Alistair Trotman v Jennifer Jarvis Roberts & Anor

MRS JUSTICE HEATHER WILLIAMS DBE: In light of my refusing the application for permission to make committal applications in relation to the two respondents, Mr Hutchings has submitted that costs should be awarded to the two respondents. A costs schedule has been served in advance of the hearing.

No VAT is claimed. The overall total in the costs schedule is £6,586.20. This included a fee for a relatively junior solicitor to attend this hearing for two and a half hours at the rate of £129 per hour and counsel's fee of £4,500 to attend the hearing this morning.

Mr Hutchings said that in light of the hearing extending into the afternoon (which has been necessary in order for me to give judgment on the substantial number of matters I have had to consider), his one-day brief fee would be £7,000 and there would be a one hour increase in the sum claimed for his solicitor. He said that adding one hour is reasonable as the hearing this afternoon has, in fact, taken longer than this. Accordingly, the overall costs that are sought now total £9,299.80.

Mr Trotman opposed the award of costs in principle. He did so on the basis that the respondents were not entitled to any costs as they were being indemnified by the local authority in relation to their lawyers' fees for these proceedings.

Mr Hutchings' response to that contention is that his instructing solicitors are instructed by the respondents who are liable to pay them; the schedule of costs is drafted on that basis and, therefore, there is an entitlement to costs in accordance with the well-established indemnity principle and there is no basis to go behind the position set out in the schedule of costs.

In response, Mr Trotman said that the respondents needed to prove that this was the position and he wanted to see evidence. He also disputed the scale of the figures claimed suggesting there was, in particular, no need for Mr Hutchings to be here this afternoon.

My decision is as follows.

The respondents have plainly been the successful party and there is no reason why costs should not follow the event, as is the norm.

As regards the point raised by Mr Trotman, I agree that no basis has been shown to go behind the statement in the schedule of costs and on the face of it, the indemnity principle applies, as Mr Hutchings points out. It may be that a person funds their litigation by a loan from the bank, by money from a friend or whatever the case may be. That does not disentitle them to claim costs from the other side and therefore, I do not accept there is force in Mr Trotman's point.

In relation to the figures claimed, the solicitors' costs throughout are at a modest level, both for attendance here at Court and for the work on the documents and so forth and I make no reductions there.

In relation to counsel's fees, I would not have reduced the figure for this morning. However, I have raised my eyebrows somewhat at the proposition that an additional £2,500 is to be added to the fee simply as a result of counsel being here this afternoon when, in any event, I had indicated at lunchtime that I would not give judgment until 3.15 pm and so Mr Hutchings was free to work on other matters in the interim.

I do not agree with Mr Trotman's proposition that there was no need for Mr Hutchings to be here this afternoon. It was not simply a question of me giving judgment; there were the consequentials to deal with, as indeed we are in the process of doing.

So, I am going to make some reduction to the figure claimed, taking account of what is necessary, reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances. Doing the best I can, but inevitably taking a relatively broad brush approach in the circumstances, not least that we are now at nearly 4.45 pm and no useful purpose would be served by my trying to arrive at a very precise reduction in Mr Hutchins' brief fee, I will order costs in the sum of £7,750.

I refuse permission to appeal. First, Mr Trotman has indicated that he does not seek to appeal against the result. However, appeals are against orders made by the court, not against particular parts of the court's reasoning.

Secondly, in relation to Mr Trotman’s first proposed ground of appeal, which concerns what needs to be shown in relation to the honesty of the belief of the maker of a statement and whether they initially bear a burden before it shifts to the person bringing the contempt application, whilst he clearly explained the point to me, in my view the law is clear, as I set out in my judgment. There is no uncertainty in the law in this regard that the Court of Appeal need resolve.

Secondly, in relation to the costs point, Mr Trotman essentially reiterated the points he made to me a few minutes ago, which I have just given judgment on. I do not accept that there is a basis for saying that my decision is arguably wrong.

So, I refuse permission to appeal. I will fill out the requisite form relating to appeals. As you will know, you do have the opportunity to make an application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.