Graham Harry Moore v Sarah Joanne Pochin MP & Anor

INTRODUCTION

This is the Judgment of the Court to which both judges have contributed.

This judgment follows a trial of an election petition (the “Petition”) under the Representation of the People Act 1983 (the “Act”) which took place between 3 and 5 November 2025 at Chester Crown Court.

The petitioner Graham Harry Moore (the “Petitioner”) was a candidate for the English Constitutional Party (the “ECP”) in the parliamentary by-election for the Runcorn and Helsby constituency held on 1 May 2025 (the “By-Election”), and as such is entitled to bring the Petition under the Act.

The Runcorn and Helsby parliamentary constituency (the “Constituency”) is partly located within the administrative area of Halton Borough Council (the “Council”) and partly within the administrative areas of Cheshire West & Chester Council (“CW&CC”). In consequence, staff from both councils were involved in the By-Election, and counting staff were largely drawn from council employees, although it is important to appreciate that they are separately employed on the night on behalf of the Returning Officer and as such they are independent of the councils, and are not acting as council employees. Before such employment they have to confirm, amongst other matters, that they have not canvassed on behalf of any of the candidates in the By-Election.

There were 15 candidates who stood in the By-Election, a number typical for a by-election but rather larger than is common in a General Election. A consequence of the number of candidates standing in the By-Election was how the count was conducted, as is addressed in due course below. There was a verified turn out of 32,740 as established towards the start of the count which took place between 01.00hrs and approximately 05.45hrs on 2 May 2025 at the DBCL rugby league stadium within the Constituency (the “Count”).

Due to the widespread interest in the By-Election, the Count (including the recount) was contemporaneously filmed by an experienced media broadcaster, and many hours of such footage exists. Extracts of such video footage were played as part of the evidence called by the Petitioner and the Second Respondent (the “Video Evidence”). As will become apparent, the Video Evidence has been invaluable when considering the issues raised on the Petition, and the evidence adduced by the parties to the Petition. As has often been said “a picture is worth a thousand words”, and that is particularly so where, as in the present case, it includes what can actually be seen occurring at the various stages of the Count, and whether what can be seen is consistent or inconsistent with the evidence of particular witnesses.

The Petitioner received the lowest number of votes of any of the candidates, namely 50 votes. By his Election Petition dated 15 May 2025, the Petitioner challenges the result of the By-Election and seeks to have the By-Election declared void, and an independent recount of each ballot paper ordered.

The First Respondent, Sarah Joanne Pochin (“Ms Pochin”), was the successful candidate, receiving 12,625 votes, and as such is currently the Member of Parliament for Runcorn and Helsby. Ms Pochin is automatically a Respondent to the Petition by virtue of section 121(2) of the Act. Ms Pochin had a majority of 6 over her nearest rival, the Labour Party candidate (who does not seek to challenge the result).

The Second Respondent, Stephen Young (the “Returning Officer”), is the returning officer for the Constituency. The Returning Officer is also automatically a Respondent to the Petition by virtue of section 121(2) of the Act.

The Petitioner challenges the result of the By-Election on the following grounds, namely that:

In terms of the relief sought, which forms part of the Prayer for Relief at the end of the Petition, the Petitioner seeks a declaration that the By-Election result is void due to a fraudulent and/or erroneous count, and seeks a recount of each individual vote (i.e. a Full Recount) and “not just bundle recounts” (i.e. a Bundle Recount), to be conducted in a neutral area, county, or shire outside the jurisdiction of Halton Borough Council or Cheshire Constabulary, with a completely independent counting team appointed by Electoral Commission and official observers from independent bodies to ensure transparency and accuracy.

As a preliminary point, it is the case of the First and Second Respondents that the recount at the By-Election was a Full Recount (as it is said is supported, and indeed corroborated, by the evidence of Penny Housley and the Video Evidence). It follows that if such evidence is accepted, and unless the allegation is made out that there was a fraudulent count, there has already been a Full Recount, and the Petitioner’s claim for relief stands to be dismissed in such circumstances.

During the course of argument, the Petitioner confirmed (as was readily apparent in any event) that the alleged Counting Violation and the alleged Human Rights Violation was each parasitic upon the other challenges (including the Main Challenge) and, in consequence, if the other challenges failed, then the Counting Violation and Human Rights Violation challenge each fails.

