Ari Mahmod v ITV Plc

The claimant, Mr Ari Mahmod, was convicted on 11 June 2007 of the murder of his niece, Ms Banaz Mahmod. He is currently serving a life sentence of imprisonment at HMP Whitemoor and appeared at the hearing before me, representing himself, on a live-link from prison.

On 30 October 2023, the claimant issued a defamation claim against the defendant, ITV plc, in the County Court Civil Business Centre in relation to statements made in a documentary broadcast by the defendant on 31 October 2012 concerning the life and death of Banaz Mahmod and in a two-part drama, which dramatized the investigation of Ms Mahmod’s murder and the subsequent criminal trials. The two-part drama was originally broadcast on 28 and 29 September 2020 and has been accessible via the ITV Hub streaming service and then later via the ITVX streaming service (which replaced ITV Hub in 2022) since the date of the first broadcast.

Mr Mahmod does not deny that he has been convicted, along with others, of murdering Ms Mahmod.

The prosecution’s case was that Ms Mahmod was murdered by members of her family, including the claimant, because they disapproved of her romantic relationship with a man named Rahmat Sulemani. The prosecution maintained that the claimant was the dominant member of the family group that killed Ms Mahmod, that he gave the order to kill her, and that the order to kill was carried out by others.

Both the documentary and the two-part drama allege that Ms Mahmod was also brutally raped by the men who actually killed her, namely, Mohammed Hama, Mohammed Ali, and Omar Hussein. The essence of Mr Mahmod’s complaint against the defendant is that he has been defamed by the rape allegation, given its association with Ms Mahmod’s murder, because of the implication that the claimant must either have also ordered her rape or must otherwise have been complicit in its occurrence, for example, by approving or, at any rate, allowing it.

The claimant also maintains that there is no credible evidence that Ms Mahmod was actually raped and that the defendant was wrong to suggest otherwise in the documentary and in the two-part drama.

This claim has a somewhat complex procedural history to which I will return. The matters for me to determine are:

There are apparently some ancillary applications that remain outstanding, but it appears that once the matters set out in [7] above have been resolved, those other applications will either fall away or can be resolved as consequential matters following hand-down of this judgment.

An account of the murder of Banaz Mahmod is set out in the Court of Appeal judgment in the case of R v Dana Amin [2014] EWCA Crim 1924 in some detail at [3]-[24]. The appellant in that case, Mr Dana Mohammed Amin, was convicted on 5 December 2013 in the Crown Court at Southwark of the common law offences of perverting the course of justice and preventing a public burial, having been involved in the disposal of Ms Mahmod’s body. He was given leave to appeal against conviction on a single ground and renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence. The appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.

In Amin at [3], the Court of Appeal provided a useful brief summary of the overall case (in this excerpt, the claimant is referred to as “Ari Mahmod Babakir Aga” and as “Ari” and identified as an uncle of Banaz Mahmod):

“3.

On 28 April 2006, the body of 20-year-old Banaz Mahmod, an Iraqi Kurd, was found buried in a suitcase in the back garden of a house at 86 Alexandra Road in Birmingham. A bootlace had been used as a ligature. She was identified from her dental records. She had gone missing from her home address on 24 January 2006. Her father Mahmod Babakir Mahmod, and her uncle Ari Mahmod Babakir Aga (‘Ari’), were subsequently convicted of her murder on 11 June 2007, the motive being (to use the highly inappropriate expression that still has currency for murders of this kind) an ‘honour killing’ because they did not approve of her relationship with a man by the name of Rahmat Sulemani. A close friend of Ari, Mohammed Hama, pleaded guilty to the murder. Another relative, Mohammed Ali (‘Ali’), had been convicted of the murder in 2010 after being extradited from Iraq.”

On 31 October 2012, the defendant broadcast a documentary, as part of its ITV Exposure series, entitled Banaz: An Honour Killing (“the Documentary”). The Documentary dealt with Banaz Mahmod’s life and death, the failings by the police to deal with threats to her life from her family which she brought to their attention (including providing the police, before her death, with a list of male family members who posed a threat to her, which included the claimant), the ultimately successful police investigation into her murder, which was led by DCI Caroline Goode of the Metropolitan Police, and the subsequent criminal trials of the various men involved in her murder, including the trial of her father and of the claimant, her uncle. The Documentary was made available for online streaming on ITV Hub for a period of thirty days beginning on 31 October 2012.

