Teledyne UK Limited v Julian Allen GAO & Ors

This case was listed before me on Friday 25^th July 2025 for final hearing of a claim for injunctive relief in respect of twelve remaining Named Defendants and for a review of an existing interim order against four categories Persons Unknown Defendants.

At the conclusion of the hearing, I granted a final injunction against the Named Defendants, and having conducted a review, a five year continuation of the injunction against the four categories of Persons Unknown Defendants subject to further annual review as set out in the terms set out in my Order attached to this Judgement at Annexe A.

These are my reasons for making that Order.

By this Claim the Claimant seeks injunctive relief to:

The Claimant holds the freehold title to sites in Shipley, Lincoln and Chelmsford and the leasehold title to sites in the Wirral, Presteigne and Newbury, from which it conducts its business.

Across those sites the Claimant produces specialised components and subsystems for medical, science, aerospace, defence and industrial applications. The products it manufactures are for commercial use in a wide range of industrial markets, including defence and aerospace. The manufactured components and subsystems are incorporated by the Claimant’s customers into their own products. Some products have military end-uses and are manufactured for use by the UK Ministry of Defence, NATO member states and other allied nations. Some products are exported under licence to Israel.

By reason of its business, the Claimant has become a target for direct-action protest, especially by activists protesting at the conflict in the Middle East. In particular, the group known as ‘Palestine Action’ has frequently targeted the Claimant’s sites. On 4^th July 2025 the website of the organisation was removed following the groups proscription. Prior to that, and as recently as 25^th June 2025, the six sites of the Claimant in respect of which this injunction is sought, were published on the website as ‘targets’ for direct action.

Each of the Named Defendants has been arrested at one of the Claimant’s sites throughout either 2024 or 2025 in connection with alleged acts of unlawful protest, carried out under the banner of Palestine Action. Specifically:

The Claimant’s sites have been the subject of protests on many occasions, many of which the Claimant acknowledges to have been peaceful and lawful. No instance of peaceful protest has been relied upon in support of the Claim. The Claimant relies upon evidence derived from a number of witness statements and supporting exhibits of protests that were not peaceful or lawful and occurred on thirteen different dates at the following locations namely:

Many of those incidents resulted in significant financial loss being caused to the Claimant as is further evidenced in the witness statements relied upon in support of the application. In particular the losses included:

The Claimant company and its sites have not been the only targets for protests by unidentified members of the Palestine Action organisation. Since the commencement of this Claim, and in direct consequence of their role in bringing it on behalf of the Claimant, Keystone Law and Manan Singh (the partner at that firm with conduct of the litigation) have been targeted in a number of incidents. In particular:

This claim first came before Bourne J on 20^th December 2024. On that date, having considered evidence in witness statements prepared by Nicholas Wargent (a Director of the Claimant company) and Manan Singh (the solicitor with conduct of the litigation on behalf of the Claimant) he issued an interim injunction against the first seven Named Defendants and four categories of Persons Unknown. The Order of Bourne J fixed a further hearing for consideration of the continuation of his interim Order for 24^th January 2025. The decision of Bourne J, in which he sets out in detail the evidence that he considered (which evidence I have also considered on the application for a final Order), is reported at [2024]EWHC 3538 (KB).

On 24^th January Tipples J heard an application for the continuation of the Order of Bourne J by which time a further seven named Defendants had been added to the Claim. Tipples J, having considered a number of further witness statements prepared by Mr Wargent and Mr Singh, extended the order of Bourne J until a final hearing which she fixed for 25^th July 2025. Tipples J refused the application of the Claimant to make an order against the four categories of Persons Unknown for a period of five years (subject to annual review) on the basis that there had been recent developments in the Middle East, including a tentative ceasefire, and that a five-year order may in the event not be necessary. She adjourned that issue for determination at the final hearing on 25^th July. The form of Order made by Tipples J was identical to that of Bourne J save for the addition of the further Named Defendants.

On 21^st March 2025 a further application was made by the Claimant to Murray J for an Order in respect of two further Named Defendants (D19 and D20). The prohibitions set out in the Order of Murray J were in identical terms to those against Named Defendants in the Orders of Bourne J and Tipples J.

Murray J listed his Order for final hearing alongside that of Tipples J on 25^th July 2025.

Although some Named Defendants have since settled the claim by signing consent orders and undertakings, twelve named defendants remained live defendants to the claim as of the date of the hearing before me, namely:

Two of the remaining twelve Named Defendants (D5 Ricky Southall and D14 Autumn Taylor-Ward) had also signed a consent order settling the claim but did not sign the relevant undertaking that accompanied that order. Despite repeated attempts by the Claimant’s solicitors to contact those defendants and to chase their missing signatures, no signed undertaking has been provided by either of them, and they remained live defendants at the hearing on 25^th July.

