Graham Harry Moore v Royal Mail Group Limited & Ors

This is the judgment of the Court to which both judges have contributed.

On 1 May 2025, a Parliamentary by-election was held for the Runcorn and Helsby Constituency. It is a matter of public record that the result was very close. Following a recount, the Reform UK candidate Sarah Pochin was elected, having secured six more votes than the Labour Party candidate. The Petitioner, Graham Moore, stood as the English Constitution Party candidate. He received 50 votes.

Pursuant to section 120 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (“the Act”), the sole method of questioning a parliamentary election is by way of presenting an election petition complaining of an undue election or undue return (“a parliamentary election petition”). The procedure for presenting a parliamentary election petition is set out in section 121 of the Act. In England and Wales, a petition must be presented to the High Court. The categories of people who may present a petition include candidates at the election and all those who voted or had a right to vote.

On 15 May 2025, Mr Moore presented an election petition to the High Court seeking to have the election declared void and for there to be an independent recount. He named four respondents: Emma Gilthorpe, who was at the relevant time the Chief Executive Officer of Royal Mail Group Limited; Mark Roberts, the Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary; Sarah Pochin MP; and the returning officer, Stephen Young. By an order of Master Armstrong sealed on 28 May 2025, Royal Mail Group Limited was substituted as first respondent in place of Emma Gilthorpe. In accordance with usual procedure, it has been directed that the trial of the election petition should take place not before 2 October 2025 in the parliamentary constituency of Runcorn and Helsby before an Election Court comprising two judges on the rota. It is important that any trial on an election petition takes place as soon as possible.

Each of the respondents has applied to dismiss the petition. In addition, Mr Moore has applied to vary the order of Master Armstrong dealing with substitution of the first respondent. It is those applications with which we are concerned.

Having heard submissions on the first and second respondents’ applications, we announced that we would allow those applications on the ground that there was no proper basis for their inclusion as respondents. We reserved our reasons while we proceeded to hear the third and fourth respondents’ applications, on which we reserved judgment.

An initial hearing on the petitioner’s application to set a date and time for trial took place on 13 June 2025. Prior to that hearing, the first respondent indicated an intention to apply for the petition to be struck out or dismissed before trial. The second respondent gave a similar indication at the hearing. Pursuant to rule 13 of the Election Petition Rules 1960 (‘the Rules’), a respondent may apply to the election court or to a Divisional Court to stay or dismiss a petition before trial. It was upon that basis that directions were given for the filing of any rule 13 applications and the hearing of such applications.

The first and second respondents both applied under rule 13. Both contended that the petition disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing it against them and that the law does not permit their inclusion as respondents to the petition. The first and second respondents also adopted arguments advanced by the third and fourth respondents to the effect that there were incurable defects in the petition such that the whole petition should be dismissed.

We dealt with the first and second respondents’ applications by first hearing the arguments as to whether they could be included as respondents to an election petition. Having concluded that they could not and therefore that the petition must be struck out against each of them, it was unnecessary to hear the first and second respondents on any of the other arguments. Indeed, it would have been improper to do so since they are not entitled to be respondents to the petition and accordingly have no standing on the wider issues.

Section 121(2) of the Act provides:

‘The member whose election or return is complained of is hereinafter referred to as the respondent, but if the petition complains of the conduct of a returning officer, the returning officer shall for the purpose of this Part of this Act be deemed to be a respondent.’

The nature of the complaints made in this case are such that the returning officer is deemed to be a respondent. It follows that the third and fourth respondents are properly named in the petition. However, the first and second respondents do not fall within the scope of section 121(2).

The scheme for parliamentary election petitions is an entirely statutory one. The High Court has no residual power or discretion to override the statutory scheme. There is no other provision within the Act permitting the joinder of respondents other than the elected member of parliament and the returning officer.

Mr Moore argues that he is entitled to join the first and second respondent ‘via common law principles’. The specific complaints made against the first respondent relate to the alleged non-delivery of election communication leaflets. Against the Cheshire Constabulary, Mr Moore raises allegations of harassment and failure to investigate election interference. Be that as it may, there is simply no statutory basis for the first and second respondents to be respondents to an election petition. Section 121(2) sets out who, by operation of law, is a respondent. It is not open to a petitioner to include any other parties as respondents. Contrary to Mr Moore’s argument that judges of the King’s Bench Division can apply the common law to go beyond the statute, the Court does not have any power to override the statutory provisions and to allow any other party to be a respondent to an election petition. None of the material Mr Moore placed before us demonstrates otherwise. The specific statutory process provided for by sections 120 and 121 of the Act does not provide a route to any legal remedy for the enforcement of common law rights or for seeking relief against third parties for alleged breaches of any statutory provisions.

Since the first and second respondents cannot be respondents to an election petition, it may not in fact be open to them to make an application to stay or dismiss the petition under rule 13. Certainly, we take the view that they are not entitled to be heard on whether the petition as a whole should be dismissed.

Section 157 of the Act provides:

“The High Court has, subject to the provisions of this Act, the same powers, jurisdiction and authority with respect to an election petition and the proceedings on it as if the petition were an ordinary action within its jurisdiction.”

The general case management powers of the High Court include the power to make an order of its own initiative (Civil Procedure Rules 3.3) and the power to strike out a statement of case (CPR 3.4).

Purporting to name someone as a respondent to a petition when that party cannot in law be a respondent amounts to an abuse of process. The procedure prescribed by the Act for challenging a parliamentary election cannot be used for litigating complaints against third parties. Further, it is not appropriate for third parties who are not in law entitled to be respondents to an election petition to be permitted to make representations on the substance or form of the petition.

In the interests of proper case management, we will declare that the first and second named respondents are not respondents to the petition. The petition should be struck out as against each of those parties and their names removed from the proceedings.

As a result of that decision, the petitioner’s application to vary the order of Master Armstrong falls away. Exactly the same considerations apply whether the first respondent is identified as Emma Gilthorpe or as Royal Mail Group Limited, or both.

