Director of Public Prosecutions v Joseph James O’Connor & Ors

By a claim form sealed on 4 April 2024, the Claimant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, seeks a civil recovery order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (“POCA”), s.243(1). The three Defendants are Joseph O’Connor (“D1”), Keir Holme (“D2”) and Kyle Lomax (“D2”).

The claim relates to cryptocurrency held in the following accounts:

The contents of these accounts is together referred to for the purposes of this claim as “the Property”. Its value was estimated in April 2024 at £3,085,039.92. As at the date of the final hearing of the claim before me, on 11 November 2025, its value was estimated at £4,135,949.11. The Claimant’s case is that the Property has been obtained through unlawful conduct.

At the end of the hearing on 9 June 2025 I indicated that I would make the order sought by the Claimant, with reasons to follow.

It became necessary to delay circulation of the draft judgment giving those reasons and conduct a further hearing for the reasons explained at [86]-[90] below. This took place on 11 November 2025.

At the end of that hearing I repeated that I would make the order sought by the Claimant. By this point the terms of the order had been agreed between the Claimant and the First Defendant, after considerable constructive liaison between those parties. I was also greatly assisted by the input of both Mr Pons and Mr Lennon KC. These are my reasons for making the order.

The Claimant’s claim was supported by three witness statements from David Chave, a Senior Financial Investigator, dated 5 April 2023, 3 April 2024 and 13 March 2025, in particular the second of these statements (“Chave 2”), with its detailed exhibits, DC/1 and DC/2.

Procedural issues from the Claimant’s perspective were addressed in four witness statements from Shahzary Mustafa, a Specialist Crown Prosecutor with the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”), dated respectively 4 April 2024, 26 November 2024, 28 May 2025 and 13 October 2025.

The First Defendant relied on witness statements from himself and his mother, Sandra O’Connor, dated 30 June 2025; and a witness statement from Roger Burlingame, solicitor, dated 28 August 2025.

D1 was born on 2June 1999. On 9 May 2023, having been extradited from Spain to the United States (“the US”), D1 pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit computer intrusions, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering in proceedings in the Southern District of New York.

The background to the offences was the hacking of the computer systems of a Manhattan based cryptocurrency provider, between March 2019 and May 2019, and thereafter the theft of $784,000 in cryptocurrency. This was a sophisticated cyber-intrusion, which occurred by the offenders gaining control of the mobile phones of executives of the cryptocurrency provider and using that control to access the computer systems of the cryptocurrency provider. They then stole cryptocurrency held by the company on behalf of at least two of its clients. The cryptocurrency was quickly moved through dozens of transactions before being exchanged, in part, for Bitcoin. Ultimately a portion of it was deposited in a cryptocurrency exchange account controlled by D1.

D1 also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit computer intrusion, two counts of committing computer intrusions, making extortive communications, two counts of stalking, and making threatening communications in separate proceedings brought in the Northern District of California.

The background to these offences was the hacking of social media accounts of high-profile individuals and then the control of these accounts to defraud members of the public into paying cryptocurrency. Blockchain analysis of the hacking revealed that between 15 and 16 July 2020, 426 transfers were made into the Bitcoin wallet set up for the funds. A total of over 12.86 BTC was obtained.

On 9 May 2023 D1 consented to a forfeiture order in the US proceedings in the sum of $794,012.64, representing the amount that he had obtained personally from committing the offence of conspiracy to commit money laundering. He admitted that the proceeds of the US offences obtained by him personally could not be located by any enforcement authority exercising due diligence.

On 25 August 2023, a restitution order was made against D1 by the Honourable Judge Jed Rakoff, a judge of the Southern District of New York. This ordered D1 to pay $2,187,716.21 to the victims of the offences.

D1 was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. He finished serving that sentence earlier this year at the Federal Correctional Institution facility in Allenwood, Pennsylvania.

On 13 April 2025 D1 was removed from the US to the United Kingdom (“the UK”), via a flight into London Heathrow Airport. I was informed that he is now living back in Spain.

D2 was born on 8 January 1997 and resides on the Isle of Wight in Hampshire. D3 was born on 28 April 1998 and resides in Nottingham.

The Holme Coinbase account was registered to D2 on 14 August 2020. He provided what is understood to be his home address in the Isle of Wight. He provided an email of johnbennet55@protonmail.com.

