Hattons of London Ltd v The Knightsbridge Collection Limited & Ors

This is my judgment on an application made by Hattons of London Ltd (“the Claimant”) for an interim prohibitory and mandatory injunction against the Defendants arising from an alleged “breach of contract, inducement of breach and unlawful means conspiracy and breach of confidentiality”.

The First Defendant (“D1”) was incorporated in October 2024, and its business model and practice are said to rely heavily (if not exclusively) on using the proprietary information and confidential information of the Claimant. D1’s sole registered director and shareholder is D8. At the start of the hearing, I was told that D8 had applied to liquidate the company.

The individual Defendants are all former employees of the Claimant. In the case of the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Defendants (“D2”, “D3”, “D4”, “D5”, “D6”, “D7”), they are recent former employees employed as Account Managers. The Eighth Defendant (“D8”) was employed as an Account Manager until October 2022.

On the morning of 16 July 2025 (the day before the hearing) Mr Andrew Pickerill (“D2”) and Mr Nicholas Harvey (“D7”) each applied for the hearing to be adjourned. They explained that they were seeking pro bono representation but had been unable to do so in time for the hearing. D2 said that he had an active grievance against the Claimant, and he believed that it was abusing its position and resources to pressure him by these proceedings. D7 said that he had not received information about the hearing in sufficient time to arrange childcare. He expressed grave concern regarding the Claimant’s request for access to his phone and said that he was feeling very stressed by the proceedings.

I directed that the parties should file any observations on the applications by 4 p.m. the day before the hearing. The Claimant strongly opposed the applications and said that the Defendants had first been sent a letter before action on 20 June 2025 and had initially been represented by solicitors. They had had sufficient notice of the application which had been properly served. The Claimant noted that two of the Defendants were legally represented and were instructing counsel to attend the hearing and that significant costs would be incurred if the hearing was adjourned.

Having considered the requests and the observations, I declined the requests for an adjournment. The Defendants had been properly served and were on notice for some time about the proceedings. An adjournment would waste costs in circumstances where, on the Claimant’s case, there was urgency in granting the relief sought. It would not be in accordance with the overriding objective for the hearing to be adjourned. I noted however the reported travel and childcare difficulties and I directed that CVP would be available and that any of the Defendants could appear remotely by CVP.  I also directed that the hearing should be listed for 2 p.m. to assist travel. I indicated that if any party wished to renew their request for an adjournment, then that could be addressed at the outset of the following day’s hearing.

At the start of the hearing on 17 July 2025, I was informed that no party intended to renew their request for an adjournment. D2 appeared in person, and I was informed that D3 was on holiday and had not contemplated attending the hearing.

For the purposes of the hearing, I was provided with a 686-page bundle as well as bundles of authorities from the Claimant and from D4 and D5.

The Claimant filed witness statements from Mr Simon Mellinger and Mr Michael Hall in support of their application.

The Fourth and Fifth Defendants filed witness statements very shortly before the hearing. No objection was taken by the Claimant to the late filing of witness evidence from the Fourth and Fifth Defendants.

At the hearing I heard submissions from Mr Northall KC (for the Claimant), Mr Cobill (for D4) and Mr Mahmood (for D5). Mr Pickerill and Mr Shore also read prepared statements which they amplified. I am grateful to all counsel as well as Mr Pickerill and to Mr Shore for their focused and concise oral submissions.

The Claimant’s application was issued with a time estimate of 1 hour which was not revised. The time estimate was unrealistic on any view and in the event the hearing did not conclude until 4.45p.m. Although time was limited, I am satisfied that all parties were able to make the points to me that they wished to make, particularly as they were supplementing full written arguments.

I have considered all of the evidence so far as is relevant and set out in this judgment such of the evidence as is necessary so as to understand my reasons for determining the application.

The background to the application before me is set out in the witness statement from Mr Mellinger who is the Managing Director and founder of the Claimant.

In summary, the Claimant is engaged in the sale of rare coins and operates within a specialist market of individual collectors. Each customer is allocated to a dedicated Account Manager, a role which facilitates the relationship between the Claimant and customer. The Claimant uses a computer system known as “Zoho One”. The customer data kept and maintained by the Claimant is not limited to customer names and contact details but also includes customers’ purchasing history. Each of D2 – D7 had access to the Claimant’s customer database during their employment (including any periods of sick leave).

Mr Mellinger explains in his statement at paragraphs 27-31 that he became aware of the Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing through a series of concerns that were expressed by customers. From those concerns it seems that a number of customers received unsolicited calls from D1 in the course of which D1 seemed to have knowledge of the customer’s previous purchases from the Claimant. The customers (wrongly) believed that they were dealing with the Claimant. Offers were made which undercut the Claimant’s prices. Mr Mellinger says that these reported concerns show “that there was an issue in respect of the First Defendant which could and/or had caused serious damage to the Claimant’s business. It was even more concerning as it was clear that the actions of the First Defendant were having a clear detrimental impact on the Claimant’s goodwill and reputation.”

In response to these concerns the Claimant carried out a number of investigations. Mr Michael Hall, the Claimant’s Technical Development Manager, sets out the investigations that he conducted in his witness statement. His statement sets out findings in respect of D3, D4, D5 and D7:

Mr Mellinger explains that the Claimant undertook a password reset across the company on 20 March 2025. He notes that D3 was not signed off sick on that date and so received the new password. He says that it is striking that D3’s login credentials were then used by D2-D7 to access the Claimant’s systems.

A private investigator was commissioned to undertake surveillance of D2-D7 during June 2025. In summary:

The individual Defendants’ contracts of employment contained an express duty of fidelity and duties of confidence. They signed written agreements referred to as non-disclosure agreements prohibiting unauthorised use of confidential information.

In the pre-action response, the individual Defendants said that they were at D1’s offices as it was a convenient place to meet to discuss their collective grievance against the Claimant. They all offered undertakings in broadly similar terms relating to basic misuse and preservation obligations. They also included an undertaking that they would not be “engaged or employed” by D1 for a period of 1 month.

The Claimant did not accept these undertakings as being sufficient, noting additionally that the Defendants had not offered an undertaking to the effect that they had not been previously engaged or employed by D1.

D1 stated that it had been trading since October 2024 using “approximately 25,000 customer records that were purchased from Chik Digital on 7 April 2025, Direct Data on 23 May 2025 and Latch Media on 11 June 2025, from recommendations and introductions from people and from meeting customers at numerous coin fairs and data lists obtained at coin fairs”. It denied that it had knowingly had access to the Claimant’s clients’ contact details but stated that it might have innocently received details through the customer data that it had purchased.

D4 and D5 each filed witness statements for the purposes of the hearing before me.

In his first witness statement, D4 admits that he attended the offices of D1 on occasions in May 2025. He says that he did so because he was contemplating joining the collective grievance claim. He denies sharing any confidential information during that time and having any discussions relating to D1. He also admits giving his login details to some of the other defendants, but he says that this was because he wanted to help them prepare for their grievance claim.

D4 says that after he had been suspended, he accessed his work laptop on 2 June 2025 using a hotspot at the D1 offices. He says that he did this because he wanted to check to see whether his customer accounts had been moved over to the Claimant’s sales manager’s son. D4 says that he spent 5 or 6 days at D1’s offices because he wanted to explore working for D1. D4 goes on to admit that “[s]ometime in June 2025, I logged on to my personal laptop at the same time as my Hattons' work laptop and I manually inputted into an Excel spreadsheet on my personal laptop around 70 customer details from my Hattons' issued work laptop. These included the customer's name, phone number, date of birth if there was one, email address if they had one, and home address. I did this because I was contemplating working for Knightsbridge when I had left the employment of Hattons but I was not thinking clearly or rationally at the time. However, after a couple of days, I heard on the grapevine that Hattons had become aware of Knightsbridge. This made me realise that inputting the details onto my personal laptop had been the wrong thing to do and so I asked one of my friends (not a co-defendant) to wipe my personal laptop.”

