LM (A Child: Return Order to the UAE; Humanitarian Protection), Re

By an application dated 29 October 2025, the applicant mother (M) seeks an order for the return to the UAE of her daughter, LM, who is aged 3 (nearly 4). The application is opposed by the children’s father (F). Subject to the court’s determination of cross-allegations made by M and F, the application is supported by LM’s Children’s Guardian, Sarah Gynne (from the Cafcass High Court Team).

The parents are both Sudanese but were brought up in the UAE and went on to hold down responsible jobs there. The parents were married in the UAE in 2021. LM was born in the USA in Summer 2022. LM is Sudanese but, because she was born in the USA, she also has US citizenship. Shortly after her birth, LM and her parents returned to the UAE. The parents’ relationship subsequently foundered and around the time of LM’s first birthday, in circumstances which are disputed, LM began living with F. M commenced proceedings in the UAE and a custody order was made in her favour on 27 April 2024. F did not comply with that order, nor subsequent orders made with a view to its enforcement.

On 14 November 2024, F removed LM from the UAE without informing M. LM was aged 2 ¼ at the time. F took LM to Malaysia for almost two months before travelling to the UK on 08 January 2025. F did not contact M to reassure her as to LM’s safety until 17 December 2024 when he sent a message in response to messages from M. F did not inform M of LM’s whereabouts at any stage.

This application was brought promptly after contacts in the Sudanese community in the UK informed M that they had seen F and LM in their locality. There was no contact between LM and M until video contact was ordered by this court, some twelve months after F had removed LM from the UAE. LM did not see M face-to-face until M was able to travel to the UK in May 2026.

Following their arrival in the UK, F’s employment in the UAE came to an end in circumstances which are not clear. This led to the expiry of his residence visa in the UAE. F then made an asylum application in the UK for himself and LM on the basis of alleged feared harm should he be required to return to Sudan. On 11 June 2025, the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) rejected the asylum claim but granted humanitarian protection to F and LM with permission to stay in the UK until 10 June 2030.

M remains living and working in the UAE. She is highly qualified and experienced in her field of work which is within the healthcare sector. F is currently studying in the UK. He and LM live in temporary accommodation. LM attends nursery where she is reported to be making good progress. It is the fourth nursery that LM has attended since she was removed from the UAE in November 2024.

As a consequence of F’s actions, LM’s life was turned upside down. She was deprived of a meaningful relationship with her mother for almost two years - almost half her life. F insists that his actions have at all times been necessary in order to keep LM safe, most particularly from the risk of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), and to promote her welfare. M says that F’s actions have been entirely inimical to LM’s welfare and are part of a pattern of serious domestic abuse.

M seeks multiple findings of fact against F. The core findings sought fall into three categories: (1) the wrongful removal of LM; (2) coercive and controlling behaviour towards M, including physical, emotional and financial abuse; (3) the exposure of LM to F’s abuse of M. M says that it is manifestly in LM’s welfare interests for her to be returned to her care in the UAE. Relying on expert evidence (to which I will return), M says that the court can be satisfied that there will be no significant difficulty in securing permission for LM to live with her in the UAE as her dependant. M says that she will promote direct contact between LM and F in the UAE should F want and be permitted to return to the UAE, and she will otherwise promote indirect contact including video contact.

Whilst F accepts that he removed LM from the UAE without informing M, he maintains that he was entirely justified in doing so. He seeks findings of fact that (1) LM was at risk of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) whilst living in the UAE and having unsupervised contact with M and her maternal grandmother (MGM); (2) M perpetrated domestic abuse towards him including physical abuse and threatening behaviour; (3) M and MGM neglected LM’s care including an occasion when LM sustained a burn to her arm whilst MGM was cooking. F says that it is manifestly in LM’s welfare interests for her to remain with him in the UK. F says that he will promote direct contact between LM and M in the UK, and indirect contact including video contact. F says that he does not intend to return to the UAE and doubts that he would be permitted to do so as he is currently the subject of criminal sanctions relating to his removal of LM.

