Mahim Khan v Alkiviades David

This matter comes before the court on the claimant's contempt application against the defendant for the breach of two court orders. The case was previously listed for 9 October 2025 before me when I adjourned the application for today's date since although the defendant had confirmed receipt of the notice of hearing by email, there was no order in force permitting alternative service by email.

On 9 October 2025 I granted the claimant's application for substituted service to the three email addresses that had been provided by the defendant which he had previously requested be used to effect service on him. I also ordered that the steps already taken to bring the notice of the hearing to the defendant's attention by the alternative method of service at or to the three email addresses provided by him, was good service under Civil Procedure Rule 16.15(2). In other words, the order had retrospective effect to validate the earlier service by email and I was satisfied that that amounted to good service.

The claimant is seeking to enforce in England and Wales a judgment and an order made in proceedings brought by the claimant against the defendant and a number of his companies which was made in the United States of America under Californian law in a judgment debt dated 21 January 2020. I am aware that Mr David disputes the validity of that judgment but it nonetheless remains that the judgment is in force and has not been successfully appealed in that jurisdiction.

On 9 May 2025, the claimant filed a without notice application seeking a freezing order over Mr David's bank accounts and an order appointing receivers over his property at 4 Wilton Place, SW1 in London ("the Property"). On 15 May 2025 the claimant issued a claim form for the purpose of enforcing the debt owed by Mr David to her in this jurisdiction. On 26 June 2025 Calver J made a without notice freezing injunction in respect of the bank accounts ("the First Freezing Order"). This order required Mr David to disclose to Ms Khan's solicitors Howard Kennedy LLP including by way of affidavit, information and details relating to his finances. Specifically, clause 9 provided as follows:

The order required Mr David to provide this information in the form of an affidavit within 10 days of being served with the First Freezing Order to the best of his ability (clause 10). The First Freezing Order was served by hand at each of the defendant's three London addresses known to the claimant. Mr David was not personally present at any of those addresses at the time insofar as the claimant was aware but the orders were handed to staff, personnel or through the letterbox onto the doormat at each of those properties. Hard copies were also served by first class post.

In each case, service of the First Freezing Order was accompanied by a letter from Howard Kennedy date 27 June 2025 which explained the claim, the orders and the need for Mr David to comply with the terms of the First Freezing Order. The letter also referred to the penal notice and recommended that Mr David take independent legal advice. The penal notice was on the front page in bold and capital letters.

Mr David replied on 1 July 2025 and in his communications provided two email addresses, a UK mobile telephone number and included an address which was that of the Property, which was also one of the service addresses. The defendant or someone calling on his behalf from his mobile phone also left a voicemail message with Howard Kennedy.

At the “on notice return date” on 3 July 2025, (meaning the date on which the application was returning to court), this time with notice having been given to the defendant so that he too could participate and attend, unlike at the without notice hearing, Mr David did not personally appear. Solicitors attended at his request, but they were not formally instructed by him to represent him, so could therefore not accept service of any proceedings or documents.

Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the First Freezing Order was continued by Freedman J in the same terms as first granted in the same terms as previously set out above. Freedman J expressly set out and repeated paragraphs 9 and 10 of the First Freezing Order, in his order of 3 July 2025 (“the Second Freezing Order”) with the same paragraph numbers. The Second Freezing Order also made clear that there was no variation or discharge and that the terms of the First Freezing Order remained in full effect and force (paragraph 8).

A receivership order was also obtained for the Property, the details of which are not relevant for the purposes of the issues before me today. The receivership order also had a penal notice. There was service of the Second Freezing Order by the same method as the First Freezing Order and it was also served at the email addresses provided by the defendant. The claimant's position is that there has been no compliance by the defendant with paragraphs 9 and 10 of the First Freezing Order or the Second Freezing Order and seek a finding that Mr David is in contempt of court and for on a future occasion, a committal hearing to take place.

The contempt application was issued on 23 July 2025 with a return date of just 2 days later on 25 July 2025. This was heard by Cotter J and on that occasion, Mr David attended in Court 11 in person. The hearing lasted from 10.30 am to 3.30 pm and I have been provided with a transcript of the full hearing. Cotter J adjourned the contempt application hearing and made a number of orders (“the Cotter J Order”). Those relevant to this application are paragraphs 1, 2 and 11. Paragraph 1 provides that:

“1.

