Timothy Perkin & Anor v Christopher Henry Hawkins & Anor

MRS JUSTICE TIPPLES: This is an application made by Timothy Perkin and John Barber as fixed charge receivers (“the receivers”) by an application of notice dated 15 August 2025 for an extended civil restraint order against Christopher Hawkins and Jane Wells (“the respondents”) in the following terms, namely that the respondents be restrained from:

“Making applications and/or issuing any claim in the High Court or County Court concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon the receivership of the property known as The Lodge, Lower Road, London SE16 2UB.”

The application does not seek a limited civil restraint order in the alternative. The application is supported by the fourth witness statement of Felicity Clair Danks, dated 15 August 2025 and exhibit FD4 (which runs to 320 pages). The supplementary witness statement of Emily Claire Black, dated 9 October 2024 and exhibit EB (which runs to 120 pages), the supplemental witness statement of Emily Claire Black dated 15 October 2025, and the exhibit there too marked EB (which runs to 20 pages). The receivers were represented by Ms Caroline Bolton of counsel who appeared before me at yesterday's hearing and filed a skeleton argument dated 15 October 2025 together with a short bundle of authorities.

The respondents did not appear before me and were not represented.

Ms Bolton for the receivers took me through the evidence of service and I am quite satisfied they have been served with the application notice and all the evidence in support. They were also well aware of yesterday's hearing.

Indeed, they filed the following documents with the Court which I have read.

A document entitled Second Affidavit of Rebuttal Unlawful Standing by Christopher Henry Hawkins made on 15 October 2025, a document entitled Second Affidavit of Truth by Jane Anne Wells, dated 15 October 2025, and a notice which runs to 7 pages addressed to the Lady Chief Justice in claim number 2025-003141 with the subject identified as “criminal harassment, procedural misconduct and rebuttal totally without merit ECRO application”.

It is important that I consider the receivers’ evidence against each respondent separately and consider whether, as the receivers maintain, that the relevant criteria are met for an extended civil restraint order and whether it is appropriate to make such an order against each respondent individually.

The factual background to this application is as follows. In August 2017, an organisation known as Secure Trust Bank PLC lent the respondents £3,055,000, which was then secured by a first legal charge over a property known as The Lodge, Lower Road, London SE16 2UB (“the property”).

I am told that the property is a commercial premises with residential flats. The term of the loan was extended until 11 February 2023 but was not repaid. On 3 May 2023 Timothy Perkin and James Graham of CBRE were appointed by Secure Trust Bank PLC as joint fixed charge receivers. James Graham subsequently retired and was replaced by John Barber. John Barber and Timothy Perkin are together now the receivers and the applicants to this application.

On 7 September 2023, the receivers issued proceedings for possession of the property in the County Court at Shoreditch and Clerkenwell against the respondents. On 6 December 2023 an order for possession was made against the respondents in respect to the property. That order was sealed on 3 January 2024. The respondents did not defend the proceedings and the order made by the court required them to deliver up possession by 3 January 2024 but which they failed to do.

By an order made on 17 January 2024 the receivers were granted permission to transfer the order for possession dated 6 December 2023 to the King's Bench Division of the High Court for the purposes of enforcement under section 42 of the County Court Act 1984. Enforcement of the possession order was scheduled for 1 July 2024.

A few days prior to this, on 26 June 2024, the respondents made an application to the High Court citing County Court Claim KO4EC282 and the warrant number in these terms:

“We, Christopher and Jane, request an extension to present our case and redeem the mortgage with Secure Trust Bank PLC as advised by TLT on 14 June. Additional time to obtain a redemption statement and complete payment. We also request the removal of the receivers James Allen Graham, CBRE, due to mismanagement and misconduct in handling the property.”

By an email dated 28 June 2024 Ms Danks, the receiver's solicitor, informed the respondents that in absence of any court order or hearing date in relation to the application, the receivers' instructions were to proceed with the eviction which was scheduled for 1 July at 7.00 am.

