F v M

This is an application brought by the father (F) for summary return of his two daughters, who were removed from Türkiye to the United Kingdom by the mother (M) on 12^th December 2024. The application is pursuant to the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, incorporating the 1980 Hague Convention. The removal was without F’s knowledge or consent; it was a carefully planned abduction. The children were taken directly from the school to the airport, deracinated from all they had known: their father, home, school and friends. As an abduction, it is towards the higher end of the index of gravity and requires to be identified as such.

There can be no doubt that the children are habitually resident in the Republic of Türkiye. Since 31^st October 2024, the Fethiye Family Court in the Muğlaprovince of Türkiye has been seized with determining questions relating to the children’s welfare. This is pursuant to M’s application. Additionally, she petitioned for divorce and financial remedies. F has filed a response and cross-application. There can be no dispute that F has rights of custody. M recognises this and its consequences, namely that her removal of the children from Türkiye was plainly wrongful, having regard to Article 3 of the Hague Convention.

The parties met in Türkiye in 2014, when M was taking a holiday in Fethiye. During the course of the next twelve months or so, M travelled back to Türkiye to visit F, approximately five or six times. In 2015, M decided to relocate permanently. The couple married in September 2016. They now have two girls, S and R, who were born in Türkiye and who are aged 8 and 6 respectively. They hold dual British and Turkish nationality. The family lived together in Fethiye until the summer of 2024. M alleges that during the marriage, she was subjected to a sustained pattern of domestic abuse, coercive control, racial hostility by the father, including physical assaults on her and the children. Additionally, M asserts that there were threats to kill her and that she was subject to degrading treatment. F denies these allegations and counters that M was abusive, relying on her conviction for actual bodily harm (ABH) in Türkiye on 19^th April 2022, following an incident when she was found to have scratched him deliberately with her nails.

The parties finally separated in August 2024. One evening in August, F returned from work, on his account, to find his clothes in bin bags and the doors of the family home locked to him. F states that the next day, he applied to the Fethiye Family Court for a Protection Order pursuant to Turkish Law No. 6284 of the Protection of Family and Violence against Women. The remedies available are broadly reflective of those available under the Family Law Act 1996. On 7^th August 2024, the Fethiye Family Court made an ex-parte Protection Order against M, requiring her to vacate the family home and not to engage in words and behaviours that involve threats or violence, insult, humiliation or degradation towards F or the children. The Order was to endure for two months, concluding in October 2024.

The contact arrangements that followed are described in F’s statement:

“On two occasions throughout this period, the Turkish court granted [M] access to the children: once in September 2024, and once on 31 October 2024, so that the children could spend time with [M] on her birthday. These contact sessions lasted from 10am to 5pm, with handovers taking place at the local police station.”

M moved into her own rental accommodation nearby; enquiries made by the police found that £600 pcm was paid into her account, which appears to be from her parents, with an additional 500 euros from a source which has not been made clear to me. M owns a house in England.

It is F’s case that the maternal grandparents travelled from England to Türkiye, in October 2024, and had contact with the children on four occasions. On a fifth occasion, it is said there was what Mr Rowbotham, Counsel for F, describes as “an explosion of abuse” from the grandparents in the restaurant in front of diners. As a result of this and what he regarded as increasingly abusive messages from M, F, twice, obtained extensions to the Protection Order; two months from 23^rd October 2024 and a further two months on 4^th December 2024.

The chronology of the Turkish proceedings has been helpfully summarised, non-contentiously, by Mr Rowbotham, which I can broadly adopt:

The children reside with M and their maternal grandparents in London. They have had negligible contact with F, and it seems clear that the gifts and cards sent to them by F were not delivered to them by M.

M seeks to rely on Article 13(2) Objections. The law in this sphere is settled but not always receptive to straightforward application. It does not require to be rehearsed extensively. The Court’s task is twofold. Firstly, to identify whether the child, in fact, objects to return; and, if so, to determine whether the child has attained the age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of their views. If this “gateway”, as it is frequently termed, is not crossed, then the defence has failed. If it is satisfied, then the Court must evaluate the weight to be given to the objections. The Court’s discretion is at large.

In Re M (Abduction: Zimbabwe) [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 FLR 251, Baroness Hale proffered the following assistance in identifying the approach to the exercise:

“Taking account does not mean that those views are always determinative or even presumptively so. Once the discretion comes into play, the court may have to consider the nature and strength of the child’s objections, the extent to which they are ‘authentically her own’ or the product of the influence of the abducting parent, the extent to which they coincide or are at odds with other considerations which are relevant to her welfare, as well as the general Convention considerations referred to earlier. The older the child, the greater the weight that her objections are likely to carry. But that is far from saying that the child's objections should only prevail in the most exceptional circumstances.”