The contempt application shall be adjourned to a case management conference referred to at paragraph 11 below, provided that the respondent [Mr David] must:

(a)

Provide the information ordered at paragraph 9 of the Freezing Orders [defined as the First and Second Freezing Orders] to the applicant's solicitors [Howard Kennedy LLP] by no later than 4 pm on 28 July 2025; and

(b)

Swear and serve on the applicant's solicitors an affidavit setting out the information provided pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Freezing Orders to the best of his ability by no later than 4 pm on 1 August 2025."

Paragraph 2 then provides that:

Paragraph 11 states that the claim shall be reserved for case management by Cotter J and the case management conference to be listed on a date to be fixed with a time estimate of one day.

It is common ground that the defendant did not comply with strict the terms of the order on the dates required by paragraph 1 of the Cotter J Order and the defendant applied for the matter to be re-listed on an urgent basis in accordance with paragraph 2 of that order. It was given a return date of 9 October 2025 which takes us to the date when I first heard this application.

It is therefore evident from that chronology that I have set out, that there is no impropriety in Cotter J not hearing the contempt application and there is nothing wrong with the case management conference not having already taken place because as is made clear in those paragraphs 1, 2 and 11, the case management conference and Cotter J's case management and reservation of the matter to himself falls away in the light of the noncompliance by Mr David of paragraph 1(a) and 1(b) of the Cotter J Order.

Mr David states that he has provided the information in correspondence but no affidavit has been sworn and filed in these proceedings and no bank account details have been provided beyond a screenshot from a mobile phone of one Revolut bank account which had in it at that time £54,000.

The defendant resists the contempt application. He initially disputed valid service and in any event considers that he is not in breach as he has provided the information sought, but if he is in breach it is only in the most technical of ways because he has sought to be transparent and open at all times in his proceedings with the defendant. He has not raised a lack of ability to comply and he has not raised any unintentionality in non-compliance. He has raised a number of other points in correspondence. The first I have already dealt with: the alleged procedural impropriety of this application not being heard by Cotter J. For the reasons explained in the Cotter J Order, there is nothing improper about this application going ahead without a case management conference first having been heard, or the application being heard by a judge other than Cotter J. The case management conference was contingent on the defendant having complied with paragraphs 9 and 10 of the First and Second Freezing Orders which he did not do.

Secondly, he raises concerns about his disability, the Equality Act 2010 and the Equal Treatment Bench Book and draws attention to the fact that Cotter J accepted that he was disabled and that reasonable adjustments may need to be made. I have confirmed with Mr David this afternoon that he has understood and been able to follow proceedings and participate as fully as possible and I have complied with Civil Procedure Rule 3.1(a) in treating him as a vulnerable litigant out of an abundance of caution. If I could perhaps reassure Mr David that describing him as vulnerable is not meant in any sense in a patronising or disrespectful way but to make sure that he is provided with all procedural protection as a litigant in person with the disability that he has set out in some of the correspondence.

The third concern that Mr David has raised is the role of the claimant's solicitors and the fact that he says that they have been involved in litigation in a number of other cases against him and he considers them to be part of a wider conspiracy to undermine and belittle him since he has played the role of something of a whistleblower about malpractices in Hollywood. I have considered carefully his submissions but the issues before me are narrow and do not concern any wider allegations that Mr David might have. This case before me is very simply about whether or not Mr David knew about the First Freezing Order and the Second Freezing Order, could comply with them, whether he deliberately failed to comply with them and whether I can be sure that he is in contempt of the order. Whether or not there is a conspiracy by powerful people in Hollywood to discredit him is not relevant to the issues I have to decide.

A further matter has been raised of fabricated evidence against him in other of the cases against him. Those other cases are outside the scope of this application. I have looked with a very keen at all the evidence filed in relation to the application before me and there is nothing in any of that which would give any suggestion that any of it has been fabricated in the sense of made up or fraudulent and no evidence has been filed by Mr David in support of that allegation.

In recent correspondence, other matters have been raised by Mr David. Firstly, he refers to a role he has in Antigua and Barbuda with ambassadorial status but no evidence has been served that would support that assertion.

Mr David has emphasised the unfairness and the injustice to him that has resulted from the various judgments that have been made against him. are also outside the scope of the matters before me. But my role is not to act as an appellate court in those matters but to consider the judgment debt. If there has been any injustice in arriving at any of the judgments, the appeal procedure in those jurisdictions is the route to challenge them. It has been explained by Mr David in a recent email that he lives in an animal sanctuary which is responsible for rescuing some 200 animals that rely on him and the sanctuary itself relies on his philanthropy to continue and that the animal welfare will be jeopardised by his continued loss of funds. It was interesting to read of his laudable involvement but they are not relevant to the issues before me to determine.

