Christopher Ness v Jennifer Miller

The Claimant argued that everyone watching the YouTube video would have realised that the words complained of related to him because of their closeness in time to the reference in the accompanying chat to “Chris Substack saw you guys in the field last Saturday” (para 32 above). He said his Substack blog and his interest in the Nicola Bulley case were well known. Mr Ness described himself as “the only person on the planet who has thoroughly documented this since March 2023”. Accordingly, he said, it would have been widely understood that he was “Chris Substack”. On 31 January 2024, he had posted a blog that referred to his visit to St Michael’s on Wyre on 27 January 2024. The YouTube video bore the same title as a recent Channel 5 programme about the Nicola Bulley case and those choosing to view the video would have been fully aware of its subject matter and would have an interest in this topic. He was the only “Chris Substack” and the Defendant had failed to suggest anyone else whom this reference could have applied to. In terms of not having amended his pleading to rely on these matters, the Claimant emphasised that he was a litigant in person.

Mr Ness suggested that his prominence as “Chris Substack” could be tested by the Court Associate performing a Google search on this phrase. I declined to permit this, given: (a) it was incumbent on the Claimant to provide the evidence that he relied upon in advance of the hearing to give the Defendant an appropriate opportunity of responding to it; and in any event (b) the position was to be judged by reference to the date of publication (3 February 2024) rather than the present date (1 July 2025).

The Claimant relied upon the meaning set out in the Particulars of Claim in terms of the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. He pointed to the reaction of a commentator in the chat, “Yes, that’s dodgy”. He spent some time taking me through documents which he said showed that the Defendant had been part of a deliberate campaign to smear and silence him and he argued that the Defendant’s purpose in this regard was relevant to the meaning of the words. He suggested the fact that the Defendant had raised a truth defence in her Defence Case Summary meant that she had accepted that the words were defamatory of him. He said that the words were clearly statements of fact.

The Claimant said that he had never intended to suggest that the Defendant was the author of the England Athletics emails; and he could see from their formatting in the redacted versions that the First and Second Emails had not been sent by the same person (albeit, he did not know at that stage who those persons were). The unredacted emails were not available when the Particulars of Claim were drafted.

In terms of the Defendant’s responsibility for the publication of the emails, Mr Ness’ case was that she had orchestrated a smear campaign aimed at damaging his reputation, which had involved not only Michelle and Joanna Sojka, but also a number of anonymous participants, including Ms Gauntlett.

Mr Ness took me through a timeline of the events and material that he relied upon. The first in time document was an email about his activities which Ms Gauntlett had sent to Walton AC on 28 September 2023. He drew attention to an anonymous blogpost from 20 December 2023 entitled “Conspiracy Coconut Chris Ness” which spoke of him in unflattering terms, including referring to him being “a narcissist that sits in his camper van munching his Doritos and wearing his tin foil hat”. He noted that a link to this blogpost had been tweeted by Joanna Sojka and a Jan Jordyn, who, he said, were both linked to Truth Finders. He then referred to a negative tweet about him from an anonymous account “Mvolunteer@76”, who he claimed was Ms Gauntlett, noting that the tweet had included the sentence, “Don’t think they give out Doritos in a police cell”. He relied on this further reference to Doritos as indicating that Ms Gauntlett was also the author of the 20 December 2023 blogpost.

The Claimant referred what he said was the Defendant’s leading role in a legal “cease and desist” letter that was served on him as indicative of her leading role more generally within what he termed “the Group”. He also relied on each of the points that he explored in cross-examination, which I have already summarised at para 51 above. In relation to the events of 8 March 2024 (when he was arrested and detained in the early hours), Mr Ness provided his bail notification form, indicating that the document was printed for him to sign at 18:45 hours that day. He emphasised that the Fifth Email had been sent prior to this time at 18:37 hours. He also referred to a document from Surrey Police, in which it was said, “On 8 March 2024 you were arrested in relation to this matter on suspicion of stalking and harassment. JM [the Defendant] was updated by email by PC Whitman in relation to your arrest”.

The Claimant relied upon the pleaded meanings in the Particulars of Claim, in terms of the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of in the emails.