On 28 and 29 September 2020, the defendant broadcast on ITV1 a two-part drama entitled Honour (“the Drama”), dramatizing the police investigation into the murder of Banaz Mahmod, focusing on the role of DCI Goode, who is played in Honour by the actor Keeley Hawes. Although the story is dramatized, many real names are used, including those of Banaz Mahmod, members of her family, and those convicted for their various roles in her murder and the concealment of her body, including the claimant. The Drama has remained accessible on ITV Hub/ITVX since it was first broadcast. Since 1 July 2024, it has also been available for streaming on Netflix, and since 29 September 2024 it has been available for streaming on Amazon Prime Video.

The Documentary was broadcast again on ITV1 on 29 September 2020 to coincide with the broadcast of the Drama. It was also broadcast on ITV Border Scotland on 30 September 2020 and was made available for streaming on ITV Hub from 29 September 2020 for a further period of thirty days.

As I have already noted, the claimant issued this claim on 30 October 2023 in the County Court Civil Business Centre. It appears that there was no pre-action correspondence. The defendant says that it first learned of the claim when it was served on it by the court on 2 November 2023. The original particulars of claim were drafted by the claimant.

On 30 November 2023, the defendant issued the Summary Judgment Application, which was served on the claimant at HMP Whitemoor.

On 28 February 2024, the claimant provided to the County Court his response to the Summary Judgment Application.

On 4 March 2024, the defendant received the claimant’s response to the Summary Judgment Application, comprised of 354 pages, much of it handwritten, dealing with a variety of topics, and not supported by a statement of truth. The defendant’s position is that much of that response is irrelevant to the Summary Judgment Application.

On 10 April 2024, the defendant was given notice that the claim had been transferred to the High Court and, in due course, a hearing of the Summary Judgment Application was listed on 7 October 2024.

On 29 July 2024, the King’s Bench Masters’ Listing Office at the High Court sent to the parties a letter setting out the comments of Master Dagnall, the assigned Master, which, without making any order, suggested that the claimant might wish to consider providing proposed replacement particulars of claim that complied with the requirements for statements of case in defamation actions, together with a witness statement of any evidence on which he wished to rely in response to the Summary Judgment Application at the hearing on 7 October 2024.

On 5 August 2024, the defendants’ solicitors, Osborne Clarke LLP (“Osborne Clarke”), wrote to the claimant to ensure that he had received a copy of the court’s letter of 29 July 2024, to draw his attention to its contents, and to observe that his lengthy response to the Summary Judgment Application was not a witness statement or verified with a statement of truth. In that letter Osborne Clarke also referred the claimant specifically to paragraphs 28-31 of the first witness statement, dated 30 November 2023, of Mr Henry Fox, an Associate Director at Osborne Clarke, where Mr Fox had noted that the claim was time-barred under section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 in respect of both the Documentary and the Drama and that if the claimant wanted the court to disapply the limitation period, then he would need to make an application to that effect, supported by evidence, under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980.

On 9 September 2024, the claimant served his first amended particulars of claim and a witness statement, along with a witness statement dated 18 April 2024 from his daughter, Skala Mahmod, describing the impact of the Documentary and the Drama on her family.

On 7 October 2024, the parties appeared before Master Dagnall for the hearing of the Summary Judgment Application, with the claimant appearing via live-link from HMP Whitemoor and the defendant represented by Mr Ben Gallop. It emerged at the hearing that the claimant did not have the hearing bundle, the defendant’s skeleton argument, or the bundle of authorities prepared by the defendant, all of which the defendant said had been sent to the claimant at HMP Whitemoor. Master Dagnall therefore adjourned the Summary Judgment Application, consulted with one of the Judges in Charge of the Media and Communications List, and then made an order dated 7 and 10 November 2024 (“the Dagnall Order”), giving various directions, including:

Since the Dagnall Order, the claimant has served various documents on the defendant, including the Claimant’s Limitation Application and the Amendment Application. The claimant has also served a further draft of Amended Particulars of Claim dated 6 February 2025 (“the APoC”) and a new unsealed claim form dated 6 February 2025 seeking £300,000 for the Netflix and Amazon Prime Video publications of the Drama.