The Holme Binance account was registered to D2 on 29 August 2020 with a different email address, namely keirbinance1@protonmail.com.

In his witness statement dated 25 November 2022 D2 stated that he met D1 online while playing the ‘Call of Duty’ game and agreed to set up the two accounts for D1.

D2 said he set up the Coinbase account using his own details but using an email address which D1 had provided to him. He did so to allow D1 to trade in cryptocurrency, on the basis that he would receive a share of any profit. Shortly after he set up the Coinbase account he saw the funds arrive, which D1 said he had sent. When he tried to send funds from this account on the instructions of the D1, he was unable to, and he was told by D1 that the account had been frozen.

D2 said he also set up the Binance account at the instigation of the D1. D2 said that this time he provided a different email address, and phone number, both of which were under the control of the D1. Once the account was set up D2 logged in and saw the funds arrive; he also logged in to provide a “selfie” photo but thereafter had no involvement with the account.

The Lomax Binance account was registered to D3 on 1 April 2020. In his witness statement dated 29 December 2022 D2 said that he also met D1 online whilst playing Call of Duty. He said he agreed to open the Binance Account for D1 in exchange for £30. D3 registered the account using the email address johnbennett66@protonmail.com. Once the account was set up D3 logged in on one occasion to upload his proof of identification and a scan of his face, but did not access the account again. He played no part in the movement of cryptocurrency into the account. The only other person with access to the account was the D1. He was aware of D2 and another male called Lamar from Leicester who may have agreed to open a cryptocurrency account for the D1.

Accordingly, D2 and D3 have both admitted opening cryptocurrency accounts on behalf of D1 but having no direct involvement in the transfer of funds into or out of the accounts. Both D2 and D3 have signed documents disclaiming any interest in the funds held in the accounts.

This was explained in detail in Chave 2. In summary, using crypto-tracking software, Hampshire Constabulary have been able to track the funding of the three accounts, albeit not to the initial source of the funding.

The tracing exercise has identified the use of additional methods to obscure and anonymise the source of the cryptocurrency, namely (i) crypto-mixing services; and (ii) anonymous cryptocurrency exchanges. A crypto-mixing service mixes different strands of cryptocurrency with a view to making the source of each separate strand harder to identify. An anonymous cryptocurrency exchange is one which does not require the user to identify themselves.

The Lomax Binance Account holds 143273.57126 BUSD which can be traced back to three sets of transactions from crypto-mixers on 3 March 2020, involving 23.357164 BTC, 21.408734 BTC and 17.17257653 BTC respectively; (ii) two anonymous cryptocurrency exchanges (MorphToken and ChangeNow) which were the source of transactions on 23 July 2020 in the sum of 43.9929985 BTC and 17.13210981 respectively; and (iii) a Binance account held in the name of Daniil Vohrin and in particular three separate transfers on 3 March 2020 of 20.04371697 BTC, 25.12169772 BTC and 55.09052244 BTC. The source of this was over 100,000 Bitcoin Cash which had arrived in this account, in two separate transactions, on 2 March 2020.

The Holme Binance Account holds 42.378 BTC which can be traced back to Binance accounts held in the name of two individuals, Cameron McCreath and Kristian Federovic. The Cameron McCreath transactions involved four deposits totalling 2444.116825 Bitcoin Cash being received into his Binance account on 23 and 24 February 2020. The value of this Bitcoin Cash, at the time, was approximately $864,702.34 USD. The Kristian Federovic transactions involved nine deposits totalling 5104.49200759 Bitcoin Cash being received into his Binance account between 23 and 25 February 2020. The value of this Bitcoin Cash, at the time, was approximately $1,805,914.57 USD. The cryptocurrency that was held in these two accounts was mixed and together made its way via a number of other cryptocurrency addresses to the Holme Binance Account.

The Holme Binance Account holds 42.378 BTC which has been traced back to a transaction on 16 August 2020, in the sum of 109,068.88851 USDC which emanated from the Lomax Binance Account. Thereafter it was partly traded for Ethereum before the account was frozen. Accordingly, it has a similar source to the Lomax Binance account.

In his witness statement dated 26 January 2023 Cameron McCreath has explained that he also met D1 through the Call of Duty game and was asked by him to open a Binance account at the beginning of 2020. D1 provided the login details and all Mr McCreath did was upload his identity documents. After that, he had no control over how the account was used and no knowledge of the source of the cryptocurrency received into it.

