Raid Tawfik Al Sadik v Suhad Subhi Sadik

This is a remedies hearing in a claim which is now a claim for libel alone. The claimantis represented by Richard Munden of counsel, and the defendant appears in person.

The matter comes before me today as a result of some earlier orders of the court. On 26November 2021, Master McCloud ordered that unless the defendant paid the claimant the sumof £12,500, being costs which had been awarded against the defendant by order of a DeputyMaster on an earlier hearing, by 4 pm on 10 December 2021, her defence in the claim shouldbe struck out and judgment should be entered for the claimant. On 17 December 2021, MasterMcCloud made a further order whereby the costs that the defendant was required to paypursuant to paragraph 2 of the order of 26 November 2021 were assessed in the sum of £14,730.Following those two orders, a further order was made by Master McCloud on 8 February 2022,and it is accordance with that order that this hearing arises before me today.

By paragraph 1of the order of 8February 2022, it was ordered that judgment should beentered for the claimant. By paragraph 2, a trial to determine the remedies to which theclaimant was entitled was ordered to be heard, and that is what has come before me today. TheMaster also gave various other directions in connection with the present hearing.

It is important to emphasise at the outset, as appears from those earlier orders, the limitednature of the issues (although they are important) which fall for determination by me today.This hearing does not involve revisiting the claimant’s entitlement to judgment on the claimfor defamation. Still less does it involve revisiting the rights and wrongs of the property disputebetween the parties which gave rise to the publication complained of in this claim for libel.

It is clear from her demeanour in the course of the hearing that the defendant remainsupset by the history of events and the plain falling out that has occurred in this family, inparticular between her and the claimant. She is married to the claimant’s brother, and she, inturn, is the sister of the claimant’s wife. The relationship between the claimant and thedefendant is accordingly a very close family relationship. But, plainly and unfortunately, ithas become a very unhappy one.

Before me today, the defendant has been supported by her daughter, Rana Sadik, and byher son, Iman Sadik. I did not make any formal order allowing them to assist her or representher, but they have both taken turns to speak on her behalf, particularly at times when she hasfelt too distressed by the hearing today to be able to continue to speak for herself. But the

The remedies sought in front of me today give rise to three essential issues. First, there
is the question of the amount of damages to which the claimant is entitled, having regard to thepublication he complains of and all the circumstances of the case. Second, there is the questionof whether the court should grant an injunction to restrain repetition of the defamatorystatements complained of. The third question which arises is whether the court should orderthe defendant to publish a summary of the judgment which I am presently delivering, whichthe court has power to do under Section 12 of the Defamation Act 2013.

I can say straightaway with regard to the claim for an injunction that it appears to me thatthe case for the grant of an injunction is a strong one. In my judgment, that would have beenplain in any event. But the history of the matters that have been ventilated in front of me today,and the defendant’s conduct in front of me today, has served to underline, in my judgment, theconclusion that an injunction is an appropriate remedy in this case.

The defendant made it perfectly clear more than once during the course of the hearingthat she did not accept the validity of the claimant’s complaints in this libel action at all; thatfrom her perspective she had spoken the truth in the publication that is complained of; that theclaimant had, indeed, acted wrongly, as she accused him of doing in that publication, by lyingunder oath and so forth - which I will come on to deal with in more detail in a moment; and,effectively, that she stood by everything that she said.

In my judgment, it is crystal clear from what has transpired in front of me today as wellas the earlier history of this litigation, in which it is quite clear that the defendant has neithershown any regret or remorse nor expressed any apology, that there is a very significant riskthat without the protection of an injunction the defamatory allegations that are complained ofwould be repeated by her in the future.

This case has come before the court on a number of occasions, and in particular it hasresulted in two detailed judgments by different High Court judges. In consequence, I have thebenefit of those two detailed judgments. The later in time of those two judgments is that ofJulian Knowles J, which was handed down on 16 October 2019 following a hearing on 2 April2019. That hearing concerned an application by the defendant to strike out the claim or forsummary judgment against the claimant on the grounds that are set out in paragraph 7 of thatjudgment. Those grounds included the contention that the allegations complained of by theclaimant were not defamatory because the claimant could not establish the thresholdrequirement of serious harm, which is contained in Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, andalso included a contention that the pursuit of the claim was an abuse of process.