At paragraph 18-19 of its skeleton argument for the hearing before me, the Defendant has raised certain issues that will require addressing in relation to the foregoing documents, and some related matters, should any part of the claim remain following the determination of the Summary Judgment Application. The defendant’s position is that it is in the interests of justice to ensure that the issues of meaning and limitation are now dealt with, with those additional matters to be addressed, if necessary, following my determination of the Summary Judgment Application. I agree.

The APoC, although containing amendments that have not yet been approved by the court, sets out the most recent and fullest formulation of the claim. The defendant therefore accepts that, in fairness to the claimant, the Meaning Determination and the Summary Judgment Application should be determined by reference to the APoC. I proceed on that basis.

Part 8 of the APoC contains a long list, in tabular form, of the alleged defamatory statements made by the defendant about the claimant in the Documentary (paragraph 8(A) of the APoC) and in the Drama (paragraph 8(B) of the APoC). In column 1 of the table, each statement is numbered, in column 2 the statement is set out together with a cross-reference to where that statement occurs in the script for the Documentary or the Drama, as the case may be, and in the third column, under the heading “meanings re[a]sonable viewer would understand”, the claimant has in general listed a few words, typically adjectives or other one- or two-word descriptions (such as “violent, coercive, controlling” or “conspiratorial, retribution, powerful”) rather than a statement setting out the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used.

I agree with the submission of the defendant that paragraph 9 of the APoC contains something closer to an articulation of the meanings that the claimant says are defamatory of him.

In relation to the statements in the Drama of which he complains, the claimant brings his claim in respect of the publication of those statements when the Drama was first broadcast on ITV1 on 28 and 29 September 2020. He also relies on the continuing availability of the Drama on ITV Hub/ITVX since that time and on the Drama becoming available on Netflix since 1 July 2024 and on Amazon Prime since 29 September 2024.

In relation to serious harm to reputation, the claimant asserts at part 15 of the APoC that:

“When the claimant was convicted for Banaz’s murder in 2007, there were no negative reaction against him and his family from [the] Kurdish community in [the] UK, in Kurdistan and in prison. … Honour killing is a sensitive and private matter, that [is] tolerated by the Kurdish community due to their cultural, traditional customs. Consequently, Banaz’s murder did not damage claimant’s reputation and his businesses among the Kurdish community in [the] UK and Kurdistan.”

The claimant also asserts at part 15 of the APoC that he, his family, and his businesses only began to suffer negative consequences from members of the Kurdish community and in prison from other prisoners after the broadcast of the Documentary and the Drama:

“It was only then [that] public rage started in [the] UK, in Kurdistan and in prison against the claimant, his family and his businesses. Threats to death, intimidation, and verbal insults [were] made against the claimant and his family, by the Kurdish community and in prison by prisoners”

The claimant asserts in his claim that the impact on him of the Documentary and the Drama has been significant. At Part 16B of the APoC, the claimant says:

“The claimant is a very well[-]known businessman, with [a] high reputation in [the] UK and in Kurdistan. The programmes closely touch the claimant’s personal integrity and his business reputation.”

Accordingly, in the APoC the claimant seeks “in … excess” of the original amount claimed of £400,000, in relation to:

“… damages to his reputation, serious harm on his health, life, freedom, daily life, mental, moral future, progression and constant fear to his life and confidence … .”

I have been provided with two bundles of documents, namely, a bundle that was prepared for the hearing on 7 October 2024 comprised of 661 pages and a supplemental bundle comprised of 407 pages.

I viewed the Documentary and both episodes of the Drama and completed several hours of pre-reading prior to the hearing before me. That pre-reading included the APoC, the various witness statements of the claimant, and the witness statements of Mr Henry Thomas Fox, an Associate Director at Osborne Clarke, as well as various other documents referred to in the witness statements of the claimant and of Mr Fox.

Exhibit 1 to the first witness statement of Mr Fox includes the transcript of the Documentary and the transcript of each episode of the Drama.

