North Warwickshire Borough Council v The Defendants Listed at Schedule A to this Judgment

This is the first annual review of an injunction granted in this matter to North Warwickshire Borough Council (“the Council”). The Council seek continuation of the existing order and power of arrest.

The Defendants are a combination of ‘Persons Unknown’ and named individuals connected with protest activity at an inland oil terminal known as Kingsbury Oil Terminal (“the Terminal”) in Kingsbury, Warwickshire. None of the Defendants attended or were represented at the review hearing.

The claim arose from protest activity that occurred in 2022 inside the perimeter and in the locality of the Terminal. The factual and procedural background to the claim is set out at [3]–[13] and [18]-[43] of the judgment that followed the trial: North Warwickshire Borough Council v Barber & Others [2024] EWHC 2254 (KB) (‘NWBC’).

On 6 September 2024, I granted a ‘final’ order, prohibiting protests within the boundary of the Terminal and restricting certain protest activity within the locality of the Terminal (‘the Injunction’). A power of arrest was attached to the Injunction, pursuant to s.27 of the Police and Justice Act 2006. The Injunction was to remain effective until 16:00 on 6 September 2027, subject to annual reviews. The hearing on 18 September 2025 was the first such review.

Paragraph 11 of the Injunction granted permission to the Council to serve the Injunction and power of arrest by alternative means. The service requirements fell into one of three categories. Those Defendants (all named individuals) identified in paragraph 11(a) could be served by recorded first class post. Those Defendants (again all named individuals) identified in paragraph 11(b) could be served by email. Those Defendants (some named individuals and some categories of persons unknown) identified in paragraph 11(c) could be served by various alternative methods specified in Schedule 3 to the Injunction. The Claimant was required to complete all of the steps identified in paragraph 1(a)-(h) of Schedule 3 to effect service on the paragraph 11(c) category of Defendants.

Paragraph 5 of the Injunction provided the time, date and location of the review hearing. Therefore, even if a Defendant had not been present in court when the Injunction was made on 6 September 2024, they would have been provided with notice of the review hearing on being served with the Injunction.

The Council has filed a number of certificates of service in respect of the Injunction and power of arrest. The paragraph 11(a) Defendants were deemed served on 18 September 2024. The paragraph 11(b) Defendants were deemed served on 16 September 2024.

In respect of service on the paragraph 11(c) Defendants, the Council relies on two certificates of service. The first is said to relate to the requirements of paragraph 1(b) – (h) of Schedule 3, and gives a deemed date of service of 26 September 2024. The second certificate relates to the erection of 17 A1 sized signs around the boundary perimeter of the Terminal, required by paragraph 1(a) of Schedule 3, and gives a deemed date of service of 21 December 2024. Mr Manning explained it had taken some time for the signage to be manufactured.

During the hearing, I queried whether the Council had complied with paragraph 1(b) of Schedule 3, namely the requirement to place a copy of the Injunction and power of arrest prominently at the entrances to the Terminal. That step did not appear to be referred to in either of the relevant certificates of service. After taking instructions, Mr Manning confirmed that the Council had not placed separate copies of the Injunction and power of arrest at the entrances. The Council’s rationale was that the A1 sized signage required by paragraph 1(a) of Schedule 3 provided information about the Injunction and power of arrest, and a QR code link to the documents, and such signage was placed prominently at the entrances. Mr Manning asked the Court to approve the alternative service steps taken to date as amounting to good service of the Injunction and power of arrest on the paragraph 11(c) Defendants. I indicated during the hearing that I was prepared to accede to that submission in circumstances where the aim of publicising the detail of the Injunction and power of arrest in prominent positions at the entrances to the Terminal had still been achieved, albeit via the A1 signage. I do however make it clear that the Court expects a party with the benefit of an alternative service provision to abide by all requirements directed by the Court. It is not appropriate for such a party to take a unilateral decision as to which steps to comply with, rather than making a formal application to vary the terms of alternative service.

Paragraph 6 of the Injunction required the Council to file and serve any updating evidence 21 days prior to the review hearing. The Council’s updating evidence is contained in the 5th witness statement of Mr Steven Maxey, the Council’s Chief Executive, dated 27 August 2025. The Injunction made no provision as to how the updating evidence should be served. It did not need to as paragraph 7 of an earlier order of Soole J, dated 6 December 2023, granted the Council permission to serve any document filed in the proceedings by the methods specified in paragraphs 7(i) to (iii) of that order. As with service of the Injunction, the Defendants were categorised into three groups. The first to be served by recorded first class post, the second by email and the third (which includes the persons unknown Defendants) by a variety of alternative service methods. The paragraph 7(i) Defendants were served by first class post on 30 August 2025. The paragraph 7(ii) Defendants were deemed served by email on 11 September 2025. The paragraph 7(iii) Defendants were deemed served by various alternative means on 28 August 2025.

In light of the aforementioned, I am satisfied that the Defendants have been served with the Injunction and power of arrest, and updating evidence, and were thus alive of the review hearing.

The importance of a review hearing, particularly in cases involving persons unknown, was emphasised by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council & others v London Gypsies and Travellers & others [2023] UKSC 47 (“Wolverhampton”). At [225] the review hearing:

“…will give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”

A review hearing is not an opportunity to revisit the original merits of the claim afresh. The proper focus of the review is to consider whether anything material has changed since the injunction and power of arrest were granted. Material changes may be factual and/or developments in the law since the order was granted. If there has been a material change or changes, the Court needs to question whether the scope of the injunction needs amending or indeed whether there remains a compelling need for any kind of injunction or power or arrest at all. Such an approach is consistent with the views expressed in a number of post-Wolverhampton cases including by Ritchie J in HS2 v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 1277 (KB) at [32]-[33], Hill J in Valero v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 207 (KB) (“Valero”) at [20]-[23], and Sweeting J in Esso Petroleum Company v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1768 (KB) (“Esso”) at [5]-[8].

The Council relies on the updating evidence in Mr Maxey’s 5^th witness statement. Mr Maxey has undertaken an internal review of the current need for an injunction and power of arrest, and remains of the view that they are necessary. His reasoning is as follows.

First, Mr Maxey states that Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion, the main protest groups with which known Defendants to the claim are affiliated, remain active. He points to the current homepage of Just Stop Oil’s website which reads “JUST GETTING STARTED” and boasts that civil resistance is how Just Stop Oil “won no new oil and gas licences in 2024.” The website continues “We know how to win, but it’s going to take all of us” and “A new revolutionary direct action campaign is coming. Help us build what’s next.”

Second, Mr Maxey states that the Council is still being notified of planed direct-action by other, unaffiliated climate action groups. He states that as recently as July 2025, the police informed the Council of information suggesting direct-action protests were being planned by environmentalists that summer. He expresses concern that the covert nature of operation of such groups makes it impossible for the Council or police to engage with those in charge of organising such protests to ascertain whether the Terminal is a target and, if so, to discuss how any protest can be conducted safely.

Third, Mr Maxey notes that the nature of risks posed by direct action or civil disobedience at the Terminal has not changed. The Terminal continues to operate and hold large volumes of exceptionally flammable products for distribution across the country.

Mr Maxey acknowledges that there have not been any further protests since the Injunction was granted but takes the view that the deterrent effect of the Injunction has been instrumental ensuring good order.

Mr Maxey gave short oral evidence at the review hearing to update matters since the signing of his 5^th statement. He addressed two matters:

I consider first whether there has been any material factual change(s) which calls into question the need or required scope of the Injunction.

The fact that there has not been any further protest activity at the Terminal since the Injunction was granted does not, of itself, provide evidence that the risk has abated. It is more likely that the Injunction and power of arrest have a deterrent effect. The logic of such an approach was endorsed by Hill J in Valero at [34]. The rationale of that conclusion is particularly pertinent in the index claim given the reduction in activity following the granting of the without notice interim injunction and, since September 2022, the cessation of protest activity. By the time of cessation of activity, contempt proceedings had resulted in the imprisonment of a number of protestors.

I do not take the view that there has been any material factual change that makes it appropriate to discharge the Injunction or power of arrest. I am satisfied that there remains a continued real and imminent risk of direct action. The well-publicised statement by Just Stop Oil in March 2025 that it was “hanging up the hi vis” was considered in July 2025 by Sweeting J in Esso at [25]. He concluded that the “announcement cannot be taken as an unequivocal and final renunciation of direct action.” The Council has provided evidence of the current wording on Just Stop Oil’s website. The references to “just getting started”, civil resistance and a “new revolutionary direct action campaign” very much suggest that Just Stop Oil do indeed have further direct action planned. I further accept Mr Maxey’s evidence that the Council received police intelligence as to protest activity by other environmentalists, unaffiliated to Just Stop Oil, as recently as July 2025.

If individuals are minded to take direct action or other protest activity, the Terminal remains a prominent target. The evidence before the Court is that the Terminal continues to operate as it did when the Injunction was granted. The Terminal remains a prominent cog in the supply chain of oil and gas products for consumption. As described in NWBC at [18]-[21], the Terminal is one of the largest oil terminals in the country, holding and transporting millions of litres of highly flammable fossil fuels. The potential consequences of fire or explosion at or in the locality of the Terminal remain extremely grave.

I have considered whether there has been any material change in the law since the Injunction was granted. Mr Manning properly drew the Court’s attention to three potential matters of law or procedure that arose from the decision of Nicklin J in MBR Acres Ltd & others v Curtin [2025] EWHC 331 (KB) (‘Curtin’):

At [356] of Curtin, Nicklin J concluded that “there is now no need carefully to define the category of “Persons Unknown” who are to be defendants to the claim…” In Esso at [28], Sweeting J considered the impact of Nicklin J’s decision in the context of an injunction review hearing. He noted differing approaches to the issue in various recent High Court decisions but concluded that the existing detailed description of the persons unknown defendants in Esso “best adheres to the guidance in Wolverhampton by identifying a class by reference to conduct…”

I considered the definition of the persons unknown defendants at the outset of the trial in the index case: see [13] of NWBC. Notwithstanding the comments made in Curtin, I am mindful of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Wolverhampton at [221] that “…where the persons sought to be subjected to the injunction are newcomers, the possibility of identifying them as a class by reference to conduct prior to what would be a breach (and, if necessary, by reference to intention) should be explored and adopted if possible.” I remain of the view that current detailed definition of the Persons Unknown defendants 19A, 19B, 19C and 19D best complies with the guidance in Wolverhampton and I do not consider it warrants amendment. There is thus no reason to amend the description of the Defendants in this case.

I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to interfere with the Injunction’s alternative service provisions in respect of the persons unknown Defendants. In so far as there is a tension between Curtin and Wolverhampton as to whether service on persons unknown is required, this Court is bound by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court made repeated references in Wolverhampton to the requirement to inform newcomers of an order. For example, at [230]: “…the obligation on the local authority to take steps actively to draw the order to the attention of all actual and potential respondents; to give any person potentially affects by it full information as to its terms and scope, and the consequences of failing to comply with it; and how any person affected by its terms may make an application for its variation or discharge…” Further, at [231]: “any application for such an order must in our view make full and complete disclosure of all the steps it proposes to take (i) to notify all persons likely to be affected by its terms…This will no doubt include placing notices in and around the relevant sites where this is practicable; placing notices on appropriate websites and in relevant publications; and giving notice to relevant community and charitable and other representative groups.” The alternative service provisions required by the Injunction remain consistent with the need for publication identified in Wolverhampton.

The requirement for permission before a contempt application could be brought was adopted in Curtin, and also by Fordham J ‘in the particular circumstances of the present case’ when granting an interim injunction in University of Cambridge v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 724 (‘Cambridge’) at [30]. However, at the review hearing in Esso, Sweeting J at [29] declined to impose such a requirement, noting that the courts already possess adequate mechanisms to address disproportionate committal application and that there was no evidence in the case before him that the claimants were bringing trivial committal applications.

I am not persuaded that it would be appropriate to add a permission requirement in the index case. Firstly, whether a permission requirement is appropriate is a fact specific case management decision. There is no evidence on the facts of this case that the Council, nor the police in utilising the power of arrest, have misused the contempt process. Secondly, the facts of the index case are materially different to Curtin, Cambridge and Esso in that a power of arrest exists. The activation of the power of arrest commences the contempt process, requiring an arrested defendant to be produced before a court within 24 hours. At [103] of NWBC, I discussed why a power of arrest was appropriate. Those reasons remain valid. The imposition of permission requirement would completely undermine the utility of the power of arrest.

In conclusion, I am satisfied that there have been no material changes to the facts, or any material legal developments, that warrant amendment or discharge of the Injunction and power of arrest. In accordance with paragraph 5 of the Injunction, a further review hearing will take place in 12 months.