AXB v CYD

The claimant posts on social media under a pseudonym. I will refer to her as “AXB”.

The first defendant is a rapper and singer from London. He has had a number 1 single in the UK charts and a number 2 album in the UK charts. He has 1.3 million followers on Instagram and 2.5 million monthly listeners on Spotify. I will refer to him as “CYD”.

The second defendant is CYD’s mother. She is a school teacher. I will refer to her as “EYD”.

The third defendant is an online content creator. He has 169,000 subscribers on YouTube and 29,000 followers on Instagram. I will refer to him as “FZG”.

The claimant had some connection with the first defendant in the past, the nature of which is disputed. She says she was the first defendant’s business partner in a clothing line, although she also says she had “an assistant type role”. The first and second defendants deny that, and say that she acted as an assistant on an ad hoc basis, without any employment or partnership agreement. It is, however, common ground that the claimant’s connection with the first defendant ended acrimoniously in 2023.

I was told at the hearing on 7 October 2025 that the claimant had not been able to issue a Claim Form because she did not have addresses for the defendants. An unsealed Claim Form dated 30 September 2025 was in my papers. After the hearing, I was on 10 October given a Claim Form with a seal dated 30 September 2025 which had been received by the claimant’s solicitors on 10 October 2025. At the date of the hearing, and when the first draft of this judgment was written, the claimant had not produced any draft Particulars of Claim. She has, however, had three hearings on applications to the High Court, the third of which was listed before me, upon which I reserved the judgment which I now give. The claimant obtained from Farbey J, when acting in person, an interim injunction on 29 August 2025, supported by a short home-made witness statement dated 26 August 2025.

The return date was on 9 September 2025 before Hill J. By then, the claimant had instructed solicitors and Leading Counsel, and filed a second and more detailed witness statement, dated 8 September 2025, the day before the return date, although it was not responsive to any evidence from the defendants. None of the defendants is legally represented. The first defendant lives and works abroad at the moment. The second defendant appeared before Farbey J in person. The third defendant did not appear and was not represented. The second defendant presented to Hill J a home-made statement of evidence signed by her and by the first defendant, entitled “Defence Statement [EYD] & [CYD]” and told Hill J that she was “confused because nobody told me about the injunction until it was on social media”. The claimant’s Leading Counsel said that the defence document “needs to be put in proper form” and asked for an adjournment, which was granted.

The adjourned hearing came before me on 7 October 2025. The second defendant appeared before me in person, and she spoke also for her son, the first defendant. The third defendant did not appear and was not represented.

The claimant has, since instructing solicitors and Counsel, produced a draft Claim Form, although there was at the hearing before me no immediate prospect of Particulars of Claim (it was suggested that they might be available after 14 days, or perhaps 7 days). She has not been allowed to issue the Claim Form because she has not found out the addresses of any of the defendants. The first and second defendants’ defence statement says that the first defendant has been openly performing and recording in Dubai for almost two years. The third defendant appears from the evidence to be based in London. The second defendant does not object to service on her by email and has been able to attend the hearings in London of which she was notified. The claimant obtained from Farbey J an order for service on all defendants of the injunction application papers and order by email. She also obtained from Hill J an order for service of the Claim Form and Hill J’s order by email but that did not overcome the difficulty she had in issuing a Claim Form which had no defendant addresses on it. Since the hearing before me, the claimant has filed evidence from her solicitor saying “Whilst it is theoretically possible that the Claimant could employ the services of a private investigator or other location tracking services, she has not means to do so”. I urged the claimant through her Leading Counsel to make an application for leave to serve out of the jurisdiction playing closer attention to the principles engaged by CPR 6.36 and 6.37 (particularly 6.37(1)(c), which says that an application for permission to serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction must set out the defendant’s address or, if not known, in what place the defendant is, or is likely to be found). I have, since the hearing, been informed that this has been put in hand.

The claimant’s draft Claim Form gives the following brief details of her claim:

“The Claimant’s claim is for:

(1)

Damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages, for libel contained in a series of videos and posts on social media falsely alleging that the Claimant was behind the @MrFakeFlex account on Instagram, that she had dishonestly fabricated evidence of the First Defendant’s wrongdoing on the @MrFakeFlex account and that she was an obsessive and mentally ill stalker who had stalked the First Defendant for years, including, but not limited to:

(a)

A video published on 23 August 2025 on YouTube on the FZG account entitled “[CYD] Says He Has A Stalker That’s Making False Screenshots….He Sent Me All His Proof”;

(b)

A video published on 25 August 2025 on YouTube on the Billythegoat Live account entitled “[CYD] Calls Billy and CRASHES OUT on STREAM”;

(c)

A video published on 25 August 2025 on YouTube on the Billythegoat Live account entitled “Discussing the [CYD] Interview with TrapLoreRoss, [FZG] and Walkz”;

(d)

A video published on 23 August 2025 on Twitch on the Billythegoat Live account entitled “[CYD’s] LAWYER CALLS BILLY ON LIVESTREAM!!!!”.