There is a further strand of concern raised by Mr David which is the role of Cotter J and his High Court Judge's clerk, again which bear no relation to the issues for determination before me.

As I explained during the course of the hearing to Mr David I have to be sure to the criminal standard that the claimant has proved to me that he is in breach of paragraphs 9 and 10 of the First Freezing Order and the Second Freezing Order, that the failure is deliberate, and that he has the ability to perform the mandatory order. The evidence which I have had before me consisted of the extensive documentation and correspondence, affidavits from Ajay Fournillier filed on 23 July, 29 July and 29 September (he is a solicitor for the claimant), Bonizwa Dzere 2 July 2025 (a paralegal), the affidavit of Russell Sargent 2 July 2025 (process server) and the affidavit of Paul Cottee process server 23 July 2025 and 13 August 2025. The defendant was advised of his rights and that he was under no obligation to give any evidence and given the warning against self incrimination. He did not give evidence per se but I received all the information he gave in his submissions and I read the documents he had provided.

I find as a fact that the defendant was properly served with the contempt application just outside court 11 in the corridor in the Royal Courts of Justice on the day of the Cotter J hearing on 25 July 2025 at 15.21pm and that he was fully aware of the contents of both the First and Second Freezing Orders including paragraphs 9 and 10. The facts are that the bundle containing the contempt application was given to Mr David physically, just outside court 11, three doors down from the court we are in this afternoon. He briefly took hold of that file before putting it down. Mr David was told the file contained the contempt application which had been discussed in court only shortly before the documents had been handed to him and the contents of the freezing orders was already well known to him. Mr Fournillier, solicitor for the claimant thus served him personally. The fact that Mr David put the file down and chose not to take it with him as he left the court does not invalidate service. In the circumstances, it is clear that personal service of the contempt application on Mr David has been effected in this case. He received it; he was aware of it.

I am also satisfied from reading the transcript of the Cotter J hearing, that he understood it and that it was carefully explained to him, not only in the letters from Howard Kennedy but also by Cotter J during the course of that hearing. I am also satisfied to the criminal standard that there has been no formal compliance with the court order, no affidavit has been served, no bank details have been provided beyond the Revolut screenshot and none of Mr David’s assets have been explained.

Mr David told me today that he had tried to serve an affidavit at court, but having read the court file on CE file there is no evidence of this. Even if there had been an attempt it has not been successfully served and lodged and Howard Kennedy have not have a copy either. He has also said that many of the bank accounts referred to in the Freezing Orders were closed long before 1 January 2024 and it was only the Revolut account that remained open, but he has not provided an affidavit as required to say that. He had said that he would provide information to the court in the correct format on 25 July 2025 but he has failed to do so. Today during the course of this hearing, I gave Mr David an opportunity to ask for time in order to comply with the order and he did not take me up on that offer. He has therefore had very many opportunities to comply with the order about which he knows all about and not done so.

In terms of the Equality Act 2010 and the disability strand. I note that he has referred to having had a brain injury but no medical evidence has been served. Cotter J found that he has capacity. I also have been impressed with the defendant's ability to engage and fully understand the issues being discussed in court and to put his points across. At times he became agitated, but was also able to remain composed at other times. In accordance with the Equal Treatment Bench Book, the reasonable adjustments sought by him have been provided and Mr David has confirmed that no further accommodation was needed for him to effectively participate in these proceedings.

In conclusion therefore, the service outside court of the contempt application amounts to good personal service, see Gorbachev v Guriev [2019] EWHC 2684 (Comm) at paragraph 27 and Field v Del Vecchio [2022] EWHC 1118 (Ch) at paragraphs 14 and 15. The legal test in the Gorbachev case was cited and followed in the Field case which states:

I am satisfied that Mr David knew and understood the contents of both the First and Second Freezing Order and the requirements of paragraphs 9 and 10 in both orders. It is apparent from the correspondence and the transcript of the hearing of 25 July 2025 that he was able to represent himself and participate in the proceedings. I find that he was able to comply and chose not to do so. There has been a deliberate failure to comply for which no acceptable explanation has been provided.

I conclude that the matters that Mr David has tried to have raised today, whether deliberately or not, such as the Hollywood conspiracy against him and the other legal claims he faces, distract and obfuscate. He has had legal advice in the background for example Edwin Coe who attended at the return hearing before Freedman J. I will adjourn this matter for a committal hearing.