Mr Vohrin and Mr Federovic are not registered to vote in the UK. They do not appear on the Police National Computer or Database. However, there is evidence that they both appear to use proton mail email addresses, which is common to the D2 and D3 accounts.

The Claimant has traced the source of the cryptocurrency to (i) deposits received into Cameron McCreath Binance account on 23 and 24 February 2020; (ii) three transfers from a crypto-mixer on 3 March 2020; (iii) transactions on 3 March 2020 from Mr Vohrin’s Binance account; (iv) nine deposits received into Mr Federovic’s Binance account between 23 and 25 February 2020; and (v) two transfers from anonymous cryptocurrency exchanges on 23 and 24 July 2020.

The following provisions of POCA are relevant to this claim.

Under s.243(1) proceedings for a recovery order may be taken in the High Court by an “enforcement authority” against “any person who the authority thinks holds recoverable property”. The Claimant is such an enforcement authority: POCA, s.316(1).

By s.266(1), if the court is satisfied that any property is recoverable, the court must make a recovery order. There are certain exceptions to the court’s powers in ss.226(3) and (4) but none of these provisions are applicable.

A recovery order is an order which vests recoverable property in the trustee for civil recovery: s.266(2).

Under s.316(4) “property” is “all property wherever situated and includes (a) money, (b) all forms of property, real or personal, heritable or moveable, (c) things in action and other intangible or incorporeal property”. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Briedis [2021] EWHC 3155 (Admin) at [10], Fordham J held that cryptocurrency falls within s.316 and in particular, s.316(4)(c).

POCA, s.304 defines “recoverable property” as “property obtained through unlawful conduct”.

Under s.241, “[c]onduct occurring in any part of the [UK] is unlawful conduct if it is unlawful under the criminal law of that part”. It includes conduct which occurs abroad and is unlawful under the criminal law of the country where it occurred, if that conduct would also be unlawful in the UK, had it occurred in England: s.241(2).

It is not necessary for a claimant to show that the conduct was of a particular kind if it is shown that the property was obtained through conduct of one of a number of kinds, each of which would have been unlawful conduct: 242(2)(b).

The courts have adopted a “fairly liberal” approach to determining how matters should be proved in civil recovery proceedings: R (Serious Organised Crime Agency) v Wang [2011] EWHC 4100 (Admin) at [22], perSilber J.

An unexplained lifestyle can be relevant as can an explanation that is offered but rejected as untruthful: Director of the Assets Recovery Agency v Olupitan [2007] EWHC 162 (QB) at [23], per Langley J.

Where from all the facts an irresistible inference can be drawn (on the balance of probabilities) that the source of funds was criminal, then that is sufficient to establish money laundering, even if no type of crime can be identified: SOCA v Gale [2009] EWHC 1015 (QB) at [17], per Griffith Williams J.

In an appropriate case, an inference for proving unspecified money laundering when such was being used as the unlawful conduct in s.241 POCA can properly be drawn from a failure to provide an explanation of apparently suspicious dealings: see, for example, SOCA v Namli [2013] EWHC 1200 (QB) at [49], per Males J (as he then was).

In Claimant v Surin [2025] EWHC 10 (KB) at [126], Mould J determined that on the facts of that case, the defendant’s prolonged inaction in responding to a freezing order and in providing evidence in response to the claim supported the inference that the property was recoverable.

On 5 April 2023 Lang J made a property freezing order in respect of the Property.

On 4 April 2024 the claim form was sealed.

Under CPR 8.5(2), at the time of serving the claim form the Claimant must also serve the evidence relied upon.

The Claimant relied on Certificates of Service indicating that service had been effected in respect of all three Defendants. It was said that the D1 had been served personally with the claim form by the US Marshall Service at the Federal Correctional Institution facility in Allenwood, Pennsylvania, such that the deemed date of service was 14 August 2024 for D1. D1 later contested that he had been served as alleged, as I explain further at [87] below.

D2 and D3 had been served by first class post on 10 June 2024.

Under CPR 8.3, aDefendant to a Part 8 claim must (a) file an Acknowledgment of Service (“A of S”) in the relevant practice form not more than 14 days after service of the claim form; and (b) serve the A of S on the Claimant and any other party.

None of the Defendants served an A of S within the 14 day period. Very belatedly, on 11 December 2024, D2 emailed an A of S to the court. By this document, D2 indicated that he did not intend to contest the claim.

On 18 March 2025 a CMC took place before Master Dagnall. None of the Defendants attended.

Under CPR 8.4(2), if a Defendant does not file an A of S within the necessary timescale, they may attend the hearing of the claim but may not take part in the hearing unless the court gives permission. Master Dagnall’s order made after the CMC reflected this. He also directed that the Defendants could not file any evidence without the permission of the court.

None of the Defendants applied to file any evidence pursuant to the Master’s order.

After the CMC, the hearing of the claim was listed for 9 June 2025.

There were difficulties in serving D1 with the documents other than the claim form, as I explain further at [69]-[75] below.

D2 and D3 agreed to accept service of further documents by email. Accordingly, they were served with the bundle for the 9 June 2025 hearing (“the disposal hearing bundle”) on 24 March 2025 and the supplementary bundle for the same hearing on 28 May 2025. They were also sent Mr Pons’ skeleton argument by email.

D1 did not engage with the proceedings in any way until a few hours before the hearing on 9 June 2025, when an email was received by the court apparently from his mother. In it, Mrs O’Connor said that she was contacting the court with D1’s “full authority and consent”. The email made various points about service of the documents, expressed concern about the position of the victims in the US and referred to the legal advice D1 had been given. Most pertinently, Mrs O’Connor said in the email that D1 had “no objection to the assets which are the subject of the proceedings being seized”. She did not ask to attend the hearing or that the hearing be adjourned. However, she was offered the opportunity to attend the hearing and arrangements were quickly put in place for her to join remotely. I am grateful to the court staff for making those arrangements.

Mr Pons had indicated prior to the 9 June 2025 hearing that while the Claimant had no objection to Mrs O’Connor being present at the hearing, he would be likely to object to her participating in it on the basis that she is not a party to the claim and has no direct interest in the property. Further, while she was purporting to speak on behalf of D1, he had repeatedly declined to participate in the proceedings and the information she was seeking to provide was information known to him. On that basis, there did not seem to be any obvious procedural basis for Mrs O’Connor’s participation. Further, D1’s own participation in the hearing would have been barred by Master Dagnall’s order from the CMC, given his failure to file an A of S, unless permission was given.

At the outset of the hearing Mr Pons made the further valid point that difficulties might arise if Mrs O’Connor sought to give evidence in the course of making submissions, as often occurs in the case of unrepresented individuals, not least because the process for securing permission from the Spanish authorities for evidence to be given from overseas set out in PD 32, Annex 3 had not been completed prior to the hearing. Nor had any permission been sought by D1 to file witness evidence, as required.

Matters were compounded by the fact that Mrs O’Connor was joining the hearing by audio link only. She indicated that her video was not working. It was far from clear to me whether D1 was with her during the hearing.

I therefore granted Mrs O’Connor permission to participate in the hearing limited to answering some questions about D1’s understanding of the hearing and setting out his position. She confirmed that she had D1’s authority to act in his behalf. She said he made no admissions as to how the Property had been obtained, but did not object to the making of the recovery order; and was “quite happy to forfeit all his interest in the assets” (meaning he disclaimed all title and rights of ownership over the Property, as D2 and D3 had done). She did not seek an adjournment of the hearing.

Mrs O’Connor had indicated in her email to the court on the morning of 9 June 2025 that she and D1 wanted to ensure that if the civil recovery order was made, the assets to which it related would be diverted to the victims in the US to assist in discharging the restitution order to which D1 was subject.

At my request Mr Pons explained the relevant processes to her during the hearing. He indicated that there has been close contact between the CPS and the US authorities concerning D1 and the status of the forfeiture and restitution orders, but that the US authorities had not taken any steps to enforce the US forfeiture and restitution orders in the UK against the Property, for example by applying to be a party to this claim. He explained that if the order was made, it would remain possible for this issue to be explored through diplomatic channels.

D2 and D3 did not attend, nor were they represented at, the 9 June 2025 hearing. CPR Part 8 makes no express provision for the hearing of a Part 8 claim in the absence of a defendant. I indicated my provisional view that this hearing was more akin to a trial than to the hearing of an application under CPR 23. Mr Pons agreed with that analysis.

On that basis, it is relevant that under CPR 39.3(1), the court may proceed with a trial in the absence of a party. Whether a court should exercise this power is a matter of discretion. In exercising its discretion, the court will have regard to the overriding objective.

Here, as set out above, both D2 and D3 have been served with the relevant documents. Correspondence showed that they had both been informed of the date of the hearing in good time, on 21 March 2025, and again on 22 May 2025. Neither has engaged with the proceedings beyond D2 completing an A of S indicating that he does not intend to contest the claim.

In those circumstances I was satisfied that D2 and D3 were both aware of the hearing and had chosen not to attend, thereby waiving their right to be represented and present at the hearing. I therefore decided to proceed in their absence, adopting the same approach to that taken by Cockerill J on similar facts in Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA v Catanzaro [2023] EWHC 3309 (Comm)).

By an application notice dated 28 May 2025, supported by the third statement of Shahzary Mustafa dated 28 May 2025 (“Mustafa 3”), the Claimant sought a retrospective order for alternative service under CPR 6.27, alternatively permission to dispense with service under CPR 6.28, in relation to service of documents other than the claim form and accompanying evidence on D1.

Mustafa 3 explained that on 10 March 2025, the bundle for the CMC had been sent to D1 at the Federal Correctional Institution facility in Allenwood. On 21 March 2025, the notice of the 9 June 2025 hearing was sent to D1 there, together with the disposal hearing bundle. Tracking documentation was provided for these communications. At some point in early April 2025 the bundles were returned to the CPS offices in London. The hearing notice was not returned.

The CPS liaised with the US authorities and established that D1 had been returned to the UK on 13 April 2025.

On 21 May 2025, attempts were made to serve the two bundles electronically on D1 at two emails known to be linked with D1 from his contact with D2 and D3. However, these emails could not be delivered and the Claimant received “bounce back” messages to that effect.

On 23 May 2025 an attempt was made to serve the bundles at an address in Liverpool linked with D1. A statement from Financial Investigator Stephen Sung dated 23 May 2025 confirmed that the occupants stated that they had purchased the property in 2023 from someone called Nathan O’Connor and were still receiving post in D1’s name. The occupants understandably refused to accept service of the bundles on behalf of D1.

On the same day an attempt was made to serve the hearing bundles on D1 at another address in Liverpool linked with him. D1’s brother was living there and accepted service of the bundles on his brother’s behalf, albeit stating that his brother remained in prison.

According to D1’s mother’s email and her account to me at the outset of the 9 June hearing, the bundles were physically brought to Spain by her sister over the weekend of 7/8 June 2025. She confirmed that both she and D1 had received the bundles for the hearing.

CPR 6.27 gives the court power to order the service of documents other than the claim form by a method alternative to those otherwise permitted where it appears to the court that there is “good reason” to do so. It includes the power to order that steps already taken by a method of service not permitted by the rules to bring a document to the attention of the other party constitutes good service. It is necessary to consider whether the method in question is likely to bring the proceedings in question to the person’s attention. This can be evidenced by the fact that the alternative method has succeeded in doing so.

Here, I indicated during the 9 June 2025 hearing that I would make the order in respect of service sought by the Claimant. I was satisfied that there was good reason to make such an order. The Claimant had made repeated efforts to bring the documents to D1’s attention. The information provided by D1’s mother made clear that they had in fact done so.

On that basis, I approved retrospective service of the CMC bundle and the disposal hearing bundle on D1 under CPR 6.27, by the alternative method of service on his brother, in person, on 23 May 2025, at the Liverpool address referred to in [74] above.

D1’s mother was emailed a copy of Mr Pons’ skeleton argument during the hearing.

Having heard submissions, at the end of the hearing, I indicated that I intended to make the order sought by the Claimant, for reasons to follow in a written judgment.

After the hearing Mrs O’Connor contacted the court asking on D1’s behalf for time to take legal advice on the issue of the extent to which the funds that formed the subject matter of the Claimant’s claim could be used to satisfy the 25 August 2023 restitution order in favour of the victims.

By an order dated 20 June 2025, I concluded that, highly unusually, it was in the interests of justice to permit Mrs O’Connor / D1 a short further period of time to take legal advice. She was granted permission to make written representations through counsel in respect of the terms of the order.

