KKK v Elena Tsirlina

In June 2024, the claimant brought a claim against the defendant for breach of contract and confidentiality which he alleged “resulted in significant financial and emotional harm and endangerment to his family and witnesses”. On 2^nd October 2024 Master Davison granted an anonymity order in relation to the claimant. That arose from an application by the claimant for proceedings to be undertaken in private, the primary reason for which was, to quote his Form N244 of 16^th July 2024, the “need to protect sensitive information that could significantly impact the safety of the claimant, the defendant and the witnesses involved in the case”.

On 17^th March 2025, I heard an application that had been served in November 2024 by the defendant for reverse summary judgment, pursuant to CPR 24.3, or, alternatively, for the striking out of the claimant’s claim and particulars of claim, pursuant to CPR 3.4(2). On 30^th April 2025, I handed down judgment granting the defendant’s application and striking out the claimant’s claim. Shortly before that date, on 26^th April 2025, the claimant had made an application, pursuant he said to CPR 39.3, but in fact, in my judgment, to CPR 23.11, for me to set aside that decision on the basis that at the hearing in March I had proceeded in his absence. Also on 26^th April, the court received a series of additional applications from the claimant, some at least of which had been provided in one form or another to the court by that date in draft.

The case was listed before me on 17^th May 2025 to deal with consequential matters arising from my judgment of 30^th April and/or to hear the claimant’s application under Rule 23.11 for me to set aside that judgment. It was necessary for me to adjourn the latter application because of the number of additional applications that fell to be considered by the court in one way or another arising from matters raised by the claimant. The case was, therefore, adjourned until 11^th September and, on that date, I heard argument as to whether or not to accede to the claimant’s application for me to set aside my judgment of 30^th April.

On 10^th November, a further judgment consequent on that hearing was handed down by the court. Its conclusion, in summary, was that the claimant had not demonstrated that he had any real prospect of success with his claim. I concluded that claim to be totally without merit and I, therefore, acceded to the defendant’s application for reverse summary judgment pursuant to CPR 24.3. My judgment also made clear that I upheld my earlier decision to strike out the claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2). It follows that I had, by that judgment handed down on 10^th November, concluded that the claimant’s original claim and his application under CPR 23.11 for the revisiting of the court’s judgment of 30^th April were both totally without merit.

At the hearing on 11^th September, the claimant made an application without prior notice before me to recuse myself, for the reasons set out in my judgment handed down on 10^th November. For the reasons also there set out, I rejected that application, which, again, I concluded to be totally without merit.

The case is listed today before me to address matters consequential on that earlier decision.

The claimant has not attended this hearing. I have, therefore, had to consider again the application of CPR 23.11 which arises where the applicant fails to attend the hearing of an application. That rule permits the court to proceed in their absence.

I am satisfied that it is appropriate for me to do so here. The claimant did provide, on 11^th November, a notice to the court and the defendant’s representatives in which he set out a number of reasons why he contended the case should not proceed today. It is right to note that that was not a formal application for an adjournment. It is right, further, to note that the same had occurred on 17^th March when the claimant did not attend, did not make a formal application for an adjournment, but did set out in an email reasons why he submitted the hearing should not go ahead. It further follows that the claimant would have been abundantly, following that earlier hearing, of the need for a formal application for an adjournment to have been made. None has been.

However, I have considered the reasons set out in the claimant’s notice to the court.

The claimant’s contention that these proceedings should be undertaken under CPR Part 82 has been a feature of his submissions from the outset. This court has determined, both in its judgment of 30^th April and, again, in its judgment of 10^th November that there is no basis before this court for CPR Part 82 to be employed.

Further, the court has concluded that the anonymity order and the direction that the proceedings be heard in private that were granted by Master Davison on 2^nd October more than offered the claimant necessary protection for him to be able to deploy any and all submissions and any and all evidence upon which he sought to rely in these proceedings. It follows that it remains this court’s view that Part 82 is not required either to allow for the claimant to attend these proceedings nor for him to fully participate in them.

He further submits, in that regard, that because of his relationship to certain state agencies and the provisions of RIPA 2000 that he cannot participate and that the proceedings to date are flawed through a failure to consider evidence from him in that regard. I am satisfied that the claimant has had every opportunity over the last year to deploy before this court any and all material upon which he would seek to rely, including material that might have any bearing on the terms of the 2000 Act. Further if there was any substance to the claims that he seeks to make, I am satisfied that, mindful of their duties under Article 2 of the European Convention, relevant state agencies themselves would have become involved in these proceedings and provided information to this court in relation to the matters raised by the claimant. They have not.

Importantly, I note that on 30^th October, and therefore a matter of days before the first of a series of what the claimant describes as RIPA notices, the claimant had made an application himself for the anonymity order in relation to him to be lifted, because he wished to converse with the press in relation to these proceedings and he submitted that the anonymity order served no useful purpose. Such wholly contradictory positions from the claimant significantly undermined his contentions now through his most recent written material as to a prohibition on him appearing unless Part 82 had been granted.