With regard to the Meaning Determination, I have had regard to the well-established principles that apply, as helpfully summarised in Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Limited [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25 (QBD) at [11]-[12], a passage approved by the Court of Appeal in Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567 at [8].

In relation to the question of whether a publication is defamatory at common law, I have had regard to the principles set out in Millett v Corbyn at [9]-[10], which summarise two common law requirements (the consensus requirement and the threshold of seriousness) and one statutory requirement (under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, namely, that serious harm has been caused to the reputation of the claimant).

I have reviewed the statements made in the Documentary and in the Drama that the claimant has set out in part 8 of the APoC as well as the “meanings” attributed to those statements. As the defendant has pointed out in its skeleton argument, many of the statements complained of by the claimant in part 8 of the APoC do not refer to the claimant, either directly or indirectly. In some cases, the words complained of in part 8 of the APoC were not broadcast (and therefore not “published” in that sense) but are stage directions in the transcript.

The claimant’s central concern in bringing this claim is that the Documentary and the Drama convey the meaning that he had some form of involvement in the alleged rape of his niece, Banaz Mahmod and it is that meaning that has led to all of the negative consequences that he alleges he, his family, and his businesses have suffered since the original broadcasts. This is because, the claimant submits, under Kurdish cultural norms, murder and rape are viewed differently.

In part 7(D) of the APoC, the claimant says:

“It is clear that Banaz was brutally murdered. There was a trial, and people were convicted of her murder. This is a fact and a true story. No one can challenge or question ITV for evidence of her murder’s account credibility.” (emphasis added)

In short, the meaning conveyed by the Documentary and the Drama that the claimant was responsible for the murder of his niece, Banaz Mahmod, along with others, is not disputed or complained of by the claimant. The claimant goes on to say:

“But, ITV is responsible and has duty of honesty and editorial standards, this includes fact checking and verifying the accuracy of statements made in the two programmes, specially those could harm someone[’]s reputation and put their lives and lives of their families in danger.

Therefore it is the ITV’s legal duty to produce credible document[ation] of the statements made in the two programmes about Banaz’s alleged rape, to the court and to the claimant, or put the hands up, take responsibility, accept full failure, come clean and do the right things for the sake of justice and honesty for Banaz too.”

At part 7(B) of the APoC, under the heading “Murder and rape in the eyes of Kurdish people”, the claimant draws the following distinctions between murder and rape, which he says “are not treated the same in the public eye and [in] prison”:

“The majority of Kurds are Muslim faith and are deeply conservative. They are a tight-knit community who respect their traditional values and customs.

Among Kurdish people the crime of rape is absolute taboo and is not tolerated under any circumstances. Anyone who is even suspected of such a crime is s[h]unned by the community and all ties with them cut/[severed].

By contrast, murder, though reprehensible and deplorable is seen as comprehensible, because given the right chain of circumstance, anyone might commit such crime, one way or another. While rape is incomprehensible and unacceptable under any circumstances.”

At paragraph 9(H) of the APoC, the claimant states that:

“The documentary linked [the claimant] directly with what had happened to Banaz, the day she was allegedly raped and murdered.”

At paragraph 9(J) of the APoC, the claimant states that in the Drama the repeated references to the claimant in the context of the Drama’s allegations that Banaz Mahmod was raped as well as murdered create an implication that he was in some sense responsible for her rape. He highlights a statement attributed to “Caroline” in the Drama (the character corresponding to DCI Goode), where during a pre-trial exchange with prosecuting counsel, in response to the latter saying “… there’s no suggestion her father or uncle killed her with their own hands”, Caroline says “She named her Uncle Ari in her list. He directed the conspiracy. He dragged the suitcase.”

The claimant submits that the reference to his dragging the suitcase was intended to mean that he was personally supervising the rape, as well as the murder, of his niece, Banaz, and that he watched as this occurred. In short, the claimant contends that the Documentary and the Drama convey the meaning that he was involved in the alleged rape of Banaz Mahmod.

On behalf of the defendant, Mr Ben Gallop submitted that the meaning of both the Documentary and the Drama, as far as they concern the claimant, is that he was responsible for the murder of his niece, Banaz Mahmod. It goes no further than this. Mr Gallop submitted that this meaning emerges clearly from the account in each programme of Ms Mahmod’s murder and the claimant’s conviction. This meaning requires no further elaboration. The defendant accepts that this meaning is defamatory at common law.

