Mohammed Abdul Munim v Hafizur Rahman

The claimant applies for summary disposal of his defamation claim pursuant to section 8 of the Defamation Act 1996. I gave my decisions to proceed in the defendant’s absence and to grant the summary relief sought at the hearing, and indicated that, as the defendant was not present, I would put my reasons in writing.

The claim has a protracted history. On 23 July 2018 the claimant issued this claim for libel in respect of comments posted on Facebook by the defendant in May 2018 alleging, in essence, that the claimant stole the design of an industry awards logo and trophy from him and that the claimant unlawfully stole the defendant’s business.

Mr Mumin and Mr Rahmin each filed witness statements in September 2020, for use at the trial which was then nearing a trial fixture. Re-amended particulars of claim and a re-amended defence were served, respectively, on 30 October 2020 and 5 May 2021.

However, in July 2020, the defendant brought a copyright claim against the claimant and ARTA Awards Ltd (of which the claimant is the sole shareholder and director) alleging inter alia that his copyright in the award design had been infringed (‘the copyright claim’). In August 2020, the defendant and Mr Rifat Ahmed issued an unfair prejudice petition in the Companies Court against the claimant and Le Chef Plc (of which the claimant is a director, and both the claimant and defendant are shareholders) (‘the company claim’). Consequently, in October 2020, the defamation claim was transferred to the Chancery Division and the three claims were consolidated by an order of Deputy Master Rhys dated 16 April 2021.

The copyright and company claims were tried together, while the defamation claim was stayed. Following a four-day trial, His Honour Judge Jarman KC, gave judgment on 21 November 2022: Munim v Rahman & ors [2022] EWHC 2870 (Ch). Pursuant to an order sealed on 14 December 2022 he dismissed both the copyright and company claims, and made costs orders against the defendant in favour of the claimant The defendant was required to make an interim payment on account to the claimant by 29 December 2022. He has not done so.

The defendant sought to appeal. On 20 July 2023, Arnold LJ granted permission to appeal in respect of the company claim but refused permission on all grounds in the copyright claim. Judgment dismissing the appeal was handed down on 14 February 2024, following a hearing on 31 January 2024. By an order of the same date, the Court of Appeal awarded Mr Munim his costs and required Mr Rahman to make a payment on account to Mr Munim in the sum of £14,000 by 13 March 2024. Again, he has not done so.

While the appeal was under way, costs and case management hearings (CCMC) listed for the defamation claim were twice vacated. A third CCMC listed for 22 March 2024 was vacated upon the parties agreeing to transfer the case back to the King’s Bench Division.

On 19 November 2024, the claimant made the application for summary disposal that is now before me. A CCMC listed for 2 December 2024 was vacated by Master Dagnall at the request of both parties to accommodate a hearing of the summary disposal application. The matter came back before Master Dagnall for a one-day hearing on 23 April 2025. He had concerns about his jurisdiction to grant some of the relief sought by the claimant and so adjourned the summary disposal application for determination by a judge of the Media and Communications List. At the same time, he gave directions for trial in the event that the application is unsuccessful.

Following a listing appointment, the claimant was under the impression the application was listed for hearing on 8 July 2025. However, due to what Mr Winn-Smith describes as an “administrative gremlin”, on the eve of the phantom hearing, it transpired that it had not in fact been listed. On 7 July 2025, Collins Rice J gave directions for the listing of the claimant’s summary disposal application, and provided the defendant with a further opportunity to file evidence in response by 18 July 2025. He has not done so.

The two day trial has been listed for 20-21 January 2026, with a pre-trial review on 16 December 2025.

The defendant has solicitors on the record, namely Lexwin Solicitors. However, neither he nor any representative is present at the hearing today. So a preliminary issue arises as to whether to proceed in his absence or adjourn the hearing. Where a party fails to appear at the hearing of an application, the court may proceed in that party’s absence: CPR 23.11(1). This is a power that must be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective of dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost, including, so far as practicable, dealing with it in the ways identified in CPR 1.1(2).

In Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 545 (QB), where the defendant failed to appear at the hearing of her own application to set aside service of proceedings on her outside the jurisdiction, Warby J observed at [23]:

“Where a litigant fails to appear without giving a reason it is necessary to consider first whether they have had proper notice of the hearing date and the matters, including the evidence, to be considered at the hearing. If satisfied that such notice has been given, the court must examine the available evidence as to the reasons why the litigant has not appeared, to see if this provides a ground for adjourning the hearing.”