(2)

Damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages for harassment contrary to s.1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, in respect of the aforementioned publications.

(3)

Damages, including aggravated damages and exemplary damages, for misuse of private information, in respect of the Claimant’s personal information and private correspondence, published in the aforementioned publications.

(4)

An injunction restraining the Defendants and each of them, whether by themselves, their employees or otherwise, from further publishing or causing to be published the same or any similar defamatory allegations about the Claimant and from further publishing the Claimant’s personal information and private correspondence.”

The case is to be particularly based, therefore, on these four videos (although it is said to be “including but not limited to” those videos, other social media posts being mentioned in non-specific terms). I will refer to the four videos as Video A, Video B, Video C and Video D respectively.

Video A was, according to the Claim Form, put out by the third defendant. Videos B, C and D were put out by “Billythegoat”, who is not a defendant, but Videos B and C refer to things said by the first defendant, and Video D refers to things said by the second defendant (although she is not, and has never claimed to be, her son’s lawyer; she is, as I have mentioned, a school teacher who, as a litigant in person, has spoken in these court proceedings on his behalf in his absence).

The claimant does not set out in the draft Claim Form the actual words of the statements attributed to any defendant and alleged to be libellous, and there were at the hearing no draft Particulars of Claim. I was therefore invited to understand her case from the evidence she has filed with the court.

She says in her first witness statement, dated 26 August 2025, that in the past few days, a social media account under the name “Mr Fake Flex” appeared on Instagram. She said she was not herself “behind the account”; she did not “make the page” and did not know who did, and she is “not an administrator of the account”. That is disputed by the first and second defendants.

Her first witness statement complains about “multiple videos” posted from “Friday 22^nd August” by the third defendant, and summarises, mostly without quotation, although occasionally with fragmentary words of quotation, what she says to be “completely false, damaging and defamatory statements which are categorically untrue and unbiased” from those unspecified videos. I am told that “unbiased” is a typo, presumably for “biased”. No video dated 22 August is referenced in the Claim Form, however. Her summary of the third defendant’s statements of which she complains is:

“a.

That I have been “stalking” [the first defendant] for 5 years.

b.

That I am completely nuts, a total psycho, a bunny boiler and similar to the stalker character in the Netflix TV show “Baby Reindeer”.

c.

He compared me to the pornstar, Bonnie Blue, who is known for sleeping with 1000 men in one day.

d.

Posted my home address and personal telephone number (I have had 3 people show up at this address and countless calls to my mobile where people harass me on the phone).

e.

He said I am the creator of the page, Mr.FakeFlex and that everything on the page is photoshop.

f.

He said that girls like me are nut jobs that deserve to die.

g.

He [that is, the third defendant] encouraged his own supporters, & [the first defendant’s] supporters… to attack me.”

She says that none of these accusations are true, content continues to be posted by the third defendant, and since then she has received offensive direct messages on her own social media page, including death threats (she does not say that any of these threats or messages came from any defendant). She felt obliged to move to a temporary location.

Her first witness statement also says that, shortly afterwards, the second defendant “began appearing on content creator’s platforms posing as [the first defendant’s] lawyer” although “I know her to be his mother”. In particular, it refers to statements by the second defendant on Video D which, again, are not identified verbatim but only by way of paraphrase, as follows:

“a number of untrue, defamatory statements … including:

a.

That I am behind the page [i.e. the Mr Fake Flex page].

b.

That I have stalked [the first defendant] for 5 years and need to be stopped by any means.

c.

That he has a Court Case against me.

d.

That I sent him nude photos.

e.

That I have created the page due to a personal vendetta.

f.

That I need psychiatric help and am mentally unwell.

g.

That I am a police informant (it is worth noting that in gang culture, being seen as a “snitch” is an acceptable reason to harm someone).

She also encouraged his fans to bully me.”

