Atole Timothy Enaholo v Totally Plc & Anor

The defendants apply for a general civil restraint order pursuant to paragraph 4.1 of CPR Practice Direction 3C against the claimant, Mr Enaholo. In the alternative, they seek an extended civil restraint order. Mr Enaholo is currently the subject of a limited civil restraint order, which was made by Bourne J on 12 July 2023 and extended by Nicklin J on 30 April 2024, with the effect that it now encompasses both the defendants in this case and also two third parties, Reed Specialist Recruitment Limited and the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.

The application was originally filed on 25 September 2023. An order of Martin Spencer J which was sealed on 15 November 2023 records in the final preamble that the defendants confirmed “that the application for a general civil restraint order is not pursued at this hearing but may be pursued at a later time”.

The claimant raises a preliminary objection to this application being heard. He contends that at the hearing before Martin Spencer J on 25 October 2023, the application for a general civil restraint order was dismissed by Martin Spencer J, and he contends that the preamble to the order is inaccurate. In his skeleton argument Mr Enaholo accuses Martin Spencer J of lying in the court order. He has also submitted a witness statement, which is dated 15 June 2025, and in that statement he states that the application for a civil restraint order failed during the hearing before Martin Spencer J.

In my judgment it is plain that the defendants are entitled to pursue the application for a general civil restraint order at this hearing today. The claimant has not sought a transcript of the hearing in order to support his allegation that the order of Martin Spencer J is inaccurate, nor did he seek at the time to have the order varied. It is inconceivable that a judge of the High Court has, as Mr Enaholo alleges, lied in a court order. That is an extremely serious allegation for which there is not a shred of evidence. I reject it as wholly unfounded. In any event, the Court’s jurisdiction to consider whether to impose any form of civil restraint order is constant.

Accordingly I proceed to address the application.

CPR 3.3(9) provides:

“If the court of its own initiative strikes out a statement of case or dismisses an application (including an application for permission to appeal or for permission to apply for judicial review), and it considers that the claim or application is totally without merit –

(a)

the court’s order must record that fact; and

(b)

the court must at the same time consider whether it is appropriate to make a civil restraint order.”

The rationale underlying the making of a civil restraint order is that a litigant who makes claims or applications which have absolutely no merit harms the administration of justice by wasting the limited time and resources of the courts. Such claims and applications consume public funds and divert the court from dealing with cases which have real merit. There is a strong public interest in protecting the court system from abuse by imposing an additional restraint on their use of the court’s resources: see Society of Lloyd's v Noel [2015] 1 WLR 4393 at [29].

A civil restraint order does not prohibit access to the courts. It requires a person who has repeatedly made unmeritorious claims or applications to have any new claim or application which falls within the scope of the order reviewed by a judge at the outset to determine whether it should be permitted to proceed: see Noel at [29]. Provided that the right of access to the court is not extinguished, the making of a civil restraint order is not contrary to article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court is entitled to regulate its affairs so as to protect its process and the interests of other parties against whom unmeritorious litigation is brought: see Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484.

There are three types of civil restraint order. A limited civil restraint order restrains the party against whom the order is made “from making any further applications in the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order” (Practice Direction 3C, paragraph 2.2(1)). A limited civil restraint order may be made where a party has made two or more applications which are totally without merit (PD3C, paragraph 2.1).

Where an extended civil restraint order is made by a judge of the High Court, it restrains the party against whom the order is made from issuing claims or making applications in the High Court or the county court “concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order” (PD3C, paragraph 3.2). An extended civil restraint order may be made where “a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit” (PD3C, paragraph 3.1). In Bhamjee v Forsdick (Practice Note) [2004] 1 WLR 88Lord Philips identified at [42]:

“We do not include the word ‘habitual’ among the necessary criteria for an extended civil restraint order, but there has to be an element of persistence in the irrational refusal to take ‘no’ for an answer before an order of this type can be made.”

