Cam Askan v Trustees of St Asaph Conservative Club

The Applicant, Cam Askan, has orally renewed his application for permission to appeal against the Order of His Honour Judge Humphries (‘the Judge’) dated 7 February 2025. In that Order, the Judge declared that an area of land further described below and referred to as the ‘Contested Land’ forms part of the property of the Respondent (‘the Club’) and is therefore owned by the Club’s trustees on behalf of the St Asaph Conservative Club. He also declared that the Club has the benefit of a pedestrian right of way to pass and repass at all times and for all purposes along a path ((‘the Path’) again, described further below) between the Contested Land and High Street, St Asaph; and that save in the case of emergency, the right is exercisable subject to the provision of at least 48 hours’ prior notice (which could be given orally, electronically or in writing). The Order included injunctive relief prohibiting Mr Askan from entering upon or causing damage to the Contested Land, removing or causing damage to the Club’s property located on the Contested Land, or otherwise committing trespass to the Contest Land; or preventing or interfering with the use of right of way of the Path, albeit with permission to lock a gate across the Path providing that the key or combination is provided to the Club. The Applicant’s claims, for harassment, breach of the Data Protection Act 2018, and nuisance, were dismissed.

Mr Askan represented himself at the trial, drafted the (original) Grounds of Appeal and Amended Grounds of Appeal, and at the oral renewal hearing. The Grounds of Appeal outlined 9 grounds. The supporting submissions and skeleton argument were not explicitly tied back to the 9 grounds, and contained separate procedural and related complaints arguing a serious miscarriages of justice (together, ‘the Written Submissions’).

Mr Askan submitted Additional Grounds of Appeal which alleged actual or perceived bias, in ‘the Appellants present and other cases’. The thrust of the perception of bias in the present case was stated to be ‘the unusual and inexplicable outcome’. In respect of recusal, the Additional Grounds alleged ‘prior relationships with opposing counsel or parties involved’, but related in fact to a previous matter complaining about the failure of a magistrate to recuse herself (in relation to a conviction later overturned on appeal). At no point did the Applicant seek the recusal of the Judge. The witness statement supporting the Additional Grounds also made complaints about (a) the Respondent’s solicitors’ initial conduct with respect to a set aside application; (b) HMCTS involvement, in unsatisfactorily dealing with issues relating the receipt of documents; (c) the Applicant’s treatment by a district judge in Wrexham County Court, in respect of a case under the Consumer Rights Act against a vendor of stereo equipment, and the dismissal of his appeal based in part on the fact that the district judge had previously been instructed by the opposing parties’ solicitors; (d) the alleged contamination by HMCTS of a case brought in the Birmingham County Court against solicitors who had given advice about bringing further proceedings against the stereo equipment vendor; and (e) the manner in which the Local Council applied to the First Tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) in relation to an adverse possession claim relating to another portion of land the Applicant claims is his. The FTT Judge found there to be a triable issue and the matter proceeds. The Applicant’s Additional Grounds conclude: ‘I do not believe that all these adverse findings of the Courts, at times egregiously wrong and unfair, are coincidences but can only be a targeted attack by certain employees of the HMCTS directed under Mr Richard Redgrave…. The HMCTS deliberately assigned judge to may cases showed intentional and serious bias against me and I ask that these discussions overturned in my favour’.

The Application for Permission to Appeal was refused by Sir Peter Lane, by Order of 10 June 2025. The Application to rely upon the Amended Grounds of Appeal was dismissed as abusive.

Following the oral renewal application, in response to a request by the Court to provide (a) a copy of the Appellant’s Notice that the Applicant said was lodged (it being different to the version provided by the Applicant in the Appeal Bundle provided to the Court by the Applicant); (b) a copy of one or more Google Earth photos referred to in the Grounds of Appeal, the Applicant provided further substantive submissions relating to supposed wrongdoing by HMCTS, and forwarded an e-mail from the Land Registry dealing with an ongoing complaint, ‘in support of improper conduct of the employees of the Land Registry’. Everything provided by the Applicant has been considered with care.

The Claim stated in very brief form:

“Conservative Club in St Asaph has installed a CCTV camera overlooking a land which Mr. Askan is in adverse possession, servicing and the only lawful occupant, amounting to, inter alia, harassment and a breach of the Mr. Askan's rights under the Data Protection Act 2018. Conservative Club had followed none of the strict guidelines for businesses set out by the Information Commissioner's Office that need to be followed. Mr. Askan seeks damages and injunctive relief. Mr. Askan brings a collateral claim under the tort of nuisance and Protection from Harassment Act 1997.”

No other particulars were provided. In its Defence and Part 20 Claim, the Club stated, not unfairly, that the allegations were not at all clear and that no cause of action was set out. It nevertheless then dealt with what it understood to be the case against it. The underlying dispute relates to the ownership of a small parcel of land. The Defendant appended an illustrative plan (‘the Plan’) to permit an understanding of the nature of the parties’ respective positions. The plan was also appended to the judgment, for the same reasons. Although use of the Plan is subject to criticism as part of the Grounds of Appeal, it is undoubtedly a very useful document in understanding the dispute. It is also an essential document to understand the judgment. It is set out below:

The Contested Land, in terms of ownership, is made up of the areas coloured purple, red and yellow on the Plan. The white ‘X’s are the locations where the Club contended that it placed air-conditioning units together with a concrete slab in 1991. The black line running between letters C and D is a wall which the Club contended it built, also in 1991, effectively enclosing the contested land between the green area (owned by the Council), and a public house, broadly to the north (‘the Wall’). The orange strip represents the Path, which the Club accepted was owned by Mr Askan, but over which it contended it had a right of access.

