Domestic & General Group Limited & Ors v Premier Protect Holdings Limited & Ors

Introduction

These are my reasons for the decisions which I announced on 26 June 2025 in respect of committal applications made by the claimants against three of the defendants, Abdelhak Akayour, Belal Ali and Mohamed Anoir Dhimi.

The background is fully set out in my judgment of 21 October 2024: [2024] EWHC 2654 (KB) (“the principal judgment”). I found that these three defendants and others had committed the torts of causing loss by unlawful means and conspiring to use unlawful means. I found that they did so by causing fraudulent misrepresentations to be made to the claimants’ customers with the intention of causing loss to the claimants.

As I mentioned in paragraphs 53 and 54 of the principal judgment, on 20 June 2023 the claimants issued contempt applications against Mr Akayour, Mr Ali and Apex Assure, on 11 December 2023 Cotter J found that Mr Akayour and Mr Ali were in contempt of court and the balance of the contempt applications, which concerns sanctions, was adjourned until after the trial.

On 2 May 2025 the claimants issued further committal applications against these defendants (“the 2025 committal applications”). In the course of the principal judgment, I made a number of adverse findings about these defendants. The aspects of the 2025 committal applications addressed in this judgment relate to some of those findings. I will refer to these as “the disputed allegations” because there is a dispute as to whether they should proceed to a hearing.

Each of these defendants accepted that the committal application against him should proceed in respect of at least one allegation of contempt. The disputed allegations were as follows:

CPR 81.3(5) provides as follows:

“Permission to make a contempt application is required where the application is made in relation to—

(a)

interference with the due administration of justice, except in relation to existing High Court or county court proceedings;

(b)

an allegation of knowingly making a false statement in any affidavit, affirmation or other document verified by a statement of truth or in a disclosure statement.”

It was common ground that:

In paragraph 44 of her judgment in Tinkler v Elliott [2014] EWCA Civ 564 Gloster LJ approved the following statement by HHJ Pelling QC of the principles applicable to an application for permission:

“… The approach to be adopted on applications for permission has been considered in a number of authorities. The principles that emerge are the following:

i)

In order for an allegation of contempt to succeed it must be shown that " in addition to knowing that what you are saying is false, you had to have known that what you are saying was likely to interfere with the course of justice” - see Edward Nield v. Loveday [2011] EWHC 2324 (Admin);

ii)

The burden of proof is on the party alleging the contempt who must prove each element identified above beyond reasonable doubt - see Edward Nield v. Loveday (ante);

iii)

A statement made by someone who effectively does not care whether it is true or false is liable as if that person knew what was being said was false - see Berry Piling Systems Limited v. Sheer Projects Limited [2013] EWHC 347 (TCC), Paragraph 28 - but carelessness will not be sufficient - see Berry Piling Systems Limited v. Sheer Projects Limited (ante), Paragraph 30(c);

iv)

Permission should not be granted unless a strong prima facie case has been shown against the alleged contemnor- see Malgar Limited v. RE Leach (Engineering) Limited [1999] EWHC 843 (Ch), Kirk v. Walton [2008] EWHC 1780 (QB), Cox J at paragraph 29 and Berry Piling Systems Limited v. Sheer Projects Limited (ante) at Paragraph 30(a);

v)

Before permission is given the court should be satisfied that

a)

the public interest requires the committal proceedings to be brought;

b)

The proposed committal proceedings are proportionate; and

c)

The proposed committal proceedings are in accordance with the overriding objective -

- see Kirk v. Walton (ante) at paragraph 29;

vi)

In assessing proportionality, regard is to be had to the strength of the case against the respondents, the value of the claim in respect of which the allegedly false statement was made, the likely costs that will be incurred by each side in pursuing the contempt proceedings and the amount of court time likely to be involved in case managing and then hearing the application but bearing in mind the overriding objective - see - Berry Piling Systems Limited v. Sheer Projects Limited (ante) at Paragraph 30(d);

vii)

In assessing whether the pubic (sic) interest requires that permission be granted, regard should be had to the strength of the evidence tending to show that the statement was false and known at the time to be false, the circumstances in which it came to be made, its significance, the use to which it was actually put and the maker's understanding of the likely effect of the statement bearing in mind that the public interest lies in bringing home to the profession and through the profession to witnesses the dangers of knowingly making false statements - see KJM Superbikes Limited v. Hinton [2008] EWCA Civ 1280, Moore-Bick LJ at Paragraphs 16 and 23; and

viii)

In determining a permission application, care should be taken to avoid prejudicing the outcome of the application if permission is to be given by avoiding saying more about the merits of the complaint than is necessary to resolve the permission application - see KJM Superbikes Limited v. Hinton (ante) at Paragraph 20.”

The claimants submitted that:

Mr Akayour submitted that:

I was not satisfied either that the case against Mr Akayour was strong enough to justify the committal application proceeding in respect of this allegation or that it was in the public interest for it to proceed. The allegation that he was a director of PRO is to be read as an allegation that he was in law a director and not, as Mr Goodfellow submitted, a “director” in some looser sense. There is sufficient uncertainty that the claimants may well not be able to prove to the criminal standard that Mr Akayour was a director of PRO. I decided to stay the committal application in respect of the disputed allegation against Mr Akayour.

The claimants submitted that:

Mr Ali submitted that:

I consider that there is a strong prima facie case against Mr Ali, who did not seek to argue that all of the statements which he made were true or that he believed them all to be true.

The contempt which Mr Ali has admitted was his failure to provide the witness statement ordered first by paragraph 8 of the order of 3 November 2022 and then by paragraph 2 of the order of 11 January 2023: see paragraphs 47(2)(b), 49(1) and 53(2) of the principal judgment. Those orders concerned Apex Assure’s customers and Mr Ali’s statements that Apex Assure had no customers, but not his statements about scripts and sales calls. For that reason, I refused permission in respect of Mr Ali’s statements to the effect that Apex Assure had no customers.

I accept that it is not in every case where a witness is found to have lied that it will be in the public interest for a committal application to proceed, but there is a strong prima facie case that Mr Ali’s allegedly false statements were intended to frustrate the disclosure process, on which the court relies to ensure that the parties are able to get at the truth, especially in a case such as the present, where the claimants’ case depended on documents in the possession of the defendants. Accordingly, I decided that it was in the public interest for the committal application to proceed in respect of Mr Ali’s statements about scripts and customer calls and I granted permission accordingly.

The claimants again submitted that there was compelling evidence that Mr Dhimi made false statements in his witness statement and that he knew that they were false. Mr Dhimi did not dispute that there was a strong prima facie case against him. He submitted, however, that the public interest had been satisfied by the principal judgment.

Mr Dhimi’s allegedly false statements supported his and UKSP’s case on issue 5, which was a central issue in this case and which I addressed at some length in paragraphs 62 to 101 of the principal judgment (and see also paragraph 169), i.e. whether UKSP was established to continue the business and operations previously conducted by Premier Protect and/or Apex Assure.

Another factor in relation to Mr Dhimi is that one of the contempt allegations which it is accepted can proceed against him is that when he gave evidence at trial he made a false statement that he did not knowingly have any business relationship with Mr Ali. This is the same as one of the false statements which he is alleged to have made in his witness statement. Since he is to be accused of contempt by making that statement in the witness box, it is appropriate for the claimants to be allowed to proceed with the allegation that he committed contempt when he made the same statement in his witness statement.

In those circumstances, I considered that it was in the public interest for the committal application to proceed in respect of the disputed allegations against Mr Dhimi and I granted permission accordingly.