She says that she has received death threats which she attributes to viewers of Video D. She says that her mental health has been affected. She expresses concern about the damage to her reputation because “I am in the middle of a court case with my former employer”, in which “my reputation is of importance” (the former employer appears from other materials to be Chanel). She says what she describes as “superfans” of the first defendant have used information from the third defendant to find and contact her family members. She has heard a rumour that a price has been put on her head (although she does not say that has been done by any defendant).

In her second witness statement, having instructed her present solicitors and Leading Counsel, she puts more flesh on her case, and it is upon this second statement that submissions to me about her case were based by her Leading Counsel.

She says that she became aware on 21 August 2025 that she was named on the Mr Fake Flex Instagram profile which appeared to have been set up with the intention of making allegations about the first defendant. It had 30,000 followers and amassed over 20 million views in a matter of days. She then lists the defamatory allegations made by the Mr Fake Flex account against the first defendant. She says:

“I am not behind this account. I did not make the page. I do not know who did and I am not an administrator of the account. I had no foreknowledge that this account (or any account) would make these allegations”.

She says that three of the Mr Fake Flex account posts “leaked private conversations between myself and a third party, discussing [the first defendant]”. She messaged the account about this and had a reply “saying it was run by multiple people”. But she has no copy of this exchange because the Mr Fake Flex account was subsequently deleted.

Her second witness statement then has a somewhat confused account of the videos and other social media postings upon which she relies for her defamation and other claims against the defendants.

The first part of this evidence does clearly identify Video A, and it exhibits a 28 page transcript of it, indicating a run-time of over 42 minutes. Again, without full quotation, it paraphrases (sometimes with fragmentary and uncontextualized quotations of a few words) what it says are defamatory and untrue statements from this video, by reference to time-stamps on the transcript. The whole of the transcript is attributed to the third defendant. Neither the first defendant nor the second defendant appear on Video A, but the third defendant says on the transcript that he and another named person have spoken to the first defendant. The transcript (in a passage not specifically objected to in the second witness statement) says that the first defendant, speaking to the third defendant and the other source mentioned, “has pretty much said that this Mr Fake Flex is being run by an Instagram account called […], also known as [AXB]”. It then makes various derogatory statements about AXB and her conduct, including her dealings with the first defendant and what are said to be bogus claims made by her through the Mr Fake Flex account. She is said to have misconducted herself in various ways when working for the first defendant and had to leave, and has been stalking the first defendant, and is “crazy”. She is accused of being dishonest and of fabricating documents. The third defendant says, early on:

“Now, one thing I’ll tell you is when talking to rappers, take everything with a pinch of salt because when you’re a media, especially for myself, rappers will tell you exactly what they want. They’ll tell you want they want put out there. You know what I mean? And I expect nothing less. You know, it’s business at the end of the day.”

Video A also reports allegations against the claimant arising from a dispute between her and Chanel, apparently based on court papers to which he refers, which are not the subject matter of the present action.

The claimant’s second witness statement says that none of the claims are true.

The second statement then refers to and complains of subsequent YouTube videos (which she says have since been removed) and Instagram stories (which she says disappear after 24 hours) from the third defendant. It also complains of a Twitch livestream by four content creators including the third defendant (but no other defendant) also on 23 August. That is not one of the four videos identified in the Claim Form.

The second witness statement says “not a single thing that [the third defendant] says is true”. It says that other content creators (not party to these proceedings) have made videos based on the information provided in the third defendant’s video.

At this point, it becomes harder to reconcile the evidence given in the claimant’s second witness statement with the other three videos (Videos B, C and D) relied upon in the draft Claim Form.

The case against the second defendant in the claimant’s second witness statement is built on “BillyTheGoat’s livestream titled; “[CYD’s] LAWYER CALLS BILLY ON STREAM!!! [CYD] STREAM TOMORROW!!!” said to have been put out on 21 August 2025, whereas Video D is dated in the draft Claim Form 23 August 2025 and has a slightly different title. It does appear, however, that they are essentially the same discussion between the second defendant (wrongly described as the first defendant’s lawyer) and the live streamer (not a party to these proceedings) known as BillyTheGoat, which was uploaded on more than one occasion to various platforms and with a slightly different title. Although the claimant’s second witness statement paraphrases (at times with fragmentary quotations) this video, it does not exhibit a transcript. The links I was provided with were not working because they required credentials I was not given in time for the hearing. In any event, since the time stamps suggest it ran for nearly two hours, it would not have been appropriate, in the absence of a pleading, for me to watch the video myself and try and reconstruct the claimant’s case from it directly. The estimate for the whole interim hearing before me (including representations on behalf of the defendants) was two hours, and the time estimate for my pre-reading in the claimant’s skeleton argument was 1 hour 30 minutes.