Mr Askan is the registered proprietor of the former HSBC Bank in High Street, St Asaph, shown edged blue and marked as ‘Old Bank Buildings’. This is registered at HM Land Registry under title number CYM496106 (the ‘Old Bank’). Mr Askan acquired the Old Bank on 27 March 2019.

The Club is the registered proprietor of the club premises shown edged red and marked ‘St Asaph Conservative Club’ on the Plan and registered at HM Land Registry under title number CYM191971. It can be seen that part of the Contested Land coloured red is encompassed within the red outline. The circumstances in which this came to be registered formed part of Mr Askan’s case as it developed at trial, and beyond: upon oral renewal Mr Askan asserted that the Club’s registration in 2004 had been fraudulently obtained by the Club, with the connivance of unnamed corrupt officials at the Land Registry. The Club maintained that it had a registered title over that part of the area coloured red encompassed within the red lines on the plan. If it was wrong about this, it claimed adverse possession.

The areas of land shown coloured purple and coloured yellow on the Plan are unregistered, over which the Club claimed adverse possession. This was disputed by Mr Askan, who also claimed adverse possession.

The Claim by Mr Askan complains of the Club’s use of CCTV to film the Contested Land. There is no Ground of Appeal which challenges the Judge’s finding (at [125]) that recording one’s own property does not amount to a breach of the Data Protection Act 2018 or associated regulations. The Club claimed that the CCTV was installed in response to Mr Askan’s conduct in trespassing on the Contested Land and removing the air conditioning units. The Judge concluded (at [117]) that Mr Askan’s claim turned to an extent on the Court’s findings in relation to the Contested Land. In this, he was undoubted correct.

After introductory matters, identification of the issues and setting out that the burden of proof, to the civil standard, lay with the party seeking to prove its claim, the judgment set out a recitation of witness the documentary evidence.

Of Mr David Gwyn Williams, one of the trustees and Part 20 Claimants, the Judge said:

“I’m afraid that his evidence was generally very poor. He became aggress with [the Applicant] on several occasions and the Court had to intervene in order to regulate his behviour…

He was not challenged about his evidence that he built the wall [C-D] in or about 1991 and that the air conditioning units were installed at the same time, fixed on a concrete slab which he had also built.”

The Judge then turn to deal with registered ownership, or paper title, of all or part of the Contested Land.

First, the Judge dealt with the current Land Registry plans, as to which he concluded on the basis of the Land Registry entries as at 16 February 2023 , at [49], that the Club owns part of the contested land (i.e. the area in Red); that the Bank’s (i.e. the Applicant’s) boundary runs in a straight line along the wall from the High Street to the back of the property; and that there are two small pieces of land which remain unregistered. Set out below are extracts from the two plans of registered land under the two titles:

In this starting point the Judge was undoubtedly correct (although the Applicant generally refused to acknowledge the plainly identified limits of the registered title CYM496106, the subject of his own purchase, as excluding the Contested Land in submissions on the oral renewal).

At paragraph 50, the Judge recorded that the Applicant challenged the accuracy of the Land Registry Plans. Specifically, the Applicant relied upon a conveyance (relating to what became the Bank) dated 13 May 1908. The Club relied on a conveyance dated 13 October 1919. The Judge notes a conflict between the 1908 and the 1919 conveyancing plans. These can be seen as follows:

The Judge records that, further to a complaint from the Applicant, the Land Registry produced an overlay of these plans as follows:

The mauve area forms part of both conveyances. The Land Registry also recorded, as the Judge noted, ‘the ordnance survey plan to this area prior to our recent survey was extremely poor and the detail on the 1908 conveyance plan shows former features and buildings prior to the redevelopment of this area’. At [55] the Judge recorded that, in addition to the plan, the 1919 conveyance included a narrative description of the overall plot being 216 square yards, the total of the two plots shown on the land (see above: Lot 1 being 186 square yards, and Lot 1a being 30 square yards).

The Judge thereafter embarked on an analysis of the various conveyances which followed. This includes consideration of 2004 transfer between the trustees of the Club. The Judge found that the fact that the transfer was between different individuals stated to by Trustees of the Club was ‘unusual but not significant’. The Applicant contended that the form FR1 was missing from the documentation, and that the transfer was executed on a TR1 and, as such, was not a first registration. Notwithstanding the use of a TR1 form, the Judge found that on balance of probabilities the Club’s land was indeed registered for the first time in 2004, on the basis that (a) there was no Title number stated on the TR1 in 2004, (b) the list of documents submitted to the Land Registry did not include any previous registration document, and (c) the “Confirmation of Registration” from the Land Registry [at 61].

Next the Judge dealt with a discrepancy between the 2004 plan and an apparent boundary plan from1997 accompanying an application for planning permission. This plan did not show the area extending into the Contested Land shown on the 2004 Registration document. He rejected the Applicant’s argument that the 1997 plan was an accurate representation of the Club’s land, on the basis that it was not consistent with the pre-registration documents, dating back specifically to the description and plan within the 1919 conveyance (see [62]).

Finally, the Judge considered an argument that there exists an HM Land Registry Current Title plan marked ‘Internal use only’. The Applicant questioned why the Respondent would have been in possession of such a document. The Judge dismissed the argument as irrelevant, in circumstances where he found that the present registered title could be traced back to, and was consistent with, the 1919 conveyance [63]. The Judge was therefore satisfied on balance of probabilities that the Club could show title to the protruding area of land in dispute, and coloured red in the Plan [64].

The Judge then turned to the Applicant’s title (derived from the Bank’s title). He noted first that the boundary as registered clearly runs down the side of the former Bank, delineated by a wall running from B to E on the Plan [65]. Referring to the Land Registry’s adjudication of the Applicant’s complaint, the Judge noted that at first registration in 2020 received from HSBC confirmed the land to be registered was the land the Bank was in occupation of. He rejected as speculation the Applicant’s suggestion that the Bank voluntarily requested the exclusion of the Contest Land from the registration. There is certainly not documentary evidence of any such request.

The Judge finally considered the extent to which the two titles as in fact first registered – which do not overlap – are reconciled with the 1908 and 1919 conveyances, which do. He concluded on the basis of the evidence that this was as a result of an inaccurate plotting of the land in the 1908 conveyance. He relied upon both the plan within the 1919 conveyance together with the description of a total of 216 square yards, with the specifically identified 30-yard plot coinciding with the protruding area of red on the Plan. At [56] and [57], the Judge followed through the conveyances in 1947, 1949, and 1953, each of which refers to the 216 square yard plot, through to the final pre-registration conveyance dated 4 January 1997, transferring the land between trustees as existing trustees retired. The 1997 conveyance refers both back to the 1919 conveyance and the 216 square yards. On the basis of this careful tracing through of the documents, the Judge concluded that, on balance of probabilities, the Club holds registered title to the area identified as red on the Plan.

At [71] and following, the Judge dealt with the question of adverse possession. This analysis concerns the yellow and purple areas on the Plan, and, only in the alternative to his determination of paper title, the area marked red. Save in respect of the question of whether an unincorporated association could claim adverse possession, no Ground of Appeal challenges the legal exposition of the Judge at paragraphs [71] to [83].

At [85] the Judge found that the Applicant’s reliance upon Openshaw & Ors (Trustees of the East Lancashire Cricket Club v P&F Properties Ltd (a decision of the First Tier Tribunal, unreported) did not apply to pre-2002 Act claims and/or where the claim was brought properly by the Trustees of the Club. It is contended by the Applicant that this was an error of law, and is considered further below.

At [86] the Judge deals with a factual issue about when the Applicant says he first started padlocking the gate to the Path, but as the Judge noted (and not appealed), this is irrelevant to the Club’s claim for adverse possession as a matter of law.

The next relevant dispute related to the date upon which the Wall was built. The Applicant has no direct knowledge of this. He relied upon an Ordnance Survey map in around 2008 which is the first time the wall appears on such mapping. The Judge accepted the factual evidence from the Club (including the person who gave evidence that he built the wall) that it was built in 1991. The Judge found that this evidence was substantiated by a planning consent dated January 1991 referring to the building of a ‘New Wall’ and by evidence relating to the installation of the air-conditioning units at around the same time. The Judge said this was ‘highly persuasive’ (see [89]).

The Judge dealt with the factual questions of factual possession and the intention to possess the land. The principles of law stated by the Judge are not appealed. The Judge found at [94] that the building of the wall in 1991 was clearly an act which signified an intention to occupy and possess. This, he found, coincided with the installation of the concrete plinth and air-conditioning units. The Judge accepted the evidence of Mr Hunter, current Chairman of the Club and member for a continuous period of 20 years. Mr Hunter explained how he would maintain the air-conditioning and keep the area clear of weeds [95], with use being ‘regular but not frequent’, but ‘at least annually’. The Judge concluded that possession and usage had been clear from at least 1991 and that the Limitation period for challenging adverse possession had expired as early as 2003, and certainly many years before the Applicant purchased the Bank (at [101]). The claim for adverse possession in relation to yellow and purple, and insofar as necessary, red, areas succeeded.

The Applicant’s claim for adverse possession, since his purchase in 2019, failed given that the requisite passage of time had not passed [104].

The Judge’s findings on trespass followed his findings on title/adverse possession ([106] – [110]).

The Judge found that the Path had been used for more than 20 years prior to the Applicant’s purchase in 2019 and that the Club had a prescriptive right to use the path to access the Contested Land ([111]-[116]).

As to the Applicant’s claims, the Judge considered these inadequately pleaded [120]. The Data Protection breaches were dismissed, given the limit of CCTV and the fact that (following the foregoing findings), the Applicant was trespassing on the Club’s land. The harassment pleas were also dismissed, in that they also related back to the installation of CCTV over the Contested Land. This was found to be a reasonable course of conduct, given ownership of the Contested Land, and in light of the Applicant’s own activities.

The wholly unparticularised allegations of nuisance (but which broadly referred back to the use of CCTV over the Contested Land) were also dismissed.

On an application for permission to appeal, the test is whether the grounds are reasonably arguable. CPR r.52.21(3) provides that:

“The appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was —

(a)

wrong or

(b)

unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.”

As to (a) a decision may be wrong if (i) the judge erred in law; (ii) the judge erred in fact; (iii) erred in the exercise of discretion. Questions of law fall squarely within the purvey of legitimate interference by an appeal court if the judge has fallen into error.

As to an error of fact, it is well established that the circumstances in which an appeal court will interfere with findings of fact by the trial judge are limited. A recent summary was given by Lord Justice Lewison inVolpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48:

In respect of procedural or other irregularity, it must (a) be serious; and (b) render the decision unjust.

The various submissions found within the Written Submissions are grouped, insofar as possible, by reference to 9 grounds identified by Mr Askan which head each section of analysis below.

The Judge was wrong to ignore the Respondent’s threats of physical violence and acts of aggression in the Courtroom towards the Appellant.

This ground was particularised at paragraph 20 of the Written Submissions. The Applicant says that one of the witnesses for the Respondent (David Williams) smelt of alcohol, and that he attempted to strike the Applicant, and that this was effectively ignored by the Judge. It is said that the Applicant was thrown off by the aggression and could not effectively present his case. The Respondent obtained a favourable judgment by fear and intimidation.

This is not reasonably arguable. Having read the transcript of the relevant passages of evidence, it is clear that the Judge intervened immediately, robustly and properly when Mr Williams spoke or pointed aggressively at Mr Askan, and when later he used threatening language when being questioned. The suggestion that Mr Askan could not thereafter present his case effectively is wholly devoid of merit: the transcript demonstrates that Mr Askan properly continued questioning, and was able to make full, and articulate closing submissions.

As identified earlier, the Court generally (and unsurprisingly) considered Mr Williams to be a poor witness. That evidence from Mr Williams which was accepted (the date of the building of the wall) was substantiated by contemporaneous documentation.

The Judge erred in his reliance on an informal map which was hand-drawn by the Respondents.

The Judge was wrong to ignore all independent and hard evidence provided by the Land Registry, Ordnance Survey, Denbighshire County Planning Department and Google Earth Pro.

The Judge was wrong to find, as he did, the ownership of the contested land.

These are taken together as they are interconnected. These overlapping points align broadly with the points made at paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 17, 21 and 23 of the Written Submissions.

The first of these complaints appears to assume, wrongly, that the Judge determined the outcome of the question of legal registration by reference to the Plan. It is plain from the judgment that it is not remotely arguable that this is what the Judge did. He referred, as I have done above, to the different coloured parcels of land by reference to the illustrative document provided as part of the Defence in order to frame the issues in dispute. That part of the Contested Land was unregistered (yellow and purple) and part registered (red) accords with the information provided by the title documentation for the land registered to the Applicant and the Respondent. The Plan was not ‘inadmissible evidence’; indeed, the Plan was not evidence at all, and was not arguably treated as such.

The Judge’s substantive determination of title to the land coloured red was made as a result of an analysis of the underlying documents, and in particular the 1908 and 1919 conveyance plans and the conveyances since, which the Judge could trace through, by specific reference to the 216 square yard plot, through to the pre-registration conveyance in 1997. The 2004 registration, predating the Bank’s first registration, refers back expressly to the 1919 conveyance. It is not reasonably arguable that ‘independent’ and ‘hard’ evidence was ignored. The opposite is the case.

The starting point was that the Red Land was clearly excluded from the Applicant’s registered title, as shown above, but included on the Club’s. Mr Askan had to therefore dislodge the legitimacy of the Club’s 2004 registration.

The Judge traced the Club’s title back. He placed significant emphasis upon the continued and consistent description of the size of the relevant plot, which can be seen plainly on the 1919 plan, through the conveyances to 2004 to demonstrate, with care, that his conclusion as to title was consistent with, not in contravention of, the information provided by the Land Registry, and all the documents demonstrating a line of consistent conveyance over the previous 80 years. There is no arguable, let alone rational, basis upon which to allege that the 2004 registration was procured by fraud with the connivance of corrupt Land Registry officials. Mr Askan, in oral submissions before me, effectively refused to engage with the consistency between the 2004 plan and the original 1919 conveyance (and the line of conveyances in between), or the continued reference to the (same) 216 square yard plot as shown on the 1919 plan in the documents throughout that time. Instead, he fixated on the difference between the 2004 plan and a 1997 planning permission document which the Judge dealt with at [62] of his judgment. Mr Askan’s submissions simply ignored all the evidence that points – very strongly – against the conclusion he has unfortunately, and without robust analysis, come to convince himself of. It is not reasonably arguable that the Judge was not entitled to prefer the consistent and decades-long conveyancing documentary record over 80 years as more reliable than a single document submitted for the purposes of planning permission in 1997.

As part of his analysis, the Judge properly dealt with Mr Askan’s argument that the 2004 registration was not or could not have been a first registration, given that a TR1 form was used rather than an FR1 form. The Judge’s conclusion on this issue was rational and certainly within the range of reasonable decisions a judge would come to on an objective review of the evidence. There was no case that the use of the wrong form itself, as a matter of law, invalidated the registration. Of particular significance was the fact that the TR1 form did not include any title number for the plot in Box 2, plainly indicating that the land had not previously been registered.

The Judge was also entitled to rely upon the fact that the Land Registry then provided a ‘Completion of Registration’ letter. I also note, in the unsolicited documentation provided to the Court following the oral submission that the Land Registry email of October 2023, the Land Registry stated:

“[F]irst registration of the registered title CYM191971 was completed in August 2004. The Deed which induced registration was a Transfer dated 12^th July 2004, made between Jean Audrey Mary Walton and David Gwyn Williams (the Transferors) and David Gwyn Williams, Ronald Safhill and Graham John David Hardy. This transfers the land comprised in the Conveyances dated 24^th February 1968 and 13^th October 1919. I have attached a copy of the Transfer for your information.

Whilst HM Land Registry did not retain the entire Conveyances, it appears we did retain copies of the plans attached thereto. I have attached official copies of both plans to the Conveyances, along with an official copy of the title plan for CYM191971 for your information.

You will note that the part of the land edged with blue and green (within the area edged pink) on your plan, which is included in the registered title of CYM191971, is included within the area edged with red on the plan to the Conveyance dated 13^th October 1919.

The title plan for CYM191971 was completed correctly, in accordance with the documentary title provided upon first registration.”

The accords with both the Judge’s and my analysis of the relevant documentation, the substance of with which, as I have stated, Mr Askan does not actually engage.

In the context of the TR1/FR1 issue, the Written Submissions suggest at paragraph 7 that the Club’s counsel lied, was in contempt of Court and that the Court intentionally ignored this misconduct. There is absolutely no basis for this serious allegation, and it illustrates the carefree attitude of Mr Askan when advancing such claims (with which his submissions are peppered). The passage of the transcript on which Mr Askan relies relates to an exchange relating to whether the 2004 registration took place by way of TR1 (it did) rather than FR1 (it did not), but whether it nevertheless in substance was a first registration, as Counsel for the Club had submitted (and as it was found to be). In no part of the transcript did the Court, as alleged by Mr Askan, ‘[accept] that the Respondent’s submissions of 16 December 20[2]4 were incorrect, deliberately false. Court was wrong to ignore the Respondent’s false statements by asking Appellant, ‘What are you wanting me to do’. In asking the latter question, the Judge was merely – and entirely properly - pointing out (during cross-examination) that the FR1/TR1 issue would be a matter for Mr Askan in submission. Far from accepting that the Club’s submissions were ‘deliberately false’, he accepted, entirely as it was open for him to do on the evidence (and consistent with the Land Registry’s own analysis), that in 2004 there was, in substance, a first registration of the Club’s title.

The third area of complaint, going to the substance of the legitimacy of the 2004 registration, is the manner in which the Judge rejected as irrelevant the existence with the Club’s disclosure of a document marked ‘For Internal Use Only’ by the Land Registry. Mr Askan submitted (at paragraph 7 of his Written Submissions), ‘Respondent created a new 2004 plan first appeared marker ‘Internal use only’ suggesting it was not previously publicly available, but denied a 1997 plan existed, contrary to DL entries….The 2004 plan was marked ‘Internal Use Only.’ The Court failed to query how the Respondent obtained a new title map from an independent government organisation. There was a total lack of interest in the Respondents’ questionable acts.’ At paragraph 21, Mr Askan extended the allegation relating to the possession of an ‘Internal Use Only’ land registry plan to infer wrongdoing on the part of the Club’s solicitors and/or someone within the Land Registry.

A review of the trial bundle demonstrates, contrary to Mr Askan’s determination to see a conspiracy against him, that the Land Registry sends out documents marked ‘Internal Use Only’ when seeking comments from interested parties. They are not secret documents which would only be accessible with the connivance of corrupt land registry officials. So, there is a letter from the Land Registry to the Club dated May 2024 relating to an update of the Club’s title plan based upon latest OS information. The plans provided for comment are marked ‘Internal Use Only’. Crucially, the trial bundle also includes a similar letter to Mr Askan in respect of his own property, enclosing two plans also marked, ‘Internal Use Only’. In other words, Mr Askan himself is in possession of Land Registry plans of his own property which are marked ‘Internal Use Only’. There is plainly nothing odd about such plans being in circulation: they are effectively drafts of documents prior to formal adoption, and the words are plainly a form of version-control. To rely upon the Club’s possession of a document marked in such a way to advance serious allegations of wrongdoing both against the Club and inferentially the Land Registry illustrates the extent to which Mr Askan has, regrettably, lost all sense of perspective and objectivity.

Mr Askan also referred to Ordnance Survey information and Google Earth information. I consider the Ordnance Survey information in the context of the timing of the building of the Wall, further below. The blurry Google Earth Pro image relied upon does not add materially to the debate, and does not dislodge the appropriate inference to be drawn from the conveyancing documents from 1919 onwards and the legitimacy of the 2004 registration.

The Judge was not only entitled to find as he did, but was upon my objective review of the same material, right to do so.

The Judge was wrong to dismiss the argument that an unincorporated organisation cannot claim adverse possession.

This is particularised at paragraph 10 of the Written Submissions. The substance of the point is an alleged error of law. Paragraph 10 also includes what is also a pleading and/or evidential point.

As to the point of law, the Applicant relies upon Openshaw. In this decision, the FTT held as follows:

“I accept the legal force of everything Mr Weekes says about the issue of standing. There is no trust in the legal sense and the shifting membership body of the Club as a whole is not capable of having been in single exclusive possession of the Disputed Land for a period of 10 years. The latter point is true because paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 6 to the 2002 Act requires the person bringing the application himself to have been in adverse possession for the previous 10 years, thereby abolishing the doctrine of successive squatters under the old regime with the exception of the circumstances set out in paragraph 11 of Schedule 6. Paragraph 11 of Schedule 6 provides for two circumstances, neither of which apply in this case: the first is where the successive squatters are successors in title to each other and the second is where the squatter has been dispossessed and has then regained possession.

24.

Even if it is possible for all the members to claim adverse possession, all the members would need to be applicants since there is no legal entity which can represent their combined interest.”

The Judge was not arguably wrong in distinguishing this decision on the basis that it applies to the statutory regime governing adverse possession post 2002, in contrast to the claim for adverse possession relied upon by the Club which significantly pre-dated the Land Registration 2002 Act. As the FTT noted, one effect of the new Act was to abolish the prior doctrine of successive squatters under the old regime. The Judge was also entitled to distinguish the case, as he did, on the basis that in Openshaw the FTT accepted the submission that the applicants were not actually trustees of the relevant club. By contrast, and contrary to the pleading/evidential point raised by Mr Askan’s written submissions, there was both witness and evidentiary evidence before the Judge that, following the amendment to the pleading at the start of the trial to which no objection was taken, the Respondents were indeed the Trustees of the Club. For example, the 2004 TR1 states that “The Transferees are to hold the Property as bare trustees of The St Asaph Conservative Club”. There was, therefore, no error of law in distinguishing Openshaw on the basis that the Part 20 declaration was sought by trustees of the unincorporated association.

The Judge was wrong to find that there was a claim for adverse possession and in granting adverse possession.

The Written Submissions deal with this at paragraph 11. The claim for adverse possession turned first upon the factual finding as to when the Wall was built, not least because this was said by the Club to be the same date that they installed the concrete slab and air-condition units, and it was these units which constituted the substantive use of the land, according to the Club. The Applicant could not give direct evidence of these matters as he had no personal knowledge.

The Judge gave a clear reason for preferring the witness testimony of the Respondents, supported by a contemporaneous planning application, that the Wall was constructed in around 1991, at the same time that the air-conditioning units were installed, rather than in or around 2008. The documentary evidence showed the following plan attached to planning permission application dated 12 March 1991, and approved 20 May 1991:

I note that, within the trial bundle, there exists a chain of correspondence between Mr Askan and an official at Denbighshire County Council in which, for obvious forensic reasons in the context of the case, Mr Askan sought a copy of any planning applications which may relate to the construction of the Wall in either 1991 or 2008. Contrary to Mr Askan’s case, that documentation clearly supports that permission to construct the Wall was sought when the witnesses say it was built, in 1991. The words ‘New wall’ are accompanied by an arrow pointing to the wall running between the Club and the wall which runs immediately to the west of the Path, demarking the edge of Mr Askan’s registered land. It is obviously the Wall. I note from my review of the trial documents that there is a photocopy of a document which appears to form part of the 1997 planning application which states in handwriting ‘withdrawn’ against the 1991 application; but there are no documents suggesting withdrawal, and there are officially stamped documents clearly stating that the application was granted, and the same is recorded in the schedule of planning applications retained by the Council and provided to Mr Askan by way of email exchange referred to above.

The principal evidence relied upon by the Applicant to contradict the direct recollection of two witnesses and the contemporaneous planning document is the fact that those compiling the Ordnance Survey (‘OS’) did not include the wall on OS maps until around 2008. He also relies upon the same 1997 planning application considered above which does not show the Wall. Although Mr Askan also said that the Land Registry supported his position, the Land Registry communication he relies upon reveals only that the Land Registry, to the extent it updates title plans at any time, does so based upon the up to date OS maps. The Land Registry therefore noted nothing more than the same (undisputed) fact that the first time the Wall appeared on an OS map was around 2008. It plainly provided no additional or independent verification of the timing of the construction of the Wall. The Wall is a minor physical feature, almost tucked away from the High Street; it is not particularly remarkable that it would not be picked up by the OS sooner than it was.

The Judge concluded that the Wall’s first appearance on an OS map did not mean that it was not in situ before then. There was certainly no evidence that the Wall was built without planning permission in 2008, or why (given a history of numerous planning permission applications over the years, including one which was granted in 1991 specifically in respect of the Wall) the Club would have wished to do so: indeed, if the connections between the Club and the Council which Mr Askan infers did exist, the Club would have had no reason not to apply for planning permission in 2008 if that is when they built the Wall. Notwithstanding the oddity of the 1997 planning application not showing the wall, the Judge was plainly entitled to find the granted 1991 planning application ‘highly persuasive’ when finding, as a fact, that the Club’s witnesses were correct that the Wall was built in around 1991.

Second, the Applicant suggests that Mr Williams stated in evidence that he had no use of the land, implying that there was no intention to possess. Mr Askan’s Written Submissions described this as an ‘explicit disinterest’, referring to pages 61-62 of the transcript for Day 2 of the trial. As with other submissions, the transcript simply does not support the Applicant’s submission in any way. Mr Williams said in evidence, explicitly, that the purpose for using the land was the location of the air- conditioning units, anchored to a concrete base on the land. Mr Hunter said precisely the same thing in his evidence. The Applicant appeared to consider that it was an answer in law to the question of adverse possession that the Club could have installed the air-conditioning units on the Clubs roof. This is not an answer. The Judge did not err in fact; his findings reflected the evidence from both Mr Williams and Mr Hunter that the Club had, since 1991, used the area of land to locate and maintain their air-conditioning units.

This is not an arguable ground of appeal.

The Judge was wrong to grant an easement under the lost modern act.

The Written Submissions deal with this at paragraphs 13, 14 and 19.

The first ground is a pleading point. It is right that the words ‘lost modern grant’ do not appear in the pleading. However, the Defence and Part 20 Claim use clear language to put into issue an entitlement to use the Path to access the Contested Land: see paragraphs 14, 16(b)(iii). A pleading point was not taken at the time, the case on easement was opened and dealt with in the evidence. This is not an arguable ground of appeal.

Secondly, the Applicant submits that the Judge was wrong to grant a right of way ‘when the court established that the respondent lied about date and method of entry to appellant’s pathway’. This relates to whether the gate to the path was first locked in 2022, as Mr Hunter originally said in evidence, or 2019, as the Judge found. Mr Hunter accepted in examination in chief that it was possible that he was mistaken in his recollection that the gate was locked towards the end of 2022, at paragraph 9 of his witness statement. He did that before confirming the truth of the statement, on oath. Mr Hunter clearly did not lie on oath about the date when the gate was locked and, contrary to the Applicant’s Written Submission, the Judge plainly did not find that Mr Hunter had done so. The Judge simply recorded his finding that, on this point, he accepted that the gate was locked from 2019, about which Mr Hunter had agreed he may have been mistaken.

At paragraph 19, Mr Askan makes the wholly misguided submission that it was ‘a serious miscarriage of justice’ to allow Counsel for the Club to deal with this issue in Evidence in Chief. Quite to the contrary, it was plainly appropriate for Mr Hunter to recognise, prior to swearing to the truth of his evidence, that he had come to consider that part of it may have been mistaken, and for Mr Hunter to be given the opportunity in Examination in Chief for a correction to his written statement be made.

This ground does not, in any event, engage with the point of substance which is that the period since locking the gate, whether 2019 or 2022, would not be sufficient to have deprived the Club from any rights it had by then acquired in respect of use of the Path. This substantive finding of the Judge is plainly correct (and not subject to appeal in any event).

This Ground is not reasonably arguable.

The Judge was wrong to ignore the direct testimony of the respondent’s witness statement.

This ground is elaborated at paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Written Submissions. These assert that the Court was wrong to ignore the Respondent’s witness statement that ‘respondent as trespassing by jumping over the walls to access appellants pathway and building but finding instead that easement was established…’ and that it was a serious miscarriage of justice for the Court to deny, and record that ‘There was no forced entry through a locked gate’ where the Club Trustee confess to jumping over the Appellant’s walls’.

The submission is entirely circular. It has as its premise that the Contested Land is owned by Mr Askan and that the Club had no easement over the Path. Were that to be the case, accessing the Contested Land over Mr Askan’s wall would have been a trespass. Other than that, the fact of access via the climbing over the wall from 2019 onwards (as the Judge found the date to be) is wholly irrelevant, analytically, to the question of ownership, through paper title or adverse possession of the Contested Land or the acquisition of an easement in the period prior to 2019. If, contrary to Mr Askan’s false premise, the Contested Land belonged, by title and/or adverse possession, to the Club, and the Club had an easement over the Path, the actions admitted to by Mr Hunter were entirely lawful.

This ground is not remotely arguable.

The Judge was wrong to deny harassment and nuisance when the respondent first committed an offence.

In light of the Judge’s finding, about which the Judge was not arguably wrong, as to ownership of the Contested Land and an easement over the Path, it is not reasonably arguable that installing CCTV to cover the Contested Land was an offence, nuisance or harassment by the Club.

There are other procedural complaints within the Written Submissions which do not obviously relate back to any of the Grounds of Appeal. For completeness, I deal with them briefly below by reference to the paragraph number from the Written Submissions.

These paragraphs both relate to a specific disclosure application issued on 12 December 2024, shortly before trial. The Judge heard and dismissed the application on the first day of trial. At paragraph 3 of his Judgment, he records that the application was based upon an assertion that the Club had made a recent application to amend the boundaries at the Land Registry. The Club refuted this and the Judge directed that a statement on the issue be filed by the Club. On the basis that there had been no such application to the Land Registry by the Club, the disclosure application was dismissed. Mr Askan does not appear to challenge this.

Instead, he asserts that the application also sought all title plans of the Club listed in the Land Registry ‘DL’ document filed with the TR1 document dated 2004 which led to (in the circumstances described above) the first registration of the Club’s title. Mr Askan refers to conveyances referred to as having taken place in 1991, 1987, 1985, 1977, 1973 and 1919. The application itself has not been included in the Appeal Bundle, and nor has the transcript for Day 1 by which this Court could see the arguments deployed and/or any reasoning of the Judge.

In refusing the application, the Judge was exercising a case management discretion. In such a decision, the Judge will be afforded a significant latitude. It is not clear whether the Club said these documents were or were not in their possession. However, it is clear that a number of the conveyances had been disclosed and were in the trial bundle: conveyances in 1947, 1949, 1953 and, importantly, 1997. As identified above, the latter referred to conveyance of the, ‘yard and outbuildings and premises thereto belonging and containing by admeasurement Two hundred and sixteen square yards or thereabouts All which said property is for the purpose of identification only delineated and edged red on the plan annexed to an Indenture of Conveyance dated the Thirteenth day of October One thousand nine hundred and nineteen’. This is the 216 square yard parcel which contains the Red area forming part of the contested land. There was no basis upon which the Judge would have had grounds to consider that yet other conveyancing documents in the years identified by Mr Askan would have added in any way to Mr Askan’s case. Mr Askan did not substantively engage with the difficulties for his case caused by the consistency of the description of conveyanced land between 1919 and 1997, and beyond to 2004; nor did he explain why even if a differently described parcel of land had been conveyed in (say) 1991, that would be of relevance given the 1997 conveyance, the one immediately pre-dating the 2004 registration, which was clearly consistent with the 1919 conveyance.

It is not therefore reasonably arguable that the Judge erred in his case management discretion in refusing that part of the disclosure application about which complaint is made.

The Applicant alleges that the ‘Court recessed due to a fire alarm. On return, Appellant walked into a conversation Respondent was having with his wife. Judge turned to Respondents representative to query, Clerk of the Court testified that she had not heard them speak.’

The exchange following a short adjournment due to a fire alarm is dealt with at p137 of the transcript. As observed by the Single Judge, the alleged misconduct is not even arguably borne out by the transcript and not otherwise explained by the Applicant. At no point did the Applicant raise any issue with the Judge relating to the clerk. This issue does not remotely constitute a ground upon which to argue that there was a serious irregularity or, if there was, it was in any way material to the outcome of the case.

The Applicant alleges (and frequently repeated in oral submissions) that “it was a serious miscarriage of justice for the Court to recognise that respondent submitted tampered evidence to the Court, and where HMCTS verified the fraud, but yet the Court found that, ‘why should the solicitors fraud affect the Respondent’s case’.

This relates not to the Order made by the Judge following Trial, but an order made by DJ Watkins in which he set aside default judgment entered on 14 September 2023 in the proceedings in the Applicant’s favour.

One of the issues was whether default judgment had been entered wrongly. A second issue was, in the alternative, if the default judgment had been entered correctly, the judgment should nevertheless be set aside pursuant to CPR13.3 because the Defendant had a real prospect of successfully defending the Claim or there are other good reasons to set the judgment aside.

The short answers to these complaints insofar as they might constitute an arguable Ground of Appeal against the Judge’s determination of the issues at trial are (1) the complaint does not relate to the Order under Appeal, but a prior order made by a different judge and which has already been the subject of an unsuccessful appeal; (2) in any event, the determination to set aside the judgment was plainly correct in law – irrespective of the factual question of whether the acknowledgement of service was or was not filed in time – given that the Club were plainly capable of demonstrating that they had a real prospect of success. Although Mr Askan clearly believes the decision of DJ Watkins to set the judgment aside was an injustice, it was not. It was the correct application of the law irrespective of whether the Club’s solicitors had or had not acknowledged service in time or had or had not sought to mislead the Court about this upon the set aside application.

Of course, if DJ Watkins considered, on the evidence before him, that the solicitors had wilfully misrepresented the position as to filing the acknowledgement of service, this would have been good reason to report them to their regulatory body and/or potentially take the initiative in respect of contempt proceedings. However, this would not of itself mean the Club did not, on its second ground, have a legitimate reason under the CPR to have the default judgment set aside. There has been no miscarriage of justice in the decision to permit the merits of Mr Askan’s claim and the Club’s Part 20 Club proceed to trial and determination on its merits.

This is not, therefore, an arguable ground of appeal.

By way of his Additional Grounds of Appeal, Mr Askan alleged actual bias (as stated in the amended Application Notice) and/or apparent bias (asserted in the witness evidence). His central ground for doing so was ‘the unusual and inexplicable outcome’ rather than anything specifically said or done by the Judge demonstrating actual or perceived bias. The case is one, it seems, of having lost what Mr Askan regarded as an unlosable case on the merits, set against a history of what Mr Askan regards as similar treatments by judges in various Courts, both in and out of Wales. He attributes this ultimately to a targeted attack by certain employees of HMCTS. This latter point proceeds on the wholly misguided assumption that the allocation of cases to judges is a matter for HMCTS. It is not; it is a function of listing which is a judicial function.

The outcome of both the application to set aside the default judgment (insofar as relevant) and the trial before the Judge were far from inexplicable. I have absolutely no hesitation in confirming, having read those parts of the transcript provided to me, the Judgment, and much of the documentation before the Court, that the Judge dealt with a difficult case with professionalism and courtesy, and provided a well-reasoned judgment on the merits which not only is not arguably in error, but in my view, the correct answer in substance. It may be that Mr Askan has had personally unpleasant run-ins with members of the Club and feels aggrieved at the way he considers he has been treated by them: the rights and wrongs of such feelings are plainly nothing I can take a view upon. It is plain from the transcript that there is considerable bad blood, and no doubt the Club felt aggrieved at the Applicant’s conduct on land which, as Judge found and this Judgment confirms, the Club was entitled to consider it owned. Where any such antipathy extended to aggressive behaviour in Court, it was dealt with robustly and properly.

Notwithstanding the origin of Mr Askan’s present perception that he has been illegitimately deprived of land by a confluence of corruption on the part of the Club, its lawyers, HMCTS and/or the Land Registry, a dispassionate analysis of the evidence shows otherwise. Mr Askan would plainly have been aware on purchase of his property that the title did not include the Contested Land. It lay on the other side of a wall to the old Bank, and it was not obvious on what ground he could ever claim adverse possession on the part of the Bank; his own ‘possession’ since 2019 could never satisfy any legal test. The analysis of the historic records dating back to 1919 demonstrate that the registration of the land to the Club reflects the 216 square yards legitimately conveyed to the Club’s predecessors-in-title, in the same narrative terms through to 1997, the pre-registration conveyance. The suggestion that the 2004 registration was procured illegitimately is wholly without evidential foundation. The pronounced tendency to see shadows where none exist is no better exemplified than his allegations around the possession of land registry documents marked, ‘Internal Use Only’, where he is similarly in possession of such documents relating to his own property, sent to him legitimately by the Land Registry in 2024.

Although it is unlikely that his judgment will alter Mr Askan’s perception, I considered it important to deal in much more detail than might ordinarily be the case upon a renewed oral application for permission to appeal, in circumstances where I essentially agreed with the much more succinct reasons of Sir Peter Lane, when refusing permission on the papers. The outcome of this case is squarely a result of an objective analysis of the evidence. The allegation of actual or apparent bias is wholly without foundation and is, as Sir Peter Lane stated, abusive. The history of other cases about which Mr Askan complained is simply not relevant to a proper analysis of the appeal before me.

I deal, for completeness, finally with other applications included with the version of the unamended Notice of Appeal provided to the Court following the hearing (but which differed from the version within the Appeal Bundle lodged by the Applicant). Mr Askan applied to the Court to:

Order that the Respondent complies with the discovery application file on 12 December 2024;

Contempt of Court against the Respondent both for lying to the Court and for the Respondent’s Witness aggressive behaviour towards the Appellant during 17 December hearing;

The renewed application for permission to appeal is denied.