Mr Hughes submitted that the case on reference had to be determined by reference to the Particulars of Claim, which had been professionally drafted. The Particulars of Claim made no reference to the “Chris Substack” comment and he contended the Claimant should not be permitted to rely upon this. The document that the Claimant filed to comply with para 4 of Master Davison’s Order of 7 March 2025 (para 30 above) was intended to be an opportunity for the Claimant to make supporting submissions on his pleaded case, not to alter his case without formal amendment. None of the specifics that were required for a reference innuendo claim had been pleaded and there was no evidence before the Court as to what viewers of the video would or would not have understood.

Mr Hughes argued in the alternative, that even if I did permit the Claimant to rely on the material in his “Claimant’s case for Trial of Preliminary Issues” document, the “Chris Substack” reference in the chat accompanying the video was not nearly specific enough to establish that the words complained of referred to the Claimant. He observed that the uncertainty over what was in fact relied upon underscored the importance of the Claimant properly pleading his case.

Whilst recognising that it was not an exhaustive list, Mr Hughes drew attention to the list of examples at para 8-002 in Gatley as indicative of the kinds of circumstances where there was sufficient for the Courts to find that the hypothetical reasonable reader acquainted with the claimant would believe that he was the person referred to. He suggested that there was nothing equivalent in this instance. Mr Hughes pointed out that “Chris” is a very common name and that Substack is a widely used platform. The pool of potential people referred to was not sufficiently narrow.

As for their natural and ordinary meaning, Mr Hughes submitted that the second part of the words in question was simply a statement of intention, referring to a hypothetical situation. He argued that the first part of the text was comment; it would be understood to be a conclusion drawn by the speaker as to the possible consequences of posting online about children.

Mr Hughes had addressed the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of in the England Athletics emails in his Skeleton Argument. However, he agreed with my suggestion that it would not be appropriate for the Court to proceed to determine the meaning of these passages in the emails if the effect of my conclusions was that the Defendant was not the publisher of the emails and the publisher of them was not before the Court.

Mr Hughes submitted that the Claimant should not be permitted to rely on a case that was not pleaded in the Particulars of Claim. The pleaded case was that the Defendant had “sent” the emails, not simply that she had procured them, whereas the case that the Claimant had sought to advance at trial was a fundamentally different one. Although acknowledging that it was “a point that can fairly be made against me”, Mr Hughes argued that the 20 June 2025 email from the Court did not absolve the Claimant from the need to plead his case properly in this regard.

Turning to the merits of the question of whether the Defendant was involved with Ms Gauntlett in the publication of the emails, Mr Hughes submitted that the Defendant’s evidence had been consistent and honest and she had given credible responses to the points that the Claimant had put to her in cross examination. There was no sound evidential basis before the Court upon which I could conclude that the Defendant had played any part in the publication of the emails.

Mr Hughes suggested that there was nothing improper or suspicious about Ms Miller sharing the trial bundle with Ms Gauntlett; she was acting in person at that stage and was in the equivalent position to a solicitor exploring the possibility of calling a particular person as a witness for their client.

As I have explained, the Particulars of Claim contain no reference to the “Chris Substack” comment that appears in the chat accompanying the YouTube video. The Claimant, quite rightly, does not suggest that the general words complained of at para 8.1 of the pleading (para 18 above) in themselves would reasonably lead persons acquainted with him to believe that he was the person being referred to, even if account is taken of the introductory averments in the Particulars of Claim (paras 10 – 13 above). Accordingly, it is quite clear that the Claimant’s case on reference cannot get off the ground if he is unable to rely upon the expanded case advanced in his “Claimant’s case for Trial of Preliminary Issues” document based on the “Chris Substack” comment (para 32 above).

Having carefully weighed the competing considerations; I have decided that the Claimant should not be permitted to expand his case on reference in this informal way. I have borne in mind the terms of para 4 of the Master’s Order of 7 March 2025 (para 30 above). It could be said that this may have given the Claimant the impression that it was sufficient for him to set out his case on reference in the document that he was to serve by 4 April 2025. However, whilst, in fairness to the Claimant, I put this point to Mr Hughes during his submissions, Mr Ness did not positively suggest that this was the reason why he had not applied to amend the Particulars of Claim; on this issue, he simply emphasised that he was a litigant in person.

