T (A Child) (Non-Agency Adoption), Re

This judgment involves the welfare of a three year old girl anonymised in this judgment as T. There are two sets of proceedings. The first are proceedings invoking the High Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction seeking relief by way of an injunction to prevent the first respondent removing T from the care of the Applicants. The second is the Applicants’ application for an adoption order in respect of T. That application is conjoined to be heard by me sitting as a judge of the Family Court. The Applicants are a married couple who have acted as T’s foster carers from when she was five days old. The first respondent is T’s mother. The second respondent, the London Borough of Ealing, obtained care and placement orders in respect of T on 7 August 2023. They opposed the application for an injunction and they oppose the Applicants adopting T. They seek to place T with her birth half-sister, R, who is placed with adoptive parents in the north of England. The third respondent, the London Borough of Hounslow, is the local authority where the applicants reside and as such were made a respondent to the adoption proceedings by operation of the Family Procedure Rules. They are neutral on the applications. T is a party to the proceedings and her Cafcass Guardian represents her and is in support of the relief sought by the Applicants.

At a hearing over three days I heard evidence and submissions. At the conclusion of the hearing I announced that the court would grant the Applicants the relief they seek. T will be adopted by them. I also made a post-adoption contact order. I endeavour to set out my reasons for making these order below.

T was born in November 2022 and is now aged three years and two months. Her birth mother is white British and aged in her late thirties. Her birth father is from a country in Africa and is aged around 30. He does not have parental responsibility for T. He is currently in prison. T has two maternal half-siblings, namely: (a) A, a boy aged nineteen; and, (b) R, a girl aged four. R was the subject of separate (earlier) care proceedings and placed in a separate foster placement to T. T has never lived with her mother or siblings. She has never met her father and last had contact with her mother at a ‘wish you well contact’ in March 2025.

Mr and Mrs X are of an east African heritage. They each moved to the UK in early adulthood. They met in 2007 and married in 2008. They have four sons. They were approved as foster carers in 2021 and have acted as such ever since.

T was removed from her mother’s care shortly after her birth due to concerns about alcohol and substance misuse and domestic abuse. She was discharged from Hospital into Mr and Mrs X’s care at the age of five days old. On 7 August 2023, at the conclusion of care proceedings in the West London Family Court, T was made the subject of care and placement orders in favour of the second respondent. Between August 2023 and March 2025, the second respondent’s social work team was unable to identify a suitable adoptive placement for T and her half-sister. On 4 September 2024, a Together and Apart assessment undertaken by the local authority concluded that R and T be placed in separate adoptive placements, in the event adopters are not identified to take both R and T because ‘there is some evidence to suggest R presents with competing needs’ and ‘we have been unable to match R and T with prospective adopters who are willing to adopt a sibling group of two.’

There is a factual difference between the local authority and Mr and Mrs X as to when they first put themselves forward as prospective adopters for T. In any event, by October 2024 they were being considered during care planning as a potential adoptive placement for her. The second respondent informed Mr and Mrs X on 27 February 2025 that T would be removed from their care and placed for adoption alongside R. Mr and Mrs X asked the local authority to reconsider and to obtain a professional assessment on the subject of the impact of disrupting T’s attachment to them. The local authority did not agree to do so.

On 26 March 2025, Mr and Mrs X gave notice to the second respondent of their intention to adopt T. Mr and Mrs X requested the local authority’s assurances that T would not be removed from their care pending the determination of their adoption application. The local authority did not agree and informed Mr and Mrs X that they were proceeding with the plan to place T with R.

On 24 April 2025, the applicants applied for an injunction to prevent T’s removal from their care. On 16 May 2025, the applicants sent an application for an adoption order to the Central Family Court. There is some doubt about what happened to this application. A Deputy High Court Judge made case management directions in respect of the injunction application on 19 May 2025. A hearing of the application for an injunction was listed on 13 June 2025. The birth parents were not joined to this application and no directions were made for the applications to be served on them, whether redacted or otherwise.

A Deputy High Court Judge made an interim injunction preventing the removal of T from the care of Mr and Mrs X (save for emergencies). It appears the judge determined that the adoption application could proceed and “deemed” the adoption application to have been made at the date of the hearing, namely 13 June 2025. The order notes that the order was to be sent to the Family Court at West London and “for the avoidance of doubt, the applicants adoption application shall be issued forthwith, transferred and listed alongside these proceedings.” T was joined as a party. The order is silent on service of the adoption application notice on T’s mother.

The matter came before a third and different Deputy High Court Judge on 4 July 2025 for case management. The order notes the injunction proceedings number. The parties were listed as the applicants, the first, second and fourth respondents. A recital to the order notes:

Detailed directions were made for further evidence to include the instruction of an independent social worker; a sibling attachment assessment; an Annex A assessment; further evidence and disclosure from the second respondent. The proceedings were listed for a directions hearing on 8 December 2025 and a four day final hearing in February 2026.

R moved to live with her adopters on 3 July 2025.

The sibling assessment report is dated 20 November 2025. The Annex A / FPR r.14.11 assessment report is dated 19 December 2025. Both recommend that T should be adopted by Mr and Mrs X. The Guardian informed the parties that she recommended that T should be adopted by Mr and Mrs X. The second respondent continued to oppose Mr and Mrs X’s application and sought to remove T from their care and to place her with R and R’s prospective adopters.

I heard this matter on 13 January 2026 (the parties were not ready for the earlier listed hearing on 8 December 2025). The order noted that adoption application had been “lodged” at the Family Court at West London but had not been issued. It further noted that directions had been made in the “deemed” adoption application proceedings. The order requested the Adoption Team at West London issue the application with urgency given the final hearing was listed for 9 February 2026.

Upon enquiry it also appeared the first respondent had not been served with the C66 Injunction application proceedings (although it is clear she was aware of these proceedings). I directed that:

I also required the second respondent to write to the first respondent forthwith explaining to her that:

The second respondent formally wrote to the first respondent setting out this information on 23 January 2026.

My order also noted that whilst T’s father does not have parental responsibility for T he is aware of the adoption process because he spoke with the FPR Rule 14.11 reporter. I required the second respondent to write to him via the relevant prison Governor explaining that:

I have seen a letter dated 6 February 2026 to the father at his prison. The letter sets out the information above and informs the father he can apply to be a party. No response has been received from him.

Her Honour Judge Downey sitting at the Family Court at West London considered Mr and Mrs X’s adoption application alongside my order from 13 January 2026 on 27 January 2026. HHJ Downey (correctly) noted that there were defects with the adoption application which included missing original documents, the child medical report was six months out of date and that proper notice of the adoption application had not been given to the birth parents. However, in the light of my order, HHJ Downey issued the application and made arrangements for the team at West London to serve the notice of application and notice of hearing on the birth parents and the London Borough of Hounslow (and the applicants and second respondent). The Notice of Hearing (clearly listing the hearing on 9-11 February 2026) was sent on by first class post on 2 February 2026 to the first respondent at the correct address. The same Notice of Hearing was sent to the birth father at the relevant prison. Again it was sent by first class post on 2 February 2026. Likewise, in the same circumstances both birth parents were sent HHJ Downey’s order made on 27 January 2026. Applying FPR Rule 6.34 and PD 6A the deemed date for service by first class post was Wednesday 4 February 2026 on the birth parents.

At the outset of the hearing on 9 February 2026 I raised with the parties my considerable concerns about: (i) the nature of a “deemed” but not issued application; (ii) fair notice to, and service upon, on the first respondent; (iii) whether proper consideration could be given to joinder of the birth father and whether consideration of his joinder would need to be adjoined to ensure fairness and the satisfaction of all statutory and procedural requirements. All represented parties submitted all requirements in relation to these issues could be met or legitimately and properly waived. I requested a written note be agreed setting this out. Mr Wilson provided this during the course of the hearing. I am particularly grateful to him for his industry and to the other advocates for agreeing and/or contributing to it. The agreed position is largely as follows.

On 13 June 2025, the Deputy High Court Judge made an order that: ‘Time is abridged for the Applicants to give notice to apply to adopt [T], such that the application shall be deemed as having been made as at the date of this hearing.’ This order was made following the court’s determination of a legal dispute between the applicants and the second respondent as to whether the requirement in section 44 (2)-(3) Adoption and Children Act 2002 (hereafter “the 2002 Act”) had been satisfied, namely that the applicants must have given notice to the relevant local authority of their intention to adopt T no less than three months before the adoption application was made. They served notice to the London Borough of Ealing on 14 March 2025, which is less than three months before they made their application on 16 May 2025. It subsequently transpired that notice should have been given to the third respondent.

The judge was able to “abridge” the notice requirement in section 44 (2)-(3) ACA 2002, applying the approach articulated in previous decisions, namely Re TY (Preliminaries To Intercountry Adoption) [2019] EWHC 2979 (Fam) (Cobb J, as he then was), Re A (A Child: Adoption Time Limits S44(3)) [2020] EWHC 3296 (Fam) (Keehan J), Re X (Time Barred Adoption) [2024] 2 FLR 513 (Arbuthnot J), Mr and Mrs C v D and Others [2024] 1 FLR 69 (Peel J), and Andrew v Beatrice and Others [2024] 1 FLR 773 (Mostyn J).

As recorded on the face of the order dated 4 July 2025, the parties (including the applicants) served the third respondents with notice in July 2025.

I am satisfied that Mr and Mrs X have given more than three months but not more than two years notice of their intention to adopt T to both the second and third respondents. The requirements of section 44 (2) and (3) of the 2002 Act have been met.

A further issue arose out of the fact Mr and Mrs X’s adoption medical report is dated 27 August 2025. However the agreed position of the parties was that the absence of the medical reports required by the FPR does not ‘invalidate’ any step taken in the proceedings, unless the court so orders, and the court may make an order to ‘remedy’ the error (FPR r.4.7) or more appositely the court could vary this time period pursuant to FPR rule 4.1 (3) (a) and (o). I accept the agreed position that this does not invalidate the January 2026 adoption application and the time can be extended. Aside from the (important) application of the FPR, there is ample medical (and other professional) evidence in the papers about T.

I was concerned about the position of T’s birth mother. It was concerning to note that despite proceedings having been issued in April 2025 she did not appear to have been served with either injunction or adoption (deemed or otherwise) application until very recently. She appears to have been aware of the issues. She emailed the allocated social worker on 26 June 2025 stating that:

on 26 November 2025 the first respondent had a lengthy WhatsApp communication with the social worker. She was asked her views on T and R being adopted and whether they should be together or apart. She stated she felt T was very settled in her placement and that she was doing well and so was “inclined” to believe this set up should continue. Change for the girls would be unsettling. She wanted them to have contact together if cared for separately. She did not want the girls to be unsettled or go through more confusion. She was very keen to have a photograph of R and T together. It is clear the first respondent knew of the adoption plans for T in November 2025.

I am satisfied that the first respondent was served with notice of the application, and in compliance with FPR Rule 14.8, notice of the final hearing. Service took place on 4 February 2026. Additionally in light of the letter sent on 23 January 2026 the first respondent was fully aware of the issues which would be aired at the hearing. The first respondent did not attend the hearing. She was in communication with the second respondent’s social worker by WhatsApp and it is clear on the basis of his evidence that she did not want to attend the hearing. Of course, the first respondent should have been formally served with both sets of proceedings much earlier. She has been aware of the substance of the applications for some time. She has set out her views. In as much as it is necessary to abridge time for service on her of the adoption application, I do so. Such an abridgement is both just and necessary to permit the court to fairly proceed to consider the much delayed welfare issues that arise in respect of T.

I am also satisfied that T’s birth father was aware of the application and received notice of the hearing. I accept he was given limited time and I further accept his position is complicated by his incarceration. He has never met T. He has not (to date) sought out contact with T. In the Rule 14.11 report, it is noted the author of the report spoke with the father’s mental health social worker on 27 November 2025 and it was reported he was “accepting” that adoption for T was the best thing to provide her with a family. Given his current situation he did not oppose adoption and whilst he would like his family to care for her, her could not provide any contact details for them. I am satisfied in these circumstances that whilst the FPR provide that a father without parental responsibility can be made a respondent to an adoption application, on the facts of the these proceedings, it was not necessary for him to be a party to the two applications before the court, and particularly the adoption application. The father was noted to want video and in person contact with T in the future.

The material evidence was provided by the applicant foster parents, the social worker from the second respondent; two independent social workers (one who authored the FPR Rule 14.11 report and the author of the Together and Apart assessment report) and the Guardian. There is also an informal letter provided to the court by the second respondent, setting out the views of the B family, who are R’s adoptive parents. It is only necessary to briefly summarise the evidence, as it mostly amounted to different opinion evidence, as opposed to disputed facts.

The applicants provided evidence that T had been placed with them from when she was only a few days old. Mrs X is her primary care giver. Mr X notes that T was placed with his family in November 2022 and that is the only family T has ever known. He describes how T has grown up with his four sons and that they are all close. He says T has thrived emotionally, intellectually and socially. She is also connected to the wider family. He notes that his home country and T’s father’s home country share a similar culture. He charts his own background as an asylum seeker fleeing war, obtaining a university degree, obtaining British citizenship and building a home for his family. The family are observant Christians and attend church. T is the second child he and his wife have fostered. They love her. He explains there was a short period when T was in respite care because the second respondent had failed to arrange for her to obtain a passport and she was unable to attend a family holiday in the USA and the respite was extended when the family returned because Mrs X was ill. He says he expressed an interest to the second respondent in adopting T and formally confirmed this at a meeting on 10 December 2024. He was then informed in February 2025 that T would be placed for adoption with her sister R to an alternative adoptive family. He then explains why he is very concerned the second respondent failed to carry out an assessment of removing T from the only family she has known and explains why he has applied for an injunction.

He gave short helpful oral evidence in which he made clear to the court his belief in the need for regular ‘organic’ contact between T and R if T is adopted by them. He promised to work with the B family to achieve this.

On behalf of the second respondent, a social work manager expressed the written view that Mr and Mrs X were only ever considered as short term foster carers for a child under two. The authority had explained to them that the plan for T was to be placed for adoption together with her sister, R and that this was explained to Mr and Mrs X at Permanence Planning Meetings for T. The manager accepts the Independent Reviewing Officer suggested Mr and Mrs X be provided with information for adoption and considered. The manager charts the lengthy history of the “family finding” process for T from August 2023. It is said that a family in the North of England became interested in T and R in November 2024. They were identified at the hearing as the B family. The second respondent selected them as prospective adopters in February 2025 and the Agency Decision Maker approved the placement on 3 April 2025. The manager explained it was best for the two sisters to be placed together and whilst there would be an “emotional impact” on T of leaving the care of Mr and Mrs X this is “often the case for children moving from foster care to their adoptive family”. The children would be carefully supported. The manager stated that Mr and Mrs X’s application to adopt T had delayed the process for both R and T. It was said that Mr and Mrs X “will not promote” R and T’s relationship because of difficulties with R’s earlier foster carers.

T’s social worker also filed witness statements. He gave evidence about R, noting she was the subject of care and placement orders and had been placed in a number of different foster families. It was noted she has some speech and language difficulties and there was discussion of autism. He notes that sibling contact took place between T and R from August 2023. It was noted the foster carers needed encouragement to support the contact. R was noted to engage with T but to be upset after the contact ended. Greater efforts were later made to properly structure and schedule contact between the girls.

In his second witness statement the social worker presents his evidence to support T being placed with R and her adoptive family in the North of England. He says that siblings provide enduring identity shaping relationships with often outlast those with parents or partners. He said growing up together supports identity and emotional resilience. His written evidence is that whilst the siblings have never lived together they have established a significant sibling relationship, evidenced by the quality, consistency and emotional significance of their interactions during contact. He summarises the ‘statutory guidance’ as expecting siblings to be placed together unless ‘overriding reasons indicate otherwise.’

He notes the prospective adopters for R are fully assessed and approved and they can offer a safe nurturing and stable family environment. They wish to adopt both girls to preserve the sibling relationship. He says Mr and Mrs X meet T’s day to day needs and have provided her with stability. He goes on to say that Mr and Mrs X have provided T with “excellent” care. He notes there is evidence of T’s adaptability and resilience. He accepts leaving the X family would be “disruptive”. He notes that T accepted respite care from the X family. He states this:

He explains why he disagrees with the Independent Social Worker report. He states:

He sets out detailed evidence of having watched R and T interact with each other over many contact sessions. He says T always presents as “excited” before seeing her big sister. He considers that R remains prominent in T’s thoughts. Once together the girls immediately seek each other out and their play is spontaneous and affectionate. He disagreed with the ISW view the children were not close and noted her observation was based on one “extremely limited direct observation”. He concludes as follows:

He further sets out detailed information about the suitability of the B family to adopt not only R, but also T as a sibling group. He explains that in addition to R and T there are four further children aged 6-14 in the B family. He is confident T’s needs would be well met. He sets out pre-move preparatory work and protective factors and further work that would take place post-move.

He goes on to give evidence in the alternative if T remains with Mr and Mrs X. He says that a post adoption contact order is needed for monthly in person contact and on-going indirect contact.

In addition the second respondent (without opposition) asked me to accept into evidence a letter from R’s prospective adopters, Mr and Mrs B. This sets out a wealth of information about them, their family and approach to R and also to T. The letter is undated but was provided at the outset of the hearing. It explains the B family have much experience of adoption and sibling groups in particular. Mr and Mrs B are “mixed heritage” and wish to adopt mixed heritage children. They explain that R has been with them for six months and she “has settled beautifully” having overcome her initial anxiety and is now settled and very happy. They provided a detailed rebuttal to some of the points made by the independent social worker who carried out the siblings assessment (referred to as SS) against R and T being placed together. They movingly set out their reasons for wanting T to be placed with R in their adoptive care:

“Our final reason for still wanting to adopt [T] is the reinforcement being a part of the sibling contacts between [R] and [T] since [R] came home brings. The girls have a wonderful relationship with each other that is developing more and more each month with every contact and as they both develop more. [T] has turned three during the contacts and [R] has undergone significant developmental progress since being placed with us and this is enriching their interaction and bond greatly. They look forward to seeing each other, greet each other with joy, hug each other, immediately carry on where they left off in play as they meet in the same place every month and both display disappointment and a level of upset when we prepare them for the time coming to an end soon. They know they are sisters, they refer to each other as sisters and [R] displays a very caring tender nature toward [T]. When they get together, they display unspoken communication with each other, whereby just a look into each other's eyes has them both running off and being a bit cheeky when you call them to come back and both laughing about it. It is not difficult at all to see that if the girls were in the same home sharing the same room and together everyday, following the same routines that their bond and relationship as sisters would flourish especially as they are so close in age at just three and four years old.”

The social worker gave oral evidence. He confirmed he has been the allocated social worker for T since February 2025, having qualified as a social worker in 2024. He confirmed he had been in touch with the first respondent during this hearing and she was aware of the hearing and the issues and wanted to know the outcome. He disagreed with SS and considered T and R have a close and meaningful relationship as siblings. He described it as “very emotional”. He views was formed by observing seven in person contact sessions and several indirect (video call) contact sessions. He disagreed with a post-adoption contact order being limited to six sessions and continued to recommend around twelve a year. He agreed Mr and Mrs X were highly motivated carers. He agreed T saw herself as part of the X family. In answer to a question from Mr Wilson he accepted the removal of T from the X family would be “traumatic” and this would involve short and long term consequences. He accepted the trauma would be akin to a bereavement and would involve significant emotional distress and the risk of T’s regression. He was taken through a chronology of T’s permanence planning by way of the contemporaneous documents by Mr Wilson and accepted the second respondent had failed to appreciate Mr and Mrs X were putting themselves forward as prospective adopters, failed to act when they did understand this and failed to carry out any proper assessment of the impact on T of the removal of her from the X family. He accepted there had been oversights.

A detailed Sibling Attachment Assessment was prepared by an ISW, hereinafter referred to as SS. SS’s report is dated 20 November 2025. SS notes that R and T were exposed to alcohol and drugs in utero and the true impact of this will emerge when they attend school. It was noted that the second respondent’s plan was for the two girls to be placed for adoption together, but if that was not possible consideration would be given to them being separately placed after one year. SS’s evidence is that there have been “considerable concerns about [R’s] development” however she has made improvements in all areas since her move to her adoptive parents, who have home schooled her. She states that R is the youngest in the family and enjoys this position and the attention she receives. She is described as thriving and developing a secure attachment to her adoptive parents.

After having reviewed contact, SS gave the following evidence in her report:

SS recommended both girls are placed separately “so that they can retain their respective positions as bring the youngest children in their family.” She noted both girls were thriving in their respective placements and it would be “difficult” for T to move from the care of Mr and Mrs X given her secure attachment. She reported that:

She recommended ongoing contact and consideration of a post-adoption contact order.

She was cross-examined by Mr Melsa. She emphasised what she observed to be the tension between the carers for T and the carers for R. She agreed they needed mediation. She agreed with Mr Melsa the starting point was to consider the siblings being placed together and she recognised T would have a sense of loss of not having grown up living with her sister, R. She reiterated her view that R was viewed as the youngest in the B family and “is the princess in the placement” and that T’s insertion into the family would be difficult for them both. SS accepted she had only seen the girls together once. She described that contact session as “seemed to be chaos” with “no boundaries” and “not managed very well” and that there was a lot of stress. There were six adults present (two sets of carers and two social workers). She accepted the girls’ relationship might have changed since then. She disagreed with the social worker’s view that they were close. In answer to questions from Mr Wilson she said that T “looks like she’s part of [the X] family” and that “she blends in” and that Mr and Mrs X treat T “as if she is their own”. She described contact between T and R should T be adopted by Mr and Mrs X as “mitigation” to reduce T’s “confusion or upset”. She accepted it would be detrimental for R and T to have no relationship and that contact would give them “a sense of belonging”. She emphasised the need for “life story” work.

In line with the statutory scheme, a FPR Rule 14.11 report by an ISW was authored. It is dated 9 December 2025. This provides a wealth of information about T, Mr and Mrs X and their suitability. It is detailed and thorough. It includes this:

In respect of contact, the ISW states:

Her ultimate conclusion is as follows:

She gave oral evidence and adhered to the views in her report and emphasised that she deferred to SS’s views on the relationship between T and S as her role was mostly focused on Mr and Mrs X’s suitability.

I also received a very helpful analysis from the Guardian who supports T being adopted by Mr and Mrs X. The Guardian was appointed during the public law proceedings for both children. She has known them for some time. She has nearly forty years’ experience as a social worker. She is critical of the failure by the second respondent to place T for adoption much earlier and notes there were twenty permanency planning meetings. She would have recommended separate adoptive placements for the girls if she had known there would be so much delay and a lack of robust care planning.

The Guardian’s analysis states the following:

She cannot agree with the social worker that the fact T was placed in respite care demonstrates her resilience to justify separation from Mr and Mrs X. She worries about separating T from Mr and Mrs X’s four boys and notes this would be a further source of loss. She concludes that:

She recommends post adoption contact between R and T in person, 4-6 times a year given the distance, but also video contact.

She gave oral evidence. Her evidence was confident and helpful, arising from her considerable experience. She emphasised her significant concern about the short medium and long term impacts on T of being removed from the only family she has ever known at three years of age. She repeatedly raised her criticism of the failure by the second respondent to engage in robust care and permanency planning for T. She supported contact between T and R six times a year, principally during the school holidays given the distance between T and R.

T is the subject of a placement order, made pursuant to s.21(1) of the 2002 Act.This is an order permitting a local authority to place a child for adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the authority. A placement order continues in force until it is revoked, until an adoption order is made in respect of the child, or until the child attains the age of 18 – see section 21(4) of the 2002 Act.

Mr and Mrs X’s application to adopt T is a “private” or “non-Agency” adoption, pursuant to section 47(1)-(2) of the 2002 Act.This is because T has not formally been placed for adoption with Mr and Mrs X by the second respondent. As such section 44 of the 2002 Actrequires Mr and Mrs X to have given notice to the local authority (the fourth respondent) in whose area they live of their intention to adopt a child before applying for an adoption order.

Section 42(3) – (5) of the 2002 Act require T to have been living with the prospective adopters for a prescribed period of time before an application for an adoption order may be made. Where the prospective adopters are local authority foster carers, the child must have ‘had his home’ with them ‘at all times during the period of one year preceding the application’.

Sections 47(1)-(2) of the 2002 Actprovide the condition which must be met in a “non-Agency” adoption:

In respect of birth parental consent, section 52 of the 2002 Act provides, so far as is relevant, as follows:

The court’s paramount consideration must be the child’s welfare throughout her life (s.1(2) of the 2002 Act). The court must have regard to the welfare checklist in s.1(4) of the 2002 Act, which provides as follows:

When choosing between two or more options for a child, the court must undertake a comparative welfare analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each option. In short, and as described by McFarlane LJ (as he then was) inRe G (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2014] 1 FLR 670, at [50], the ‘judicial task’ is to:

The “test” for severing a child’s relationship with their birth family through adoption is a strict one. This was emphasised in the Supreme Court’s decision in Re B (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2013] 2 FLR 1075, the effect of which was summarised by Sir James Munby P in Re B-S (Adoption: Application of s 47(5)) [2014] 1 FLR 1035, at [22], as follows:

In Re W (Adoption: Approach to Long-Term Welfare) [2017] 2 FLR 31, McFarlane LJ (as he then was) cautioned against using the phrase ‘nothing else will do’ to bypass the need to undertake a full welfare analysis. At paragraph 68 he explained that:

In the same decision, McFarlane LJ rejected the argument that there was a “presumption” in favour of a child growing up within or alongside his birth family. At paragraphs 71 to 73 he explained as follows:

The right to respect for “family life” for the purpose of Article 8 ECHR exists between: (a) T and Mr and Mrs X; (b) T and her sister, R; and, (c) T and her birth mother. Where the rights of the children conflict with those of the adults, the rights of the children prevail. The European Court of Human Rights in Y v United Kingdom [2012] 2 FLR 332, at paragraph 134.

The Statutory Guidance on Adoption For Local Authorities, Voluntary Adoption Agencies and Adoption Support Agencies (July 2013), at paragraph 4.12, provides as follows:

At paragraph 8.53, the Guidance further states that:

Section 46 (6) of the 2002 Act provides that:

Section 51A(2) of the 2002 Act enables the court, when making an adoption order, also to make an order requiring the person in whose favour the adoption order is or has been made to allow the child to visit or stay with the person named in the order or for the person named in that order and the child otherwise to have contact with each other. This applies where an adoption agency has placed or was authorised to place a child for adoption (s.51A(1) of the 2002 Act).

Alternatively, a post-adoption contact order could be made pursuant to s.8 Children Act 1989.

In Re R (Adoption: Contact) [2006] 1 FLR 373, the Court of Appeal reviewed the authorities in relation to post-adoption contact and considered the approach in light of the forthcoming implementation of the 2002 Act. At paragraph 49 Wall LJ explained that:

In Re B (A Child) (Post-Adoption Contact) [2019] 2 FLR 117, the Court of Appeal was required to consider whether the enactment of section 51A of the 2002 had changed the settled approach to the making of post-adoption contact orders. At paragraph 54 the President answered that it had not:

The President continued explaining that the ongoing debate about post-adoption contact had not changed the legal test:

In Re R and C [2024] 4 WLR 91, Baker LJ endorsed the comments of Wall LJ in Re P(Placement Order: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535, explaining, at paragraph 66 that:

Lastly, I note the detailed consideration of post adoption contact set out by Cobb LJ in Re S (Foster Care or Placement for Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 47.

I first record my disquiet over the long delay to resolution of this issue for T. I agree there was a failure by the second respondent to carry out robust care planning for T. I am also concerned that whilst the injunction proceedings were issued in April 2025 they are only now being resolved in late February 2026. T is three. Eleven months is too long to decide the relatively straightforward matter of whether or not Mr and Mrs X should adopt T. The fig leaf of an interim injunction is no substitute for swift welfare decision making, particularly in the field of adoption. The welfare assessment for T may have looked different without the various delay before and after issue of proceedings.

In this unusual case all parties agree that T should be adopted. The dispute is whether the 2002 lifelong welfare checklist dictates that Mr and Mrs X adopt T or whether, as per the second respondent’s case, T’s lifelong welfare best interests are met by placement with her sister, R, and her adoptive family. Those are the two welfare options open to the court. This crucial welfare decision should not be taking place when T is aged three and R aged four. It could and should have been made much earlier. The second respondent and the court share a responsibility for this.

It has not been suggested that Mr and Mrs B should be joined as parties. Given the welfare assessment is whether to place T with them or continue the placement with Mr and Mrs X, the fairness to Mr and Mrs B, of the proceedings and the final hearing, is something which has caused me some residual concern. I have heard and read the detailed evidence from Mr X. Their case has been advanced with skill and distinction by Mr Wilson. Mr and Mrs B have not had these advantages. I have carefully read and considered their letter. The case for placing T with them has been argued diligently by Mr Melsa, who has advanced the case carefully in the face of mostly contradictory welfare evidence. Ultimately the decision must come down to a welfare analysis of the competing placements. I must holistically and carefully consider them side by side. There is no unfairness to Mr and Mrs B, however, because I can determine the welfare analysis on the basis of the detrimental impact of removing T from Mr and Mrs X, their boys, their home and wider family. This is the over-arching determining factor. It is not one Mr and Mrs B can gainsay. I am not deciding this case on the respective suitability of the X placement over the B placement. Both of these families can offer T a loving and suitable home where I hope she would develop and flourish. I am unpersuaded by the evidence of adverse impact on T of R’s potential additional needs and/or R’s more difficult journey from birth to now. Nor am I persuaded about the impact on T (or R) of losing their special status in the hierarchies of their respective homes. An order of this court requiring the separation of siblings with the effect that they will grow up in separate homes cannot be determined by the pursuit of perfection. If T has to adjust the additional needs (if any) of R and/or if T needs to re-stablish her place with the family and her identity amongst other siblings, than that is very essence of family and sibling life. The court must be careful to guard against engineering the protection of a child from the rough and tumble of everyday life, that is the hallmark of growing up with the highs and lows of sibling relationships.

I make a clear finding that T and R enjoy a close and loving relationship. I accept the evidence of the social worker and the views of the B family as set out in their letter. I also reiterate the point made during the course of the hearing. The life-long welfare analysis for T both in respect of who adopts her and the issue post-adoption contact would not have been determined, or even largely influenced, by whether two year old T enjoyed the two hour supervised play session, described in the evidence. Whether T does or does not have a close relationship with R (as it happens she does) could not determine the lifelong issues the court must confront. The law and guidance makes clear the importance of the court promoting blood, sibling relationships. Many siblings may not have enjoyed a close or even loving relationship with their brother or sister, but the fact of having grown up together may well have been of the most profound importance to assist them to establish their identity, thereby providing them with the security to develop and mature with confidence. Most of us will not receive the benefit of starring in a television series to assist us to answer the existential question: who do you think you are? A big sister or a little brother may help do the job instead.

In February 2026, the welfare imperative is for T to continue to live in the same home, with the same parents and her four older siblings. To remove T from the only carers and home she has ever had would be contrary to her welfare interests. The various social workers were correct to describe this as trauma. I therefore accept the welfare analysis of the Guardian, the ISW, SS and the second respondent’s social worker evidence that removal of T from the X family would be a trauma akin to bereavement with long and short term consequences.

I have in mind the first respondent’s evolved view that her youngest daughter should remain where she is now, where she is settled.

Great weight must be placed on placing siblings together for adoption. I have set out the Guidance above. This is one of those limited cases, where T cannot be placed with R for the good reason that she would be traumatised by being removed from Mr and Mrs X, their sons and her home.

I understand the second respondent’s case and place considerable weight on placing siblings together. Identity is an integral part of what it means to be human. Fraternity is a cornerstone of the development of our identity. Most humans identify strongly with their siblings as these are the humans who we most resemble and identify with at the formative stage of our development. By looking sideways we may form a strong sense of who we are. It is likely to help us to develop. My concern, in this nuanced case, is not the reaction of three year old T being kept from living with her big sister, but the older, early teenage T looking back with her growing understanding of why and how she was kept apart from her birth family. This has the potential to be damaging for her. The court must weigh in the balance the need to protect T from the certainty of trauma of separation from the X’s, against the risk of future emotional harm springing from her growing understanding of her journey, identity and her belonging. I am satisfied that the balance comes down firmly in respect of protecting T now and making a post adoption contact order to limit or seek to manage the future risk of emotional harm.

Having assessed the evidence, contact between T and R is not ‘mitigation’. It plays a much greater role in T’s formation and development from childhood into adulthood. T and R spending time together is fundamental to T’s understanding of who she is. Whilst there are many welfare positives to T ‘blending in’ and ‘looking like she is a part of the X family’, there are also welfare disadvantages to this. It might inadvertently promote a false sense of identity, tugging at strings, with the risk of unravelling the secure belonging and attachment which Mr and Mrs X have created for T. The post adoption contact order will (I hope) be nourished by Mr and Mrs X and (I hope) embraced by Mr and Mrs B, to create a space for X to understand she is surrounded by the love of the X family and that of her sister and their shared identity. I hope the thirteen year old T looking backwards, and forwards, will understand this.

I therefore accept the agreed position that T’s welfare dictates she must be placed for adoption rather than be placed with birth family or long term fostering. I accept the section 47, 2002 Act conditions are met for a non-agency adoption. I accept that section 52 (1) (b) of the 2002 Act applies and the T’s welfare dictates that her mother’s consent is dispensed with. I have applied section 1 (2) of the 2002 Act. T’s lifelong welfare dictates that she remains placed with Mr and Mrs X for the reasons I have given and therefore I reject the second respondent’s case to place T with R and the B family as this is contrary to her welfare needs both now and throughout her life. The strict test for ‘severing’ T’s links with her birth family are met because of the trauma of separation from Mr and Mrs X. Any interference in the Article 8 ECHR rights of the first respondent and/or R are justified in accordance with the law, as proportionate and necessary to safeguard the welfare interests of T.

I have considered pursuant to section 46 of the 2002 Act the need for a post adoption contact order. I am satisfied I can make a post-adoption contact order pursuant to section 51A (1) of the 2002 Act because an adoption agency was authorised to place T for adoption and the court has made an adoption order. Pursuant to section 51(A) (2) of the 2002 Act I make a post adoption contact order requiring Mr and Mrs X to allow T to visit or stay with Mr and Mrs B (with their consent) for the purposes of having contact with R. There should be a minimum of six visits each year some in or near the vicinity of the B family home; and some in or in the vicinity of the X family home and/or some at a mutually agreed location if that is easier for the families. The visits should be mostly during R and T’s school holidays, given the distance that will separate them. It should be organic. No party was opposed to a post-adoption contact order being made. The second respondent’s suggestion of twelve contact sessions a year is simply too much given the distances. Six times a year with meaningful contact is more likely to nourish the relationship than more short trips. Indirect video contact should also take place. I prefer to make a section 51A 2002 Act order rather than a section 8, 1989 Act order because I return to the importance of this relationship being nurtured now to protect, promote and enhance T’s welfare throughout her life. Whilst she is living with Mr and Mrs X, the relationship with R requires vigilance now for the purposes of protecting T’s welfare, all the days of her life.

I also record the importance of the first respondent’s views that her two daughters should grow up having contact with each other in the welfare analysis.

I also hope that R and T’s big brother, who I am told begins university, will be able to place a role in their lives, so all siblings may support each other.

I will consider with the Guardian how and when T will be informed of this decision.

I am very grateful to the solicitors and counsel for their expert assistance and ask they draft an order to give effect to this judgment.