Finally, we would also note at the outset that the Petitioner made various allegations as to what he (or others) had allegedly observed in terms of alleged irregularities and/or fraud in other by-elections. It is no part of our role, or function, to adjudicate upon such matters even were we in a position to do so (which we are not). This Election Petition relates to, and is limited to, this By-Election and the grounds of challenge as advanced in the Petition. In relation to that, it does not assist to consider what may or may not have happened, or may or may not have allegedly been observed, in any other by-election.

APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

The Petition is governed by the Act and the Parliamentary Election Rules contained in Schedule 1 thereto (the “Rules”). Those provisions prescribe the means by which a parliamentary election may be questioned and delimit the grounds on which a return may be avoided.

By section 120(1) of the Act no parliamentary election and no return at such an election shall be questioned except by a petition presented in accordance with the Act.

In the present case, the Petitioner originally sought to make the Royal Mail Group and the Chief Constable of Chester Constabulary (Mark Roberts) respondents to the Petition. The Divisional Court (Yip and Butcher JJ) declared that they were not proper respondents to the Petition and struck the Petition out against them with their names being removed from the proceedings (see Moore v Royal Mail Group & Others [2025] EWHC 2320 KB at [16] (hereafter the “Divisional Court Judgment”)).

For the reasons identified in the Divisional Court Judgment, the Divisional Court allowed the Petition to proceed as against Ms Pochin and the Returning Officer notwithstanding certain alleged deficiencies in the Petition and its service. Those reasons were affirmed in part by the Court of Appeal in its judgment ([2025] EWCA Civ 1378 at [85] (hereinafter the “Court of Appeal Judgment”)), and the Court of Appeal directed that the trial of the Petition against the First and Second Respondents should proceed to trial, as it has before us.

The scheme for parliamentary election petitions is an entirely statutory one. The High Court has no residual power or discretion to override the statutory scheme (see the Divisional Court Judgment at [11]).

Section 157(3) of the Act provides:

“The High Court has, subject to the provisions of this Act, the same powers, jurisdiction and authority with respect to an election petition and the proceedings on it as if the petition were an ordinary action within its jurisdiction.”

The general case management powers of the High Court (contained in the Civil Procedure Rules, hereinafter “CPR) include the power to make an order of its own initiative (CPR 3.3) and the power to strike out a statement of case (CPR 3.4). Witnesses are summoned and sworn as nearly as circumstances admit as in a trial in the High Court (see section 140(1)), and the Election Court may of its own volition examine any person required to attend or who is in court (see section 140(3)).

Section 23 of the Act provides:

“23.

Rules for parliamentary elections.

(1)

The proceedings at a parliamentary election shall be conducted in accordance with the parliamentary elections rules in Schedule 1 to this Act.

(2)

It is the returning officer’s general duty at a parliamentary election to do all such acts and things as may be necessary for effectually conducting the election in the manner provided by those parliamentary elections rules.

(3)

No parliamentary election shall be declared invalid by reason of any act or omission by the returning officer or any other person in breach of his official duty in connection with the election or otherwise of the parliamentary elections rules if it appears to the tribunal having cognizance of the question that—

(a)

the election was so conducted as to be substantially in accordance with the law as to elections; and

(b)

the act or omission did not affect its result.”

Accordingly, the test for invalidating an election is that set out in section 23(3), namely that no election shall be declared invalid “by reason of any act or omission of the returning officer or any other person in breach of his official duty … if it appears… that – (a) the election was so conducted as to be substantially in accordance with the law as to elections; and (b) the act or omission did not affect its result.”

The leading authority remains Morgan v Simpson [1975] QB 151. In that case the Court of Appeal made clear that the law as embodied in what is now section 23(3) requires that an election shall be declared invalid where it appears either that it was so conducted that there was substantial non-compliance with the law as to elections or that there was a breach of the rules or an irregularity which affected the result. In this regard, per Stephenson and Lawton LJJ, the word “and” between section 23(3)(a) and (b) need not be read disjunctively in order to give effect to the intention of Parliament (see at pp. 167E and 171 B-C), whilst Lord Denning MR considered that the section should be transformed into positive terms and “and” read as “or” to show when an election is to be declared invalid (see at p. 161C-E).