The defendant has been legally represented since the commencement of these proceedings, and throughout the first instance and appellate hearings in respect of the copyright and company claims. His current solicitors have been acting for the defendant in this claim since 21 March 2024. Notice of today’s hearing was sent by the Listing Office on 18 August 2025 to the email address for Lexwin Solicitors which they have provided to the court, and from which they emailed the court most recently on 22 April 2025. The claimant’s skeleton argument, the hearing bundle and the authorities bundle were duly filed in accordance with Collins Rice J’s directions. They are accessible to the claimant’s representatives on ce-file.

In addition, Mr Winn-Smith, informs me that the claimant’s solicitors have copied the defendant’s solicitors into all correspondence regarding the listing of this hearing, and they have served the hearing bundle, the authorities bundle and the claimant’s skeleton argument on the defendant by email. They have never received any bounce-back of any emails they have sent to the defendant’s solicitors.

The defendant’s solicitors were rarely responsive prior to the hearing originally listed on 2 December 2024. But on 25 November 2024 they wrote to the court seeking an adjournment of the hearing and stating:

“In respect of the proposed directions, the Defendant requests 21 days to file any evidence in response to the Claimant’s application and evidence filed. Parties have yet to exchange Costs Budget and Budge discussion reports and the directions may include provision for the same prior to the re-listed CCMC and application hearing.”

Notwithstanding the defendant’s expressed wish to file evidence in response to the summary disposal application, the defendant did not file or serve any evidence prior to the re-listed hearing before Master Dagnall on 23 April 2025. The claimant’s solicitors sent messages to the defendant’s solicitors, chasing for his responsive evidence and the precedent H and R forms, by email on 4 March, 13 March, 7 April and 8 April 2025. They received no response. On the evening of 22 April 2025, the defendant’s solicitors wrote to the court and the claimant’s solicitors:

“We write to inform the Court that despite repeated endeavours and efforts seeking his instructions we have regrettably received no further instructions from the defendant Mr Rahman. Furthermore, we have not been placed in funds either to prepare for the hearing or to instruct Counsel to attend on his behalf.

In these circumstances, we respectfully inform the Court and the Claimant’s representatives that we will not be attending the hearing scheduled for tomorrow.”

The defendant’s solicitors have been unresponsive since then. However, they have not at any stage sought to come off the record. The defendant has not served a skeleton argument or otherwise engaged with the claimant in the preparation for this hearing.

I am satisfied that the defendant has had notice of the hearing, and of all the materials before the court. He had engaged in the proceedings for several years. The summary disposal application and supporting evidence was filed at a time when he was still actively engaged in the proceedings. It is likely that, in circumstances where he has lost the two related claims on which his defence of truth, at least, is based, and he has failed to pay £94,000 that he was ordered to pay on account, the defendant has chosen to absent himself from this hearing.

In my judgment, it would be contrary to the interests of justice and the objective of dealing with cases at proportionate cost to adjourn this hearing. I have no reason to believe that the defendant would attend an adjourned hearing, so an adjournment would be a waste of the claimant’s and the court’s time and resources. I also bear in mind that pursuant to CPR 23.11(2), the court has an unfettered jurisdiction to ‘re-list’ (i.e. re-hear) the application, on application or of its own initiative.

Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1996 provides, so far as relevant:

“(1)

In defamation proceedings the court may dispose summarily of the plaintiff’s claim in accordance with the following provisions.

…

(3)

The court may give judgment for the plaintiff and grant him summary relief (see section 9) if it appears to the court that there is no defence to the claim which has a realistic prospect of success, and that there is no other reason why the claim should be tried. Unless the plaintiff asks for summary relief, the court shall not act under this subsection unless it is satisfied that summary relief will adequately compensate him for the wrong he has suffered.

(4)

In considering whether a claim should be tried the court shall have regard to—

(a)

whether all the persons who are or might be defendants in respect of the publication complained of are before the court;

(b)

whether summary disposal of the claim against another defendant would be inappropriate;

(c)

the extent to which there is a conflict of evidence;

(d)

the seriousness of the alleged wrong (as regards the content of the statement and the extent of publication); and

(e)

whether it is justifiable in the circumstances to proceed to a full trial.”