Having with careful attention viewed the Documentary and both episodes of the Drama, having considered the transcripts of each programme, and having considered the submissions of the parties in relation to the Meaning Determination, I am satisfied that neither the Documentary nor the Drama conveys the meaning that the claimant knew about, was responsible for, or was involved in the alleged rape of Banaz Mahmod.

Each programme makes clear that the claimant’s role was to direct that his niece, Banaz, be murdered by others. In short, I accept the defendant’s case as to the natural and ordinary meaning of each programme, namely, that the claimant was responsible for the murder of his niece, Banaz Mahmod.

Turning, then, to the Summary Judgment Application, CPR r 24.3 sets out the test for summary judgment. It provides that the court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on an issue arising in the claim if it considers that the relevant party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, the defence, or the issue, as the case may be, and there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should proceed to trial.

I have regard to the well-established legal principles that apply to the determination of an application for summary judgment, as helpfully summarised by Nicklin J in Amersi v Leslie [2023] EWHC 1368 (KB) at [142].

Given the meaning that I have determined for both the Documentary and the Drama, the Summary Judgment Application may be dealt with relatively briefly. The Summary Judgment Application is made on the following three grounds (which are set out at paragraph 9 of the first witness statement of Mr Fox):

The issues raised by Ground 3 have to a significant extent, although by no means entirely, been addressed by amendments to the claimant’s Particulars of Claim that were directed by Master Dagnall, as I have summarised in the procedural history above.

It is clear, for the reasons that I have already given, that the claimant does not say he was defamed by any statements in the Documentary or the Drama that he was involved in the murder of Banaz Mahmod. He accepts this as “a true story”. He accepts that it is a matter of fact that he was convicted of, and is serving a life sentence for, her murder. I have found that neither the Documentary nor the Drama bears the meaning that he says is defamatory of him, namely, that he ordered and/or was otherwise involved in the alleged rape of Banaz Mahmod. Accordingly, his claim has no basis. It has no realistic prospect of success. The claimant has not advanced any compelling reason why the claim should nonetheless be heard. The Summary Judgment Application therefore succeeds on Ground 1.

I will strike out the claim form and the Particulars of Claim under CPR r 3.4(2)(a) and grant summary judgment on the claim under CPR r 24.3 in favour of the defendant.

Strictly speaking it is not necessary, therefore, to consider Ground 2 or the Claimant’s Limitation Application, however as those questions were fully argued, I will set out my conclusions on them as briefly as I can.

Section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 provides that limitation period in defamation claims is one year after the date on which the cause of action accrued, namely, the publication of the alleged defamatory statement.

Section 8(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 provides, in essence, that the publication of a statement is its first publication to the public if any subsequent publication is “substantially the same”. Section 8(3) of the 2013 Act provides that, for the purposes of section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980, any cause of action against a person for defamation in respect of a subsequent publication is “to be treated as having accrued on the date of the first publication”. This is known as the “single publication rule”.

Section 8(4) of the 2013 Act disapplies the single publication rule if the manner of a subsequent publication of an alleged defamatory statement is “materially different from the manner of the first publication”. Section 8(5) provides that a court, in determining whether a subsequent publication is “materially different from the manner of the first publication”, may have regard to the level of prominence the statement is given and the extent of the subsequent publication.

Section 8(6) of the 2013 Act makes clear that the single publication rule does not limit the court’s discretion under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980, so the Claimant’s Limitation Application, which I deal with below, is not excluded by that rule. In its skeleton argument, the defendant has referred me to the Explanatory Notes to the 2013 Act at paragraph 63 and to paragraphs 7-007 – 7-008 of Gatley on Libel and Slander (13^th edition) in relation to the single publication rule and the question of whether a subsequent publication is “materially different”. I have had regard to those commentaries.

In brief, it is clear that the single publication rule means that any cause of action arising from the broadcast of the Documentary arose on 31 October 2012, such that the last date for issuing proceedings was 1 November 2013. In relation to Episode 1 of the Drama, any cause of action arose on 28 September 2020, such that the last date for issuing proceedings was 29 September 2021. In relation to Episode 2 of the Drama, any cause of action arose on 29 September 2020, such that the last date for issuing proceedings was 30 September 2021.