It follows that I am wholly satisfied that it is appropriate for the court to proceed in the claimant’s absence under Rule 23.11. I note also in that regard that Rule 23.11(2) does permit the claimant to make an application for the relisting of this hearing and so there is that safeguard if, contrary to my findings, there is any unfairness to him in what I have determined to do.

I turn then to the matters to be addressed at this consequential hearing. The first is as to the status of the anonymity order granted by Master Davison on 2^nd October. In my judgment of 10^th November 2025 (at paragraph 106) I said this:

“I have considered again the Defendant’s application to lift the Anonymity Order granted by Master Davison. That anonymity is predicated on there being a need to protect the Claimant’s identity for the protection of himself and his family. On the analysis of the material before me, it remains my view, as set out in paragraph 88 of the 30 April 2025 judgment, that the Claimant has failed to establish any substantive foundation for that protection to be required. Given the lack of evidential support, I have concluded that it is appropriate to revoke the Anonymity Order made by Master Davison. This revocation will come into effect as part of the Order consequential on this judgment being handed down”.

It follows, therefore, that this court by its judgment of 10^th November has determined that that anonymity order should be discharged. The matters that I have just set out in relation to the claimant’s RIPA notices and his submissions in relation to CPR Part 82 also fall to be considered in this context. Given that as recently as 30^th October the claimant considered the anonymity served no useful purpose, and given that the purpose of that order was to allow him to present any and all evidence and submissions before this court for the purposes of these present applications, the order has now ceased to serve any useful purpose and I do, therefore, discharge that order.

The next matter to be considered is the defendant’s application that I make a limited Civil Restraint Order. CPR 3.3(9) stipulates that if the court considers an application is totally without merit then, first, the court’s order must record that fact and, second, the court must consider whether it is appropriate to make a civil restraint order.

As I have already indicated, and as the court’s judgment of 10^th November 2025 makes clear, I am satisfied that (i) the original claim brought by the claimant in June 2024, (ii) his application under CPR 23.11 to set aside the court’s judgment of 30^th April 2025, and (iii) his application of 11^th September 2025 for me to recuse myself, were all totally without merit.

I have considered whether also that categorisation would apply to the other applications advanced in one form or another by the claimant during the proceedings and listed at paragraph 5 of the court’s judgment of 10^th November 2025. Given that it was the court’s assessment at that time that the status of these various applications was unclear, it does not seem clear to me that I should include those unissued applications in the application of CPR 3.3(9) and the Practice Direction at 3C. Nevertheless, by reference to the Practice Direction 3C at paragraph 2.1, it does appear that a limited civil restraint order can be made because there have been two or more applications which, in this court’s view, are totally without merit. It follows that the making of such an order is permitted. The purpose of doing so is that the claimant be restrained, by reference to paragraph 2.2 of the Practice Direction, from making any further applications in the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of the identified judge.

I have considered with care the history of these proceedings and the conduct of the claimant within them. As set out in great detail in the court’s two judgments, the claimant has throughout these proceedings raised numerous meritless applications. He has failed repeatedly to comply with any number of court orders, and has done so in a deliberate, if not belligerent, way.

His attitude is amply demonstrated by two utterances from him. First, in an email on 27^th April 2025 to the defendant and her solicitors he said:

“I am in no hurry, I bear no legal costs in pursuing claims against Elena Tsirlina, and you have no realistic prospect of recovering any legal fees from me – I have no assets other than those frozen in” the country from which he came.

Similarly, in an email to the defendant’s solicitor of 16^th May 2025 he said this:

“Even if you somehow persuade a British court that Elena Tsirlina did not violate the rights of the Claimant or his minor child … I will nonetheless:

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File a separate legal claim;

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Pursue the matter in the Court of Appeal;

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And, if necessary, proceed to the European Court of Human Rights”.

He went on to say:

“If you believe that I will grow tired or give up – you are mistaken. We are only at the beginning”.

It is entirely clear to me, against that, that there is a very real need for there to be a limited Civil Restraint Order in relation to this claimant. Its purpose is not to prevent the claimant from seeking to challenge this court’s decision by a legitimate route through appeal to the Court of Appeal or, indeed, should he choose to do so, to the European Court of Human Rights; nor does it prevent the claimant from seeking to revisit this decision under CPR 23.11. But this order does seek to restrain the uncontrolled and meritless approach of the claimant, as exhibited over the last year, going forward and I am, therefore, satisfied that such an order should be made.

Next, I have to consider the means by which, going forward, the claimant should be permitted to communicate with others.

The claimant, during the course of these proceedings, has chosen to communicate not only with the Court’s Listing Office and the identified contact at the defendant’s solicitors, but at various stages to communicate with others working for that firm directly, the defendant herself directly, counsel instructed to represent the defendant directly, and the judge dealing with proceedings directly. Such direct contact is not only contrary to directions given by this court on a number of occasions during the course of these proceedings, but also is wholly unacceptable.

It does seem to me, therefore, necessary not only that there should be a specific requirement in the order this Court makes today to preclude contact by the claimant other than by identified routes, but that there should be a penal sanction included in the order, both to ensure that the limited Civil Restraint Order is effective, and that this direction as to means of contact is effective. I am satisfied that nothing short of such a penal sanction will have any prospect of focusing the claimant on compliance.

In relation to compliance, before moving away from the Civil Restraint Order, I should note that the claimant, in recent correspondence, has submitted that there has been a violation of Master Davison’s Anonymity Order by the defendant submitting to this court a draft of that civil restraint order and, indeed, a draft order for consideration for today’s hearing.

The claimant’s submissions in that regard are misconceived. The defendant provided those drafts to this court after its judgment had been handed down and they were circulated only to the court and the claimant. It follows that those corresponded with in relation to the claimant in his real name were those who the claimant himself had corresponded with repeatedly in his own name. There was no breach of the anonymity order in that correspondence, nor any issue as to contempt, as the claimant suggests, in that regard.

The final issue to be determined is in relation to costs.

The defendant seeks her costs of and occasioned by the defendant’s application of 27^th November 2024 for reverse summary judgment and/or for the striking out of the claimant’s claim. In other words, the defendant seek the costs arising from the claim itself and from her application to strike that claim out. More particularly, the defendant seeks a summary assessment of costs by reference to Practice Direction 44, paragraph 9.2, which makes clear that the general rule is that the court should carry out a summary assessment of the costs “44PD9.2(b) at the conclusion of any other hearing which has lasted not more than one day, in which case the order will deal with the costs of the application or matter to which the hearing related. If this hearing disposes of the claim the order may deal with the costs of the whole claim.”

The defendant further seeks that those costs be assessed on an indemnity basis. She relies on the observations of Lord Woolf, Chief Justice, in Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Ltd v Salisbury [2002] EWCA Civ 879, which makes clear that an indemnity basis of assessment is intended to be awarded in circumstances where the conduct of the parties was such as to take the situation out of the norm in a way which justifies an order for indemnity costs.

I agree with the submissions of Mr Fisher, on behalf of the defendant, that the claimant’s approach to this litigation takes this case very far out of the norm. As I have already touched on, and as is set out in more detail in my previous judgments, this claimant has failed to comply with a series of court orders or to apply for relief from sanctions. He has sought to email repeatedly and prodigiously the defendant’s counsel, the judge, a host of representatives from the defendant’s solicitors and others in a disproportionate way that has put a significant burden on both the defendant, those acting for her and, indeed, on the court. He has made a series of applications, or has sought to advance matters intended as applications not in proper form, without merit and without, even when directed to do so, evidence either of their proper service or, indeed, of an evidential basis for them.

The claimant has failed to evidence serious allegations that he has made in relation to his connections with UK authorities justifying his application for CPR Part 82 to be employed. He has breached, particularly, aspects of the Court’s order of 14^th May 2025, both in relation to the service of evidence and in relation to means of communication. He has shifted the sands of his claim on a number of occasions, most notably in his Position Statement provided, contrary to the Court’s order, at the hearing on 11^th September 2025, and he has twice failed, without good reason, to attend these proceedings.

I am wholly satisfied, against that background, that the test for an indemnity basis of assessment is here made out, and I direct that that is the basis upon which costs are to be assessed.

As to whether that should, however, be on a summary assessment, I am troubled by the history of these proceedings. Whilst it is unquestionably right that the court’s decision of 30^th April 2025 arose out of a one day hearing on 17^th March 2025, and that that decision did address both the claim and the application to strike it out, which would ordinarily viewed in isolation give rise to summary assessment, the court has also to take notice of the fact that there was here a further hearing before Master Davison on 2^nd October 2024, and that there then were hearings on 7^th May and 11^th September 2025, which both related to the claimant’s application for the court’s decision of 30^th April to be set aside. It follows that these proceedings do not easily fit within the test under the Practice Direction for summary assessment to be granted. I have, therefore, determined to take the matter in stages.

I have been helpfully taken by Mr Fisher through the schedules of costs. Those dated 13^th March and 9^th September 2025 reflect the costs incurred in relation to the meritless claim originally advanced by the claimant, and the defendant’s successful application for that to be struck out. Those costs reflect two one day hearings. I am satisfied that the costs there set out have not been unreasonably incurred, and I do consider, therefore, that it is appropriate for there to be summary assessment on an indemnity basis of those costs which come to a total figure of £70,663.13.

The costs arising thereafter, by reference to the two day hearing over 7^th May and 11^th September 2025, do require to be subjected to a detailed assessment. I am satisfied, however, by reference to CPR 44.2(8), that the defendant is entitled to a payment on account in relation to that which is to be the subject of that detailed assessment on an indemnity basis. I therefore direct a payment on account of £40,000 in relation to that. I will hear submissions on behalf of the defendant as to the period over which that is to be paid and the terms of the order that is to reflect the judgment that I have just given.