London Borough of Havering v William Stokes & Ors

The Claimant is the council and local planning authority for the borough of Havering (“the Borough”) which covers some 44 square miles in the north-east of Greater London. The Claimant has applied, pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Order of Eyre J dated 3 October 2024 (“the Injunction”), for the renewal of that order for a further period of 12 months as against Persons Unknown.

At the hearing of the application, the Claimant was represented by Ms Natalie Pratt of counsel. None of the Defendants were represented although the London Gypsy and Travellers Group submitted a letter in advance of the hearing (see further below at [13]-[16]).

For the purposes of the hearing, I was provided with an extensive bundle of evidence as well as a bundle of authorities. Ms Pratt submitted a detailed set of written submissions in advance of the hearing and also made oral submissions at the hearing. I am grateful to her for her considerable assistance.

The judgment is divided into the following sections:

The Injunction was made following Eyre J’s judgment which is reported at London Borough of Havering v Stokes & Ors [2024] EWHC 2496 (KB), “the Eyre J Judgment”.

In summary, the Injunction was not borough-wide against Persons Unknown but applied to 306 specific sites (described in the Injunction as the “Sensitive Sites”)in the Borough which equated to just under 23% of the land in the Borough. The Sensitive Sites were selected by the Claimant as being those that were frequently targeted by unauthorised encampments visiting the Borough. They were identified as being particularly vulnerable and included parks and open spaces, school grounds, retail sites and car parks: see [65] of the Eyre J Judgment.

A power of arrest was attached to the prohibitions only in relation to two Named Defendants (the Fourth and Sixteenth Defendants); no power of arrest was granted in relation to Persons Unknown.

The factual background that led to the making of the Injunction is set out at [14] – [25] of the Eyre J judgment. At [15] Eyre J explained:

“The Claimant’s concern is not primarily with traveller encampments without more. Instead its particular concern is with those of such encampments as are associated with commercial fly-tipping and/or forcible entry to property and in particular those of such encampments as are associated with aggression on the part of the occupiers to others. It is important to keep in mind at all times that, as the Claimant expressly recognises, to the extent that those who engage in such behaviour are members of the Traveller or Gypsy communities they form a small and non-representative minority in such groups.”

The Injunction was made against 43 named defendants up to and including 19 October 2025 and is due to expire as against those defendants at 00:00 hours on 20 October 2025. The Claimant has made no application in respect of those defendants but has applied for the Injunction to be extended for a further period of one year in relation to the defined category of Persons Unknown. As with the Injunction in respect of the named defendants that aspect of the order of Eyre J is also due to expire at 00:00 hrs on 20 October 2025.

“Persons Unknown” in the draft order that is being sought by the Claimant are defined as “persons unknown forming unauthorised encampments within the London Borough of Havering”.

The application before me related to slightly fewer Sensitive Sites than in the Injunction, some 291 Sensitive Sites. The Claimant does not seek an order in respect of Sensitve Site numbers 27, 51, 133, 151, 155, 268, 286, 287, 288, 289, 291, 295, 301, 302 and 304 in the Injunction.

As with the Injunction, the order that the Claimant seeks forbids Persons Unknown forming an Encampment on the Sensitive Sites or any part of the Sensitive Sites within the London Borough of Havering unless certain conditions have been met:

In the early hours of 6 October 2025, the Public Interest Law Centre sent to me direct a letter on behalf of LGT, a charitable NGO who were ordered to be served with proceedings relating to injunctions against persons unknown by the Supreme Court in the case of WolverhamptonCity Council & Ors v London Gypsies and Travellers & Ors [2023] UKSC 47; [2024] 2 WLR 45 (“Wolverhampton”). I directed that the KB Listing Office should return the letter to the solicitors referring them to the provisions of CPR 39.9 that provides that all communications with the Court should be copied to the parties (see R (Jasseh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 47 (Admin), [23]). The letter was subsequently resubmitted and copied to the Claimant.

In the letter LGT explained that they had requested the Claimant to agree that these proceedings should be joined with the case of Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Richmond of Thames (KB-2024-003315). The Claimant declined to agree to that proposal, pointing out that these proceedings were at a very different stage from Richmond’s which had been issued after the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton. There was then a subsequent request for the Claimant to confirm that it would not seek its costs against LGT in the event that they applied to be heard at the hearing before me. The Claimant indicated that it would be neutral as to whether permission to intervene should be granted and it would only seek costs if the application required an adjournment.

In the event the LGT did not make an application to be heard at the hearing because they were unable to obtain the services of counsel sufficiently experienced in this area.

In the letter from Public Interest Law Centre, the LGT requested that the order contained a liberty to apply provision to enable them to make an application to vary any order made at a future date. I have taken into account LGT’s letter and note that the draft Order being sought has provision by which the Defendants or anyone notified of the Order may each of them apply to the court on 72 hours written notice to both the court and the Claimant (without prejudice to the right of that person to apply to shorten the time for written notice) to vary or discharge this Order or so much as if it affects that person. I will direct that the Order which I make should be notified to LGT accordingly.

Sensitive Site 300 was only served on 1 October 2025 as it had been overlooked by the Claimant. An application was made during the course of the hearing (with written notice filed later that day) for relief from sanctions.

Applying the three-stage test in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, the Claimant accepted that the breach of the order requiring service was serious and significant. The reasons advanced for the default were, as I have explained, that it was an oversight by the Claimant. Any prejudice to Unknown Persons that might be affected by the failure to serve that Sensitive Site could be cured by suspending the operation of the injunction as it affects that site for 28 days. That was the course adopted by Garnham J where there was a similar defect in service in respect of one site in Rochdale MBC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1314 (KB) (“Rochdale”): see [5] and [81] of that judgment.

Having considered the three stage Denton test, I will grant relief from sanctions but, as in Rochdale, the appropriate and proportionate response to this defect in service is to suspend the operation of the injunction as it affects Sensitive Site 300 for 28 days.

For the purposes of this application the Claimant filed a number of witness statements:

In her statement, Ms Mehat explains the background to the proceedings and confirms that the Injunction has been effective. She says that unauthorised encampment numbers have fallen from 177 in the period 2014 to 11 September 2019, to three in the period 11 September 2019 to 24 May 2021 (when a power of arrest was in force against Persons Unknown), seven in the period 24 May 2021 to 3 October 2024 (when a power of arrest was not in force against Persons Unknown) and three since the grant of the Injunction on 3 October 2024. The most recent of the unauthorised encampments was on the weekend of 6 September 2025.

Ms Eastaff has reviewed Council’s records of unauthorised encampments that have formed in the Borough since 3 October 2024. There have been three such encampments.

Alongside the reduced frequency of unauthorised encampments, the duration of the encampments that have formed has also reduced, with most moving on within a 24-hour period. Ms Mehat explains that there is flexibility to negotiate a longer stay if appropriate. Ms Mehat states that the

“Council takes a constructive approach to work with the Travellers to understand their needs, and educate them on the Injunction and its effect. If there is a compelling welfare need that requires the encampment to be tolerated for a short time on the site on which it has formed, or on another more suitable site, the Council will tolerate as required. Enforcement by contempt proceedings (or, historically, the power of arrest) is always a last resort, and has never needed to be relied upon. Generally, the Travelling community adhere to the Injunction when made aware of it, and move on promptly as required; that is in stark contrast to the position prior to the grant of injunctive relief.”

Ms Mehat states that the costs incurred by the Claimant in the clearance of fly-tipped waste have been reduced to nil (or such a negligible amount that they did not warrant recording). She says that that is a significant reduction from the sum of £162,467.30 in the period 2016 to March 2019.

The Claimant operates a negotiated stopping policy (a “Negotiated Tolerance Procedure and Temporary Transit Agreement”). Whilst the Policy is documented, Ms Mehat “acknowledge[s] that it is not a formally adopted Council Policy. The Council intends to update the Policy (and would need to do so to update the injunction order at Schedule 1, following this Application). In doing so, the Council is willing (if required) to elevate the Policy to a formal Council policy, which will be prepared and placed before its Cabinet for approval as soon as possible. If required, the Council is willing to provide an undertaking to this effect.”

The Claimant argues that the significantly reduced number of unauthorised encampments in the Borough (and on the Sensitive Sites specifically) is not evidence that the threat has dissipated, but rather that the Injunction is having its intended effect.

Ms Mehat says that there are two main reasons why injunctive relief continues to be needed:

“a.

the Council apprehends that if the Injunction expires, unauthorised encampments will again form in the Borough with greater frequency, size and duration, in line with the experience of the Borough prior to the grant of injunctive relief, and significant harm will be suffered by the inhabitants of the Borough as a result; and

b.

the alternative methods and powers available to the Council to control and manage unauthorised encampments are not as effective or efficient enough to prevent the apprehended harms (or reduce them to a manageable level).”

In her statement Ms Mehat addresses the reasons why the Claimant is seeking an injunction against Persons Unknown:

“The nomadic way of life of the Gypsy and Traveller community means that there is a revolving cast of people passing through the Borough and who are forming encampments (as demonstrated by the three encampments in 2025 all having been formed by different people, none of whom were recognised). In those circumstances, it is impossible for the Council to know who will in fact visit the Borough and form an unauthorised encampment.

86.

When unauthorised encampments form, the Council is not always able to identify those who are present at an encampment. It is common for members of encampments to decline to give a name when asked by Council officers, or they give only a first name, surname or nickname. In this Claim, the vast majority (if not all) of the 105 Named Defendants were identified with the assistance of the Metropolitan Police, who checked the registration numbers of the vehicles present at the various encampments against the police database. Even then, sometimes no trace of the person or vehicle could be found, or various other issues arose, such as cloned number plates and incomplete or incorrect data, again thwarting attempts at identification. Indeed, some Named Defendants were discontinued against because the identification data obtained in this way was shown to be unreliable.”

In his statement Acting Chief Inspector Routley explains that the three unauthorised encampments that have formed in the Borough since the grant of the Injunction (which were on Sensitive Sites) were tolerated for a brief period, which allowed for the orderly vacation of the encampment. He says that his “review of the Police records also suggests that the encampments formed on 20 May 2025 and 5 July 2025 were formed by different persons, and no person who identified themselves to the Police Officers was already known to the Police; they appeared to be first-time visitors to the Borough, and have not been identified in the Borough since.”

In Wolverhampton the Supreme Court (Lords Reed, Briggs and Kitchin with whom Lords Hodge and Lloyd-Jones agreed) set out at [225] the need for review of injunctions against persons unknown and the issues to be addressed at such a review. The Supreme Court explained that the review:

“give[s]all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”

The correct approach to review of such injunctions has been considered in a number of first instance cases. Those were comprehensively reviewed by Garnham J in Rochdale who concluded:

“51.

In my judgment the correct approach is dictated by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton and in particular in [225]. This is not a “tick box” exercise, but the matters on which evidence should be adduced and argument focused are (i) how effective the order has been; (ii) whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; (iii) whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and (iv) whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made. The parties should give full disclosure, supported by appropriate evidence, directed towards those questions.

52.

There will be cases, such as Basingstoke, where an issue has emerged, whether at the original hearing or in preparation for the renewed hearing, which needs to be addressed expressly at that renewal hearing. Whether that necessitates an expanded renewal hearing or what [the Deputy Judge in Basingstoke & Deane BC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 738 (KB)] calls a de novo hearing will depend on the facts. The position may also be different where the application for further injunctive relief is not made during the currency of the previous order, but after it has expired. But the guiding light will always be the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton.”

Finally, I note that, on the basis that in this case the Claimant is seeking an element of precautionary relief, the Court would usually be required to have regard to the multi-factorial test stated by Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown [2019] 4 WLR 2. That test requires these two questions to be answered in the affirmative before injunctive relief could be granted. First, is there a strong possibility that, unless restrained by an injunction, the defendant will act in breach of the claimant’s rights? Secondly, if the defendant did act in contravention of the claimant’s rights, would the resulting harm be so grave and irreparable that, notwithstanding the grant of an immediate interlocutory injunction (at the time of the actual infringement of the claimant’s rights) to restrain further occurrence of the acts complained of, a remedy of damages would be inadequate. However, I respectfully concur with the conclusion of Garnham J at [78] of Rochdale that the test articulated by“Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown [2019] 4 WLR 2 and approved by Sir Geoffrey Vos MR in Barking and Dagenham v Persons Unknown [2022] EWCA Civ 13 has been subsumed into the Wolverhampton framework. The Vastint test, however, provides a useful double check.”

In my judgment there has been no material change of circumstances such as to justify a full Wolverhampton review. The fact that there has been a reduction in the number of unauthorised encampments is not a material change of circumstances but rather evidence that the Injunction has had the intended effect. The courts have repeatedly held in this context that evidence that an injunction has been effective is not evidence that the threat has dissipated; rather, it is evidence that the injunction has had its intended effect: see Ritchie J’s judgment in Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 134 at [64]; the judgment of Dexter Dias J in Shell Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 3130 (KB)at [111]-[112]; the judgment of Hill J in Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 207 (KB) and the judgment of Garnham J inin Rochdale at [57].

On the evidence before me there has been no material change since the Eyre J judgment. Accordingly, the approach that I have taken is that set out in Rochdale, focusing as Garnham J emphasised, on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton and [225] in particular.

The evidence before me indicates that the Injunction has been effective (see the citations from Ms Mehat’s statement above at [21] and [23]-[24].

Unauthorised encampments have continued to form. Indeed the last unauthorised encampment was relatively recent in early September 2025. Ms Mehat’s evidence also indicates that unauthorised encampments continue in areas near to the Borough.

The fact that the Borough remains a target for unauthorised encampments indicates that there is a proper justification for the Injunction to be renewed against Persons Unknown. It is telling that neighbouring areas that do not have similar injunctive relief have experienced unauthorised encampments with greater frequency. Ms Mehat explains in her statement that Thurrock has had 15 unauthorised encampments between January 2023 and 11 August 2025. Newham recorded six unauthorised encampments in the borough throughout 2024.

As part of the Claimant’s duty of full and frank disclosure Ms Pratt drew two particular matters to my attention.

The first is the fact that there was a delay in serving the Injunction. Ms Eastaff explains in her fourth witness statement at [13] that the service of the Injunction occurred between January 2025 and March 2025. She explains that “[a]t the relevant time, when the final Order was granted in October 2024, we experienced a large number of staff off sick simultaneously. This reduction in available resources directly impacted our capacity to carry out our duties in a timely manner and we were only able to deal with priority emergency matters. Unfortunately, we did not have the budget to recruit agency staff or arrange resources from elsewhere in the Council to undertake service of all 306 sites at the time. Consequently, as soon as capacity in the team increased in January 2025, service was undertaken swiftly on all sites.”

That delay might be said to undermine the need for injunctive relief. However, it is notable that there have been three unauthorised encampments since the Injunction was served, the third as recently as last month. In my judgment the delay in serving the Injunction does not materially detract from the need for injunctive relief.

The second is that the Claimant does not operate a transit site and that there is a shortfall in the provision of pitches for Gypsy and Traveller accommodation. Ms Warren in her statement explains that the five-year supply balance is a shortfall of 60 pitches. However, as Ms Warren explains at [23] of her statement:

“The assessed need addressed the longer term need of Gypsies, Travellers and Travelling Showpeople in the Borough and deals with a[n] issue different to that of the injunction. The assessed need reflects the needs of those who wish to set up a more permanent or semipermanent residence within the Borough, whereas the injunction is capturing those who are transiting through the area, with a propensity to leave waste, often linked to their commercial enterprises, dumped behind. Typically, those who are captured by the Council’s injunction are not those who want to stay in the Borough on a permanent or semi-permanent basis; it is not a case that they are forming unauthorised encampments because there is a shortfall in pitch provision”.

I am satisfied that on the basis of the foregoing I should extend the Injunction for a further period of twelve months as against Persons Unknown. If no application is made for it to be renewed, then it will expire by effluxion of time.

I have considered the draft Order that has been prepared and will grant it in those terms, subject to the modifications:

In my judgment there is no reason to depart from the usual position that no undertaking as to damages is required. No such undertaking was required by Eyre J, and the position has not materially changed since his judgment.

I invite the Claimant to prepare a revised draft of their proposed order reflecting this judgment.