Finally, I note that the Documentary was shown again on ITV1 on 29 September 2020. In my judgment, it is not arguable that the re-broadcast of the Documentary on ITV1 on 29 September 2020 was “materially different from the manner of the first publication” in 2012, but even if it were, the last date for issuing defamation proceedings in relation to that re-broadcast was 30 September 2021.

I have no hesitation in concluding that the availability of the Drama on ITV Hub/ITVX does not amount to a subsequent publication that is “materially different from the manner of the first publication” nor does the subsequent availability of the Drama on Netflix or, for that matter, on Amazon Prime.

Accordingly, even if, contrary to my finding in relation to Ground 1 of the Summary Judgment Application, the claimant has an arguable cause of action in defamation against the defendant, any such cause of action is well outside the relevant limitation period for defamation. Accordingly, ignoring for the moment the Claimant’s Limitation Application, the Summary Judgment Application would also have succeeded on Ground 2.

Turning to the Claimant’s Limitation Application, I note that section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 gives the court discretion to disapply the one-year limitation period on the application of the claimant if it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so. Section 32A(2) sets out the circumstances to which the court should have regard in making its determination as to whether it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed, including, the length of and reasons for the delay on the part of the claimant and other factors.

The first point to note about the Claimant’s Limitation Application is that it was made more than three years after the expiry of the limitation periods for a defamation claim arising out of the two episodes of the Drama and more than 11 years after the limitation period for a defamation claim arising out of the Documentary. The Claimant’s Limitation Application was also only made 16 months after the claim form was issued and only after repeated prompting by the defendant’s legal team, for example, in paragraph 30 of Mr Fox’s first witness statement, to which I have already referred, and in paragraph 41 of Mr Fox’s second witness statement, which was dated 16 May 2024. The claimant was also prompted by Master Dagnall to consider making such an application.

The primary reasons given by the claimant for his delay in bringing the claim and in making the Claimant’s Limitation Application relate to his imprisonment, his difficulties obtaining legal advice, his ignorance of what was required to bring such a claim, and, to a certain extent, his deteriorating physical and mental health.

The claimant has also asserted at paragraph 14 of his fourth witness statement, which is dated 6 February 2025, that allowing the claim to proceed will somehow be beneficial for Banaz Mahmod and her family because, if the claim is successful, it will help to remove “the stigma” that the alleged rape allegation has brought on them.

The defendant characterises these reasons in its skeleton argument as “obviously poor ones and inconsistent with a genuine desire to vindicate his reputation”. I agree. None of this comes close to evidence of the sort of exceptional circumstances that would make it equitable to disapply the limitation periods. I also note, a fortiori, that if I were to disapply the limitation periods, the prejudice to the defendant would be considerable, given the length of time since the original broadcasts, the fact that both the Documentary and the Drama were produced by separate production companies independent of the defendant, and the fact that the passage of time would make any defence under section 4 of the 2013 Act very difficult.

Were there any merit in the claim, it would still not be equitable, in my judgment, for the court to disapply the limitation periods that apply and allow the claim to proceed. Accordingly, had it been necessary to determine it, the Claimant’s Limitation Application would have failed.

In light of the foregoing conclusions, it is not necessary to deal with the Amendment Application.

At the start of the hearing, I was conscious that the claimant was at a disadvantage not only because he is a litigant in person, but also because he was having to present his case in relation to the applications considered at the hearing over a video-link from the prison where he is currently serving his life sentence for murder and having to do so in a language in which he is not a native speaker. I therefore invited him to send to me after the hearing the speaking note that he was using when making his oral submissions during the hearing, if he wished to do so.