We observe that the power to remove parties who are not properly named as respondents is part of the inherent power of the High Court, as preserved by section 157 of the Act. It is a power that can be exercised by any judge of the High Court. Had the first and second respondents invited the Court to take that course earlier, it could have been done at the hearing on 13 June 2025. Further, we take the view that it would have been more appropriate to make an application to strike out on behalf of Emma Gilthorpe rather than seeking to substitute the Royal Mail Group Limited. However, we do accept that the first and second respondents wished to give Mr Moore proper notice of their applications before advancing them. These matters may have a bearing on the exercise of our discretion in relation to the costs of the first and second respondent’s applications.

The third respondent’s application seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it has not been validly served upon her. In a statement in support of that application, she indicates that on or around 20 May 2025, she became aware that a bundle of documents had been sent to her parliamentary address at the House of Commons. She understood that the documents contained an election petition. She points out that this was neither her residential address nor was it an address nominated for service under the Civil Procedure Rules. She also contends that the precincts of Parliament are not an appropriate venue for the service of legal proceedings and says that it is long-established that legal processes may not be served on Members of Parliament within the precincts of the House without permission of the Speaker. Further, she says that as purported service was attempted on a sitting day, it was a contempt of Parliament. In those circumstances, she argues that not only was the attempted service procedurally defective but also that it was improper in constitutional terms.

The fourth respondent also relies upon the invalidity of service upon the third respondent. The argument, in essence, is that the legislative requirements are strict and that if the petition has not been validly served upon the successful candidate, it must be dismissed. Procedural irregularity cannot now be cured retrospectively and time for effective service cannot be extended. In addition, the fourth respondent’s application relies upon other defects in the form of the petition, namely the inclusion of the first and second respondents and failure to state the result of the election and the date of return as required by rule 4(1)(b) of the Rules.

The respondents contend that these errors are fatal and that this Court has no option but to dismiss the petition.

The petitioner resists these applications. He contends that he has a fundamental right to contest the integrity of the election. He argues that relying upon procedural technicalities over substantive rights undermines the bedrock of English law and violates the constitutional, common law and human rights of English subjects. He further submits that denying him a trial would be a breach of his Article 6 ECHR rights. He denies that service on the third respondent was invalid, maintaining that it was not a breach of parliamentary privilege and that it was reasonable to send the petition to the third respondent’s place of business. He indicates that he also sent the documents via email on 16 May 2025 and received read receipts.

In order to consider the merits of the respective cases on the third and fourth respondents’ applications it is necessary to refer in more detail to the statute and rules bearing on the issues.

Section 121(3)-(5) of the Act provides as follows:

“(3)

The petition shall be in the prescribed form, state the prescribed matters and be signed by the petitioner, or all the petitioners if more than one, and shall be presented to the High Court …

(4)

The petition shall be presented by delivering it to the prescribed officer or otherwise dealing with it in the prescribed manner, and the prescribed officer shall send a copy of it to the returning officer of the constituency to which the petition relates, who shall forthwith publish it in that constituency.

(5)

The petition shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed.”

The ‘prescribed officer’ referred to in subsection 121(4) is that Master of the King’s Bench Division chosen by the Lady Chief Justice: section 157(4). ‘Prescribed’ means ‘prescribed by rules of court’: section 185. The rules of Court setting out the relevant prescriptions are the Rules.

Section 122 of the Act provides, in part:

“1)

Subject to the provisions of this section, a parliamentary election petition shall be presented within 21 days after the return has been made to the Clerk of the Crown … of the member to whose election the petition relates.”

Section 122(5) provides for particular circumstances in which a petition may, with the leave of the High Court, be amended to add an allegation of an illegal practice. Those circumstances are not relevant here.

Section 136 of the Act deals with the provision of security for costs. It provides in part:

“(1)

At the time of presenting an election petition or within three days afterwards the petitioner shall give security for all costs which may become payable by him to any witness summoned on his behalf or to any respondent.

(2)

The security shall be—

(a)

in the case of a parliamentary election petition, such amount not exceeding £5,000 as the High Court or a judge of the High Court, directs on an application made by the petitioner; …

and shall be given in the prescribed manner by recognisance entered into by any number of sureties not exceeding four or by a deposit of money, or partly in one way and partly in the other …

(3)

Within the prescribed time after giving the security the petitioner shall serve on the respondent in the prescribed manner—

(a)

a notice of the presentation of the petition and of the amount and nature of the security, and

(b)

a copy of the petition.”

The Rules contain the following provisions of relevance:

“rule 2

…

(4)

Subject to the provisions of the Act and these Rules, the practice and procedure of the High Court shall apply to a petition under these Rules as if it were an ordinary claim within its jurisdiction, notwithstanding any different practice, principle or rule on which the committees of the House of Commons used to act in dealing with election petitions.

…

rule 4

(1)

A petition shall be in the form set out in the Schedule to these Rules or a form to the like effect with such variations as the circumstances may require, and shall state-

(a)

in which of the capacities mentioned in section 121(1) or section 128(1) of the Act the petitioner or each of the petitioners presents the petition;

(b)

the date and result of the election to which the petition relates, showing in the case of a parliamentary election the date on which the return was made to the Clerk of the Crown of the member declared to have been elected;

(c)

in the case of a petition mentioned in subjection (2) or (3) of section 122 or subsection (2), (3) or (4) of section 129 of the Act, the date from which the time for the presentation of the petition is to be calculated; and

(d)

the grounds on which relief is sought, setting out with sufficient particularity the facts relied on but not the evidence by which they are to be proved;

and shall conclude with a prayer setting out particulars of the relief claimed.

(2)

The petition shall be presented by filing it and at the same time leaving three copies at the election petitions office.

rule 5

(1)

Within three days after the presentation of the petition the petitioner shall apply without notice being served on any Respondent within the meaning of Rule 6 to a master to fix the amount of security for costs which he is to give pursuant to section 136 of the Act.

…

rule 6

Within five days after giving the security the petitioner shall serve on the respondent within the meaning of section 121(2) or section 128(2) of the Act and on the Director of Public Prosecutions a notice of the presentation of the petition and of the nature and amount of the security which he has given, together with a copy of the petition and of the affidavit accompanying any recognisance.

Service shall be effected in the manner in which a claim form is served and a certificate of service shall be filed as soon as practicable after service has been effected.