If the precondition for an extended civil restraint order is met, the court has a residual discretion whether to make the order: paragraph 3.1 of PD3C provides that the court “may” make an order. In Noel, Lewis J gave the following guidance at [47]:

“In exercising that discretion, the court must have regard to the purpose underlying the making of such civil restraint orders, namely that such orders should be made if, but only if, it is necessary to protect the administration of justice from abuse. That involves an assessment of the risk that the individual litigant will, unless restrained, make further applications or claims which are totally without merit and which will waste the time and resources of the courts, thereby consuming public funds and diverting the courts from dealing with other cases. The making, and the terms, of any order should reflect a proportionate response to the level of risk of future, unmeritorious proceedings. The exercise of discretion will, generally, involve an assessment of the level of risk that the individual poses of making further, unmeritorious applications in future. In considering that issue, as Legatt J. observed at paragraph 69 of his judgment in Nowak v Nursing and Midwifery Council and others [2013] EWHC 1932 (QB):

‘The fact that the litigant has repeatedly issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit will itself almost inevitably demonstrate the existence of such a risk. But in considering the extent of the risk it may also be relevant to consider other factors, such as any statements of the litigant's future intentions, other aspects of the litigant's conduct and whether the circumstances which have generated the hopeless claims or applications are continuing or likely to continue.’”

A general civil restraint order may be made “where the party against whom the order is made persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate” (PD3C, paragraph 4.1). Where a general civil restraint order is made by a judge of the High Court, it restrains the party against whom the order is made from issuing any claim or making any application in the High Court or the county court, unless the court decides to make it less prohibitive, without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order.

An extended civil restraint order or a general civil restraint order “will be made for a specified period not exceeding three years” (PD3C, paragraphs 3.9 and 4.9). The duration may be extended by a period no greater than three years on any given occasion (PD3C, paragraph 3.10 and 4.10).

Where an order of the court records that a claim or application was totally without merit, it is not necessary or appropriate for a judge who is subsequently considering whether to make a civil restraint order to re-examine that question (Nowak at [67]). However, the court is not restricted to considering proceedings and applications where there was at the time an express finding of a total lack of merit. In Kumar [2006] EWCA Civ 990, Brook LJ held at [67] to [68]:

“It is of course correct that para 1 of Practice Direction C imposes an obligation on courts to ensure that their orders record that a statement of case or application was totally without merit, but the absence of this mantra on the face of an order does not oblige a later court, when convinced that a statement of case or application must have been treated as being totally without merit, to correct the earlier order under the slip rule or to send it back to the original court for correction under that rule. This would be to elevate form over substance in a very undesirable way.

68.

But if the earlier order does not speak for itself, a rather more detailed examination of the earlier litigation history must be undertaken...”

In Kumar, Brooke LJ observed at [60] that the power to make a general civil restraint order:

“…is apt to cover a situation in which one of these litigants adopts a scattergun approach to litigation on a number of different grievances without necessarily exhibiting such an obsessive approach to a single topic that an extended CRO can appropriately be made against him/her.”

The first question when considering whether to make an extended or general civil restraint order is whether the litigant has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit. Second, the court must ask itself what risk there is that if unrestrained or not further restrained where some form of CRO has already been imposed, the litigant will issue further claims or make further applications which are an abuse of the court’s process. Third, the court should determine what is the least restrictive form of order shown to be required. When determining whether to impose a general civil restraint order, this encompasses the question posed by paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 3C whether an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate.

Mr Enaholo brought a claim for damages for clinical negligence and breach of his data protection rights against the defendants. The claim arose out of Mr Enaholo's attendance at an urgent care centre complaining of chest pain. He was sent to accident and emergency at St Mary’s Hospital in London for testing to rule out acute coronary syndrome. Various tests were carried out and did not indicate anything untoward. The clinician who reviewed him at St Mary’s ruled out a physical cause to his symptoms but reached a provisional view that he may be suffering from a mental health disorder. That was because of the far-fetched account he gave of being subjected to microwave radiation by the Metropolitan Police Service acting on the instructions of his former employer, Reed Specialist Recruitment PLC. The clinician arranged for Mr Enaholo to see the psychiatric liaison nurses. He was seen by such a nurse, but he made clear he did not wish to undergo any mental health examination and he left the hospital before any such evaluation could be undertaken.