On the 1 of July 2024 High Court enforcement officers attended at the property in order to enforce the possession order. They were unable to do so because the respondents and others had barricaded themselves into the property. A number of other people were present outside the property and the situation was unsafe for the enforcement officers, so they withdrew and were unable to proceed. There is a witness statement from Ashley Naylor, dated 2 July 2024, in the papers before me which sets out what happened on that occasion.

Also on 1 July 2024, the respondents applied to the High Court again in case number of KOEC282/HP336/2024 for an order staying the enforcement of the writ of possession and that application was dismissed. The reasons given by Master Armstrong were set out in these terms:

“1.

There's no evidence of any reasonable prospect of the mortgage being paid within a reasonable or at all.

2.

If the defendant asserts the final judgement order was based on fraud that needs to be determined by way of issuing separate originating process.

3.

There's no evidence of permission to appeal having been granted or sought in time or at all for no identifiable defence being referenced to or made apparent within the application.

4.

There is no evidence of misconduct by the receiver, nor apparent good reason to remove him."

Later that same day Master Stevens, another Master sitting in the King's Bench Division, set aside Master Armstrong's order on certain conditions and, in particular, the Master became aware of the respondents' earlier application dated 26 June 2024. Master Stevens then ordered a stay of execution of the writ pending judgment till further order of the Clerkenwell and Shoreditch County Court in relation to the application which had been made on the 26 June 2024. This is at page 192 of the bundle before me. The receivers were not present when Master Stevens made his order and were entitled to apply to set it aside, which they did by an application notice dated 4 July 2024. The receivers' application was made in these terms:

The application notice asked for the receivers’ application to be determined without a hearing. The application was supported by the witness statement of Felicity Danks dated 4 July 2024. The receivers did not make any application for a limited civil restraint order although, if they were right that the three applications referred to were totally without merit, the court would be obliged to consider whether a civil restraint order was appropriate: see CPR 23.12(1A).

Ms Danks’ witness statement refers to the three applications the respondents had made in these terms: first, the application dated 26 June 2024 for an extension of time and removal of the receivers as the County Court application; second, the application which came before Master Armstrong on 1 July 2024 as the first High Court application; third, the application which came before Master Stevens later the same day, on 1 July 2024, as the second High Court application.

On 17 July 2024 Master Gidden determined the receivers' application dated 4 July 2024 on the papers. Master Gidden made an order in these terms, having set out various recitals narrating the background to the application, namely that: (1) Master Stevens’ order dated 1 July 2024 is set aside; (2) the stay of execution in respect of the writ is lifted; (3) the defendants’ County Court application, the first High Court application, and the second High Court application be dismissed as being totally without merit.

The court did not decide to make any form of civil restraint order and no such order is included as part of Master Gidden’s order made on 17 July 2024. Rather paragraph 4 of the order provides as follows:

That paragraph of Master Gidden’s order specifically sets out directions as to what was to happen if the respondents intended to make any further applications. That order makes clear that the respondents were not precluded from making any applications but rather set out clearly what was required if any further applications were to be made and, in particular, any further applications in relation to “Any matter arising from the defendants' debt to Secure Trust Bank PLC”. That order made by Master Gidden was sealed by the court on 18 July 2024.

The respondents have not appealed that order or otherwise sought to challenge it. The writ of possession was then executed on 6 September 2024. The receivers then took steps to sell the property in via a firm called TM Property and Investment Limited. The agreed price was £4,125,000 and the receivers had carriage of the sale of the property to the buyer.

Two months after that the respondents made two further applications, one to the County Court and one to the High Court. The first application was issued on 15 November 2024 in the Shoreditch and Clerkenwell County and it sought an order setting aside the possession order dated 6 December 2023.

The second application was issued in the High Court. I am referred to claim KO4EC282 and to the warrant number 336/2024. That application notice made by the respondent was in these terms:

“We humbly request for a stay of completion order CPR 3.1(2)(f) as an imminent completion of the property 'The Lodge' is to complete on or before 20 November 2024. We filed an application to set aside the possession order at the County Court under CPR 52.16, we asked the matter to be considered by the honourable court.”