In his second statement, D4 exhibits the appeal against the dismissal of the grievance which has been lodged on behalf of him as well as D2, D3, D5, D6, D7 and two current employees of the Claimant. He also exhibits an email from D8 to D6 in which an insolvency practitioner states that she has been recently instructed in relation to the liquidation of D1.

In his first witness statement, D5 sets out the background to his grievance claim and the difficulties that he had with the Head of Sales. He admits that he accessed the Customer Base Report as well as the Agent Only base report from around “March 2023” (which I take to be a mistaken reference to March 2025). He says that his access had been blocked and so he used D3’s login details. He says that he did this as he was considering raising a grievance. He responds in detail to the IT report relied upon by the Claimant. He says that his wife used his work laptop, and it was his wife who downloaded Zoom and that she had deleted the internet browsing history before it was returned to the Claimant. He says that “The agent only base report may have downloaded whilst I was trying to refine the filters on the system. I have never denied accessing the report”.

D5 says that he considers that the Claimant’s application in respect of a requirement to serve an Affidavit and for an imaging order were neither necessary nor proportionate. He says any restriction on his employment would have a “crippling effect” on his family as he is the sole breadwinner.

In his second statement D5 exhibits his appeal against the outcome of the grievance. He says that the investigation was conducted poorly, and he has serious concerns as to the Claimant’s true motive underlying these proceedings which appear to be a counterattack for raising the grievance.

The Claimant invited the court to make the following conclusions on the basis of the evidence on the basis that they could “be deduced, either through necessary inference from the primary facts, or through reasonable inference”:

The Claimant submitted that the Defendants’ conduct was such that it could clearly be inferred that they would not abide by their legal obligations unless restrained by the court, and that springboard relief was necessary to remove any competitive advantage the Defendants have gained from their unlawful conduct to date. Although the Claimant accepted that the court needed to consider the position in respect of each Defendant separately it was important not to place the evidence in silos and that the court should look at the evidence holistically.

The Claimant’s submissions on the relief that was primarily in dispute are addressed below.

In their written submissions counsel for D4 and D5 agreed for the purposes of the hearing that there was a serious issue to be tried and that damages would not be an adequate remedy. Each submitted though that, where D4 and D5 had already offered undertakings, the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of an injunction. At the hearing Mr Cobill and Mr Mahmood each made clear that if, however, the court was against them on that issue then whilst they would accept the proposed terms of the injunction (save in respect of the claim for springboard relief) they did not accept that the tests for the requirement for service of an Affidavit or for an imaging order were met. I address those issues below.

D2 read a statement at the hearing. He said that he never worked for D1. He said that D8 was “a friend and former colleague”. He went on to say:

“I introduced him to contacts like a web developer, but I had no commercial involvement with him. A blog post once wrongly named me as working for Knightsbridge, but that was corrected before any legal action was taken. I also registered a transport company called AP Services Stoke in February 2025. It has not traded at all due to my poor mental health, but it was intended as a possible future option because I could no longer cope with going back to the claimant’s workplace. The registered address is the same as Knightsbridge only because we used the same accountant — it means nothing more than that.”

D2 said he “strongly” opposed “the request for forensic access to my personal phone. My phone contains highly sensitive data — including evidence that supports my grievance, legal documents, private health records, and financial information. Giving access to that would seriously undermine my legal position and breach my privacy. I cannot and will not agree to it.”

D6 also read a written statement. At the outset he said that whilst “I acknowledge the claimants wish to litigate this matter to a group, however this had led their counsel to assign blame and make claims that are leading and imprecise at best and could be argued and proven to be inflammatory or completely false.” He says that the IT report indicates:

“There is no evidence of unusual activity pertaining to myself

I have not accessed Hattons of London systems outside of the office or incentive destinations from a date unknown to me but likely to be prior to the registration of The Knightsbridge Collection Ltd, as far as I recall the last time I accessed Hattons of London systems outside of the office was July 2024.

I have not accessed Hattons of London systems since my sickness commenced on 3^rd March 2025

Aside from the spurious link between my sickness period and the use of the third respondents login I am not mentioned in the statement at all.”