The Named Defendants have not engaged with these proceedings at any stage. They have not acknowledged the claim, sought to defend it, made any representations nor attend any previous hearing. No Named Defendant attended the hearing before me on 25^th July and no representations were made to the Court, in writing or otherwise, by or on behalf of any defendant (as to which see the postscript to this judgement below).

At the hearing listed before me the Claimant sought final injunctive relief against the remaining twelve Named Defendants and a continuation of the Order against the four categories of Persons Unknown. The Claimant invited me to make a single coterminous Order that would expire on 25^th July 2030, with an annual review in respect of Persons Unknown. In support of that application the Claimant relied upon the evidence that had previously been considered by Bourne J, Tipples J and Murray J, together with further witness statements from Scott Patterson (21^st May 2025) Nicholas Wargent (23^rd May 2025) and Manan Singh (27^th May 2025).

At the outset of the hearing Natalie Pratt, on behalf of the Claimant, sought permission to rely upon a seventh witness statement prepared in these proceedings by Manan Singh, her instructing solicitor. That statement is dated 21^st July 2025 and was accompanied by a large volume of documentary exhibits. On the basis that I was undoubtedly going to be assisted in determining this application by receiving and considering the most up to date evidence about events that were continuing to evolve I granted permission at the outset of the hearing for the Claimant to rely upon that statement.

Each of the Named Defendants was served with the Order of Tipples J or Murray J as applicable to their cases. Those Orders listed this hearing on their face and the other service provisions of each of those orders have been complied with. The applicable certificates of service were produced in the procedural bundle prepared by the Claimant for the hearing.

The Claimant drew my attention to the fact that four bundles had been sent to the last known address of the fourth Named Defendant (Najam Shah) but had been returned unopened with an indication that he was no longer at that address. I am nonetheless satisfied that he has been properly served in accordance with the terms of the earlier Orders.

The Persons Unknown Defendants have been served with notice of this hearing in accordance with the service provisions of the earlier Orders of Murray J and Tipples J and the Certificates of Service were also before me in the Claimant’s procedural bundle. I am entirely satisfied that by discharging the comprehensive notification requirements in the Orders of Tipples J and Murray J the Claimant has taken all reasonable steps to draw its application to the attention of Persons Unknown in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council & Ors v London Gypsies and Travellers & Ors [2024] AC 983.

The Claim is advanced under three heads namely trespass, interference with the Claimant’s common law right to access the highway and public nuisance (by obstruction of the highway).

Trespass to land is the interference with possession or the right to possession and includes instances in which a person intrudes upon the land of another without legal justification. The key and well-established features of trespass are:

A person does not commit a trespass where they enter onto the land of another pursuant to a licence, whether express or implied. However, where a person enters onto land pursuant to a licence, and proceeds to act in a way that exceeds the scope of that licence or remains on the land after the expiration of the licence, a trespass is committed (See Hillen v ICI (Alkali) Ltd[1936] AC 65 at Paragraph 69 per Lord Atkin).

In Marshall v Blackpool Corp [1935] AC 16 at 22 Lord Atkin explained the right to access the public highway:

“The owner of land adjoining a highway has a right of access to the highway from any part of his premises. This is so…whether he is entitled to the whole or some interest in the ground subjacent to the highway or not. The rights of the public to pass along the highway are subject to this right of access; just as the right of access is subject to the rights of the public and must be exercised subject to the general obligations as to nuisance and the like imposed upon a person using the highway.”

Having considered that passage from Marshall Jonathan Hilliard KC (Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) held in Arla Foods Limited & Anr v Persons Unknown & Ors [2024] EWHC 1952 (Ch) at paragraphs 89 to 93:

“An interference with the right is actionable without proof of loss, and if an interference does cause a loss, then damages can be obtained. Taking the last part of the extract from Marshall above, in my judgment the key question here is the qualification of the right of access by the rights of the public. In Ineos Upstream Ltd v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 2945 (Ch), Morgan J considered at [107] the interaction of the adjoining landowner’s right of access to the highway with the protestors’ right to a reasonable use of the highway. He assumed in favour of the protestors that if they were carrying on a reasonable use of the highway which impacted on the rights of the claimants in that case to access the highway, that would not be an infringement of the right of access to the highway.

While Morgan J did not have to decide the point, because the claimants in that case put their case on the basis of public nuisance rather than the landowner’s right to access the highway, in my judgment that is correct and I should take the same approach here. The rights of the public include the right to reasonable use of the highway. Therefore, applying the principles set out in Marshall, a reasonable use of the highway by members of the public will not constitute unlawful interference with the adjoining landowner’s right to access the highway.