It is well-established that litigants in person are expected to comply with the procedural rules: Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12, [2018] 1 WLR 1119. Moreover, the Particulars of Claim in in this instance were professionally drafted and – unlike the position with the England Athletics emails – all of the relevant material was available to the Claimant and to the pleader at the time when the pleading was prepared. No explanation has been advanced as to why the “Chris Substack” comment was not relied upon in the pleading if, as is now said, it is central to the case on reference.

The importance of the case on reference being clearly pleaded has been stressed by the Courts on multiple occasions, including by Dingemans and Warby LJJ in Dyson (paras 59 and 62 above); and by Collins Rice J in Bridgen (para 65 above). At the very least, the Claimant was put on notice by the Defendant’s Skeleton Argument of 27 June 2025 that this pleading point was being taken against him, but he did not apply to amend his case on reference nor supply a proposed Amended Particulars of Claim.

Further, if and insofar as the Claimant wishes to rely upon a reference innuendo as the means of establishing that the words complained of referred to him, this a separate and distinct cause of action to the pleaded case based on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of (para 66 above). Accordingly, in this respect the Claimant is seeking to advance a case that is not only a substantial amplification of the pleaded claim, but a new claim altogether.

The “Claimant’s case for Trial of Preliminary Issues” is not an effective substitute for a properly pleaded case. It is a more informal document. I accept that, in a general sense, it gave the Defendant some notice of the point being raised: the document includes a screenshot of the relevant part of the live chat, it emphasises the “Chris Substack” comment, its proximity in time to the words complained of and it makes reference to the Claimant’s Substack blog of 31 January 2024, which is appended (without indicating which parts of the blog are relied upon for these purposes). The Claimant goes on to assert that there was no ambiguity as to who was being referred to in the video “either by the live audience or to any individual subsequently viewing the broadcast”. However, the Claimant does not indicate: (a) whether he relies upon the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used or whether he is relying upon a reference innuendo or both (paras 59 and 65 above); (b) if he relies on the former, what are his particular attributes that he alleges the hypothetical reasonable viewer who is acquainted with him would know; or (c) if he relies on the latter, the special circumstances that he says were known to some or who those people are.

These omissions are important. In order to evaluate the merits of the natural and ordinary meaning route, the Court and the Defendant need to understand the specific attributes that are relied upon as within the knowledge of the reasonable viewer; the Court then needs to know from the Defendant the extent to which these are in dispute; and, in turn, the Court will then be in a position to make an assessment, including making findings of fact on those matters, after hearing relevant evidence first if appropriate (paras 62 – 63 above). By way of example, as I have noted earlier, there appears to be a dispute between the parties as to the title of the Claimant’s blog (paras 11 and 14 above). I heard no evidence on this point (although it appears from the link to the audio of the 31 January 2024 blog (at page 117 of the bundle) that the Defendant is correct in saying that the blog is called “Outside the Cave”). Moreover, although the Claimant asserted in his oral submissions that his blog is very well known, there is no indication in his Claimant’s Case document as to, for example, the number of subscribers that it had at the material time and/or to the level of engagement with it on social media; the only matter he referred to was the outcome of a Google search undertaken over a year later.

Furthermore, there is no clearly articulated case based on a reference innuendo in the “Claimant’s case for Trial of Preliminary Issues”, if that is the case that he wants to advance; see further at para 100 below.

Accordingly, the case on reference fails; the Claimant is not able to show that the words complained of referred to him.

Nonetheless, I have also considered the substantive position, that is to say whether the Claimant would succeed in establishing that the words complained of referred to him, if he was permitted to treat the “Claimant’s case for Trial of Preliminary Issues” document as part of his pleaded case (contrary to my primary conclusion set out above).

The first way that reference may be established is where the words used are such that the hypothetical reasonable reader / viewer acquainted with the claimant would believe that he was the person referred to (paras 59 – 62 above). As I have explained, subject to the “acquainted with” aspect, the question is to be approached in the same way as when the Court determines the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of (para 60 above). Accordingly, the question is what the hypothetical reasonable reader / viewer would understand; what any particular person knew or would understand is irrelevant, and the intention of the publisher is also irrelevant (para 55 above). Context is relevant and the hypothetical reader / viewer is taken to be representative of those who read / viewed the publication in question (para 55 above).

For the reasons set out in the following five paragraphs, the Claimant has not shown that the words used were such that the reasonable viewer who was acquainted with him would understand that he was the person referred to.

Firstly, this is not an instance where the Claimant relies upon something in the allegedly defamatory words themselves, contending that because of a known attribute of his, those words would be understood to refer to him (in their natural and ordinary meaning). There is nothing in those words themselves – set out at para 8.1 of the Particulars of Claim - that provides a link to the Claimant. The Defendant did not refer to “Chris Substack” when she spoke. Rather, the Claimant relies upon a proximate comment of a third party in the chat (Charlotte) regarding “Chris Substack”, as providing the basis for the reasonable viewer to have understood, in turn, that the words spoken by the Defendant referred to him. Accordingly, if there is to be a case on identification it is not one derived from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, but via a reference innuendo route – particular facts known to particular people that do not appear in the words themselves.

Secondly, whilst the Court did not have to reach a final view on this matter, the observations of the Court of Appeal in Dyson, indicate that the scope of the attributes of a claimant that are to be regarded as known to the hypothetical reasonable reader / viewer is a relatively narrow one. The question is what an “acquaintance” would know. The example given by Dingemans and Warby LJJ was a claimant’s age and “other outwardly obvious characteristics” (para 63 above; emphasis added). In a similar vein, their Lordships did not anticipate that this inquiry would generally involve the resolution of factual disputes and they agreed with counsel that the hypothetical reader or viewer was not someone who knew “full details about the claimant” (para 63 above). It appears to me that a pastime of the Claimant, namely his authorship of a particular blog does not come within this relatively narrow scope. Whilst recognising, of course, that the particular context is always important, further support for this view, is found in the nature of the non-exhaustive examples given at para 8-002 of Gatley, as Mr Hughes submitted (para 77 above). These included situations where the words complained of described the claimant by a nickname or pseudonym, a photograph, drawing or caricature, a description of his office or status, his residence or his physical likeness.

Although not articulated as such, the Claimant’s central contention appears to be based on a reference innuendo along the following lines, that some viewers of the YouTube video would have read the accompanying chat, that some of this number would have known of the Claimant’s Substack blog and some of these viewers would have known that he had recently posted about visiting St Michael’s on Wyre on 27 January 2024 and so put two and two together to conclude that he was the person being spoken about by the Defendant in the words complained of.

Thirdly, the name “Chris” is a relatively common one; and, whilst I have no evidence as to the numbers involved, it is evident that many people post on Substack. It also appears to be common ground that very many people have commented on social media about the Nicola Bulley case (para 11 above). On the face of it, “Chris Substack” potentially encompasses a significant number of people and is insufficiently specific to be understood by the reasonable viewer as referring to the Claimant. Insofar as the Claimant relies on the particular knowledge of particular people, that would need to be advanced as a reference innuendo case, as I have explained. Mr Ness is wrong in suggesting that it was incumbent on the Defendant to positively identify someone other than him who could be “Chris Substack”; the onus is on him to establish that the words used were such that the reasonable viewer who was acquainted with him would understand that he was the person referred to. (I add, for completeness, that there is nothing in the Claimant’s contention that by pleading a defence of truth, the Defendant accepted that the words referred to him; truth was plainly pleaded in the alternative and the Defendant made clear she disputed that the words used referred to the Claimant (paras 34 – 35 above).

Fourthly, as I have already highlighted at paras 88 - 89 above, the Claimant’s case as to the attributes he relies upon is less than clear. This is compounded by the fact that the Claimant chose not to file a witness statement and give evidence in support of his case. Accordingly, there is, for example, no evidence before the Court as to the number of subscribers that his blog had at the material time or as to the level of engagement with it on social media. Instead, the Claimant chose to rely on wide-sweeping assertions in his oral submissions (para 67 above), which were not set out in his Claimant’s Case document in advance and which were not the subject of any supporting evidence.

Finally, I turn to the second way that reference to the Claimant can be established, namely via a reference innuendo (para 59 above). As I have explained, this involves a distinct cause of action from a case based on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used (para 66 above). It involves pleading the particular facts that are relied upon, the identity of those who had knowledge of these particular facts and any supporting inferences that are relied upon (para 66 above). Even if Mr Ness were permitted to rely on the “Claimant’s case for Trial of Preliminary Issue” document, it is evident that the contents of this document fall a long way short of meeting these requirements. Secondly, the Claimant has adduced no evidence to support a reference inuendo case. There are, for example, no witness statements from viewers of the YouTube video, indicating that they did understand that the Defendant was speaking of Mr Ness in the words complained of.

Accordingly, even if the Claimant was permitted to rely upon his “Claimant’s case for Trial of Preliminary Issue” document, he has failed to show that the words complained of referred to him.

For completeness, I will address the meaning of the words complained of in relation to the YouTube video. However, I do so briefly, given I have already concluded that the Claimant’s defamation case in respect of the video fails as he has not shown that the words complained of referred to him. I stress that in order to address this aspect, I have to proceed on the alternative assumption that the words complained of do refer to Mr Ness; what follows is not to be taken as undermining the firm conclusion I have just expressed that the words complained of do not do so.

I confirm that I adopted the approach described in Millett (para 54 above). I have directed myself in accordance with the well-established principles (para 55 above).

I have considered the words in their context. Both parties expressed the view that “mentioning children” in the words complained of would be understood in the context of what was said shortly beforehand by Michelle Sojka at 14:19 (see Appendix 1), to refer to mentioning children when posting online.

If the words complained of did refer to the Claimant (contrary to my primary conclusion), their natural and ordinary meaning was that “he had posted online about children in a way that could put their safety at risk”.

I conclude that the words complained of contained an expression of opinion, rather than a statement of fact about the actions referred to. The words complained of included that these “takes it to a whole new level” and “potentially endangers children” (emphasis added). Thus, what was being said was in the nature of a deduction, a conclusion and/or an observation (para 56 above). Furthermore, the basis for the comment (the online posting mentioning children) was included.

If it did refer to the Claimant (contrary to my primary conclusion), the statement was defamatory at common law as it attributed behaviour that was contrary to the common shared values of our society and would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would treat him (para 57 above).

The second part of the words quoted at para 8.1 is simply a statement of intent on the part of the Defendant and does not contain any defamatory imputation in respect of the Claimant.

For the reasons I have explained at para 55 above, the additional points raised by the Claimant in his oral submissions (para 69 above) are not relevant to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words.

I will permit the Claimant to rely upon the case on publication that he set out in his “Unredacted Emails” document (para 44 above). The position is distinct from his non-pleading of a case on reference (paras 84 – 90 above). Firstly, unlike the position with the YouTube video, the unredacted emails were not available to the Claimant when the Particulars of Claim were prepared and they have only recently become available. Secondly, the 20 June 2025 communication from the Court positively indicated to the Claimant that he could set out his case on the Defendant having procured Ms Gauntlett to publish the emails in an amended version of his “Claimant’s case for Trial of Preliminary Issues” document or in a fresh document (as opposed to a pleading) and no time limit was imposed (paras 43 – 44 above). Thirdly, the case that is advanced is relatively clear so that it can be responded to and assessed by the Court. Fourthly, I am satisfied that the Defendant had an adequate opportunity to respond to the Claimant’s case in this respect and that she will not be prejudiced by this decision. I turn to the merits of Mr Ness’ contention.

The Claimant’s case is largely based on a series of assertions. I have summarised his submissions at paras 70 – 73 above. He alleges that the Defendant played the lead tactical role in coordinating a smear campaign against him aided by her Truth Finders “teammates” involving a number of anonymous participants including Ms Gauntlett. Assertions are not a substitute for evidence. As I have indicated, the Claimant chose not to give evidence. However, I address below as part of my reasoning each of the central points that he made in questioning the Defendant and in his oral submissions.

I note that the Claimant’s case rests on inference; there is no direct evidence that the Defendant procured the publication of the England Athletics emails. There are, for example, no messages passing between the Defendant and Ms Gauntlett to that effect in the disclosure that Ms Miller gave (para 40 above). Ms Miller has denied any involvement; and in the emails exhibited to Ms Miller’s 26 June 2025 witness statement, Ms Gauntlett denied that Ms Miller was involved.

Whilst giving her evidence, the Defendant said that at the time when the emails were sent, she had never heard of England Athletics. The Claimant replied that he accepted this. This in itself is not fatal to the Claimant’s case. It would not be necessary for the Defendant to know the precise name of the athletics body in question, if she had indeed knowingly caused the emails to be sent.

I did not hear evidence from Ms Gauntlett and I am not in a position to make specific findings as to the sources of the material contained in the emails. However, I am satisfied on the evidence before me that Ms Miller did not ask or encourage Ms Gauntlett to send the England Athletics emails and that she had no advanced knowledge that Ms Gauntlett was going to send the emails. It therefore follows that she did not procure their publication. In these circumstances, the sheer fact that Ms Gauntlett may (and I stress may) have come to learn indirectly of some information that had originated from Ms Miller and, unbeknown to the Defendant at the time, relied upon it in her communications with the athletics bodies, does not in itself make Ms Miller liable as a publisher of the England Athletics emails. (She is not being sued as a publisher of information to Ms Gauntlett.)

I do not consider it appropriate or necessary on the limited evidence before me to make findings, one way or the other, as to whether Ms Gauntlett is or was the anonymous person who posts as “MVolunteer@76” (para 51(iv) above), although I observe that the supporting material identified by Mr Ness appeared to be limited. It is unnecessary for me to do so because the Claimant’s line of reasoning (summarised at para 72 above) is in any event unsustainable. The alleged link between the Defendant and the publication of the England Athletics emails is no more than speculative. The sheer fact that the Defendant and (potentially) Ms Gauntlett had both published online posts that are critical of the Claimant is unremarkable for present purposes and does not begin to prove that they conspired to send the England Athletics emails. The views that the Claimant has posted about the Nicola Bulley case (which there is no need for me to rehearse here) are unusual and controversial and that there have been expressions of disagreement and contrary views posted is not in itself evidence of a co-ordinated plan or campaign to defame him.

In terms of the Claimant’s specific chain of reasoning (para 72 above), there is no clear evidence that Ms Gauntlett is the author of the “Conspiracy Coconut Chris Ness” post. The sheer fact that this post of 20 December 2023 and the subsequent tweet from “MVolunteer@76” of 7 January 2024 both refer to Doritos does not prove that the authors are the same person. As the Claimant accepted when I put it to him, the reference in the later tweet to Doritos may be because the person who sent it had read the 20 December 2023 post (as opposed to written it). Furthermore, even if the authors were the same, the sheer fact that two people involved with Truth Finders tweeted / retweeted those posts, shows no more than that they agreed with them. It does not begin to prove that there was a mutually agreed plan to defame the Claimant via the England Athletics emails.

I listened carefully to the Defendant’s evidence and I accept the credibility of her account. I accept her denial of involvement in the England Athletics emails.

More specifically, I accept the answers that Ms Miller gave in relation to the First Email, which I have already set out at para 51(ii) above, namely that she did not know Ms Gauntlett at the time, that she had not communicated with her about her 10 February 2024 police complaint and she did not know Ms Gauntlett was intending to send the email. As I have explained at para 114 above, if the reference in the First Email to a police investigation was to the Defendant’s police complaint and this information had come to Ms Gauntlett indirectly (by “Chinese Whispers” as Ms Miller put it), that in itself would not make her liable for the publication of the First Email. I reach a similar conclusion in relation to the passage in the penultimate paragraph of the first 8 March 2024 email that the Claimant put to her, where again I accept Ms Miller’s answers (para 51(vi) above).

I also accept the Defendant’s account that she did not contact Ms Gauntlett in relation to the reference to the Claimant’s bail conditions that appears in the Fifth Email (para 51 (v) above). The Surrey Police document that the Claimant relied upon (para 73 above) does not establish that the Defendant was told of the Claimant’s bail conditions (as opposed to his “arrest” earlier in the day). The Defendant accepts that she was told of the arrest (para 51(v) above). Accordingly, this document does not undermine the credibility of the Defendant’s account in the way that the Claimant suggested. I have already explained that even if the information regarding the bail conditions did originate from the Defendant and found its way to Ms Gauntlett via a series of “Chinese Whispers” this in itself would not make Ms Miller a publisher of the England Athletics emails (para 114 above).