As to the conduct of the election itself, Lord Denning MR said as follows at p. 164 E:

“If the election was conducted so badly that it was not substantially in accordance with the law as to elections, the election is vitiated, irrespective of whether the result was affected or not.”

In his Skeleton Argument, the Returning Officer has raised the question of the standard of proof, and referred to cases which suggest that the criminal standard of proof may obtain on election petitions on the basis that many petitions will be based on allegations which, if proved, amount to a criminal offence. In this regard, by section 63 of the Act, if any person to whom the section applies is, without reasonable cause, guilty of any act or omission in breach of his official duty, he or she is to be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the summary scale. The section embraces any registration officer, returning officer, presiding officer, any deputy of any such person, and any other person whose duty it is to be responsible for the used ballot papers and other documents (including returns and declarations as to expenses).

Whilst the criminal standard would apply in relation to the proving of any such offence, that is not the role of an election court. We consider that the language of section 23, with its reference to “substantial compliance” suggests that a finding is to be made on balance of probabilities.

Further, whilst it is true that the real gravamen of the Petitioner’s complaint is that there was a fraudulent and/or erroneous vote count, it is well established that in civil cases even those alleging deceit or fraud, the civil standard still applies – see the citation of the leading authorities in JSC BM Bank v Kekhman [2018] EWHC 791 at [46]-[56], as approved by the Court of Appeal in Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Arkhangelsky[2020] 4 WLR 55 at [45]-[46].

In this regard, the burden and standard of proof in relation to allegations of fraud are well-established. The burden of proof is upon the claimant as in an ordinary civil claim. As to the standard of proof, the fact that fraud is alleged does not change the standard from being on the balance of probability – see In Re B (Children) [2009] 1 AC 11 at [13] per Lord Hoffmann.

In this regard Lord Nicholls stated as follows in In Re H (Minors) [1996] AC 563, 586E-G:

“The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability. Fraud is usually less likely than negligence… Built into the preponderance of probability standard is a generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the allegation.

Although the result is much the same, this does not mean that where a serious allegation is in issue the standard of proof required is higher. It means only that the inherent probability or improbability of an event is itself a matter to be taken into account when weighing the probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred. The more improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence that it did occur before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be established.”

In In Re B (Children) the House of Lords emphatically re-iterated that there is only one civil standard emphasising that any logical or necessary connection between the seriousness of an allegation and its inherent probability is to be rejected; inherent probabilities are simply something to be taken into account as a matter of commonsense in deciding where the truth lies (see Lord Hoffmann at [13] to [15]).

See also what Griffith Williams J stated at [10] of his judgment in Gale v Serious Organised Crime Agency, quoted by Lord Phillips in that case in the Supreme Court ([2011] UKSC 49):

“9.

The burden of proof is on the claimant and the standard of proof they must satisfy is the balance of probabilities. While the claimant alleged serious criminal conduct, the criminal standard of proof does not apply, although 'cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil tribunal that a person has been fraudulent or behaved in some other reprehensible manner. But the question is always whether the tribunal thinks it more probable than not' – see Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153 at para 55, per Lord Hoffmann.”

In applying the civil burden of proof on balance of probabilities, inherent probabilities can be weighed alongside or against specific evidence from a particular case. But care must be taken in working out what in a particular case is inherently probable or improbable. It is generally correct that, absent other information, the more serious the wrongdoing, the less likely it is that it was carried out, because most people are not serious wrongdoers. The standard of proof remains the same, but more cogent evidence is required to prove fraud than to prove negligence or innocence because the evidence has to outweigh the countervailing inherent improbability.

Thus as Andrew Smith J stated in Fiona Trust and Holding Corp v Privalov [2010] EWHC 3199 (Com) at [1438]:

“It is well established that "cogent evidence is required to justify a finding of fraud or other discreditable conduct": per Moore-Bick LJ in Jafari-Fini v Skillglass Ltd., [2007] EWCA Civ 261 at para.73. This principle reflects the court's conventional perception that it is generally not likely that people will engage in such conduct: "where a claimant seeks to prove a case of dishonesty, its inherent improbability means that, even on the civil burden of proof, the evidence needed to prove it must be all the stronger", per Rix LJ in Markel v Higgins, [2009] EWCA 790 at para 50. The question remains one of the balance of probability, although typically, as Ungoed- Thomas J put it in In re Dellow's Will Trusts, [1964] 1 WLR 415,455 (cited by Lord Nicholls in In re H, [1996] AC 563 at p.586H), "The more serious the allegation the more cogent the evidence required to overcome the unlikelihood of what is alleged and thus to prove it". Associated with the seriousness of the allegation is the seriousness of the consequences, or potential consequences, of the proof of the allegation because of the improbability that a person will risk such consequences: see R(N) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region), [2005] EWCA 1605 para 62, cited in Re Doherty, [2008] UKHL 33 para 27 per Lord Carswell.”

In the present case it does not ultimately matter whether proof for the purposes of section 23 is to be on balance of probabilities or to the criminal standard as we are sure, to the criminal standard, of the factual findings that we make in due course below.

WITNESSES

All the witnesses were sworn in the same manner as in an action tried in the High Court (as envisaged in section 140(1) of the Act). In view of the nature of the allegations advanced in the Petition, we indicated to the parties at the outset that we would find it of assistance if, in addition to verifying the statement of truth in their witness statement in relation to the evidence contained therein, each witness would give additional oral evidence in chief, before their cross-examination. All the parties agreed to such an approach, which was followed in relation to all the witnesses that were called.

The Petitioner gave evidence before us. In circumstances in which he was not legally represented, and had drafted the contents of his witness statement himself, the Court took the Petitioner through his witness statement, and the allegations in the Petition, to ensure that all such evidence was properly brought out, and the Petitioner then availed himself of the opportunity to give further evidence. After confirmation that the Petitioner had said all that he wished to say, he was then cross-examined by Mr Straker KC on behalf of the Second Respondent, and Mr Richardson on behalf of the First Respondent. Further cross-examination took place on the second day of the trial when the Petitioner was recalled to address the Video Evidence that he had adduced before the Court.

Just as we indicated to the Petitioner during the course of the trial that we were sure that his motives for the bringing of the Petition were the purest of motives to ensure a public airing, and determination, of the concerns he had in relation to the Count as part of a free election in a democratic society, so we are satisfied that the factual evidence that he gave before us was honestly believed by him.

The key factual issues, however, are whether he was or was not mistaken when he says that he personally saw what he estimated to be 116 votes for him consisting of two bundles of 50 and an estimate of 16 loose (i.e. the Bundling Issue) and whether he was or was not mistaken when he says that what he observed was a Bundle Recount and not a Full Recount. Such evidence has to be viewed in the context of the evidence as a whole including the evidence of Penny Housley on behalf of the Second Respondent, and the large volume of Video Evidence adduced during the course of the trial.

Ms Philips was one of the Petitioner’s counting agents at the Count, and she had made a short statement in relation to her involvement at the Count. In her statement she stated, amongst other matters as follows:

“… I observed a number of votes cast for the ECP well in excess of 50 votes, stated later. However, I noted a serious concern with the counting process. The middle tables, where vote bundles are stacked, were positioned out of sight of the count agents. Despite raising objections and concerns about this lack of visibility.

This counting technique and process created an environment conducive to potential fraud or at minimum an error. As counting agents, acting in an official capacity, we were unable to observe critical stages of the process”.

In circumstances in which the Petitioner was not legally represented the Court adopted the same approach of asking Ms Philips questions to elucidate her evidence in chief. In the course of that evidence in chief she stated that she saw a tray at the CS 8 station with the name of the Petitioner on it, and she expressed her belief that she saw two bundles paper clipped and others around or on top in the tray, so she thought that would be two bundles of 25 which made 50 but then she saw more “so none of that made sense to me”. Ms Philips was then cross-examined on behalf of the Respondents, and the Court then asked her further questions. Ms Philips confirmed to the Court that she did not at any stage complain to the Returning Officer or anyone else that what she was seeing was untoward.