The genesis of this libel claim is set out in paragraphs 3 to 5 of that judgment of JulianKnowles J, as follows:

“The libel claim arises out of three WhatsApp messages sent

by the Defendant to a group of 34 people on 18 or 19 September 2017 (the Messages). WhatsApp is a messaging service allowing users to exchange messages to each other individually, or via

user defined groups, over the internet. All of the group members were part of the Claimant’s wider family. The Messages were sentfollowing bitterly contested family property litigation between

The pleaded meanings alleged by the claimant are set out in paragraph 6 of thejudgment, as follows:

“The pleaded defamatory imputations arising from these

words are as follows (Amended Particulars of Claim

(APOC), [11]). The Claimant asserts they meant that he had:

a.

Arranged to rob his brother’s house.

b.

Lied, even after having sworn on the Quran to tell the truth;

and

c.

Committed perjury in order to dishonestly promote his interests
at the expense of his own brother.”

The parties and the factual background are set out in paragraph 10 to 16:

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“10.

The Claimant is a businessman and philanthropist who
lives in Dubai and spends 30 to 35 days in London each

year. As I have said, the Claimant and Defendant are

brother and sister in law: the Claimant is the brother of

the Defendant’s husband and she is the sister of the Claimant’s wife. She has a house in Kuwait with her husband. There is an issue about the Defendant’s residencewhich I will discuss later, but it is common ground

that until at least 19 September 2017 she lived at 22 Ennismore Mews, London SW7 (22EM), whilst also maintaining a house in Kuwait.”

11.

This libel claim arises out of the property litigation in

2016 – 2017 between the Claimant and Defendant (together with her husband and son) about the

ownership of 22EM. This property was at the time owned by the Claimant, but the Defendant’s case was

that he agreed to sell it to her husband in 1992. The Claimant contended that there was no such agreement. 22EM was owned by a company called Fourstar Limited(‘Fourstar’) in a trust structure for the benefit of the Claimant’s son.

12.

The Defendant’s family commenced a claim for proprietary

estoppel against the Claimant and Fourstar in the County Court. Fourstar issued its own claim seeking possession of 22EM and mesne profits; the two claims were consolidated and tried before His Honour Judge Gerald in the Central London County Court between 11 and 18 September 2017

(the 22EM Litigation). The litigation was very acrimonious.

13.

On 18 September 2017, the last day of the trial, the Defendant

encountered the Claimant, his wife and his solicitor in Pret

a Manger on the Strand. There was an exchange between them, the details of which are disputed but do not matter for present purposes. She then took the photograph which accompanied the Messages complained of.

Later on 18 September 2017, the Defendant’s family discontinued their claim and agreed terms of settlement

As I have said, the members of the WhatsApp group to whom the Messages were sent are identified by name in

And the procedural background to these proceedings up to the time that the matter wasin front of Julian Knowles J are set out in paragraphs 17 to 25:

“17.

The procedural history to this claim is as follows.

18.

The Claimant states that he learned of the words complained
of on 19 September 2017. His lawyers wrote a letter before action on 20 September 2017 which was delivered to 22EM.

19.

On 26 September 2017 the Claimant issued a Claim Form and filed Particulars of Claim seeking £25 000 in damages and an injunction against the Defendant in both defamation and

harassment. The harassment claim was later discontinued.

The same day the Claimant sought to serve these on the Defendant at 22EM, together with an Application Notice

by which the Claimant sought an interim injunction against

the Defendant in both harassment and defamation (the Interim Injunction Application). On 4 October 2017 Nicklin J heard

the Interim Injunction Application and rejected it.

20.

On 24 May 2018 the Claimant applied for judgment in default

in respect of his defamation claim, together with summary

disposal pursuant to s 8 of the DA 1996 (the Default Judgment Application). On 26 June 2018 Nicklin J heard the Default Judgment Application. I have an approved transcript of his judgment. He held that the Defendant’s messages were seriously defamatory of the Claimant, that the claim satisfied the

requirement of serious harm under s 1 of the DA 2013, and that

it warranted at least £10 000 in damages (the maximum award available under the summary disposal procedure). He also grantedan injunction to restrain the Defendant from making further

Taking matters thereafter shortly, in due course the Defendant
says that she became aware of the proceedings for the first time

On 7 November 2018 the Claimant filed and served his APOC.

On 28 January 2009 the parties exchanged Costs Budgets.

On 30 January 2009 the Defendant made this application.

On 29 March 2019 the Claimant applied to amend his Claim
Form to increase the amount of damages claimed to £50 000

After that judgment was handed down, further steps occurred between that time and themaking of the orders that have led to the hearing in front of me. The defendant had served adefence which did not contain a plea that the allegations complained of were true. On 24 June2021, the defendant applied to amend her defence to introduce a defence of truth. Thatapplication was dismissed, and she was ordered to pay the costs. It appears that it was thosecosts which became the subject of the unless order to which I have referred, which resulted inthe default judgment, which, in turn, resulted in the order for a remedies hearing in front of me.

In the course of considering the defendant’s application in front of him, Julian KnowlesJ had to consider the law relating to serious harm, and then to apply that law to the facts of thecase as they then appeared to him. He carried out the exercise of applying those principles,beginning at paragraph 93 and continuing up until paragraph 101.

Now, as I indicated before I began delivering this judgment with regard to any referencesthat I might make to earlier judgments or orders of the court, all that is in those paragraphscould be read into this judgment. However, I will highlight the following points.

In considering the meanings complained of by the claimant, the judge said this atparagraph 93:

“Obviously, they are very serious. They are of dishonest

And at that stage, the judge referred to the other substantive judgment that I have thebenefit of today; that is to say the judgment of Nicklin J dated 26 June 2018, which I will come back to in a minute. The judge quoted these words from paragraph 16 of Nicklin J’sjudgment:

“That is something which clearly touches upon the claimant’spersonal integrity and, indeed, his core attributes. This was a seriously defamatory allegation.”

Julian Knowles J then went on in paragraph 94 to consider the pleading that,

“The claimant and all the publishees of the messages are

Muslim, such that the allegation of having lied after swearing

on the Quran is particularly damaging and distressing to the

claimant.”

And he accepted that was a factor that was capable of exacerbating the extent of the harmsuffered by the claimant over and above that flowing from the allegation of having lied on oath.

22.

At paragraph 95, Julian Knowles J turned to consider the question of the extent ofpublication as rehearsed in his judgment, which I have not read out in full. The publicationwas directly made to 34 individuals who were members of the claimant’s close extendedfamily. The judge said “That is a comparatively small number, but it is not trivial.”Again, he cited from Nicklin J’s judgment at paragraph 18, where Nicklin J, referring to well-known principles to be extracted from other cases, said with regard to seriousness and thedetermination of seriousness,

“… this is not a numbers game as frequently has been said

in the authorities. An allegation that is published strategically

or targeted to a group of people who are important to the

individual claimant may cause more damage to a claimant’s

reputation than indiscriminate publication to many more people.”

23.

In paragraph 97, Julian Knowles J picked up the contents of paragraph 23 of theclaimant’s third witness statement which he had already cited in paragraph 15 of his judgment.

24.

And then in paragraph 98, the judge summarised the contents of certain paragraphs ofthe claimant’s first witness statement:

“Paragraphs [54]-[59] of the Claimant’s first Witness Statement

are relevant. In those paragraphs the Claimant said he found

the messages extremely distressing. He did not lie to the court when he gave evidence about the ownership of 22EM. He said

the messages are highly damaging to him within his family. To

be accused of stealing from his brother is ‘deeply wounding’. Without an understanding of the matters involved he is concernedthat people who read the allegations may have suspicions about him. He said the publishees are members of his wider family and

Transcribed from the official recording by eScribers 8

he cares a great deal for them and he holds their opinion of him

in high regard. He said that he believes the Defendant deliberately
elected to make the statements to this group intentionally to hurt

him as much as possible. He also said that the statements are

likely to damage his professional reputation more widely among

the Palestinian diaspora. He also explained his concern that the

messages might be forwarded to others. Finally, he said he has

a significant profile in the Middle East because of his professional

and philanthropic activities and he has a reputation as a man of

integrity.”

25.

At paragraph 99, the judge turned to the ‘grapevine effect’ which is part of the claimant’spleaded case, and he said this:

“There is evidence that the messages have been disseminatedoutside the WhatsApp group.”