Where allegations are contested, tension inevitably arises between establishing the fact and / or authenticity of a child’s objections and the summary complexion of the regime in which these decisions are taken. In evaluating the evidence, however, even on a summary basis, the Court is not shackled to accepting mere assertion, reported by an adult or indeed expressed by a child. On the contrary, it is bound to consider all the relevant evidence before it. An evaluative assessment must be made here just as it must when, for example, considering an Article 13(b) defence. In that context, Moylan LJ puts it in these terms in Re C (Children) (Abduction: Article 13 (b)) [2018] EWCA Civ 2834 at [39]:

“In my view, in adopting this proposed solution, it was not being suggested that no evaluative assessment of the allegations could or should be undertaken by the court. Of course a judge has to be careful when conducting a paper evaluation but this does not mean that there should be no assessment at all about the credibility or substance of the allegations …”

All this resonates, at least by parity of analysis, when considering whether a child has expressed objections to return; whether those objections are authentic and, if so, the weight which should be given to them. The exercise required is manifestly subtle and nuanced, sometimes exquisitely so. This is the inevitable consequence of evaluating a child’s wishes and feelings within the constraints of a summary jurisdiction, itself predicated on principles of international comity.

In this case, both children have become aware of their parents’ polarised positions. Given F’s very limited contact with the children since they were abducted, I consider it safe to conclude that it is M who has discussed the proceedings with them. Though R says that she will not go to Türkiye and will “scream down the whole airport” if made to return, she is unable to articulate any reasons for her resistance. In speaking to the Cafcass Officer, she expressed her concern that F will miss them if they do not return. I note the following passage in the Cafcass Report:

“Whilst exploring who is important to them, [S] named her friends and family which included her aunt, cousins and uncles in England. [R] named her sister. I queried if they identified their mother and father as being important to them. [R] said yes, they are important. [S] said that her father was not important to her because of how he treated her, he would smack her. [R] commented that her father wanted them to be maids.”

R describes Türkiye as being “nice” but went on to correct herself, calling it “boring”. I do not consider those descriptions to be consonant with a resistance expressed as “screaming down the whole airport” and, in her case, her clear view that both parents are important to her. Ms Cull-Fitzpatrick, the Cafcass Officer, relates that M “has shared some of her own feelings and experiences with the children”. I find that rather an ambiguous remark. She goes on to say that “this will have influenced [their] perception of their father”. However, she concludes that “the children did not appear scripted in their answers”. These remarks are set out in the Cafcass Report under the heading “Professional Judgement”. With respect to the author of the report, I find these passages so equivocal and cautious as ultimately to rob them of any clear meaning. Evaluating M’s reports of domestic abuse “taken at their most serious”, leads Ms Cull-Fitzpatrick to observe “I would be concerned about the risk of harm to [S] and [R] associated with domestic abuse as well as physical abuse perpetrated by [F], should they return to the same circumstances in which they were previously living in Turkey”. I note that she does not appear to perform the same evaluative exercise when assessing F’s complaint of domestic abuse against M, supported as it is, by her conviction for ABH and an, at least partial, admission by M herself.

I do find the report very helpful when the concentration is on the children and not on the allegations. In particular, I note that R is “already displaying anxious behaviours” most likely in consequence of feelings of “confusion, sadness, and abandonment”. Though R’s behaviours are not extensively recorded, they are described as “visible” and sufficient for Ms Cull-Fitzpatrick to advise “the parents to seek professional therapeutic support via their GP to ensure that she is able to access the necessary support”. I note that unlike her sister, R is said not to have made any friends at her English school. Also, when the children were asked if there was anything else they felt was important for the judge to know, S wrote “I don’t want to go back to Turkey, please. I want to stay in England” (this was accompanied by a drawing of a smiley face). R is recorded as not having “anything to add”.

The Cafcass Report describes how “the children said that their father was rude to their mother”, explaining that R “knew this because her mother had told her...”. In relation to R’s complaint that F smacked her, Ms Cull-Fitzpatrick says that when she “tried to establish specific details of the incidents, [R] shrugged her shoulders and said that she didn’t know”. Both children are reported as saying that when they lived in Türkiye, “dad kicked their mum out” (sic). R is reported as saying that “her father wanted her to be a boy so that he would have help with the restaurant”. S also spoke negatively about her experiences in Türkiye, describing it as “not good”, elaborating that “people were not nice, but rude”. I note that echoes the remarks made by her sister (see above). S also volunteered that “people were not rude to her but they were rude to her mother”. Again, this resonates with R’s comments and further reflects M’s influence on the girls’ expressed views.

Mr Rowbotham submits that “whilst the mother alleges that the children have made express and unambiguous comments of not wanting to return to Türkiye, that evidence is plainly self-serving and cannot be relied upon”. It is contended that the threshold is not met in the case of either child. Insofar as there are identifiable objections, Mr Rowbotham suggests that they are raised in relation to a return to F’s care rather than an objection to a return to Türkiye. Having regard to the children’s ages, I consider that these two distinct concepts have, understandably, elided in their minds. It is important to note that it is intended that the children should live with their mother in Türkiye on their immediate return. However, it is also clear that there are well advanced family proceedings in which F intends to pursue sole custody of the girls. In these circumstances, I consider Mr Rowbotham’s interpretation of the children’s views to be too rigid.

In any event, the gateway stage is not intended to be a sophisticated or complex test. Article 13(2) exists to respect the autonomy of children and young people, underscored by Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. Here, I am satisfied that, on a straightforward and balanced examination of whether the simple terms of the Convention are met, both children have expressed a resistance to return to Türkiye, which goes beyond a preference or view, and should ostensibly be regarded as an objection.

As discussed above, the second stage of consideration is an unfettered discretionary exercise. As the extracts from the Cafcass Report reveal, it is not possible to be confident that the views expressed by both girls might be said to be authentically their own. They manifestly reflect the perhaps inevitable influence of their abducting parent. The lack of any detailed reasoning behind the objections is strikingly similar to the lack of detail supporting the serious and colourful allegations M makes against F. The deliberate suborning of the children’s own independent wishes, as I find this to be, inevitably calls into question the weight that can be placed upon their expressed objections, particularly in the light of their age and understanding.

The discretionary exercise is a wide one. As Baroness Hale said in Re M (supra), the objections must also be considered with regard to the extent to which they coincide or conflict with other factors related to the child’s welfare. The general Convention considerations must, additionally, be accommodated:

“44.

... As is clear from the earlier discussion, the Convention was the product of prolonged discussions in which some careful balances were struck and fine distinctions drawn. The underlying purpose is to protect the interests of children by securing the swift return of those who have been wrongfully removed or retained. The Convention itself has defined when a child must be returned and when she need not be. Thereafter the weight to be given to Convention considerations and to the interests of the child will vary enormously. The extent to which it will be appropriate to investigate those welfare considerations will also vary. But the further away one gets from the speedy return envisaged by the Convention, the less weighty those general Convention considerations must be.”

Both these girls have now been living in the UK for twelve months. They are black British / Turkish and are bilingual, entirely fluent in both English and Turkish. They have a very strong relationship with each other. They orbit each other’s lives, sharing many interests, reflecting their proximity in age. R appears to depend on her older sister. I note that she was very reluctant to be seen by the Cafcass Officer on her own and similarly hesitant about leaving S with the Cafcass Officer. When the Cafcass Officer endeavoured to speak with M on her own, I am told that R “became distressed and lay on the floor in protest, refusing to leave the room”. Eventually, with a lot of reassurance, she stood outside the door and watched. She quickly became distressed and so the discussion with M was terminated.

Ms Cull-Fitzpatrick highlighted that “such behaviour in a child of [R]’s age is unusual and there may be several contributing factors, however, it is likely that her previous experience of being separated from her mother contributed to her display of behaviour and feelings of distress”. It must also be likely that being taken from her home, school, father, friends and belongings without any preparation will have caused her continuing psychological distress, coupled with M’s clear exposure of the children to the parental conflict. As I have commented, the Cafcass Officer has recommended that R be referred for therapeutic help.

Many have emphasised, in other cases, that applications pursuant to the Hague Convention are intended to be speedy and summary, recognising that in cases of abduction and wrongful retention, delay will invariably, perhaps always, be harmful to the child. It is instructive to consider the weight given to the impact of abduction on children, recognised in the criminal law: see Re H [2016] EWCA Crim 1754, [2017] 1 Cr App R (S) 23 (165). It is almost paradigmatic in these cases that the focus is on the adults and not the children. That is strikingly so in the voluminous papers filed in this case. Though predicated on principles of comity, the Hague Convention is above all else, structured to protect children. This should not be lost sight of.

Attached to one of M’s three statements and extensive exhibits are the children’s school reports. R’s school report, prepared by the Head Teacher, describes R as intellectually curious and enthusiastic, participating actively in class activities, attentive and thoughtful. Although she is currently below national expectations, thought to be due to her late start, she is making steady and encouraging progress. She addresses her work with enthusiasm, and her progress has had a positive impact on her confidence.

S is making even greater progress. She appears to have an aptitude for mathematics and has a growing confidence in numeracy. This is described by the Head Teacher as “a joy to see”. It is also noted that her “positive attitude and joyful spirit make her a pleasure to teach”.

It is clear that the upheaval in these children’s lives has had a predictably adverse impact on them as, no doubt, has their exposure to adult conflict. Against this backdrop, their progress and burgeoning confidence at school illuminates what I consider to be their clamant need for stability and security. The Head Teacher’s observations eloquently identify the children’s feelings which, in turn, add depth and force to their expressed wishes. In the wider context of this analysis of their needs, their objections to returning to Türkiye gain much greater weight, force and authenticity.

Again, the law in this sphere is settled. In Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, [2011] 2 FLR 758 at [31] - [35], the Supreme Court reiterated the test to be applied when assessing an Article 13(b) defence. The principles can be succinctly stated:

The risk of physical harm, M contends, is posed both to herself and the children. As far as the children are concerned, this is predicated on the allegation that F would hit and slap them. There are no actual recollected occasions when this is said to have occurred. I have noted that Ms Cull-Fitzpatrick, despite her efforts, was not able to establish specific details of the occasion when R said her father slapped her. F accepts that he occasionally used smacking as a form of discipline but strenuously disputes that this amounted to assault or that it was frequent. I do not regard M as a reliable chronicler of the truth, in which context I note that the children make no other specified criticisms of their father. I consider F’s account of the smacking to be most likely accurate, in particular, it was deployed infrequently.

Whilst smacking children is entirely unacceptable, I do not consider that what has occurred here falls within the contemplation of this defence. It would be inaccurate to describe it in the language of Article 13(b), the wording of which has been carefully considered. This provision requires behaviour which generates a grave risk and is intolerable. Whilst deprecating any smacking of a child, I consider it would be a distortion of the language of Article 13(b) to describe what I have concluded occurred in its terms.

In respect of any physical harm alleged to have been sustained by M, Mr Rowbotham submits that M adopts “a scattergun approach to this defence”, alleging a considerable number of unsubstantiated allegations which have become increasingly colourful, or “outrageous” as he puts it, as the litigation has progressed. For reasons that I have already indicated, I do not consider that these allegations can be “taken at their height”, they require an evaluative assessment.

M asserts that F lives a life of crime, operating at a very high level. I agree with Mr Rowbotham that the gravity and seriousness of her allegations have escalated in each statement. It is contended that F has “at least 16 criminal convictions”. F’s criminal antecedents have been produced. They may or may not be complete, but they are relatively recent. They amount to a false report of theft of a phone and selling bottles of alcohol, in his restaurant, on which excise duties had not been paid. M suggests that F can “pay people to do anything”. This includes threatening, intimidating or harming others on his behalf. M contends that F can make people “disappear”. She asserts that F is involved in prostitution. She says there are “rumours surrounding the Applicant running brothels at the restaurant”.

M says that in the period the children were living with their father, she received calls from “strangers” stating that “they want the women they sold to the Applicant returned to them”. It is not clear how they knew M or why it was thought she would have the authority to do their bidding. I understand M to be insinuating that F was involved in some form of human trafficking. M also contends that she and the children are at risk of being killed. In her third statement, which I permitted to be filed at the commencement of this hearing, M asserts an incident in which F “threatened to stab [her] with a knife”. This had never been mentioned at any stage before in these proceedings.

In her second statement dated 26^th September 2025, M relates the following:

“[F] began suggesting that I should engage in prostitution and sell the children to a village in Eastern Turkey. If I said anything in response, he would retort with words around selling all three of us to the black market as monkey performance is in high demand.”

None of these colourful allegations fit with the broader canvas of the evidence, much of which is also provided by M. In the Turkish proceedings, M alleges that the family was dependant on support from England to meet the household expenses. She also asserts that F worked very long hours at the restaurant. Both of these are difficult to reconcile with the allegations of F’s high-level criminal activity. They betray no evidence of high living on the proceeds of crime which usually accompany such activities. Indeed, the prevailing impression is that family finances are very tight. Even F’s conviction for non-payment of excise duties suggests that the family was struggling financially. Moreover, as it appears, F spent most of his time working at the restaurant, often till late at night, it is difficult to see when he had the opportunity to orchestrate trafficking. I note that both girls find the time that they have spent at the restaurant to be “boring”.

There is barely a scintilla of evidence of any of these serious allegations. Plainly, the Court is required to conduct a paper evaluation and, as such, must be cautious. However, the striking lack of detail on these issues, their escalating seriousness and their inconsistency with the wider evidential canvass corrodes their credibility.

In her first statement, M also asserts that she received threatening messages, again from ‘strangers’, saying “bad things were going to happen”. She continues, “my children and I have feared for our lives so many times and I can’t return my children to Turkey under no circumstances”. I note that these allegations have not been made in the Turkish proceedings and again, lack any kind of specificity. I do not consider they are established on the evidence. In my judgement, they reflect M’s desperation when contemplating any return to Türkiye. She plainly considered her separation from the children to be cruel and unjustified. She also felt that F skilfully manipulated the legal process, such that her voice was not heard.

This lack of detail characterises a great deal of M’s Article 13(b) defence. Her assertion of “controlling or coercive behaviour”, again, has a formulaic and artificial complexion to it, e.g. “when I posted pictures of myself on social media, I was forced to take them down immediately”; “the applicant controlled my movements. I was not allowed to talk to people or move freely. If I did, I was met with threats of abuse. I was forced to sit in the restaurant”. M says nothing more about either of these allegations, nor are they placed in any context. Controlling and coercive behaviour is an insidious and subtle form of domestic abuse. It is frequently characterised by a pattern of incidents which seem trivial but are cumulatively corrosive of autonomy. None of this pattern emerges here. M’s statement frequently descends into a list of unspecified allegations.

Ultimately, these fail to discharge the burden of proof that rests on those asserting this defence. It is unnecessary to trawl through each of the many allegations, which I, again, agree with Mr Rowbotham can properly be described as “scattergun”. In parenthesis, I would also add that in this case, once again, the Practice Guidance (Case Management and Mediation of International Child Abduction Proceedings) 2023 is honoured in the breach, not the observance. The bundle is 530 pages and there is a supplemental bundle too. Neither party is served by this. The Practice Direction exists to keep a focus on the issues in the applications. Non-compliance means that the issues are not being focused upon with sufficient clarity. That assists nobody. Moreover, it runs the risk of obfuscating key issues by marginal or irrelevant ones. For all the reasons I have set out, I reject M’s Article 13(b) defence.

Returning to the children’s objections to return. I have indicated that I consider that their views had been influenced by M. Nonetheless, I have concluded that they are genuinely and strongly held. It is clear that they have experienced protracted separation from their mother in Türkiye. F was greatly restricted in the care that he could provide for them in consequence of his commitments to his restaurant. Whether on M’s allegations or F’s account of events, it is clear that one of the nannies selected by F was unsuitable for the post. M contends that the boyfriend of that nanny sent her a picture of a gun. The implication was that she was being threatened and intimidated to the extent of an insinuated death threat. F’s response to this, unlike any of the other allegations, is apparently to accept the truth of it, “[M] writes ... that she received a message from this ex-boyfriend of [the nanny] with a picture of a gun. I was very sorry to read that and I am reassured that I did the right thing by firing [the nanny] as soon as I heard about her past”. The significance of all this, from the children’s perspective, is that they were isolated from their primary carer, in the care of adults who were barely known to them, at least one of whom, was plainly unsuitable. This continued, pursuant to three concurrent ex-parte Orders, for a period of four months. From the girls’ perspective, having regard to their age, that was a very significant period of time. Manifestly, this was a traumatic experience for them.

Further, whilst I deprecate M’s wrongful removal of the children, it is not difficult to see how she felt she had no alternative. Nonetheless, again, from the children’s perspective, it compounded trauma with further trauma. R’s behaviour has been sufficiently striking for an experienced Cafcass Officer to indicate that she needs therapeutic help. As I have said, I have no doubt that is not a recommendation made lightly.

It is clear that these two girls are now basking in the stability of their stable home, their structured education and routine, and their return to their primary carer. What awaits them in Türkiye, on F’s own case, is further litigation (seeking a return to his care) which, in itself, will generate great stress for these two girls and their mother. It is in this context, that I can consider their expressed views, notwithstanding the influence of M, require to be afforded great and ultimately determinative weight. In particular, R’s circumstances in the UK are propitious for the therapeutic input that she requires. The girls’ attendance at school is 100% with good punctuality. They are described as cheerful, positive and developing good relationships with peers and adults. R is described as “learning to manage more challenging feelings with support from staff when needed”. In short, they are thriving. They have been living in the United Kingdom now for almost exactly a year. Inevitably, the further one gets from the speedy return contemplated by the Convention, the weaker the pull of the general Convention considerations of comity become. Ultimately and for these reasons, I consider their welfare needs points strongly to remaining in the UK. It is their own instinctive recognition of this which, I find, generates their objections.