THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE PEPPERALL Approved Judgment | Hamer v. Levy |
BRISTOL DISTRICT REGISTRY
Bristol Civil Justice Centre
2 Redcliff Street, Bristol BS1 6GR
Before :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE PEPPERALL
Between :
LINDA HAMER | Appellant |
- and - | |
HESTHER LEVY | Respondent |
The Appellant appeared in person
Suffian Ali Hussain (instructed by Scott Richards Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 13 October 2025
Approved judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 24 November 2025
by circulation to the parties and by release to the National Archives.
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE PEPPERALL:
This case concerns the question of whether an appeal from the decision of a circuit judge striking out an appeal from a district judge is a second appeal such that it lies to the Court of Appeal, or a first appeal such that it lies to the High Court. In considering the appeal upon the papers, I determined that this was a second appeal and that the High Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. By my order dated 24 June 2025, I therefore struck out this appeal but, since my order was made without a hearing, I afforded the parties the opportunity to apply to set aside or vary my order.
Linda Hamer argues that the High Court does have jurisdiction to hear her appeal and therefore applies to set aside my earlier order.
BACKGROUND
On 27 June 2024, Hesther Levy issued proceedings against her tenant, Linda Hamer, seeking possession of 4 Belle Vue Road, Kingsbridge in Devon under the accelerated possession procedure pursuant to s.21 of the Housing Act 1988.
The claim came before District Judge Priddis sitting in the County Court at Torquay and Newton Abbot on 5 August 2024. The judge ordered Ms Hamer to give possession and pay her landlord’s costs.
Ms Hamer appealed and, on 8 October 2024, her appeal came before His Honour Judge Mitchell. The judge treated a letter from Ms Levy’s solicitor as an application to strike out the appeal on the basis that it had no real prospect of success. He heard oral argument from the solicitor and from Ms Hamer in person but afforded Ms Hamer the opportunity to lodge further written submissions following the hearing.
Subsequently Judge Mitchell considered both the oral submissions and Ms Hamer’s written submissions. Having done so, by an order made on 6 November (but not drawn up until 15 November) 2024, the judge struck out Ms Hamer’s appeal.
By an appellant’s notice lodged on 9 December 2024, Ms Hamer sought to appeal Judge Mitchell’s order. She argued that the s.21 notice was invalid because her landlord had failed to provide the prescribed information in accordance with the Housing Act 2004 and the Housing (Tenancy Deposits) (Prescribed Information) Order 2007, and that Judge Mitchell had therefore been wrong to strike out her appeal.
ARGUMENT
Ms Hamer argues that Judge Mitchell’s decision to strike out her first appeal was not a final decision within the meaning of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) Order 2000 (“the 2000 Order”) so that any appeal from such strike-out lies to the High Court. She relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Scribes West Ltd v. Relsa Anstalt [2004] EWCA Civ 965, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1839 and the decision of Hickinbottom J in London Borough of Southwark v. Ofogba [2012] EWHC 1620 (QB). Ms Hamer also referred me to the decision of Kerr J in Topping v. Ralph Tristees Ltd [2017] EWHC 1954 (QB). Further, she argues that there is merit in her appeal.
Suffian Hussain, who appears for Ms Levy, argues that this is plainly a second appeal and that I was right to strike it out for want of jurisdiction. He relies upon my earlier decision in Jarvis v. Metro Taxis Ltd [2024] EWHC 1452 (KB). Further, Mr Hussain took me to a letter in the bundle from Ms Levy in which she explained the hardship that she has suffered through not being able to obtain possession of her property.
Before turning to the question of jurisdiction, I should make plain that neither Ms Hamer’s argument as to the merits of her appeal nor Ms Levy’s letter, even if such material were otherwise properly put into evidence in this appeal, is relevant to the narrow question of jurisdiction that is before the court.
ANALYSIS
Ms Hamer’s reliance on Scribes and Ofogba is fundamentally flawed:
First, Ms Hamer’s argument is dependent upon the distinction formerly made by Articles 3 and 4 of the revoked 2000 Order between final decisions in multi-track Part 7 claims (where, at that time, the appeal from the decision of a judge sitting in the county court lay to the Court of Appeal) and other county court decisions (where the appeal lay to the High Court). That distinction was removed by the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) Order 2016 (“the 2016 Order”) which revoked the 2000 Order. As explained below, the High Court now hears most first appeals from circuit judges sitting in the county court irrespective of whether the decision would have been regarded as a final decision as defined by the 2000 Order.
Secondly and in any event, Scribes and Ofogba were only dealing with the proper destination for a first appeal under the 2000 Order. Even under that legislation, it was the law that, irrespective of whether the decision under appeal was final, a second appeal lay only to the Court of Appeal: see Art. 5 of the 2000 Order.
Further, Topping was concerned with the proper route of appeal where a multi-track trial was released for trial to a district judge. It was not concerned with and does not assist as to the proper approach to a second appeal.
Since 2016 and save in contempt cases, appeals from a circuit judge sitting in the county court ordinarily lie to the High Court: see Practice Direction 52A, para.3.5, table 1, and art.5 of the 2016 Order. But appeals from decisions of the county court which were themselves made on appeal lie only to the Court of Appeal and are subject to more exacting requirements:
Section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”) provides:
“Where an appeal is made to the county court, the family court or the High Court in relation to any matter, and on hearing the appeal the court makes a decision in relation to that matter, no appeal may be made from that decision unless the Court of Appeal considers that–
(a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or
(b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.”
Section 56 of the 1999 Act authorises the Lord Chancellor to specify that appeals which would otherwise lie to the High Court should instead lie to the Court of Appeal.
Pursuant to such power, art.6 of the 2016 Order provides:
“Where—
(a) an appeal is made to the county court or the High Court (other than from the decision of an officer authorised to assess costs by the Lord Chancellor); and
(b) on hearing the appeal the court makes a decision,
an appeal shall lie from that decision to the Court of Appeal and not to any other court.”
Rule 52.7(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 provides:
“Permission is required from the Court of Appeal for any appeal to that court from a decision of the county court, the family court or the High Court which was itself made on appeal, or a decision of the Upper Tribunal which was made on appeal from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal on a point of law where the Upper Tribunal has refused permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.”
Rule 52.7(2) provides the enhanced test for permission in second appeals:
“The Court of Appeal will not give permission unless it considers that
(a) the appeal would–
(i) have a real prospect of success; and
(ii) raise an important point of principle or practice; or
(b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.”
Article 2 of the 2016 Order provides that a decision includes any judgment, order or direction.
As I observed in Jarvis, the essential policy is that parties in civil cases who have already enjoyed access to one appeal should only exceptionally be granted a further right of appeal. Such restriction on second appeals assists in rationing access to the senior courts so that the High Court can focus upon its trial work and the Court of Appeal upon the resolution of first appeals and those second appeals (a) that are properly arguable and raise important matters of principle or practice; or (b) where there is some other compelling reason for allowing a second appeal to be argued. Further, by restricting access to second appeals, the policy assists in controlling the total cost and length of litigation.
Accordingly:
First appeals from decisions of district judges sitting in the county court lie to a circuit judge sitting in the county court.
No appeal lies from a decision of the circuit judge refusing permission to appeal a decision of a district judge:
First, s.54(4) of the 1999 Act makes clear that there is no right of appeal from the refusal of permission.
Secondly, in limited circumstances the county court’s refusal of permission may be challenged not by appeal but by a claim for judicial review: R (Sivasubramaniam) v Wandsworth County Court [2002] EWCA Civ 1738, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 475.
An appeal lies from a decision of the circuit judge either allowing or dismissing an appeal from a district judge. Any such appeal lies to the Court of Appeal and not the High Court.
An order striking out an appeal – rather than either refusing permission or hearing and then dismissing the appeal – is a case-management decision: Patel v. Mussa [2015] EWCA Civ 434, [2015] 1 W.L.R. 4788. In Patel, the appeal was struck out upon the appellant’s failure to comply with case-management directions. This case is to that extent different in that Ms Hamer’s first appeal was struck out because Judge Mitchell concluded that the appeal had no prospect of success. Properly analysed, that is a difference in the justification for the striking out but it does not transform the judge’s decision from a case-management decision into an order refusing permission to appeal. Indeed, Judge Mitchell was clear that he was not deciding the question of permission but rather exercising his case-management powers to dispose of a hopeless appeal.
While a decision of the county court refusing permission to appeal cannot be challenged further by way of appeal, I accept that an appeal does lie from Judge Mitchell’s case-management decision to strike out Ms Hamer’s appeal.
Judge Mitchell’s order was, however, a decision made by a judge on hearing Ms Hamer’s first appeal. Accordingly, Ms Hamer’s further appeal is, in my judgment, caught by s.55(1) of the 1999 Act, art.6 of the 2016 Order, and r.52.7(1) with the consequence that her appeal lies only to the Court of Appeal and she will have to satisfy the more stringent second-appeal test. I am reinforced in that view by the decision in Patel in which, even under the 2000 Order, the appeal against the striking out of the first appeal was considered to be a second appeal that lay to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s.55 of the 1999 Act.
OUTCOME
For these reasons, Ms Hamer’s appeal against Judge Mitchell’s order lies to the Court of Appeal and this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain her appeal. I therefore dismiss Ms Hamer’s application to set aside my earlier order striking out her appeal and I lift the stay imposed by Judge Berkley on 4 August 2025 with immediate effect.