He then made reference to the fact that in his third witness statement at paragraph 28:

“The claimant said he has become aware through family and

friends that ‘many people’ in London and the Middle East havebecome aware of the statements complained of.”

26.

The judge then referred to the evidence of Hassib Bishara and what he said in his witnessstatement. And he then referred to the evidence of the claimant’s daughter, Gheeda Al Sadikand the evidence that she had given in her witness statement about onward circulation of themessages complained of by the claimant.

27.

At paragraph 100, the judge said that he was,

“Satisfied that the defendant has not shown the claimant

has no realistic prospect of showing the publication of

messages has caused the claimant serious harm, or that it

is likely to do so.”

And he based that conclusion on the following six matters,

“a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

The very serious nature of the allegations, striking as they

At paragraph 101, Julian Knowles J said that in his analysis he had not overlooked thefact there was no direct evidence of adverse impact. Indeed, the evidence shows that somepeople plainly have pushed back against the allegations, and, if you like, stuck up for theclaimant’s integrity in spite of the allegations being made.

Finally, so far as this judgment is concerned, in dealing with the allegation of abuse of process, the judge returned, at paragraph 108, to the allegation that this type of publication inthis form to this number of people was likely to have a ‘grapevine effect’, and he said this:

“A well-known feature of harm to reputation is the propensity

for defamatory statements ‘to percolate through underground channels and contaminate hidden springs’: Slipper v BBC

[1991] 1 QB 283, 300.”

The witnesses to whose evidence Julian Knowles J made reference have each been calledas witnesses in the hearing today. They have each verified their witness statements, that is tosay: the claimant has verified his first, second and third witness statements; Mr Bishara hasverified his witness statement; and the claimant’s daughter has verified her witness statements.

It seems perfectly clear to me, from the content of those witness statements and theadditional evidence which the witnesses added orally, that there has plainly been, as one wouldexpect there is a very real risk of happening, a significant degree of dissemination of theseallegations beyond the original 34 people to whom the defendant circulated them. That is, inmy judgment, entirely unsurprising. The fact is the allegations were very serious. They werequite likely to be picked up by people who were interested in the claimant, his personal lifeand his business conduct, whether by way of salacious gossip or by way of serious concern asto what he had been up to and whether he was dishonest, guilty of criminal conduct, and soforth. As the claimant’s daughter explained, people gossip about these matters.

It seems clear to me, from the evidence that I have heard and read, that these allegationshave circulated and, indeed, are still live and have a propensity still to remain in circulation.Quite apart from the particular facts of this case, this is a very common phenomenon of socialmedia in particular where the so-called ‘grapevine effect’ is well recognised as a matter ofprinciple in the authorities as being something that may happen, even if there is no detectablespread of allegations beyond the first circle of people to whom they are published. It is also aphenomenon which is very familiar to the courts on the facts of different cases that come infront of the courts. Obviously, the facts of each case are different, but I am not at all surprisedto hear the evidence of the claimant’s daughter, which she gave orally, that this is aphenomenon that is applicable to these particular messages and that it has had that effect.

I think that the defendant, in some of what she said today, either by way of questions thatshe asked the witnesses or by way of statements that she made in the course of the hearing, wassuggesting that really she said this to a group of family members and, effectively, it wasnobody’s business to push the allegations out further than that. And part of her presentation infront of me today has been to ask, well, who did it and how did they do it, and when did they

As far as the question of whether that, in fact, happened, which I think comprised theother main limb of the defendant’s stance on this aspect of the case, I am entirely satisfied,having heard the witnesses, that their account of how other people have passed these allegationsback to them, when they did so, and the circumstances in which they do so is an accurate andreliable account. I detected no reason why these witnesses should have been untruthful aboutthose matters. And what they said appears to be entirely coherent as to their actual experienceof having these allegations fed back to them from various sources in the way that they describein their evidence.

Some points were made on behalf of the defendant about timing and the speed with whichthese allegations reached, I think, both Mr Bishara and the claimant’s daughter. I want to makeclear that I have taken those arguments into account. However, Mr Bishara was absolutelyclear that the contents of his witness statement are accurate. I see no reason to doubt that re-affirmation of his witness evidence. And the claimant’s daughter, equally, was clear that theseallegations were first communicated back to her when she was, if I understand correctly, in acoffee shop with her son on the morning after they had first been posted.

