Gillian McGivern v MBR Acres Limited and Others

This is my summary assessment of the costs incurred by the Respondents. The appeal and the application were dismissed following my judgment handed down on 4 August. The Respondents now seek summary assessment of their costs on the standard basis. Each party made further written submissions in relation to costs; the Appellant on 1 August 2025 and the Respondents on 4 August 2025.

The hearing was an appeal against an order of Costs Judge Whalan dated 20 November 2024 and an application for a Costs Capping Order by the Appellant.

The Respondents submitted two statements of costs. The first relates to the Appellant’s appeal amounting to £36,983.50. This includes £9,059.50 for work done on documents and £16,233.50 for counsel’s fees. The second statement relates to the Appellant’s costs capping order application, in the sum of £6,329.00. This includes £3,434.00 for work done on documents and £1,650.00 for counsel’s fees. The Respondents therefore seek costs totalling £43,312.50 excluding VAT. The Appellant, accepts that costs are payable but submits that these should be “nominal”, or if quantified should be no more than £15,000 plus VAT.

The Appellant’s own statement of costs for the hearing on 3 July 2025 is in the sum of £58,956.66 excluding VAT. This includes £37,140.00 for work done by her solicitors (including work done on documents and attendance at the hearing), £20,000.00 for counsel’s fees, and £1,816.66 for other expenses (court fees and transcription fees).

Assessment on the standard basis in accordance with Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 44.4. requires me to allow costs that are proportionate to the matters in issue, and which were reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount. When assessing costs, the court must have regard to all the circumstances, including the conduct of all parties, the amount or value of any money or property involved, the importance of the matter to all parties, the complexity of the case, the skill, effort, specialised knowledge, and responsibility involved, the time spent, and the place where the work was done.

The primary issues for determination are whether the costs claimed by the Respondents are reasonable and proportionate, specifically in relation to:

There is force in the Appellant’s challenge to the rates for a Grade A work. While the Respondents assert that the work was complex and largely undertaken by junior fee earners with supervision, they offer no specific justification for a Grade A solicitor in Manchester commanding rates so significantly above the guideline rates of £288 per hour for that region and for a significant amount of the work being undertaken at the highest rate claimed. The Appellant’s point about the availability of a local office or a lower-grade fee earner for such an attendance is also pertinent. While some degree of senior representation at a hearing is often justified, the specific travel costs and the grade of fee earner need closer scrutiny where the Grade A rate is well above the guideline.

The Appellant proposes the application of guideline rates for Manchester, specifically: Grade A £288, Grade B £242, Grade C £197, and Grade D £139. The Respondent’s statements of costs define fee earner grades as follows:

In fact, most of those working on the case at the Respondent firm appear to have been Grade A fee earners, although charged at differing rates and notwithstanding the inclusion of a Grade D rate of £235. The total time recorded at all grades across both statements is about 45 hours.

If all of the work detailed in the Respondents’ statements of costs had been carried out at a uniform rate of £288.00 per hour, the total amount claimed would, on my calculation, be a little under £13,000 (this figure of course excludes disbursements and counsel’s fees) rather than the figure of nearly £21,000 which is claimed.

As far as counsel’s fees are concerned, while the Appellant points to the lack of a fee note, I accept the Respondents’ submission that there is no conventional requirement for this in a summary assessment. More compelling is the Respondents’ argument that both sides instructed leading counsel with considerable expertise in the area being litigated, and that their fees are broadly comparable (£20,000 for the Appellant, £22,250 for the Respondents, exclusive of VAT). This suggests that, in the context of this appeal, the instruction of King’s Counsel was considered necessary by both parties and that the fees are not, on their face, disproportionate.

I find some merit in the Appellant’s challenges to specific work items. The alleged over-claim for “Considering the Appellant’s appeal notice and grounds for appeal” where the Respondents claimed 2.7 hours compared to the Appellant’s 1.9 hours for drafting suggests potential inefficiency or duplication. The time claimed for reviewing counsel’s skeleton argument (7.8 hours in total across both statements of costs) and preparing the N260 (6 hours in total) also appears on the high side, particularly when compared to the Appellant’s time for similar tasks. As to “advice on strategic issues”, the Appellant’s argument that this was “not work between the parties” appears to me to be a fair point when assessing inter-parties’ costs.

I acknowledge the potential legal importance of this case, as highlighted by both parties, but this is clearly a factor, as is the complexity of the arguments, which potentially elevates rather than reduces costs. The Respondents’ argument that their costs are 27% lower than the Appellant’s is a powerful indicator that their overall costs are within a reasonable range for an appeal of this nature. The Appellant’s earlier application for a £30,000 costs cap on the Respondents’ costs weakens their current submission that there should, in effect, be a cap of £15,000. The Appellant has disclosed, that The Law Society sought to have the Appellant run slightly different arguments very late in the day, offering an indemnification of £30,000, which the Appellant declined to avoid unfairness to the Respondents and a real risk of adjournment. The Respondents suggest that the late change in the Appellant’s arguments in relation to The Law Society’s position, leading to potentially unnecessary work, is also a relevant factor in their favour.

Drawing these threads together, I determine that a reduction is warranted, primarily in relation to the hourly rates of the Grade A fee earner and certain specific tasks that appear to be excessive. While the overall complexity and importance of the case justify significant costs, and the comparison with the Appellant’s own costs provides a useful benchmark, the lack of specific justification for the high hourly rate and some of the time claimed means some adjustment is necessary.

Considering all factors, including the need to do justice between the parties, I am persuaded that while the Respondents’ costs are generally proportionate given the nature of the appeal, adjustments are required to reflect the arguments advanced.

Therefore, I assess the Respondents’ total costs at £34,000.00 (VAT not being claimed). This figure reflects the complexity and importance of the case, the need for skilled representation, and general proportionality in comparison to the Appellant’s own claimed costs, while also addressing the specific concerns raised by the Appellant in relation to hourly rates and excessive time claims.