On 30 May 2025, Osborne Clarke forwarded a copy of the claimant’s speaking note, headed “Hearing Statement” and dated 23 May 2025, comprised of 30 handwritten pages, together with a further 17 pages of attachments, including a psychiatric report on the claimant dated 13 February 2007 prepared by a consultant psychiatrist at King’s College Hospital named Dr George Stein and a letter dated 20 May 2025 to the claimant from his Prison Offender Manager. The claimant also attached to his Hearing Statement a two-page statement dated 3 January 2025 signed by two persons named Hawkar Hassan and Arkan Ali, who identify themselves as Iraqi Kurds and friends of the claimant, which describes the impact of the programmes on the claimant and other members of his family and comments on how Kurdish viewers would have reacted to the Documentary and the Drama. The claimant also attached a newspaper review of the Drama that, according to a handwritten marking on it, appeared on 29 September 2020, and he attached a one page excerpt from a document that appeared to concern a false allegation allegedly made by Mohammed Hama against the claimant on 19 December 2005. In addition, Osborne Clarke forwarded two emails, sent on behalf of the claimant, from two individuals named Adam Omar and Mahmet Murat, each identifying himself as a family friend, providing evidence of the impact of the programmes on the claimant’s family and also commenting on how Kurdish viewers would have reacted to each of the Documentary and the Drama.

On 9 June 2025, Osborne Clarke wrote to the court to outline the defendant’s position in relation to the documents that were provided to the court by the claimant after the hearing. The defendant expressed the view that the claimant had not limited himself to his speaking note at the hearing and had filed additional evidence in support of his position and had raised new points in response to submissions made by the defendant at the hearing. The defendant confirmed that it was neutral on whether this new evidence was formally admitted but submitted that the delay in forwarding this evidence meant that it should be afforded little, if any weight, by the court.

On 11 June 2025, Osborne Clarke forwarded a further message to the court from the claimant, responding to Osborne Clarke’s message of 9 June 2025, in which, in essence, the claimant submitted that the emails from Mr Omar and Mr Murat in support of his case did not constitute new evidence, because they were made some time ago and supported his reasons for his delay in bringing the claim. The claimant also noted that some of the additional evidence that he had filed with the court (concerning his medical condition, his mental health, and how a typical member of the Kurdish community would have reacted to the Documentary and the Drama) were intended to demonstrate the serious impact that the allegations made in the Documentary and the Drama had had on the claimant and his family.

I have read all of the material that has been provided by the claimant following the hearing de bene esse. To the extent that it adds evidence on any relevant matter that was not before me at the hearing, it would not be fair to admit it. Much of it, however, merely repeats or adds little of substance to what was already before me. I have carefully reviewed the claimant’s hearing statement and taken all of his submissions into account to the extent that it is fair to do so in relation to the issues that were addressed at the hearing before me.

As I have already noted, the claimant has brought this action because he believes that statements made in the Documentary and the Drama about the alleged rape of Banaz Mahmod by the three men who killed her, namely, Mohammed Hama, Mohammed Ali, and Omar Hussain, implicate the claimant, given that the three men are part of or closely associated with the claimant’s family and were acting on his instructions in carrying out the murder. He considers that a viewer or, at any rate a Kurdish viewer, would conclude, having viewed the Documentary and/or the Drama, that the claimant had something to do with the alleged rape, having ordered it to occur, or having approved its occurring, or having allowed it to occur.

The claimant also strongly disputes that there is reliable evidence that Banaz Mahmod was actually raped by Hama, Ali, and Hussain. He heavily criticises the defendant and the production companies that made the Documentary and the Drama, respectively, for suggesting that she was raped. He criticises their reliance, for example, on a transcript of a recording of a phone call made by Hama while in prison, during which he boasted about having raped Banaz Mahmod before killing her. The claimant relies on the fact that neither Hama, nor anyone else, has ever been charged with or convicted of raping Banaz Mahmod.

The claimant appears to believe that he can use this defamation claim as a vehicle to challenge the allegation in the Documentary and the Drama that Banaz Mahmod was raped. That, of course, is wrong. The purpose of a defamation claim is to litigate the question of whether the claimant’s reputation has been caused serious harm by a defamatory statement or statements made by the defendant. The focus is therefore solely on the impact on the claimant’s reputation (in this case, of course, the claimant being a convicted murderer) of one or more identified statements made a defendant once the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement or statements has been determined.

I have already ruled that neither the Documentary nor the Drama, properly understood, conveys the meaning for which the claimant contends, namely, that the claimant was involved in the alleged rape of his niece, Banaz, by others, namely, Hama, Ali, and Hussain.

For these reasons, I have reached the following conclusions: