ESSO Petroleum Company, Limited & Anor v Persons Unknown & Ors

This is the second annual review of the injunction granted in this matter to Esso Petroleum Company, Limited and ExxonMobil Chemical Limited (“the Claimants”). They seek the continuation of the existing order with some amendments. The First, Second, and Third Defendants are identified as Persons Unknown who are connected with the ‘Extinction Rebellion’ (“XR”) campaign or the ‘Just Stop Oil’ (“JSO”) campaign. The Fourth Defendant (“D4”), Paul Barnes, and the Fifth Defendant (“D5”), Diana Hekt, are named individuals.

The injunction was originally obtained by the Claimants in 2022 in response to environmental protest campaigns. The injunction protects various sites (“the Sites”), which include an oil refinery, fuel terminals, logistic hubs, and compounds across the United Kingdom. The Sites form a significant element of the national energy infrastructure. The Fawley site, for instance, is the largest oil refinery in the United Kingdom, providing 20% of the nation’s refinery capacity.

The history of protest action at these Sites and elsewhere is well-documented in the evidence, including in the statements of Mr. Anthony Milne, Mr. Stuart Sherbrooke Wortley, Mr. Nawaaz Allybokus, and Mr. Martin Pullman. These statements describe the significant problems experienced by the Claimants, not as isolated events, but as part of a wider pattern of "direct action" at oil terminals across the country. The Sites are mainly complex industrial units which process or store substantial amounts of volatile and highly flammable material capable of being released in liquid or vapour form. The sites are secure and subject to stringent safety measures and protocols which would not be apparent to a member of the public. They therefore involve managed risk. The consequences of any of the risks involved eventuating present a clear and significant danger to those who work at or visit the Sites, anyone entering unlawfully or protesting at the Sites and, not least, the local population and environment.

On 19 July 2023, Linden J granted "final" relief, imposing an injunction effective for a period of five years, subject to annual review (“the Linden Order”). Subsequently, on 29 January 2024, Ellenbogen J reviewed the Linden Order, prior to its first annual review, to consider whether any changes were necessary in the light of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton CC v. London Gypsies & Travellers [2024] AC 983 (“Wolverhampton”). Ellenbogen J concluded that no changes were required, granting similar relief with minor "tidying up" in relation to one area no longer requiring protection and another where previously unregistered land had become registered (“the Ellenbogen Order”). The first annual review hearing took place on 10 July 2024 before Tipples J, who concluded that there had been no material change in circumstances warranting the discharge or amendment of the injunction. She ordered that it continued unchanged. D4 and D5 were, as previously, "carved out" of the injunctions due to assurances they had provided.

The purpose of a review hearing for an injunction, particularly one against Persons Unknown, was clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton. At [225], the Court observed that a review:

“…will give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”

As Mr Morshead KC observed, this is an area of evolving jurisprudence so that it is also open to the Court to review the operation of continuing injunctive relief in the light of legal developments. That has already taken place in this case following the decision in Wolverhampton. I am satisfied that the Claimants have drawn to my attention all of the recent relevant case law in relation to the granting of similar injunctive relief.

In cases where the review is uncontested, the primary focus is not to revisit the merits afresh but rather to determine whether the injunction has outlasted the compelling need which led to its initial imposition, in view of any changed circumstances. This approach is consistent with the views expressed by Hill J in Valero v Persons Unknown (2025 review) [2025] EWHC 207 (KB) at [20-30], and by Garnham J in Rochdale MBC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1314 (hereafter “Rochdale”) at [42-52].

I agree that this is the practical and proportionate way to approach a review ordered as part of the original grant of relief. Such a review is also an opportunity to make necessary adjustments in the light of experience of the practical operation of the injunction and changing circumstances. The Court should nevertheless be wary of embarking upon fundamental changes to the scope or nature of injunctive relief at a review hearing rather than requiring a further and full application to be made. I also bear in mind that there is no legal presumption of continuance.

The evidence before me, particularly from the fifth and sixth witness statements of Ms Stebbing demonstrates that the threat of direct action at and against the Sites continues to be a real one.

First, there is direct evidence from JSO itself acknowledging the effectiveness of injunctions in deterring their actions. A tweet from 13 September 2023 stated, in relation to protests on highways:

“Disruption is frustrating, but we have no other choice. Fossil fuel companies have taken out private injunctions that makes protests impossible at oil refineries, oil depots and even petrol stations…”

This strongly suggests that the injunctions covering oil refineries have compelled JSO to target other infrastructure and, conversely, that the removal of the injunction would invite renewed activity of the sort that it was designed to prevent.

Secondly, other courts have also recently found there to be a continuing threat in cases similar to the present application (see Valero (above) and Exolum Pipeline Systems Ltd v Persons Unknown - 25 February 2025, Swift J reviewing the order made in that case in 2024 – see Exolum Pipeline System Ltd & Ors v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 1015 (KB)).

Thirdly, specific incidents indicate ongoing interest in the Sites. For example, in December 2023, an individual trespassed on the Fawley Site to film its layout by drone, subsequently publishing the footage online, which has gathered over 146,000 views to date. Whilst some time ago and not overtly a protest, the filming of the site and the high number of continuing views demonstrates a persistent interest in the Claimants’ infrastructure. Broader interest in the Claimants’ assets across England by environmental activists is also described in Ms Stebbing’s evidence.

Fourthly, XR and JSO continue to focus their attention on the oil and gas sector. Recent examples include multiple environmental activist groups, including JSO, targeting airports in Europe in July-August 2024, with JSO stating that "areas of key importance to the fossil fuel economy will be declared sites of civil resistance around the world". In October 2024, XR activists blockaded the United Kingdom Oil & Gas plc production site in Surrey, and in January 2025, XR occupied the Manchester office of an insurance broker, because it was involved, it was said, in insuring fossil fuel projects. Direct action by other related groups, such as Shut the System and Youth Demand, also occurred in 2025.

Fifthly, whilst JSO issued a press release on 27 March 2025 stating it would be “hanging up the hi vis” at the end of April 2025, the evidence in Ms Stebbing’s sixth witness statement casts significant doubt on the finality of this change in approach. The press release itself contained a "Note to Editors" that is hard to reconcile with an unequivocal renunciation of direct action. More significantly, undercover reporting on 16 May 2025 referred to an alleged recording of JSO indicating it had not disbanded, prompting JSO to email its mailing list on 21 May 2025 stating: “GB News was right for once. We are “plotting a very big comeback””. The email further suggested that this renewed campaign might operate under a new title albeit with the same aims and conducted by the same protesters:

“Just Stop Oil was just the beginning. A new campaign is in the works—one that will build on our knowledge and success as Just Stop Oil and will face the grinding injustice of our political and economic system head on. We're just getting started.”

Similar statements by XR in the past, that it was relinquishing particular forms of protest, have not been honoured. On 19 May 2025, JSO posted a social media photo stating "JUST GETTING STARTED". A Times report in June 2025 indicated JSO activists were recruiting for Youth Demand, with events advertised using the JSO logo, and an organiser quoted as saying,

"This is an inhale before we breath out and expand into brand new territory, into something even bigger than we’ve tried before. This is the start of something genuinely thrilling".

As Linden J observed in his judgment in this matter [67]:

“It would have been very easy for Extinction Rebellion or Just Stop Oil to give assurances or evidence to the court that there was no intention to return to their activities of 2021/2022, and no risk of trespass on the Sites or damage to property by protesters in the foreseeable future, but they did not do so.”

It may of course be that any leadership or governance that exists within these campaigning movements is limited and that a binding assurance from the centre cannot in fact be given. That in itself would make it difficult to rely upon any announcement that there had been a cessation of the activities at which the injunction is aimed. Equally it continues to be the position that no assurances have been given which leads me to conclude that there remains a real risk of direct action from JSO or XR or those connected with their campaigns.

I am satisfied that the hearing of this review was properly notified in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Ellenbogen Order. Ms Stebbing’s seventh witness statement details the steps taken, including uploading documents to the webpage, placing copies in clear plastic containers at the Sites, and sending emails to relevant addresses for the First, Second, and Third Defendants. In relation to D4 and D5, service was by email, and where delivery failures occurred for D4, extra measures were taken to provide the information by first-class post.

Mr Morshead submitted that the provisions at paragraph 15.1 of the present Order were becoming unwieldy to operate in practice because of the accumulation of documentation produced as a result of the further hearings following the grant of relief. He suggested that if the order were to continue then it would be sensible and necessary to remove the requirement for full paper copies of documents to be deposited, other than the orders themselves (as provided for at paragraph 12), in favour of the links already given on the Warning Notices (see further below) which point to the relevant documents online by means of a link to a website. I agree that requiring the Claimants to maintain a growing library of material at the Sites, in ever larger plastic boxes, is unsatisfactory and may well prove unworkable in future. The solution suggested will meet the requirement to serve the material concerned in an effective way. Links to a website may indeed prove to be a more satisfactory arrangement. 

Photographic evidence of four Notices being displayed at all Sites was provided by 13 June 2024 for the annual review hearing. However, it was discovered that Avonmouth and Alton only had two Notices each, and Purfleet had a damaged Notice. These deficiencies had been promptly rectified by ordering new Notices on 11 June 2024.

While there was a period where some Sites may not have had the full complement of four Notices, the Claimants have explained that this confusion arose from changes to the wording of the Notices following court orders, and that at all times at least two Notices were present. Furthermore, other methods of notification, such as website publication and email, were consistently used. I accept the Claimants’ submission that this oversight did not cause prejudice to any Persons Unknown, given the other notification steps undertaken. I also note that the Claimants now conduct monthly checks to ensure Notices and containers are in place.

D4 and D5 remain carved out of the injunction due to their earlier undertakings and assurances. D5 has provided a signed copy of a further undertaking, effective until 31 July 2026 or the date of the next review hearing. However, D4 has not yet returned a signed copy of his undertaking, despite continued efforts by the Claimants to contact him, including through letters sent on 24 June 2025 and 3 July 2025. The Claimants propose a pragmatic course which is to allow them liberty to apply to make D4 subject to the injunctions in the absence of receiving further assurances of the same sort as were originally obtained from him, a course which has already been taken in earlier orders in these proceedings. I agree with that proposal.

The potential harm arising from direct action at the Sites remains substantial and, potentially, dangerous. The operations at the Sites involve hazardous substances, regulated under the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015. Entry by untrained protesters who lack appropriate protective clothing or equipment poses significant risks to personal injury and health and safety. Moreover, such actions clearly risk disrupting the Claimants' operations and, consequently, the United Kingdom's downstream fuel resilience, impacting contractual obligations to customers essential for maintaining critical services, including road, rail, and air travel.

I have to consider whether any reasons or grounds for the discharge of the injunction have emerged since the last review. The principal factual development has been JSO’s announcement in March 2025 in relation to "hanging up the hi vis". However, as I have outlined above, the evidence shows, in my view, that this announcement cannot be taken as an unequivocal and final renunciation of direct action. The amorphous nature of the group, combined with the past experience of similar unfulfilled statements by XR, and JSO’s subsequent communications and activities, mean that it would be premature to rely on this announcement as a basis for amending or discharging the injunction. The risk of direct action by those connected with the JSO campaign remains real and imminent.

In relation to legal developments, there have been discussions in recent cases concerning two procedural matters: (a) how "Persons Unknown" ought to be described; and (b) whether orders against them should include a requirement for permission before a contempt application may be brought.

As to the description of "Persons Unknown," the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton stated at paragraph 221:

“…Even where the persons sought to be subjected to the injunction are newcomers, the possibility of identifying them as a class by reference to conduct prior to what would be a breach (and, if necessary, by reference to intention) should be explored and adopted if possible.”

While Nicklin J in MBR Acres Ltd v Curtin [2025] EWHC 331 suggested it was "no longer necessary, nor appropriate" to restrain particular categories of defendants for contra mundum injunctions, and Fordham J adopted a similar approach in University of Cambridge v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 454, I note that Soole J subsequently doubted this position in University of Cambridge v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 724, reverting to the orthodox approach. I am told that Bourne J at the review hearing of an injunction relating to London City Airports, on 24 June 2025 preferred a more straightforward reading of Wolverhampton paragraph 221 and held that this point was procedural, not justifying re-writing orders on review. I find no compelling reason to amend the description of the Defendants in this case when considering it on review save in one respect (see further below). The current description best adheres to the guidance in Wolverhampton by identifying a class by reference to conduct notwithstanding the cogent reasons set out by Nicklin J for taking a different course in MBR. I do however consider that the prospect of JSO evolving, deliberately, into a differently named campaign essentially involving the same organisation, supporters and protesters is demonstrated on the evidence and requires an adjustment to the description of the Defendants to add “or other environmental campaign” so as not to, potentially, thwart the purpose of the injunction. This course was taken in the City Airport injunction proceedings. Any concern that this may involve a widening of the injunction is tempered by the fact that the description involves conduct that is on its face unlawful and where Convention rights are qualified so that the balancing exercise is heavily in favour of a restraint.

As to a requirement for permission before a contempt application may be brought, this measure was adopted in MBR and the University of Cambridge cases. It is apparent that Nicklin J in MBR Acres was significantly influenced by the particular claimants' conduct in that case, which involved trivial and inappropriate contempt applications. However, I observe that the suggestion of a blanket requirement for all newcomer injunctions in protest cases appears to have been made per incuriam given other relevant authorities, such as AG v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273, Sectorguard plc v Dienne plc [2009] EWHC 2693 (Ch), and PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v. Maksimov & Ors [2014] EWHC 4370 (Comm). These cases suggest that the courts already possess adequate mechanisms to address disproportionate committal applications. In the present case, there is no evident need or justification, in my view, to impose a requirement for the Claimants to seek permission before commencing any committal applications. The Supreme Court in Wolverhampton, which carefully balanced the interests of landowners and Persons Unknown, did not impose such a requirement. There is no evidence before me that claimants are generally bringing trivial committal applications in cases of this nature. While the specific factual circumstances may have driven the decisions in MBR Acres and the Cambridge cases, those particular concerns are not present here. Imposing such a permission filter could lead to disproportionate burdens and complexities, potentially requiring multiple hearings and appeals, which would be more stressful for potential defendants and consume significant court resources. It is generally preferable for all matters to be addressed in one committal hearing unless a specific factual reason necessitates otherwise.

I am satisfied that the injunction has been effective to date, as there has been no direct action at the Sites for some years. Indeed, the evidence from JSO itself supports this conclusion, indicating that the existence of injunctions at oil refineries has caused them to target other sites.

There remains a proper justification for the continuance of the injunction. A real and imminent risk of direct action at the Sites persists if they were to be left unprotected. This view has been consistently taken by multiple judges in this claim and in other similar claims. The substantial harm, particularly the health and safety risks, to those who are not trained to understand the many hazards at the Sites, underscores the necessity of the injunction. The Defendants have no lawful reason to enter or remain upon these restricted and fenced-off private lands for the purpose of direct action. The evidence has clearly demonstrated that the existence of criminal offences is insufficient to deter the Defendants.

I conclude that nothing material has changed since the Ellenbogen Order was made to warrant its discharge or amendment. The evidence demonstrates a continued threat of direct action at the Sites. The injunction has not outlasted its need.

It remains necessary for the injunction to continue in its present form subject to the limited amendments referred to above.