The paraphrase of what the second defendant said to BillyTheGoat in this video is in paragraph 35 of the claimant’s second witness statement, broken down into a number of statements, all said to be false, under sub-paragraphs a. to j. They include specific allegations of misconduct by the claimant in relation to the first defendant’s clothing brand, stalking, dealings with Chanel and others referred to as scams, sometimes leading to a payoff in her favour, changing lawyers and delaying substantive resolution of legal proceedings, fabricating messages and audio on social media, running or controlling the Mr Fake Flex page, surreptitious photography of the first defendant’s family (his child and the child’s mother), harassment through social media, and manipulation of courts. delaying cases to avoid scrutiny.

The case against the first defendant in the claimant’s second witness statement is based on an eight minute appearance by the first defendant on BillyTheGoat’s livestream on 22 August 2025. Again, no transcript is exhibited, but there is in paragraph 41 a paraphrase, with fragmentary quotations, of allegations against the claimant by the first defendant which are complained of, by reference to time stamps. The video link was again not working for me because of a lack of credentials. Five allegations are set out. They include stalking the third defendant, tricking a solicitor in the music industry, photography of the previously mentioned child and that child’s mother, being a manipulator, and the circumstances in which the first defendant “let her go”. The claimant says in her witness statement that none of the statements complained of are true. None of the statements complained of is quoted in full.

The claimant followed up her second witness statement with a third witness statement dated 25 September 2025 and, on the eve of the hearing before me, with a fourth witness statement, dated 6 October 2025.

The second defendant, speaking for herself and on behalf of her son, the first defendant, and in the defence statement signed by both of them, denies the spin put on some of the statements, but for the most part asserts that they are substantially true and, further or alternatively, that any of those which may prove not to be substantially true have not seriously harmed the claimant’s reputation in the light of those that are. She has in the defence statement produced a detailed response, sometimes exhibiting documents (totalling well over 100 pages), in support of this case. In addition to a defence of truth, she says she will put forward a case of honest opinion.

The second defendant also filed a detailed “Defence Skeleton Argument”, which included submissions about the evidence as well as the law. It pointed to inconsistencies in the claimant’s case at the interim hearings, accused her of a failure to make full and frank disclosure, and attempted a detailed dismantling of the claimant’s case against the first and second defendants.

On the central allegation that the claimant is indeed behind the content of the now-deleted Mr Fake Flex Instagram account, the second defendant puts forward a case based on a variety of circumstantial evidence, including:

She expounded on this case before me and, in response, the claimant’s Leading Counsel attempted to refute it. But neither side won a decisive victory before me in that respect. The second defendant’s case, which she is not, of course, obliged to have fully-formed before a trial, appeared to me to be on the whole reasonably arguable, notwithstanding the best efforts of the claimant’s Leading Counsel. It was also presented with an attention to detail and a lack of hyperbole which reflected well on the second defendant as a litigant in person, and suggests she might bring similar qualities to any evidence she may give at a trial (she tells me she expects to give evidence at any trial).

The second defendant also argued that there were similarities between the claimant’s case against the defendants in this action and her dispute with Chanel in other litigation. She submits that:

It is clear from the way that both the claimant and, through the second defendant, the first two defendants present the case to me that there is a fundamental dispute about whether the other side is credible and honest, or lying and dishonest. Both sides accuse the other in that respect. The claimant also accuses the first defendant of being a criminal, although he has not been convicted of any criminal offence. It likely that the question of credibility will play a major part at any trial, which will have the benefit of hearing from witnesses, examining evidence in detail, and evaluating both the documentary and social media evidence and any witnesses who do give evidence, for better or for worse. I have looked at both sides’ case on this. I am completely unable, on the material before me, and at this interim stage, to pronounce confidently on the outcome of that battle of credibility.

I am further hampered in the evaluation of the claimant’s case by what does appear to have been a fairly comprehensive failure even to attempt full and frank disclosure when she made her original appearance, without notice, before Farbey J on 29 August 2025. The written evidence and written submissions which the claimant relied on were nakedly one-sided and partisan. They made no effort to identify possible weaknesses in her case, or what might prove to be strengths in the defendants’ case. She referred to a number of legal concepts and authorities in her skeleton argument before Farbey J, but the duty to make full and frank disclosure was not mentioned or addressed. The claimant’s own written note of her without notice hearing before Farbey J does include this:

“The Applicant referred to the duty of full and frank disclosure but submitted that the Respondents would be unable to produce evidence of ‘stalking,’ as alleged, because such conduct has not occurred.”