…

rule 19

Any period of time prescribed by Rules 5, 6 or 7 shall be computed in accordance with section 119 of the Act and shall not be varied by order or otherwise, but save as aforesaid rules 2.8 to 2.11 and 3.1(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 shall apply to any period of time prescribed by these Rules as if it were prescribed by the Civil Procedure Rules.

…”

The ‘return’ to be submitted to the Clerk of the Crown, referred to in s. 122(1) of the Act is the subject of specific rules contained in the Parliamentary Elections Rules, which are scheduled to the Act (‘the Elections Rules’). Paragraph 50(1) of the Elections Rules provides:

“50 (1) In a contested election, when the result of the poll has been ascertained, the returning officer shall forthwith –

(a)

declare to be elected the candidate to whom the majority of votes has been given;

(b)

return his name to the Clerk of the Crown; and

(c)

give public notice of his name and of the total number of votes given for each candidate together with the number of rejected ballot papers under each head shown in the statement of rejected ballot papers.”

Paragraph 51 of the Elections Rules provides, in part:

“(1)

The returning officer shall return the name of the member elected by endorsing on the writ a certificate in the form in the Appendix.

…

(2)

The returning officer may, on receiving a receipt, deliver the writ with the certificate endorsed on it to the postmaster of the principal post office of the place of election or an official designated for that purpose by a universal postal service provider … for the area in which the election is being held or to his deputy …

(3)

The designated official or his deputy shall send the writ so endorsed by the first post, free of charge, under cover to the Clerk of the Crown with the words “Election Writ and Return” endorsed on it.”

The ‘manner in which a claim form is served’, as referred to in rule 6(2) of the Rules is governed by CPR Part 6. CPR r. 6.3(1) provides:

“A claim form may be served by any of the following methods – (a) personal service in accordance with rule 6.5; (b) first class post …; (c) leaving it at a place specified in rule 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 or 6.10; (d) fax or other means of electronic communication, in accordance with Practice Direction 6A; or (e) any method authorised by the court under rule 6.15.”

CPR r. 6.9(2) provides that where the method of service is by first class post, or by leaving a document at an address, the relevant place of service on an individual is the usual or last known residence of that individual. CPR r. 6.9(3) provides that where a claimant has reason to believe that the usual or last known residence of the individual is an address at which the defendant no longer resides, ‘the claimant must take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant’s current residence…(“current address”)’.

CPR r. 6.9(4) provides that: ‘Where, having taken the reasonable steps required by paragraph (3), the claimant – (a) ascertains the defendant’s current address, the claim form must be served at that address; or (b) is unable to ascertain the defendant’s current address, the claimant must consider whether there is – (i) an alternative place where; or (ii) an alternative method by which, service may be effected.’ CPR r. 6.9(5) provides that: ‘If, under paragraph (4)(b), there is such a place where or a method by which service may be effected, the claimant must make an application under rule 6.15.’ CPR r. 6.9(6) provides that: ‘Where paragraph (3) applies, the claimant may serve on the defendant’s usual or last known address in accordance with the table in paragraph (2) where the claimant – (a) cannot ascertain the defendant’s current residence or place of business; and (b) cannot ascertain an alternative place or an alternative method under paragraph (4)(b).’

CPR r. 6.15 provides: ‘(1) Where it appears to the court that there is a good reason to authorise service by a method or at a place not otherwise permitted by this Part, the court may make an order permitting service by an alternative method or at an alternative place. (2) On an application under this rule, the court may order that steps already taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant by an alternative method or at an alternative place is good service.’

Given the facts of the present case, and the terms of rule 2(4) of the Rules, the following further provision of the CPR is also of potential relevance:

“3.10

Where there has been an error of procedure such as a failure to comply with a rule or practice direction –

(a)

the error does not invalidate any step taken in the proceedings unless the court so orders; and

(b)

the court may make an order to remedy the error.”

What happened in the present case may be summarised as follows. Mr Moore’s petition was presented to the High Court on 15 May 2025. It identified him as the petitioner, and named the four respondents we have already referred to. It identified the relevant election as being that for the Parliamentary seat of Runcorn and Helsby, stated the date of the election as 1 May 2025, and the date of the declaration of the result as 2 May 2025. There was no distinct statement of the date of the return to the Clerk of the Crown. The petition referred to Ms Pochin MP as ‘the elected candidate for Reform UK’; and to the fact that Mr Moore had received 50 votes. It contained a hypertext link to the results as put on the web at https://hbcnewsroom.co.uk, which is on the website of Halton Borough Council, and set out the full results. The petition further included what Mr Moore contended were ‘Grounds of Challenge’ to the result of the election, ‘Evidence’ therefor, and the ‘Relief Sought’, and was signed by Mr Moore.

On 15 May 2025 Mr Moore applied to the High Court for an order to set security for costs in support of his election petition. On the same day, Master Eastman set the amount of security for costs required at £5000, to be paid into the Court Funds Office within three working days. Also on 15 May 2025, Mr Moore paid the sum of £5000 into court as security for costs; and issued an application notice seeking an order setting a date and time for trial.

At 18.58 on 16 May 2025, Mr Moore sent an email to Ms Pochin MP, as well as to Val Phillips, Emma Gilthorpe, Mark Reaney and legal.services@cheshire.police.uk, which said:

Mr Moore sent Ms Pochin MP (and the other respondents) a copy of the petition (as well as the order as to the amount of security, and a copy of the cheque by which he had deposited funds at the Court Funds Office) by post (Royal Mail Special Delivery). That to Ms Pochin MP was addressed to her at the House of Commons. A Royal Mail ‘Track your Item’ document indicates that the item was delivered on 19 May 2025. Ms Pochin MP’s First Witness Statement, at paragraph 3, states:

We regard it as clear from the above that Ms Pochin MP had personally received a hard copy of the petition on or before 20 May 2025.

During the course of the hearing, we were referred to a number of authorities bearing on the importance of certainty and promptness in the process of considering election petitions, and on the extent to which the court can permit any departures from the requirements of the Rules. We need to refer to five.

Ahmed v Kennedy, Ullah v Pagel [2002] EWCA Civ 1793, [2003] 1 WLR 1820 is a decision of the Court of Appeal. In the two cases involved, the petitioners had presented their petitions in time, and had served copies of the petition within the five day period prescribed, but had not given notice within that time of the amount and nature of the security provided. The Divisional Court had found that there had been a non-compliance with s. 136(3) of the Act, which was a mandatory requirement, and that the petitions must be struck out. That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The main judgment was given by Simon Brown LJ. A central aspect of the petitioners' case was that, whatever the Rules provided, any failures to comply with them were subject to the exercise of the High Court's discretionary powers under the CPR, notably CPR r. 3.10 and 3.1(2)(a). That argument was rejected by Simon Brown LJ, who held (at para 23) that the legislation dictates the following hierarchy of provisions: first, Part III of the Act and the Rules made under section 182(1); next the CPR; finally any residual 'practice, principle or rule' of the House of Commons (likely to concern matters such as agency and scrutiny).

The petitioners’ case was that their non-compliance was of the third kind. Simon Brown LJ rejected that contention, holding that there was a complete failure to give the notice within the prescribed time since the notice served was simply not the notice required, because there had been no notice at all of the amount and nature of the security. He stated, however, (at para 28):

“I accept that it might be otherwise in other cases. Suppose, for example, the figure for security were misstated or certain particulars were omitted or a petition was served with only its alternate pages copied. The examples were multiplied in argument. I readily accept that not every typographical and other such error will necessarily constitute non-compliance with the legislative requirements. Precisely which errors are remediable and which fatal it is unnecessary to decide. It is sufficient for present purposes to hold that the document served must at least address each of the two specified requirements, the petition and the security, before there can properly be said to have been timeous compliance with this legislation.”

At paras 31-32, he said:

“31.

As already indicated … I find it impossible to regard the non-compliance in the present case as a curable irregularity …. It strikes me rather as a fundamental failure to effect timeous service of a proper notice.

32.

Are the failures here, therefore, such as to require the striking out of these petitions, there being no discretion in the court to do otherwise? Despite [the] able submissions to the contrary, I am persuaded that they are. Timeous service is an imperative in these cases. Rule 19 is very strong. CPR r.2.11, for example, ordinarily allows for parties to agree variations of specified time limits. Rule 19 disapplies it in rule 6 cases.”

At para 40 Simon Brown LJ referred to -

“… Parliament's insistence upon the strict compliance by both parties with the series of requirements imposed by section 136 of the 1983 Act to ensure that any petition is made ready for listing and disposal as speedily as possible. Flexibility and discretion are all very well but there is merit too in certainty, not least in the field of electoral challenge. It is undesirable to have someone serving in a public office with doubts surrounding the legitimacy of his election.”

May LJ agreed with Simon Brown LJ. So did Clarke LJ, though he gave his own reasons, which included the following passages:

“51.

On the facts … no document which either purports to be or can even arguably be said to be a notice of the nature and amount of the security was given by the petitioners in either case. This is not therefore a case in which it can be said that a defective notice was given in time. It is a case in which no notice was given at all in either case.

52.

It follows that in order to be able to proceed each petitioner needs an enlargement or extension of time to serve a notice. Since the court has no jurisdiction to grant such an enlargement or extension, it follows that these petitions cannot proceed and the appeals must be dismissed.

53.

… However, it does appear to me to be important that we should not seek to decide questions which do not arise for decision on these facts ….

54.

In particular, all the cases to which Simon Brown LJ has referred … are cases in which no notice was given within the prescribed period. None of them is a case in which a defective notice was given timeously. I would leave open for future decision whether the court has a discretion, through section 157(3) of the 1983 Act and CPR r.3.10, to treat a defect in a timeous notice as a failure to comply with a relevant rule. Alternatively, a court might treat a notice which substantially complied with the provisions of section 136(3) as sufficient compliance with it. As Simon Brown LJ puts it, precisely which errors are remediable and which fatal it is unnecessary to decide.

55.

I would, however, add this. Although I would leave these questions for future consideration in the light of such rules as then apply, even if the court had a discretion in such a case, I would expect it to be exercised in a petitioner's favour only in a very rare case, because I can see no reason in principle why petitioners and their solicitors should not read the relevant provisions of the 1983 Act and the 1960 Rules, which are quite simple, and apply them in accordance with their terms.”

The second authority, Saghir v Najib [2005] EWHC 417 (QB) was a decision of the QB Divisional Court, composed of Richards and Tugendhat JJ. That was a case relating to a local election in respect of Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council. The facts were that the petitioners had not, within the five day period after the giving of security, served notice of the presentation of the petition, or served a copy of the petition. What they had done was serve notice of a different document, not the petition presented (paragraphs 40-44). They had also not served, within the five day period, any notice of the security which they had given (paragraphs 45-49). In those circumstances, Richards J, with whom Tugendhat J agreed, said (at 50-51):

“[50] The petitioners' failure to serve the required notice of the petition or of the security brings this case squarely within the reasoning in Ahmed. As in Ahmed, this was not merely a case of deficient service within the time prescribed: on proper analysis, no notice at all was served within the time prescribed. Indeed, the present case can be regarded as an even stronger one on its facts than Ahmed, since in this case neither limb of the notice requirements was complied with. On the basis of Ahmed it is clear that such non-compliance with the procedural rules cannot be remedied and must lead to the striking out of the petition.

[51] Thus the question left open in Ahmed, as to whether the court has a discretion to validate or overlook a defective notice served timeously, does not in my view arise for decision after all. I should, however, make clear that if the court did have a discretion to cure the defects in this case, which in my view it does not, I would not exercise that discretion so as to cure them. The petitioners’ various failures are too extensive, and their conduct insufficiently meritorious, to warrant an exceptional exercise of discretion in their favour.”

The third case is Scarth v Amin [2008] EWHC 2886 (QB), [2009] PTSR 827, again a decision of a QB Divisional Court, comprised of Tugendhat and Christopher Clarke JJ. There, one of the arguments which counsel for the returning officer (as here Mr Straker KC) had made was that the petition in that case was defective because it had not stated the number of votes given to each candidate. Mr Straker had relied on the terms of rule 50 of the Local Elections (Principal Areas) (England and Wales) Rules 2006, in relation to what the returning officer had to state by way of declaration of the result.

At [14]-[17] Tugendhat J (with whom Christopher Clarke J agreed) said:

“[14] In our judgment rule 4 of the 1960 Rules does not require the petition to state all the matters of which rule 50 of the 2006 Rules requires the returning officer to give notice at the time when the result of a poll on a contested election has been ascertained.

[15] We arrive at this conclusion as a simple matter of construction. But there would be objections in principle to the construction suggested by Mr Straker. The requirements of rule 4 are mandatory, so that if they are not complied with the petition will be struck out. And by s.129(6) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 a petition may only be amended within the 21 day period allowed by s.129(1) for the presentation of a petition, which has long since expired. It would follow from the submission of Mr Straker that the omission of the name of one unsuccessful candidate, or of the votes cast for him, might nullify a petition.

[16] All legislation must be interpreted in the light of the objective which the legislature must be taken to have been pursuing. There are competing public interests at stake. On the one hand, the rules requiring timely and proper presentation of a petition are strict, because it is in the public interest that there should be early clarity as to who has been elected. But this public interest does not, in our judgment, require such a construction of rule 4.

[17] On the other hand, there is a countervailing public interest that there should be free elections “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people”: see Art 3 of the First Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights and Sch 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This principle has long been recognised in English law, and goes back before the Bill of Rights Act 1688 article 8 (“That Election of Members of Parliament ought to be free”). For there to be free elections there must be a procedure for determining what opinion the people have expressed in cases where an election is questioned, and for elections to declared void in appropriate cases. It would be wrong in principle to adopt an interpretation of the 1960 Rules which placed conditions upon the presentation of valid petitions which were more restrictive than necessary to achieve the certainty that is required, and which obstructed the determination of what opinion the people had expressed.”

The fourth is the decision in Miller v Bull [2009] EWHC 2640 (QB), [2010] 1 WLR 1861, a decision of Tugendhat J. In that case, the returning officer for a parish council election declared that the successful candidate had been elected without contest and notified the petitioner that his nomination was invalid. The petitioner wished to challenge the returning officer’s decision, and presented a petition to the court together with security for costs. Although he sent a copy of the petition to and served a notice of its presentation in due time, he did not comply with the obligation to serve on them, within the five day period, any notice of the amount and nature of the security which he had given. He had later done so, but not until after the five days had passed. The petitioner applied for a retrospective extension of time for compliance.

Tugendhat J held that, construed in accordance with its natural meaning and in accordance with the authority of Ahmed v Kennedy, rule 19 of the Rules would preclude the grant of an extension of time pursuant to CPR r. 3.1(2)(a) of the time limits prescribed in rule 6(1) of the Rules, and the court would have not power to extend them. However, he held that rule 19 of the Rules, so construed, was a disproportionate measure and incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR and A3P1 of its First Protocol. He further held that he was not bound to come to the same conclusion as to the meaning of rule 19 as the Court of Appeal had given it in Ahmed v Kennedy because, since the decision in that case, amendments had been made to the Rules (including rule 19) by the Election Petition (Amendment) Rules 2003 (SI 2003/972). Rule 19 had been amended so that, inter alia, the word ‘varied’ had replaced the word ‘enlarged’ which had appeared in the original version of the Rules. At [92] he said:

“It follows that in my judgment I am not bound to come to the same conclusion as to the meaning of the current version of rule 19 as the Court of Appeal came to in relation to the pre-2003 version they were considering. On the contrary, having reached the view that I have, I am bound to disregard the apparent prohibition in rule 19 upon the Court enlarging the time for compliance with rule 6 that occurred in the present case, in so far as that would have the effect of making the proceedings a nullity.”

Before us, Mr Straker KC submitted that Miller v Bull was wrongly decided, and that Tugendhat J had been bound by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ahmed v Kennedy. He referred to the fact that in Stoddart & Hume v Gartland & Little [2014] EWHC 2817 (QB), Supperstone J, with whom Jay J agreed, said that he would have taken a different view from Tugendhat J as to whether Ahmed v Kennedy remained binding (see at [16]). We are firmly of the view, with respect to Tugendhat J, that Ahmed v Kennedy was not capable of being distinguished in Miller v Bull, and that the changes made to the Rules by the 2003 amendments did not have the effect that that decision was no longer binding on the judge.

On the other hand, we agree with and have found of assistance the following parts of the reasoning of Tugendhat J in Miller v Bull:

“[43] It seemed to me that the major interest at stake in an election petition is not the private right of a petitioner, but the rights of the public. There is a public interest that there should be free elections held "under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people": see art 3 of the First Protocol (P1-3) of ECHR and Sch 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”). This principle has long been recognised in English law. The Statute of Westminster (1275) 3 Edw 1 ch 5 (“… elections ought to be free …”), and the Bill of Rights Act 1688 art 8 (“That Election of Members of Parliament ought to be free") are both in force to this day. For there to be free elections there must be a procedure for determining what opinion the people have expressed in those cases where an election is questioned, and for elections to be declared void in appropriate cases.

…

[78] In the light of the fact that the Petitioner was not legally represented at the material time, and the fact that it is now commonly the case that petitioners are not represented (at least at the stage when the present the petition), I also note the observation of Grove J [in] Williams v Tenby at p138: “I think the petitioners in these cases are advised by competent persons, and ought to pursue the provisions of the Act.”

[79] Grove J was speaking of a time when the franchise, and so those who were able to present petitions, was restricted to men who fulfilled a property qualification. It may be for that reason that he was able to say that petitioners were then advised by competent persons. The franchise is now universal. … It is important that the law should be proportionate for the whole electorate. While there may be more educated voters in the twentieth and twenty first centuries than there were in the nineteenth century, the electorate now includes not only people who have the means to pay solicitors, but many who do not have such means. It includes both those who are well, and not so well educated, and those who are accustomed to reading legal texts, and those who are not. It also includes those whose first language may not be English, and those who suffer from impaired eyesight, as well as disabilities of all kinds, whether from birth or by reason of illness or age.”

The final authority to which we need to refer at this stage is the decision of the Divisional Court, composed of Popplewell and Jeremy Baker JJ, in Ireland v Dorries [2015] EWHC 2781 (QB), [2016] 1 WLR 571. That was a case in which the petitioner had presented an election petition on 28 May 2015, and on 2 June 2015 sent it by first class post to the constituency office of the respondent in the constituency. The evidence in that case as to the respondent’s knowledge of the petition was summarised by Popplewell J at paragraphs [6]-[7] as follows:

“[6] Ms Dorries was at the time conducting her Parliamentary duties in London according to her evidence. Her evidence is that she did not receive those documents until 10 June 2015, although she was aware of the existence and some of the content of the petition before then. She was first aware of the existence of the petition on Monday 1 June when Mr Ireland announced on his Twitter account that it had been issued. On 4 June she was telephoned by a Central Bedfordshire Council Legal Services Officer to be told that they had received a copy of the petition and that it bore the Association address. On the same day she was sent an email from the Guardian newspaper purporting to quote what was said to be the key extract from the petition and asking for her comment. She declined to comment because she had not seen the petition.

[7] After 4 June, when she learnt that the petition had apparently been sent to the Association address, she asked her personal assistant to collect it, but the latter was unable to attend for personal reasons until Monday 8 June when she collected it and sent it by Recorded Delivery to Ms Dorries’ office in Westminster. Her evidence is that she opened it on Wednesday 10 June, although in the application notice it is said that she received it on 9 June. It is her evidence that the Association office is a small office staffed by volunteers which, apart from the period of the election campaign when it was used as her headquarters, is usually only open once a week on a Monday morning.”

On 10 June 2015 the petitioner had applied without notice for retrospective permission to serve the petition at an alternative place, namely the address to which it had been posted, pursuant to CPR r. 6.15. The master made an order that service of the petition at the address to which it had been sent was good service, and that the petition was deemed to have been served on 4 June 2015. The respondent applied to have that order set aside and the petition dismissed on the ground that the court had no power to make an order for alternative service of an election petition under CPR r. 6.15. It was common ground that the constituency office had not been a usual or last known address of the respondent, and that there was only timeous service of the petition and notice of the matters required by the Act and Rules if the master’s order was validly made (paragraph 19).

The Divisional Court first considered whether the court had power to permit service by an alternative method prospectively under CPR r. 6.15(1), and concluded that it had. This was explained by Popplewell J at [22] as follows:

“Addressing first the question of whether service by an alternative method is permissible in relation to an election petition where what is sought is a prospective order under rule 6.15(1) I have concluded that such service is permitted by the statutory framework. Sections 121(5) and 136(3) of ROPA require service to be within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner. The prescribed time and manner mean those prescribed in the rules which provide a hierarchy: see Ahmed v Kennedy [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1820. Rule 6.2 of EPR prescribes that service is to be in the manner in which a claim form is served. CPR rule 6.3 identifies the permitted methods of service for that purpose. CPR rule 6.3(e) specifically provides that alternative service pursuant to an order made under rule 6.15 is a valid and permitted method of service. If such an order is sought and made in advance of the expiry of the five day limit (set out in EPR rule 6.1), so that no question of EPR rule 19 coming into play arises, there is in my view nothing in the statutory framework to prevent such service falling within the range of permitted modes of service which are prescribed.”

The Divisional Court then considered the issue of whether the court had power to validate service retrospectively under CPR r. 6.15(2). The court preferred to express no view on that question. At [26] Popplewell J said this:

“[26] That then leads to the second aspect of the jurisdictional question, which is whether there is a power to validate retrospectively under rule 6.15(2) when the application has not been made or heard prior to the expiry of the five day period imposed by EPR rule 6. That brings into play questions as to whether granting retrospective validation would cut across EPR rule 19 and in particular the prohibition in that rule on extending periods of time. I prefer for my part to express no view on that question and it is unnecessary to do so for the purposes of this case. That is because I am persuaded that if the power exists under rule 6.15(2) this is not an appropriate case in which that power should be exercised.”

Popplewell J then summarised the principles on which a retrospective validation might be granted as follows:

“[27] The principles to be applied in cases of civil claims have recently been authoritatively identified by the Supreme Court in the case of Abela v Baadarani [2013] 1 WLR 2043. The main principles are these. An order under rule 6.15(2) can only be made if in all the circumstances of the case there is good reason to do so. That involves a value judgment based on an evaluation of a number of different factors. The mere fact that the defendant has learnt of the existence and content of the claim form cannot without more constitute a good reason to make an order under rule 6.15(2), but it is a critical factor. The most important function of service is to ensure that the content of the claim form is brought to the attention of the defendant. Another highly relevant factor is whether the defendant has shown himself unwilling to cooperate with service of proceedings. Another highly relevant factor is whether it is impossible or impracticable to effect service without an order from the court under rule 6.15(2).”

At [28]-[29] Popplewell J added that, in the context of election petitions and in view of the public interest in speedy certainty reflected in rules 6 and 19 of the Rules, any case for retrospective validation ‘must have an additional degree of cogency and force’.

Popplewell J then conducted an assessment of whether retrospective validation was, in that case, warranted. He concluded that it was not. The first factor militating against it was that service by post to the constituency office ‘did not bring the existence or content of the petition to the knowledge of Ms Dorries’ (paragraph 30). Second, that ‘there was no attempt in this case to effect personal service on Ms Dorries’ (paragraph 31). In this context it was contemplated that she might have been served at the House of Commons. There was a dispute as to whether that would have constituted a contempt of Parliament in the absence of permission of the House, but ‘leave could have been sought from the Speaker’. Thirdly there had been no sufficient attempt to discover her residential address so as to effect valid postal service (paragraph 32). Fourth no attempt had been made to use other methods to bring the existence and contents of the petition to the knowledge of Ms Dorries (paragraph 33). Fifth, that there had been no explanation of the delay in seeking an order under CPR r. 6.15(2), notwithstanding that the petitioner ‘was advised by legal advisers who must be taken to have been aware of the statutory framework and the applicable procedural provisions’ (paragraph 34). And, sixthly, that there had been no failure on the part of Ms Dorries to cooperate in service being effected.

Given the factual and legal background which we have set out, we will now consider in turn the matters relied upon by the third and fourth respondents in support of their contention that the petition should be dismissed at this stage.