I really do not think that trying to catch people out about the details of the timing ofevents that happened years ago is appropriate or productive in this particular context. Thesimple fact is that very soon after the defendant had sent those messages out to the original 34people, they were already being passed on, in my judgment, on the evidence, to, for example,the claimant’s daughter and then, or very soon afterwards, to Mr Bishara. And I have littledoubt that this is simply symptomatic of wider dissemination, although how wide thedissemination was and has been it is impossible to know.

The other point that I should mention is that in the run up to this hearing there has beena flurry of activity on the defendant’s part. Questions were raised about another order which Ihave not yet mentioned, namely an order of 17 March 2022, by which it was ordered that thewitnesses for the claimant were permitted to give evidence at this remedies hearing by way ofvideo-link from Dubai. Questions were raised, really, about how it came to be that the courtwas asked to make that order in respect of Mr Bishara when it has become clear, from hisevidence before me, that he was in London on 17 March 2022, having arrived here in February,and that he only went back to Dubai yesterday, 30 March 2022. Now, the suggestion was madethat this reflected on his credibility. But I want to make it clear that I have considered thatcarefully and I do not consider that there is any basis to attack his credibility on those grounds.

What appears to have happened – and there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of thecontents of the correspondence involving the claimant’s solicitors – is that those solicitorsapplied for the order for evidence to be given by video-link from Dubai on the understanding(not having spoken to him directly) that Mr Bishara was, in fact, absent in Dubai on 17 March2022 and would continue to be so until today’s hearing. In fact, as I have said, he came toEngland, on his evidence, most recently on 22 February 2022 and returned on 30 March. Hisposition is that he has been a regular visitor to this country for the last 30 years, coming toLondon typically every six or eight weeks. He lives in Dubai but he has, I think, a businessand interests, and certainly a residence, in this country. His position is that he goes backwards

The other aspect that was raised by a second witness statement of the defendant’sdaughter, Rana Sadik, was to do with a challenge as to whether people really had been in touchwith, in particular, the claimant’s daughter, as she said. In that witness statement, thedefendant’s daughter sets out her attempts, effectively, to question these various people as towhether they truly have been in touch with the claimant’s daughter, as the claimant’s daughtersuggests. I have looked at all of that evidence even though there is no formal application toput it in front of me, and Mr Munden says that it should not be considered and that is out oftime. But it seems to me that even if it was admitted in evidence, and taken at its highest value,all it shows is that attempts to question those witnesses have not resulted in any of them sayingthat the evidence of the claimant’s daughter is wrong. Broadly speaking, what it shows is thatthey are reluctant to become further involved and they are not supporting the suggestion thattheir evidence has been misrepresented or fabricated in some way.

That also, in my view, explains another criticism made by the defendant in her closingstatement, namely that there has been no direct evidence from all those people. That seems tome unsurprising because people very often, in this type of dispute, do not want to becomeinvolved. It does not diminish the credibility of the evidence of the claimant’s daughter thatpeople have, indeed, contacted her, as she says, reflecting the fact that these allegations havebeen spread around.

There is also, I mention finally, the question of proportionality. Of course, if people arewilling to give evidence, the claimant could have produced possibly a long list of people whohad heard of these allegations one way or another. But in my judgment, it is an entirelyproportionate way to carry on with this claim and to produce the volume of witness evidencewhich has been produced in this case. And, as I say, I see no grounds for doubting the accuracyof the evidence of the claimant’s witnesses, having seen them give evidence and havingconsidered the probabilities as well as the contents of their written and oral evidence.