However, that was a self-serving statement on one aspect of the case (“such conduct has not occurred”) and did not disclose anything, for example, about the allegations which had been made against her by the first defendant in the context of the breakdown of their working relationship (she covered this in her first witness statement with only a passing reference “He became aggressive & violent and we parted on bad terms”), or about her dispute with Chanel and allegations against her by Chanel (which she did not mention at all). In this context, I am aware from the Court file (the C-E File) that there are proceedings between Chanel as claimant against AXB as defendant in the course of which Chanel obtained injunctions against AXB and, following a settlement, in which AXB was alleged by Chanel to have breached undertakings she had given to the court in those proceedings.

There was no duty to make full and frank disclosure in subsequent hearings, given that they were on notice. However, in the absence of the third defendant from the hearings (although on notice), I am wary of assuming that everything is as it may appear to me now, in which no-one presented what might be his case in defence. The second defendant is not connected with the third defendant and told me she does not speak for him. The second defendant raised full and frank disclosure in the skeleton argument on behalf of herself and the first defendant. The claimant’s Leading Counsel did not deal with full and frank disclosure.

After the hearing on 7 October, and after this judgment had been substantially completed in draft, the claimant’s solicitors filed, late in the afternoon of 14 October, draft Particulars of Claim. These dramatically reduce the scope of the proposed defamation action and, indeed, of other aspects of the action.

Pleadings and evidence serve quite different purposes. A pleading formulates the case that has to be met. Evidence supports the case. Usually (and certainly in this case), evidence is a mixture of what is relevant and irrelevant or of marginal relevance. Evidence should not be confused with pleading. It is essential that the party claiming interim injunctive relief in a freedom of speech case identifies its own case in a pleading unless the most extreme pressures of time make that practically impossible. If it relies on raw material by way of exhibited evidence, without providing a pleaded case, it is asking the court, and the parties, to work out what the pleaded case will be for themselves. That does not make for clear thinking or reliable analysis. Both of those are essential when assessing the merits and prospects of a given case.

The draft Particulars of Claim should in this case have been provided well before the hearing on 7 October. That was already nearly six weeks after the initial application to Farbey J. There was ample time to do it.

The failure to produce draft Particulars of Claim, at the hearing on 7 October or immediately afterwards, meant that time was wasted trying to construct the claimant’s case from her evidence, when preparing for that hearing, and at the hearing itself, and when writing the first draft of this judgment. It also deprived the defendants of the opportunity of considering the pleading when making their own submissions at the hearing.

The pleading provided on 14 October is 14 pages long, with an additional 135 pages of appendices, including transcripts not previously in evidence.

It abandons the claimant’s claims that the defendants defamed her by alleging that she engaged in theft, or fraud, or online scams, or engaged in blackmail or extortion (which are all claims reflected in paragraph 7(a)(v) and (vi) of the draft order).

It limits the defamation claim to statements that, in their ordinary and natural meaning, are said to mean:

The interim injunctive relief I am asked to grant on the basis of the libel action is as follows:

“7.

Until further order of this Court, the Defendants, whether by themselves or their agents or otherwise shall not, whether on social media, by broadcast, by written publication or otherwise, publish or cause to be published any statement, image or other material which:

(a)

alleges that the Claimant:

(i)

Created the “@Mr.FakeFlex” account on Instagram.

(ii)

Ran the “@Mr.FakeFlex” account on Instagram.

(iii)

Contributed content to the “@Mr.FakeFlex” account on Instagram.

(iv)

Forged documents, fabricated evidence, or created fake messages or content of any kind in connection with the “@Mr.FakeFlex” account on Instagram, or generally.

(v)

Engaged in theft and/or fraud and/or online scams.

(vi)

Engaged in blackmail or extortion.

(vii)

Is a stalker and/or engaged in stalking of the First Defendant or of any other person.

For the avoidance of doubt, the prohibitions set out above means that the Defendants are prohibited from continuing to publish, among other things, the following videos:

(i)

A video published on 23 August 2025 on YouTube on the FZG account entitled “[CYD] Says He Has A Stalker That’s Making False Screenshots….He Sent Me All His Proof”;

(ii)

A video published on 25 August 2025 on YouTube on the Billythegoat Live account entitled “[CYD] Calls Billy and CRASHES OUT on STREAM”;

(iii)

A video published on 25 August 2025 on YouTube on the Billythegoat Live account entitled “Discussing the [CYD] Interview with TrapLoreRoss, [FZG] and Walkz”;

(iv)

A video published on 23 August 2025 on Twitch on the Billythegoat Live account entitled “[CYD’s] LAWYER CALLS BILLY ON LIVESTREAM!!!!”. ”

I explored the possibility of undertakings to the court at the hearing, and explained to the second defendant the serious consequences in the event of any breach. The position turned out to be as follows:

All the relief claimed under paragraph 7(a) of the draft order is relief that engages the defendants’ Article 10 right to freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights, as enacted into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. Therefore, section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 applies. Section 12 provides, so far as material (and with emphasis added):

“12 Freedom of expression.