By section 9(1) of the Defamation Act 1996 “summary relief” means such of the following as may be appropriate:

“(a)

a declaration that the statement was false and defamatory of the plaintiff;

(b)

an order that the defendant publish or cause to be published a suitable correction and apology;

(c)

damages not exceeding £10,000 or such other amount as may be prescribed by order of the Lord Chancellor;

(d)

an order restraining the defendant from publishing or further publishing the matter complained of.

Section 9(2) of the Defamation Act 1996 provides:

“The content of any correction and apology, and the time, manner, form and place of publication, shall be for the parties to agree. If they cannot agree on the content, the court may direct the defendant to publish or cause to be published a summary of the court’s judgment agreed by the parties or settled by the court in accordance with rules of court. If they cannot agree on the time, manner, form or place of publication, the court may direct the defendant to take such reasonable and practicable steps as the court considers appropriate.”

CPR r.53.5(2) provides that in proceedings for summary disposal under ss.8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1996, rules 24.4, 24.5 and 24.6 apply. An application for summary judgment under Part 24 may not be made if an application has been made for summary disposal in accordance with the 1996 Act and that application has not been disposed of (CPR 53.5(3)(a)).

The test to be applied pursuant to s.8(3) is essentially the same as under CPR 24.3. But there are significant differences in the relief that may be obtained. One difference is that pursuant to s.9(1)(a) the court has the power to make a declaration of falsity, a power which the claimant asks the court to exercise in this case. Another difference is the limit on damages awarded pursuant to s.9(1)(c).

The statements complained of in the re-amended particulars of claim consist of:

I have set out the posts in an appendix to this judgment.

In the re-amended defence, the defendant has admitted that he published each of these posts on each of these three threads.

The claimant’s pleaded meanings are as follows:

“6.

Each of the threads was read together and each has a common sting. The natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of in each of the threads was as follows:

(a)

The statements complained of in the First Thread: The Claimant had stolen the Defendant’s business, business idea and intellectual property, was dishonestly profiting from the Defendant’s ideas and hard work, and should not be associated with.

(b)

The statements complained of in the Second Thread: The Defendant had invited the Claimant to participate in his business, and the Claimant had betrayed the Defendant, cheating him out of his business, his business idea and intellectual property, and stealing them for his own use.

(c)

The statements complained of in the Third Thread: The Claimant is a dishonest exploitative crook who has stolen the Defendant’s business, business idea and intellectual property.

6.1

In the alternative, in their natural and ordinary meaning the words complained of meant and were understood to mean as follows:

(a)

The words at paragraph 5.1(a): The Claimant stole the concept of ARTA, its branding and the design of the trophy from the Defendant.

(b)

The words at paragraph 5.1(b): The Claimant stole the idea for the ARTA awards from the Defendant and should not be associated with.

(c)

The words at paragraph 5.1(c): The Claimant has abused the Defendant’s intellectual property.

(d)

The words at paragraph 5.4(a): The Claimant stole the idea for the ARTA awards from the Defendant.

(e)

The words at paragraph 5.4(b): The Claimant stole the concept of ARTA, its branding and the design of the trophy from the Defendant.

(f)

The words at paragraph 5.4(c): The Defendant had invited the Claimant to participate in his business, and the Claimant had betrayed the Defendant, cheating him out of his business, his business idea and intellectual property, and stealing them for his own use.

(g)

The words at paragraph 5.7(a): The Claimant is a dishonest exploitative crook who has stolen the Defendant’s business, business idea and intellectual property.

(h)

The words at paragraph 5.7(b): The Claimant is a dishonest cheat.”

Although paragraph 6.1 is pleaded in the alternative to paragraph 6 (i.e. if the defendant did not accept that each thread was read together and had a common sting), the defendant has admitted paragraph 6 and paragraph 6.1. I will focus on paragraph 6, as the defendant has admitted that each thread was read together and had a common sting. But in any event I agree with the claimant that the more granular set of alternative meanings is consistent with the primary meanings contended for.

The matters in issue on the pleadings are:

I shall consider each of the disputed issues in turn.

It is an essential element of the cause of action for defamation that the words complained of should be published “of and concerning” the claimant: E. Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20, Lord Loreburn, p.24; Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116, Viscount Simon LC, pp.118-119. It is therefore necessary for the claimant to plead the facts relied on for the case that the words would have been understood to refer to him.

In Dyson Technology Ltd v Channel Four Television Corporation [2023] EWCA Civ 884, [2023] 4 WLR 67, Dingemans and Warby LJJ explained, at [34]-[35], that a claimant may be proved to be the person identified or referred to in a statement in two main ways:

As Nicklin J observed in Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 at [96]:

“Understanding the law relating to reference must start with the appreciation of the fundamental principle that the test is objective. The question is whether the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader (if necessary, attributing knowledge of particular extrinsic facts) would understand the words to refer to the claimant: Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239, 1243B, 1245B, per Lord Reid; 1261E-F per Lord Guest; and 1264A per Lord Donovan. In assessing this, the Court adopts the same approach as to the determination of meaning: 1245G per Lord Reid.”

Ordinarily, to establish reference innuendo, the claimant must identify one or more individuals who read the statement complained of and who knew special facts from which reasonable people would reasonably understand the statement to refer to the claimant. As the test is objective, it is not necessary for the purpose of establishing reference, to prove that the words were in fact understood by one or more identified individuals as referring to the claimant: Lachauxv Independent Print Ltd [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB); [2016] QB 402, Warby J, [15]; Economou v De Freitas [2016] EWHC 1853 (QB), [2017] EMLR 4, Warby J, [11]; Monir v Wood, Nicklin J, [103(i)].

In a case of widespread publication, it is open to a claimant to invite the court to infer that there must have been at least some readers who would have known the facts from which an ordinary reasonable reader would conclude that the defamatory publication referred to him.

In the Third Thread, the claimant is identified by name and photograph. It is a case of ordinary reference which, as I have indicated, is admitted.

The facts relied on to establish reference in respect of the First Thread are:

“(a)

The originating post in the thread, posted by Sufi Miah (‘the Sufi Miah Post’) to which the Defendant’s posts above replied was a link to an article in Bangla Mirror News with the headline, ‘ARTA’s award ceremony on 30^th September: Venue and £50,000 trophy shown’ (‘the Article’), and a photograph from the Article, showing the Arta Awards trophy and five men with the Claimant in the centre;

(b)

the Claimant and the Defendant were the developers of ChefOnline and jointly promoted ARTA;

(c)

The Claimant was the owner and sole director of ARTA, and the CEO of ChefOnline;

(d)

By reason of their knowledge of the facts and matters set out in subparagraphs (b) and (c) above, the Claimant was identified by a large but unquantifiable number of readers of the First Thread as the individual referred to in the words complained of in the First Thread.”

The defendant has admitted (a) and (c) but he has denied (b) and (d) and alleged that readers would have understood the First Thread to refer to Razak Ahmin (Shahid), who was one of the five men shown in the photograph. His denial of (b) is inconsistent with, and cannot stand in the face of the findings of fact made by HHJ Jarman KC. As regards his assertion that readers would have understood the thread as referring to Razak Ahmin (Shahid), the defendant relies in his witness statement dated 15 September 2020 on a response posted by Sufi Miah in the following terms:

“This message is on behalf of Razak Amin (Shahid)

This is a sad day!!! Because I have never stolen or deceived anyone in anyway.

If only people put money wgere their mouth us. They they will realise what is stolen and what is not.”

However, first, the only reason readers would have understood the first post referred to Mr Amin was that he appeared in the photograph, which reason applied equally to the claimant. Secondly, it was in response to Mr Miah’s post on behalf of Mr Amin that the defendant stated his post was “directed towards ARTA and ChefOnline” and made clear that what he had written applied to “the owner/director/ceo of ARTA or chefonline” (i.e. the claimant).

In respect of the Second Thread the claimant has pleaded, and the defendant has admitted, that shortly after posting the first post in the Second Thread, he edited it to add a screenshot of his first response to Sufi Miah’s originating post in the thread, thereby publishing the second post in the Second Thread, and including the photograph from the Article showing the Arta awards trophy and five men with the claimant in the centre. In addition, the claimant has pleaded – and the defendant has denied:

“(b)

The Claimant and the Defendant were the developers of ChefOnline and jointly promoted ARTA; and

(c)

By reason of their knowledge of the said facts and matters set out in sub-paragraph (b) above the Claimant was identified by a large but unquantifiable number of readers of the Second Thread as the individual referred to in the words complained of in the Second Thread.”

As I have said in respect of the First Thread, his denial of (b) cannot stand in the face of HHJ Jarman KC’s judgment.

There is no realistic prospect that the claimant would fail to establish reference at trial. In the First Thread, he was identified by his photograph at the centre of the group of five men, and by express reference to his role as owner and director of ARTA Ltd and CEO of ChefOnline. Those were attributes which would have been known to those reasonably acquainted with the claimant and would have led them to believe he was the person referred to. In the Second Thread, he was identified by the same photograph and by reference to his work with ChefOnline and ARTA Ltd, which would have been known to those reasonably acquainted with him, not least given the very small number of individuals involved. Moreover, the Third Thread was posted in close proximity in time, expressly revealing to the public at large the name of “the culprit” referred to in the earlier Threads.

A statement is defamatory at common law if it would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally and it would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would treat the claimant: Millett v Corbyn [2021] EMLR 19, [9] (Warby LJ). The agreed meaning of each of the Threads self-evidently meets this test. No basis for suggesting otherwise has ever been put forward.

Section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 provides that: “A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.” The onus is on the claimant to establish that the statement complained of has in fact caused or is likely to cause serious harm to his reputation. The court is entitled to draw inferences based on the admitted evidence. Mass media publications of very serious defamatory allegations are likely to render the need for evidence of serious harm unnecessary. But the issue of serious harm is not a “numbers game”: very serious harm to a reputation can be caused by the publication of a defamatory statement to one person. The difficulties of obtaining evidence from those in whose estimation the claimant’s reputation has been damaged are well-recognised.

The admitted facts are that the claimant is a businessman and entrepreneur based in London, with a focus upon the catering and restaurant trade. He is the sole owner and director of ARTA Awards Limited, the business of which is the financing (largely through sponsorship), marketing, and production of an awards competition and ceremony: the Asian Restaurant Takeaway Awards (ARTA). The claimant is the “principal driver behind ARTA and [his] identity and reputation is very much bound up with it”.

The First Thread was published on the Facebook account of Sufi Miah, a co-director of Le Chef Plc, a member of ARTA’s steering committee group and a broadcaster whose audience was essentially drawn from Bangladeshi community. It would have been visible to Mr Miah’s and the defendant’s Facebook friends. The Second and Third Threads were posted on the defendant’s Facebook account. The defendant has pleaded that he had 1,843 Facebook friends. The Threads would have been visible to them, and the privacy settings on the defendant’s account enabled access by the public at large to the Second and Third Threads. It is inherently likely, given their own involvement with Le Chef Plc and ARTA Ltd and Mr Miah’s broadcasting role, that a substantial number of Mr Miah’s and the defendant’s Facebook friends and contacts would have been connected to the Asian restaurant trade and/or the Bangladeshi community.

The meaning of each Thread was seriously defamatory, accusing the claimant, in essence, of dishonest and criminal business practices. The First Thread gave an express warning not to engage in business with the claimant, and such a warning is implicit in the Second and Third Threads. The fact that the accusations were made by the defendant, who readers would have understood to have direct knowledge of the facts, enhanced the credibility of the allegations.

The reactions by readers to the Threads included the following:

“A thief always be a thief”

“What happened to good old fashioned leg breaking? I would straight break their legs”

“Your absolutely right! Keep at it and expose them for who they really are as some people have no integrity or respect and need taught lesson. So name and shame the scum bags…”

“Wow Shame on those guys for stealing & leaving you without a cut.”

It is clear that these readers believed the allegations and it is inherently likely that a substantial number of other readers who did not post a comment also believed the allegations.

The claimant’s evidence is that the allegations “had a major impact on my relationships with business partners and investors. At one stage the future of ARTA was hanging in the balance.”

In my judgment, having regard to the gravity of the imputations which were targeted at discouraging people from doing business with the claimant; their credibility in view of the defendant’s perceived direct knowledge; their publication to thousands of readers, of whom many were in the British Bangladeshi community and/or connected to the Asian restaurant trade; and the comments showing that the allegations were believed, the serious harm threshold is clearly passed. There is no real prospect that the claimant would fail to establish serious harm at trial.

The defendant raised a defence of truth. In essence:

In the copyright claim, HHJ Jarman KC concluded that the defendant worked for Le Chef as an employee, not an independent contractor. The development of the ARTA logo was “a collaborative effort” between the defendant and the claimant, with input from Mr Noor, and the defendant’s contribution was made in the course of his employment by Le Chef. The main contribution to the development and production of the Trophy was from Special EFX Ltd, at the request and for the benefit of Le Chef, and paid for accordingly. HHJ Jarman KC concluded at [95]:

“In my judgment the ARTA logo and trophy were created for and paid for by Le Chef to be used by ARTA with the intention of promoting Le Chef’s interests. Mr Rahman’s contribution was made in the course of his employment with Le Chef, and the copyright vests in Le Chef. Le Chef by permitting ARTA to copy them, and creating the second logo, has not infringed any rights in relation to them so far as Mr Rahman is concerned.”

In the company claim, the court concluded that Mr Rahman signed the share transfer forms and duly consented to the transfer of his 20% share-holding (retaining a 5% share-holding). He did so for commercial reasons. The business was in financial difficulty. The original budget for development of £20,000 was “substantially inadequate”. The true budget was £100,000, so the claimant invested a further £80,000, and the transfer of shares by the defendant was effected to reflect the claimant’s very substantially increased investment.

The defence of truth is hopeless in the face of the binding findings of fact made by HHJ Jarman KC, and the dismissal of the copyright and company claims, upheld by the Court of Appeal.

Section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides:

“(1)

It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that the following conditions are met.

(2)

The first condition is that the statement complained of was a statement of opinion.

(3)

The second condition is that the statement complained of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion.

(4)

The third condition is that an honest person could have held the opinion on the basis of—

(a)

any fact which existed at the time the statement complained of was published;

(b)

anything asserted to be a fact in a privileged statement published before the statement complained of.”

In Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB); [2020] 4 WLR 25, Nicklin J summarised the approach to determining whether the statement complained of is a statement of opinion at [16]:

“(i)

The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact.

(ii)

Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc.

(iii)

The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion.

(iv)

Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, i.e. the statement is a bare comment.

(v)

Whether an allegation that someone has acted ‘dishonestly’ or ‘criminally’ is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact.”

This summary was quoted with approval by the Court of Appeal in Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567, [2021] EMLR 19. In Blake v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000 [2024] EMLR 2 Warby LJ observed at [22]-[23]:

“But the first condition for the availability of this defence is that the statement was one of opinion: see s.3(2) of the 2013 Act. A statement will only be defensible under s.3, therefore, if it is recognisable as a comment or opinion as distinct from an imputation of fact. If it is not, the defendant will need to prove that it is substantially true (s.2 of the 2013 Act) or that it was a reasonable publication on a matter of public interest (s.4 of the Act).

Opinion is synonymous with “comment”. It is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation or the like. As with meaning, the court deciding whether a statement is one of fact or opinion looks only at the words complained of and their immediate context, and the ultimate question for the court is the objective question of “how the words would strike the ordinary reasonable reader”.”

The defendant seeks to rely in the re-amended defence on the honest opinion defence. However, the only words which are asserted to be a statement of opinion are the words “the Claimant is a dishonest exploitative crook” in the agreed meaning of the Third Thread. As is apparent from s.3(2), and was confirmed in Millett v Corbyn at [17], the statutory test refers to the “statement complained of”, not the meaning of that statement or the imputation it conveys. The defendant has no pleaded case that any part of the First or Second Threads is opinion. Nor in respect of the Third Thread has he indicated any words in the posts which he asserts are statements of opinion. It is not possible to map the words “the Claimant is a dishonest exploitative crook” directly onto the words the defendant used in the Third Thread.

In any event, in my judgment, applying the approach identified above, it is clear that each of the three Threads consists of statements of fact not opinion. The defence has no realistic prospect of success because the first criterion is not met.

It would also fail to meet the third criterion. The facts which existed at the time the statement complained of was published included that:

Knowledge of those facts amounts to knowledge that the allegation that the claimant stole the defendant’s business (i.e. his shares) was untrue, and knowledge that the defendant was only one contributor, and that he received a salary for the work he undertook. An honest person with knowledge of these facts could not have held the opinion that the claimant was a “dishonest exploitative crook” (or, considering the words of the statements complained of, a “crooked man and a cheat”, “a crook and a thief” or a “cheat and a crook”), given that the only bases for those allegations put forward would have been known to be untrue.

For these reasons, in my judgment, the defendant would have no realistic prospect of establishing a defence of honest opinion at trial.

Section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides:

“(1)

It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that—

(a)

the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of public interest; and

(b)

the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest.

(2)

Subject to subsections (3) and (4), in determining whether the defendant has shown the matters mentioned in subsection (1), the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case.

(3)

If the statement complained of was, or formed part of, an accurate and impartial account of a dispute to which the claimant was a party, the court must in determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that publishing the statement was in the public interest disregard any omission of the defendant to take steps to verify the truth of the imputation conveyed by it.

(4)

In determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest, the court must make such allowance for editorial judgement as it considers appropriate.

(5)

For the avoidance of doubt, the defence under this section may be relied upon irrespective of whether the statement complained of is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion.”

There are three questions to be addressed:

The first question is an objective one for the Court. Matters of public interest are of “potentially wide compass save that they exclude purely personal or private matters”: Harcombe v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2024] EWHC 1523 (KB),[2025] 1 WLR 405, Nicklin J, [273]. The second question concerns the defendant’s actual state of mind at the time of publication.

The final question, which only arises if the first two questions have been answered affirmatively, is whether, judged objectively, the defendant’s honest belief that publication was in the public interest was reasonable. The public interest defence is not assessed simply by reference to the single meaning, but by reference to the statement complained of and the range of meanings that it bears: Harcombe, [281]. The focus must be on things the defendant said or knew or did, or failed to do, up to the time of publication: Harcombe [279]. The court should take a fact-sensitive and flexible approach, having regard to practical realities.

Efforts to verify are usually regarded “as an important factor in the assessment of the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that publication was in the public interest”: Harcombe, [283]. In Economou v de Freitas [2016] EWHC 1853 (QB), [2017] EMLR 4, in a statement approved by the Supreme Court in Serafin v Malkiewicz [2020] UKSC 23, [2020] 1 WLR 2455 at [67], Warby J observed at [241]:

“I would consider a belief to be reasonable for the purposes of section 4 only if it is one arrived at after conducting such inquiries and checks as it is reasonable to expect of the particular defendant in all the circumstances of the case.”

See, too, the endorsement of this statement in Riley v Murray [2022] EWCA Civ 1146; [2023] EMLR 3 at [84], a case concerning a Tweet made by an individual.

For the purposes of this summary disposal application, the claimant bases his submissions that there is no realistic prospect of this defence succeeding solely on the third criterion.

There is no evidence from the defendant to suggest that any enquiries or checks were carried out. The burden is not on the claimant, but he has provided evidence that at no time prior to the publications did the defendant approach him to seek to verify any information. The claimant states:

“if the Defendant had genuine concerns about the ownership of the intellectual property relating to the ARTA trophy, logo and concept he could have raised them with me. It would have been a straightforward matter, with the assistance of some legal input, to explain that either as an employee of Le Chef plc or as an independent contractor the IP rights did not vest in the Defendant. Ultimately this is what the court decided. Similar concerns regarding the shareholding position in Le Chef plc could have been raised privately.”

In my judgment, the defendant has no realistic prospect of establishing that, assuming he honestly believed publishing the statements complained of was in the public interest, that his belief was reasonable. Given the gravity of the allegations that he made against the claimant, it was wholly unreasonable to publish them without taking any steps to verify the underlying facts, or to ascertain the claimant’s answer as to where copyright vested or the circumstances in which the share transfer took place.

It follows that, in my judgment, there is no defence to the claim which has a realistic prospect of success. Nor do I consider that there is any other reason why the claim should be tried, not least given that there been a trial of the related claims which has resulted in binding findings of fact which effectively dispose of the primary defence, namely the defence of truth. In circumstances where he has, as yet, been unable to recover any of the costs owed to him by the defendant, the claimant is understandably doubtful that he will receive any damages the court may award. In these circumstances, he now wishes to bring these proceedings to an end as swiftly as possible, despite the statutory limitation on damages. In these circumstances, it is consistent with the overriding objective to grant the summary disposal that the claimant seeks.

The claimant seeks each of the forms of summary relief which the court has the power to grant.

I will grant a declaration that the statements complained of were false and defamatory of the claimant. There will be some cases where the court may be reluctant to make such a declaration, and may refrain from doing so, having heard no evidence on the matter. But in this case there has been a trial of the related claims. It follows from the findings made by the High Court and upheld on appeal that the statements are false, and as I have said they are plainly defamatory.

In Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525, Nicklin J considered the power to order the defendant to publish a summary of the judgment provided by s.12 of the Defamation Act 2013. He observed:

“239.

The purpose of this section is to provide a remedy that will assist the claimant in repairing the damage to his reputation and obtaining vindication. Orders under the section are not to be made as any sort of punishment of the defendant.

240.

Orders under s.12 are discretionary both as to whether to order the publication of a summary and (if the parties do not agree) in what terms and where. Exercising the power to require a defendant to publish a summary of the Court’s judgment is an interference with the defendant’s Article 10 right. As such, the interference must be justified. The interference may be capable of being justified in pursuit of the legitimate aim of ‘the protection of the reputation or rights of others’. Whether an order under this section can achieve this aim will be a matter of fact in each case. If the interference represented by a s.12 order is justified, then the Court would then consider whether (if the parties agree) the terms of the summary to be published is proportionate. The Court should only make an order that the defendant publish a summary of the Court’s judgment if there is a realistic prospect that one or other of these objectives will be realised and that the publication of a summary is necessary and proportionate to these objectives.”

In this case, the claimant seeks an order requiring the defendant to publish or cause to be published a suitable correction and apology, pursuant to s.9(2) of the Defamation Act 1996, rather than a summary of the judgment pursuant to s.12 of the 2013 Act. Nevertheless, similar principles apply. The purpose of such an order is not punitive. It is to assist the claimant in repairing the damage to his reputation and obtaining vindication. Exercising the power is an interference with the defendant’s article 10 right. On the face of it, an order to publish a suitable correction and apology may appear to be a greater interference than an order to publish a summary of the judgment. However, if the parties cannot reach agreement on the content of the correction or apology, the court’s power is limited to directing the publication of a summary of the judgment (s.9(2) of the 1996 Act). So, in reality, the interference is no greater than an order made pursuant to s.12 of the 2013 Act.

In my judgment, there is a realistic prospect that an apology and correction (or, if it comes to it, a summary of the judgment) would come to the attention of those who read the statements complained of, for example, if it were to be posted on the defendant’s (and/or Mr Miah’s) Facebook account. I consider that ordering the defendant to publish such a correction and apology is justified as a measure designed to protect and vindicate the claimant’s reputation, in circumstances where he has succeeded in his claim.

During the hearing I raised the possibility of the court facilitating the process by giving an indication of the short statement that the court would be likely to order in the event the parties cannot agree: see, in relation to a s.12 order, Schofield v Politicalite Ltd & or [2024] EWHC 543 (KB), [62]. However, it would be undesirable for the court to take an active role in formulating the terms of a correction and apology. The statutory provisions envisage the court will only have a role (in default of agreement) in formulating a summary of its own judgment.

I can address the level of damages briefly. This is self-evidently a serious matter affecting the claimant’s reputation, heightened by his standing as a business leader within the Asian restaurant sector and the wider Bangladeshi community. The seriousness with which readers will have taken the posts is amplified by the apparent credibility of the defence who might be expected to have good grounds for making the claims that he made given that he worked with the claimant. Having regard to the claimant’s evidence of damage, and bearing in mind that the defendant doubled-down on his allegations, resulting in more extensive publication of them, it is manifest that on any view if assessed on a regular basis the damages award would be well in excess of the statutory cap. Accordingly, I award damages in the sum of £10,000, that being the maximum permissible when awarding damages on summary disposal of a claim.

The final element of relief the claimant seeks is an injunction. He recognises that the case relates to statements published many years ago. On the evidence before me, the Second and Third Threads were published for several months but then removed by the defendant. There is no evidence as to whether the First Thread is still published. I assume that either it had already been removed or the defendant did not remove it only because it was not on his own account.

I am persuaded that despite the age of this matter, I should restrain the defendant from repeating the statements complained of. I bear in mind that he did say in his statement dated 15 September 2020 that he did not intend to publish any more words that the claimant has complained of, but this is not a case where he has given any undertaking not to do so. He has not, at this stage, apologised or corrected his statement. The interference with his right to freedom of speech as a result of imposing an injunction is minimal, given that it only prevents him from repeating matters that the court has determined are false, defamatory of the claimant, and which there is no public interest in repeating.

I grant summary relief in favour of the claimant in the form of a declaration of falsity, an order to publish a correction and apology, damages in the sum of £10,000 and an injunction.