One point made on the defendant’s behalf by her daughter was to do with the questionof whether one can satisfactorily assess the credibility and demeanour of witnesses by video-link compared to live appearance in court; and this is a matter that was particularly relevantperhaps to Mr Bishara. I just say two things about that which I also said during the course ofthe dignified statement that the defendant made at the end of the case and that her daughterpursued in part on her behalf. First of all, in this particular case I do not consider there is anydifficulty about assessing the credibility of the witnesses. The quality of the video receptionwas extremely good, and I could see the witnesses very clearly. But secondly, and althoughthe courts proceed on the principle that assessment of demeanour is something which can inprinciple be carried out accurately by judges and is a telling and important aspect of assessingwhere the truth lies, experience shows that, in fact, this it is not always the case. So the wholequestion of assessing demeanour very often is not the most important factor in deciding onwhether to accept the evidence of a witness or not. What one looks for, typically, iscorroboration for contemporary events, as well as taking into account considerations ofprobability. And as I have said, it seems to me that the probability is very clear that matters

That brings me on to the first of the heads of relief and the question of the measure ofdamages. Mr Munden has helpfully set out in his skeleton argument well-known authoritieson this topic, principally the decision of Warby J in the case of Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC1226 (QB), which, in turn, internally cites other authorities.

As the case law makes clear, the purpose of damages in the law of libel is generally toserve three ends; first, to compensate the claimant for the damage to his reputation; secondly,to vindicate his good name; and, thirdly, to take account of the distress, hurt and humiliationwhich the defamatory publication has caused. And then there are a number of factors aboutthe way in which one approaches the measure of damages. I do not propose to read out allthose factors; they are very well known and well established. And obviously one looks atthings like how serious the allegation is, how widespread it has been, which aspects of theclaimant’s life it impacts upon, its propensity to percolate and spread, and so forth.

Under the heading of ‘Compensation’ Mr Munden made the following principalsubmissions. In respect of gravity, he said that the statements complained of convey themeaning that the claimant arranged to rob his brother’s house, lied even after having sworn onthe Quran to tell the truth, and committed perjury in order to dishonestly promote his interestsat the expense of his own brother.

Before dealing further with that, I should make reference to the citation of Nicklin J onone topic which I have not already picked up, essentially, through the medium of the judgmentof Julian Knowles J, and that is the significance of this being a default judgment. That positionwas summarised by Nicklin J in paragraph 7 of his judgment of 26 June 2018 in the context ofwhat was then in front of him, which is to say that he had granted judgment in default of anacknowledgement of service or a defence. And he said this at paragraph 7:

“The pleaded meaning is one which is not absurd or not
manifestly incapable of being borne by the words. It is clear
those words are defamatory. So according to the authorities

I should assess the claim in which I have granted judgment
today on the basis that the words complained of that were
published to roughly 34 people that were in the WhatsApp
group bear the meanings set out in the particulars of

claim.”

That, in my judgment, is a correct summary of the law which applies to this hearing as much as it did to that previous hearing in front of Nicklin J. And, therefore, Mr Munden’s starting-point that this is the meaning of the statements complained of is the correct starting-point.

Mr Munden then argues that the allegations strike directly at the claimant’s integrity,loyalty to his family, honesty, and religious beliefs. They are very seriously defamatory andhurtful, particularly to a man who has worked extremely hard not only in business but also inphilanthropic endeavours, including helping members of his family, including the defendant,as the claimant explains in his evidence.

Mr Munden then cites from one of the claimant’s witness statements:

Transcribed from the official recording by eScribers 13

“The statements go to the very core of my character and being and concern my dealings with family and my stance as someone who was once a child refugee

from Palestine. I believe the defendant chose her words

and statements deliberately in a calculating manner to

cause maximum damage and distress to me.”

Mr Munden next submits that the allegation of lying after swearing on the Quran isobviously more significant here where both the claimant and the publishees are Muslim, asJulian Knowles J had noted.

Mr Munden then cites part of the evidence of Mr Bishara, stating that the claimant is anhonourable man. The nature of the statements are clearly intended to cause him maximumdistress and attack those matters that are most important to him and bring his family’s integrityand his Palestinian heritage.

And then, again, Mr Munden refers to parts of Nicklin J’s judgment, which I think I havealready quoted, possibly through the medium of Julian Knowles J’s judgment, about the extentto which the allegations were serious and defamatory and struck at additional character aspectsof the claimant’s life. And Julian Knowles J made similar comments.

Next, under ‘Compensation’, Mr Munden deals with the extent of publication. I thinkthat I have probably covered that pretty fully already. The 34 publishees are highly significant,because at least 12 of them are close family members of the claimant. Very often, publicationto people close to the claimant is more harmful and hurtful than publication to strangers. There
is then the ‘grapevine effect’ which I have mentioned more than once. And Mr Mundenhighlights, in particular, that the claimant’s daughter details telephone calls andcommunications she received from at least 12 individuals demonstrating the allegations hadbeen circulated in London and elsewhere. And that she makes clear that what she has said isnot an exhaustive list and she is aware that “many others would have contacted my siblingsand even my father.” And he also points out that the claimant’s own evidence is,

“The claimant has become aware through family and friends

that many people in London and the Middle East have now

become aware of the statements.”

And again, there is talk in the daughter’s evidence of the claims being circulated in the widercommunity in London and elsewhere.

Then, under the heading ‘Vindication’, Mr Munden reminds me of the jurisprudencewhich points out the significance of the size of the award as being a marker of what the claimanthas recovered and whether his complaints have been met by vindication. Put shortly, if aclaimant was to complain of a very serious defamation and was to be awarded only a modestamount of money, the thinking is that people would point to that and say, well, it was not reallyall that serious, or perhaps he did not succeed in full. Whereas, if they can see a sizeable award,that has the effect of demonstrating that the allegations are without foundation. The law cannotrepair the reputation of a person which is harmed by a defamatory publication. All that it cando in this regard is to provide compensation by way of damages to reflect the seriousness ofthe harm. Mr Munden points out, correctly, that in this case there has been no acknowledgmentof wrongdoing, no expression of regret, no apology, and no retraction by the defendant.

And then under the question of ‘Distress, Hurt and Humiliation’ Mr Munden goes overthe same evidence relating to the defendant’s conduct and the injury to the claimant’s feelings.In particular, he highlights a passage from one of the witness statements of the claimant inwhich he says that he feels,

“… a great sadness to think my lifetime’s work in helping

my family and the wider Al Sadik family as well as the
philanthropic work for the Palestinian community and
general integrity of my dealings has been undone with

some bitter and carefully placed words from the defendant.”

It is perfectly clear to me on that basis, which is the basis upon which I am required toproceed and it is appropriate to proceed, that the claimant deserves a good reputation both inbusiness and as a family man and, also, as a philanthropist and as somebody who has not givendishonest evidence to the court let alone having sworn on the Quran. Further, at the age of 78to find serious allegations like this percolating in the way that they do is deeply distressing anddeeply injurious to feelings and does cause a lot of upset. It is inevitable that this will be so,and that is another matter which has a bearing on the appropriate measure of damages.

It is quite clear, in my judgment, that the defendant is not at all repentant about what shehas done. And it is quite clear that there have been specific incidents in which she, thedefendant, has shown a belligerent approach to these issues, and particularly in contacting theclaimant’s wife. One of them is in the claimant’s second witness statement at paragraph 10where he complains that the defendant sent abusive and vitriolic WhatsApp messages to hiswife on 10 January 2018. There is a similar complaint in respect of the further message sent
to his wife by the defendant on 17 April 2018. And his evidence at paragraph 12 is:

“It is clear from these messages the defendant remains

completely unrepentant about the defamatory statements

she posted in the WhatsApp group on 19 September 2019,

and this is extremely distressing to both me and my wife.”

And it seems to me from what has happened today that that remains the defendant’s position,and that she is unrepentant.

The conduct of the litigation, and the conduct of the hearing today in cross-examiningthe claimant’s witnesses, as the defendant has done, and maintaining the stance she has done,are all matters that are capable of aggravating, that is increasing, the award of damages whichwould otherwise be appropriate. And in my judgment, they are plainly significant in this case,and plainly do aggravate the damages which it would otherwise be appropriate to award.

Just to be clear on this for the benefit of the defendant, if somebody publishes somethingwhich the court finds to be unjustified and harmful to reputation, the defendant can reduce theharmful effect of that by, for example, apologising, withdrawing, and expressing remorse; orthe defendant may do nothing, in which case the position is essentially neutral; or the defendantcan make things worse by persisting in the allegations, and by the way in which the litigationis conducted. And it is the third of those situations that has arisen in this case.

Mr Munden, finally, has asked for an award of damages in the sum of £50,000 which isthe increased amount which the claimant now seeks. When the matter was in front of Nicklin

J on 26 June 2018, the limit of the claimant’s claim then was £10,000, and Nicklin J said atparagraph 25 of his judgment,

“I am satisfied an award in excess of £10,000 would be

appropriate possibly by quite some margin.”