It was submitted by the Claimants that the decision of Julian Knowles J in High Speed Two (HS2) Limited v Four Categories of Persons Unknown & Monaghan & Others [2022] EWHC 2360 (KB) at [196] suggests that no balancing act is to be applied between the right to access the highway and the Article 10 and 11 rights of the defendants, because in a claim under this cause of action much, if not all, of the relevant protest is taking place on private land. I do not take Julian Knowles J to be going so far in [196]. Rather he simply put forward the fact that in the case before him much if not all of the protests had taken place on private land as being the first of three reasons why there was no unlawful interference with Articles 10 and 11 on the facts before him. Further, here, the Claimants rely on the obstruction of the highway, such as by protestors mounting and affixing themselves to vehicles on it, as future acts that would breach their right to access the highway, and that acts are not taking place on private land.

However, as set out below, I consider that the apprehended actions would amount to a violation of the Claimants’ right to access the highway whether or not such a balancing act is to be applied. Therefore, I do not consider it necessary to consider further the question of whether such a balancing act needs to be applied.”

Public Nuisance (by obstruction of the highway)

It is long established that in certain circumstances a public nuisance can be occasioned by obstruction of the highway. In Thurrock Council & Anr v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 2576 (KB) Julian Knowles J, having conducted a comprehensive review of earlier authorities summarised the law in this regard as it relates to protestor cases at Paragraph 64 of his judgement:

“(a)

There is a right to peaceful assembly on the highway, but it must be remembered that the highway is more than just the carriageway. The assembly on the highway in Jones, was concerned with the grass verge;

(b)

That right does not extend so far as to allow the committing of a public nuisance;

(c)

While the right to use the highway comprises activities such as assembly on the highway, such activities are subsidiary to the use for passage, and they must be not only usual and reasonable but consistent with the primary use of the highway to pass and repass, if a person is deliberately interfering with the primary use to pass and repass, they are obstructing the highway;

(d)

That public nuisance may arise by the unreasonable obstruction of the highway, such as unreasonably impeding the primary right of the public to pass and repass;

(e)

Whether an obstruction of the highway is unreasonable is a question of fact, but will generally require that the obstruction is more than de minimis, and must be wilful.”

An application for injunctive relief that interferes with the qualified Article 10 and 11 right of a Defendant will give rise to additional considerations. Any interference with the Article 10 and 11 rights of a Defendant must be a proportionate means to a legitimate aim, and necessary in a democratic society.

In DPP v Ziegler & Ors [2022] AC 408 the Supreme Court set out the test to be applied by a Court when considering the proportionality of any injunctive relief sought. In summary, determination of the issues that arise under Articles 10 and 11 require the Court to ask itself five questions:

The fifth and final question will necessarily require a fact specific inquiry in which the Court performs an evaluation of the circumstances of the case before it in order to assess whether any interference is proportionate. That inquiry will itself require the Court to engage with four further questions:

In Zeigler (at paragraph 72) the Supreme Court adopted a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to any proportionality assessment as had been set out by Lord Neuberger in City of London Corporation v Samede [2012] PTSR 1624 (See Paragraphs 39 to 41) which in summary are:

When considering Article 10 and 11 rights in the particular context of a claim for trespass Lord Burnett (LCJ) observed in DPP v Cuciurean[2022] 3 WLR 446 (DC) at Paragraph 46 that:

“Articles 10 and 11 are subject to limitations or restrictions which are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Those limitations and restrictions include the law of trespass, the object of which is to protect property rights in accordance with A1P1. On the other hand, property rights might have to yield to articles 10 and 11 if, for example, a law governing the exercise of those rights and use of land were to destroy the essence of the freedom to protest. That would be an extreme situation.”

As Sheldon J observed in The Office Group Properties & Anr v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1438 (KB) at Paragraph 29 of the Judgement (before disposing of the case on different grounds):

“it will be an unusual case where Article 10 and 11 rights of those who trespass on private land will outweigh the A1P1 rights of the landowner”

It is in any event not suggested on the facts of this case that a prohibition on trespass would have the effect of preventing the effective exercise of the Article 10 and 11 rights of any defendant.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council and others v London Gypsies and Travellers and others[2023] UKSC 47 makes plain that any claim and application for injunctive relief against newcomer Persons Unknown is to be treated differently to those against named defendants. In particular a Claimant must show a ‘compelling need’ for the order sought (at Paragraph 218):

“any [claimant] applying for an injunction against persons unknown, including newcomers … must satisfy the court by full and detailed evidence that there is a compelling justification for the order sought … There must be a strong probability that a tort … is to be committed and that this will cause real harm. Further the threat must be real and imminent.”

Following Wolverhampton, Ritchie J summarised the requirements for an injunction against persons unknown in Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 134 (KB). In particular a number of substantive and procedural requirements must be satisfied before relief could be granted.