The application stated that it needed to come before the Senior Master and needed to be heard before Wednesday, 20 November 2024. The details provided on page 2 of the application seek an order for a stay to stop the receivers from selling the property so that the respondents would have carriage of the sale on the footing that the receivers were not obtaining the best price.

Those two applications dated 15 November 2024 came before Senior Master Cook on 19 November. The receivers were represented by Natalie Pratt(?) of counsel and directly instructed counsel representing the defendants.

The order made, I do not have any note of the hearing before Master Cook. I just have a copy of the order that he made. The order sets out in the recitals the applications before the court, what the Master had read, and who appeared before him. The order he made was in these terms:

It is important to note that the order did not make any provision for any formal civil restraint order against the respondents. They had at that point in time been five applications made by the respondents which had been certified as totally without merit and at that hearing before Master Cook the receivers were represented by counsel. The inference I draw from that is that the receivers did not consider at that point in time any need for such an order and therefore did not apply for one. The issue before me on this application is what has changed in the meantime such that it is now appropriate, some 11 months later, to make not just a limited civil restraint order against each respondent, but an extended civil restraint order against both of them.

The respondents did not issue any appeal against the order of Master Cook and in the meantime the respondents have not made any further applications at all, whether in relation to the proceedings originally commenced in the Clerkenwell and Shoreditch County Court number EO4EC282 or anywhere else. Further, as there had been no applications or claims. there have been no more applications or claims that have been certified as totally without merit.

The receivers also refer to an order made by Master Gidden in a different claim, number KB-2023-00423, which were commenced by the respondents against Secure Trust Bank PLC. That order was made almost two years ago on 30 November 2023 and was sealed by the court on 7 December 2023. That order stayed the claim brought by the respondents against Secure Trust Bank PLC.

The order is at page 251 in the bundle before me and gives the following reasons for making the order which is set out at page 252. I am not going to read all the reasons, but I'll just start off with the first two identified by the Master:

“The claim sets out an unparticularised monetary claim against the defendant on the basis that a mortgage was not binding on the claimant. It is incoherent and relies upon spurious legal concepts and irrelevant statutes. It seeks to pursue what appeared to be hopeless points to advance futile arguments. It is in the interest of all court users that the court takes proper steps to secure the efficient administration of justice to make sure that its procedures and not abused...”

So that claim has been stayed. There was no appeal against that order made by the Master by respondents.

The receivers do not seek to count that claim as being totally without merit, but rather maintain that it is something the court should taking into account in assessing the overall conduct of the respondents.

The present situation is that the receivers appointed by Secure Trust Bank PLC have enforced the charge and the property was sold on 5 December 2024 and, having been sold, the respondents have made no further applications or claims to the court in respect to this.

The receivers also refer to the fact that on about 2 June 2025 the first respondent Christopher Hawkins, and it is only the first respondent, purported to serve a statutory demand on the receivers’ solicitors TLT, Secure Trust Bank PLC and CBRE Ltd claiming to be owed the total of $600 million US dollars. TLT, Secure Trust Bank PLC, and CBRE Ltd applied to the High Court for an injunction to prevent the first respondent from taking any action based on the statutory demands. The injunctive relief sought was granted by HHJ Jonathan Russen KC.

The receivers also rely on other conduct of the respondents which is set out, in particular at paragraphs 11 and 46 of Ms Danks’ fourth witness statement, paragraphs 4 to 9 of Emily Black's supplemental witness statement dated 15 October 2025 and paragraphs 8 to 15 of Emily Black's witness statement dated 9 October 2025.

Those paragraphs in Ms Danks’ witness statement explained that although the respondents did not defend the possession proceedings in the County Court, throughout the proceedings, they set numerous lengthy:

“"Judicial notices and/or affidavits” to Secure Trust Bank PLC, the receivers and their solicitors which were written in “incomprehensible pseudo legal language containing vexatious allegations... and generally nonsensical."

In addition to that, the receivers refer to a “cease and desist” notice served by the second respondent on 16 June 2025 which they maintain is nonsensical and threatens claims against at Ms Danks’ colleague, Emily Black, in relation to alleged fraudulent use of intellectual property associated with a trust called “Wells Hawkins Trust One”.

The recent developments set out in Emily Black’s witness statements refer to documents that the respondents have now served in response to the receivers’ application for an extended civil restraint order and were served on 14 October 2025. At paragraph 16 of her witness statement Emily Black asserts in evidence the following:

Much of the correspondence which has been sent to the receivers which they maintain is vexatious and nonsensical, has been served by the respondents after the receivers issued and served their application for a civil restraint order on 15 October 2025. However, the position remains that no further applications or claims have been issued by the respondents since 15 November 2024. Ms Bolton for the receivers also accepts that the statutory demand served by the first respondent is not an application or claim and, in any event, this document does not concern the second respondent.

As to the documents which the respondents have served, they are in these terms.

The first respondent, Christopher Henry Hawkins, has served a document entitled “Second Affidavit, Rebuttal and Lawful Standing”, which is dated 15 October 2025. That document starts off by saying:

“I am not the corporate fiction ‘Mr Christopher Henry Hawkins’ nor any variation thereof presented in all capitals with titles. I do not consent to the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division nor do I recognise the authority of the applicants or their agents in this matter.

The claimants/applicants have unlawfully converted private class property and are misrepresenting their standing…"

The affidavit, as it is described, goes on to respond to the ECRO application and maintains that the applications certified as totally without merit were:

“Lawfully granted and raised about a procedural jurisdictional concerns and sought redress for harm but the court failed to engage with the substance of these filings and denied all hearings breaching principles of justice.”

Mr Hawkins’ document then continues by rebutting all documents which have been served on him. He demands disclosure and transparency and at the bottom of page 2 asserts what he describes as a lawful counterclaim for £25,240,000 comprising a £25,000,000 in damages for unlawful conversion, trespassing, procedural harm, generally £4,000 in costs incurred defending against the application related to misconduct. The document then goes on to refer to the legal foundation in case law, public declaration of standing, a final affirmation and then refers to the law of the Prophets, and then sets out about service.

The document served by the second respondent is a “Second Affidavit of Truth” as it is entitled by Jane Anne Wells. It is also dated 15 October 2025. Page 1 of the second respondent's documents described as Second Affidavit of Truth starts in introduction by saying:

Her affidavit then challenges the ECRO threshold, rebuts the documents that have been served on her and then takes issue with the applications which were determined as totally without merit.

Her affadavit continues by demanding procedural transparency, has a heading entitled Reframing of Notices, and contains an assertion of lawful counterclaims, and asserts a counterclaim for £25,240,000, demands full disclosure, opposes the scope of an extended civil restraint order and asks for this application to be dismissed.

The third document which was addressed to Lady Chief Justice is entitled “Formal Notice of Criminal Harassment”. I have looked at that document and read it. I do not refer anymore to it here.

I have considered all the evidence in the bundles and all of the documents which were handed up to me in court yesterday.

I then heard submissions from Ms Bolton and, having done so, I reserve judgment as I wished to reflect on the matter overnight.

The relevant law in relation to the making of extended civil restraint orders is well settled and clear.

Paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 3C to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 provides as follows:

“3.1

An extended civil restraint order may be made by - …

(2)

a judge of the High Court …

where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit.”

Paragraph 3.2 then set out:

Paragraphs 3.3 to 3.11 then set out more detail in relation to the effect of extended civil restraint orders and, in particular, the order must be made before a specified period not exceeding 3 years.