I do not accept that the Defendant’s oral evidence contradicted para 5 of her 26 June 2025 witness statement. The Claimant placed considerable store on the proposition that the Defendant’s oral evidence was inconsistent with her reference in the statement to “the emails that include details of my police complaints to police” (para 47 above). However, as I have explained, Ms Miller’s evidence allowed for the possibility that some information that originated from her had found its way to Ms Gauntlett via “Chinese Whispers”. Accordingly, she did not positively dispute that the references in the emails that Mr Ness highlighted were or could have been references to her police complaints. What she did dispute was that she knew Ms Gauntlett at the time, that she had communicated with her directly and that she was aware of the intended England Athletics emails. All of that is consistent with her witness statements and I accept her evidence in these respects.

I accept that the Defendant had proper reasons for objecting to the witness summons obtained by the Claimant. Master Davison agreed and set this aside (para 41 above). I also accept that, more recently, the Defendant did ask Ms Gauntlett to provide a witness statement, as she said. I do not consider that the sharing of the bundle with Ms Gauntlett was suspicious or improper in the circumstances. I accept the explanation given by the Defendant and by Mr Hughes (paras 51(i) and 82 above). For the avoidance of doubt, this entailed using the disclosed documents for the purposes of the proceedings.

I record that a suggestion made in one of the Claimant’s documents that the Defendant had bribed Ms Gauntlett to send the England Athletics emails was not even put to Ms Miller in cross examination, nor mentioned in Mr Ness’ oral submissions. There is no supporting evidence for this whatsoever and I reject this allegation.

For completeness, I also record that there is nothing in the YouTube video, in the sending of the cease and desist letter or in the contents of the Defence Case Summary that supports the Claimant’s case on publication.

Accordingly, I conclude that the Claimant has failed to show that the Defendant caused or procured the publication of the England Athletics emails.

As the Defendant was not involved in the publication of the England Athletics emails and I have not heard from the publisher of the emails, I consider that it would be inappropriate for me to reach any decision as to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of. Mr Hughes agreed with this position (para 79 above) and Mr Ness did not express a view on it.

For the reasons I have explained at paras 83 – 91 above, the Claimant’s pleaded claim does not provide a basis for him to show that the words complained of in the YouTube video referred to him. In the alternative and even if it would be appropriate to take account of the contents of his “Claimant’s case for Trial of Preliminary Issues” document, the Claimant has failed to show that the words complained of in the YouTube video referred to him (paras 92 – 101 above).

For the reasons I have explained at paras 110 – 124 above, the Claimant has failed to show that the Defendant caused or procured the publication of the England Athletics emails.

It therefore follows that the claim in libel must be dismissed.

As I indicated at the hearing, I will give the parties an opportunity to make concise written submissions on the way forward in relation to the remaining claims and any other consequential matters (in particular, costs and permission to appeal).

As regards the Data Protection claims, it appears to follow that the part of the claim that relates to the England Athletics emails also falls to be dismissed, as I have found that the Defendant was not involved in their publication. However, I will not strike it out without giving the Claimant an opportunity to address this. I emphasise that this is not an opportunity to re-argue the conclusions that I have reached on publication. It is simply to give both parties a chance to address how these conclusions impact on the Data Protection aspect of the case. As regards the YouTube video, para 16 of the Particulars of Claim is less than clear as to how the Data Protection claim is put and as to what is relied upon. I also note that a Jameel abuse argument is raised as an alternative basis for striking out the Data Protection claim (para 94 of Mr Hughes’ Skeleton Argument).

The false imprisonment claim is unaffected by the decisions I have made at this stage. However, there is an outstanding strike out application in respect of this claim, which Mr Hughes indicated would be pursued. It will therefore be necessary for the Court to make directions in relation to the hearing of that application. I anticipate that the Claimant will want an opportunity to respond in writing to the contentions raised at paras 81 – 87 of Mr Hughes’ Skeleton Argument before any hearing.

As the Claimant is a litigant in person and the Defendant was only represented for the purposes of the Preliminary Issues Trial, I have not circulated a version of this judgment in draft. The Order accompanying the handed down judgment dismisses the libel claim and sets out a timetable giving the parties the opportunity to make sequential written submissions on the following matters: