Mohamed Amersi v Charlotte Leslie & Anor.

This judgment is divided into the following sections:

In this libel action, the Claimant complains of the publication by the First Defendant to various individuals of several documents, between late December 2020 and early January 2021 (“the Memos”) (details are given in [28] below). The defamatory meanings that the Claimant alleges were conveyed by the Memos are set out in [29] below.

This judgment resolves two Applications. The Claimant’s application to amend his Particulars of Claim – to particularise and clarify his case on serious harm to reputation which he alleges was caused by publication of the Memos (“the Amendment Application”) (see Section E: [70]-[98] below); and a related application by the Defendants to strike out the original claim for failing to plead a proper case on serious harm (“the Strike Out Application”) (see Section F: [138]-[139] below).

Before turning to those Applications, I shall need to set out some of the history of the litigation between the parties (which includes an earlier data protection claim) as well as considering and analysing the extensive evidence that has been filed by the parties.

The parties

In the Particulars of Claim in this action, the Claimant describes himself as a “businessman and philanthropist”. The Claimant is the founder of the Conservative Friends of the Middle East and North Africa Limited, a company limited by guarantee, incorporated on 21 January 2021, which aims to promote a better relationship between the Conservative Party, the UK Government and the Middle East and North Africa (“COMENA”).

The First Defendant is a former member of Parliament and the managing director of the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant is a company limited by guarantee, incorporated in March 2019. According to evidence filed by the Defendants, however, the organisation, the Conservative Middle East Council (“CMEC”), has been in existence for over 40 years. It was established by the former Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, on the instruction of the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Its purpose was to forge and maintain relationships between the Conservative Party and the Middle East and North Africa region and included organising events, debates, facilitating interaction between Conservative MPs and Middle Eastern embassies in the United Kingdom and arranging fact-finding missions to the region for Conservative MPs. CMEC is associated with, but no longer formally affiliated to, the Conservative Party.

The Claimant’s response to the Memos

The first complaint sent to the First Defendant regarding the Memos was a six-page letter, dated 7 January 2021, from the Claimant’s former solicitors, Mishcon de Reya (“the MdR Letter”). The MdR Letter contained a point-by-point rebuttal of the “scurrilous, misleading and untrueallegations” and sought a retraction of what were said to be these defamatory and false allegations about the Claimant in the Memo “together with a list of all of those to whom it had been circulated”.

From early January 2021, the Claimant made several people (including many in the Conservative Party) aware of the dispute, including, in many instances, sending some of them copies of the Memos and the MdR Letter (see [110] and [112] below).

The Claimant’s current solicitors, Carter-Ruck, sent a further letter of complaint to the Defendants about the Memos, on 21 February 2021. It was clear from the letter that, although he was aware in general terms about circulation of the Memos, the Claimant did not know the identity of all the publishees. In this respect, the letter stated the following:

“Our client is, at present at least, obviously unable to confirm with precision the number of people to whom the memorandum was circulated… Suffice it to say our client had become aware of the identity of a number of recipients to whom the memorandum was sent. The true extent of publication will, of course, be explored further in the event our client is forced to commence proceedings and he will employ all legal methods available to him, including by way of disclosure, in order to arrive at a complete list of those to whom the memorandum was initially circulated.

What our client can confirm, however, is that the memorandum was sent to a number of Ambassadors, diplomats, Conservative Members of Parliament and other individuals in the Arab diplomatic corps in London. This group of people is, as your clients well know, extremely important to our client and to COMENA. Our client holds their opinion of him very dearly.”

The letter sought a “full list of all those to whom the memorandum has been circulated”, damages and costs. At that stage, the Claimant had identified Sir Nicholas Soames as a potential defendant to the threatened libel action. A response was sought by 26 February 2021, or the Defendants were advised “they should be left in no doubt whatsoever that proceedings for libel against them will swiftly follow”.

The Defendants did not comply with the Claimant’s demands. Nevertheless, proceedings for libel did not “swiftly follow”. Instead, by letter dated 19 March 2021, the Claimant’s solicitors threatened to bring an application, under CPR 31.16, for pre-action disclosure seeking all copies of the Memos that had been published and the identities of all individuals and organisations to whom any version of the Memo had been sent. As well as maintaining the threat of a claim for defamation, the letter advised the Defendants that they “should be aware that a subject access request is being prepared for service separately”.

On 1 April 2021, the Defendants’ solicitors responded rejecting both the claim in defamation and the threatened application for pre-action disclosure. The letter admitted that the First Defendant had published a copy of the Memo to (1) Sir Nicholas Soames (who had then sent it to Ben Elliot, the Co-Chair of the Conservative Party); (2) “an ambassador of a CMEC territory” (who sent it on to two other such ambassadors); (3) “a limited number of senior figures within the Conservative Party with a relevant interest”; and (4) “a limited number of relevant individuals connected formally to the security services”. Defences of privilege and truth were advanced. The response also expressly challenged any contention that the Claimant could demonstrate that the limited publication of the Memos could satisfy the requirements of s.1 Defamation Act 2013 (serious harm to reputation). Finally, the Defendants’ solicitors advised that they intended to treat the Claimant’s solicitors’ letter of 19 March 2021 as a subject access request, made under s.45 Data Protection Act 2018, and informed the Claimant’s solicitors that they would receive the relevant response within the month.

A demand that the Claimant be provided with the names of those to whom the Memos had been sent – made in Carter-Ruck’s letter of 7 April 2021 – went unsatisfied. The threatened application for pre-action disclosure did not materialise.

The Defendants disclose copies of the Memos

On 14 May 2021, the Defendants’ solicitors provided copies of various documents to the Claimant (“the 14 May Documents”). As noted, they did so having treated the Claimant’s solicitors’ demands to be supplied with copies of the Memos (and any accompanying documents) as a subject access request under the relevant data protection legislation. The 14 May Documents included copies of the Memos that were sent to five named individuals (Sir Alan Duncan, Crispin Blunt, Sir David Lidington, Sir Julian Lewis and Sir Nicholas Soames) and eight individuals who were identified only by description (Persons A and H – each described as “Former Conservative MP”; Persons B, C, E and F – each described as “National Security Individual”; Person D – described as “Ambassador”; and Person G – described as “Conservative MP”) (together “the Unidentified Publishees”).

If the purpose of the threatened libel action, first intimated in the MdR Letter and repeated by Carter-Ruck, was vindication of his reputation, at the latest from receipt of the 14 May Documents (and probably in January 2021), the Claimant had sufficient information to commence a claim for defamation. He did not do so. He took a different approach.

The Data Protection Claim

On 29 June 2021, the Claimant issued a Part 8 Claim against the Defendants seeking an order, pursuant to s.167 Data Protection Act 2018, requiring them to comply with their statutory data protection obligations (“the Data Protection Claim”). It is tolerably clear that the main purpose of the Data Protection Claim was to obtain the names of the Unidentified Publishees (a fact the Claimant appears later to have confirmed in an interview with the Financial Times – see [19] below).

The Data Protection Claim was listed for trial on 23 November 2021. However, on the day of trial, Tipples J adjourned the proceedings because there were substantial disputes of fact that made the claim unsuitable for trial as a Part 8 claim. As a result, the Data Protection Claim was transferred to Part 7. Directions were given for the service of statements of case, disclosure, witness statements and a revised trial window between 25 March 2022 and 13 April 2022. The Judge ordered the Claimant to pay 65% of the costs of the Part 8 proceedings.

The Data Protection Claim was relisted for trial on 5 April 2022, but it did not reach a conclusion. It was formally discontinued by the Claimant on 28 March 2022. The Claimant and the Defendants agreed that there should be no order for costs. In an article published in the Financial Times on 27 March 2022, the Claimant was quoted as saying of his decision to discontinue the Data Protection Claim: “I have achieved all that could realistically be achieved from that process and I am now in a position to seek vindication over the false and defamatory statements made about me.”

Media coverage of the dispute

On 7 July 2021, an interview with the Claimant was published in the Financial Times, written by Tom Burgis, under the headline “The donor, the Russian deals and the Conservative money machine” (“the First FT Article”). The First FT Article, which is still available online, included reference to the litigation between the Claimant and the Defendants. As the article has been relied upon by the Defendants, and because it has a bearing on some of the issues I must decide, I have set it out in Annex 1 to this judgment.

A transcript of the interview between the Claimant and Mr Burgis, which led to the publication of the First FT Article, has been provided by the Claimant as part of the evidence. In the interview, the Claimant said this of his dispute with the First Defendant:

“… she [the First Defendant] will be taken to the cleaners. Because we have started our DPA claim, and she’ll be forced to disclose what damage she’s done to me, and others, as well, and after that we’ll take libel action…

…

So, I said, in good faith, because the party asked me to sort it out, I said in good faith, if she wants to settle on terms that have got five provisions, number one, I want an apology. Number two, I want a retraction. Number three, I want a cease and desist. Number four, I want to know who she sent this paperwork to. After six months, we don’t know. Six months. Six months, she doesn’t want to share who sent the stuff to. Is that behaviour that can be condoned here?... Number five, an admission that she wrote this… If she had done this in good faith, given me these five points in good faith, I would not want to have sued her for damages. Do you know what my costs are to date, £260,000. I could go there and give it to a COVID charity, which would help people. Instead, I’m wasting my time and wasting my money for absolute nonsense… [unclear] now will be incurred. £260,000 worth of costs, right? Nearly 300,000 now, after the DPA filings. £300,000 I would have wasted which I would have given to the party, to the poor, to other people. I have wasted this on this, so it is only fair now that I recoup as much of that, which I will donate to the party…”

On 31 July 2021, a further article, again based on an interview with the Claimant, was published in The Sunday Times under the headline: “Access capitalism scandal: A dinner with Prince Charles, then the begging letter arrived” (“the ST Article”). The ST Article is also still available online (albeit behind a paywall). As the headline suggests, one of the main themes of the ST Article is what was called “access capitalism”. One paragraph recorded the Claimant’s answer as to the benefits he received from his membership of the concierge service, Quintessentially, run by Mr Elliot:

“Asked if Elliot was in effect operating a pay-to-play scheme, Amersi replied: ‘You call it pay-to-play, I call it access capitalism. It’s the same point. You get access, you get invitations, you get privileged relationships, if you are part of this set-up, and where you are financially making a contribution to be a part of that set up. Absolutely.’”

A follow-up article to the First FT Article was published by the Financial Times, on 2 August 2021 – “New claims raise questions over Tory donor’s Russian business links” – again written by Mr Burgis (“the Second FT Article”). The full text is set out in Annex 1, but the opening paragraph gives a summary:

“A major Conservative donor received $4m from a company he knew to be secretly owned by a powerful Russian who was at the time a senior member of Vladimir Putin’s regime, according to three people with direct knowledge of his business dealings.”

The dispute between the Claimant and the Defendants is referred to in paragraphs 18-25 of the Second FT Article.

On 4 August 2021, an article was published in The Daily Mail under the headline: “Revenge of Mr Moneybags: To friends he’s the tycoon who gives to good causes and bankrolls ministers but to enemies he’s a shadowy figure with alleged Russian links. Now this feud over rival Tory factions has blown up” (“the Mail Article”). The Mail Article is long, and covers much of the same ground as the FT and ST Articles. For the purposes of this judgment, I have set out parts of the Mail Article in Annex 1.

The Defendants have exhibited to their witness statements several further articles about the Claimant, published in the later months of 2021 and early 2022. I need not set them out, but they have been relied upon in relation to the issue of the cause of any harm to the Claimant’s reputation. One article, however, published by TheObserver on 5 February 2022 (“Give me back my £200,000 major donor tells Tories”) (“the Observer Article”), is perhaps of some importance, not least in demonstrating the publicly deteriorating relationship between the Claimant and the Conservative Party. The sub-headline – “Controversial telecoms mogul Mohamed Amersi takes on Conservative party over exclusion from elite gatherings and auction prizes never received” – gives a flavour of the piece. The Observer Article included the following:

“A legal letter seen by the Observer and sent to Ben Elliot, co-chair of the Conservative party and co-founder of the concierge company Quintessentially, is the latest sally in a year-long dispute involving Amersi and other party figures over a new Conservatives’ friends of the Middle East group, which he chairs. Amersi’s lawyers warn that unless the dispute is amicably settled, officials should set out proposals for reimbursing his donations and other costs.

Amersi believes one of the reasons for his exclusion is that he exposed the ‘access capitalism’ he alleges Elliot presides over, in which he claims privileged relationships are extended to those who make hefty donations. His business dealing in Russia and an advisory role on a deal in Uzbekistan also faced scrutiny last year, but he denies any wrongdoing and a report on him by party officials did not flag any significant concerns.”

The Claimant addressed these media reports, in general terms, in his second witness statement. He said that by the time of the publication of these articles, the damage to his reputation “had already been done”. He suggested that the press “served to amplify the damage which had already been done by the publication and percolation of the [Memos].” Relying upon sources, that he refused to name, the Claimant alleged that the First Defendant had been responsible for orchestrating the media coverage.

The claim for defamation

Meanwhile, whilst the Data Protection Claim was pending trial, on 17 December 2021, the Claimant issued the Claim Form in the current defamation action. I infer that the Claim Form was issued then because of the impending 1-year limitation period. However, at that stage, the Claimant did not serve the Claim Form on the Defendants. He waited until 6 April 2022 (see [27] below).

On 21 March 2022, Carter-Ruck sent a letter to the Defendants’ solicitors, headed “Further Letter of Claim”. This letter identified “the publications that our client presently intends to include within the Particulars of Claim” which, it said, Leading and Junior Counsel had been retained to draft.

The original Particulars of Claim

The original Particulars of Claim were dated 6 April 2022, and were served on the Defendants on this date, together with the Claim Form. The period for serving the Claim Form would have expired on 17 April 2022. The Claimant therefore took full advantage of the maximum time that the law permits for bringing a defamation claim.

The publications and alleged defamatory meanings

In total, in his original Particulars of Claim, the Claimant complained of fifteen publications of sixteen Memos to thirteen publishees. Copies of each of the Memos relied upon were exhibited as an Appendix to the Particulars of Claim. It would be too cumbersome to set out all the publications complained of. Instead, I have set out one of the publications – Document 14 – in Annex 2 to this judgment. I have selected this publication because it captures many of the defamatory meanings which are common to several publications of which the Claimant complains. I have partially redacted Annex 2 to remove irrelevant references to third parties. Document 14 was also a document circulated by the Claimant himself (see [110] and [112] below). In Annex 3, I have summarised all fifteen publications relied upon by the Claimant in a Schedule. The publications are shown in the order in which they appear in the Particulars of Claim, which is not chronological.

There is a substantial degree of repetition/overlap between the defamatory meanings the publications are alleged to bear. Largely this reflects the fact that some of the Memos were published to more than one person, and because several common themes are repeated in the different versions of the Memos even if the wording of some of the Memos varied. Overall, the Claimant complains of the publication of the following 22 distinct imputations that he contends are conveyed by one or more of the Memos and are defamatory of him:

At least one of the pleaded meanings breaches the repetition rule and others are in a form which leaves unclear what defamatory act or condition is being attributed to the Claimant (see [29(7)], [29(18)] and [29(19)]). There is a live issue as to whether some of these meanings are defamatory of the Claimant at all. Now is not the time to consider whether, in the context in which they appeared, these meanings (a) are defamatory of the Claimant at common law; and (b) would be understood to be statements of fact or expressions of opinion. I shall assume, for the purposes of this judgment that each publication does bear the meanings attributed to them by the Claimant and that they are defamatory of him. The Claimant is entitled to have his claim taken at its highest for the purposes of the present judgment.

A final alleged publication, to Person F, said to have occurred between December 2020 and January 2021, was also pleaded in the Particulars of Claim. However, the Claimant was unable to identify what document(s) had been published to Person F. In a claim for defamation, a failure to plead the words complained of (and with it the meaning the publication is said to bear) is a breach of CPR PD 53B §4.2(1) and (4). In consequence, as the relevant publication is fundamental to the cause of action, the Particulars of Claim failed to disclose a cause of action for defamation in relation to this alleged publication to Person F.

The Claimant has certainly adopted what might be called an all-embracing approach to the identification of the defamatory imputations that he says are conveyed by the Memos. He has not limited himself to what might be regarded as the most serious imputations. At the hearings, on 27 June 2022 and on 10 January 2023, I asked Mr McCormick KC to identify the defamatory imputation the publication of which the Claimant regarded to be the most damaging to his reputation. He declined to do so. That might be thought to be surprising. Most claimants can usually point, without difficulty, to what they regard as the most serious imputation(s) conveyed by a publication. It is usually the imputation that a claimant perceives as likely to do him/her the most reputational harm.

Nevertheless, I have not pressed the Claimant to provide an answer because, on the facts of this case, his interpretation of what is the most damaging imputation is of less relevance than what the publishees thought was most damaging. That is of potential importance to the issue of serious harm to reputation because it is the actual impact that these defamatory imputations had on the publishees that matters. Subject to the Claimant demonstrating that the imputation was defamatory at common law, it is possible, for example, that a particular publishee could be particularly sensitive to – and regard as damaging to the Claimant’s reputation – an allegation that the Claimant had been motivated by a desire to secure an honour. By the same token, some publishees might regard such an allegation as trivial and incapable of damaging the Claimant’s reputation in their eyes. As I shall explore in more detail later in this judgment, this point only serves to demonstrate that, in a defamation claim that is brought in respect of discrete publications to identified individuals, a case of serious harm to reputation that is based solely on inference may struggle to meet the statutory test. It is the actual impact of the relevant defamatory imputation(s) on the publishees that matters and must be proved.

The case on serious harm to reputation

Pursuant to s.1 Defamation Act 2013, a statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant (see further Section G(2): [143]-[163] below). As such, a claimant in a defamation action must plead (and subsequently prove) his/her case that the publication of the relevant statement has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to his/her reputation.

Although fifteen separate publications were relied upon, in the Particulars of Claim the Claimant advanced a single paragraph containing a composite case on serious harm to reputation in the following terms:

“64.

The publication of each of the statements set out above has caused and/or is likely, if not corrected, to continue to cause serious harm to the reputation of the Claimant. In support of his case on serious harm the Claimant will rely on the following:

(1)

Each of the meanings pleaded above is defamatory of the Claimant at common law and seriously so;

(2)

The First Defendant’s position as a former Member of Parliament lent significant authority and credibility to the allegations made by her;

(3)

The First Defendant’s position as Managing Director of the Second Defendant, an organisation having a long history of involvement of Parliamentarians, Ambassadors and other senior figures and of engagement between the Conservative Party, Conservative Governments and the Middle East, further added to the authority and credibility of the allegations she made against the Claimant;

(4)

By including within various of the published documents numerous embedded hyperlinks the First Defendant gave the impression that the material published by her was carefully researched, documented and accurate. When composing Document 12 she expressly referred Sir Nicholas Soames (but intending her words to be read by Ben Elliot) to those links as being carefully researched evidence supporting what the documents sent to him alleged;

(5)

All of the individuals targeted by the First Defendant to receive the statements (insofar as those recipients have been partially identified of described by the Defendants) are persons of standing and importance, whose opinion of the reputation of the Claimant is important to him because:

(a)

of their common membership of the Conservative Party and/or because of the influence those persons have over decisions including whether or not COMENA should be affiliated to the Conservative Party, and/or

(b)

of their involvement in the diplomatic service and hence the influence they have over whether to facilitate or resist engagement with COMENA and/or the Claimant, and/or

(c)

of their involvement in the assessment and tendering of advice on matters of National Security and hence the influence they have over the extent to which COMENA and/or the Claimant would be regarded by the Conservative Party or the Government of the UK as suitable to promote the interests of the UK or the Conservative Party.

(6)

The nature of the allegations, and the method of publication by the First Defendant, is such that the allegations or their substance was intended to and was likely to be repeated and republished by the original publishees and/or to percolate further amongst the political, diplomatic and security community and become the subject of media speculation and repetition. The republication set out in paragraph 60 above is relied upon as an example of this effect. The Claimant will rely upon such further republications as become known to him.”

The reference to paragraph 60 was to an allegation that, in early January 2021, Person D (now identified as His Excellency Sheikh Fawaz bin Mohamed bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, the Ambassador to the UK for Bahrain) had forwarded one or more of the documents sent to him by the First Defendant to four Ambassadors to the United Kingdom.

As is immediately apparent from the terms of the pleading, the Claimant’s case of serious harm to reputation was entirely inferential.

CPR 53B PD §4.2(3) requires a claimant to set out in his/her Particulars of Claim: “the facts and matters relied upon in order to satisfy the requirement of section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 that the publication of the statement complained of has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant” (emphasis added). The Claimant’s original Particulars of Claim did not comply with this Practice Direction.

Defence not yet filed

On 19 April 2022, the Defendants filed an Acknowledgement of Service indicating that they intended to defend the claim. The Defendants did not file a Defence. Instead, on 10 May 2022, they issued an Application Notice seeking directions for the trial of various preliminary issues as to meaning (“the Preliminary Issues Application”).

The Order of 23 May 2023: Disclosure application and costs information

It became apparent, when I reviewed the documentation in support of the Preliminary Issues Application, that the Claimant’s principal objection to the proposed trial of preliminary issues was that: “it is not possible for the Court to rule definitively and conclusively on meaning and the related issues before certain documentation and information has been provided by the Defendants”. The Defendants did not agree. They contended that the information and documents sought by the Claimant were not relevant to the natural and ordinary meaning of the publications.

Having considered the available documentation relating to the earlier Data Protection Claim, which had been discontinued, I made an Order, on 23 May 2023, which directed that the Preliminary Issue Application would be listed for hearing in the week commencing 27 June 2022. I also directed that, by 13 June 2022, the Claimant must (a) issue any Application Notice seeking disclosure and/or further information from the Defendants; and (b) file and serve a witness statement setting out the Claimant’s costs of the Data Protection Claim and the costs he had incurred in the subsequent defamation claim. I made a similar direction that the Defendants should also file a witness statement confirming the total of their costs of the Data Protection Claim and their incurred costs in the defamation action.

The Order contained the following explanation for the orders that I had made:

“(A)

This is not the first claim brought by the Claimant against these two Defendants. The Data Protection Claim was originally heard as a Part 8 Claim on 23 November 2021 but reallocated to Part 7 and given a new trial date in April 2022. A consent order of 25 March 2022 led to the filing of a Notice of Discontinuance by the Claimant on 28 March 2022. An Order reflecting the agreed no order for costs was made on 1 April 2022, and sent to the parties on 5 April 2022 (‘the Discontinuance Order’).

(B)

… [T]he Claimant issued this further claim – for libel – on 17 December 2021. On 21 March 2022, the Claimant’s solicitors sent to the Defendants’ solicitors a ‘Further Letter of Claim’ (an original letter of claim complaining of defamation having been sent on 12 February 2021). The letter said that it was sent ‘in accordance with the Pre-Action Protocol for Defamation’, even though by that stage a Claim Form had already been issued. On 6 April 2022, i.e. the day after the Discontinuance Order was received by the parties, the Claimant served the Claim Form in the current action together with Particulars of Claim and Appendices that run to over 100 pages.

(C)

The principal objection raised by the Claimant to the proposed trial of preliminary issues is: ‘it is not possible for the Court to rule definitively and conclusively on meaning and the related issues before certain documentation and information has been provided by the Defendants’ (Letter of 17 May 2022). A similar point had been made in the letter of 21 March 2022. However, this might be thought to be a surprising position, and one that calls into question whether the Particulars of Claim discharge their essential function of properly identifying the basis of the claims (in particular, the obligation to set out fully the words complained of in respect of each publication: CPR PD 53B §4.2(1)). The claim in respect of alleged publication to ‘Person F’ does not identify any words alleged to have been published by the Defendants. The repeated use of the phrase ‘the Claimant reserves the right (sic) to amend his case on the meaning… following provision of further information and/or disclosure of [further communications]’ gives further cause for concern on this point.

(D)

I note that the Claimant’s position is that he has been seeking further documents (a point made in §7 Particulars of Claim), but it is arguable that the Claimant should have made an application for those further documents before pleading substantial Particulars of Claim. An application for pre-action disclosure was threatened by the Claimant on 29 April 2021, but not pursued. An application for disclosure, whether made, pursuant to CPR 31.16 prior to issue of the Claim Form, or after issue of the Claim Form, would have enabled a proper consideration of whether the Claimant had established a sufficient basis to justify a disclosure order prior to Particulars of Claim. The limits on ‘fishing’ for a claim for defamation are well established. One course that the Court could adopt is to strike out those parts of the Particulars of Claim that the Claimant contends are not amenable to a preliminary issue determination of meaning. To regularise this unsatisfactory situation, I have required the Claimant to make any application for the disclosure that he contends would enable him properly to plead his claim. I am unimpressed by the attempt, without a proper application being made or evidence in support, by the Claimant to seek a wide-ranging disclosure order. Nevertheless, the Defendants should consider any application carefully and respond constructively. Whilst there may be grounds upon which to resist some of the disclosure sought, an unreasonable refusal to provide disclosure may lead to sanctions in costs.

(E)

Besides these issues, more generally I also have concerns about the following specific matters:

(a)

First, the proportionality of a claim that advances (at least) 15 separate publications which are alleged to bear a several common defamatory meanings. If the Claimant’s objective is vindication, then it is arguable that this would not be impaired if he were to be limited in the number of publications that he complains about. I recognise that limiting the claim in this way would potentially reduce his claim for damages (if the claim were successful), but the question would be whether the additional costs of obtaining that additional sum would be proportionate. The Claimant will need to demonstrate what, of real benefit, is achieved by his being permitted to pursue claims in respect of all 15 publications. I have required the parties to provide information about costs which will give the Court information about the costs’ expenditure of the parties to date.

(b)

Second, the Claimant has pleaded a general claim to serious harm to reputation caused by all the publications, without distinguishing between them (§64). The paragraph appears to rely solely upon an inferential case as to serious reputational harm. Ultimately, the issue is whether, in respect of each publication sued on, the Claimant has demonstrated that this publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to his reputation. In cases where the individual publishees are identified and identifiable, the actual impact of the publication on the Claimant’s reputation is likely to be capable of proof.

As the Order of 23 May 2022 was made without a hearing, it contained the usual provision enabling a dissatisfied party to apply to vary or discharge the Order or any part of it. On 30 May 2022, the Claimant issued an Application Notice seeking to vary the Order (“the Variation Application”). By the Variation Application, the Claimant sought to remove the requirement that he should provide details of his incurred costs in both the Data Protection Claim and the defamation action. In support of the Variation Application, and relying upon several authorities, some dating back to 1852, the Claimant argued:

“6.

Information as to solicitor and own client costs is privileged and confidential, unless and until the party asserts a specific entitlement to recover such costs, whether through the costs management process, or by way of summary or detailed assessment. At that stage the Court’s powers of case management and cost management engage, including the requirement to ensure that the parties are on an equal footing.

7.

It is unclear on what basis an order that a party disclose solicitor and own client costs can be made, not least when it concerns previous claims which have been settled between the parties. If there is such a power for a court to make that order, it would seem to be an unnecessary and disproportionate interference with the rights of confidence and privacy of the parties (including legal professional and/or litigation privilege).

8.

When verifying a Precedent H, for the purposes of a costs management order pursuant to CPR 3.15, and to assist the Court when making case management decisions pursuant to CPR 3.17, the party’s solicitor must state that ‘This budget is a fair and accurate statement of incurred and estimated costs which it would be reasonable and proportionate for my client to incur in this litigation.’ The party is not required to state or disclose solicitor and own client costs.

9.

Further information in relation to what the parties have spent on the Data Protection Claim beyond that set out above remains both privileged and confidential. Given the compromise on costs (the reasons for which are of course privileged) it is difficult to see how such information could assist the Court in managing this claim.”

For their part, the Defendants confirmed that they had no objection to providing information about their incurred costs.

On 7 June 2022, I made a further Order directing that the Variation Application would be heard together with the Preliminary Issues Application on 27 June 2022. Pending that, I varied the 23 May 2022 Order to stay the requirement that the Claimant provide details of his incurred costs. In the “Reasons” accompanying the Order, I noted:

“(A)

I am very far from convinced by the Claimant’s arguments. Modern case management has moved on somewhat since the 1800s. The Court now takes a much more active interest in the cost of litigation, particularly when the litigation engages Article 10 rights. The days when the Court simply provided a playing field and an umpire/referee, and generally left the parties to play the game they chose are gone. The Court will want to look carefully at the history of this litigation, including the earlier (and connected) Data Protection Claim to see whether it is being conducted efficiently, for a legitimate purpose, and at proportionate cost. Ordinarily, the Court would expect litigants to assist it with this task, including the timely provision of relevant information about costs when required.

(B)

Nevertheless, the Claimant has raised a point of principle as to whether the Court has jurisdiction to make the order requiring provision of information relating to the total costs expended on the Data Protection Claim. That point of principle will have to be resolved. Time may not allow for it to be dealt with at the hearing on 27 June 2022 (the time estimate of which cannot be expanded), so it may be adjourned to a later date. Pending resolution of the point, and to protect the Claimant’s position in the meantime, I have [stayed that part of the Order].

(C)

I am even less convinced by the argument that the Court has no jurisdiction to order information about the costs of a party in current litigation beyond such costs as the party seeks to recover from the opponent(s). Subject to further argument, this appears to fall squarely within the ambit of the Court’s case management power. As to whether the Court should make such an order, I will hear the Claimant’s arguments at the hearing of the Application, and in the meantime I have effectively extended the stay by amending the relevant parts of the Order.

(D)

Simply for parity of treatment, I have also stayed/amended those parts of the Order that also applied to the Defendants. I note from the Defendants’ submissions that they do not oppose provision of this information. They remain free to do so, but will not be required to do so pending further order of the Court.”

The Claimant’s Disclosure Application

On 13 June 2022, the Claimant issued his Application Notice seeking specific disclosure from the Defendants pursuant to CPR 31.12 (“the Disclosure Application”). The disclosure sought was of the following:

The Claimant’s evidence on the Disclosure Application

In support of the Disclosure Application, the Claimant filed witness statements from himself and his solicitor. In his witness statement, the Claimant’s solicitor, Nigel Tait, explained why the disclosure was necessary for the fair disposal of the proceedings:

“… [T]he Claimant is aware of individuals who had seen the publications, but understands from enquiries he has made with a number of individuals that not all of those individuals may be the original publishees. This demonstrates that the publications have been republished and percolated, and it is this that is causing the Claimant additional concern. Without the identities of the original publishees, the Claimant cannot determine conclusively to whom the publications (and each publication, bearing in mind they are all subtly different) were distributed).”

Mr Tait also exhibited a Precedent H form detailing the Claimant’s incurred costs for this claim. As at 13 June 2022, the total figure in that schedule was £80,844. However, it is perhaps important to note what Mr Tait said about this figure in his witness statement:

“I exhibit a Precedent H which details the Claimant’s costs incurred in the Libel Claim at the date of this statement insofar as the Claimant will seek to recover such costs from the Defendants. I should make clear that the amount in Precedent H is my estimate of the likely costs that the Claimant could recover on the standard basis for this stage of the action…”

In light of what happened subsequently, and the fact that the point was not fully argued or resolved, it is neither necessary nor appropriate in this judgment to determine what this paragraph means. On one construction, the figure of £80,844 might, actually, not be the total of the Claimant’s incurred costs, but a notional lower figure representing what the Claimant might seek to recover from the Defendants if he were successful in getting an order for costs against them. I express no concluded view, but my initial reaction is that a convincing justification would have to be shown for allowing a party to litigation to hide from his/her opponent(s) and the Court the total sum he is paying his own lawyers. My provisional view is that the Court, particularly in civil claims concerning freedom of expression, has a very real interest in receiving this information, for example to resolve whether a party is using his/her/its greater resources to intimidate or bully an opponent. The extent to which the party might ultimately recover those costs against an opponent is only a small part of the overall picture.

In his witness statement, the Claimant dealt with what he had said in the First FT Article in July 2021 (see [18] above). The interview had been, he said, conducted over Zoom. As to what he had said about the costs of the proceedings, the Claimant stated:

“20.

… [W]hat I said in [the] interview was that I had incurred £260,000 worth of costs. Mr Burgis appears to have taken this out of context to mean costs incurred for the legal action that I have taken against the Defendants. While I had, by that point, of course incurred legal costs in my legal action against the Defendants, I had also incurred the costs (both legal and out-of-pocket expenses) in setting up COMENA, at the request of and with the support of the Conservative Party, which was intended to promote a better relationship between the Conservative Party, the Government and the MENA region should COMENA be affiliated with the Conservative Party. That figure of £260,000 included those costs.

21.

I further informed Mr Burgis in our Zoom interview on 1 July 2021 that, if the First Defendant wanted to settle this matter, I wanted an apology, a retraction of the allegations contained in the [Memos], for her to cease and desist from making the same and/or similar defamatory allegations, to be told to whom she had sent the [Memos] and an admission that she was the author of the [Memos]. I explained to Mr Burgis that I did not want to have to sue the Defendants for damages nor would I be seeking to recover my costs if a suitable settlement could be reached. Indeed, the 7 July 2021 article reports that ‘I do not want to hurt the [Defendants] nor ‘bankrupt’ them.”

It appears that the Claimant may not have had a copy of the transcript of his interview with Mr Burgis (see [19] above) when he wrote that section of his witness statement. It is tolerably clear, on reading the transcript, that the Claimant was indeed talking about his legal costs in the claim against the Defendants, not the costs of setting up COMENA. I can only assume that the Claimant must have misremembered what he had said in his interview with Mr Burgis on the issue of costs when he prepared his witness statement. In the First FT Article, Mr Burgis had not taken out of context what the Claimant had said; he reported it accurately.

As to the discontinuance of the Data Protection Claim, the Claimant stated:

“I maintain that I have achieved all that could realistically be achieved from [the Data Protection Claim] in obtaining the material that I did. It became clear that an overall settlement including the rectification and erasure of inaccurate personal data and an apology was not going to be possible. I am now therefore seeking vindication over the false and defamatory statements made about me by the Defendants. My position is that should this matter settle before significant further costs are incurred, I will not seek to recover all of my recoverable costs from the Defendants.”

In the next section of his witness statement, the Claimant explained why, although he had originally threatened to do so, he had not taken proceedings against Sir Nicholas Soames for his role in publishing the Memos:

“It appears to me that the Defendants are insinuating… that they are the defendants to these proceedings because they are an easier target. The reality, as became clear following receipt and review of the 14 May disclosure, is that Sir Nicholas Soames appears to have made no efforts to independently fact-check the publications complained of. It was my belief (and remains my belief) that Sir Nicholas was (mis)led by the First Defendant, and thus, although he should have conducted his own independent fact-checking, he is not the individual who should be held responsible for the publications complained of. Furthermore, by Sir Nicholas’ own admission in his email dated 2 February 2021 to my solicitors, his position at President of the Conservative Middle East Council ‘is entirely honorary and carries with it no executive position or authority’.

While I did say that ‘I have thus far spared Sir Nicholas the embarrassment of being sued based on his grandioseness (sic)’, this quote has been reported in the [FT] Article without the full surrounding context. I had explained to Mr Burgis that part of my decision not to sue was because Sir Nicolas had continued to recommend me for a ‘Trade envoy role’ in the Middle East. Sir Nicholas’ recommendation was prior to the appointment of Lord (Edward) Lister as the UK’s special envoy for the Gulf in February 2021.

Sheikh Fawaz drew my attention in the meeting, arranged by the Ambassador of Kuwait, on 11 May 2021 in the Bahraini embassy in London that if I should ever sue Sir Nicholas, his king would be ‘very upset’ because the King of Bahrain and Sir Nicholas attended the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst together… It was made clear to me that if I sued Sir Nicholas it would make it difficult, if not impossible for the government of Bahrain to ever engage with COMENA.

Finally, Sir Hugo Swire also discouraged me from commencing proceedings against Sir Nicholas due to the latter’s close proximity to the Prince of Wales (whose many charitable initiatives I support).”

Finally, responding to a suggestion made by the Defendants that the Claimant’s litigation was an example of a “strategic lawsuit against public participation” (a so-called “SLAPP”), the Claimant said:

“… [N]othing could be further from the truth. The right to bring a legal claim is a fundamental right in a democracy, and it is my wish, as is well within my right, to challenge the defamatory allegations that have been made about me by the Defendants in a court of law in order to vindicate my reputation.”

The Defendants’ evidence on the Disclosure Application

The Defendants filed evidence in response to the Disclosure Application from the First Defendant and their solicitor, Tim Lawrence.

In his witness statement, Mr Lawrence stated that he had spoken to several publishees. He set out what each had said.

As to the Defendants’ costs, for the Data Protection Claim (taking into account £16,500 received from the Claimant, but excluding former solicitors’ costs), the Defendants’ costs were £49,309.74 (excluding VAT). For the defamation claim (again excluding former solicitors’ costs), the Defendants’ costs were £64,455.50 (excluding VAT). The costs of the Defendants’ former solicitors – which covered work for both the Data Protection Claim and the early part of the defamation claim – were £66,417.50 (excluding VAT).

In her witness statement of 21 June 2022, the First Defendant set out her objections to being required to identify Persons A, B, C, E, F, G and H (as already noted (see [54(2)] above), Person D has been confirmed to be Sheikh Fawaz). The First Defendant contended that identity of these individuals was confidential. In her statement she explained:

“Sharing information about a person or an organisation, which is not immediately apparent from the public profile, with other interested parties is not uncommon in the sector in which I operate. It goes without saying that such communications are understood to be confidential by the sender and recipient and any further dissemination would be mutually agreed or obvious under the arrangements in which the information was passed on. It is integral to the political and diplomatic ecosystems to manage sensitive information carefully. That obviously require me to respect the confidentiality of the Unidentified Publishees, all of whom are experienced professionals. I would never have built a relationship with any of them if they did not trust me to be discreet and respectful…”

In respect of those who were identified as National Security Individuals (B, C, E and F), specific concerns had been raised as to the potential damage that would be caused if the identity of each person were to be revealed. In her witness statement, the First Defendant provided the following information:

The First Defendant also stated, in her statement, that, following receipt of the MdR Letter, she had not sent out any further copies of the Memos to any other person. On 10 January 2021, Sheikh Fawaz told the First Defendant that he had seen the MdR Letter and gave the impression that it was being circulated more widely. In her statement, the First Defendant commented: “the fact that the Claimant was threatening to sue me, CMEC and Sir Nicholas Soames would have been an extremely unusual event and of enormous interest in the MENA diplomatic world”.

The First Defendant disputed that the evidence of “percolation” was necessarily attributable to publication of the Memos. She has pointed to the substantial media coverage – largely provoked by the Claimant’s own activities – including the FT, ST and Mail Articles (see [18]-[23] above) – as having been more likely to have caused any harm to the Claimant’s reputation. Yet, as the First Defendant noted, the Claimant had not made any claim against the publishers of these articles, a point that has not been disputed by the Claimant. The First Defendant stated: “a number of ambassadors recorded to me their shock and confusion following the Claimant’s allegations about The Prince of Wales and his household [a reference to the ST Article]. Respect of a kingdom’s Royal Family is regarded as essential diplomacy”. Swiftly following the publication of the ST Article, the First Defendant noted what she described as “backtracking” by several people who it was said had agreed to hold senior roles in COMENA.

The Preliminary Issues Application and the Disclosure Application were both listed for hearing on 27 June 2022.

In their skeleton argument for the hearing, the Defendants contended that the Disclosure Application should be refused.

The Defendants submitted that:

“On the evidence before the Court, there are legitimate concerns that the Claimant’s dominant motive in seeking this disclosure through the [Data Protection Claim] and not in this application is collateral. If prompt vindication was his dominant motive he could have achieved such vindication as was due simply by proceeding with a defamation claim in relation to the publishees identified by [the 14 May Documents]… Although it is accepted that the Court cannot conclusively make a determination as to the Claimant’s motive at this stage, the legitimate concerns arising from his conduct are a further factor that should be taken into account in the proportionality evaluation.”

On behalf of the Claimant, it was submitted that the disclosure sought from the Defendants was necessary for several reasons. First, any covering documents that accompanied publication of the relevant Memo to each publishee would be relevant and admissible as context to the publication. In his written submissions, the Claimant recognised that if further documents were provided relevant to the context of any publication, then he might need to amend his Particulars of Claim to set out a revised case both on (a) what words were published on each occasion; and (b) the natural and ordinary meaning he contended the publication bore. Second, it was argued that, in determining the natural ordinary meaning of a publication, the Court was required to attribute characteristics of the specific publishee to the notional ordinary reasonable reader. That task could not be carried out unless the identities – and therefore the characteristics – of the publishees were disclosed to the Claimant.

Before the hearing, I had already expressed concerns about the proportionality of the litigation being embarked upon by the Claimant. If there was ever a case in need of early and robust case management, this was it.

It emerged clearly from the Claimant’s evidence (see [49] and [52] above) – and confirmed by Mr McCormick KC at the hearing on 27 June 2022 – that the Claimant’s objective in these defamation proceedings was vindication, with any award of damages being very much a secondary consideration. As I had noted in the Order of 23 May 2022, if the priority was vindication, then, in the interests of proportionality, the Court could explore limiting the number of publications complained of (see paragraph (E)(a) in [42] above).

The very substantial overlap of the defamatory meanings of the publications complained of meant that the Claimant would not be prejudiced in the scope of any vindication he might obtain if he were limited to the publications to the known individuals. I therefore proposed a potential solution that might resolve both the Disclosure Application and deal with my concerns as to the proportionality of the proceedings: a stay of the claims in relation to publications to Unidentified Publishees, pursuant to CPR 3.1(1)(f).

The other issue that I decided needed to be addressed was the Claimant’s pleaded case on the alleged serious harm to his reputation arising from the publications, which failed to comply with CPR 53B PD §4.2(3) (see [38] above). I had raised this issue in the Order of 23 May 2022 (see paragraph (E)(b) quoted in [42] above) and, at the hearing, addressing Mr McCormick KC, I reiterated the point:

“[The Claimant] complains of the publications to individuals; that is why I was surprised to see that you have a single serious harm paragraph. Each of [the] publications is a separate cause of action, and it must be supported in its own way by … proof of serious harm caused by that publication. As Mr Lawrence has done in his second witness statement, he has contacted several of the unidentified publishees, and they have given… evidence as to the effect of the publication on [them]. You could – and arguably should – had done that in relation to the named publishees, but you have not.”

Later in the hearing, I set out that I would require the Claimant:

“… to set out his proper particulars of serious harm to reputation that was occasioned by each publication. And because he would have to do that by amendment, he would have to apply to amend to add those particulars and then the Court would consider whether the particulars that were being advanced have a real prospect of success.”

The Claimant did not oppose the proposed stay or his being required to provide better particulars in respect of his case on serious harm to reputation. As a result, I made an Order on 27 June 2022 which:

The Amendment Application was made by the Claimant by Application Notice dated 29 July 2022. The Claimant provided a draft Amended Particulars of Claim. The relevant parts of the draft Amended Particulars of Claim are set out in Annex 4 to this judgment.

The draft Amended Particulars of Claim

Although I had made clear, at the hearing on 27 June 2022, that the Claimant should, in the amendments, plead his case on serious harm to reputation for each publication relied upon (see [67] above), the draft Amended Particulars of Claim did not do so. Instead, the Claimant has largely retained the approach of pleading a ‘composite’ case of alleged serious harm to reputation (now significantly expanded in §§65-128). However, he also sought to introduce several paragraphs relating to serious harm to reputation in earlier sections of the pleading (see §§21, 28A, 41.1 to 41.4, 45, 47A, 49 and 60 to 60C). This approach has substantially complicated the process. To understand the Claimant’s full case on serious harm to reputation, it is necessary to carry out an extensive cross-referencing exercise, publication by publication. This has tended to obfuscate rather than clarify.

In a case involving individual and discrete publications, this method of pleading is to be deprecated and should not be adopted. It fails to set out a clear and concise statement of the facts upon which the claimant relies and fails to comply with CPR 53B PD §4.2(3), which requires a claimant to set out separate particulars of serious harm for each publication relied upon. That is necessary because each publication is a separate cause of action (see [147]-[149] below).

Following receipt of the draft Amended Particulars of Claim, on 9 September 2022, the Defendants complained that the amendments failed to comply with the Court’s requirements. The Claimant’s solicitors rejected this. In a letter, dated 7 October 2002, they argued:

“Insofar as it is possible to do so in the circumstances of this case, the pleading and our client’s evidence identifies the nature and extent of the reputational harm which has been caused and the likely source of that harm. The proposition that more is required of him is not correct as a matter of law or practice, and would impose an unnecessary and unrealistic threshold on an individual seeking vindication in circumstances similar to this case.”

As part of their Strike Out Application, the Defendants have argued that the failure by the Claimant to set out clear particulars of serious harm to reputation, publication by publication, was in defiance of what I had required the Claimant to do (see [67]-[68] above). Being charitable to the Claimant, the structure of the Amended Particulars of Claim reflects a fundamental legal point upon which he has relied: that, even in a case of separate publication to identified individuals, a claimant is nevertheless entitled to rely on a composite case of serious harm. As I explain later in this judgment, I have rejected that argument (see [160]-[163] below).

The evidence relevant to the Amendment Application

Before the hearing on 10 January 2023, the Claimant filed several witness statements containing his evidence in support of the Amendment Application: his Second, Fourth and Fifth Witness Statements, dated, respectively, 29 July 2022, 7 October 2022 and 3 November 2022.

It is notable that the Claimant has not filed witness statements from any of the individuals to whom he alleges the various Memos were published so as to provide evidence of whether publication caused any harm to his reputation. Following the hearing on 27 June 2022, in early July 2022, the Claimant’s solicitors did send out letters to people who had received the Memos asking them to provide information (“the July Letters”). Whilst some responses were received, none of the identified publishees has been prepared to give a witness statement to the Claimant. Largely, the exercise of obtaining evidence from the publishees has been done by the Defendants.

The purpose of filing evidence in support of the Amendment Application was for the Claimant to demonstrate to the Court that the amendments, for which he sought permission, had a real prospect of success (see Section G(1): [140]-[142] below). In other words, that he had a real prospect of showing that the publications of the relevant version of the Memo to each identified publishee had caused serious harm to his reputation (or was likely to do so). That was a question of the Claimant identifying and presenting his evidence of the real (or likely) impact on each of the publishees. That should have been largely a straightforward exercise.

The Claimant’s second witness statement – the principal evidence in support of the Amendment Application – did not approach the task in this way. Instead, it presented a mixture of evidence. Some of the evidence does go to the question of the reputational harm alleged to have been caused by publication of the Memos to the identified publishees, but much of the Claimant’s evidence relates to reputational harm that he attributes to the publication of the Memos generally. The statement is short on the former and long on the latter. It contains no evidence as to any reputational harm caused by publication of the Memos to Crispin Blunt, Sir Julian Lewis or Sir Alan Duncan.

The witness statement also contains much irrelevant material. In the first section of his second witness statement (running to almost 40 paragraphs), the Claimant set out details of his background, his history of donations to the Conservative Party, CMEC (and its perceived problems) and his foundation of COMENA. He also included paragraphs criticising the First Defendant. Much of this evidence has little or no relevance to the Amendment Application. To pick one example, the following paragraph, ostensibly about CMEC, provides no evidence of serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation caused by any of the publications:

“I went back to CCHQ in March 2020 to ask more question about CMEC. I suggested to CCHQ that, instead of starting a new organisation, we should try to bring CMEC back under the auspices of the Party, so as not to lose its rich legacy. I was provided by CCHQ with a letter from Ms Leslie to Brandon Lewis, then Chairman of the Party with regard to CMEC’s change in status to not being affiliated to the Party and the consequences flowing therefrom… It was explained to me that one of the reasons why CMEC had in fact disaffiliated was because of the Conservative Party Constitution requirements to submit annual statements of accounts and therefore disclose sources of funding. There were suggestions (made directly to me by the CCHQ Outreach team and in publicly available articles) that CMEC had been taking money to provide access…”

Other than, perhaps, as an effort to embarrass the Conservative Party, I fail to understand why the Claimant has included this evidence in his witness statement. It does, however, have echoes of some of the Claimant’s media statements (see [18]-[23] above). Witness statements in litigation are not to be used for settling scores or advancing some wider agenda.

Similarly of concern are parts of the Claimant’s fourth witness statement, dated 7 October 2022. The purpose of this witness statement was to respond to the evidence of the Defendants. Whilst in part it did so, the Claimant also used it as a platform to attack those who the Claimant believed had been guilty of “appalling abuses of parliamentary and diplomatic privilege”, including those alleged to have made “unsubstantiated accusations” against him in parliamentary debates on 20 January 2022 and 17 March 2022. Those complaints were wholly irrelevant to the Amendment Application. Worse, the attacks appear to have been an attempt by the Claimant to use the privilege attaching to reports of Court proceedings to facilitate an act of retaliation, ironically, for what the Claimant characterised as misuse of privilege.

The balance of the Claimant’s second witness statement is devoted to (a) other instances where the Claimant has evidence of circulation of the Memos (or discussion of their contents) and (b) what I will call the general case of reputational harm, which the Claimant ascribes to the “percolation effect”. In an appropriate case, such evidence may provide a basis on which the Court can be asked to infer that further reputational harm has been caused by the relevant publication. Whether the Court will draw that inference will depend upon the cogency of the evidence and an assessment of the evidence as a whole. Ultimately, whether reputational harm has been caused is a matter of fact, drawing appropriate inferences based on evidence; it is not a matter of guesswork or speculation.

In contrast to the Claimant’s efforts, the Defendants have adopted a much more straightforward approach. Their evidence has focused on what, if any, reputational harm has been caused to the Claimant in the eyes of the named publishees identified in the Particulars of Claim. The Defendants have filed the following witness statements in answer to the Amendment Application: (1) the third witness Statement of the Defendants’ solicitor, Tim Lawrence, dated 9 September 2022; (2) the second witness statement of the First Defendant, dated 9 September 2022; (3) a witness statement from Sir Nicholas Soames, dated 8 September 2022; (4) a witness statement from Crispin Blunt MP, dated 7 September 2022; (5) a witness statement from Sir Alan Duncan, dated 6 September 2022; and (6) a witness statement from Sheikh Fawaz, dated 8 September 2022.

In his fourth witness statement, responding to the evidence of the publishees that had been provided by the Defendants, the Claimant summarised his position as follows:

“To my mind, the cleanest and simplest way to resolve the disputed facts I discuss below is for the witnesses in the Defendants’ evidence to take the stand, and have their evidence properly tested. I invite them to do so, as I intend to, and to waive privilege from which they might otherwise benefit. This will give me a chance of a fair trial in this case.

… I wish to be clear that the individual response of a small handful of recipients of the memorandum are in any case not my sole concern in this claim. My concern is the cumulative impact which publication of the memoranda by the Defendants had (and continues to have) on my reputation among broad political and diplomatic circles within which it was the intention of the Defendants and/or correctly foreseen by them that the allegations made against me would spread… I have received a considerable amount of information about the circulation of the memoranda within the diplomatic community and the impact thereof on my reputation and on the relationships between members of that community. I do not feel that it would be right to identify the specific persons who have provided me with this information given the damage that it might do to the wider diplomatic interests of the countries involved and to the UK’s relationship with those countries.”

In the following sections of the judgment, I will identify the evidence relevant to each of the publications to identified individuals sued upon by the Claimant in his claim against the Defendants, before turning to the Claimant’s case of general damage to his reputation which he says has been caused by publication of the Memos.

Sir David Lidington

In relation to Sir David Lidington, the Claimant relies principally upon the emails that Sir David sent to the Conservative Party after receiving the Memo.

On 9 January 2021, Sir David Lidington sent an email to Mr Elliot, with the subject “COMENA and CMEC”.

“I should be grateful if we could have a word about this issue?

Mohamed Amersi called me shortly before Christmas to say that he had been asked by [name redacted] and the Party board to establish a new affiliated group covering the Middle East and North Africa. I have met Mohamed at Party fundraisers and at interfaith meetings sponsored by his foundation. I do not know him well but I have always found him friendly and know that there has been very generous in his support for the Conservative Party. He asked me if I would agree to be an honorary officer of COMENA.

I replied that I would consider this but needed to think about the time commitment and satisfy myself that there was no conflict of interest with my other activities. (Mohamed has somewhat jumped the gun in apparently saying that I have definitely agreed to serve). I also asked him why he was not working with CMEC. He responded that CEMC had told him that they did not want to formally affiliate to the Party and added that COMENA would cover Israel and Iran as well as the Arab world, bypassing both CMEC and CFI.

Subsequently, [Charlotte Leslie] whom I obviously know as a [redacted], called me. She made a number of allegations about Mr Amersi’s background and conduct which, if true, would cause considerable concern. [Charlotte] also said that [her] understanding was that the Board had not invited Mohamed to establish COMENA and that this was very much his personal initiative.

I now also understand that solicitors letters are being exchanged.

It would be helpful to understand exactly what the Party’s position is on what seems to be developing into a nasty spat between different Conservatives…”

Mr Elliot responded to Sir David by email, at 08.51 on 10 January 2021:

“Thank you for this.

I have had more incoming from both sides on this than everything else put together this week. I have a meeting set on this tomorrow and it is nonsensical that the Party has been put in this position. I am happy to speak before or call you afterwards…”

Sir David replied to Mr Elliot at 09.11 on 10 January 2021:

“I have seen details of the questions that [Leslie] is posing about Mohamed – the sources for which seem to be press articles (esp Forbes). But I assume that [name redacted] or others have supplied you with that material anyway.

The Forbes article to which Sir David was referring has been provided in the evidence. It was published, on 10 October 2006, under the headline, “The Incredible Shrinking Metromedia”. So far as concerns this litigation, the article mentions the Claimant in the context of his connection with Megafon.

In addition, the Claimant states that Sir David chairs the Royal United Services Institute (“RUSI”). The Claimant had expressed an interest in providing some financial support for RUSI. The Claimant’s evidence is that, immediately following publication of the Memos, Sir David decided that RUSI was not able to accept the Claimant’s offer of financial support and that he would have to think about his further involvement in COMENA. In relation to the latter, the Claimant states that Sir David asked him to put his name in square brackets in documents relating to COMENA.

For the Defendants, Mr Lawrence spoke to Sir David Lidington, on 2 July 2022, sending a follow-up email of 4 August 2022, to which Sir David responded on 8 August 2022.

In the call on 2 July 2022, Sir David told Mr Lawrence (as recorded in the latter’s notes of their conversation) that he had not circulated the Memo he received to anyone else and he “could not now distinguish between the effects of the [Memo] and the effects of the press and media coverage when it comes to attributing what he now thinks of [the Claimant]”. In his follow-up email, Mr Lawrence asked Sir David to clarify what he “now thinks” of the Claimant “and how this contrasts with what you may have previously thought of him”.

In his email of 8 August 2022, Sir David provided the following “sequence of events”, to the best of his recollection:

Sir David has not provided a witness statement and it is clear, from Mr Lawrence’s evidence, that, as matters stand, Sir David is not prepared to become further involved in the litigation.

In his fourth witness statement, the Claimant did not respond to the Defendants’ evidence concerning any damage to his reputation caused by publication of the Memos in the eyes of Sir David Lidington.

At the hearing of the Amendment Application, the Defendants submitted that the alleged harm to the Claimant’s reputation, pleaded in Paragraph 106 of the Amended Particulars of Claim, was not attributed to any of the publications complained of. Further, and in any event, the Defendants argued that an organisation such as RUSI would have its own due diligence process.

Following the hearing, on 12 January 2023, Mr Lawrence received a letter from Dr Karin von Hippel, the Director General of RUSI. The following evidence is taken from the Fifth Witness statement of Mr Lawrence, dated 17 January 2023. Dr Von Hippel’s letter was a response to an inquiry made by Mr Lawrence on 8 December 2022. In her letter, Dr von Hippel said this about RUSI’s policy on accepting or refusing donations:

“3.

Each potential donation or contribution is subjected to a rigorous internal process of evaluation and due diligence, which involves an assessment of both the suitability and integrity of the donor as well as the question of whether a contemplated donation fits into our mission and can be completed by our staff. We have, therefore, declined to accept donations that, while coming from impeccable sources, required us to engage in work we could not be sure to accomplish to the high standard expected of us; or, the reverse, with donors we do not see as suitable.

4.

In assessing the suitability of each donation, we rely on information available in the public domain, on active searches through databases, direct inquiries with regulatory and statutory bodies as well as, occasionally, investigators commissioned for this purpose.

5.

It is in the nature of this process that it remains confidential. However, what I can say is that:

(a)

A decision on whether to proceed with a donation or donor is always taken based on information from multiple sources.

(b)

Such a decision is very rarely unanimous, with an element of institutional judgment being an essential ingredient in the process

(c)

A determination not to proceed with a particular donation or donor cannot necessarily be interpreted as in any way expressing any doubt about the integrity of the potential donor or partner institution. As already mentioned, the decision could result from other factors, including limitations in our capacity to deliver, or changes in the priority of our activities, or the nature of the industry from which the donation comes.

We would never discuss our detailed deliberations or considerations in respect of any particular decision relating to a donor with unconnected third parties. We are not therefore prepared to discuss them with you or your client, but would stress again my point 5(c) above that any decision in relation to Mr Mohamed Amersi was taken purely based on the Institute’s own internal process of deliberations, and not on the basis or under the influence of information which may have been either supplied to us directly or released in the public domain by your clients.”

Mr Lawrence has also set out in his fifth witness statement his further efforts to contact Sir David Lidington. Consistent with the indication he had given (see [92] above), Sir David has refused to engage with further inquiries raised with him. Following receipt of the letter from Dr von Hippel, Mr Lawrence emailed Sir David, on 13 January 2023, to seek any comments/observations on its contents. He did not receive a response.

In response, the Claimant provided a further witness statement, his sixth, dated 27 January 2023. In this statement, the Claimant advanced a further paragraph for which he sought permission to amend (§106A Amended Particulars of Claim). The Claimant stated that he disagrees with what Dr von Hippel has said in her letter. He claims that Sir David Lidington was “the key decision-maker when it came to assessing whether to accept or reject donations from me”. He added:

“When RUSI agreed in principle on 1 July 2021 to accept a donation from my foundation [Sir David] endorsed that agreement on 2 July 2021, but then suspended that endorsement by 7 July 2021 meaning that I was asked not to disburse funds. On 1 August 2021 I was informed that Sir David had again given the donation the ‘green light’ only to be told some hours later by a member of the RUSI fundraising team that he had changed his position and that the donation was again suspended, to be revisited by the year end. RUSI ultimately did not follow up on this.”

The Claimant also stated that, on 7 July 2021, he sent a copy of the First FT Article to RUSI, although he is unaware whether Sir David had seen it. He went on:

“No explanation was provided to me for Sir David’s decision. Nonetheless, RUSI continued to engage with me and I was again requested to disburse funds on 1 August 2021 (supported, I was told at the time by a member of the RUSI fundraising team, by Sir David) in accordance with the Invoice only for it to be again suspended that same day at the instigation of Sir David (as I was informed by the RUSI fundraising team), possibly because (it was suggested to me by the same member of the RUSI fundraising team) of the publication of the [ST Article]. But again no formal explanation was provided to me… All this start/stop demonstrated unequivocally to me that Sir David had an effective veto over any donation I might make and that although not the sole cause of his decisions, those decisions were, I believe, contributed to by the damage done to my reputation in his eyes by the [Memos] published to him by the Defendants.”

The failure/refusal to identify the “member of the RUSI fundraising team” in these paragraphs was a breach of CPR PD 32 §18.2 (see [121] below) and affects the weight to be attached to this (hearsay) evidence (see [190] below).

Sir Julian Lewis

The Defendants rely upon a witness statement from Sir Julian Lewis that had been agreed by him, but is unsigned. As at the date of Mr Lawrence’s third witness statement, Sir Julian had felt unable to sign the statement. As Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee of the House of Commons, he wanted to get approval from the Committee’s legal advisor before doing so. The draft statement was subsequently exhibited – still unsigned – to Mr Lawrence’s fourth witness statement, dated 7 November 2022. Mr Lawrence had sent emails to Committee’s legal advisor seeking a response, but, on 27 October 2022, he received a message that she was on maternity leave. In light of that, Mr Lawrence then provided the draft approved statement. I am satisfied that the draft statement represents Sir Julian’s evidence, albeit he has not yet felt able formally to sign the statement.

Sir Julian exhibited to his draft statement various messages and emails that had passed between him and the First Defendant and stated the following:

“My recollection of our conversation on 24 December 2020 is that Ms Leslie gave me a summary of what has [happened] and her concerns about COMENA as subsequently set out in the memoranda and said that she thought that they should be put before the proper security channels. I agreed to do so and said that she would probably not receive a response. I told her that I had never previously heard of the Claimant.

My duty was simply to pass on the information to the appropriate body. It was not necessary for me to form a view about the Claimant and I do not remember doing so. I did not distribute the memoranda elsewhere or discuss their contents. I am not involved with the Arab Diplomatic Corps or the possible affiliation of organisations such as COMENA.

I have formed a negative view of the Claimant as a result of matters arising subsequently which have been the subject of widespread media coverage and I contributed to the ‘Lawfare’ Parliamentary debate on 20 January 2022 where I referred to this case.”

In his fourth witness statement, the Claimant did not respond to the Defendants’ evidence concerning any damage to his reputation caused by publication of the Memos in the eyes of Sir Julian Lewis.

Crispin Blunt

Crispin Blunt MP has provided a witness statement to the Defendants. The material parts of his evidence are as follows:

“3.

On 18 December 2020, I had a conversation with Charlotte Leslie in person at her home. In that conversation I informed her that I had heard that Sir Hugo Swire MP and the Conservative Party were in the process of setting up another organisation similar to CMEC. Ms Leslie was understandably perturbed by this.

4.

I had never heard of the Claimant until alerted by Sir Hugo of his organisation. I recall that Sir Hugo mentioned the source of funding and may also have referred to the Claimant’s motivation to be rewarded with an honour.

5.

On 30 December 2020, Ms Leslie then sent to me by email a copy of the memorandum which has now been controversial in this case. Ms Leslie’s email to me was timed at 1.52pm and at 11.56pm I responded to her with an email containing the words ‘plainly a total bounder! With some very odd fish for company. More than enough to kill it off I think.’

6.

A further email exchange took place the following day, 31 December 2020. At 9.31am, Charlotte responded to me saying, ‘thanks Crispin. Good to know I am not alone in feeling uneasy about this. Apparently Johnnie Astor & Trish are supportive.’ At 10.46am I responded, ‘supportive of you or this Melmotte figure’. Then at 11.06am Charlotte responded ‘sorry not clear. Of Mr Amersi’.

7.

As far as my view of the memo is concerned, it contains first-hand evidence that a Conservative Party organisation focusing on the Middle East was proposed on the basis of being funded by the Claimant. The purpose of this organisation appeared to be both [to] supplant CMEC and by extension its founding purpose that was to support the 1980 EU Venice Declaration in support of Palestinian statehood, instead replacing it with support for the highly controversial Abraham Accords which are properly seen as a betrayal of aspirations for Palestinian statehood by some of the leading Gulf Arab monarchies.

8.

That the Claimant’s money and business appeared to have its roots in the UAE, a leading promoter of the Accords, only reinforced my concerns over what was going on. The Claimant seemed to be overtly seeking UK status through the honours system in reward for his political donations to the Conservative Party and in my estimation, this raised further doubts over his motives.

9.

I did not circulate the memo further nor did I share my view of the Claimant’s headline traits beyond my conversation with Charlotte.

10.

I consider it a touching thought that my private view of the Claimant’s merits, confirmed and/or reinforced by this memo, could have such a devastating impact upon his reputation so as to justify Court action.

11.

The reporting of his affairs since, the reported conduct of his business in Uzbekistan, his relations with the Prince of Wales’ charities, his disgraceful and indefensible use of a rich man’s tool, ‘lawfare’ against Charlotte Leslie, just served to confirm my conclusion from the memo. The Claimant’s case is that the memo was sent to persons of standing and importance whose opinion of the Claimant’s reputation was important to his aspirations. However, affiliation decisions would not be taken by or involve me in any event. It is certainly true that I would have argued against affiliation of COMENA had I offered my view or if it had been sought, but that was due to the reasons explained above in this statement and not a result of the memo written by Charlotte…”

In his fourth witness statement, the Claimant suggested that Mr Blunt’s evidence was helpful in establishing harm to his reputation by publication of the Memos. He pointed to the email from Mr Blunt, on 30 December 2020, as demonstrating that he understood the Memos were designed to “kill off” COMENA and Mr Blunt’s reference to the Claimant as a “total bounder”. In his further email of 31 December 2020, Mr Blunt also compared the Claimant to the character of Augustus Melmotte in Anthony Trollope’s novel, “The Way We Live Now”: “a dishonest and corrupt financier with a mysterious past”. The Claimant states that, as he has not previously met Mr Blunt, his impression of the Claimant must have been formed exclusively on what was said about him in the Memos.

In response to Mr Blunt’s evidence as to the impact of the Memo on his view of the Claimant’s reputation, the Claimant stated:

“Even had Mr Blunt not been personally affected by the memoranda at all (which his evidence strongly contradicts), this would not detract from my claim that my reputation was harmed by the dissemination of the Defendants’ memoranda in political and diplomatic circles; in the event it is perfectly clear that the memoranda seriously harmed my reputation in Mr Blunt’s mind.”

The Claimant disputes several other aspects of Mr Blunt’s evidence, including what Mr Blunt said about Sir Hugo Swire’s suggestion that the Claimant may have been motivated by the prospect of an honour: “I do not believe that he [said this] because there was no basis for him to hold such a view. Never have Sir Hugo and I ever discussed this.” These further factual disputes are not material, save perhaps on the issue of Mr Blunt’s credibility (see [201] below).

Sir Alan Duncan

Sir Alan Duncan has provided a witness statement to the Defendants. The material parts of his evidence are as follows:

“3.

My involvement in this matter began when the Claimant telephoned me, and that was before any material from Ms Leslie was received. I cannot be sure when that call took place but it came to me completely out of the blue, although I was aware of the Claimant before he called me. The Claimant said that he was establishing a new organisation to represent the Conservative Party in the Middle East region. He said that the organisation was to be funded by him. I told the Claimant that his approach was ill-conceived and unacceptable. I asked him what he was trying to achieve, and he replied that he thought that CMEC was no longer a suitable organisation to represent the Conservative Party in the Middle East, and that he wanted to set up COMENA which would have a wider geographical remit. I said to the Claimant that his idea would not work and that, in my view, he was trying to destroy CMEC which was a long-standing established organisation. I said that I felt that it was inappropriate for the Claimant to parachute himself into the situation and for him to go around the Gulf region with what would effectively be a Conservative Party calling card.

4.

I was immediately of the view that the structure of the new organisation was completely improper because an MP’s liaison group should be run by an MP and not run by a donor. An organisation led by a donor would look too much like an attempt to buy influence. I believed CMEC, or anything like it, should be about parliamentary liaison, not Party influence.

5.

The memorandums written by Ms Leslie which are a basis for the Claimant’s claim were sent to me on 3 January 2021 by email.

6.

When I received and skim-read them – which is all I ever did – I could see that they concerned the Claimant and his intention to establish a group to represent the Conservative Party in the Middle East region. I had already spoken to the Claimant about what I thought.

7.

I did not need to read a memorandum from Ms Leslie to form a negative view of the Claimant. My view of him was not created by the memorandum but rather because I did not believe that a donor should lead as Chairman or promote an organisation such as the one suggested by the Claimant.

8.

I was subsequently aware of negative press coverage of the Claimant demonstrating his self-discrediting conduct and it is that which has most influenced my current view of him.

9.

I did not discuss the memorandums with anybody else and did not copy them on to any other recipients…”

In his fourth witness statement, the Claimant disputes Sir Alan’s recollection of their introduction, about the funding of COMENA, and what was said about CMEC during their conversation, and suggests that Sir Alan had been “unfriendly” to him when they spoke on 4 January 2021. The Claimant infers “that this hostility must have arisen from reports of me which Ms Leslie gave to him, most likely via the memoranda which Ms Leslie sent Sir Alan on 3 January 2021, the day before our conversation”. The Claimant challenges as “somewhat inconceivable” Sir Alan’s evidence that he had only “skim-read” the Memos.

Ben Elliot

Mr Elliot did not respond to the July Letter sent by the Claimant’s solicitors. In his evidence, the Claimant stated that he was not surprised by Mr Elliot’s lack of response because he was aware that “CCHQ and members of the Party more generally simply do not want to be drawn into this dispute”. Mr Lawrence also tried to contact Mr Elliot, without success. In the absence of engagement from Mr Elliot, the parties have relied, principally, upon the available contemporaneous documents on the issue of serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation caused by publication of the Memos.

The Claimant has obtained various emails as a result of a data protection subject access request he made to the Conservative Party. The Claimant has generally relied upon some of these documents as demonstrating the harm he alleges has been caused to his reputation in the eyes of Mr Elliot.

The issue of what harm (if any) was caused by publication of the Memos is, in Mr Elliot’s case, complicated by the Claimant having sent him a copy of the Memo. The Claimant’s claim against the Defendants relates to the publication of Documents 12 and 13 to Mr Elliot on 4 January 2021. However, before that, on 2 January 2021, the Claimant had himself sent Document 14 to Mr Elliot, unheralded, by WhatsApp message at 15.01. At 15.03, the Claimant sent a further message to Mr Elliot:

“Happy New Year my friend. I know you said I shouldn’t disturb you before the 4th but this is out there. Not causing any damage but obviously a little awkward. Let me [know] if and when you want to chat about it; otherwise we now have 130 supporters [for COMENA], 100 needed and going very strong!!!”

The reference to “this is out there” is a reference to Document 14 sent in the preceding message (the document is set out in Annex 2).

Between 4-9 January 2021, the Claimant and Mr Elliot exchanged the following messages (with ellipses in the original text):

It is convenient to note here that, in addition to sending Document 14 to Mr Elliot, the Claimant also sent it to several other people, in many instances, accompanied by the MdR Letter (see [7] above). The distribution was as follows:

The Claimant also sent the MdR Letter to several other people: Baroness Morris, Mr Garnier MP, Sir Hugo Swire, Lord Astor, Mr Goodman, Mr Elliot, Mr Walloopillai, Ms Milling MP and the UAE Ambassador to the UK. By 12 January 2021, Sheikh Fawaz had seen the MdR letter which had “come into circulation” (see [58] above and [118] below).

The Claimant has explained his reason for distributing the MdR Letter was:

“… in order to make sure that my rebuttal of the allegations made in the [Memos] was provided to a select group of important individuals. It was important for me that I try to mitigate the damage caused to my reputation, and also that key stakeholders in COMENA were aware that I was taking steps to deal with Ms Leslie’s allegations head on and that I would settle the matter with, inter alia, an apology and a retraction. In particular, a number of these individuals (including the UAE Ambassador) had asked for a copy of [the MdR Letter]… By the time I shared the [MdR Letter], all of the known republications of the [Memos] had already taken place and I shared it with the recipients who had specifically informed me of their receipt of the [Memos] and/or awareness of their contents and (as I have set out…) those that I had a duty to inform.”

Sheikh Fawaz

In relation to Sheikh Fawaz, the Claimant’s case is that the Sheikh received Document 14 on 1 January 2021 and Document 16 on 2 January 2021. The First Defendant authorised Sheikh Fawaz to forward Document 14, and he did forward it, to four other Ambassadors to the UK: those of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. In her evidence, the First Defendant stated that Sheikh Fawaz asked to be permitted to forward the Memo because “he thought they needed to see it”. The Claimant alleges that, at a meeting on 11 May 2021, Sheikh Fawaz referred to having seen “several writings” from the First Defendant, which the Claimant infers was a reference to the Memos.

The Claimant also states he had spoken to a Kuwaiti statesman, His Excellency Abdullah Bishara, about his vision for COMENA. The Claimant states: “He confirmed to me that my ‘problem’ was Sheikh Fawaz as he was obstructing the progress of COMENA.”

Sheikh Fawaz has provided a witness statement to the Defendants. The material parts of his evidence are as follows:

“3.

The concerns that I had in relation to COMENA were set out in my letter to Ben Elliot of 12 January 2021 (exhibited… with his response). These related to the longstanding relationship between CMEC and the Arab Diplomatic Corps, the varied and conflicting accounts, raised my concerns and I requested that these concerns were addressed for the sake of Diplomatic confidence in the Party and its affiliated groups.

4.

A meeting between me and the Claimant took place in May 2021 which was organised through the Kuwaiti Ambassador. At the meeting, the Claimant spoke about his charities and his background.

5.

The Claimant opened the meeting by talking about his charitable activities and donations to Bahrain charities, which were not correct, and made me immediately suspicious of him from the outset. The Claimant said that he had accompanied HRH Prince Charles during a visit to Bahrain and that he (the Claimant) had made donations to charities during that visit. In fact, I was in Bahrain at that time, and I was accompanying HRH Prince Charles as I do on every visit by the Prince. I attended every meeting and never saw the Claimant during that visit. The Claimant was not part of the delegation and I have subsequently checked that fact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bahrain. Rupert Goodman was also present on that visit and he told me that the Claimant was not there. So I have been able to check with two sources the falsity of what the Claimant had said to me.

6.

The Claimant made that claim at the start of the meeting and so I was put on notice straight away that the Claimant’s claims were verifiably untrustworthy.

7.

I shared my account of this concerning episode with another ambassador. That other Ambassador told me that the Claimant had also made untrue claims about him about a different matter.

8.

I formed a view of the Claimant’s character as a result of my interaction with him at the time rather than anything in the memorandum.”

The letter to Mr Elliot (copied to Sir Nicholas Soames), dated 12 January 2021, to which Sheikh Fawaz referred, was in the following terms:

“I write as Ambassador of the Kingdom of Bahrain and on behalf of the Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrain and my colleagues and members of the Arab Diplomatic Corps in the UK to express my concern regarding reports that a party donor, Mohammed (sic) Amersi, is setting up an alternative Conservative Middle East Council by the name of ‘The Conservative Friends of the Middle East and North Africa’, called COMENA. As a member of the Arab diplomatic corps and the wider diplomatic community in London, I share the sentiment of many colleagues when I say that I have some concerns regarding the formation of such a group.

For over forty years, the Conservative Middle East Council (CMEC) has occupied a special place in politics between the Middle East and United Kingdom. CMEC has long performed an important role in facilitating dialogue between our respective regions, one built on forty years of trust and hard work. I also note that the Arab diplomatic corps are fully engaged with CMEC today and that the quality and significance of what CMEC does since their de-affiliation from the Conservative Party has not subsided in any way. In fact, I can speak on behalf of all my Arab League colleagues when I say that we have seen more and not less engagement with the Conservative Party since CMEC’s status changed as an affiliated group.

Thus, naturally the Arab diplomatic community in London have found it disturbing to see varied and conflicting accounts of the Conservative party’s backing of ‘COMENA’ and have found ourselves on the receiving end of a restricted and confidential legal letter, addressed to CMEC’s director, Charlotte Leslie, which has come into circulation.

I would be very grateful to you for some clarity on this matter, and I hope these concerns will be addressed for the sake of diplomatic confidence in the party and its affiliated groups, which are stronger and more important to us than ever.”

In his response, dated 14 January 2021, Mr Elliot wrote:

“Thank you very much for your letter dated 12 January.

The Party’s relationship with Bahrain and the Middle East is, as ever, crucially important to us, as is your own friendship and support. I myself have a personal love of your wonderful Country and visit each year as a guest of His Royal Highness the Crown Prince to the Grand Prix.

I am indeed aware of the creation of this new group and am very sorry it has caused some confusion. I am in touch with both groups (the Conservative Middle East Council and The Conservative Friends of the Middle East and North Africa) and will write again in due course to clarify any issues.”

In his fourth witness statement, the Claimant described the witness statement of Sheikh Fawaz as a “disingenuous and misleading version of events”, in other words that it is untrue, and encourages Sheikh Fawaz to “submit to cross-examination” on it. Specifically, the Claimant takes issue with three matters in Sheikh Fawaz’s statement.

CPR PD 32 §18.2 provides that: “A witness statement must indicate: (1) which of the statements in it are made from the witness’s own knowledge and which are matters of information or belief, and (2) the source for any matters of information or belief.” In his witness statement, the Claimant confirmed, only, that “where I have obtained information from other sources, such information is true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.” That ignored the requirement to indicate the source of information that is not within the deponent’s own knowledge. The failure by the Claimant to identify the source of the information (recounted in the paragraph quoted in [120(3)] above) beyond an unidentified “contact” is, I am satisfied, deliberate. That would have affected the weight I would have attached to the evidence, had it been material. As it has no relevance to the issues I have to decide, the point does not arise.

Sir Nicholas Soames

The Claimant does not complain, directly, of the publication of the Memos to Sir Nicholas. Nevertheless, it is part of the Claimant’s case he was sent a copy with the intention that it should be provided to Mr Elliot and the publication to Mr Elliot is one of those complained of by the Claimant.

Sir Nicholas has provided a witness statement to the Defendants. The material parts of his evidence are as follows:

“3.

My involvement in this matter began when the Claimant wrote to me asking for a meeting. I had never met the Claimant, and did not reply to him.

4.

Then, Ms Leslie called me by telephone just before the Christmas holidays in 2020. She told me that the Claimant was planning to set up a new organisation to rival the Second Defendant, a plan about which I had previously heard only as vague gossip.

5.

During that telephone conversation, Ms Leslie said that she had prepared a memorandum upon the subject and I asked her to let me see a copy of it. In the light of that conversation, I agreed with Ms Leslie that in his role as Co-Chairman of the Conservative Party, Mr Elliott (sic) needed to see the memorandum.

6.

Ms Leslie sent a copy of the memorandum to me by email and I sent it on to Ben Elliott. The letter under which I sent the memorandum was dated 4 January 2021. I thought that Mr Elliott should know about the contents of the memorandum and I only sent it to him because I felt that its whole purpose dictated that he should see it. I did not send it to anyone else.

7.

I recall speaking on the telephone to Mr Elliott on the day I sent the memorandum and him informing me that he knew what the problem was and that the Board of the Conservative Party also were already aware of the matter.

8.

I do not know what Mr Elliott did with the memorandum once he had received it from me.

9.

At the time, I became aware that the Claimant had been naming people who supported his intention to set up his new organisation, to be known as COMENA. Amongst those was Sir David Liddington (sic), another former Conservative Member of Parliament.

10.

I spoke to Sir David Liddington and told him that the Claimant was using his name and that of Theresa May as people who had accepted positions in COMENA, and Sir David told me that he had done no such thing. Sir David expressed displeasure that the Claimant was using his name.”

In his fourth witness statement, the Claimant states that Sir Nicholas Soames’ witness statement “appears to do little to contradict the serious harm to my reputation”. He deals with the following three matters:

General reputational harm caused by publication of the Memos

A large part of the Claimant’s case on serious harm to reputation has been devoted to general evidence of reputational harm which the Claimant alleges has been caused by publication of the Memos (see §§69-128 Amended Particulars of Claim and evidence in support).

The Claimant stated that he was first alerted to the existence and circulation of the Memos on 2 January 2021, after being contacted by Mohamed Mansour who had received a copy from “one of the MENA Ambassadors” (see also §86 Amended Particulars of Claim). The Claimant said that he was “shocked” by what he read. He does not, however, provide any evidence of what Mr Mansour thought about the document.

On 2 January 2021, Mark Garnier MP sent an email to Amanda Milling, Co-Chair of the Conservative Party, attaching Document 14:

“I did want to bring to your attention some negative reactions from CMEC. I have attached a copy of a note being circulated by Charlotte Leslie that has been passed to us at COMENA. As you can see it is libellous to COMENA and Mohamed, and has implications for the Conservative Party, and ministers too. Its unpleasant, as you can see, and inaccurate. This will be dealt with in the appropriate fashion, the intention being to stop this action by Charlotte in as sensible manner as possible…

I can’t see any reason why you need to be drawn into this, but I didn’t want you to be blindsided by it.”

Mr Garnier has not provided any evidence. He is not complained of as a publishee of any of the Memos. The Claimant also alleges that Mr Garnier provided a further copy of Document 14 by email on 4 January 2021 and that this was further circulated within the Conservative Party (see §§93-96 Amended Particulars of Claim).

The Claimant states that he contacted his solicitors, Mishcon de Reya, on 4 January 2021, because he “considered the memorandum to be very likely to cause serious damage to [his] reputation”. At that stage, the Claimant said that he did not know the full extent of the distribution of the Memos. If the Claimant was concerned about the potential damage to his reputation caused by publication of the Memos, and any onward publication of their contents, it is perhaps surprising that correspondence, like the July Letters, were not sent on the Claimant’s behalf much sooner, particularly in view of the fact that, in May 2021, he had received the 14 May Documents (see [13] above).

Beyond the publishees identified in the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant believes, as a result of his own inquiries, that copies of one or more of the Memos were also published to (1) Amanda Milling, then Co-Chair of the Conservative Party; (2) Gaj Wallooppillai, Chief of Staff to Mr Elliot and Ms Milling; (3) James Kerby at CCHQ; (4) Jascha Widecki at CCHQ; (5) Myles Stacey at CCHQ; (5) the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UK; (6) the Saudi Ambassador to the UK; (7) the (then) Egyptian Ambassador to the UK; (8) the Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates; (9) the (then) Jordanian Ambassador to the UK; (10) the Lebanese Ambassador to the UK; and (11) the Head of the Palestinian Mission to the UK. In his statement, the Claimant does not state when the relevant Memos were received by the identified individuals, from whom, or what (if any) impact the relevant publication had on the Claimant’s reputation.

A substantial part of the Claimant’s case on ‘percolation’/republication is alleged further dissemination of the Memos within the diplomatic community by Sheikh Fawaz. The Claimant relies upon the following:

The Lebanese Ambassador, who is not a publishee relied upon in the claim, sent an email, dated 11 July 2022 in response to the July Letter (“the Lebanese Ambassador’s Email”), indicating that he did not want to get involved “in what is a UK domestic matter nor in an internal Conservative party spat” and that his email should be considered his “last involvement in this matter”. His substantive response was:

“Throughout successive meetings of the Council of Arab Ambassadors, concerns were raised in connection with the suitability of Mr Amersi to lead the COMENA initiative. These concerns came in the context of a report prepared by CMEC questioning Mr Amersi’s background for COMENA leadership and highlighting questions about his motives and alleged proximity to some foreign actors. Subsequently, these concerns were further amplified when some Amersi-related reports started to appear in the press.

Notwithstanding concerns about Mr Amersi’s motives and connections, there was general agreement in the Council of Arab Ambassadors that we should not involve ourselves in an internal Conservative Party matter and that we should deal with any entity that the Party might wish to affiliate to and appoint as an interface with MENA States. In contrast, a few colleagues suggested that we should relay our concerns about Mr Amersi’s background to the party…”

More generally, on the issue of reputational harm, the Claimant stated that, after publication of the Memos, at meetings at some embassies (the Claimant has not given the details or dates), the relevant Ambassador would be accompanied by ‘political directors’ or the Claimant was subjected to a pre-meeting ‘interview’ where questions were asked about his activities in Russia and visits to Iran. The Claimant states:

“While these were conducted in a friendly manner, they were as a result of enquiries being made about me following the publication of the [Memos]. This was highly embarrassing. I had previously had the ability to meet Ambassadors one-on-one at short notice, and had never encountered any such pre-meeting before and I was taken unawares by these intrusive interviews”.

The Claimant also relies on alleged harm to his reputation in the eyes of the Kuwaiti Ambassador, which he attributes to the Memos. The Kuwaiti Ambassador is not one of the publishees relied upon in the claim, so this evidence is part of the generic case of reputational harm. A good friend of the Claimant, Safa Al Hashem, the first female member of the Kuwaiti parliament, spoke to the Kuwaiti Ambassador between 22 April 2021 and 1 June 2021. She said that he was “embarrassed” to be introduced to the Claimant as “he had a bad reputation and was not as clean as [he] seemed to be” and he was “apparently close to the Russian regime and an Iranian stooge”. Despite this, the Claimant’s evidence suggests that the Kuwaiti Ambassador had not reached a settled conclusion about him. In his statement, the Claimant added:

“… the Kuwaiti Ambassador, after hearing representations from some of the Arab Ambassadors who were voicing their support for COMENA, decided to approach Lord Astor in order for him to provide a balanced account of CMEC and COMENA and my suitability to lead COMENA. On 23 April 2021, Lord Astor confirmed in writing to the Kuwaiti Ambassador that ‘COMENA is therefore well placed to maximise the relationship between the MENA region and the UK government. COMENA’s ties to the Gulf countries via the senior leadership assembled within COMENA will be much strengthened, not weakened. COMENA has the full support of over 100 Conservative MPs’. Unfortunately Lord Astor’s letter did not yield any result as the [Memos] (and the intense lobbying of Sheikh Fawaz and Sir Nicholas Soames) had done significant damage already”.

The Claimant also relies upon the email traffic around the Conservative Party headquarters in early January 2021 (see [85]-[87] above and §§21, 96-98, 99-102 Amended Particulars of Claim) as demonstrating reputational harm caused by publication of the Memos. In his statement he said that these emails demonstrated:

“(1)

Very promptly after the [Memos] began circulating, fears began to mount about my credibility and background (matters which had been extensively referred to in the [Memos]). Further due diligence checks were undertaken and pre-existing due diligence updated. The outcome of these checks, eventually, was that there were no issues, but it is clear that for some time those concerns were very present.

(2)

The concerns raised by [the First Defendant] in the [Memos] – the ones which made her ‘uncomfortable about what [her] research had revealed’ and left her feeling ‘exposed because of what [she] had discovered about [me]’, the same revelations which she felt it necessary to relay to active members of the National Security service and senior members of the Party, were matters which had not been raised in repeated Governmental (sic) due diligence checks.”

(I assume that the reference to “Governmental” due diligence checks is a reference to the due diligence check carried out by the Conservative Party, not the Government.)

In a response to the July Letters, Ronel Lehmann, one of the Treasurers of the Conservative Party who had supported the efforts to set up COMENA, stated, in a letter dated 21 July 2022:

“Imagine my dismay in early January 2021 when I learned that Charlotte Leslie had issued memoranda that called into question Mr Amersi’s bona fides and suitability to lead. I was shocked and contacted Mr Amersi. To his credit, he furnished me with the details, including a reply from Mishcon de Reya.

I understood from the outreach team that this did major damage to his initiative. This was not the man that I had come to respect and admire. To the best of my knowledge, I have never met Ms Leslie. Although I am a member of many Party affiliated organisations and attend a multitude of Friends of groups, I have never been introduced or attended any Conservative Middle East Council events.

Sadly for me, given the memoranda, the lobbying by a Party stalwart and grandee and other former Parliamentarians associated with CMEC, the impact on Mr Amersi was negative and I had to respond to queries from the many associates that I had introduced to Mr Amersi. Unfortunately, given that it was a blue on blue spat the Party did not act as I was hoping or expecting to resolve the issue and was horrified that someone who had done so much for the Party was being trashed very publicly and left hanging out to dry.

Over the past year, it is well documented that I have tried to resolve the dispute, but unfortunately, my efforts have been severely rebuffed. I have always believed that your client has had his character unfairly besmirched and had no choice but to resort to legal action to vindicate his reputation.”

Mr Lehmann then gave an example of a post – Chairman of an Advisory Board – that he was hoping to offer to the Claimant, but which had not been possible and explained:

“[The Claimant] does not know that I have been forced to seek alternative arrangements due to the impact such an appointment would have on our business reputation. Likewise, his own initiative that would have been a major asset for the Party, our country and the MENA region is stalled because of the memoranda, the lobbying against it and the paralysis of the Party structures in resolving it.”

The Claimant states that, in May and June 2021, he had planned, with Lord Astor, to host three dinners at Hever Castle (see §113 Amended Particulars of Claim). It was intended that the guests should include “the Arab Ambassadors, various Foreign Office Diplomats, and other persons in British society who had links to the Gulf”. Invitations were ready to be sent out, but in May 2021, Lord Astor told the Claimant that the plans for the dinners would have to be halted given the contents of the Memos.

In June 2021, the Claimant attended a launch event of the Conservative Networking group (see §116 Amended Particulars of Claim). The Claimant states:

“I was directly asked about issues with the formation of COMENA and why it had not yet got off the ground. I did not want to go into the contents of the [Memos]. However, various questions were asked of me about my Russian and Iranian links.

At the same event, I was sitting on a table with a Parliamentarian who wishes to remain anonymous, who asked me questions about the contents of the [Memos]. I had to explain that I had been to Israel more times that I had to Iran and that far from their questions about links to the Kremlin, I had only visited Russia on three social occasions since 2008 (which was the year I stepped down from the MegaFon board).”

On 11 November 2022, the Defendants issued an Application Notice seeking to strike out the Claimant’s claim. The Strike Out Application was based on three principal grounds:

In submissions made on the Claimant’s behalf, there has been no real attempt to defend the original ‘composite’ plea of serious harm to reputation. The Claimant has maintained, in his evidence and submissions, that, by these defamation proceedings, he is pursuing vindication (see [49], [52] and [65] above). He denies any suggestion, implicit in the Defendants’ submissions, that this action is an abuse of process.

Amendments to Statements of Case

Permission to amend a Statement of Case can be granted by the Court pursuant to CPR 17.3. The key principles guiding the exercise of this power are:

As the merits test for granting amendments is the same as that for summary judgment, it is necessary to identify some of the key principles that apply in that area.

The, now familiar, principles governing summary judgment were summarised in Easyair Ltd -v- Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) [15] per Lewison J (and approved by the Court of Appeal in AC Ward & Sons Ltd -v- Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098). Drawing upon other relevant authorities the following can be stated:

Serious harm to reputation: s.1 Defamation Act 2013

So far as material, s.1 Defamation Act 2013 provides:

“A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.”

Whether the publication of the statement has caused or is likely to cause serious reputational harm is a matter of fact, “which can be established only by reference to the impact which the statement is shown actually to have had. It depends on a combination of the inherent tendency of the words and their actual impact on those to whom they were communicated”: Lachaux -v- Independent Print Ltd[2020] AC 612 [14] per Lord Sumption.

Even before the introduction of the new threshold requirement in s.1, assessment of harm to reputation was never just a ‘numbers game’: “one well-directed arrow [may] hit the bull’s eye of reputation” and cause more damage than indiscriminate firing: King -v- Grundon [2012] EWHC 2719 (QB) [40] per Sharp J. Publication to a relatively small number of publishees may yet cause very serious harm to reputation: Sobrinho-v- Impresa Publishing SA [2016] EMLR 12 [47]; Dhir -v- Sadler [2018] 4 WLR 1 [55(i)]; Monir -v- Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB)[196]. Whether such serious reputational harm has been caused is ultimately a matter of evidence.

It is well-recognised that a claimant may struggle to identify, or to produce evidence from, all those to whom an article was published and in whose eyes the claimant’s reputation was damaged: Doyle -v- Smith [2019] EMLR 15 [122(iv)]; Sobrinho [48]; Ames -v- Spamhaus [2015] 1 WLR 3409 [55]. In mass publication cases, it may also be invidious for a claimant to have to seek out those who substantially thought the less of him because of a defamatory publication and, often, it will not be necessary to do so (because ultimately the evidence is likely to go to damages not liability – see further [157] below). Whether a claimant can be expected to produce “tangible evidence” of serious harm to reputation caused by a publication will depend on the circumstances of publication: Ames [55]. In single publishee cases, however invidious the task may be, a claimant must satisfy the requirements of s.1 by evidence, or his/her claim will fail.

When considering the statutory serious harm requirement, it remains important not to lose sight of some of the fundamental aspects of the cause of action. At common law, each publication of a defamatory statement gives rise to a single cause of action. Beyond raising the bar for what is “defamatory”, s.1 does not alter this basic proposition. At the hearing on 10 January 2023, the Claimant did not challenge this. Since the hearing, the Court of Appeal has handed down judgment in Banks -v- Cadwalladr [2023] EWCA Civ 219, which has confirmed this orthodoxy. Warby LJ explained:

The Court of Appeal found that the correct interpretation was the latter: [46]. The case concerned whether the claimant could succeed with his claim for the continued publication of the statement complained of after the point at which the defendant’s public interest defence had been lost. However, Warby LJ’s judgment contains statements of principle that have wider application. He identified several reasons why there was no inconsistency in this approach, one of which was: “a claimant cannot succeed in establishing liability in respect of publications which do not cause serious harm, because there is some other publication that does, or because serious harm is caused by the ‘publication’ taken as a whole”: [47]. As to the Court’s task when evaluating whether a publication has caused serious harm to reputation, Warby LJ explained that the nature and extent of the publication will be relevant ([49]):

“I do not agree that this analysis requires proof that each individual publication caused serious reputational harm. There will doubtless be cases in which an individualised approach is both possible and necessary. That might be so, for instance, in a case of publication to a small number of identified individuals only one of whom turns out to have believed the allegation complained of. But the statutory words ‘its publication’ are flexible enough to embrace other kinds of case, including the typical case of media or online publication involving a mass of individual publications to numerous unknown individuals. There is no principled objection to the application in such a case of a modified version of the traditional pragmatic approach of the common law, which is to consider the relevant publications collectively when assessing reputational harm…”

This statement of the law – and at its heart the recognition that each publication is a separate cause of action – is consistent with several earlier first instance decisions on section 1; see e.g. Sube -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd [2018] 1 WLR 5767 [22]-[23], [34] per Warby J; Webb -v- Jones [2021] EWHC 1618 (QB) [13]-[28] per Griffiths J; Banks -v- Cadwalladr [2022] ELMR 21 [51] per Steyn J; Mahmudov -v- Sanzberro[2022] 4 WLR 29 [42] per Collins Rice J; Gooderson -v- Qureshi [2022] EWHC 2977 (KB) [68]-[70] per Heather Williams J; and (by parity of analysis on the issue of the impact of publication to a single individual in a malicious falsehood case) my observations in Peck -v- Williams Trade Supplies Limited [2020] EWHC 966 (QB) [16].

Of particular relevance and importance is Collins Rice J’s decision in Sivananthan -v- Vasikaran [2023] EMLR 7 in which the Judge explained:

Mr McCormick KC referred to Collins Rice J’s later decision in Soriano -v- Société d’exploitation de l’hebdominaire Le Point SA [2022] EWHC 1763 (QB) as supporting the role of an inferential case as to serious harm to reputation (see [8]-[9]). Soriano was a case of a newspaper. As the Judge noted, where there is a general readership of the publication complained of, as opposed to identified publishees, there is a greater scope for (and, in cases of extensive publication, probably an inevitability of) inferences being drawn as to reputational harm. She emphasised the need to avoid “a mini trial of the strength of the evidence” as to reputation harm, but noted that the “‘serious harm’ test is about establishing the facts of the impact of publication, by one evidential means or another” ([58]). I accept, as the Judge did, in that sort of case that it is a “multifactorial and evaluative” exercise ([68]), that it can properly include the “percolation effect” and that it will be relatively rare for there to be a “paper trail” demonstrating the link between the publication and the reputational harm caused by it ([75]).

However, some care needs to be taken with the ‘percolation’ effect caused by republication of the statement. To take a simple example. A publishes a defamatory statement to B and thereafter, B publishes or communicates the defamatory statement (or its substance) to C. A claimant in a defamation claim can rely upon republication of a defamatory statement to C in two distinct ways.

Even before the enactment of the serious harm requirement in the Defamation Act 2013, the choice of how the action was framed had potentially important consequences where a claimant sought to rely upon republication of a defamatory statement. In a Slipper case, the cause of action is the publication of the defamatory statement to B. McManus -v- Beckham [2002] 1 WLR 2982, is a good example. The claimants relied upon an alleged slander that was republished in subsequent national newspaper articles. In a slander case, a claimant would need to establish all the necessary ingredients of that cause of action: publication of words that referred to the claimant which bore a meaning that was defamatory of him/her. The action could fail for several reasons, for example, if the words spoken by the defendant were found not to bear a meaning that was defamatory of the claimant at common law. If the action failed, any subsequent republication of the slander in a newspaper which did bear a meaning defamatory of the claimant would not assist. The cause of action having failed, no issue of damages would arise. The same result would follow if A established a defence for the publication to B (e.g. qualified privilege) even if such a defence would not have been available for the publication to C.

If the claimant seeks to hold A liable, as tortfeasor, for the republication to C, then s/he must establish all the necessary ingredients of that cause of action and A would be able to rely on all defences available for that publication.

The introduction of the serious harm requirement in s.1 Defamation Act 2013 also has potentially important consequences for how a claimant seeks to treat republication. Again, using the example of the publication by A to B and the onward republication to C. If the claimant sues A over the publication to B (and relies on the republication to C as Slipper damage), then s/he must establish that the publication to B has caused serious harm to his/her reputation (or is likely to do so). If the claimant fails to show that the publication to B caused serious harm to his/her reputation (for example because B did not believe the allegation, perhaps because s/he knew or believed it to be false) then the cause of action will fail. It would be irrelevant to show that C believed the allegation, possibly acting to the claimant’s detriment in consequence, because this would be relevant only to the assessment of damages in the claim for publication to B. If the publication to B did cause serious harm to the claimant’s reputation, then (assuming the claim succeeds) s/he would potentially be able to recover in relation to the republication to C.

If, alternatively, the claimant seeks to hold A liable, as tortfeasor, for the republication to C, s/he must prove that the publication to C meets the s.1 threshold. Again, if C did not believe the allegation – occasioning therefore no reputational harm – the claim would fail. It is irrelevant, in a claim over publication to C, that B believed the allegation and serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation was caused in his/her eyes.

Finally, on the issue of republication, it is necessary also not to lose sight of the basic rules of causation, a point that Collins Rice J noted in Sivananthan. There is a clear, and principled basis, on which the Court can, in an appropriate case, infer a degree of “percolation” caused by the repetition of defamatory allegations in cases involving widespread publication (e.g. a national newspaper article). That principle is well-recognised: Slipper 300C per Bingham LJ; and Cairns -v- Modi[2013] 1 WLR 1015 [26]-[27] per Lord Judge CJ. But that is in the context of Slipper damages. Whilst there is an obvious overlap between the issues of serious harm to reputation and damages, s.1 is a threshold issue: Riley -v- Murray [2022] EMLR 8 [43] (and on appeal [2023] EMLR 3 [15]). A claimant suing on a seriously defamatory article published in a national newspaper article may well be able to satisfy the s.1 requirement by a wholly inferential case: see Lachaux [21] per Lord Sumption. In such a case, it is unlikely that the claimant would need to rely on the ‘percolation’ effect to surmount the s.1 threshold, although this inferred republication can legitimately be taken into account at any assessment of damages.

But where a claimant complains of publication of a defamatory statement to either a single publishee or a limited number of publishees, the scope for reliance on inference is likely to be very much reduced, both in relation to the direct harm caused to the claimant’s reputation in the eyes of the immediate publishee(s) and any ‘percolation’ effect. The impact of Lachaux is that such reputational harm must be proved. Where the publishees can be identified, that means that an absence of evidence of the actual impact on the individual publishees may mean that a claimant cannot discharge the evidential burden placed on him/her by s.1. Drawing inferences is not a process of optimistic guesswork; it is a process whereby the court concludes that the evidence adduced enables a further inference of fact to be drawn.

Likewise, any reputational harm caused by ‘percolation’, similarly, must be proved, and proved to have been caused by the original publication sued upon. If, for example, the court were to accept a publishee’s evidence that s/he did not pass on the defamatory statement (or its gist), there is simply no ‘percolation’ effect because there has been no republication. If the publishee says that s/he sent the defamatory publication to one other identified person, it would be a relevant issue whether the claimant’s reputation had been seriously harmed in the eyes of this person. I am deliberately keeping the examples simple to demonstrate the relevant principles. Much will depend upon the nature and extent of the original publication and the nature and extent of any republication that is alleged to have been caused by it.

Without the benefit of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Banks -v- Cadwalladr,Mr McCormick KC argued that the Claimant was entitled to rely on “the cumulative reputational harm caused by the publication of the same or substantially the same allegations across [the Memos]”. He submitted that this was “in line with the common law and established practice” and was not ruled out by s.1 or the approach adopted in the authorities identified in [149] above. The Claimant accepts that publication takes place on each occasion on which the words complained of are published. Consequently, Mr McCormick KC recognises that, strictly, the publication of each copy of a newspaper, containing a defamatory article, creates thousands of causes of action. Nevertheless, he contends that “the law recognises the reality that… for the purposes of assessing the impact upon the claimant’s reputation, one takes account of all the technically separate publications and aggregates their impact”. Mr McCormick could provide no authority for this proposition. Even before the Court of Appeal’s decision in Banks -v- Cadwalladr, for the reasons I have outlined above, I would have been satisfied that it was wrong.

The fact that, in mass publication cases, the Court pays little attention to the individual causes of action is because it is rarely (if ever) necessary or relevant to do so. This is simply a recognition of the realities of defamation litigation. If the published statement has remained unaltered (i.e. there has been no change to the article as first published), then the objective single meaning remains the same across all causes of action. This, in turn, calibrates the availability of substantive defences of truth/honest opinion across the board. With the advent of s.8 Defamation Act 2013, for the purposes of limitation, it is only the date of first publication that is relevant. A newspaper defendant might be able to demonstrate, by evidence, that some of the publishees, for example, did not understand the words complained of to bear the objective single meaning that the law ascribes to a publication, or did not understand the words to refer to the claimant, or did not believe what was alleged against him/her. That evidence may be relevant (potentially) to s.1 and/or damages. But it rarely benefits a defendant to explore such matters because they will never be a ‘knock-out’ blow, and could only ever (potentially) reduce the damages in the event that no substantive defence succeeds or is available. Further, the costs of obtaining such evidence would usually be so wholly disproportionate to the likely impact that it might have on any award of damages that, even if the Court did not exclude such evidence on case management grounds, most commercially sensitive publishers would be unlikely to want to expend resources obtaining it.

Publication to a limited number of identified individuals is wholly different. In such cases, focus upon the particular circumstances of each publication is not only possible, in most cases it will be necessary for several important reasons, not least investigation of serious harm to reputation under s.1 and, potentially, the availability of defences. Take an example of a letter that has been published to 10 people. Of those, the publication to half of them might successfully be defended on the grounds of privilege. In consequence, the defamation claims based on publication to those individuals would be dismissed (quite apart from whether the s.1 threshold could be met in respect of any of those publications). Even if the claimant could prove ‘percolation’ of the defamatory allegations, if that republication was a result of a privileged publication, s/he cannot rely upon this reputational harm for the non-privileged publications because such harm has not been caused by those publications. A claimant cannot, as a matter of basic principle, “aggregate” the reputational harm either for damages or s.1. Ultimately a claimant must satisfy s.1 by evidence. Absent some very unusual features, a purely inferential case of such reputational harm in single publishee cases is highly unlikely to discharge this burden, whether at the summary judgment or trial stage, particularly if there is direct evidence available from the relevant publishee.

It was faintly argued by Mr McCormick KC in his skeleton argument that this point should be left to a trial. I disagree. The point about whether it is permissible to ‘aggregate’ reputational harm across multiple publications is a pure matter of law. It can, and should, be resolved now. For the reasons I have given, the argument is wrong and must be rejected. The point has been decided by the Court of Appeal in Banks -v- Cadwalladr. The proper course, in this case, is for the Court to assess, publication by publication, whether the Claimant has a real prospect of showing that it has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to his reputation. As each of these is a single publishee case, the question in each case is whether the Claimant has a real prospect of demonstrating serious harm to reputation in relation to this publishee.

As I have rejected the ‘composite’ case of serious harm to reputation, I can turn to consider the submissions of the parties in relation to the Claimant’s case on serious harm to reputation caused by the publication of each Memo to the named publishees. Although not strictly relevant to the issues I must resolve, I simply note that in respect of the Unidentified Publishees, the evidence presented by the Defendants (see [54] above) provides no support that any serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation has been caused (or is likely to be caused) by further publication of the Memos to the Unidentified Publishees.

The Claimant’s overarching submission is that he has pleaded the best case he can as to the serious harm to reputation that he alleges has been caused by publication of the Memos. He says that the proper place for the Court to carry out what is an assessment of evidence is at trial. In summary, he has a pleaded case as to serious harm to reputation with a real prospect of success and he should be granted permission to amend his Particulars of Claim.

Sir David Lidington

The Claimant recognises that Sir David has refused to become involved in the proceedings and there is no indication that his position is likely to change. He has refused to provide a witness statement. The Claimant’s case that, nevertheless, he has a case with a real prospect of success rests, principally, on two pieces of evidence.

The Defendants argue that Sir David saw the Memo he was sent as being part of a “nasty spat” between two Conservatives (see 9 January 2021 email). The broader issue identified by the Defendants is a contention that the Claimant, here, as with other publishees, fails to distinguish between concern about political matters (i.e. a damaging row between two prominent Conservatives) and evidence of actual harm to the Claimant’s reputation caused by the allegations in the Memo. Sir David confirmed to the Defendants’ solicitors that, in relation to any reputational harm to the Claimant in his eyes, he could not now distinguish between the effects of the Memo and the effects of later media coverage (see [90] above). Finally, in his most recent proposed amendments (§106A Amended Particulars of Claim), the Claimant now contends only that publication of the Memos to Sir David only “contributed” to what is alleged to be Sir David’s decision to suspend acceptance of donations from the Claimant.

Sir Julian Lewis

Sir Julian was the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee. The Claimant contends that he “considered the allegations contained in the documents sent to him to be of sufficient importance and seriousness that… he sent them on to the United Kingdom’s security services…” This, the Claimant submits, is “good evidence not only of the damage to [his] reputation in his eyes, but also of how the seriousness of the allegations made in the documents would be perceived by others”.

In response to the evidence submitted by the Defendants, the Claimant complains that Sir Julian’s witness statement is unsigned and of “uncertain admissibility at trial”. As to Sir Julian’s evidence, that he did not remember forming any view about the Claimant upon receipt of the Memo, the Claimant suggests that “this is not evidence that he did not form any view, let alone that he did not form any adverse view”.

The Defendants contend that, as he states in his approved witness statement, Sir Julian felt under a duty to pass on the Memo to the security services. Even if the inferential case (advanced in §28A Amended Particulars of Claim) were to be accepted, the Claimant has simply failed to provide any evidence in support of his case that the publication of the Memo to Sir Julian caused serious harm to his reputation.

Crispin Blunt

Understandably, the Claimant places much weight on the email exchanges between Mr Blunt and the First Defendant on 30/31 December 2020 (see paragraphs 5 and 6 of Mr Blunt’s witness statement – [102] above), in particular the description of the Claimant as being a “total bounder” and a “Melmotte figure” (see §41.1 to 41.4 Amended Particulars of Claim). It is submitted on the Claimant’s behalf that this is “as good contemporaneous evidence as there could be of the damage caused to [the Claimant] in Mr Blunt’s eyes”.

Mr Price KC for the Defendants submitted, however, that the seven defamatory imputations that the Claimant complains were published to Mr Blunt are all “borderline defamatory”. Four relate to using money for political advantage (three in relation to honours). None of the imputations relates to the Claimant’s business history. It is suggested that there is no basis to interpret Mr Blunt’s “flippant references” to “bounder” and “Melmotte” as reflecting any belief that the Claimant had been guilty of any improper business practices. Mr Blunt’s awareness of the Claimant and his promotion of COMENA pre-existed receipt of the Memo and his hostility was largely based on his perception that COMENA was seeking to supplant CMEC and to promote the Abraham Accords in place of Palestinian statehood. The allegation of the Claimant seeking an honour as a reward for his political donations may, on Mr Blunt’s evidence, already have been communicated to him by Sir Hugo Swire.

Sir Alan Duncan

In support of his amendments advancing a claim that the publication of Documents 10 and 11 to Sir Alan Duncan has caused him serious reputational harm, the Claimant submitted that Sir Alan was “unfriendly” towards him in a telephone call the day after receiving the Memos. Based on this, the Claimant contended that:

“… the reasons for that unfriendliness and the extent to which it was based on the allegations published to Sir Alan… is the subject of … disputed evidence. This is not an issue which can be resolved against [the Claimant] without a trial.”

The Defendants submit that it is plain from the evidence that any antipathy shown by Sir Alan to the Claimant pre-dated receipt of the Memos. The two men had spoken on or before 24 December 2020. The Defendants contend that, on the basis of Sir Alan’s witness statement, the Claimant has no real prospect of demonstrating serious harm to his reputation. The inferential case that he has advanced is bound to fail.

Ben Elliot

Mr Elliot has completely refused to engage with either side. As such, both sides have based their submissions on the available contemporary evidence.

The Claimant relies upon the fact that in his covering email, sending Documents 12 and 13 to Mr Elliot, Sir Nicholas Soames referred to a “potentially worrying situation” and that the issues raised in the Memos were “serious enough to warrant urgent attention at the highest levels of the party organisation.” The Claimant’s broad case is that, prior to receipt of the Memos, Mr Elliot had been supportive of COMENA and that in the Summer of 2020, the Claimant had been given the ‘all-clear’ as a donor (see §§84-85 Amended Particulars of Claim). Yet, following the Memos, steps were being taken to investigate the Claimant (see [109] above). The Claimant recognises that the absence of evidence from Mr Elliot means that his case of serious reputational harm is based entirely on inference but hopes “that it will not always be so”.

The Claimant has also acknowledged that the extent to which the publication of Documents 12 and 13 to Mr Elliot on 4 January 2021 has harmed his reputation has been complicated by his decision to send Document 14 to Mr Elliot on 2 January 2021.

The Defendants have argued that the reaction of Sir Nicholas Soames to the Memo is not evidence of what Mr Elliot thought of it. They submit that, looked at as a whole, the evidence provides no support for the Claimant’s case that the publication of the Memo to Mr Elliot had caused serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation. On the contrary, the Defendants contend that Mr Elliot appears to have been unconcerned about the contents of the Memo but much more concerned about a potentially damaging public spat between the Claimant and the First Defendant.

Sheikh Fawaz

The Claimant contends that he has a claim as to serious harm to his reputation with a real prospect of success arising from (a) the fact that he sought permission to forward Document 14 to four other Ambassadors; (b) his letter to Mr Elliot of 12 January 2021, in which he suggested that the “Arab diplomatic community” had found it “disturbing to see varied and conflicting accounts of the Conservative party’s backing of ‘COMENA’”. As to Sheikh Fawaz’s witness statement, the Claimant submitted:

“Sheikh Fawaz says in his witness statement that he ‘formed the view of the Claimant’s character as a result of my interaction with him at the time rather than anything in the [Memo]’… However ‘at the time’ in that sentence appears to refer to a meeting said to have taken place in May 2021 and Sheikh Fawaz’s (disputed) account of that meeting. He does not give any evidence about the impact of the [Memos] on him at the time of the publication, in January 2021 which substantially undermines the inference invited in the Amended Particulars of Claim. Again this would be a matter to be explored in evidence with him at trial.”

The Defendants place substantial reliance on Sheikh Fawaz’s witness statement as demonstrating that the publication of the Memos did not cause any harm to the Claimant’s reputation, still less serious harm. Further, the fact that Sheikh Fawaz sought permission to forward Document 14 to four other Ambassadors, the Defendants argued, does not demonstrate that the Claimant’s reputation had been harmed in Sheikh Fawaz’s eyes. As is clear from the Sheikh’s letter to Mr Elliot, the issue that was of apparent concern to Sheikh Fawaz was the potential for the establishment of COMENA to undermine CMEC. Sheikh Fawaz was anxious to establish whether the formation of COMENA had the backing of the Conservative Party in light of the “conflicting accounts” that he had received. The Defendants argue that there is nothing to suggest that the document was forwarded by Sheikh Fawaz because of reputational concerns about the Claimant. The fact that the document was forwarded, and any contention this republication has caused further harm to the Claimant’s reputation is, the Defendants submit, irrelevant to the issue of whether the publication of the Memos to Sheikh Fawaz caused serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation in his eyes.

General reputational harm caused by (re)publication of the Memos

Fundamental to the Claimant’s submissions on serious harm to reputation was his contention that he was entitled to rely upon the “aggregation” of evidence of harm to reputation caused by any publication of the Memos. As I have rejected that submission ([163] above), it is not necessary to set out the Claimant’s submissions on this evidence (which is set out in Section E(2)(h): [125]-[136] above). My conclusions on this evidence are set out in Section I(7) of this judgment ([220]-[232] below).

I shall deal with each of the identified publishees and consider whether the amendments for which the Claimant seeks permission demonstrate a case in relation to serious harm to reputation that, applying the principles I have set out, has a real prospect of success. Whist material disputes of fact cannot be resolved otherwise than at trial, and faithful to the principle that I must not conduct a mini-trial, at this stage, I am nevertheless entitled (and bound) to assess the evidence (even if it is voluminous) to see whether it satisfies this merits test.

Before turning to the case in respect of the individual publishees, I should set out some general observations as to the approach of the Claimant. The Claimant has provided no direct evidence from any of the identified publishees capable of demonstrating that publication of the relevant Memo(s) to him/her has caused (or is likely to cause) serious harm to his reputation. On one level, that is a surprising (and potentially risky) approach for any claimant to adopt in defamation proceedings. It was seriously suggested, on the Claimant’s behalf, that the parties (and the Court) might have to wait until trial to hear from the relevant publishees. If the relevant witness refused to assist the Claimant by providing a witness statement, it was envisaged that the individual would be compelled by the Claimant to attend the trial by service of a witness summons (assuming the relevant witness could be compelled) and then asked questions as whether the Claimant’s reputation was seriously harmed in his eyes. Alternatively, if the relevant publishee was a witness called by the Defendants, the Claimant would attempt to cross-examine the relevant publishee to seek evidence of serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation caused by the relevant publication(s).

This might be thought to be the paradigm example of waiting to see whether something turns up at trial. It is not how modern defamation litigation is conducted. Unless the Court can be satisfied, by evidence, that there is a real prospect that the Claimant will be able to produce evidence in support of his claim of serious harm to reputation – whether by documents or witness evidence – then the Court is likely to dismiss the claim summarily at an earlier interim stage. It will do so, applying the well-established principles of summary judgment, and in furtherance of the overriding objective, to avoid the potentially massive waste of the resources of the Court and the parties by speculatively taking the matter to trial to find out whether the relevant publication has caused serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation.

Sir David Lidington

The high point of the Claimant’s case as to serious harm to his reputation caused by publication of the Memo to Sir David is what he says in his email of 9 January 2021 (see [85] above). However, this does not demonstrate that the allegations in the Memo caused harm to the Claimant’s reputation in Sir David’s eyes. His abiding concern appeared to be the potential for the dispute between the Claimant and the First Defendant to cause harm to the Conservative Party. Of particular importance is Sir David’s use of the words “if true” in the email. This shows that he was treating the contents of the Memo as representing allegations that had yet to be substantiated. Indeed, in his email of 10 January 2021, he referred to them as “questions that [the First Defendant] is posing” (see [87] above). As at 9 January 2021, Sir David was also aware that the Claimant was threatening legal action against the First Defendant, even if it was not until 21 January 2021 that he was sent a copy of the MdR Letter which contained the Claimant’s rebuttal of the allegations (see [112(3)] above). I accept that a publication that casts suspicion of wrongdoing on a person may still be found to be defamatory (at Chase level 2 or 3), but Sir David’s evidence already demonstrates that he did not understand the Memos to bear the meanings that the Claimant has ascribed to them (which are, bar one, all Chase level 1 allegations of guilt).

Paragraph 105 of the Amended Particulars of Claim contains a bald assertion of what Sir David understood the Memos to mean, which is unsupported by any evidence from the Claimant and is positively undermined by Sir David’s own evidence. Paragraph 108 seeks to rely upon the “appetite of Parliamentarians… for gossip” as providing a base on which to infer that there has been further dissemination of the contents of the Memos by Sir David. Against this optimistic inferential case, the Defendants have provided actual evidence. Sir David did not circulate the Memos to anyone else. In consequence, the Claimant has no real prospect of showing any ‘percolation’/republication as a result of the publication of the Memo to Sir David.

The evidence regarding RUSI’s refusal to accept a donation from the Claimant, on analysis, also does not demonstrate a case of serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation caused by publication of the Memos with a real prospect of success. The Claimant’s pleaded case – for which he seeks permission to amend – is set out in Paragraphs 106-106A of the Amended Particulars of Claim. Paragraph 106 contends that, immediately following publication of the Memos, Sir David informed the Claimant that he no longer wanted the Claimant to contribute financially to RUSI given “the Claimant’s alleged Russian links”. It is to be noted that only Document 4 contained any suggestion of any “Russian Links” (see [29(13)]). That case is, at least, clear, but it has been undermined by what is now alleged by the Claimant in Paragraph 106A. Although Sir David, on the Claimant’s case, appears to have vacillated about whether RUSI should accept a donation, at least initially, in early July 2021, Sir David is alleged to have endorsed receipt by RUSI of funds donated by the Claimant. That is inconsistent with the Claimant’s case that publication of the Memos had caused serious harm to his reputation in Sir David’s eyes.

There are also significant causation problems with the Claimant’s inferential case in relation to RUSI. Following receipt of the Memos, Sir David had found and noted earlier publicity concerning the Claimant. In his email of 10 January 2021 (see [87] above), Sir David expressly referred to “press articles” as one of the likely sources of the First Defendant’s information about the Claimant. There is direct evidence from Dr von Hippel which contradicts the inferential case advanced by the Claimant, on the basis of an unidentified “member of the RUSI fundraising team”, that Sir David had an effective “veto” over acceptance of donations by RUSI. Finally, the Claimant himself sent RUSI a copy of the First FT Article and, on the basis of the evidence from the unidentified member of the fundraising team, the decision to refuse the donation in August 2021 may also have been influenced by the ST Article (see [98] above).

As now seems to be acknowledged in Paragraph 106A of the Amended Particulars of Claim, the Claimant’s case that the issues with donations to RUSI demonstrate reputational harm caused by publication of the Memos to Sir David is weak. Following receipt of the Memos, Sir David continued to engage with the Claimant regarding his proposed donations to RUSI and, in July 2021 (i.e. some 6 months after publication of the Memos to him), he had initially agreed that RUSI would accept a donation from the Claimant only. Leaving to one side Dr von Hippel’s evidence, these facts alone undermine the Claimant’s case that the publication of the Memos had caused any harm to his reputation. I accept that it is the Claimant’s case that Sir David changed his position about whether any donations from the Claimant should be accepted, but this whole issue is further complicated by the Claimant sending RUSI a copy of the First FT Article and the subsequent publication of the ST Article. These matters only serve to emphasise how, without evidence from Sir David, the Claimant’s case that publication of the Memos caused serious harm to his reputation lacks any real prospect of success.

In my judgment, there is nothing in Sir David’s evidence that can support a case that the Claimant’s reputation had been seriously harmed by publication of the Memos to him. The inferential case based on the seriousness of the pleaded imputations breaks down once the evidence demonstrates that the publishee did not understand the words to bear these meanings. Significant aspects of the Claimant’s inferential case of serious harm to reputation in Sir David’s eyes, arising from RUSI’s decision to refuse donations from him are contradicted by direct evidence from Dr von Hippel. Against that, little weight can be attached to the hearsay evidence from an unidentified member of the fundraising team. Finally, in the most recently advanced amendment (§106A Amended Particulars of Claim), the Claimant’s case as to the reputational harm caused by publication of the Memos to Sir David, has been significantly downgraded to an allegation only that the Memos “contributed” to the decision by RUSI to refuse the donation.

The case of serious harm to reputation caused by publication of the Memos to Sir David will be as evidentially hopeless at trial as it is now. There can be no real prospect of the position improving before trial and there is no material dispute of fact that would require to be resolved at trial. It has not been suggested by the Claimant that there is any real possibility of something turning up in disclosure. Sir David has refused to get involved and so the prospect that he will provide a witness statement for the Claimant must be somewhere between remote and nil. Even if the Claimant were, by use of a witness summons, to compel Sir David’s attendance at the trial of this claim to answer questions as to the impact that the publication of the Memos had on the reputation of the Claimant, Sir David has already made clear that he cannot now differentiate between harm caused by the Memos and subsequent press coverage of the Claimant. Had the Claimant approached Sir David for a witness statement when he received the 14 May Documents, that problem might have been overcome. This is perhaps one of the pitfalls of adopting what I have found to be a tactical approach to the conduct of these defamation proceedings adopted by the Claimant.

Overall, the Claimant’s case that his reputation has been seriously harmed (or is likely to be) as a result of publication of the Memos to Sir David Lidington is fanciful and devoid of reality. The Claimant’s case of serious harm to his reputation is not based on any properly premised inference. It is speculative and optimistic guesswork. Applying the merits test, the time has come to bring an end to this part of the Claimant’s claim. Allowing it to continue would not serve the overriding objective. Permission to amend is refused for the case of serious harm to reputation alleged to have been caused by Publications 3 and 4 to Sir David Lidington.

Sir Julian Lewis

Whilst it might have been better if Sir Julian had signed his witness statement, the Claimant has not suggested that the approved draft witness statement that has been provided does not represent Sir Julian’s evidence. I do not understand the Claimant’s challenge to the admissibility of this evidence at trial, and the point was not explored in submissions. As it stands, Sir Julian’s evidence is admissible hearsay. If, ultimately, Sir Julian did not give evidence at trial, unless a successful application were made to exclude the hearsay evidence on other grounds, the Claimant’s points would go only to the weight to be attached to this evidence.

Sir Julian did not know the Claimant before he received the Memo. He had spoken to the First Defendant before receiving the Memo and it was at her request that the Memo was sent by Sir Julian to the security services because he considered that it was his duty “simply to pass on the information to the appropriate body”. Critically, in that context, Sir Julian’s evidence is that it was not necessary for him to form a view about the Claimant – someone he did not know – and Sir Julian did not recall doing so. He did not distribute the Memo further or discuss their contents. Although the Claimant has highlighted that Sir Julian has not, in terms, stated, in his approved statement, that he did not form a view of the Claimant having read the Memo (still less anadverse view), the Claimant has not challenged the substance of Sir Julian’s evidence.

Against that evidence, the Claimant’s inferential case that Sir Julian’s act of passing of the Memo to the security services demonstrates serious harm to his reputation (Paragraphs 28A and 104A Amended Particulars of Claim) is hopeless and devoid of reality. It is not saved by the speculative and optimistic pleading of serious harm to reputation in Paragraphs 105 and 108 in the Amended Particulars of Claim (and my reasons for rejecting this evidence in relation to the publication to Sir David Lidington apply equally to this publication – see [186] above).

Again, applying the merits test, in respect of the publication to Sir Julian Lewis the Claimant has no real prospect of demonstrating that it caused serious harm to his reputation. There is no material dispute of fact that would require to be resolved at trial and the Claimant has not suggested that any evidence is likely to emerge on disclosure that might change this assessment. Allowing the claim to continue, on the speculative basis that some evidence of reputational harm might turn up at the trial, would not serve the overriding objective. Permission to amend is refused in respect of the publication to Sir Julian Lewis.

Crispin Blunt

Looked at in isolation, and superficially, the evidence from Mr Blunt’s emails may appear to provide evidence of some harm being caused to the Claimant’s reputation as a result of his reading the Memo. However, the Claimant must show that he has a real prospect of demonstrating serious harm to his reputation caused by the publication of the statement. The defamatory meanings said to be conveyed by this publication are more limited – and arguably less serious – than other publications. Meanings (1) to (6) concern allegations which I would describe as being internal Conservative Party matters, touching upon the Claimant’s role in setting up COMENA (and what he hoped to gain from it) and potential conflict with CMEC. Meaning (7) is the only imputation that has a reach beyond the Conservative Party.

As I have already indicated, I shall proceed on the assumption that all seven imputations are borne by the publication and that they are defamatory of the Claimant at common law. However, in my judgment, and judged objectively, these allegations are not the most serious. They do not allege any sort of criminal or seriously antisocial behaviour. Nor does the Claimant contend that they suggest that he was guilty of any sort of corruption. At best, the Claimant can contend that the imputations are capable of reflecting adversely on his honesty and integrity. It is on this point that evidence of actual impact on the publishee is perhaps most important. Mr Blunt may have been particularly sensitive to allegations concerning the integrity of the Claimant in his dealings with the Conservative Party and its groups. But it remains for the Claimant to demonstrate that it was the publication of the Memo that has caused serious harm to his reputation. In other words, he must show that it was the nature of the allegations that caused the reputational harm, not unconnected concerns or considerations. In my judgment, he has not done so.

The important evidence is Mr Blunt’s witness statement. He has explained, in detail, what he thought of the Claimant. He was opposed to the affiliation of COMENA to the Conservative Party and he had reservations as to the sources of the Claimant’s money (not a meaning complained of by the Claimant). He also thought that the Claimant was seeking to obtain an honour in reward for his political donations to the Conservative Party. Importantly, however, Mr Blunt thought that this reflected on the Claimant’s motives rather than his integrity. Perhaps most importantly, the clear tenor of Mr Blunt’s evidence is that the Memo did not cause serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation in his eyes. He points to the subsequent media coverage as having more significant impact.

Mr Blunt’s evidence that he did not further circulate the Memo or discuss its contents has not been challenged by the Claimant. Again, this direct evidence disposes of the inferential case of further onward publication of the Memo and any suggestion that this further ‘percolation’ has caused the Claimant serious reputational harm.

Stepping back, this is another instance where the Claimant has not provided evidence that discloses a real prospect of establishing that publication of the Memo has caused him serious reputational harm. The inferential case has been undermined by positive evidence provided by the Defendants demonstrating a lack of serious reputational harm. It was not suggested on the Claimant’s behalf that there were grounds upon which to challenge Mr Blunt’s evidence. Tellingly, in his evidence, the Claimant appeared to accept that Mr Blunt’s evidence tended to show that he had not been “personally affected” by the Memo. Insofar as the Claimant sought to challenge aspects of Mr Blunt’s witness statement (see [105] above), this could only be relevant if the Claimant were making some attack on Mr Blunt’s credibility, but he has not seriously done so. There are no material disputes of fact that require resolution and the Claimant cannot suggest (and has not suggested) that there is any real prospect of further evidence becoming available before trial. That leaves the Claimant’s prospects of success dependent on the cross-examination of Mr Blunt at trial providing evidence of serious reputational harm. Set against Mr Blunt’s witness statement, that prospect is simply fanciful. Permission to amend in respect of the publication to Mr Blunt will be refused.

Sir Alan Duncan

The amendments for which the Claimant seeks permission follow the same pattern as for the previous three publishees. The only direct evidence of serious harm relied upon in respect of Sir Alan Duncan is the alleged “unfriendliness” in the telephone call between him and the Claimant on 4 January 2021 (see §45 Amended Particulars of Claim). In addition, the Claimant again relies upon the inferential case as to serious harm to reputation (§105) and Parliamentarians’ appetite for gossip as a basis for an inferential case as to further publication/percolation (§108).

Against that, the evidence demonstrates that any antipathy shown by Sir Alan towards the Claimant in the telephone call on 4 January 2021 pre-dated his receipt of the Memos. The Claimant had contacted Sir Alan “out of the blue”, just before Christmas 2020, to tell him about COMENA. Sir Alan’s evidence was that he was unimpressed by the proposals, describing them as “ill-conceived and unacceptable”. He thought that the Claimant was “trying to destroy CMEC”. Sir Alan also thought that it was inappropriate for the Claimant, a donor, to lead COMENA. By the time he had “skim-read” the Memos in advance of his further call with the Claimant on 4 January 2021, he had already formed a negative view of him. Sir Alan says that this negative view was not created by the Memos, but “because [he] did not believe that a donor should lead as Chairman or promote an organisation such as the one suggested by the Claimant.” Sir Alan did not discuss the Memos with, or send them to, anyone else. In summary, Sir Alan’s evidence, provides no evidence that the publication of the Memos caused any harm (still less, serious harm) to the Claimant’s reputation.

In his fourth witness statement, the Claimant has raised some points of challenge to Sir Alan’s evidence, for example whether the call in December 2020 had been ‘out-of-the-blue’ and whether the Claimant and Sir Alan had previously met at a Mansion House dinner in April 2018. In my judgment, none of these points has any substance and the Claimant has not suggested that the rest of Sir Alan’s evidence should be rejected. The Claimant has left, essentially unchallenged, the key parts of Sir Alan’s evidence as to the harm to the Claimant’s reputation caused by the publication of the Memos. In consequence, there is no material dispute of fact that would require resolution at a trial.

Put simply, the Claimant’s case of reputational harm was based on the alleged unfriendliness of Sir Alan in a telephone call. From that, the inference was invited that this unfriendliness was caused by receipt of the Memos and the further inference that this indicated serious reputational harm had been caused by them. Sir Alan’s evidence has destroyed the single plank on which that inference rested. Further, Sir Alan has disposed of the suggestion that the Memos did, in fact, cause serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation. All that remains is the submission that the minor disputes as to unimportant aspects of Sir Alan’s evidence should be resolved at trial. This is simply a reworking of the “something might turn up” refrain. The Claimant has demonstrated no case of serious harm to his reputation caused by publication of the Memos to Sir Alan Duncan that has a real prospect of success. The inferential ‘percolation’ case has been disposed of by Sir Alan’s direct evidence. Permission to amend will be refused.

Ben Elliot

The Claimant’s case of serious reputational harm is at its weakest in relation to Mr Elliot. There is no direct evidence that supports the Claimant’s case on this issue and so he has been forced to rely, again, entirely on an inferential case. I accept Mr Price KC’s submission that Sir Nicholas Soames’ reaction to the Memo is not evidence of what Mr Elliot thought of it. The absence of Mr Elliot as a witness does not necessarily determine the issue against the Claimant. If the contemporaneous documents demonstrated a credible basis upon which to conclude that the Claimant’s reputation had been seriously harmed in Mr Elliot’s eyes, then the Claimant’s case might pass the merits test for an amendment. But, in my judgment, plainly they do not.

The evidence that the Claimant has relied upon is in two main categories: internal Conservative Party emails (see [109] above) and messages exchanged between him and Mr Elliot (see [110]-[111] above). In respect of the former category, at best, the emails demonstrate that receipt of the Memos caused Mr Elliot to require some further due diligence checks be carried out. To that extent, the evidence demonstrates that he did not dismiss the Memos (or their contents) out of hand. That, however, does not establish what impact the publication of the Memos had on the Claimant’s reputation and, critically, whether it caused serious reputational harm in Mr Elliot’s eyes. On that point, the emails provide no support for the Claimant’s case.

Mr Elliot’s emails clearly demonstrate that his reaction was one of irritation at an unwelcome spat between the Claimant and the First Defendant where “the only loser… is the party”. If Mr Elliot had understood the Memos to bear the meanings attributed to them by the Claimant, and to have seriously damaged the Claimant’s reputation in his eyes, he could have been expected to do two things. First, it is likely that he would have challenged the Claimant about them. Second, it is likely that he would have raised his concerns specifically within the party. He did neither. All Mr Elliot did was to seek a report confirming that the Claimant was a “due and proper person”. Mr Elliot got the response he sought in the Report on 12 January 2021. It apparently assuaged any concerns that Mr Elliot had because there are no further emails in which Mr Elliot refers to the issue. Importantly, despite the Claimant’s claim that the Memos were circulated within CCHQ, none of the allegations contained in the Memos appears in the Report.

After receipt of the Report, what did remain of concern to Mr Elliot – see his 15 January 2021 email ([109(7)] above) – was the potential for the ongoing dispute to cause damage to the party and his desire to see both sides “down tools and keep quiet”. The other emails relied upon by the Claimant do not shed light on Mr Elliot’s views of the Memo or demonstrate any harm to the Claimant’s reputation in his eyes. The emails in April/May did not (apparently) involve Mr Elliot and, critically, the conclusion was that “nothing bad came back from CRD on this” (see [109(8)] above). If anything, that evidence tends to prove that no real harm had been caused to the Claimant’s reputation.

The messages exchanged between Mr Elliot and the Claimant are in a similar vein, and support the conclusions I have reached on the basis of the emails relied upon by the Claimant. The first, and perhaps most striking, thing to note is that (in his messages at least) the Claimant appears unconcerned about the Memos. On 2 January 2021, after sending Document 14 to Mr Elliot, the Claimant says that it is “not causing any damage”. I will not attach weight to this comment because (a) it was an early reaction; and (b) the Claimant’s response to the Memos no more sheds light on the impact on Mr Elliot than does the reaction of Sir Nicholas Soames.

On 4 January 2021, not having received any response from Mr Elliot, the Claimant bombarded him with messages, but Mr Elliot remained unresponsive. The clear message that the Claimant wanted to send was that his priority was the affiliation of COMENA to the Conservative Party and he wanted Mr Elliot’s support: “I don’t care about her or CMEC”. In a change of position from the message 2 days earlier, the Claimant did suggest that he had “taken a huge reputation hit” and had spent money “helping the party and HMG” (a reference to the Claimant’s promotion of COMENA) but he then described this as “not important”.

On 6 January 2021, still not having stimulated any real engagement by Mr Elliot, the Claimant sent further messages. Asked whether he wanted to see a copy of the Claimant’s solicitors’ letter to the First Defendant, Mr Elliot provided a one-word response: “No”. This exchange is significant. First, if the Claimant had been really concerned about the allegations in the Memos, he would have been keen to send the MdR letter to Mr Elliot to refute the allegations, not asked him whether he wanted to see it. Second, and more importantly, if Mr Elliot had taken seriously any of the allegations in the Memos, he would probably have asked to see the Claimant’s response. His lack of interest in it is consistent with his view that this was a distracting – and potentially damaging – “spat” which he wanted to “close down”. Despite being told by Mr Elliot that he did not want to see the MdR letter, the Claimant responded that he would receive it “officially” the next day. The Claimant then returned the focus of his messages to promoting COMENA. Mr Elliot’s protest that “this has turned into an unnecessary spat before even launch” indicate, again, that his concern was not about the allegations in the Memos but the risk of damage to the party caused by the dispute.

On 8 January 2021, the Claimant changed tack. He offered to “drop this”, which was clearly an offer not to pursue his complaint with the First Defendant. In the context of the exchange as a whole, I construe this as an offer to “drop” the dispute with the First Defendant if COMENA got the go-ahead. It is, perhaps, a revealing insight into the Claimant’s attitude to the dispute with the First Defendant, at least at that moment.

None of these messages or emails provides any support for the Claimant’s claim that the publication of the Memos to Mr Elliot caused any real harm to the Claimant’s reputation, still less serious harm. On the contrary, Mr Elliot appears to have been troubled by the contents of the Memos only to the extent that he wanted to make sure that they had been properly checked. On 7 January 2021, he received the MdR letter setting out the Claimant’s refutation of the allegations in the Memos. Thereafter, having received, substantially, the ‘all-clear’ in the Report on 12 January 2021, there is no evidence that Mr Elliot harboured any concerns about the Memos beyond his fear that the party might be damaged by the “spat”.

Apart from the rather vague hope that Mr Elliot may have a change of heart, and perhaps provide him with a witness statement, the Claimant has not suggested that the evidential position is going improve between now and any trial. He has used a subject access request to obtain documents relating to him from the Conservative Party. There can be no real expectation that there will be any further documentary material available at trial that might be relevant to his case. Judged by the documents he has obtained, it would be somewhat surprising if any documents came to light that actually provided any support for his case that publication of the Memos caused serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation in Mr Elliot’s eyes. The Claimant has identified no material dispute of fact that would require resolution at a trial.

For these reasons, permission to amend in relation to the claim in respect of publication of the Memos to Mr Elliot is refused. The claim is entirely speculative and devoid of reality. There is no real prospect of the evidence improving prior to trial and the overriding objective would not be served by allowing this claim to continue.

Having reached these conclusions, I do not need to resolve the issue of causation in relation to this publication. The chronology demonstrates that Mr Elliot first received a copy of the Memo – Document 14 – from the Claimant, on 2 January 2021. The Claimant was under no duty to send it to him. If the allegations contained in Document 14 (which, on the Claimant’s case, are more extensive than those in Documents 12-13) caused any damage to the Claimant’s reputation in Mr Elliot’s eyes, then the Claimant is responsible for that publication and that damage. These causation arguments cannot be explored further because Mr Elliot has refused to engage with either side, but they weaken yet further the Claimant’s case that it was a publication of the Memos by the Defendants that had caused harm to his reputation.

Sheikh Fawaz

The Claimant’s response to Sheikh Fawaz’s evidence was to challenge him to submit to cross-examination. That will not do. If there were some material dispute of fact that needed to be resolved on the issue of whether the publication of the Memo caused serious harm to reputation, that might be an issue that would require resolution at a trial. But there is not. The challenges made by the Claimant to Sheikh Fawaz’s evidence are principally to what took place at the meeting between the Claimant and the Sheikh, in May 2021, and the claim that the Sheikh had told the Claimant that his main concern about the Claimant was his links to Russia, which the Claimant suggests was caused by the publication of the Memo. There is a complete absence of reality in the suggestion that the Court should allow this issue to go forward to a trial at which the Claimant, presumably, would attempt to cross-examine Sheikh Fawaz into accepting his version of what took place at the May 2021 meeting with a view to persuading him to change his evidence that publication of the Memo had not caused serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation. The Claimant has provided no other evidence that could provide a realistic basis upon which he could seek to impeach the evidence of Sheikh Fawaz on the issue of serious harm to reputation. Permission to amend will be refused in relation to this publication.

Sheikh Fawaz has provided a witness statement to the Defendants. His statement provides no evidence that publication of the Memo to him has caused serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation. Not only does Sheikh Fawaz state, expressly, that his view of the Claimant’s character was formed as a result of his personal interaction with the Claimant rather than anything in the Memos, the contemporaneous evidence, in Sheikh Fawaz’s letter of 12 January 2021 to Mr Elliot, demonstrates that any concerns that he had following receipt of the Memo were focused on the formation of COMENA, and its potential to harm the standing of CMEC. Sheikh Fawaz noted that CMEC had “long performed an important role in facilitating dialogue..., one built on forty years of trust and hard work”. The letter from Sheikh Fawaz contains no expression of concern about any of the allegations complained of by the Claimant. It is also clear from his letter that the MdR letter had been widely circulated in the Arab diplomatic community in London by 12 January 2021. Put shortly, most of those who had received a copy of the Memo had very shortly thereafter received the Claimant’s rebuttal in the MdR letter.

General reputation harm caused by (re)publication of the Memos

In the preceding sections of the judgment, I have explained why I am not satisfied that the Claimant has demonstrated a case of serious harm to reputation caused by the publications complained of to the six identified individuals which has a real prospect of success. The consequence of that is that permission to amend will be refused for those publications. For the reasons explained in the next section of the judgment, as the existing pleading fails to disclose a proper case on serious harm to reputation, the effect will be that the claims in respect of these six publishees will be dismissed. In consequence, it is not necessary to consider whether the Claimant has a real prospect of showing that any ‘percolation’/republication caused serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation. I have set out my conclusions in the preceding sections as to the extent to which any of the identified publishes has republished the contents of the Memos they received, but as already explained (see [153] above), if the cause of action in respect of any publication fails, any further damage alleged to be caused by it falls away.

Therefore, it is not strictly necessary for me to deal with the extensive further particulars upon which the Claimant has relied (§§69-128 Amended Particulars of Claim). A separate substantial complaint could be raised regarding these paragraphs on the grounds that they do not set out a clear case on causation. But, on analysis, even ignoring these fundamental problems, the particulars do not themselves raise a case of serious harm to reputation with a real prospect of success.

The Claimant states that he believes that the evidence shows that there has been “percolation” of the allegations made against him in the Memos. It may be that – in a very general sense – his evidence does support a broad case that the Memos have circulated more widely than the original publishees, but the critical questions are:

That second question is a basic requirement of causation. In this case, the issue of causation is further complicated by (1) the fact that the Claimant himself had circulated the Memos and the MdR Letter (see [110] and [112]-[113] above); and (2) the subsequent media publication about the Claimant and the dispute (see [18]-[24] above).

I do not intend to lengthen this judgment even further by dealing with every aspect of the Claimant’s case on ‘percolation’/republication. I shall deal with what I regard to be the key points.

Mark Garnier MP does refer to the Memo he had seen as being “libellous”, but his reference to its contents being “inaccurate” strongly suggests that he did not believe its contents (see [127] above). As such, and particularly in the absence of any evidence from Mr Garnier, this does not provide a credible basis on which to contend that the Claimant’s reputation was seriously harmed by the publication of the Memo to Mr Garnier, or its republication by him.

Even if assumed to be proved, the alleged further dissemination of the Memos by Sheikh Fawaz (see [130] above) goes no further than establishing republication. It does not demonstrate any reputational harm, still less serious reputational harm.

My conclusions as to the Lebanese Ambassador’s Email (see [130] above) are:

Without more information about the Claimant’s experience at meetings at embassies (see [132] above), and particularly the dates of these events, it is impossible to attach much weight to this evidence on the issue of the extent of any reputational harm to the Claimant’s reputation and, more importantly, its cause. Certainly, after the publication of the First and Second FT Articles (particularly having regard to paragraphs 5-7 and 10-20 of the First FT Article, paragraphs 1-2, 4-17 of the Second FT Article, and paragraphs 2, 24-27 of the Mail Article), questions about the Claimant’s connections with Russia, could not necessarily be ascribed to circulation of the Memos or their contents.

In respect of the alleged damage to the Claimant’s reputation in the eyes of the Kuwaiti Ambassador (see [133] above), Ms Al Hashem’s evidence does pre-date the publication of the First and Second FT Articles. However, it is difficult to see how the Kuwaiti Ambassador could have extracted the meaning that the Claimant was an “Iranian stooge” from the Memos, particularly as one of the meanings complained of by the Claimant said to be conveyed by several of the Memos is that he “dishonestly claims to be of Iranian heritage and to hold networks of influence in Iran” (see [29(12)] above). Also, the only reference in the Memos alleged to be defamatory of the Claimant that might be capable of suggesting that he was “close to the Russian regime”, are:

As a basis for demonstrating serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation, there are several problems with Mr Lehmann’s evidence (see [135] above). First, Mr Lehmann is not a publishee in one of the publications that the Claimant has sued on (indeed, it is not clear from his letter whether he even received a copy of any of the Memos – directly or indirectly – or if he did, which one(s)). Second, it is clear from his letter, that what Mr Lehmann learned of the contents of the Memo did not in any way damage or diminish his view of the Claimant’s reputation. Third, insofar as Mr Lehmann’s evidence discloses what imputation(s) he thought the Memo(s) bore, it is limited to calling into question his “bona fides and suitability to lead”, which is some way short of the meanings complained of by the Claimant. At best, Mr Lehmann’s evidence goes some way to demonstrating that the Claimant’s reputation has been harmed in the eyes of others, but, crucially, there remains a problem of causation. Mr Lehmann’s evidence does not assist in showing a causative link between the publication of any of the Memos to the publishees and the reputational harm. Further, Mr Lehmann identifies a separate factor that was also in play in causing any reputational harm beyond the Memos: the “lobbying” of the “party stalwart and grandee” (which may be a reference to Sir Nicholas Soames) and “former Parliamentarians associated with CMEC”. No weight can be attached to Mr Lehmann’s opinion that the Claimant’s character has been “unfairly besmirched”, particularly because the Claimant’s reputation had not been damaged in Mr Lehmann’s own eyes. Mr Lehmann’s evidence provides some limited hearsay evidence that the Memos may have been a factor in a negative attitude demonstrated by some towards the Claimant, but the details are unclear.

The evidence about the cancellation of the Hever Castle dinners (see [136] above) and the Conservative Networking event (see [137] above) is similarly vague, cannot be linked the any of the publications complained of in the Particulars of Claim and therefore suffers from similar causation issues.

In summary, the Claimant’s evidence demonstrates that there has been some republication of the Memos and their contents beyond the original publishees. The evidence is far too speculative. On the evidence, the only publishee who further distributed a copy of the Memo was Sheikh Fawaz, but as the Claimant had himself distributed Document 14, it is not possible to draw any reliable conclusions as to those responsible for circulating the Memo(s) more widely. Further, the Claimant has failed to produce any evidence that such republication has caused serious harm to his reputation.

In contrast to the previous section, I can state my conclusions on this issue very shortly. The original Particulars of Claim failed to disclose a proper pleading of serious harm to reputation alleged to have been caused by the relevant publications. To satisfy the requirements of CPR 53B PD §4.2(3), and to disclose a proper cause of action, each publication relied upon by the Claimant was required to be supported with particulars of serious harm to reputation that the Claimant alleged was caused (or likely to be caused) by that publication. The composite case – because it did not distinguish between the publications alleged to have caused the harm – failed to do so.

The Claimant has not seriously argued against this conclusion. His argument rested upon the premise that such a composite/aggregate case was sufficient in law to satisfy the serious harm requirement. For the reasons I have explained, I have rejected that submission (see [147]-[163] above).

In consequence, the plea of serious harm to reputation in the original Particulars of Claim (contained in Paragraphs 5 and 64) will be struck out pursuant to CPR Part 3.4(2)(a). Having reached that conclusion, it is not necessary to consider that alternative bases on which the Defendants advanced the Strike Out Application.

As I have refused permission to amend, the Particulars of Claim do not disclose a proper cause of action in respect of any publication relied upon and, ordinarily, the Court would strike out or dismiss the claim. Before doing so, I should consider whether the Claimant ought to be given a further opportunity to attempt to remedy the issue that has led to the claim being struck out. Whether to give a party such an opportunity is a question of making an assessment whether there is any realistic prospect that s/he would be able to remedy the problem if given a chance. If there is no realistic prospect that the party can fix the problem, providing a further opportunity is simply likely to waste further the parties’ costs and the Court’s resources. Even were the Court to consider that the party might be able to remedy the issue, an important discretion is to be exercised as to whether to permit a party to have another go. That discretion must be exercised having regard to the overriding objective.

In my judgment, the Claimant should not be given a further opportunity to see whether he can plead a case of serious harm to reputation caused by the publications relied upon. I do not consider that there is any realistic prospect that he could advance such a case. The Amendment Application has failed not on a technicality, because of a deficiency in pleading, but substantively, because the evidence relied upon does not disclose a claim with a real prospect of success. The Claimant has put forward the best evidential case he has on serious harm, and it does not meet the merits test. He has not suggested that this evidence would improve were he to be given a further opportunity to replead his case. For the reasons I have set out, unless the named publishees significantly changed their positions, the prospect of such further evidence emerging is fanciful. For this reason, I refuse to give the Claimant a further opportunity to replead his case.

Even had the Claimant been able to raise some prospect that he might be able successfully to replead his case on serious harm, there is a further factor which would have weighed heavily against him. In pursuit of the overriding objective, the Court strives to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. That includes, so far as practicable, saving expense, ensuring that a case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly, and allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases: CPR 1.1. “It is no longer the role of the court simply to provide a level playing-field and to referee whatever game the parties choose to play upon it. The court is concerned to ensure that judicial and court resources are appropriately and proportionately used in accordance with the requirements of justice”: Dow Jones & Co Inc -v- Jameel [2005] QB 946 [54] per Lord Phillips MR.

It has not been necessary for me to rule on the Defendants’ argument that the Claimant’s claim has been an abuse of process (see [138(3)] above). The circumstances in which a Court will dismiss a defamation claim as an abuse of process, because of some impermissible collateral purpose, are rare. Strong evidence is required that a claimant is, in reality, seeking something beyond the protection and vindication of his reputation before the court would stay or dismiss the proceedings as an abuse of process: Goldsmith –v- Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 478, 500 per Scarman LJ. The hurdle is a high one. See also discussion in Broxton –v- McClelland [1995] EMLR 485, 497-498 per Simon Brown LJ.

Nevertheless, there are several aspects of the conduct of the Claimant – many of which were relied upon by the Defendants – that give real cause for concern as to (1) whether his pursuit of these proceedings has been genuinely to seek vindication rather than some other impermissible collateral purpose(s) and (2) whether he has sought to obtain this vindication at proportionate cost.

For the reasons I have explained, I do not need to resolve whether the Claimant has pursued this libel action for an impermissible collateral purpose. What I am entitled to conclude is that, by conducting the proceedings in the way I have identified, the Claimant has exhausted any claim he might have on the further allocation of the Court’s resources to this action. Although I have concluded that no purpose would be served by giving the Claimant a further opportunity to replead his claim, I am also satisfied that it would not serve the overriding objective to permit the Claimant to do so. As a result, this claim is at an end.

Mr Amersi says CCHQ has asked him to set up 'COMENA'. Ilma Bogdan, in a text to an MP, says COMENA has been "created by CCHQ". She claims it has a board which includes parliamentarians and ex-parliamentarians.

CMEC's Director approached one of the people named in the text as 'on the board'. They had not agreed to be 'on the board'. She understands that CCHQ did not 'ask' him to set this up, and that this is not Mr Amersi's first

attempt to do so: he has approached the Conservative Party on at least one previous occasion and the Party Board apparently turned him down.

In March and again in September 2020, Mr Amersi approached CMEC's

Director, offering money if she agreed to him being appointed CMEC's chairman. For obvious reasons this offer was politely declined. Mr Amersi said he had given enough money to the party and felt he deserved either a knighthood or a peerage and that running a 'friends of' group would help him achieve this.

CMEC's Director suggested he could be introduced and involved in CMEC in other ways and offered him the opportunity to be the main sponsor of the prestigious annual PM's Gala Lunch. Mr Amersi rejected this offer. He told her that he had been considering setting up a similar organisation to CMEC and had a young woman in mind who would run it. However, he told her that he would not set up this organisation.

Mr. Amersi promised he would keep in touch and notify CMEC's Director if he changed his mind on setting up an organisation and if he did he would work collaboratively with CMEC. He did not honour this promise. CMEC's Director was notified that Mr Amersi was trying to set up 'COMENA' by an 'insider', then a concerned MP, then a perturbed ambassador.

Who is trying to set up 'COMENA'?

New Donor: Mr. Amersi is a recent Conservative Party donor(£500k since 2018). He donated to main Conservative leadership candidates, and to the Rochdale and Central Devon Conservative Associations.

His wife is Russian. Prior to Mr. Amersi's donating, his wife, was a donor to the party. (£268,000 between June 2017 and March 2018)

Origin and contacts: Mr. Amersi says he is of Iranian heritage and claims to travel frequently to Iran and hold networks of influence in Iran. However, multiple sources within Iran claim he is not originally Iranian and he is unknown to them. He has reportedly spent time in Russia. Details are unclear.

Off-Shore Philanthropic Foundation: Mr. Amersi is generally listed as a philanthropist: Founder of The Amersi Foundation. The Foundation is not a UK Charity, it was registered in The Bahamas in 2012.

Business in UAE: His country of residence is listed as the UAE on Companies House. His main business. Inclusive Ventures Ltd was dissolved.in the UK n December 2017 (just before his wife stopped donating to the party and he started) and appears to be now registered in Dubai.

PPE Contract: A government minister rang the CMEC Director on 2^nd September to press the case for Mr. Amersi to be made Chairman of CMEC. This minister had had no prior involvement in CMEC. To support his demand, he said he and Mr. Amersi had been involved in a PPE contract which involved equipment Mr. Amersi sourced from the UAE. The Minister said that the Director should appoint Mr. Amersi Chairman because he would be a generous benefactor to CMEC. If necessary, she can provide a text message from the minister, in support of this account.

The minister demanded that she meet with Mr. Amersi. Subsequently, on 25^th September, she met Mr. Amersi, near her home. During this meeting, he confirmed he had acquired PPE from the UAE "free of charge" as a gift. He said he believed that this was another demonstration as to why he deserved a peerage or knighthood.