As with the Petitioner, we are satisfied that the factual evidence Ms Philips gave was honestly believed by her, but the key factual issues are whether she was or was not mistaken as to what she believed she had seen in terms of votes cast for the Petitioner, and whether the concerns she expressed in her witness statement as to the counting process were in fact made out, in each case on the entirety of the evidence including the evidence of Penny Housley on behalf of the Second Respondent, and the large volume of Video Evidence adduced during the course of the trial.

Whilst no other factual witness were called to give evidence on behalf of the Petitioner, the Petitioner also served statements, in support of the Petition from Laurence Walker, Audrey Cain, Richard Alexander and Kay Alexander. Such evidence was limited to evidence that they had not received an ECP election leaflet through their letterbox from Royal Mail (i.e. in the context of the Royal Mail Issue). We bear such evidence in mind notwithstanding that it has not been tested in cross-examination. We address the Royal Mail Issue in due course below. The Petitioner also served a statement from a William Howarth which relates to alleged electoral malpractice in relation to the Kirkholt and Balderstone ward by-election (also on 1 May 2025). Whilst we have read that statement, it relates to a different by-election, and we did not derive any assistance from it.

The petitioner sought to call Nigel Jacklin, who describes himself as a Consultant Statistician, as an expert. Mr Straker KC, on behalf of the Second Respondent, whilst conceding that expert evidence is permissible on the hearing of an election petition, raised in his Skeleton Argument whether the evidence that was sought to be adduced in the present case was admissible, and was relevant to the issues that arise, questioning whether Mr Jacklin had the relevant expertise, as well as questioning the methodology he had adopted, whilst also pointing out that much of his report involved him commenting upon on factual matters, which are matters for determination by the Court, rather than for expert opinion evidence.

Mr Jacklin undertook a purported statistical analysis, and purported to address the assessment of the case for a recount and whether the result of 50 votes was deliberate malpractice. We note that Mr Jacklin does not assert any particular experience of, or expertise in, elections, and that much of his report strays into what are contested issues of fact which are for determination by the Court in relation to which expert opinion evidence is neither admissible nor relevant. Nevertheless, in circumstances where time was of a premium, and we considered that all the points made by the Respondents as to Mr Jacklin’s evidence and expertise could be addressed in closing, we decided to hear the evidence of Mr Jacklin, de bene esse, without making an initial ruling on its admissibility. Those acting for the Respondents did not demur from the adoption of such a course.

Unfortunately, and as became readily apparent during the course of Mr Jacklin’s evidence, there were significant problems with both the form and substance of his evidence. So far as the form was concerned, and leaving aside the fact that he strayed into expressing opinions on questions of fact which are for the Court, it became apparent that Mr Jacklin had written his report, and expressed his views, based solely upon the evidence of the Petitioner (which evidence was in issue and was not accepted by the Respondents, who had adduced evidence of their own contradicting that of the Petitioner).

Surprisingly, as Mr Jacklin candidly accepted in cross examination, he had not even received the witness statements served on behalf of the Respondents, he was unaware of their contents and (as a result) he had not taken them into account. It may well be that this was a consequence of the Petitioner being a litigant in person, with him not thinking to provide Mr Jacklin with the Respondents’ statements, nor inviting him to update his report based on them. In such circumstances the primary responsibility for a situation arising whereby Mr Jacklin had not considered the other (contradicting) evidence must rest with the Petitioner, though we would have expected any expert to ensure that he had been provided with all witness evidence and was aware of, and therefore in a position to address the consequences of, any differences in the factual evidence served by the respective parties, when expressing his professional opinion.

The consequence was that Mr Jacklin’s evidence (to the extent that it was expert opinion evidence at all) was seriously flawed, and fundamentally undermined, given that his report and expressions of opinion therein was each based solely upon the evidence of the Petitioner (which he assumed to be correct) when there were important issues of fact in play including, in particular, as to how votes were counted (and whether or not in bundles of 50) and whether there was, or was not, a Full Recount. Such matters cut across the matters on which Mr Jacklin saw fit to opine, and he had neither had the chance to consider the contrary factual evidence that had been served, nor the implications of the same, when expressing the views he did. Had he done so we do not consider that he could have expressed the conclusions he did, and in the terms that he did.

A further significant, and troubling, issue with Mr Jacklin’s evidence concerned his independence. It emerged in the course of his evidence that in March or April 2025 Mr Jacklin had written two articles on social media critical of Reform UK. Mr Jacklin said:

“I wrote an article in probably March or April, as I believed that the Reform party had expelled the branch chair and said that he had stepped down without agreeing that wording with him. When I did that, at the time I had mistakenly decided to join Reform. … I had been selected to be a candidate and Reform barred me from standing as a candidate, so I wrote a second article.”

Mr Straker KC put to Mr Jacklin that the articles were not “at the very lowest, flattering of the Reform Party” to which he replied that they were a true account of the actions of the party with respect to the chair of the Bexhill and Battle branch who had been summarily dismissed after something said on the BBC programme, Question Time. He acknowledged that when he spoke to the Petitioner in May 2025, and provided his report, he was conscious of the fact that the successful candidate in the Runcorn and Helsby by-election had been the Reform candidate.

We consider that Mr Jacklin’s history with the Reform UK party gave him what was described during the trial as “skin in the game” and compromised his perceived independence as an expert. At the very least, and in accordance with his duty to the Court, Mr Jacklin should have disclosed this history in his report, and not left it to emerge for the first time during, and as a result of, cross-examination.

In relation to the substance of his evidence, Mr Jacklin calculated that the Petitioner’s share of the vote was in the order of 464 votes rather than 50. He found this figure by taking, as a starting point, the Petitioner’s evidence that he saw 116 ballots in his favour (two piles of 50 and 16 loose votes) on the basis that he only observed half the tellers for half the time. Quite apart from our being unconvinced that such extrapolation has any basis in fact (or statistical justification), it is predicated upon an acceptance that the Petitioner saw 116 ballots in his favour (2 bundles of 50 and approximately 16 loose) in circumstances where such evidence was contested, and the evidence on behalf of the Respondents was that the votes were not bundled in clips of 50 (but rather clips of 10 consolidated into clips of 100), and the Petitioner only received an overall total of 50 votes. In his evidence, Mr Jacklin acknowledged and accepted that his views rested significantly upon the fact that the Petitioner was recorded as securing 50 votes and that this was also the number of ballots that he understood were in each batch of collated votes (which was contradicted in the evidence of Ms Housley).

Yet further, and as addressed below, the evidence of Ms Housley was that at any one of the ten trestle tables around the perimeter of the counting area where votes were counted, the Petitioner only received between zero and 7 votes into his tray at a particular trestle table, and that at no time were the contents of the trays physically consolidated (so there were never more than 7 physical votes in favour of the Petitioner at any one place), evidence which, if accepted, fundamentally undermined both the Petitioner’s evidence, and Mr Jacklin’s methodology and conclusions based on the same.

Furthermore, we are unconvinced by the reasoning adopted by Mr Jacklin as to his statistical evidence when he states in his report at paragraphs 7.17 to 7.19 as follows:

“7.17

If we merely consider the most recent election and say that on the basis of previous elections we might expect the claimant to get between 50 and somewhere over 1,050 votes then the chances of getting 50 votes (the same as 2016) are around 1 in 1,000. This is very low but not impossible.

7.18

If we consider the two by-elections (where the Party results may have attracted more attention than in the general election) we can calculate the chances of the candidate getting 50 votes on both occasions on the same basis each time (1 in 1,000). The chances of this happening on both occasions are 1 in 1000 multiplied by 1 in 1,000 i.e. 1 in a million. This is extremely low. Even if we reduced the probability to 1 in 100 this would still be very low (1 in 10,000).

7.19

The calculation in 7.17 make the pattern observed very unlikely but still possible. The calculation in 7.18 makes the observed pattern extremely unlikely. Given my conclusion under point 7.7 my view is that these probabilities support the claimant’s case for a re-examination and recount of the ballot papers.

Specifically this would require checking all batches to make sure they only contain votes for the relevant Party.”

A factor which Mr Jacklin did not mention, but which we consider to be self-evidently relevant, is that when the Petitioner stood in the General Election, he was one of only five candidates, whilst in the by-elections there were 14 and 15 candidates respectively. Given the much smaller body of candidates in the general election, the distribution of votes to candidates other than those representing the main parties could be expected to be greater. We therefore consider it to be inappropriate to extrapolate from the number of votes secured by the Petitioner when he stood for election in Chorley in the General Election to the number of votes he could be expected to receive when standing in this By-Election.

The statistical calculations made by Mr Jacklin in paragraphs 7.18 and 7.19 are, we are satisfied, without foundation. In any event, and as Mr Jacklin acknowledges, a Full Recount would establish the actual position (and that is, of course, what the Respondents say did happen, as addressed below).

In all of the above circumstances, we were unable to give any weight to the opinions expressed by Mr Jacklin, and we do not consider that the Petitioner established any expert basis to support the assertion that it was statistically improbable that the Petitioner would receive exactly 50 votes in two separate elections. We would only add, in any event, that we heard evidence which enables us to be make findings, of which we are sure, as to the number of votes actually received by the Petitioner, as addressed in due course below. In such circumstances, evidence as to statistical probabilities, even had it been established (contrary to our findings), is simply not in point.

Penny Housley is the Head of Democratic Services and the Deputy Returning Officer at Cheshire West and Cheshire Council (CW&CC), a role she had held for ten years, having held multiple election roles since 1999. In her current role, and prior to the By-Election, she had previously acted as a Deputy Returning Officer for 3 General Elections (2017, 2018 and 2024), a parliamentary by-election (City of Chester 2022), the EU Referendum (2016) and numerous other elections. It was clear to us that she has very considerable experience of the proper conduct of by-elections and the conducting of the count in relation to such by-elections.

She was appointed as Deputy Returning Officer in relation to the By-Election to assist the Returning Officer at Halton Borough Council. In that role she was present at the Count, and witnessed the counting of the votes, and the recount. As such she was able to give first-hand evidence in relation to the Count and the issues raised in the Main Challenge. In addition to her own witness statement she was also able to confirm the truth of the contents of the witness statement of Ellen Meachen, from her own first-hand knowledge of the matters stated therein. Ms Meachen was the Deputy Elections Manager at Halton Borough Council in relation to the By-Election. In her statement she addresses the By-Election itself, and the Count on the night. She was unable to give oral evidence before us due to prior commitments which were in place before the current trial dates were fixed.

We found Ms Housley to be an impressive, and transparently honest, witness whose evidence we have no hesitation in accepting. This would have been so even without the Video Evidence as it was clear to us that she has a comprehensive knowledge and recollection of the conduct of the Count and the factual matters that are relevant to the Main Challenge. However, as will appear, her evidence on all the key issues was further corroborated by the Video Evidence that we have seen. We address the substance of her evidence, and its impact upon the Petitioner’s challenge, in due course below.

DISCUSSION: WAS THE ELECTION SO CONDUCTED AS TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW AS TO ELECTIONS IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THERE WAS NO ACT OR OMISSION ON THE PART OF THE RETURNING OFFICER THAT AFFECTED THE RESULT?

It will be recalled that section 23(3) of the Act provides that:

“(3)

No parliamentary election shall be declared invalid by reason of any act or omission by the returning officer or any other person in breach of his official duty in connection with the election or otherwise of the parliamentary elections rules if it appears to the tribunal having cognizance of the question that—

(a)

the election was so conducted as to be substantially in accordance with the law as to elections; and

(b)

the act or omission did not affect its result.”

In considering whether there was any such act or omission and if so whether the election was so conducted as to be substantially in accordance with the law as to elections and whether the act or omission did not affect its result it is convenient to divide this discussion into two time periods, first the conduct of the election before and immediately up to the arrival of the ballot boxes at the Count and, secondly in relation to the Count itself (and the Main Challenge).

There are numerous stages of proceedings in a parliamentary election and they are to be conducted in accordance with the Rules. The conduct of the Election prior to the Count is addressed in the statement of Ellen Meachin as verified in the statement and evidence of Penny Housley. The stages include publication of the notice of election for the by-election (which took place on 28 March 2025), an online briefing for prospective candidates and agents (which took place the previous day), the nomination of candidates (by 4pm on 2 April 2025), the preparation and publication of a statement of the people who stood nominated arranged alphabetically in order of their surnames (on 2 April 2025), the form of the ballot paper (which was duly met), publication of notice of the poll (also on 2 April 2025), the issue of postal ballot forms and postal ballot statements (the appropriate procedures were followed), the provision of sufficient polling stations and allocation of voters thereto (met with 55 polling stations) with associated requirements for the polling stations and their equipment and staffing (which were also met), and the appointing of polling and counting agents for each candidate (which was undertaken by the specified deadline and in accordance with the Rules).

We do not need to address any of the above matters, or other aspects of the By-Election before the polling day, in any further detail in circumstances in which the Petitioner confirmed, during the course of oral argument, that he did not suggest that there had been any breach of the Rules themselves prior to the Count. Based on the evidence of Penny Housley verifying the contents of the statement of Ellen Meachin (of which she confirmed she had personal knowledge), we are satisfied that the requirements of the Rules were met at all stages prior to polling day. For the same reasons we are also satisfied that, throughout the polling day, the requirements of the Rules were met at all polling stations.

For completeness, we address the Royal Mail Issue and Cheshire Constabulary Issue at this point as, chronologically, they pre-date the Count.

It is said that Royal Mail interfered in the By-Election by its failure to deliver Election Communication Leaflets of the ECP (the Royal Mail Issue).

Following the Petition being struck out against Royal Mail, this ground of challenge did not feature prominently at trial, and was not developed orally. We can deal with it in short order as we are satisfied that it is misconceived, and does not give rise to any valid ground of challenge to the By-Election.

Section 91(1) of the Act provides that:

“A candidate at a parliamentary election is, subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as the universal postal service provider concerned may specify, entitled to send free of any charge for postage which would otherwise be made by a universal postal service provider either –

(a)

one unaddressed postal communication, containing matter relating to the election only and not exceeding 60 grammes in weight, to each place in the constituency which, in accordance with those terms and conditions, constitutes a delivery point for the purposes of [section 91(1)] or

(b)

one such postal communication addressed to each elector.”

As is clear from the language of the statute, the entitlement is only an entitlement to send (free of postage), it is not an entitlement to delivery. The statute does not give, nor could it sensibly give, an entitlement to delivery whether at each property, to each elector or at all. Furthermore, the Act provides no electoral remedy in the event of non-delivery. It is not difficult to see why this is so given the myriad of reasons why a leaflet or leaflets might not be delivered, ranging from logistical difficulties to leaflets being lost in the post to events preventing delivery including at, but not limited to, the delivery address.

In any event, and more fundamentally, the Returning Officer has no control over such matters, and in such circumstances the Returning Officer cannot, and does not, have any responsibility for the same. The same is not provided for in the Act or the Rules, and it is difficult to see how they could have responsibility given their lack of involvement in, or control over, such process.

We are satisfied that the Royal Mail Issue does not give rise to any valid ground of challenge to the Election, and we so find.

So far as the Cheshire Constabulary Issue is concerned, it is said that Cheshire Constabulary harassed the ECP campaign and failed to investigate election interference (specifically the removal of an ECP Wikipedia page during the election period).

As with the Royal Mail Issue, and following the Petition being struck out against Cheshire Constabulary, this ground of challenge did not feature prominently at trial, and was not developed orally. We are satisfied that it does not give rise to any valid ground of challenge to the Election.

Once again the statute does not provide for any responsibility for the Returning Officer in relation to the acts or omissions of Cheshire Constabulary, and it is difficult to see how the Returning Officer could have any responsibility for the same given the lack of any control over the actions of Cheshire Constabulary.

Furthermore we are satisfied that the acts or omissions of police officers fall outside the remit of the Election Court, whose jurisdiction is limited to the conduct of the Election itself. No authority has been identified to support the assertion that any alleged police inaction could render an election void in any event. We would only add that had that not been so, we consider that there would, in any event, have been insurmountable difficulties in terms of causation.

We are satisfied that the Cheshire Constabulary Issue does not give rise to any valid ground of challenge to the By-Election, and we so find.

In the light of the evidence we have heard, and our findings above, we are satisfied that in the period prior to the Count there was no act or omission by the Returning Officer or any other person in breach of his official duty in connection with the election or otherwise of the Rules, and that the Election was so conducted as to be substantially in accordance with the law as to elections. As there was no act or omission there also can have been no act or omission that affected the result.