D6 said that the only device he possessed was his personal mobile which was turned off whilst at work and kept in a locker. The IT report had identified that no confidential information had been accessed from his mobile phone. He noted that the initial pre-action letter had not identified him. He objected to the imaging order which would be an unjustified intrusion into his privacy.

The first issue to consider is whether the threshold for injunctive relief is met.

American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] A.C. 396 at pp 406-409 established that in considering an application for an injunction the court will consider (a) whether there is a serious question to be tried, (b) whether damages will supply an adequate remedy and (c) where the balance of convenience lies.

As noted above, counsel for D4 and D5 accepted for the purposes of the hearing that there was a serious question to be tried and that damages would not be an adequate remedy. However, they submitted that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of injunctive relief as sufficient undertakings had already been offered.

In Lansing Linde Ltd v. Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251, the Court of Appeal described the balance of convenience as an exercise in identifying the “lesser evil: will it do less harm to grant an injunction which subsequently turns out to be unjustified, or to refuse one if it subsequently turns out that an injunction should have been granted.” The underlying principle is that the court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or the other: National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd v Olint Corpn Ltd [2009] UKPC 16, [2009] 1 WLR 1405. This principle applies whether the court is considering a mandatory injunction as much as it applies to a prohibitory injunction: see Lord Hoffmann at paragraph 19:

“What is required in each case is to examine what on the particular facts of the case the consequences of granting or withholding of the injunction is likely to be. If it appears that the injunction is likely to cause irremediable prejudice to the defendant, a court may be reluctant to grant it unless satisfied that the chances that it will turn out to have been wrongly granted are low; that is to say, that the court will feel, as Megarry J said in Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340, 351, “a high degree of assurance that at the trial it will appear that the injunction was rightly granted”.

The willingness of an applicant to give the respondent a cross-undertaking in damages (as is the case in respect of this application) is a very material consideration for the court in determining whether or not the interim injunction should be ordered. The fact that an ultimately unsuccessful claimant will have to compensate the defendant for losses suffered by them through their complying with the interim remedy for the duration of the period during which it took effect is a major factor in assessing the balance of convenience (SmithKline Beecham Plc v Apotex Europe Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 658; [2007] Ch. 71, CA at [26] per Jacob LJ).

Applying those principles to the evidence currently available to the court I am able to reach the clear conclusion that the “least irremediable prejudice” to one party would be achieved by granting the Claimant an injunction against all the Defendants in respect of paragraphs 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 (Footnote: ¹), and 22 of the Claimant’s draft order (Footnote: ²) (i.e. the provisions prohibiting the use of any confidential information and the preservation, delivery up and deletion and destruction provisions).

I accept the Claimant’s submission that although it is important to look at the evidence in relation each Defendant individually it is important also to step back and look at the evidence holistically. Having done so, I do not accept that the court can draw all of the inferences that the Claimant has sought to draw (see paragraph 31 above), in particular those inferring dishonesty. However, insofar as I am required to do so, I have a high degree of confidence that at trial the Claimant will be able to establish that the injunction was rightly granted.

The Claimant seeks an order requiring each of the Defendants to serve an Affidavit setting out the particulars listed in paragraph 14 of the draft order. D4 and D5 both opposed such an order being made.

Mr Northall KC submitted that the form of the order sought had been drafted in the circumscribed terms identified in Aon Ltd v JLT Renaissance Brokers Ltd [2010] IRLR 600 (“Aon”) and Le Puy Ltd v Potter [2015] IRLR 554. He argued that the information required was focused and proportionate. The Claimant would be unable to plead its case with precision as to what use its confidential information has been put to without such an order. The Claimant can prove that certain of the Defendants accessed the information. However, to fully plead its case, the Claimant needed to be able to identify to whom this information was conveyed to, and to what use it has been put. He argued that “the order will save costs: depending on the content of the affidavit there may be significantly saved costs in reduced scope for imaging orders and springboard relief”. That final point is of some significance to which I will return.

Mr Cobill and Mr Mahmood both relied on the fact that D4 and D5 have already served witness statements. They said that an Affidavit would add nothing and that it was a “fishing expedition” by the Claimant. Mr Cobill said that D4 had already signed witness statements verified by a statement of truth that placed him at risk of contempt proceedings if they contained a false statement. Why, he asked rhetorically, should D4 be placed at the risk of perjury in respect of an Affidavit.

Mr Mahmood submitted that the references to providing particulars in relation to any Confidential documents held at “any time” was unduly onerous.

In Aon Mackay J set out the issues to be considered when a court determines whether to exercise its discretion to require service of Affidavit evidence (see [26] of the judgment): the inability of the claimant to plead a case without that relief; the width of the order sought; the saving of costs; the adequacy of damages as a remedy; the need to take pragmatic steps to protect the claimant’s business from future and further loss; and the need to police the order.

In my judgment, these factors all point towards granting the relief sought. The Claimant will be unable to plead its case with precision as to what use its confidential information has been put to without such an order. Paragraph 14 of the draft order is focused and proportionate and targeted at supporting the primary provisions of the draft order, which aim to detain and preserve relevant evidence, wherever it may now be, and put the Claimant in a position to limit future damage. D4 and D5 have agreed that damages would not be an adequate remedy. Finally, such relief could save costs. I do not accept that the requirement to providing particulars in relation to confidential information at any time is unduly onerous.

It follows therefore that I will grant the order sought in respect of service of Affidavit evidence.

The Claimant seeks “springboard relief” in the terms set out at paragraph 7 of the draft order:

“The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents must not carry on or be engaged, concerned or interested in any business within the United Kingdom that provides goods or services in competition with the Applicant, including any such business operated by the First Respondent.”

D4 and D5 both argued that such an order would be disproportionate. Mr Mahmood described it as “draconian” whilst Mr Cobill described its drafting as impermissibly wide and opaque. As noted above, D5 expressed particular concern as to the impact on his family of such a provision as he was the sole breadwinner.

In the course of argument, I indicated that I was concerned that the terms currently sought were too wide. I questioned whether an order limited in time to one month after the date for provision of Affidavit evidence or further order would be more proportionate. Counsel for D4 and D5 acknowledged that that would address their concerns. The Claimant did not object to confining the order in this way.

The applicable principles to be applied by the court when considering whether to grant such springboard relief were set out in QBE Management Services (UK) Ltd v Dymoke [2012] EWHC 80 (QB); [2012] I.R.L.R. 458; (2012) 162 N.L.J. 180 (Haddon-Cave J, as he then was) at [239] et seq. Once the relevant conditions have been satisfied, the court asks whether it is in the interests of justice and proportionality to impose a springboard injunction (CEF Holdings Ltd v Mundey [2012] EWHC 1524 (QB); [2012] I.R.L.R. 912; [2012] F.S.R. 35 (Silber J)).

Sir Terence Etherton MR gave guidance on the exercise of the jurisdiction to grant springboard relief in Forse v Secarma Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 215; [2019] I.R.L.R. 587. He explained that such orders are not punitive but are intended to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from any commercial advantage wrongly achieved. Such injunctions must be no greater in scope and for no greater period than is reasonable to remove the unfair advantage secured by the defendant, and the court must estimate what that period will be and limit the relief accordingly (see especially at [33] and [57]– [60]).

In my judgment the Claimant has been able to show unlawful use of its confidential information; that the Defendants thereby gained an unfair competitive advantage over the Claimant; and that the advantage still exists at the moment and will continue to have effect unless the relief sought is granted. However, having regard to the principles set out in Forse, the terms of the relief sought are greater in scope than is necessary and proportionate. I will therefore make an order limited to one month after service of the Affidavit evidence or further order.

I should add that I have taken into account that this order could theoretically have a very serious impact on D1. However, if, as seems to be the case, D1 is in the early stages of liquidation then it will in fact be of limited if any impact.

The Claimant seeks an order for imaging which it says will provide it with the security to confirm that the Defendants have complied with their obligations.

There was a dispute between the Claimant and D4 and D5 as to the correct legal approach. All acknowledged that the court had to be satisfied to a high degree of assurance that the Claimant would succeed at trial in establishing a breach of confidence. However, the Claimant argued that it was important to distinguish between those cases concerned with search orders and those that were only concerned with imaging orders. The Claimant relied in particular on Warm Zones v Thurley and Buckley [2014] IRLR 791 and Arthur J Gallagher Services UK Ltd v Skriptchenko [2016] EWHC 603.

Mr Cobill, for D4, objected to the relief being sought on a number of bases. He argued that the order did not comply with the provisions of the CPR as it departed from the model order without explaining the reasons for the proposed departures. He noted that there was no explanation or justification for the Claimant to appoint its own expert rather than for an independent expert. In any event, the order could not be justified by reference to the guidance in Nix v EmerdataLtd [2024] EWHC 125 (Comm).

Mr Mahmood adopted Mr Cobbill’s submissions and referred additionally to Hyperama plc v Poulis (2018) EWHC 3483 and TBD (Owen Holland) Ltd v Simons [2020] EWCA Civ 1182). Mr Mahmood argued that in any event the failure of the Claimant to file an Affidavit in support of its application for an imaging order, contrary to CPR 25.17, was a “knockout point” preventing the Claimant pursuing such an order.

In my judgment there is force in the arguments of D4 and D5 that the Claimant has not complied with CPR 25.17. It is true that the provision is contained in section IV of CPR 25 which is headed “Search and Imaging Orders”. However, CPR 25.15 (headed “Scope”) makes plain that:

“This Section applies to applications for search orders, imaging orders, or both.”

Thus, this section applies just as much to applications solely for imaging orders as it does to applications solely for search orders or to applications for both.

CPR 25.17 is expressed in mandatory terms:

“5.17.—(1) An application must be supported by evidence on affidavit or

affirmation.”

As to the applicable tests to be applied, I note that both Nix v Emerdata and Hyperama were without notice applications: the former for an imaging order and the latter for a doorstep delivery up order. TBD was an appeal from an imaging order made as part of a search order. All are cited by the editors of the White Book (see 25.19.8) as offering guidance in respect of imaging orders as a less intrusive alternative to search orders.

In the event however I have not had to determine the competing arguments as to which tests are to be applied and the effects of CPR 25.17 as I have concluded, even on the basis contended for by the Claimant, that it is not just or proportionate to grant an imaging order at this stage.

Mr Northall KC focused his oral submissions on the judgment in Warm Zones. However, as Simler J (as she then was) made clear, the key question for the court is what course represents the least risk of injustice at this stage (see [33] and [38] of her judgment). Moreover, Simler J noted that it was of relevance in that case that the claimant was not there seeking to restrain the defendants from working in their chosen fields, whether in competition with the claimants or not (see [36]). The position is different here – at least as this stage – where I have granted springboard relief.

Critically, I am not persuaded that the least risk of injustice would eventuate from granting the imaging order sought. Such orders are intrusive: as Arnold LJ observed in TBD at [178] there are disadvantages: “[i]maging is, by its very nature, incapable of discrimination between information that is relevant to the issues in the proceedings and information that is irrelevant, or between business information and personal information, or between information that is subject to legal professional privilege and information that is not.”

As noted earlier, Mr Northall KC submitted in his skeleton argument that an order for filing of Affidavit evidence would have the effect of limiting the scope for an imaging order. It may be following the service of Affidavit evidence there would be a basis for such an order being made but that is a matter that can be pursued, if so advised, at a later stage in the case.

Neither D4 nor D5 submitted that it was inappropriate to give directions for a speedy trial. In my judgment this is an appropriate case for a speedy trial. All parties in the action need to know as soon as sensibly possible to what final relief, if any, the Claimant is entitled (see Veriton Advisors v Jump Trading International [2023] EWCA Civ 701).

For the foregoing reasons I grant the application in part, and I invite the parties to agree a draft for my approval. If there are aspects of the order which cannot be agreed, then the parties should file brief submissions setting out the points of dispute.