The substantive requirements are:

The procedural requirements are:

On the basis that in this case the Claimant is seeking an element of precautionary relief the Court would usually be required to have regard to the multi-factorial test stated by Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown[2019] 4 WLR 2. That test requires these two questions to be answered in the affirmative before injunctive relief could be granted:

Those questions are to be addressed by reference to the following factors:

In Rochdale MBC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1314 (KB) Garnham J considered the Vastint test and how it sat alongside the Wolverhampton framework and concluded at Paragraph 78:

“In my judgment, the test articulated by Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown [2019] 4 WLR 2 and approved by Sir Geoffrey Vos MR in Barking and Dagenham v Persons Unknown [2022] EWCA Civ 13 has been subsumed into the Wolverhampton framework. The Vastint test, however, provides a useful double check.”

Approach to ‘review’

At Paragraph 225 of the Judgement in Wolverhampton the Supreme Court observed that the temporal limitation and periodic review of newcomer injunctions provides:

“all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”

A series of recent decisions have considered how the Court should approach the review exercise. In High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 1277 (KB) (‘HS2’),Ritchie J considered the correct approach and concluded that (at Paragraph 32):

“Drawing these authorities together, on a review of an interim injunction against PUs and named Defendants, this Court is not starting de novo. The Judges who have previously made the interim injunctions have made findings justifying the interim injunctions. It is not the task of the Court on review to query or undermine those. However, it is vital to understand why they were made, to read and assimilate the findings, to understand the sub-strata of the quia timet, the reasons for the fear of unlawful direct action. Then it is necessary to determine, on the evidence, whether anything material has changed. If nothing material has changed, if the risk still exists as before and the claimant remains rightly and justifiably fearful of unlawful attacks, the extension may be granted so long as procedural and legal rigour has been observed and fulfilled.

On the other hand, if material matters have changed, the Court is required to analyse the changes, based on the evidence before it, and in the full light of the past decisions, to determine anew, whether the scope, details and need for the full interim injunction should be altered. To do so, the original thresholds for granting the interim injunction still apply.”

The same approach was taken by Morris J in Transport for London v Persons Unknown & Ors [2025] EWHC 55 (KB) and by Hill J when conducting the annual review in Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 207 (KB).

In Basingstoke & Deane BC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 738 the Court took a different approach and conducted a further full Wolverhampton assessment. However, in Rochdale Garnham J considered that Basingstoke could be regarded as an outlier for good reason on the facts and held that:

“In my judgment the correct approach is dictated by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton and in particular [225]. This is not a “tick box” exercise, but the matters on which evidence should be adduced and argument focussed are (i) how effective the order has been; (ii) whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; (iii) whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and (iv) whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made. The parties should give full disclosure, supported by appropriate evidence, directed towards those questions.”

In this case Miss Pratt submits that there has been no change of circumstance that would necessitate a full Wolverhampton assessment and that I should follow the approach taken in Rochdale and other cases, effectively treating Basingstoke as an outlier.

I accept the Claimant’s submission as to the correct approach to review in this case. This is not a de novo hearing of the application for a Persons Unknown Order, and the Court has previously, and on two occasions, performed a full Wolverhampton assessment alongside a Ziegler proportionality assessment. The process of annual review provides an additional check and balance on an Order that has already been the subject of anxious scrutiny against stringent criteria. The purpose of the review is to ensure that there has been no change of circumstance as would mean that the continuation of the order was unnecessary or that it should otherwise be discharged or varied.

Miss Pratt referred the Court, in discharging the Claimant’s obligation for full and frank disclosure, to the decision of Nicklin J in MBR Acres Limited & Ors v Curtin & Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 331 (KB) (a decision handed down after the Order made by Tipples J in this case).

That decision, is notable for two reasons:

Having drawn my attention to that decision Miss Pratt nonetheless urged me not to vary the form of any order I am willing to make in this case so as to make it a truly contra mundum order. She submitted that such an approach would be inconsistent with the approach taken in a number of other cases decided post Wolverhampton, and that although Fordham J followed the same approach as Nicklin J at the first hearing of a without notice application in The Chancellor, Master and Scholars of the University of Cambridgev Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 454 (KB), that approach was not followed by the Soole J on the return date who preferred and adopted the ‘conventional’ approach (See [2025] EWHC 724 (KB)).

Miss Pratt further submits that I should not impose a permission condition in this case. Accepting that such conditions have featured in some other recent injunctions (See for example Trinity College Cambridge v Persons Unknown and St John’s College Cambridge v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1577 (Ch)), she submits that:

In addition to the evidence that had previously been considered by Bourne J, Tipples J and Murray J, (which I received in extensive bundles that I have read and considered carefully) I have also scrutinised the further statements and associated exhibits relied upon by the Claimant from Scott Patterson (21^st May 2025) Nicholas Wargent (23^rd May 2025) and Manan Singh (27^th May 2025).

The evidence establishes that since the grant of the initial relief by Bourne J on 20^th December 2024 there have been just two instances of unlawful protest at the Shipley site. One of those incidents, on the 28^th January 2025, caused major disruption and led to the addition of two further named defendants to the Claim (Defendants 19 and 20). That position, when compared and contrasted to the position in 2024 and earlier, demonstrates a marked decrease in unlawful protest and a marked decrease in the harm caused by such protests (financial or otherwise). I am satisfied that this decrease in unlawful activity is evidence of the relief having its intended effect, rather than evidence that the risk of further unlawful protest has dissipated.

The proscription of Palestine Action and the removal of the group’s website does not in my judgement diminish the risk of further unlawful protest. It might rather be said that whilst the risk remains the same, the ability to monitor and respond to that risk has been reduced as following proscription a number of alternative groups have been rapidly formed that all pursue the same aims with similar tactics being deployed.

The evidence clearly establishes that unlawful protests of the type suffered by the Claimant continue at other sites and against other bodies and companies that are not themselves protected by injunctive relief. The targeting of the offices of Keystone Law and the solicitor with conduct of this litigation on behalf of the Claimants demonstrates that when injuncted from unlawful protest at the Claimant’s sites the focus has shifted to attacking those associated with the Claimant and concerned in obtaining injunctive relief. Were that relief to be withdrawn I have no doubt that the focus would return to Teledyne who would be subject to further unlawful action.

The removal of the Palestine Action website, which listed Teledyne and its sites, described them as ‘targets’, advocated unlawful attacks upon them, and educated those visiting the webpages how to conduct those attacks and how to seek to avoid detection having committed them, does not materially reduce the risk to the Claimant given the emergence of other groups and Teledyne having been publicly named as a target for a prolonged period of time in material that was available to download and easily accessible.

The tentative ceasefire that had recently been announced prior to the hearing before Tipples J has not resulted in any lasting end to hostilities. Support for the pro-Palestinian cause remains significant with protests continuing (both lawful and unlawful) on a regular basis.

I am satisfied on all of the evidence that the risk of further unlawful action targeting the Claimant’s sites remains high and that the relief granted to date has been effective is reducing that risk to the levels that have pertained following the initial grant in December 2024.

I am satisfied on the evidence having regard both to past events and to the very real threat of a repeat of similar unlawful protest in the future, that the conduct of the named Defendants and the identified categories of Persons Unknown would prima facie constitute the torts of trespass, interference with the common law right of the Claimant to access the highway at its Shipley site and public nuisance by obstruction of the highway.

I am further satisfied on the evidence that there remains a real and imminent risk of further unlawful protest at the Claimant’s sites and that any such unlawful protests would represent an infringement of the Claimant’s rights. No defendant has sought at any stage to engage with the Claimant’s application and no arguable defence to the claim has been identified. The fact that since the interim relief was granted the number of incidents has diminished is evidence that the injunctive relief is well targeted and effective.

The tactic of pursuing and targeting the lawyers acting for the Claimant represents a shift in emphasis as a direct result of the Court issuing relief. The proscription of Palestine Action has not reduced the risk in my judgement; it has rather made it harder to monitor and respond to that risk. A number of other groups have emerged to fill the vacuum created by proscription and the aims of those groups remain the same. There is no reason to suppose that the Claimant does not remain a ‘target’ of those groups, and the individuals associated with them.

The majority of the named defendants have been charged with a variety of criminal offences arising from their previous targeting of the Claimant. They have been tried or are awaiting trial. All have pleaded not guilty in their criminal proceedings but none of them deny the underlying conduct. As I have already observed all have failed to engage with this Claim in any way.

The loss that would be occasioned to the Claimant by further acts of unlawful protest would not in my view be adequately compensated by damages. Significant harm has already been caused to the Claimant’s sites. That harm (both caused and risked) is not only financial. There is a significant direct risk of physical harm to the Claimant’s staff, the defendants and the wider public by protests that targets secure sites on which are stored highly volatile chemicals and other compounds. There is also an ongoing indirect risk to military personnel occasioned by equipment shortages if disruptive protests on the scale of those to date continue. The financial costs have been significant, both direct and in terms of the further security measures that have had to be taken to secure the Claimant’s six sites. The Claimant’s should not have to make good the significant destruction caused by the Defendant’s actions by conducting repairs.

Asking myself the five Ziegler questions the first four can plainly be answered in the affirmative. I have therefore gone on to consider the fifth ‘proportionality’ question and in doing so the four sub-questions:

I am satisfied that the aim of the injunctive relief sought is sufficient to justify interference with the Defendant’s rights. There is a history of seriously disruptive unlawful conduct designed to obstruct the highway and future disruption would cause significant loss to the Claimant. There is plainly a rational connection between the final injunctive relief sought and the aim of preserving the right of the Claimant to free and unfettered access to the Public Highway. The decrease in unlawful protests since the interim relief was granted demonstrates that the injunction has achieved its intended effect.

As I have already observed I do not consider damages to be an adequate remedy and there are no less restrictive means available. I do not consider that recent changes to the law to create new criminal offences aimed at protesters have had the effect of deterring those who seek to unlawfully protest at the Claimant’s sites in the manner prohibited by the terms of this injunction.

I am also satisfied (as were Bourne J and Tipples J when granting interim Orders), that the making of this final Order will not interfere with or restrict the right to peaceful and lawful protest at any of the Claimant’s sites. As the evidence before me demonstrated, peaceful and lawful protests have taken place, and the Order sought would not fetter the right to hold them. Rather, the Order is targeted at the restriction of unlawful protest that would cause further serious losses to the Claimant in addition to those that have already been occasioned.

In all of the circumstances I am satisfied that the Ziegler requirements are all satisfied and that it is just and convenient to grant the final Order sought against the Named Defendants.

As I have stated at Paragraph 49 (above) I accept the submissions of the Claimant that in reviewing the Order against Persons Unknown I am not required to make fresh Wolverhampton and Ziegler assessments; the Court has previously been satisfied of those requirements and the Valero procedural requirements before granting interim relief.

On review I am satisfied that there are no grounds for the discharge or variation of the relief against Persons Unknown as granted previously (subject to one minor amendment to one of the terms of the final Order that gives proper effect to a right of way running through the Claimant’s land). The factual analysis and reasoning that justifies the making of the final Order against the Named Defendants applies equally to the need for an Order against defined categories of Persons Unknown. Even if I had been satisfied that I was required to make a fresh assessment I would have been satisfied that an Order against Persons Unknown was justified on the evidence that I have read and considered and the conclusions I have reached upon it.

I am not invited by the Claimant to make a true contra mundum Order of the type made by Nicklin J in MBR Acres. To the contrary the Claimant positively submits that the Court should not make such an order in this case, arguing that to do so would be to impose an Order of far wider scope than that currently in force with no justification for doing so.

At Paragraph 221 in Wolverhampton the Supreme Court held that:

“The actual or intended respondents to the application must be defined as precisely as possible. In so far as it is possible actually to identify persons to whom the order is directed (and who will be enjoined by its terms) by name or in some other way, as Lord Sumption explained in Cameron, the local authority ought to do so. The fact that a precautionary injunction is also sought against newcomers or other persons unknown is not of itself a justification for failing properly to identify these persons when it is possible to do so, and serving them with the proceedings and order, if necessary, by seeking an order for substituted service. It is only permissible to seek or maintain an order directed to newcomers or other persons unknown where it is impossible to name or identify them in some other and more precise way. Even where the persons sought to be subjected to the injunction are newcomers, the possibility of identifying them as a class by reference to conduct prior to what would be a breach (and, if necessary, by reference to intention) should be explored and adopted if possible.”

In MBR Acres, Nicklin J concluded that in order to give effect to this aspect of the Judgement it was necessary to make a true contra mundum Order. There will no doubt be cases similar to MBR Acres in which it will be possible, and indeed desirable, to frame the Order in a similar manner and thereby to achieve the precision in definition required to be compliant with the procedural requirements imposed by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton.

However, each case will undoubtedly turn on its own facts and different factual scenarios may require different approaches to the drafting of Wolverhampton compliant Orders. In this case I am satisfied that the terms of the previous order defined the intended respondents as precisely as it is possible to do and identifies any newcomers ‘as a class by reference to conduct prior to what would be a breach’. I do not therefore consider it necessary or appropriate to impose a true contra mundum order that would mark a significant, and unnecessary, widening of the scope of the order that has hitherto been in place.

I note that in the reviews that were conducted in both London City Airport Ltd & Ors v Persons Unknown (24 June 2025, unrep.) [2025] 6 WLUK 499 and Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Persons Unknown[2025] EWHC 1768 (KB) Bourne J and Sweeting J respectively declined to follow the approach of Nicklin J in MBR Acres and did not impose contra mundum Orders, each preferring not to interfere with the ‘conventional’ form of Order as had previously been imposed in each case.

I am furthermore unpersuaded, notwithstanding the approach taken by Nicklin J on the facts of MBR Acres, that there is any blanket requirement to impose a condition that requires the Claimant to seek permission before bringing contempt proceedings. As Sweeting J held in Esso Petroleum:

“I observe that the suggestion of a blanket requirement for all newcomer injunctions in protest cases appears to have been made per incuriam given other relevant authorities, such as AG v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273, Sectorguard plc v Dienne plc [2009] EWHC 2693 (Ch), and PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v. Maksimov & Ors [2014] EWHC 4370 (Comm). These cases suggest that the courts already possess adequate mechanisms to address disproportionate committal applications.”