The claim was dismissed by Kerr J following a trial in a judgment dated 17 December 2024: see Enaholo v Totally PLC & Anor [2024] EWHC 3249 (KB). Mr Enaholo did not seek to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but he has communicated a complaint against that judgment in a claim against the UK which he seeks to take to the European Court of Human Rights. In that claim he alleges breaches of his human rights by the defendants, the Metropolitan Police Service and the courts.

During the course of these proceedings:

It can be seen that in these proceedings nine applications that Mr Enaholo has made have been certified as totally without merit. Mr Enaholo has been given warnings that he was at risk of a civil restraint order being imposed on three separate occasions by Lane J, Sir Stephen Stewart and Martin Spencer J.

That is not the totality of the meritless applications that the claimant has made in these proceedings. On 6 September 2023, HHJ Ambrose sitting as a judge of the High Court refused the claimant's application to amend the costs order he had made from “costs in the case” to “costs reserved”. The claimant persisted in making his application, claiming the judge had made an order for costs reserved despite the judge’s recollection that he had made an order for costs in the case, which recollection accorded with the defendants’ solicitor’s note and the defendants’ counsel’s recollection. The claimant’s application resulted in the transcript being acquired at public expense, which showed unambiguously that the judge’s order reflected the order he had made at the hearing and indeed that Mr Enaholo had agreed to the costs order being in that form. Although not certified as totally without merit, it is clear that it was an example of the claimant persisting in a meritless application.

Equally, the order dismissing the claim did not certify it as totally without merit, but in my judgment it is plain that the clinical negligence claim was always bound to fail. The clinicians reached a provisional view based on Mr Enaholo’s presentation and subject to an assessment with which he chose not to engage. That provisional assessment was obviously not negligent. As Kerr J observed:

“There were strong objective grounds for supposing that the claimant was mentally unwell when he attended the UCC and, later, St Mary’s Hospital on 30 June 2019. The vast majority of doctors would agree with the view that there is no recognisable condition known as electrosensivity. The claimant does not understand that few medical professionals, Dr Tresidder’s paper notwithstanding, share his belief in electrosensitivity, i.e. the health effects of induced microwave radiation.

57.

The vast majority of ordinary people, including doctors and nurses, would regard as far fetched and unlikely the proposition that the MPS and its agents would follow a person and subject him to irradiation. It was not unreasonable to draw the conclusion that his belief was probably a delusion; particularly as the results of the tests carried out at the two medical centres revealed no organic cause for the claimant's reported symptoms, namely chest pain and palpitations.”

Although Mr Enaholo seeks to challenge Kerr J's judgment in Strasbourg and has forcefully sought to challenge it before me, he did not seek permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Mr Enaholo’s submissions before me focus primarily on the rectification point. I make no finding that the data protection claim was totally without merit. As I say, my focus in that regard is on the clinical negligence claim, which was wholly without merit.

I have also had regard to other litigation which Mr Enaholo has brought or sought to bring:

The history I have outlined demonstrates that this criterion is met. In these proceedings nine applications have been certified as totally without merit. That is a very high number. The history of these proceedings clearly shows, again and again, that Mr Enaholo irrationally refuses to take ‘no’ for an answer. And, as I have said, there is evidence beyond the orders formally certified as totally without merit that both in these proceedings and other litigation he has brought claims and applications that are without merit.

The claimant’s skeleton argument and witness statement in the response to this application give a flavour of his allegations and approach to litigation. He states:

“On 30 June 2019 claimant was fraudulently diagnosed with acute coronary syndrome (ACS) and psychotic disorder by the defendants on behalf of Reed Specialist Recruitment, defendant’s contractor, Met Police Service contractor and claimant’s previous employer, who was using their operatives contracted to Met Police Service to target claimant’s heart with microwave radiation device with through-the-wall sensor.”

He accuses Martin Spencer J of lying in his court order dated 15 November 2023; as I have said, an allegation that is totally without merit. The claimant accuses Kerr J of “fraudulently dismissing the claim” and of “helping the defendants to fabricate evidence”, an allegation that is totally without merit. He makes clear that if the outcome of this application is unfavourable to him, he will “refer the matter to the Lady Chief Justice of England and Wales and the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Justice for investigation and disciplinary action, and will equally be referred to the European Court of Human Rights”. In correspondence he has attacked the defendant’s solicitors Capsticks LLP, alleging “connections” with the Metropolitan Police Service and accusing them and the defendant’s counsel of “spoliating and suppressing evidence”.

The defendants submit that the claimant has a clear and unswerving belief that he is the subject of microwave radiation. He strongly objects to any suggestion that his perception is the result of a mental illness or disorder. If such a suggestion is made by a medical professional, his response on two occasions has been to bring legal proceedings. It is therefore a reasonable conclusion that if Mr Enaholo engages with medical professionals in the future who make recommendations or suggestions in respect of his mental health, he will once again issue proceedings.

I accept, as Kerr J did and as counsel for the defendants has, that the claimant’s belief is sincere. Nevertheless it is an irrational and unswerving belief which motivates him to continue to make meritless claims and applications. In fact, as I have indicated, he has brought proceedings on more than two occasions, albeit the judicial review proceedings were predecessors to the private law claim in the county court. As I have said, I am aware of five claims that the claimant has brought or sought to bring. The attempt to obtain an injunction against Reed and the Metropolitan Police Service ought to have been a separate claim, rather than being brought under the claim number for this claim, given that they were not parties to this claim. So, in reality there are six claims and in reality totally without merit orders have been made in in two of those claims if it is recognised that the injunction against Reed and the MPS ought to have been a separate claim.

The claimant is not a litigant whose meritless claims have been focused on one case or one or two defendants. It is clear from the approach that he has taken in the past and from the materials he has presented to the court in these proceedings that his complaints continue to expand to encompass numerous individuals and organisations, not limited to the defendants, his past employers, the Metropolitan Police Service and medical professionals but extending also to the Home Office and the Information Commissioner and indeed in terms of complaints encompassing the Nigerian security service and British Airways and regulatory bodies to whom he makes complaints where he is dissatisfied with the response. There is a real risk, indeed I consider it highly probable, that if unrestrained Mr Enaholo will bring further meritless claims and applications against others.

In his submissions today he has said that the Metropolitan Police Service has been carrying out radiation against him for seven years, and he says that whenever they do this, they then send an email under a disguised name. For this purpose he relies on an email which states that it is from OmniaMed Communications inviting him to join a heart failure foundation course. He alleges that that was in fact sent by the Metropolitan Police Service following their focusing of radiation on his heart. He claims that if a civil restraint order is made, it will stop him from bringing claims in respect of that type of matter. As I have said, a civil restraint order does not in fact prevent him from bringing any claims or applications, but it imposes a hurdle of having to seek permission first, and the type of claims that he wishes to pursue are precisely the type of claim that should be the subject of such a hurdle.

The limited civil restrained order imposed by Bourne J, as varied and extended by Nicklin J, remains in effect only for the duration of these proceedings, and it only restrains his ability to make applications in these proceedings. It provides no protection to the defendants or Reed Specialist Recruitment limited or the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis in any other proceedings he may bring; nor does it protect anyone else. Mr Enaholo submits that imposing a general civil restraint order would be in breach of his right to life. I do not accept that. It is a submission that has absolutely no merit. As I have said, a civil restraint order merely imposes a hurdle involving the claimant needing to make an application for permission.

Having carefully reviewed the history of this litigation and, to the extent that I have information about it, other litigation brought by Mr Enaholo, I am satisfied that this is a case in which the court not only has the power to make a general civil restraint order but that it is imperative to do so. I do not consider that an extended civil restraint order would be sufficient, given that the risk of the claimant pursuing further meritless claims and applications is not limited to the parties to these proceedings, nor is it limited to these proceedings. It extends far and wide, encompassing many potential parties, including any medical professionals who may at any stage offend Mr Enaholo by suggesting that a mental health assessment is required. Accordingly I will make a general civil restraint order against Mr Enaholo for a period of three years.