(1)

This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression.

(…)

(3)

No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.

(4)

The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such material), to—

(a)

the extent to which—

(i)

the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or

(ii)

it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published.”

In Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee [2005] 1 AC 253, the House of Lords held that the purpose of section 12(3) was to buttress the protection afforded to freedom of speech at the interim stage by setting a higher threshold than the guideline of “a serious question to be tried” or a “real prospect” of success at trial which is applied in non-Convention cases by American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [2975] AC 396 (para 15 of Cream). It therefore propounded (in para 22) the following test:

“Section 12(3) makes the likelihood of success at the trial an essential element in the court's consideration of whether to make an interim order. But in order to achieve the necessary flexibility the degree of likelihood of success at the trial needed to satisfy section 12(3) must depend on the circumstances. There can be no single, rigid standard governing all applications for interim restraint orders. Rather, on its proper construction the effect of section 12(3) is that the court is not to make an interim restraint order unless satisfied the applicant's prospects of success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to justify such an order being made in the particular circumstances of the case.

As to what degree of likelihood makes the prospects of success ‘sufficiently favourable’, the general approach should be that courts will be exceedingly slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant has not satisfied the court he will probably (‘more likely than not’) succeed at the trial. In general, that should be the threshold an applicant must cross before the court embarks on exercising its discretion, duly taking into account the relevant jurisprudence on article 10 and any countervailing Convention rights. But there will be cases where it is necessary for a court to depart from this general approach and a lesser degree of likelihood will suffice as a prerequisite. Circumstances where this may be so include those mentioned above: where the potential adverse consequences of disclosure are particularly grave, or where a short-lived injunction is needed to enable the court to hear and give proper consideration to an application for interim relief pending the trial or any relevant appeal.”

The claimant’s Leading Counsel indicated that, even if the trial were to be expedited, it could not be listed before March 2026, given the time needed for pleadings, disclosure and witness statements. If granted, therefore, this restriction on freedom of expression would not be for a brief period of days or weeks. It would for a period of months.

The potential adverse consequences of disclosure are mitigated by the fact that the allegations in question are well and truly in the public domain regardless of whether the three defendants remain completely silent about them between now and trial. This is a feature of the claimant’s own evidence. The videos and other materials were discussed on platforms and social media over which the defendants have no control (that is, platforms and social media other than the first and third defendants’ own accounts). The harm the claimant fears is not directly from any defendant but from members of the public who have already seen or become aware of the material in question and been incensed by it. These unidentified third parties are not going to calm down just because no defendant adds to what has already been said. It is not my impression from the evidence, and given what the second defendant said to me at the hearing about herself and her son the first defendant, that any defendant proposes to say anything else, even if not restrained, except perhaps in order to defend themselves from any future allegations by the claimant. The claimant has not offered to restrict her own freedom of speech in any way.

The test I must apply in this case is the section 12(3) test of whether at trial the claimant “is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed”. I do not think that it is “likely”, applying the considerations required by the judgment of the House of Lords in Cream. Having considered the now-voluminous evidence filed on both sides in this case, I can say that there are two sides to this case. I cannot say the claimant’s case is more likely than not to succeed. But I do not regard it as likely to succeed even to a less rigorous standard than that. The evidence is all over the place. The credibility of the parties will be critical, and is presently entirely at large. The case is, as it seems to me now, at best finely balanced, and, given the inherent probabilities, if anything tilted against the claimant. There is quite a credible case that she was either behind or at least substantially contributed material to the Mr Fake Flex account. If that is established, her credibility on everything else will be severely compromised, and she has evidential difficulties in respect of the other matters too. The defendants (or, at least, the first and second defendants, whose views were being reported by the third defendant) are determined to prove the substantial truth of what is said or reported in the videos, and all the other social media posting complained of is based on the video content. I make no prediction, but I do think the defendants have a good chance of success, based upon what I have seen.

That is sufficient to dispose of the application so far as the libel case and paragraph 7(a) of the draft order is concerned.

However, the claimant also faces the hurdle imposed by the rule in Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269. Per Warby J in LJY v Persons Unknown [2018] EMLR 19 at para 41:

“The threshold test of likely success is not always the right one to apply. In defamation, the rule has for a long while been that the Court will not grant an injunction if there appears to be any real prospect that the claim might fail (the rule in Bonnard v Perryman , or "the defamation rule"). In Holley v Smyth [1998] QB 727 (CA) the defamation rule was held to preclude the grant of an injunction to restrain an alleged libel, even though the claimant asserted not only that the allegations were false but also that the defendant's motive for the threatened publication was blackmail. Because the claimant could not satisfy the court that the allegations were plainly untrue the Court decided, by a majority, that the injunction should be discharged.”

None of the allegations identified by claimant as the basis for the case sketched out in the Claim Form are plainly untrue. I say that having examined both the transcripts and other summaries underlying the claimant’s characterisation of what is said, and the evidence filed on both sides in respect of the substantial truth of what was said. On the contrary, there is a real possibility that the essential truth of what was said by or ostensibly on behalf of the defendants in the publications complained of will be proved at trial.

I recognise that, as Warby J said in LJY at para 45:

“It has never been enough, for this purpose, for a defendant merely to assert the truth, or a belief in the truth, of the allegation which it threatens or intends to publish. Some credible basis for the assertion has to be put forward.”

My assessment of what is likely is not based on a bare assertion or belief. It is based on the evidence I have seen and the submissions I have heard.

I will not make the orders in paragraph 7(a) of the draft order or any of its sub-paragraphs (i) to (vii).

The undertakings offered by the second defendant in relation to paras 7(a)(i), (ii), (v) and (vi) of the draft order no longer align with the substantive relief claimed in the action, following service of the draft Particulars of Claim (see para 47 above). Undertakings in relation to para 7(a)(v) (theft and/or fraud and/or online scams) and para 7(a)(vi) (blackmail or extortion) are no longer appropriate and should not be included in the order I make. That leaves only the undertakings she has offered in relation to the orders sought in paras 7(a)(i) – (iv) (set out at para 48 above), which do correspond at least to some extent to the recently pleaded case. They may be included in the order if she is still willing to give them, and a reference to the informal undertakings in the same terms from CYD can also be included, although they were not formal undertakings given at the hearing to the court.

The interim injunctive relief claimed on the basis of AXB’s misuse of private information claim is as follows:

“7.

Until further order of this Court, the Defendants, whether by themselves or their agents or otherwise shall not, whether on social media, by broadcast, by written publication or otherwise, publish or cause to be published any statement, image or other material which:

(…)

(b)

discloses or threatens to disclose the Claimant’s home address, personal telephone number, photographs or other images of her child, personal communications or correspondence including emails and direct messages, or any personal information relating to her or her family.”

The test imposed by section 12 of the Human Rights Act applies to this as well. The enhanced requirements of the rule in Bonnard v Perryman do not apply.

So far as the underlying cause of action is concerned, the principles are well established: see Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22 at paras 12-20; In re S (A Child) [2004] UKHL 47 at para 17; Murray v Express Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481, at paras 24, 35-36 and 40-41; and Duchess of Sussex v Associated Newspapers [2021] 4 WLR 35 at para 31. The claimant must, first, show that she enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information in question. If she does, the court must engage in intense scrutiny of the rights in question and determine whether, on the one hand, the privacy rights of the claimant should yield to the rights of the defendant and others to the free flow of information or, on the other hand, whether the claimant’s rights should prevail over those of others. The competing rights are of inherently equal value. The answer is determined by the yardsticks of necessity and proportionality.

The second defendant has offered an undertaking to the court in the terms of paragraph 7(b) of the draft order. She has also offered an undertaking from her son the first defendant in the same terms, which can be recorded in the order although it cannot be a formal undertaking to the court since he is not present or legally represented and has not consented to it in advance of the hearing.

I am satisfied that the evidence filed by the claimant justifies an order against the third defendant in this respect. It alleges that the third defendant has posted her home address and telephone number in a video which had 46,000 views; apparently by showing a letter addressed to her from the Trade Marks Registry. It also alleges that the third defendant has posted images of her child (although this appears to be because he visited her public Instagram account which includes photographs of her child). The “personal information relating to… her family” covered by the draft order appears, from her evidence, to consist of phone numbers of her mother, father and step mother, although there is no direct evidence that any of this was published by the third defendant or any other defendant. It is not clear from the evidence what specific publication of the “personal communications or correspondence including emails and direct messages” referred to in the draft order can be proved against any defendant, except that during Video A the third defendant shows the first defendant and the claimant emailing each other about money allegedly owed to her. There is also WhatsApp messaging between the claimant and the first defendant.

I will make an order which is more tightly drafted and proportionate than the one claimed, but which is otherwise substantially in the same terms, as follows:

“Until further order of this Court, the Third Defendant, whether by himself or his agents or otherwise shall not, whether on social media, by broadcast, by written publication or otherwise, publish or cause to be published any statement, image or other material which:

discloses or threatens to disclose the Claimant’s home address, personal telephone number, photographs or other images of her child, or personal communications or correspondence which are not already in the public domain, save for the purposes of litigation, or taking legal advice.”

This order will be made against the third defendant. The undertakings from the second defendant and, informally, from the first defendant, should be in the same limited and specific terms.

Finally, in relation to a claim for harassment, the claimant seeks the following interim injunctive relief:

“(c)

Further, the Defendants must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of the Claimant contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and in particular must not do or procure, incite, abet or encourage any other person to:

(i)

Publish the allegations prohibited by paragraph 7(a) of this Order.

(ii)

Post threatening or abusive comments on social media sites;

(iii)

Issue death threats against the Claimant;

(iv)

Make phone calls to the Claimant, including silent calls;

(v)

Approach the Claimant in the street in connection with the allegations references in paragraph 6(a) of this Order.”

The section 12 Human Rights Act test applies, but not the rule in Bonnard v Perryman.

The order should be limited to specific acts, in order to avoid arguments about what, in the abstract, might amount to unlawful harassment.

I will not grant relief in the terms of paragraph 7(c)(i) of the draft order, for the reasons I have already given when assessing the evidence in the context of the libel claims.

In relation to (iii), (iv) and (v), there is no real evidence that any of the three defendants issued death threats against AXB, or made phone calls to her including silent calls, or approached her in the street in connection with any allegations. I will not make any orders in those terms. I also note that the second defendant, on her own behalf and on behalf of the first defendant, offered undertakings in the terms of paragraphs 7(c)(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) of the draft order, which in itself shows that there is no threat as far as they are concerned.

In relation to (ii), there is some evidence of threatening and abusive comments posted in response to the videos, but they are not attributed to any defendant and I am concerned about the breadth of the expression “threatening or abusive”. It would include, for example, a threat of legal proceedings (albeit that the ambit of the order is limited to threats on social media). It would also include specific criticism, as well as general abuse. Abuse is itself a vague term, encompassing real harassment but also the sort of disrespectful language on social media which ought to be acceptable, even if unwelcome, in ordinary discourse. There is also the point that I have already decided to refuse relief in relation to the specific allegations which the first and second defendants intend to prove as substantially true, although they are defamatory.

I am not satisfied that there is a threat of any action from any defendant by way of harassment between now and trial which ought in my discretion to be the subject of interim injunctive relief. I will therefore make no order in the terms proposed by paragraph 7(c) of the draft order. I will however accept the undertakings which have been offered, albeit not by the third defendant.

Hill J was satisfied that it was strictly necessary for the evidence not to be provided to any non-party without further order of the court; and that any non-party (other than a person notified or served with her order) seeking access to or copies of the evidence should make an application to the court on notice to the parties (para 4 of the order of Hill J; see also paras 8-11 of her order).

I am asked to make similar orders (paras 3 and 8-11 of the draft order).

I also realise that this judgment, if published without anonymisation, will amplify the allegations damaging to the claimant’s reputation, which she has brought these proceedings to stop. That has the potential of denying her substantial justice, even if she is ultimately successful in her claims.

I apply the test of strict necessity required to justify any derogation from the important and essential principle that justice is done in public: see Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417. The question is whether derogation is strictly necessary in order to achieve justice in the proceedings: see PMC v Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126at para 28.

I am persuaded to make the orders sought, with liberty to apply, and also to anonymise the names of the parties in the published version of this judgment, with liberty to apply. This is in order to protect the subject matter of the action in the unusual circumstances that the claimant has filed evidence that she has received death threats and is in serious fear for herself and her child and has had to relocate because of a storm of online abuse of exceptional breadth which has followed the allegations already made public.

On the other hand, there should be no harm in the judgment being published without anonymisation when the facts of the case are being more definitively considered and decided later in the litigation, either in the claimant’s favour or against her. That is because there will be more context in which to place what I have said in this judgment.