There being in my view no blanket requirement to impose a restriction on contempt proceedings, I do not consider it appropriate to impose such a requirement on the facts of this case.

There is only one aspect of the previous Orders that requires modification and that is to give effect to a public right of way that passes over the Claimant’s Shipley site. I have given effect to that right of way by making a minor adjustment to Paragraph 2(i)(a) of the Order which ensures that no person would breach the terms of the Order by exercising their right to pass and re-pass only along the public right of way.

Although Tipples J declined to make a five-year order against Persons Unknown (subject to annual review) she did so on the basis that events in the Middle East at the time of the hearing before her may have resulted in an order of that length being unnecessary. The issue of the length of Order was ultimately adjourned to be determined at the final hearing. I take the view that any optimism the Court may have held as regards the need for a longer order appears to have been misplaced in the light of subsequent events. I take the view that a five-year Order is appropriate and remind myself that in any event an application may be made to set aside this Order, and it will also be subject to annual review. If in twelve months the Court concluded that in fact a five-year Order was no longer required, it would be open to the Court to then vary or discharge the Order I have made. Important safeguards against an unduly long order are built into the annual review process.

Having concluded that the Order should be made for a five-year period I have issued a single Order that applies for the same duration of time in the case of the Named Defendants and Persons Unknown and consolidates the earlier orders made by Tipples J and Murray J into a single Order.

For the reasons that I have now given, I issued a single Order on 25^th July 2025 in respect of both the Named Defendants and the Persons Unknown Defendants for a period of five years, namely until 25^th July 2030.

As regards the Persons Unknown Defendants the Order will be subject to annual review, the first such review taking place no later than 25^th July 2026.

The twelve named Defendants referred to in Paragraph 11 of my Order (D1 – 7, D14, D16, D17, D19 and D20) will pay the Claimant’s costs on the standard basis to be assessed. Each of them must make a payment on account of costs in the sum of £6125 by 4pm on 8^th August 2025.

By an email to the Court office timed at 5.19 pm on Friday 25^th July Robert Lizar Solicitors invited me to vary the order for Costs that I had made in respect of Mary Ensell and Harry Wade, the 19^th and 20^th Named Defendants. The email explained that Robert Lizar Solicitors do not act for those defendants in the hearing that was listed before me but do act for them in contempt proceedings that had been listed before Stacey J on 28^th July 2025. The email made the following request:

“We write in respect of the Order made today renewing the Injunction and ordering costs of £6,125 against each of the named defendants in the Injunction Proceedings of £6,125, to be paid by 4pm on 8 August 2025.

The reason for this email is that our clients had understood that a settlement had been reached in the Contempt Application, which ensured that no costs would be sought against them in the Injunction Proceedings, as well as the Contempt Application.

It was the Defendant’s understanding that the settlement agreement would be a full and final agreement relating to all financial claims and costs between the parties. The terms of the agreement are described in the Claimant’s skeleton argument as: “The Claimant will undertake not to pursue the Defendants for any financial loss at this time or in the future”.  

On this basis our clients did not attend today’s hearing, as they did not contest the injunction renewal and understood that costs would not be sought against them.

Following the hearing, this matter was raised with the Claimant in an attempt to reach an agreement. There is a dispute between the parties regarding the scope of the settlement agreement reached. The Claimant (copied into this email) does not accept that the settlement reached in the committal application applies to the injunction proceedings (and disputes that the skeleton argument quoted reflects the terms of the agreement). Unfortunately, it does not appear that agreement will be reached between the parties.

The Court clearly made the costs orders today without being informed about or addressed on any of these matters. As stated, had our clients been aware that the Claimants would seek costs they would have attended the hearing. In order to allow for a fair disposal of the costs in the claim we therefore respectfully request that our clients be allowed to make brief submissions on costs in writing to the Court as to why the costs order against them should be set aside, to which the Claimant can of course respond.

We submit that the most proportionate method to address the issue is to vary the order made today to allow for submissions to be made in writing by the Defendants. We understand that the Claimant’s position is that a formal application to vary the costs order should be made by our clients. In our submission this will incur unnecessary expense and delay which is not required and is not proportionate to the issues. We should inform the court that both our clients are each of extremely limited means, they are unable to afford legal representation. Legal aid is not available in relation to the main injunction proceedings and only covers the committal applications. This is a discrete issue that could be resolved proportionately and fairly through short written submissions by both parties.

Should the Court accede to our request, then we would ask for a period of 7 days to serve our client’s submissions, allowing the Claimant a further appropriate period (of no less than 7 days) to respond.”

I do not accept the premise of the email that the non-attendance of the Defendants at the hearing before me was because they did not anticipate an application for costs to be made against them; as I observed in the body of my Judgement they have not engaged with this Claim in any way or at any stage. The opportunity to address the issue of costs was at the hearing before me on 25^th July of which they were fully aware. The Defendants did not take that opportunity and I do not consider it appropriate to now informally set aside or otherwise vary my Order. It is a matter for the Defendant’s whether they now seek to make a formal application to vary with the attendant cost implications of doing so.

For the purpose of this Order:

Until and including 25 July 2030, the First to Seventh Defendants, Eighth to Eleventh Defendants (Persons Unknown), Fourteenth Defendant, Sixteenth Defendant, Seventeenth Defendant, Nineteenth Defendant and the Twentieth Defendant and each of them (whether by themselves or by instructing, encouraging, or allowing any other person) are forbidden from:

Pursuant to CPR rules 6.15 and 6.27, the Claimant has permission to serve the First to Seventh Defendants, Fourteenth Defendant, Sixteenth Defendant, Seventeenth Defendant, Nineteenth Defendant and the Twentieth Defendant with, and notify the Eighth to Eleventh Defendants (Persons Unknown) of,this Order and any further documents in the Claim by (with 3(i) – 3(iv) to be treated conjunctively):

The deemed date of service of any documents referred to in paragraph 3 above shall be the day on which service of the document or documents is completed in accordance with paragraph 3 above.

The Eighth to Eleventh Defendants (Persons Unknown) or any other person other than a Named Defendant and who is affected by this Order may apply to the court at any time to vary or discharge this Order or so much of it as affects that person, but they must first give the Claimant’s solicitors 72 hours’ notice of such application. If any evidence is to be relied upon in support of that application, that evidence must be served on the Claimant’s solicitors 48 hours in advance of the hearing.

Any person applying to vary or discharge this Order must provide their full name and address for service.

The Order against the Eighth to Eleventh Defendants (Persons Unknown) shall be reviewed at a hearing no later than 25 July 2026 (or as near to that date as the court can reasonably accommodate), with a time estimate of ½ day, unless the Claimant indicates to the court that it does not seek an extension of the Order, upon which the Order will expire as against Persons Unknown only.

The Claimant must file and notify Persons Unknown of (in accordance with paragraph 3 above) any evidence upon which it intends to rely at the review hearing by 4pm on 4 July 2026. Any other person who would like to participate in the review hearing must also file and serve on the Claimant any evidence upon which they intend to rely at the review hearing by 4pm on 4 July 2026.

All communications with the Claimant about this Order should be sent by email to the Claimant’s solicitors, Keystone Law, at info.teledyne@keystonelaw.co.uk.

All communications with the Court about this Order should be sent to KBJudgesListingOffice@justice.gov.uk or Room E03 Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London WC2A 2LL. The Telephone number is 020 3938957. The offices are open between 10am and 4pm Monday to Friday.

The First to Seventh Defendants, Fourteenth Defendant, Sixteenth Defendant, Seventeenth Defendant, Nineteenth Defendant and the Twentieth Defendant shall pay the Claimant’s costs of the claim on the standard basis to be assessed if not agreed.

The First to Seventh Defendants, Fourteenth Defendant, Sixteenth Defendant, Seventeenth Defendant, Nineteenth Defendant and the Twentieth Defendant shall each make a payment of account of costs to the Claimant in the sum of £6,125 by 4pm on 8 August 2025.

No Order as to costs against the Eighth to Eleventh Defendants (Persons Unknown).

A Defendant who is an individual and who is ordered not to do something must not do it him or herself or in any other way nor must he/she do it through others acting on his/her behalf or on his/her instructions or with his/her encouragement.

In this Order, references to ‘the Defendant’ means any or all of them (unless expressly stated otherwise).

A requirement to serve on a ‘Defendant’ means on each of them. However, the Order is effective against any Defendant on whom it is served in accordance with this Order.

An Order requiring ‘the Defendant’ not to do anything applies to all Defendants.

This Order contains the following schedules and annexes

The first witness statement of Nicholas James Wargent dated 13 December 2024;

The first witness statement of Manan Singh dated 13 December 2024;

The second witness statement of Nicholas James Wargent dated 19 December 2024;

The third witness statement of Nicholas James Wargent dated 15 January 2025;

The third witness statement of Manan Singh dated 23 January 2025;

The fourth witness statement of Manan Singh dated 13 February 2025;

The fifth witness statement of Manan Singh dated 18 March 2025;

The first witness statement of Scott Douglas Patterson dated 21 May 2025;

The fourth witness statement of Nicholas James Wargent dated 23 May 2025;

The sixth (labelled ‘fifth’) witness statement of Manan Singh dated 27 May 2025;

The seventh witness statement of Manan Singh dated 21 July 2025.