The court will only make an extended civil restraint order in circumstances where a limited civil restraint order is not sufficient to meet the risk posed by further unmeritorious applications or claims. The meaning of “persistently” has been considered in a number of authorities. It is now well settled that what is required is for the party to have made three or more totally without merit claims or applications: Sartipy v Tigris Industries Inc [2019] 1 WLR 5892 (“Sartipy”) at paragraph 28.

In Sartipy the Court of Appeal provided further clarification in this regard at paragraphs 29 to 32 of its judgment. Those paragraphs are relevant here and I read them out:

Further observations made by Fordham J in Reelworld Europe Ltd v Uddin [2021] EWHC 535 (QB) are also relevant:

“16.

The fact that the trigger test is satisfied does not mean the making of an ECRO follows. The Court has an important judgment and discretion to exercise as to whether an order is justified and, if so, what order should be made. In addressing the exercise of the judgment and discretion I have had regard in particular to the objective assessment of the risk posed by the respondent. Put another way, I have evaluated the ‘threat level’.”

There can be no issue here that the respondents have issued five applications which the court has certified as taking without merit. However, I have to evaluate each respondent's overall conduct and determine whether that conduct is such that he or she has acted persistently in issuing claims or applications which are totally without merit. Is this, for example, a case where each respondent is seeking to relitigate issues that have already been decided and refused to take no for an answer? Further, the question of persistence has to be determined by reference to the claims and applications which are totally without merit before the court can look at other conduct.

Taking first the second respondent. The last application she issued together with the first respondent, which was totally without merit, was on 15 November 2024. That took the total number of applications to five, including a second application to challenge the possession order, together with an application to stop the sale of the property proceeding.

The property has now been sold and no further claims or applications have been made by the second respondent and there has been no appeal against the Master's decision dated 19 November 2024. On top of that, no application for a civil restraint order was made before the Master on 19 November 2024 when the receivers were represented by counsel, and there is no evidence to explain why the receivers took until 15 August 2025 to make an application for a civil restraint order against the second respondent when she has made no further applications or claims in the meantime.

It is correct that the second respondent sent a “cease and desist” notice. But that alone does not turn the conduct down to 19 November 2024 into persistently issuing claims or applications. In these circumstances I am not satisfied on an objective assessment of the evidence that the receivers have put before the court that the threat level or risk posed by the second respondent is such that an extended civil restraint order should be made. No application is made by the receivers for a limited civil restraint order. Indeed, given the width of the order that they have sought, it is not what they want.

The application made by the receivers is for an extended civil restraint order restraining the second respondent from making:

That is in effect to prevent the respondents making any complaint at all about the conduct of the receivership.

Any such complaints may or may not be hopeless, but when the circumstances are that the second respondent states that she does not accept the jurisdiction of the court, the property has been sold, and no applications or claims have been made since November 2024, in my view is not appropriate to make any form of restraint order against the second respondent. It may of course turn out that the receivers' application for an extended civil restraint order is premature and, if circumstances change, and the second respondent issues any further applications or makes claims or which the court determines are totally without merit, then the Court would have to consider whether any form of civil restraint order is appropriate at that stage. But the evidence before the Court, on my assessment of it, does not support the making of any such order now. I therefore dismiss the receivers' application against the second respondent.

Turning now to the first respondent. The only difference between him and the second respondent is that he has served statutory demands on various people and is now subject to a High Court injunction to prevent him from serving anymore. The receivers accept that the statutory demands are not claims or applications, so this is conduct that the receivers can rely on only if persistence is established by the issue of other claims or applications.

In that context the position of the first respondent is the same as the second respondent and, on my objective assessment of the evidence before the court, I am not satisfied that at the present time there is sufficient evidence to show that the first respondent has persistently issued claims or applications and that there is a real risk that he will issue further claims or applications or is seeking to relitigate issues which have already been decided. Again, it may turn out that this application by the receivers is premature but, as matters stand, the receivers' application against the first respondent also fails. I am also not satisfied it is appropriate to make a limited civil restraint order against the first respondent for the same reasons I have identified against the second respondent.

Accordingly, the receivers' application for an extended civil restraint order is dismissed.