The fourth respondent submitted to the court that the first and second respondents should not have been made respondents to the petition. We did not understand him to submit that, because of their being named and a case made against them as respondents in the petition, that of itself rendered the petition irremediably defective. If that submission was intended to be made, we would reject it. We see no basis in the Act or the Rules for saying that a petition is invalid because it contains what, on the basis of our holding above, is an impermissible naming of persons as respondents who should not be named, or the inclusion of a case against them as respondents which should not have been included. Provided that the petition meets the relevant requirements in relation to the proper respondent(s) to a petition, then we consider that the inclusion of irrelevant allegations against persons who cannot be respondents does not render the petition invalid.

The fourth respondent did, however, contend that the fact that the petition had not stated the date on which the return was made to the Clerk of the Crown meant that it was not ‘in the prescribed form’ and did not ‘state the prescribed matters’ as required by s. 121(3) of the Act; further that the petition could not be amended, nor the defect remedied; and thus the petition had to be dismissed under rule 13 of the Rules.

Mr Straker KC accepted that all the points taken by the fourth respondent were ‘technical’. That is certainly an accurate description of this one. As set out above, by paragraph 50 of the Elections Rules, the returning officer is to make the return of the name of the successful candidate ‘forthwith’ after the result of the poll has been ascertained. Under paragraph 51(4) of the Elections Rules it is provided that if the return is being made by post, it is to be sent by the first post. It is thus clear from these rules themselves that the return will happen very shortly after the result has been announced.

As regards petitions, the only significance under the Act and Rules of the date of the return is that, subject to the exceptions provided for in subsections 122 (2) and (3), a parliamentary election petition must be presented within 21 days after the return has been made to the Clerk of the Crown. Here, the petition was presented on 15 May 2025, well within 21 days of the date of the election, the date of the ascertainment and publication of the result, and the date of the return (which we have not been told but which can have been no earlier than 2 May 2025).

In our view, the correct construction of rule 4 of the Rules is that it is not necessary for the petition separately to state the date of the return if there is a sufficient statement of the date on which the returning officer had an obligation to make the return. The wording of rule 4 is that the petition ‘shall state … the date and result of the election …, showing in the case of a parliamentary election the date on which the return was made…’ (emphasis added). If, as here, the petition states the date on which the election was conducted and date on which the result was declared, then there is a sufficient ‘showing’ of the date on which the return was made, because the returning officer had an obligation to make the return ‘forthwith’. To require that there should be a separate specification of the date of the return – which, other than as a deduction from the date of the declaration of the result, may well not be within the knowledge of a petitioner – serves simply to add a technical requirement, which might well not be understood by petitioners (many of whom, as Tugendhat J pointed out in Miller v Bull, may be unrepresented), to no real purpose.

If we are wrong as to that construction of rule 4, then we consider that this is a case of an error of procedure, constituted by a failure to comply with a rule, and, pursuant to CPR r. 3.10 this does not of itself invalidate the petition, and the court can make an order remedying the defect. We do not consider that there is any inconsistency with Ahmed v Kennedy in holding that CPR 3.10 is of application in this case. As we have set out above, Ahmed v Kennedy was a case in which there was non-compliance with the Act itself, in that there had been no notice, within the prescribed time, of the security provided, and the only suggested way of remedying that would have been by virtue of some sort of extension of time, but that would have been contrary to the terms of rule 19 of the Rules. Here: (1) there is no requirement in the Act itself as to what the petition should contain, there is only a reference to what may be prescribed by rules; (2) rule 4 of the Rules, while specifying what the petition should include, has no equivalent of the provision in rule 19 stating that periods of time cannot be varied by order or otherwise which ousts the power of the court to remedy non-conformity with the rule; (3) the Rules do provide, by rule 2(4) for the application of the practice and procedure of the High Court, which includes CPR r. 3.10, save insofar as they are inconsistent with the Act and Rules. The application of CPR r. 3.10 is not, in our view, inconsistent with rule 4 of the Rules. Given the nature of rule 4, which is procedural, and where insistence on a precise compliance with its requirements in all cases will foreseeably produce injustice rather than justice in some cases, it would need to be clearly stated that a power such as that in CPR r. 3.10 was not applicable, and that is not done.

It is not difficult to think of many examples of where a strict application of rule 4, such as contended for by the fourth respondent, might mean that otherwise meritorious petitions were found invalid and demurrable for technical errors or oversights. Thus, it might be the case that the petition got the date of the election slightly wrong; or contained a statement of some evidence by which the facts relied on were to be proved; or set out the relief claimed at the beginning rather than at the conclusion of the document; or, while saying what was being sought in the body of the petition, contained nothing which would ordinarily be described as a ‘prayer’. All of these are the types of matters which it would reasonably be expected should be capable of being remedied or disregarded in an appropriate case, and where, if it had actually been intended by Parliament that that should not be the case, that would have needed to be stated expressly.

Accordingly, had it been necessary, we would have decided that, pursuant to CPR r. 3.10(b), the error should be rectified by deeming the petition to be compliant with rule 4 of the Rules notwithstanding partial non-compliance with rule 4(1)(b).

The fourth respondent next contends that the petition was invalid because it did not state the result of the election, as required by rule 4 of the Rules. We regard this point as clearly unfounded, on the simple basis that the petition did state the result of the election. It indicated that Ms Pochin had been successful, that the petitioner had not been successful, and gave the number of votes the petitioner had received as declared by the returning officer. If more were necessary, the petition contained the link we have mentioned to the page on Halton Borough Council’s website which had set out the full results, including the number of votes cast for each of the 15 candidates.

Mr Straker KC’s argument on this point was that ‘to state the result, in the context of a parliamentary election with 15 candidates, must be to give more than merely the name of the winning candidate and one losing candidate’. He accepted, in light of the decision in Scarth v Amin, that it was not necessary for the number of votes received by each candidate to be stated, but referred to paragraph 50 of the Elections Rules to suggest that the requirements there set out as to what the returning officer has to declare indicated that, for the purposes of rule 4 of the Rules ‘to state the result of an election is to state that so and so won and so and so lost.’

As we understood this submission, it was that the petition was invalid because it had not set out the names of the other candidates who had not been elected. We do not accept that that is so. Mention of all the non-elected candidates is not, in our view, essential for there to be a statement of ‘the result’ of the election, which is focused on who was returned. Further, rule 4 clearly does not expressly say, and cannot in our view be said to require, that the names of all the other unsuccessful candidates should be set out in the body of the petition, as opposed to by reference to a website which set out the full results.

While we are not in doubt about this point, we should add that, if we are wrong about it, we would again consider that CPR r. 3.10 was potentially applicable, and we would if necessary make an order remedying any defect on this score, by deeming the petition to be valid notwithstanding any non-compliance with rule 4(b) as a result of inadequate particularisation of the result of the election.

The remaining point taken by the fourth respondent, and by the third respondent, is that there was no valid service of the petition on the third respondent within the five day period specified by rule 6 of the Rules. It is clear that the sending of the petition to the third respondent at the House of Commons was not service in accordance with CPR r. 6.3(1) because the House of Commons was not the third respondent’s usual or last known place of residence. That, the third and fourth respondents say, is the end of the matter. Mr Moore, however, points to the fact that the third respondent actually received the petition within the five day period. In his skeleton argument, under the heading ‘Validation of Service at Business Address’, he argued, inter alia, that the House of Commons should be regarded as a valid address for service ‘at common law due to actual notice’ (paragraph 47). Orally, he made it clear that he applied, if necessary, for an order retrospectively validating the service of the petition by post on the third respondent at the time it occurred. The third and fourth respondents articulated no prejudice which they suffered by reason of this application for retrospective validation being made in this way, though they contended that the court had no power to grant it and in any event should not do so. We will accordingly consider Mr Moore’s application which we treat as one made under CPR r. 6.15(2).

Before we turn to deal with whether the court has the power to and should grant a retrospective validation of service, we should first deal with the issue raised by the third respondent as to whether service of the petition by post at the House of Commons constituted a contempt of Parliament. As to this, it is not for us to decide whether or not a contempt of Parliament was committed. What we can say is that the material put before us does not persuade us that there was any contempt. The third respondent referred to a passage in Erskine May where, at paragraph 15.11, under the heading ‘Other indignities offered to either House’, the following appears:

“Other acts, besides words spoken or writings published reflecting upon either House or its proceedings which, though they do not tend directly or indirectly to impede either House in the performance of its functions, yet have a tendency to produce this result indirectly by bringing such House into odium, contempt or ridicule or by lowering its authority, may constitute contempts.

For example, serving or executing civil or criminal process within the precincts of either House while the House is sitting without obtaining the leave of the House is a contempt, as is disorderly conduct within the precincts of either House while the House is sitting. However, where such misconduct has led to criminal proceedings against the individual or individuals concerned the House has not pursued the matter as a contempt. This was the case when hunt protesters invaded the Commons Chamber but were handed over to the police…”

Simply on the basis of that passage, which is all that we were referred to in this regard, it appears to us that the type of service of process which is being referred to is attempted personal service: that is an act which may foreseeably lead to disorderly conduct, or in any event be such as to bring a Member into odium, ridicule or contempt. Service of an election petition, by first class post, which has moreover been screened, does not appear to us to be in the same category. In the absence of any indication from the Speaker or any other authorities of the House of Commons that what occurred is a contempt of Parliament, and without any other material to go on than that to which we have referred, we consider that the suggestion that there was a contempt of Parliament is not made out.

We therefore turn to consider the argument pressed by the third and fourth respondents, in particular by Mr Straker KC, that the court cannot retrospectively validate the service which there was upon the third respondent, because that would cut across and be inconsistent with rule 19 of the Rules. This is the question left open and undecided in Ireland v Dorries.

In our judgment, an order under CPR r. 6.15(2) that steps taken to bring the petition to the attention of the relevant respondent within the five day period are good service is not inconsistent with rule 19 of the Rules. We say this for the following reasons:

We thus turn to the question of whether there should be a retrospective validation of the steps taken within the five day period to bring the petition to Ms Pochin MP’s attention, namely the sending in the post and receipt by her of the petition at the House of Commons. The principles to be applied in relation to such questions were summarised by Popplewell J in Ireland v Dorries at [27], quoted above. We have, although it was not cited to us, also considered the summary of principles set out in the more recent decision of the Court of Appeal in R (Good Law Project) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 355, especially at [55] per Carr LJ.

In our judgment, this is a case in which there should be retrospective validation of the steps taken. The most important factor, which we regard as critical, is that Ms Pochin MP actually received, by post, a hard copy of the petition within the five day period. The most important function of service was thus fulfilled, in that Ms Pochin both knew the contents of the petition, and that it was intended to initiate process.

Clearly, Mr Moore did not send the petition to the address required by the relevant rules. He explained this to us on the basis that he did not know Ms Pochin’s usual address, and had not been able to find it out, though he accepted he had not asked the returning officer. He added that he had reservations about mixing up the public and private lives of candidates for election. No doubt Mr Moore should have pursued Ms Pochin’s usual address with the returning officer, and had he been legally advised he might well have done so. But his failure to do so did not prevent his taking steps which effectually brought the petition into Ms Pochin’s hands within the short time permitted under the Rules.

The facts of the present case are materially different from the superficially similar case of Ireland v Dorries. Above all, the first factor militating against retrospective validation there, namely that the existence and content of the petition had not been brought to Ms Dorries’ attention within time by posting it to the constituency office, is absent here. Further, in that case, the petitioner had taken no other steps to bring the existence and contents of the petition to the knowledge of Ms Dorries. Here, by contrast, Mr Moore sent the petition, by email, to Ms Pochin MP within the five day period. It is true that there has been a delay in Mr Moore’s making an appropriate application for retrospective validation. This is, we have concluded, because Mr Moore, unlike the petitioner in Ireland v Dorries has not been advised by legal advisers. While that does not absolve him from compliance with the rules, it does, in our view, need to be put into the balance when considering whether to grant retrospective validation.

In summary, we regard the following matters of particular significance:

For these reasons we refuse the third and fourth respondents’ applications to dismiss the petition. The trial of the petition should go ahead.