At that time, it seems to me, the evidence of indirect dissemination was less clear than it is infront of me today, and the persistence in the allegations and the lack of retraction had obviouslynot subsisted for as long as it has now that the matter is in front of me.

As to the guidance to be obtained by considering awards which have been made in othercases, in Doyle v Smith [2019] EMLR 19, Warby J said at [131]: “The authorities suggest thatthe Court should have regard to other awards made by Judges and/or approved by the Court ofAppeal, in respect of comparable libels”.

At the same time, as Eady J said in Al Amoudi v Kifle [2013] EWHC 293 (QB) at[24]: “comparable awards … are … of limited assistance only because circumstances vary somuch from one case to another”. Further, as Nicklin J said in Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC3525 at [228]: “Damages for libel cannot be calculated on any mathematical basis. Bydefinition, they seek to provide compensation for harm that it is almost impossible to quantifyin monetary terms. The Court attempts to achieve consistency in awards by applying theprinciples I have identified above, but in reality, no case presents exactly the samecircumstances and only some level of commonality or general principle can be extracted”.

It seems to me that £50,000 is an appropriate award of damages in this case having regardto the seriousness of the defamatory statements, the degree of direct circulation, the plaindegree of extended ‘grapevine’ circulation, and the defendant’s completely unrepentantattitude to the litigation, persisted in, as I say, up to today and in the course of today’s hearing.

Nothing less than that, in my judgment, would satisfy the three principal purposes of anaward of damages in this case, namely to compensate the claimant for harm, for the damage tohis reputation; vindicate his good name; and take account of the distress, hurt and humiliationwhich the defamatory publication has caused. And here the claimant repeated in his evidenceto me today orally the seriousness of the hurt and the distress to him that has been occasioned.

So for those reasons, I propose to make an award of damages in the sum of £50,000 thatis sought, which includes aggravated damages.

I also propose to grant an injunction to restrain a further publication.

So the only matter that remains to be decided is whether to make an order requiring the defendant to publish a summary of the judgment. Nicklin J, when the matter was in front of him on 26 June 2018, was not persuaded that this remedy, that is ordering the publication of asummary judgment, was appropriate. The position, in my judgment, in front of me today is
not significantly different.

In the course of reflecting on this judgment before delivering it, I have revisited Section12 of the Defamation Act 2013, which is the section which gives the court a discretion to orderthe defendant to publish a summary of the judgment; I have considered the decision of NicklinJ in Monirv Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB), in which Nicklin J discussed the principles at

It is not clear to me whether the defendant still is part of this WhatsApp group. In anyevent, I dare say that it could be reconstituted fairly easily. I also understand the force of MrMunden’s point, that it is at least arguable that a retraction or a statement coming from thedefendant summarising the judgment and possibly providing a link to this full ruling (which iswhat I ordered in Glenn v Kline that the defendant should do) would be more effective in termsof clarifying the position and telling people what the outcome of the proceedings has been thanthe claimant, himself, circulating the outcome of the judgement. But as against that, thequestion is always what is appropriate and proportionate.

On the one hand, the claimant will get his vindication from the sum that I have awarded.Further, he will be able to tell people that he succeeded and why he succeeded either in outlineor by reference to this detailed judgment. On the other hand, making an order against thedefendant that she should publish the summary is an incursion on her rights of freedom ofexpression. And, it seems to me, it probably would require some order requiring her toreconstitute the WhatsApp group as well as to send the summary in whatever the form the courtthought was appropriate to the original publishees. Overall, I am not persuaded that that is anappropriate course to take in all the circumstances.

The position is that in other cases sometimes the court has ordered this relief and in somecases it has not. The only case I am aware of – I am sure there are others – where the court has
is the case of Serafin v Malkiewicz [2019] EWCA Civ 852, which is referred to in Glenn vKline, but there was no reasoning about that because it arose in front of the Court of Appeal atthe stage of the order being sought; and so one does not get any guidance from that judgment.

Doing the best I can, and influenced but not determinatively by what Nicklin J said andthe view that he took, I am not persuaded that this will be more effective in terms of vindicationthan simply allowing the claimant to disseminate the outcome of the hearing for himself.

So I propose to decline the third head of relief that Mr Munden has asked for, which is