Mohammed Yasin Chaudhry & Anor v Abrar Qureshi

As I mentioned in the Introduction, the First Claimant is the Regional President of the PPP in AJK and he holds a parliamentary seat in the AJKLA. He has been a member of this parliament since 1990, winning election that year and subsequently in 1996, 2011, 2016 and 2021. He referred to twice achieving a record number of votes in his favour. The 2021 election was in July 2021, prior to the Defendant’s publication of the videos. The next election is in 2026. The First Claimant has held various significant ministerial posts over the course of his political career and from 2016 – 2021 he was the Leader of the Opposition Party in the AJKLA.

The First Claimant came to the United Kingdom in 1966 as a child. He lived with his family in Stoke on Trent, where he continues to reside. He has business interests in both Pakistan and the United Kingdom. He regularly travels between the United Kingdom and Pakistan and has family homes in both locations.

There is a significant community of people from AJK who live in the United Kingdom. Many of them are registered voters in Pakistan, where they remain eligible to vote provided they attend the relevant polling station in person. The First Claimant said that there are approximately 100,000 registered voters in his constituency and that 50-60% of these voters live in the United Kingdom. Whilst the Defendant did not accept this specific figure, he does agree that a significant portion of the First Claimant’s voters are based in the United Kingdom.

The First Claimant comes to the United Kingdom three – four times a year and when he does so, he has frequent interactions with his supporters. He is involved in social activism both here and in Pakistan.

The First Claimant has known the Defendant for a number of years, as they are both from AJK. Between 2012 and the November 2021 publications, the Defendant interviewed the First Claimant on three occasions and until the matters complained of in these proceedings, they had enjoyed a good relationship.

Mr Sabeel worked for the First Claimant as his private secretary for around six years.

The Second Claimant was born in the United Kingdom, where he grew up. He is currently 38 years old. After University, he helped to run the family businesses in the United Kingdom. In 2019, he went to Pakistan to try and pursue a political career. In the 2021 elections his father won two seats, but was only permitted to keep one of them. He relinquished the seat in Charoi and the Second Claimant successfully stood as the PPP’s candidate in the by-election that followed. He was in prison on remand at this time as a result of a prosecution arising from the polling station incident. He is currently the Minister of State for Disaster Management, Rescue 1122, Civil Defence and the Koti Development Authority. He is also involved in social activism.

The Second Claimant has homes in the United Kingdom and in Pakistan. He travels between the two countries. He has friends and family in the United Kingdom and, like his father, a significant proportion of his electors reside here.

The Second Claimant said he was released from prison on 11 November 2021 and that the first time he came to the United Kingdom after the publication of the videos was about a year later. He said he had been to the United Kingdom three times since his release from prison. The first occasion was for a family wedding; the second time was in anticipation of the trial in this case taking place in April 2025; and the third time was for this hearing.

It was common ground that both Claimants are very well known in in political and activist circles amongst the AJK Pakistani community in the United Kingdom and in Pakistan.

The Defendant is an online journalist based in Milton Keynes. He reports via his dedicated YouTube and Facebook platforms, to which viewers can subscribe to watch reports on current affairs, politics and sport. His output is aimed specifically at the Kashmiri and Pakistani communities in Pakistan, the United Kingdom and more widely. When the Particulars of Claim were pleaded in February 2023, the Defendant’s YouTube channel had 192,000 subscribers and his Facebook page had 723,000 followers. The Defendant said that both have increased substantially since that time and that his combined followers now significantly exceed one million people. He accepted that he is famous amongst the Kashmiri and Pakistani community in the United Kingdom.

On 28 October 2021, Mr Sabeel held a press conference at the Central Press club in the AJK capital, Muzaffarabad, at which he made a number of serious allegations relating to the conduct of the First and Second Claimants. This was shortly after he had been released from prison. The press conference was widely reported by news channels in AJK.

On 31 October 2021, Mr Sabeel contacted the Defendant and asked if he wanted to interview him in respect of the allegations that he had made at the press conference. The interview took place the following morning and was posted on the Defendant’s YouTube channel and Facebook page that same evening.

Prior to their removal, the two videos were accessible to any user of the World Wide Web. The Claimants note that a screenshot of the Defendant’s Facebook page taken before the video’s removal, indicates that at that juncture the Short Video had 74,000 views, 254 comments and 1,700 likes. (The comments are not visible in the screenshot.)

In each of the videos, the Defendant is shown in the centre of the screen interviewing Mr Sabeel, who appears in the top right-hand corner of the screen. In the Short Video (but not in the Long Video) captions appear at the top and bottom of the screen. In terms of the excerpts from the Short Video set out below, Passages N and O are, respectively, the top and bottom captions that appear throughout the Short Video. Passages P and Q appear between 07:10 and 07:15 minutes into the Short Video.

Passage A is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: On which position did you work with Chaudhry Yasin and for how many years?

Sabeel: Yes. I have worked with Chaudhry Yasin for about six to seven years as a private secretary.

Abrar Qureshi: What kind of man is he with whom you worked for six years?

Sabeel: Yes. Well. As I have said in my previous press conferences that he is from our constituency. He, on one hand, enjoys big name, and people call on him for their work, be it the provision of jobs or something else. They request him to get them adjusted or to their daughters or help them in any way he can on some or other issue. It is a fact. The first and foremost thing about him is, as you hear, that he imparts so much value to his tribe. There is too much tribal prejudice in him.

Abrar Qureshi: OK. We, we, we we will discuss these subjects. Whom and how does he blackmail? But first tell me as you mentioned the press conference. I have seen its highlights. Why did you conduct this (Sablee…yes) press conference in Muzaffarabad? Why it couldn’t be arranged in Kotli.

Sabeel: Yes. It is your important question. In fact, when I was judicial, I was maltreated in the jail. In that entire act of persecution, the district administration of Kotli was in collusion with them or, fearing them, was unwilling to take action against them. We approached to the Division but we couldn’t have any output or positive response. Therefore, if I had held my press conference in Kotli or Mirpur, I perhaps wouldn’t have found such response. That’s why; I went to Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir.”

Passage B is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: OK. I got it. Tell me Sabeel, as I have to ask short questions for short answers, why you were jailed.

Sabeel: Well, Chaudhry Yasin trapped me in a fake case with his pre-planned intent. The office of assistant commissioner, Dilan Juttan, the government office of Madam Benish Jaraal was burnt two three months ago. Not only was her office burnt but also slogan bearing her name ‘Go Benish Jaraal Go’ were written in the entire Tehsil, from Kaldub to Narr and from Charhoi to Issar (Abrar Qureshi…right). Then the library established by her was also demolished. In that case, I was….

Abrar Qureshi: OK Sabeel, (Sabeel….in this case, they…) if you have not set Benish Jaraal’s office on fire, then who did so?

Sabeel: Sir, everyone knows that Benish Jaraal was doing her duty honestly. Her sense of duty was a problem to him. Everyone knows it. It was burnt by Chaudhry Yasin. He did so. It was all pre-planned because his basic target was Benish Jaraal. He wanted to defame her, as Chaudhry Yasin was unable to get her transferred. As I have been with him, I know that he requested Mr. Farooq Haider, Finance Minister and the senior member of revenue, but he failed in transferring her. Then he played this conspiracy to transfer her.”

Passage C is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: Got it. How long have you been in the jail?

Sabeel: Well. I was in the jail for two months.

Abrar Qureshi: Were you sexually assaulted there?

Sabeel: Of course, I was sexually assaulted. I was tortured afterwards; the worst kind of torture and I was sexually assaulted. Amir Yasin himself made video of the sexual assault to blackmail me. There I was torched, battered, dragged and wounded.

Abrar Qureshi: Then Sabeel, who sexually assaulted you? Did it happen in the presence of Amir Yasin, the existing member of Assembly and he himself made its video?

Sabeel: Yes. I was sexually assaulted by two of his gunmen present there, and he was making video of the crime. The purpose of the sexual assault and the video was that I should give statement against the Assistant Commissioner, Benish Jaraal in the court. They wanted to use me against her. They wanted to blackmail me but I was not blackmailed.

Abrar Qureshi: You still were not. Who burnt you with cigarette?

Sabeel: Amir Yasin himself burnt me as I was flattened to the ground prostrate. I was taken to the B Class. There a prisoner, Raja Iftikhar aka Khari who is associated to Sensa and is serving the death sentence for murder, but there he bullies everyone with impunity, dragged me to him. Shahnawaz Yasin Chaudhry and his men impeached in murder case, pulled me down. Five men seized me while Amir Yasin himself torched me with two cigarettes.

Abrar Qureshi: Shahnwaz Yasin and Amir Yasin are sons of Chaudhry Yasin. Both of them tortured you in the jail?

Sabeel: Yes. In the jail, and openly, in public. It was not only in B-Class of Jail but they also tortured me openly and every prisoner knows it.”

Passage D is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: OK. Tell me, as I know that thugs, gangsters, thieves and robbers frequent the jails but wasn’t there any man of principles to see it all happening but he kept quiet.

Sabeel: They all saw it passively. Jail superintendent had great reputation for following the merit. He also belongs to a Sadaat tribe. He is Syed Yasir Kazmi from Bagh. He knows it. I went to him. Then I was severely tortured. I went to him and said, ‘Sir, Allah has bestowed you authority. See what is happening with me. Take action against them. Stop them.’ Once or twice he asked them to stop but they said to him they will get him transferred through the Minister of Jails. They said this to the superintendent in front of me. The superintendent was helpless. Then after two or three days, he acted as if having COVID symptoms and took a leave to stay away. My parents or I couldn’t get anything except pseudo sympathies from the people in touch. They said that we couldn’t defy Chaudhry Yasin, nor could they.

Abrar Qureshi: May these people be destroyed! The jail superintendent, making excuse of COVID, said that he was going on leave. Who threatened him to refrain from intervention, otherwise he would be transferred?

Sabeel: Amir. Sir, in front of me and Amir Yasin who became member of Assembly later, as they went there before the elections and he, in front of me, said, ‘Go and tell the jailer, the superintendent or tell anyone else.’ He challenged me, claiming that he would get him transferred by asking the Jail Minister.”

Passage E is as follows:

“Sabeel: She cried and said, ‘You are like my sons. And this Amir Yasin blackmails my daughter. He has her photos. Her daughter is in Spain. Maybe that sister of mine might be listening. He has got some vulgar footage from somewhere, and he blackmails us daily. If you delete them, please.’ She herself was an officer. She would see that I had phones of Chaudhry Yasin, everything. I managed his calls then. Let me tell you that Amir Yasin is a married person. He had two phone sets; I knew because I also lived in the same house. One set he had when he was with his family while the other one he would hide in the TV trolley that was in the room they had given me. I was already suspicious why he hid the phone before going to his family… Then I took the phone to the washroom in that room and flushed it. And I told them. I think I have done no wrong, as she is someone’s daughter sister, as I have sisters and mothers too. Now she has been saved from blackmailing.

Abrar Qureshi: Then Sabeel, you are saying that the wrong you committed, the stealing of the phone was actually an act of perpetual charity. And you have no remorse or regret on it.

Sabeel: No, no. Not at all. And if they wanted to get the price of that iPhone 5s I was ready to give it. I even said to him to take the money. I used to get wages from them. He didn’t tell anyone in his home about the phone for two or three months that his phone was missing. He knew that it had a problem. He was a thief himself. He knew that they would say that Amir had only one phone. From where had the second phone come? Then he revealed after two or three months that his phone was missing. He said that it was in Sabeel’s room, etc. His real issue was that who knows how many homes he was meant to destroy and he was intoxicated about why did this happen why did he waste it.

Abrar Qureshi: Well. So she was an officer of Education Department, and he had her daughter’s photos…. Objectionable photos the reason for which the existing member of Assembly, Amir Yasin would blackmail her. And at the outcry of her mother, you threw that phone in the toilet.

Sabeel: Certainly, certainly. That is what I did.”

Paragraph F is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: Coming back to the word of blackmailing, Sabeel when you were with Chaudhry Yasin for six years, what did you see, find or lose. Whom did they blackmail and how? Have you any evidence?

Sabeel: Sir, evidence of blackmail? All the audiences listening are my evidence. As you also have connections to the area of Paanch Charhoi, and you know that people here are upstanding. Most of them are not highly educated. Some of the aged people whose children, sons or daughters, are getting education, visit Chaudhry Yasin in the village with CVs of their children, saying, ‘Mr. Chaudhry, we voted and supported you. See this is my daughter or son….’ They don’t pay attention towards the sons but their interest is verily in the daughters, planning how to blackmail them. There is no intention to give jobs. They told me loudly for everyone to hear, to give them visiting cards. But Mr. Abrar, if you have a CV, what else detail do you need besides it. Then they say that if they have number, it is ok. If no number, then they should be given visiting cards. I gave them visiting cards. Then they started receiving messages on WhatsApp. Those our daughters, sisters and mothers would call them merely for their jobs, but they had ulterior intentions.”

Paragraph G is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: What is at F-10, Islamabad? Why it is a prohibited area?

Sabeel: They have taken a house at F-10 on rent. It is an exclusive cell to appease their lewdness at the cost of Kashmir wealth looted by them. They lavish away hundreds and thousands of rupees in one night. Many people go there. What should I say. Who doesn’t go there?

Abrar Qureshi: What is source of income of Chaudhry Yasin? What have you realised in these six years?

Sabeel: Sir, they have no business. They claim to have some business; some big business. But they have no business. There is a plant of LPG in Mirpur. His elder son, Shahnawaz Yasin he too drinks and stays sleeping so how does he look at it and what income is generated from it? But their source of income is to sell out government land. And when they see a weak person, they grab this plot. On the other hand, they extract money from schemes. It is tax payers’ money but they rip it off and live on it and have reached here.

Abrar Qureshi: Sabeel, you are talking about a person with whom you have been living. You have eaten his food and that person who is called ‘the Lion of Kashmir’. You are talking about that person. Do you realize?

Sabeel: Yes, I am sure.”

Passage H is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: Well. So she was an officer of Education Department, and he had her daughter’s photos…. Objectionable photos the reason for which the existing member of Assembly, Amir Yasin would blackmail her. And at the outcry of her mother, you threw that phone in the toilet.

Sabeel: Exactly. I exactly did so.”

Passage I is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: How long have you been in the jail?

Sabeel: Well. I was in the jail for two months.

Abrar Qureshi: Were you sexually assaulted there?

Sabeel: Of course, I was sexually assaulted. I was tortured afterwards; the worst kind of torture and I was sexually assaulted. Amir Yasin Himself made video.

Abrar Qureshi: Then Sabeel, who sexually assaulted you? Did it happen in the presence of Amir Yasin, the existing member of Assembly and he himself made its video?

Sabeel: Yes. I was sexually assaulted by two of his gunmen present there, and he was making video of the crime. The purpose of the sexual assault and the video was that I should give statement against Assistant Commissioner, Benish Jaraal in the Court.

Abrar Qureshi: Who burnt you with cigarette?

Sabeel: Amir Yasin himself burnt me as I was flattened to the ground prostrate.

Abrar Qureshi: Shahnwaz Yasin and Amir Yasin are sons of Chaudhry Yasin. Both of them tortured you in the jail?

Sabeel: Yes. In the jail, and openly, in public. It was not only in B-Class of Jail but they also tortured me openly and….”

Passage J is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: Ok. Tell me, as I know that thugs, gangsters, thieves and robbers frequent the jails but wasn’t there any man of principles to see it all happening but he kept quiet?

Sabeel: They all saw passively. Jail superintendent had great reputation for following the merit….

Abrar Qureshi: May these people be destroyed! The jail superintendent, making excuse of COVID, said that he was going on leave. Who threatened him to refrain him from intervention, otherwise he would be transferred?

Sabeel: Amir. Sir, in front of me and Amir Yasin who became member of Assembly later, as they went there before the elections and …”

Passage K is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: Sabeel, tell me that you are accused of stealing Amir Yasin’s phone. Are you a thief? Did you do this and why did you do this?

Sabeel: I didn’t want to mention I, but as you have raised the question. She said, ‘You are like my sons. And this Amir Yasin blackmails my daughter. He has her photos. Her daughter is in Spain. He has got some vulgar footage from somewhere and he blackmails us daily. If you delete them, please.’ Then I took the phone to the washroom in that room and flashed it. And I told them. I think I have done no wrong, as she is someone’s daughter sister, as I have sisters and mothers too.”

Passage L is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: Coming back to the word of blackmailing, when you were with Chaudhry Yasin for six years, what did you see, find or lose. Whom did they blackmail and how? Have you any evidence?

Sabeel: Sir, evidence of blackmail? All the audiences are my evidence.”

Passage M is as follows:

“Abrar Qureshi: What is at F-10, Islamabad? Why it is a prohibited area?

Sabeel: They have taken a house at F-10 on rent, that is total…

Abrar Qureshi: What is source of income of Chaudhry Yasin? What have you realised in these six years?

Sabeel: Sir, they have no business. They claim to have some business. But their source of income is to sell out government land, people…

Abrar Qureshi: Sabeel, you are talking about a person with whom you have been living. You have eaten his food and that person who is called ‘the Lion of Kashmir’. You are talking about that person. Do you realize that?

Sabeel: Yes, I am sure.”

Passage N is as follows:

“Amir Yasin, the member of Assembly, subjected me to sexual assault, burnt my body with cigarettes. Listen to the painful story of this young man.”

Passage O is as follows:

“Spent 6 years with Chaudhry Yasin. Which which girl did he blackmail and sexually assault? How does he blackmail people? I know all.”

Passage P is as follows:

“Chaudhary Yasin’s son Amir Yasin, the member of Assembly, subjected me to sexual assault, burnt my body with cigarettes.”

Passage Q is as follows:

“Spent 6 years with Chaudhry Yasin. Which girl did he blackmail and sexually assault? How does he blackmail people? I know all.”

The approach to determining meaning as a preliminary issue is well established. The judge reads or watches the offending publication to capture an initial reaction before reading or hearing the parties’ submissions: Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567, [2021] E.M.L.R. 19 (“Millett”) at para 8. Where, as here, the publication is in another language, the Court cannot glean the meaning simply by watching the recordings; instead it is necessary to rely upon the translated transcript(s), although this inevitably means that the Court does not have the benefit of gaining the immediate impression that the words and images would have had on the hypothetical viewer. In Shakil-Ur-Rahman v ARY Network Limited & Ghafoor [2015] EWHC 2917 (QB) Haddon-Cave J (as he then was) adopted the following approach: firstly, he played the recording of the broadcasts with the transcripts to hand, watching enough of the recording to obtain a flavour of the tone and structure and the style and approach of the presenter and the other speakers; secondly he read the full English translation of the entire transcripts of each broadcast and formed his own impression of the meaning of the particular words complained of; thirdly, he considered counsels’ written and oral submissions regarding the meaning of the words; and fourthly he replayed the recordings with the transcript and his notes to hand in order to confirm or adjust the impression he had formed earlier (para 38).

The legal principles to be applied when determining the meaning of the words complained of were distilled by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2024] 4 WLR 25 (“Koutsogiannis”) at paras 11 – 12. This distillation was approved by the Court of Appeal in Millett at para 8. I will summarise the pertinent elements for present purposes. The Court’s task is to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of (para 11). This is the meaning that the hypothetical reasonable reader or viewer would understand the words to bear (para 11). The intention of the publisher is irrelevant (para 12(ii)). The hypothetical reasonable reader is neither naïve, nor unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking, but he must be treated as a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available (para 12(iii)). Over elaborate analysis should be avoided and the Court should not take too literal approach to the task (para 12(iv) and (v)). The publication must be read as a whole (including any “bane” and “antidote”) and account taken of the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication (para 12(viii) and (ix)). Sometimes, context may clothe the words in a more serious or a weaker meaning, than would be the case if the words complained of were read in isolation (para 12(viii)). It is necessary to take account of context and the mode of publication (para 12(ix)). No evidence beyond the publication complained of is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning of the words (para 12(x)). The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question (para 12(xi)). Judges should have regard to the impression that the words had upon them in considering what impact they would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader (para 12(xii)). In determining the single meaning, the Court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties, save that it cannot find a meaning more injurious than that pleaded by the claimant (para 12(xiii)).

In Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772, [2003] EMLR 11 (“Chase”) at para 45, Brooke LJ identified three types of defamatory allegation, broadly: (1) the claimant is guilty of the act; (2) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant is guilty of the act; and (3) there are grounds to investigate whether the claimant has committed the act. These meanings were described by Nicklin J in Brown v Bower [2017] EWHC 2637 (QB), [2017] 4 WLR 197 (“Brown”) (at para 17) as “a helpful shorthand”, rather than a straight jacket, given that there is almost infinite capacity for subtle differences of meaning.

The “repetition rule”, was explained by Lord Devlin in Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 in the following terms:

“…you cannot escape liability for defamation by putting the libel behind a prefix such as ‘I have been told that…’ or ‘It is rumoured that…’ and then asserting that it was true that you had been told or that it was in fact being rumoured. You have…to prove that the subject-matter of the rumour was true…A rumour that a man is suspected of fraud is different from one that he is guilty of it. For the purposes of the law of libel a hearsay statement is the same as a direct statement and that is all there is to it… (page 275)

…It is not therefore, correct to say that a statement of suspicion imputes guilt. It can be said as a matter of practice that it very often does so, because although suspicion of guilt is something different from proof of guilt, it is the broad impression conveyed by the libel that has to be considered and not the meaning of each word under analysis. A man who wants to talk about smoke may have to pick his words very carefully if he wants to exclude the suggestion that there is also a fire; but it can be done. One always gets back to the fundamental question: what is the meaning that the words convey to the ordinary man: you cannot make a rule about that.”

In Brown, Nicklin J emphasised that when considering the meaning of the words in question, the repetition rule is to be applied alongside all the other matters to which the Court must have regard; the task is always to determine what the ordinary reasonable reader would understand the words to mean (para 28). Nicklin J went on to indicate:

“30.…to produce a Chase level 1 meaning, the effect of the publication (taken as a whole) has to be the adoption or endorsing of the allegation. That adoption or endorsement may come from ‘bald’ repetition…or it may come from other context which signals to the reader that the allegation is being adopted when it is repeated. The converse is also true. The context may signal to the reader that the allegation is not being adopted or endorsed.

…..

32.…When the authorities speak of rejecting submissions that words repeating the allegations of others bear a lower meaning than the original publication that is a rejection of the premise that the statement is less defamatory (or not defamatory at all) simply because it is a report of what someone else has said. That kind of reasoning is what the repetition rule prohibits when applied to meaning. The meaning to be attached to the repetition of the allegation has still to be judged, applying the rules of interpretation I have set out above, looking at the publication as a whole.” (Emphasis in the original.)

Determination of the meaning of a publication also involves assessing whether the words in question convey fact or opinion. The applicable principles were summarised by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis at paras 16 – 17. The ultimate question is how the words would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion (para 16(iii)). The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact (para 16(i)). Opinion is something “which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation etc” (para 16(ii)).

As Steyn J explained in Vine v Barton [2024] EWHC 1268 (KB) at para 23, a statement is defamatory at common law if it: (a) attributes to the claimant behaviour or views that are contrary to common, shared values of our society (referred to as “the consensus requirement”); and (b) would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would treat the claimant (“the threshold of seriousness”).

Section 1(1) of the 2013 Act provides that: “A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant”.

In Riley v Sivier [2022] EWHC 2891 (KB); [2023] EMLR 6 (“Riley”) at para 103, Steyn J cited her earlier summary of the relevant principles at para 51 in Banks v Cadwalladr [2022] EWHC 1417 (QB); [2022] EMLR 21 (“Banks”). (The Court of Appeal subsequently allowed part of the appeal in Banks, [2023] EWCA Civ 219, but did not call into question the accuracy of this summary.) The summary refers to Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27; [2020] AC 612 (“Lachaux”); and Turley v Unite the Union and Stephen Walker [2019] EWHC 3547 (QB) (“Turley”). As relevant, Steyn J said:

“i)

The protection of reputation is the primary function of the law of defamation and section 1 is concerned with harm to the reputation of the claimant, being harm of the kind represented by general damage, rather than special damage: Lachaux, Lord Sumption JSC (with whom all members of the court agreed), [15] and [19].

ii)

Section 1 imposes a higher threshold of seriousness than the common law rules ‘which were seen unduly to favour the protection of reputation at the expense of freedom of expression’: Lachaux, Lord Sumption [1], [12]; Turley, Nicklin J, [107(i)]. The provision was intended to effect ‘a substantial change to the law of defamation’: Lachaux, Lord Sumption [16]. As Saini J emphasised in George v Cannell [2021] EWHC 2988 (QB); [2021] 4 WLR 145, [117], it is important not to lose sight of the statutory qualifier serious harm.

iii)

The court should assess whether the serious harm test is met in respect of each statement individually, not cumulatively: Sube v News Group Newspapers [2018] EWHC 1961 (QB); [2018] 1 WLR 5767, Warby J, [22].

iv)

There is no presumption of serious harm. A claimant must demonstrate as a fact that the publication of the statement he complains of has caused or is likely to cause harm to his reputation that is ‘serious’: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [12]-[16], [21]; Turley, Nicklin J, [107(iv)].

v)

The propositions that (i) the publication ‘has caused’ serious harm to the claimant’s reputation and that (ii) it ‘is likely to’ cause such harm are each propositions of fact which necessarily call for an investigation of the actual impact of the statement. When determining whether a statement ‘has caused’ serious harm, the focus is on historic harm. What were the consequences for the claimant’s reputation, in terms of the actual impact on those to whom the statement was communicated? When determining whether a statement ‘is likely to’ cause serious harm, the focus is on the probable future harm. Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [14]-[15]; Turley, Nicklin J, [107(ii)-(iv)].

vi)

Whether a publication causes serious harm depends on the reactions of others, rather than the perception of the claimant: Economou v De Freitas [2016] EWHC 1853 (QB); [2017] EMLR 4, Warby J, [131]. The assessment of harm to the claimant’s reputation may take account of the impact of the publication on those who do not know the claimant, but might get to know him in the future: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [25].

vii)

A claimant who has the burden of proving that a statement caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to his reputation may do so by evidence directly going to prove such harm, or by inference from other facts. A claimant may produce evidence from those who watched, heard or read the statement complained of about its impact on him, but his case will not necessarily fail for want of such evidence: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [21]; Turley, Nicklin J, [107(vi)]. The difficulties of obtaining such evidence from those in whose eyes the claimant’s reputation was damaged are obvious and well-recognised: Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing SA [2016] EWHC 66 (QB); [2016] EMLR 12, Dingemans J, [48]; Economou v De Freitas [2018] EWCA Civ 2591; [2019] EMLR 7, Sharp LJ (with whom all members of the court agreed), [28] and [31]; Turley, Nicklin J, [109(ii)] ...

viii)

Sometimes inference may be enough, but it cannot always be so. The evidence may or may not justify an inference of serious harm. Inferences of fact as to the seriousness of harm done to a claimant’s reputation may be drawn from the evidence as a whole, including the meaning of the words, the scale and circumstances of the publication, the claimant’s situation and the inherent probabilities: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [21]; Turley, Nicklin J, [107(vi)-(vii)] and [108] ...

ix)

If it is shown that the claimant already had a bad reputation in the relevant sector of his life, that will reduce the harm: see, albeit in the context of assessment of damages: Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2021] EWHC 1797 (QB); [2022] EMLR 2, Nicklin J, [209]; and Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [16] (and see the recognition that assessment of whether the serious harm test is met and assessment of the measure of general damages ‘raise a similar question of causation’: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [24]. The evidence that is admissible is limited to evidence of general bad reputation in the sector: Gatley on Libel and Slander, 13^th ed., 34.081-34.091. Rumours are not admissible, Umeyor v Innocent Ibe [2016] EWHC 862 (QB), Warby J, [78].

x)

Evidence of damage to the claimant’s reputation done by earlier publications of the same matter is legally irrelevant to the question whether serious harm was caused, or is likely to be caused, by the publication complained of: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [24] (accepting that Warby J was entitled to apply the Dingle rule in applying s.1 of the 2013 Act). However, in circumstances where a claimant ‘points to some hostile remark or other adverse event in his life as evidence of harm to reputation caused by the publication complained of, and there are other possible causes of the remark or event, in the form of other publications to the same or similar effect’, the Dingle rule has no bearing in determining causation: Economou v De Freitas, Warby J, [19].

xi)

The court should not ‘consider the issue of serious harm in blinkers’. Directly relevant background context (see Burstein v Times Newspapers [2001] 1 WLR 579, May LJ, [47]) may be relevant to the assessment of whether the serious harm test is met: Umeyor v Innocent Ibe, Warby J, [77]-[78].

xii)

In general, a libel has greater potential to cause harm if it is published to the world at large and if it has been published repeatedly, than if it has been published to a single person on a single occasion: Cairns v Modi [2012] EWCA Civ 1382; [2013] 1 WLR 1015, Lord Judge CJ, [24]. But assessment of harm to reputation is not a ‘numbers game’: ‘one well-directed arrow [may] hit the bull’s eye of reputation’ and cause more damage than indiscriminate firing: King v Grundon [2012] EWHC 2719 (QB) [40], Sharp J. Very serious harm to reputation can be caused by publication to a relatively small number of publishees: Sobrinho [47]; Dhir v Saddler [2017] EWHC 3155 (QB) [55(i)]; Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB) [196]; Turley, Nicklin J, [109(iii)]. Moreover, in an appropriate case, a claimant ‘can also rely upon the likely ‘percolation’ or ‘grapevine effect’ of defamatory publications, which has been ‘immeasurably enhanced’ by social media and modern methods of electronic communication: Cairns v Modi, Lord Judge CJ, [26] and Slipper v British Broadcasting Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283, Bingham LJ at 300’: Turley, Nicklin J, [109(i)].”

As material, section 4 of the 2013 Act provides:

“(1)

It is a defence to an action for defamation for a defendant to show that –

(a)

the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of public interest; and

(b)

the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest.

(2)

Subject to subsections (3) and (4), in determining whether the defendant has shown the matters mentioned in subsection (1), the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case.

.....

(4)

In determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest, the court must make such allowance for editorial judgment as it considers appropriate.

(5)

For the avoidance of doubt, the defence under this section may be relied upon irrespective of whether the statement complained of is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion.

(6)

The common law defence known as the Reynolds defence is abolished.”

A defendant bears the burden of proving this defence on a balance of probabilities. As identified by Nicklin J at para 138(ii) in Turley, when considering whether the defendant has established this defence, there are three questions to be addressed:

The principles relating to the third element of the defence were summarised by Steyn J at para 130 in Riley. The passage makes reference to: Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127 (“Reynolds”); Economou v De Freitas [2016] EWHC 1853 (QB); [2017] EMLR 4 (Warby J, as he then was) and [2018] EWCA Civ 2591; [2019] EMLR 128 (“Economou”); Serafin v Malkiewicz [2020] UKSC 23; [2020] 1 WLR 2455 (“Serafin”) and to the decision of Nicklin J at first instance in Lachaux at [2021] EWHC 1797 (QB); [2022] EMLR 32. As relevant to the present case, Steyn J said:

“iii)

The court should take a fact-sensitive and flexible approach, having regard to practical realities. One or more of the ten illustrative factors identified by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds, 205A-D (‘the Reynolds factors’) may well be relevant, but those factors should not be used as a checklist.

iv)

The public interest defence reflects the appreciation that a journalist is not required to guarantee the accuracy of their facts. The truth or falsity of the defamatory statement is not one of the relevant circumstances to which the court should have regard in assessing whether s.4(1) is met; it is a neutral circumstance. On the other hand, whether the journalist believed a statement of fact they published to be true, at the time of publication, is relevant ... Indeed, a journalist who has published a statement of fact which they did not believe to be true is unlikely to be able to show that they reasonably believed publication was in the public interest.

v)

Efforts to verify the statement complained of ‘will usually be regarded as an important factor in the assessment of the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that publication was in the public interest. That is not to say that a failure to verify will necessarily lead to the s.4 defence being rejected; everything depends upon the particular circumstances of the case’: Lachaux, Nicklin J, [137. In Economou, in a statement approved by the Court of Appeal at [101] and by the Supreme Court in Serafin, [67], Warby J observed at [241]:

‘I would consider a belief to be reasonable for the purposes of section 4 only if it is one arrived at after conducting such inquiries and checks as it is reasonable to expect of the particular defendant in all the circumstances of the case.’

vi)

A failure to invite comment from the claimant prior to publication will ‘no doubt always at least be the subject of consideration under subjection (1)(b) and may contribute to, perhaps even form the basis of, a conclusion that the defendant has not established that element of that defence’. But an invitation to comment cannot be described as a ‘requirement’ of the s.4 defence: Serafin, Lord Wilson, [76].” (Text italicised in the original.)

At para 131 Steyn J continued:

“When addressing the third question, the court is required to make such allowance for editorial judgment as it considers appropriate (s.4(4) of the 2013 Act). The importance of giving respect, within reason, to editorial judgment is relevant when considering the tone and content of the material and the nature and degree of the steps taken by way of verification prior to publication. Even if the court considers that the journalist has fallen short in some respects, it is important to consider the process and the publication in the round, reaching an overall judgment as to the availability of the public interest deference. It is well established that the court must tolerate recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation on the part of a journalist. See Banks, [112]-[114] and the authorities cited therein.”

And at para 133 she observed:

“Section 4 of the 2013 Act has to be interpreted and applied in conformity with the parties’ respective rights under articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, although those rights do not give rise to any separate and distinct issues to those which fall to be determined pursuant to s.4 of the 2013 Act. The special importance of expression in the political sphere, a freedom which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society, is well recognised; and the concept of political expression is a broad one. The limits of acceptable criticism are wider in respect of political expression concerning politicians and other public figures ... On the other hand, as Lord Nicholls observed in Reynolds at 201A-C:

‘Reputation is an integral and important part of the dignity of the individual ... Once besmirched by an unfounded allegation in a national newspaper, a reputation can be damaged for ever, especially if there is no opportunity to vindicate one’s reputation. When this happens, society as well as the individual is the loser ... Protection of reputation is conducive to the public good. It is in the public interest that reputation of public figures should not be debased falsely.’”

At para 134, Steyn J observed that the same standards apply to “citizen journalists” as are expected of professional journalists, citing Doyle v Smith [2018] EWHC 2935 (QB),[2019] 15, Warby J at paras 81 and 95 - 96.

The principles relating to general damages were set out by Warby J in Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC 1226 (QB) at paras 20 – 21:

“[20] The general principles were reviewed and re-stated by the Court of Appeal in John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 … Sir Thomas Bingham MR summarised the key principles at pages 607 – 608 in the following words:

The successful plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to recover, as general compensatory damages, such sum as will compensate him for the wrong he has suffered. That sum must [1] compensate him for the damage to his reputation; [2] vindicate his good name; and [3] take account of the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused. In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to reputation the most important factor is [a] the gravity of the libel; the more closely it touches the plaintiff's personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be. [b] The extent of publication is also very relevant: a libel published to millions has a greater potential to cause damage than a libel published to a handful of people. [c] A successful plaintiff may properly look to an award of damages to vindicate his reputation: but the significance of this is much greater in a case where the defendant asserts the truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or apology than in a case where the defendant acknowledges the falsity of what was published and publicly expresses regret that the libellous publication took place. It is well established that [d] compensatory damages may and should compensate for additional injury caused to the plaintiff's feelings by the defendant's conduct of the action, as when he persists in an unfounded assertion that the publication was true, or refuses to apologise, or cross-examines the plaintiff in a wounding or insulting way... ”

[21] I have added the numbering in this passage, which identifies the three distinct functions performed by an award of damages for libel. I have added the lettering also to identify, for ease of reference, the factors listed by Sir Thomas Bingham. Some additional points may be made which are relevant in this case:

(1)

The initial measure of damages is the amount that would restore the claimant to the position he would have enjoyed had he not been defamed: Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2004) 41 EHRR [37], [45].

(2)

The existence and scale of any harm to reputation may be established by evidence or inferred. Often, the process is one of inference, but evidence that tends to show that as a matter of fact a person was shunned, avoided, or taunted will be relevant. So may evidence that a person was treated as well or better by others after the libel than before it.

(3)

The impact of a libel on a person's reputation can be affected by:

a)

Their role in society. The libel of Esther Rantzen [Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers(1986) Ltd [1994] QB 670] was more damaging because she was a prominent child protection campaigner.

b)

The extent to which the publisher(s) of the defamatory imputation are authoritative and credible. The person making the allegations may be someone apparently well-placed to know the facts, or they may appear to be an unreliable source.

c)

The identities of the publishees. Publication of a libel to family, friends or work colleagues may be more harmful and hurtful than if it is circulated amongst strangers. On the other hand, those close to a claimant may have knowledge or viewpoints that make them less likely to believe what is alleged.

d)

The propensity of defamatory statements to
percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs, a problem made worse by the internet and social networking sites, particularly for claimants in the public eye: C v MGN Ltd (reported with Cairns v Modi at [2013] 1 WLR 1051 ) [27].

(4)

…..

(5)

A person who has been libelled is compensated only for injury to the reputation they actually had at the time of publication. If it is shown that the person already had a bad reputation in the relevant sector of their life, that will reduce the harm and therefore moderate any damages. But it is not permissible to seek, in mitigation of damages, to prove specific acts of misconduct by the claimant, or rumours or reports to the effect that he has done the things alleged in the libel complained of: Scott v Sampson (1882) QBD 491, on which I will expand a little. Attempts to achieve this may aggravate damages, in line with factor [d] in Sir Thomas Bingham’s list.

(6)

Factors other than bad reputation that may moderate or mitigate damages ... include the following:

a)

Directly relevant background context within the meaning of Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 579 and subsequent authorities ...

b)

Publications by others to the same effect as the libel complained of if (but only if) the claimants have sued over these in another defamation claim, or if it is necessary to consider them in order to isolate the damage caused by the publication complained of.

c)…

d)

A reasoned judgment, though the impact of this will vary according to the facts and nature of the case.

(7)

In arriving at a figure it is proper to have regard to (a) jury awards approved by the Court of Appeal: Rantzen 694, John, 612; (b) the scale of damages awarded in personal injury actions: John, 615; (c) previous awards by a judge sitting without a jury: see John 608.

(8)

Any award needs to be no more than is justified by the legitimate aim of protecting reputation, necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of that aim, and proportionate to that need: Rantzenv Mirror Group Newspapers (1986) Ltd ... This limit is nowadays statutory, via the Human Rights Act 1998.”

Factors and circumstances that may be regarded as aggravating a claimant’s damage were identified by Nourse LJ in Sutcliffe v Pressdram Ltd [1991] 1 QB 153 at para 184:

“It is very well established that in cases where the damages are at large the jury (or the judge if the award is left to him) can take into account the motives and conduct of the defendant where they aggravate the injury done to the plaintiff. There may be malevolence or spite or the manner of committing the wrong may be such as to injure the plaintiff’s proper feelings of dignity and pride. These are matters which the jury can take into account in assessing the appropriate compensation.

The conduct of a defendant which may often be regarded as aggravating the injury to the plaintiff’s feelings, so as to support a claim for ‘aggravated’ damages, includes a failure to make any or any sufficient apology or withdrawal; a repetition of the libel; conduct calculated to deter the claimant from proceeding; …the general conduct either of the preliminaries or of the trial itself in a manner calculated to attract wide publicity; and the persecution of the plaintiff by other means.”

Aggravated damages are sometimes awarded as a separate sum. However, in Lachaux, Nicklin J explained why he considered this practice to be unnecessary and unwise, given that the court’s task is to assess the proper level of compensatory damages due to the claimant taking into account all of the relevant factors (para 227).

If judgment is entered for the claimant, the Court has a discretion to grant injunctive relief. It is well established that it may do so where it is satisfied that the words are injurious to the claimant and there is reason to apprehend further publication by the defendant: Gatley para 10-040 and the authorities at footnote 302.

Tugendhat J observed in ZAM v CFW [2013] EWHC 662 (QB) that once a final judgment has been entered, a defendant’s right to freedom of expression does not preclude the grant of an injunction, on the contrary “a claimant who succeeds in obtaining a final judgment is normally entitled to a permanent injunction to vindicate the right that he has proved that he has” (para 22). The grant of a final injunction after trial represents “a legitimate and proportionate interference with freedom of expression, necessary for the protection of the reputation of the claimant”: Gatley, para 10-040.

Section 12(1) of the 2013 Act provides that the Court may order the defendant to publish a summary of the judgment, where judgment has been given for the claimant in an action for defamation. Section 12(2) states that the wording of the summary and the time, manner, form and place of its publication are for the parties to agree. However, subsections (3) and (4) addresses a situation where the parties cannot reach agreement on the wording or on the time, manner, form and/or place of publication; the wording is to be settled by the Court and the Court may give such directions as to time, manner, form and/or place of publication as it considers reasonable and practicable in the circumstances.

The decision whether to make a section 12(1) order is a discretionary one. Nicklin J identified the applicable principles in Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB). The order represents an interference with a defendant’s Article 10 right to freedom of expression and, as such, must be justified. However, it may be justified by the legitimate aim of “the protection of the reputation or rights of others” on the particular facts of the case and provided the statement is also necessary and proportionate (para 240). Nicklin J continued:

“There is an obvious purpose, in an appropriate case, for ordering a newspaper to publish a summary of the judgment because there is a realistic basis on which to conclude that the published summary will come to the attention of at least some of those who read the original libel and others who may have learned about the allegation via the ‘grapevine’ effect…Each case will depend upon its own facts. If the defendant has already published a retraction and apology, then, depending upon its terms, that may mean that an order under s.12 is not justifiable or required. The claimant will be able to point to that to assist in his vindication or repair to his reputation.”

In order to form an initial impression of the words complained of and then to finalise my view as to their natural and ordinary meaning, I followed the process adopted by Haddon-Cave J (as he then was), which I have described at para 55 above.

The Claimants’ pleaded case on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of is as follows:

The Defendant’s Defence denied the meanings relied upon by the Claimant, but did not plead any alternative meanings. In his Skeleton Argument, Mr Kelly argued that the words complained of did not bear a defamatory meaning, especially when understood as a report of Mr Sabeel’s statements and in light of the disclaimers. He submitted that the words were presented as the allegations of Mr Sabeel and they were not endorsed by the Defendant.

Save in one or two very minor respects, my conclusions as to the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of accords with the initial impressions that I formed and noted.

The natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of in Passage A is that “The First Claimant had colluded with the district administration of Kotli in preventing action being taken in respect of the mistreatment of Mr Sabeel in jail”. In so far as this is slightly different from the Claimants’ pleaded meaning, Mr Wilcox did not dispute this meaning when I raised it with him during his oral submissions.

I agree with the four pleaded meanings relating to the First Claimant in respect of Passage B that I have set out at para 78 above.

I agree with the three pleaded meanings relating to the Second Claimant in respect of Passage C that I have set out at para 78 above, save that I do not consider that the words referred to Mr Yasin himself torturing Mr Sabeel other than by burning him with cigarettes. Accordingly, the third meaning in respect of Passage C is that “The Second Claimant tortured Mr Sabeel by burning him with cigarettes”.

I agree with the pleaded meanings relating to the Second Claimant in respect of Passages D and E that I have set out at para 78 above.

I agree with the pleaded meanings relating to the First Claimant in respect of Passages F and G that I have set out at para 78 above.

I agree with the pleaded meanings relating to the Second Claimant in respect of Passages H and K that I have set out at para 78 above. My initial impression was that Passage H indicated that the Second Claimant held the compromising photos of the official’s daughter in order to blackmail her, as opposed to the words indicating that he had blackmailed her. However, on reflection, and after hearing Mr Wilcox’s submissions on this point, I accept that, read in context with the other misconduct reported by Mr Sabeel, Passage H, contains a statement about what the Second Claimant has done, as opposed to a view about something he would do in the future.

I agree with the three pleaded meanings relating to the Second Claimant in respect of Passage I which I have set out at para 78 above, save, as I have already indicated at para 83 above, the third meaning is that “The Second Claimant tortured Mr Sabeel by burning him with cigarettes”.

I agree with the pleaded meaning relating to the Second Claimant in respect of Passage J which I have set out at para 78 above.

I agree with the pleaded meanings relating to the First Claimant in respect of Passages L, M, O and Q, which I have set out at para 78 above.

I agree with the pleaded meanings relating to the Second Claimant in respect of Passages N and P, which I have also set out at para 78 above.

In arriving at these meanings I considered Mr Kelly’s submissions, directing myself in accordance with the principles I identified at paras 58 – 59 above. I have no doubt that in relation to both videos, the Defendant adopted and endorsed Mr Sabeel’s statements. The Defendant made a number of statements in the videos which clearly associated him with the allegations made by his interviewee. In the Long Video he introduced the interview by saying:

“What happened with this young man? Why was he imprisoned? Who sexually assaulted him? Let’s hear these things from him. Hearing these things, you will also be dumbfounded like me. That’s why: I am sitting before him. Today I will talk to him.”

These words unequivocally presented Mr Sabeel’s account as a credible one and one that had had a considerable impact upon the Defendant. These words also gave specific endorsement to the allegation that Mr Sabeel had been sexually assaulted whilst in prison.

Furthermore, the Defendant concluded the interview footage in the Long Video by saying:

“Thanks very much for your time, Sabeel. You were wronged. That’s why I talked to you and I will talk to you again. I wanted to hear you to know what was going on in our region and that in 21^st Century. If this cruelty is the order of the day, then I will have to ponder who is responsible for it. Take care. Thanks for your time.” (Emphasis added.)

It is quite clear from this passage, particularly the phrases I have italicised, that the Defendant was endorsing Mr Sabeel’s account.

In both videos, after hearing Mr Sabeel’s allegations of mistreatment in prison, the Defendant said, “May these people be destroyed”. Whist he may have been referring to those responsible for running the prison (as opposed to the Claimants), this remark indicates that he was giving credence to Mr Sabeel’s account.

I also note that in both videos the Defendant asks leading questions, introducing serious allegations against the Claimants before Mr Sabeel has made them. At 02:10 minutes into the Long Video the Defendant asked, “Whom and how does he blackmail?” before this allegation has been made by Mr Sabeel. At 06:20 minutes into the Long Video the Defendant asked, “Were you sexually assaulted there?”, prior to Mr Sabeel having mentioned that he was sexually assaulted whilst in prison. At 07:13 minutes, the Defendant asked, “Who burnt you with cigarette?” before Mr Sabeel had said he had been treated in this way. At 16:31 minutes, the Defendant asked Mr Sabeel what he had seen when he worked for the First Claimant, adding “Whom did they blackmail and how? Have you any evidence?”. After Mr Sabeel then gave a description of blackmail (at Passage F), the Defendant commented at 17:59 minutes, “So it happened”. The same leading questions regarding the sexual assault, the burning with cigarettes and blackmail also appear, respectively, at 01:41, 02:21 and 05:24 minutes into the Short Video. I also bear in mind that the captions set out in Passages N and O were displayed throughout the running time of the Short Video.

There was nothing to counteract the clear impression that the Defendant was adopting and endorsing Mr Sabeel’s account. He was not, for example, questioned in a challenging manner that suggested there were potential credibility issues with his account.

Accordingly, in arriving at the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, I have proceeded on the basis that the Defendant adopted and endorsed Mr Sabeel’s account. To adopt the commonly used terminology, these were “Chase 1” meanings (para 57 above). Although the alleged disclaimers were not pleaded in the Defence, Mr Wilcox did not object to the Defendant’s reliance upon them. In so far as they are relied upon in respect of the meaning of the words complained of (in addition to supporting the publication on a matter of public interest defence), it will suffice for present purposes to indicate that I reject the Defendant’s account regarding the presence of the disclaimers. I address this in detail when I come to the public interest defence.

I have directed myself in accordance with the well-established principles that I referred to at para 60 above. The statements were plainly ones of fact about how the Claimants had behaved, rather than the expressions of opinion.

As I have found that the natural and ordinary meanings of the passages relied upon entailed statements of fact that the Claimants had been responsible for very serious misconduct and criminal behaviour, I am quite satisfied that in each of the passages relied upon, the published words were defamatory at common law of the Claimants. They described conduct that was contrary to the shared values of society and that tended to have a substantial adverse effect on the way that people would treat the Claimants.

The Particulars of Claim pleaded that the imputations conveyed by the videos constituted very serious defamatory allegations (para 34). The Court was invited to infer that serious harm had been caused to the Claimants’ reputations by each publication in light of the following (paras 35 – 36):

In addition to the inferences to be drawn from these matters, reliance was placed on the evidence of the First and Second Claimants.

The First Claimant’s witness statement dated 13 November 2024 said that the allegations had been incredibly damaging and had “made me a laughing stock amongst some segments of the community”. He said that some people had believed the allegations and had called or visited him asking him about his involvement and others had told him they did not know who to believe. He had to keep telling people that it was all lies, which he found very embarrassing, humiliating and upsetting. He added that “although matters have calmed down a lot from when these allegations first came out” his political opponents and business rivals continued to share this false information and he continued to receive comments and taunts “everywhere I go, whether in the UK or Pakistan” and that at social functions he had seen people sniggering at him.

The First Claimant confirmed the contents of his statement in his evidence in chief. With the Court’s permission, he was asked to elaborate on certain aspects by Mr Wilcox. However, although invited to give further details, most of his answers addressed matters on the same level of generality as his witness statement had done. He did add that whenever he came to the United Kingdom these matters were brought up by supporters, friends and relatives; and that whenever he went to social events he was asked “What is this?”. However, he did not give examples of particular events or occasions where this had occurred.

In cross examination, the First Claimant confirmed that he did not suggest that his businesses had suffered as a result of the videos. He maintained that his reputation had been badly damaged, although he accepted that the situation had calmed down to some extent with the passage of time. He described his popularity as a politician, saying that he had served and uplifted his community and as a result they had loved and supported him. He agreed with the proposition that he was an extremely popular politician amongst the AJK Pakistani community in the United Kingdom, but he said that his reputation had been tarnished by the Defendant’s publication of the videos and that he was worried about the impact upon the 2026 election and whether he would be re-elected.

In his witness statement dated 13 November 2024, the Second Claimant said that many people had called him to tell him about the allegations after the videos were published and that because of the Defendant’s extensive following on social media, the videos “spread like wildfire in the community”. He said that many people assumed the videos were true and, although he kept telling people that this was not the case, the damage had been done. Dealing with this was very embarrassing for him. He said that since the allegations “my life has turned upside down as people believe I am a sexual abuser which is the worst thing you can be called in a conservative community”. He indicated that his political opponents kept taunting him about these matters and that he was worried the allegations would put an end to his political career.

The Second Claimant confirmed his witness statement in his evidence in chief. In response to additional questions from Mr Wilcox, he said that people would question him about what was said in the videos when they came to visit and that he had received “hundreds” of telephone calls from people in both the United Kingdom and Pakistan on this topic. He thought that because the Defendant was a well-known journalist people had assumed that the contents of the videos must be true. When asked to give examples of people asking him about the publications when he was in the United Kingdom, the Second Claimant said that it had happened in Stoke on Trent, Bradford and Manchester, amongst other places. When asked again to give examples of what people had said to him, he said that they had asked whether the sexual abuse allegations were true. He said that the Defendant’s interview with Mr Sabeel was the first thing he was asked about by every person he met at his nephew’s wedding. When asked to give an example of his political opponents taunting him about Mr Sabeel’s allegations, the Second Claimant said that it had happened in both Pakistan and the United Kingdom. When asked by Mr Wilcox when he first became aware that he was being taunted in this way, he said that it was when he came out of prison, as it was on social media.

In response to Mr Kelly’s questions in cross examination, the Second Claimant agreed that he had been elected to the AJKLA despite being remanded in prison in respect of murder allegations. He said that this was because his father was so popular, having served the State so well for 35 years. He accepted that since the videos were published, he had been made a Minister in the current coalition government (from June 2023). He said his appointment was a decision made by his party, not by the electorate. He maintained that he had received hundreds of telephone calls asking him about the contents of the videos, but indicated that he had not received any emails on this topic. When asked about texts and WhatsApp messages, he said he had changed his telephone about three or four times in the intervening period (and did not realise that he would still be able to access the WhatsApp messages). He agreed that he had suffered no consequential financial loss, but stressed that the publications had caused him real embarrassment. He said that the trust of the people was not like it had been and that he was not as popular a politician as he used to be. In re-examination, he observed that it was relatively common in Pakistan for prominent politicians to spend time in jail as a result of the actions of their political opponents, but it did affect their popularity.

Mr Kelly contended that the words complained of had not caused and were not likely to cause serious harm to the Claimants’ reputation. He emphasised that both Claimants’ evidence was devoid of examples of their reputations having been damaged in the eyes of their electors. They had been, and were still, very popular politicians with the AJK electorate. Mr Kelly argued that there was no tangible evidence of loss of reputation and that the alleged harm was speculative. He noted that the videos were taken down four days after they were broadcast and he suggested that the majority of the disclosed comments on the Defendant’s Facebook page about the Short Video were supportive of the Claimants.

I have directed myself in accordance with the principles set out at paras 62 – 63 above. As I have indicated, the Claimants rely upon both inferred damage and their evidence of damage to their reputations. Whilst I appreciate that it is necessary to consider each defamatory statement individually (para 63 above), I set out my reasoning on a collective basis in order to avoid repetition, as it applies to each of those statements. I begin with identifying what can be inferred as to the damage to the Claimants’ reputations, before turning to the specific evidence that they rely upon.

In terms of what can safely be inferred in terms of damage to their reputations, I bear in mind the following:

Given these circumstances, I readily accept that the publication of the words complained of occasioned substantial damage to the reputations of both of the Claimants. The fact that the Claimants were very popular with their electors prior to the publication cuts both ways. On the one hand it may mean, as Mr Kelly emphasised, that the allegations had less of an impact than matters of comparable seriousness would have had upon less well-thought of public figures. On the other hand, it is precisely because the Claimants were popular and well-known that they have much to lose.

At an earlier stage of the litigation, the Defendant sought to rely on the proposition that reputational damage caused by the videos was limited because other media outlets had also carried reports of the allegations that Mr Sabeel made at the 28 October 2021 conference. However, this line of defence was not pursued by Mr Kelly. As I explained at para 63 above, evidence of damage to a claimant’s reputation from earlier publications of the same matter is legally irrelevant (save where a particular hostile remark or adverse event is relied upon, which was not the case here).

I turn to the specific evidence relied upon in support of the Claimants’ case on “serious harm”. Although the Claimants asserted, and the Defendant did not dispute, that the Short Video had received at least 254 comments and 1,700 “likes” at the time of its removal, the comments that the Defendant disclosed at the start of the trial (para 11 above) appeared to come from 40 different people. These comments express a range of views. Some are very supportive of the Claimants. However, at least 11 of these comments are strongly critical of the Claimants and/or appear to give credence to the material published in the video. Furthermore, the number of “likes” tends to indicate that a substantial number of people either accepted what was said in the interview or, at least, found it interesting and potentially credible. Accordingly, this provides some supporting evidence of the damage to the Claimants’ reputations, at least in the more immediate aftermath of the videos’ publication.

I have carefully considered the Claimants’ evidence. I accept that both Claimants have experienced negative comments and intrusive questions arising from the publication of these videos and that this has been a source of embarrassment, distress and worry to them. I also accept that this has continued for a considerable period of time and was not confined to the immediate period after publication, albeit the level has reduced. Accordingly, this constitutes further evidence that damage to their reputations has occurred.

However, I do not accept that the reputational damage sustained has been of the order described in the First and Second Claimants’ witness statements. This is primarily for the following reasons:

Overall, I do accept that the Claimants’ evidence augments and reinforces the conclusion that I would in any event arrive at through inference that the Defendant’s publication of the statements in question caused serious harm to the reputations of both Claimants. Whilst this is not to the degree that they have alleged, the level of damage comfortably crosses the serious harm threshold.

The pleading of publication on a matter of public interest was somewhat vague in the Defendant’s Defence. However, I accept that there is sufficient there for Mr Qureshi to be permitted to raise this defence (and Mr Wilcox did not press the contrary position).

Mr Qureshi’s defence was clarified by his evidence and by Mr Kelly’s skeleton argument. In his witness statement (which he adopted in his evidence in chief), the Defendant said that he felt it was important in the interests of freedom of expression to provide Mr Sabeel with a platform to talk about the serious matters he had raised at the 28 October 2021 press conference, as these were plainly matters of public interest and societal importance. He said that along with Mr Raja Haseeb Ahmed, his Programme Producer, he had worked hard to get different viewpoints on what had happened following Mr Sabeel’s press conference on 28 October 2021. He said that they had tried “many times” to talk to the Claimants and to find out what they had to say.

In cross examination, the Defendant said that he always investigated first and would never publish a story without having done so. He described the pre-publication obligations of a journalist as including undertaking the research, collecting the evidence and speaking to all the relevant sources. He said he had investigated this story from May 2021 until it was published on 1 November 2021. However, he also said that he first heard about Mr Sabeel’s allegations shortly after the press conference on 28 October 2021. Mr Qureshi said he had a team of more than ten people based in Pakistan, including his producer, his script writer, his researcher and his graphic designer; and that when Mr Sabeel spoke to him on the morning of 1 November 2021 the team was already conducting investigations. He said he had told Mr Ahmed by phone what he wanted him to look into and what he wanted him to raise with the Claimants; and that subsequently Mr Ahmed had reported back to him by phone. He agreed that he must have made notes at the time, but he indicated that he did not retain these and so was unable to provide them. He accepted that Mr Ahmed had sent him the WhatsApp message referred to in his affidavit (para 124 below). Mr Qureshi said he had not retained any other notes or records from the investigation.

When Mr Wilcox asked Mr Qureshi whether he believed that Mr Sabeel’s account was true, he said it was for the public to decide if it was true or not. However, he also said that he would not have published it unless he had believed it to be true. The Defendant agreed that he had not offered the Claimants an apology, nor published a retraction at any stage.

The Defendant drew attention to the disclaimers that currently appear on his YouTube channel and Facebook page, which say:

“The views and opinions expressed during this or any program are those of the guests and do not necessarily represent the views, policies, or endorsement of Gorakh Dhanda Limited. While we aim to provide a platform for diverse perspectives, these views should not be considered as facts.

Gorakh Dhanda Limited takes no responsibility for any inaccuracies or misrepresentations made during this and any program. We encourage individuals to verify any information presented independently.”

Mr Qureshi said that the disclaimers had always been there from the start of his YouTube channel and Facebook page. The disclaimers were in Urdu and in English. He said they were visible on the YouTube channel and on the Facebook page and also on the videos themselves if they were played through the playlist. The Defendant’s YouTube Channel is now called “Gorakh Dhanda with Abrar Qureshi”.

Mr Ahmed’s affidavit (para 124 above) was dated 1 February 2024. He said that he went to the Islamabad resident of the First Claimant on 29 October 2021, as instructed by the Defendant, in order to obtain his response to Mr Sabeel’s allegations. He said that upon seeing the media card around his neck, the staff at the gate of the house stopped him and told him to wait. They did not allow him to go into the property and although he told them the reason for his visit, they returned 15 minutes later and informed him that Mr Chaudhry did not want to meet him. Mr Ahmed said that after this he had sent a WhatsApp message to Mr Chaudhry who had replied asking him to call him. However, when he had then called him and indicated that he wanted to ask him about Mr Sabeel’s allegations, the First Claimant had refused to do so and had used “inappropriate language” before putting the phone down on him. Mr Ahmed said he tried calling again, but that this time there was no answer.

The First Claimant denied Mr Ahmed’s account and denied that he had received any contact from or on behalf of the Defendant in relation to Mr Sabeel’s allegations before the videos were published. The suggestion of contact by Mr Ahmed with the Second Claimant was only raised in the Defendant’s oral evidence and was not put to Mr Yasin when he gave evidence.

Mr Kelly did not take issue with the majority of Ms Sultana’s witness statement (para 18 above). She exhibited a screenshot of the Defendant’s original YouTube channel taken on 23 May 2023. This shows no disclaimer at the top of the screen, in contrast to a screen shot taken that day of the new channel. She noted that no disclaimer appears in the Long Video shared by another YouTube user (para 111(vi) above), which remains available on his channel. Ms Sultana said she was able to peruse the Defendant’s new YouTube channel as far back as 23 March 2023 and the earliest video uploaded to it did not have a disclaimer attached to it. Mr Kelly did challenge para 10 of Ms Sultana’s statement, where she said she had been able to access videos on the Defendant’s original YouTube channel from October and November 2021 and they did not have disclaimers in them. He put to her that a disclaimer was present at the top of these videos and at the top of the playlist, which she disputed.

In his skeleton argument, Mr Kelly identified the following matters as evidencing the reasonableness of the Defendant’s belief that publication was in the public interest:

In his oral submissions, Mr Kelly emphasised the Defendant’s evidence as to the investigations that had been undertaken before publication and as to the presence of the disclaimers.

The Claimants’ Reply disputed that the Defendant had reasonably believed that publishing the statements complained of was in the public interest. At trial, Mr Wilcox submitted that the Defendant had failed to show that he reasonably believed that publication was in the public interest in light of the following, in particular:

As I have explained at para 7 above, I am only concerned with the third limb of the defence as it is accepted that the statements complained of were on matters of public interest and the Claimants did not properly challenge the proposition that the Defendant believed that publishing the statements complained of was in the public interest. I will first address the relevant factual disputes.

I reject the Defendant’s account that he had carried out an investigation before publishing the videos. In assessing this and other matters of disputed fact, I have made allowance for the fact that the Defendant was giving his evidence through an interpreter, however, I am clear that his account is not credible. This is, primarily, for the following reasons:

I also reject the proposition that the First and Second Claimants were given the opportunity to respond to Mr Sabeel’s allegations or to put forward their own versions of events, before the videos were published. I do so for the following reasons:

I also reject the Defendant’s account that the videos contained disclaimers (paras 122 - 123 above). I do so primarily for the following reasons:

Accordingly, I find that there was an unexplained failure to give the Claimants an opportunity to comment on Mr Sabeel’s allegations, in circumstances where the Defendant accepted in his evidence that the circumstances required this. Furthermore, although the Defendant said that consistent with his duties as a journalist, he would never publish a story without first conducting an investigation (para 120 above), I have found that he did just that on this occasion. Whilst a failure to verify the statement complained of and/or to obtain a pre-publication comment from the claimant is not always fatal to a defendant’s reliance upon the third limb of the public interest defence (para 66 above), these are very relevant factors in circumstances such as the present where the published material makes very serious allegations of criminal conduct by prominent public figures that is likely to attract considerable interest, Furthermore, the publication is by someone who presents himself as a responsible journalist and who is expected to conform to the standards of responsible journalism.

I also bear in mind that the tone of both videos and the questions and observations made by the Defendant during the interview with Mr Sabeel, endorsed rather than challenged his account (paras 91 – 98 above). This was not a neutral and balanced news report and, as I have found, there were no disclaimers attached. The Defendant did not put potentially conflicting or undermining material to Mr Sabeel, such as his earlier interview where he accepted that he was responsible for the arson (para 129(v) above).

In the circumstances, the Defendant has failed to show that he reasonably believed that publishing the statements complained of was in the public interest.

I mention for completeness, that whilst the Defendant’s evidence was somewhat equivocal on whether he believed that Mr Sabeel’s allegations were true (para 121 above), I do not specifically conclude that he did not believe the allegations to be true. There is in any event ample basis for concluding that the public interest defence is not made out (as I have identified) even if Mr Qureshi did believe Mr Sabeel’s allegations at the time of publication.

Accordingly, it follows that the Claimants have established their claim in libel.

I have already summarised the Claimants’ evidence regarding the impact of the matters complained of (paras 103 - 108 above). I set out my findings regarding their evidence and as to the inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances when I addressed “serious harm” (paras 111 – 117 above).

I direct myself in accordance with the legal principles that I identified at paras 70 – 72 above. I bear in mind the purpose of compensatory damages and that the sums awarded must be sufficient to afford vindication for each of the Claimants and reflect the humiliation and distress that they have been occasioned, in addition to the damage to their reputations. I will make a single award for each Claimant that combines general damages and a modest element for aggravating features.

I accept Mr Wilcox’s submission that each Claimant should be awarded the same amount of damages. The First Claimant is the more prominent politician at present and, thus, it might be said, has the more to lose. However, the Second Claimant is the upcoming politician who potentially has the majority of his political career ahead of him; and thus, in that sense, it could be said that he has more to lose. I find that these features balance each other out.

In assessing the appropriate level of the awards, the gravity of the libel is the most important factor. In this instance, I have accepted that the words complained of entailed very serious statements of fact to the effect that the Claimants had been involved in blackmail, sexual abuse, theft of public monies and corruption. The Second Claimant was also said to have orchestrated torture and burnt a prisoner with cigarettes. The Claimants are prominent public figures in Pakistan and these defamatory imputations went to the core of their political and personal identities. I also bear in mind all of the matters that I set out at paras 111 – 112 above, including as to the Defendant’s considerable standing within the Kashmiri Pakistani community both here and abroad, the substantial number of United Kingdom based viewers and the likelihood of percolation.

I have also assessed the Claimants’ evidence and the disclosed comments on the video (paras 114 – 117 above). Whilst I have concluded that there was a significant element of exaggeration in their accounts, I have accepted that both Claimants have experienced negative comments and intrusive questions arising from the publication of these videos and that this has been a source of embarrassment, distress and worry to them. I accept that this has continued for a considerable period of time and that it was not confined to the immediate period after publication. I further accept that part of the effect of being asked these kinds of intrusive questions is that they will then have felt more uncomfortable and wary when attending other public events. It is also entirely credible that the publication of such serious allegations has caused them considerable worry over the impact upon their political careers, albeit there is no specific supporting evidence of such damage having occurred.

Whilst I bear in mind that this judgment will afford the Claimants a measure of vindication, as will the order I intend to make under section 12 of the 2013 Act (para 158 below), these aspects are ancillary to the award of damages in terms of vindication: Gatley, para 10-045. Furthermore, there has been an intervening period of nearly four years since the publication of the videos.

I identify the following aggravating factors as present:

Mr Wilcox placed particular reliance upon the following awards: Veliu v Mazrekaj [2006] EWHC 1710 (QB), [2007] 1 WLR 495; Berezovsky v Terluk [2010] EWHC 476; Al-Amoudi v Kifle [2011] EWHC 2037; and Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 2053 (QB), [2015] EMLR 637. He provided adjusted figures for each of the awards taking account of inflation and, where appropriate, the 10% Simmons v Castle uplift. I show the adjusted figures in parentheses when I refer to these cases below. Mr Wilcox suggested that each of these awards was relevant to my assessment and that Berezovsky and Sloutsker, in particular, were comparable to the present case. He suggested that my award to each Claimant should be in the £275,000 - £325,000 range. Relying on the same factors as he had in respect of “serious harm”, Mr Kelly submitted that these figures were far too high.

In Veliu, the defendant newspaper published allegations that the claimant was closely involved with or implicated in the terrorist bombing attacks on the London Underground. The newspaper was widely read in the Albanian community in London and that community numbered around 20,000 people. Eady J described the libel as “one of the gravest imaginable” and of “exceptional gravity”. He noted that the words were published at a time when feelings were running especially high as it was soon after the 7 July 2015 bombings in Central London and that the claimant had suffered great distress and embarrassment and also concern for his physical safety. Eady J determined that an appropriate starting point was £180,000 (£401.885) prior to account being taken of an offer of amends made by the owner.

In Berezovsky, a programme was broadcast on a Russian language television channel which alleged that the claimant had been a knowing party to a criminal conspiracy to avoid his extradition and enable him to claim political asylum in Britain, by procuring a false confession obtained through bribes and drugging the individual, that the claimant was in physical danger if returned to Russia. The allegation was calculated to put at risk the claimant’s refugee status and his leave to remain in the United Kingdom. A defence of justification failed and various evidence was introduced attempting to attack the claimant’s character. Eady J awarded £150,000 (£303,277).

Al-Amoudi concerned a publication in the online news site Ethiopian Review stating that there were reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant of having knowingly financed international terrorism, that he had married his young daughter off to an elderly Saudi royal as a gift, that he was probably responsible for murdering the person whom his daughter had an affair with and he had been hunting his daughter, and his supposed granddaughter, across London in order to ensure their execution in Saudi Arabia by way of flogging, stoning to death or otherwise. HHJ Richard Parkes QC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, considered that “it is difficult to imagine more serious allegations”. The article was still available at the time of the hearing and the Court was satisfied that there was a substantial Ethiopian exile community in this jurisdiction and that the likely readership of the article would have been several thousand people. The claimant’s evidence as to the impact of the article was accepted and there were a number of specific aggravating features identified, including that the defendant had repeated the libels and abused the claimant. HHJ Richard Parkes awarded £175,000 (£330,456).

In Sloutsker, the words complained of were published in a number of online publications by the defendant journalist. The claimant, a former senator in the Senate of the Russian Foundation, was accused of taking out a contract to murder the defendant’s husband, of bribing court officials in Russian criminal proceedings and fabricating evidence in those proceedings. No defence was filed and the defendant played no part in defending the claim. Damages were assessed on the claimant’s unchallenged case and on the basis that the publications could easily have reached as many as 60,000 people. Warby J (as he then was) awarded £110,000 (£188, 518, or £171,380 without the uplift).

I have summarised the circumstances of the four cases relied upon by Mr Wilcox in order to briefly show why, in my judgment, each of them involved particularly serious libels and damage to the claimants that went beyond the circumstances of the present case. I also note that none of these cases involved a finding, as I have made here, that the claimant had put forward an exaggerated account of the consequential impact of the libel. More generally, every case involves an individualised fact-sensitive assessment and there is limited assistance to be obtained from earlier awards.

Having regard to all the relevant circumstances I have identified in this case, I conclude that an award of £130,000 to each claimant affords appropriate vindication of their reputation and reflects the damage that has been suffered.

The Claimants seek a final injunction to restrain future publication of the defamatory statements. Mr Kelly did not raise any free-standing objection to this if I found in the Claimants’ favour on liability.

Having regard to the principles I have summarised at paras 73 – 74 above, I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case for the grant of injunctive relief. The defamatory allegations are very serious ones that have been injurious to the Claimants. The Defendant has not provided an apology or a retraction. It was not clear from his evidence whether he now accepts that the words he published were false; and, until he instructed Mr Kelly, he failed to treat these proceedings sufficiently seriously. The Defendant has not offered to give an undertaking to refrain from publishing the words complained of in the future.

In the circumstances I am satisfied that the grant of a final injunction is necessary and proportionate in order to prevent additional harm to the Claimants’ reputations. I will therefore make an order restraining the Defendant from publishing, or causing or permitting the publication, of the words complained of or of any similar words defamatory of the Claimants.

The Claimants seek an order under section 12(1) of the 2013 Act that the Defendant must publish a summary of this judgment. Mr Kelly did not raise any free-standing objection to this if I found in the Claimants’ favour on liability.

I direct myself in accordance with the principles set out at paras 75 – 76 above.

Given that the Defendant’s YouTube Channel and Facebook page continues to publish material that is of particular interest to the Kashmiri Pakistani community, including those based in the United Kingdom, I am satisfied that a summary of the judgment published on these platforms is likely to come to the attention of the same people who viewed or heard about the two videos published on 1 November 2021. Accordingly, this step would have real utility in circumstances where, as I have indicated, the videos are still available on social media (para 111(vi) above). I also bear in mind the factors I have referred to at para 154 above. For these reasons I am satisfied that ordering the Defendant to publish a summary of this judgment is a necessary and proportionate step in the circumstances.

Mr Wilcox suggested that I should supply the wording for the summary and give directions as to the time, manner, form and place of publication. However, it is clear from the terms of section 12(2) that these are matters for the parties to discuss and resolve, with the Court’s involvement only required in default of agreement being reached (para 75 above). Accordingly, the order I will make upon handing down this judgment will include provision for the parties to agree these matters, with liberty to apply if that does not prove possible. The wording of the statement should be concise and its contents proportionate to my findings.

For reasons I have explained above, I have concluded that:

Counsel provided an agreed order after having had the opportunity to make written submissions on the appropriate terms of the order I should make, when this judgment was circulated in draft to allow for submission of typographical corrections.