Mr Lennon KC provided written submissions on behalf of D1 dated 29June 2025. D1 served witness statements from himself and his mother dated 30 June 2025. Mr Pons provided responsive submissions dated 7July 2025.

By an order dated 17 July 2025 I acceded to D1’s request, opposed by the Claimant, that the matter should be listed for a further hearing. I took that course, in particular, for the following reasons.

First, it was apparent that there was now an issue between the parties as to whether D1 had, in fact, been personally served with the claim and the evidence relied upon, on 14 August 2024, by the US Marshall Service at the Allenwood facility, as had previously been understood to be the case.

Second, Mr Lennon KC accepted that a further hearing would dispose of the Claimant’s complaint that he had not, in fact, been personally served with the claim or otherwise have a proper opportunity to defend himself.

Third, D1 had advanced a series of legal submissions in support of the proposition that any civil recovery order made by this court should be structured so as to enable D1 to pay to the US authorities the amount demanded under the restitution order. In essence, D1 was concerned by the risk of having his only means to pay his liability under the restitution order being “recovered” by the civil recovery order.

Fourth, the Claimant contended that there remained procedural defects in D1’s position and took issue with D1’s legal analysis in a range of ways.

After the 17 July 2025 order was made, a further hearing was duly listed for 11 November 2025. D1 served further evidence namely the witness statement of Roger Burlingame, solicitor, on behalf of the D1, dated 28 August 2025. The Claimant served the fourth witness statement of Shahzary Mustafa dated 13 October 2025.

I was also provided with very helpful Notes from Mr Lennon KC and Mr Pons dated, respectively, 31 October 2025 and 4 November 2025 and a draft agreed order.

The Claimant had made D2 and D3 aware of the 11 November 2025 hearing and served with them with the hearing bundle. They did not attend, nor were they represented at, the hearing. I concluded that it was appropriate to proceed in their absence for the same reasons as applied in relation to the 9 June 2025 hearing, as set out at [67]-[70] above.

Counsel’s Notes and submissions made the following broad points clear.

First, it was now agreed that it was not necessary for me to resolve the legal dispute that had arisen between the parties as to whether the court could, or should, structure the civil recovery order so as to enable D1 to pay to the US authorities the amount demanded under the restitution order.

Second, while the Claimant did not actively support D1’s position, there was no formal opposition to the Claimant’s desired final outcome in principle. There had been useful discussions between the parties about how that end might be achieved.

Third, it was agreed that the Claimant was limited in what he can do to achieve that outcome. The Claimant could not, in the circumstances of this case, simply pay recovered monies to the US authorities. Nor could the Claimant agree to any order that excluded the $2,187,716.21 sought by the restitution order, leaving D1 to repay the restitution order (or not). Rather, in order for the restitution order to be satisfied by the funds covered by the order sought in these proceedings, there needed to be some action by the US authorities.

Fourth, while the evidence suggested some disagreement as to whether there had been sufficient engagement with the US authorities to date, it was now understood that if the order sought was made, the US Department of Justice would send a formal letter to the Home Office requesting an asset sharing agreement for the purpose of compensating the victims in the US proceedings. This would be pursuant to a treaty signed between the UK and the US governments on 6 January 1994, providing for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, which I have seen. This route of “enforcement” places matters at an executive level such that the Claimant himself would play no role in the negotiation of the asset sharing agreement.

The net result was that the Claimant and D1 were agreed that the civil recovery order sought by the Claimant could be made, provided that a preamble to the order reflected the expected roles of the US Department of Justice and the Home Office once the order was made.

I am content to approve the civil recovery order agreed between the Claimant and D1, subject to the modest revisions discussed and agreed during the 11 November 2025 hearing. This included provision for the Claimant to serve the order not only on all the Defendants but directly on the Home Office, to assist with the future steps anticipated, described at [98] above.

The Claimant and D1 agreed that it was appropriate for me to set out brief reasons for approving the order, not least because of the sums of money involved and because D1 and D2 have not consented to the order, albeit that they have both disclaimed any interest in the funds held in the accounts. I now do so.

The starting point is that the effect of POCA, s.266(1), is that absent the application of any of the exceptions, which is the case here, the court “must” make a recovery order if the court is satisfied that any “property” is “recoverable”.

Cryptocurrency is “property” for the purposes of POCA, s.316(4): Briedis at [38] above.

POCA, s.282A(1) provides that the court may make a recovery order in respect of property wherever situated, and in respect of a person wherever present. The Property in this case is held by financial institutions that have a presence in the UK, but it is not entirely clear where the Property is held.

Assuming that the Property is held outside of the UK, s.282A(2) applies. This provides that in order to make a recovery order in respect of property that is outside the [UK] there must be a “connection between the case and England the relevant part of the [UK]”.

By s.282A(3), the nature of the connection required is described in schedule 7A of POCA. By para. 5 of schedule 7A the connection is satisfied where a person whose conduct was part of the unlawful conduct, or who holds the property in question, is linked to the relevant part of the UK.

The “link” includes being a British citizen, or a person domiciled, resident or present in the relevant part of the UK.

In this case, D1, D2 and D3 are all British citizens. D2 and D3 currently appear to be present in England and Wales. D1 was in England at some point between 13 April 2025 (when he arrived at Heathrow, having been removed from the US) and 7/8 June 2025 (by which point he was in Spain).

I am satisfied to the civil standard of proof that the cryptocurrency at issue in this case is “recoverable property” under POCA, s.304, in that it is “property obtained through unlawful conduct”, for the following reasons.

The convenience of cryptocurrency as a method of money laundering arises out of its nature. The Claimant cited open source material from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to the effect that (i) cryptocurrencies are anonymous at their point of creation, such that the “placement” stage of the money laundering process is often absent; (ii) it only takes a few seconds to create a free account and it is only possible to use each account twice: to receive money and then transfer it elsewhere; (iii) it is possible to create a large money laundering scheme with thousands of transfers at a low cost and to execute it using a computer script; and (iv) due to rapid increases in exchange rates, with some cryptocurrencies showing 10,000% growth, it is very easy to justify unexpected wealth through cryptocurrencies.

The Property is held in the name of the D2 and D3. Their accounts were set up at the instigation of D1 in August 2020, when it can be inferred that he needed to move cryptocurrency. The accounts were set up to make it appear as if D2 and D3 owned and controlled the Property, when in reality it was D1 who arranged for the Property to be transferred into these accounts, and he maintained control over them. D2 and D3 were merely “proxies” for D1. The obvious inference is that the use of proxies to open accounts was designed to conceal D1’s identity and his control of the cryptocurrency. I accept Mr Pons’ submission that this factor alone strongly suggests that unlawful conduct was involved.

As noted at [26]-[33] above, further steps were taken before the cryptocurrency arrived in the Binance and Coinbase accounts of D2 and D3 to conceal their origin and who was holding/moving it. This included (i) the use of crypto-mixers; (ii) the use of anonymised cryptocurrency exchanges; and (iii) the use of additional proxies such as Mr McCreath and in all probability, Mr Vorhin and Mr Federovic.

D1 has admitted his involvement in unlawful conduct through which he obtained cryptocurrency in both the New York and the California proceedings. He accepted obtaining $794,012.64 in cryptocurrency and that the proceeds could not be located by any enforcement authority exercising due diligence. The unlawful conduct which occurred in the US would plainly amount to unlawful conduct in England and Wales, had it occurred here, namely (i) unauthorised access to computer material, contrary to the Computer Misuse Act 1990, s.1; (ii) fraud, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s.2 and (iii) money laundering offences, contrary to POCA, ss.327, 328 or 329.

There is no information available as to how D1 could lawfully have obtained this amount of cryptocurrency.

At no point has D1 provided any information to explain the source of the Property and its lawful origin, notwithstanding his late engagement with the proceedings through asking his mother to attend the 9 June 2025 hearing and his provision of a witness statement dated 30 June 2025.

For all these reasons the Claimant’s claim succeeds.

I make a civil recovery order under POCA, s.266 in respect of the Property described at [2] above. Christine Bartlett of Richard Long & Co. is appointed as the trustee for civil recovery (“the Trustee”) within the meaning of POCA, s.267. The Property shall vest henceforth in the Trustee.

All persons in possession of the Property must give possession of the said Property to the Trustee. A penal notice is attached to the order.

The Property Freezing Order made by Lang J on 5 April 2023 shall be treated as discharged with effect from the date 7 days after the Property vests in the Trustee.

The Claimant is required to serve a copy of the order on D1 and D2 and the Home Office.

There shall be no order for costs.