, no need to make a further order which would, as he put it, be "Retrospective punishment which is against his human rights."

In our judgment, the existence of the Serious Crime Prevention Order is not a bar to the making of this order. The evidence about the Serious Crime Prevention Order is to the effect that Mr Parkin notifies, as he is required to under that Serious Crime Prevention Order, the Economic Crimes Unit for Greater Manchester Police that he is intending to bring a claim. Mr Parkin then gets an out of office email or a standard emailed response, and nothing further is done. This is not adequate protection for those who are subject to the claims made by Mr Parkin.

It is right to record that Mr Parkin is subject to an injunction preventing him from bringing claims, made after the last adjournment. The evidence in relation to the injunction shows that Mr Parkin has made applications to bring further claims, but he has been refused permission. The evidence does not show that Mr Parkin has given up attempting to litigate, and the fact that he has been refused permission to bring those new claims shows that those proposed claims had no reasonable basis to make the claim.

So far as other matters that have been raised by Mr Parkin are concerned, he points out that he is 57 years old and, as already indicated in the first judgment given this morning relating to the application to adjourn, seriously ill with a number of medical conditions. We accept that he is the age he says he is, and that he suffers the conditions about which we have some medical evidence. Those conditions have not, however, stopped him from litigating and bringing litigation which is both vexatious and without any reasonable grounds and that he brought that litigation habitually and persistently.

Other matters that have been raised by Mr Parkin are that, as far as the form of order is concerned and to be consistent with our order when refusing the adjournment this morning, any order that is made against him should cover him as Mr John Deeds, Mr Gary Parkin, Mr Steven Cole and other aliases, but make no mention to Mr Thomas Baker or Miss Diane Bunkle. We agree that that is appropriate because that was on the basis on which we refused the adjournment this morning.

That leads to one further point raised by Mr Parkin. If an order is to be made, Mr Parkin asks that it be not Gazetted because he says he is facing criminal charges where allegations that he committed serious sexual offences have been made. The trial date was going to be some time this year, but the trial has been adjourned to October 2026, because of delays going back to the Covid pandemic. Mr Parkin is concerned that there will be prejudice to him in those criminal proceedings if an order is Gazetted. Mr Parkin also points to the fact that on 29 January 2025 the Divisional Court, when adjourning the proceedings, did not Gazette the proceedings. Although that is not apparent from the transcript of the proceedings in January 2025 that we have, it is common ground, and confirmed by Mr Chegwidden for the Attorney General and by Mr Parkin in the submissions, that there was some discussion with Bean LJ in relation to that. The Divisional Court decided at that stage not to Gazette the proceedings.

We therefore turn to the exercise of our discretion. We are sure that the statutory conditions are satisfied for the reasons already given. We find that this is an appropriate case in which to make an order under section 42 of the 1981 Act against Mr Parkin. This is because it is plain from the evidence, and common ground, that Mr Parkin has issued numerous proceedings which have been without any reasonable grounds, and which have been vexatious and, in our judgment, the appropriate order to stop those vexatious proceedings is to make an order under section 42. The Serious Crime Prevention Order does not in practice prevent claims being issued. Although there is an injunction, it is apparent that Mr Parkin remains determined to bring claims.

Finally, we note that the order does not prevent Mr Parkin from bringing proceedings, it only prevents him from bringing proceedings if the High Court does not grant leave. It ensures that there is a proper balance of protection for those who have been the victims of his serial claims, and ensures that Mr Parkin's own rights, including his rights under article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to which domestic effect was given in the Human Rights Act 1998, are protected.

So far as the form of order is concerned, there should be no reference in the description of the respondent to Mr Thomas Baker or Miss Diane Bunkle, but the order can refer to other aliases. We are satisfied that publishing the order in the Gazette is necessary to protect others from Mr Parkin, and that it will have no effect on the fairness of any criminal proceedings in Manchester. In any event, if it does have any unexpected effect on those proceedings, those are matters which Mr Parkin can raise, if so advised, when the trial for those criminal proceedings takes place in Manchester. This is because the trial judge in the criminal proceedings has a duty to ensure that those proceedings are fair.

For the reasons that we have given, we grant the order sought by His Majesty's Attorney General, subject to the amendments in relation to the names of Mr Thomas Baker and Miss Diane Bunkle.