Unless the court rejects the most serious findings sought by M against F and makes the most serious findings sought by F against M, the Guardian supports the making of a return order. Whilst noting F’s obvious love for LM and his ability to meet her physical and educational needs, the Guardian has grave reservations about F’s ability to meet LM’s emotional needs. Those reservations are based not just on past matters which, as the Guardian readily acknowledges, are the subject of dispute and require determination by the court, but on the Guardian’s own discussions with the parents and her observations of contact.

An unusual feature of this case is the fact that, as already mentioned, F and LM have been granted humanitarian protection by the SSHD. Whilst there is a significant and developing body of case law relating to applications for return orders where there are parallel protection claims, counsel agree that there is as yet no reported case involving an application for a return order where humanitarian protection has been granted. In short, F contended at the outset of the final hearing that, by analogy with case law relating to pending protection claims, the court should not make a return order, or at least should not direct the implementation of a return order, if to do so would contravene the prohibition against refoulement (which prohibits the direct return of refugees to the country where they fear persecution or their indirect return via a third country). F said, at the outset of this hearing, that the prohibition against refoulement would be contravened if LM were returned to the UAE as the UAE should not be considered a safe third country and LM would be at high risk of deportation to Sudan. F further contends that the return of LM would risk breaching LM’s rights under ECHR Art 3 (‘prohibition of torture’). In short, M and the Guardian contend that there is no basis for importing the principle of non-refoulement into cases involving humanitarian protection and that, in any event, there is no realistic risk of LM being deported to Sudan nor of her safety being compromised if she were returned to M’s care.

The SSHD was made aware of this apparently novel legal point but declined to intervene, commenting as follows (in a letter dated 04 June 2026): “As understood, the question concerns whether, and in what circumstances, a return order may be implemented in respect of a child who is a dependant upon a grant of humanitarian protection. The Secretary of State considers that this is ultimately a matter for the Court to determine following consideration of the parties’ submissions and the relevant authorities.”

The matter was listed before me for a composite fact-finding and final welfare hearing with a time estimate of five days. The core bundle ran to 710 pages and included: (1) four statements from each parent, with exhibits; (2) statements form LM’s maternal grandmother (MGM) and maternal great-uncle (MGU); (3) Ms Gwynne’s welfare report dated 02 June 2026; (4) reports from two experts, Diana Hamade and Dr Ian Edge, who, with the court’s permission, had been jointly instructed to advise in respect of aspects of the law in the UAE. There was a separate bundle which ran to 136 pages containing documents relating to the protection claims and grant of humanitarian protection. I also had the benefit of a separate authorities bundle which ran to 426 pages.

The advocates had prepared detailed and helpful skeleton arguments. I am most grateful to them, and their instructing solicitors, for their considerable assistance.

I heard oral evidence over four days from Dr Edge (remotely), M (in person), MGM (remotely from the UAE), MGU (remotely from the UAE) and F (in person). MGU’s evidence was interposed towards the end of F’s evidence to accommodate MGU’s work commitments. The court arranged for Sudanese Arabic interpreters to be available to assist where necessary. M and MGU gave evidence in English; F gave evidence largely through an interpreter; MGM gave evidence entirely through an interpreter. I heard closing submissions on day five. I then took time to prepare this judgment.

It is not practicable for me to deal with each and every aspect of the evidence or submissions, but this judgment has been prepared after reflecting on everything that I have read and heard.

The following is gleaned from the written and oral evidence.

As already described, M and F were both brought up in the UAE. Although they had met briefly in 2008, their relationship did not develop until around 2019. They married in the UAE in early 2021 but continued living in different cities which was a continuing source of tension between them. M became pregnant later in 2021.

F says that M’s mood changed dramatically during pregnancy and that she became depressed and violent towards him. He says that on one occasion in late 2021, whilst he and M were preparing a watermelon in the kitchen, M came at him with a knife. F seeks a finding that this happened. M told me that she did find pregnancy tiring and difficult, particularly whilst she was holding down a full-time job; she could be “grumpy” but she was not depressed; she was never violent towards F. M says that the “watermelon incident” has been entirely fabricated by F.

M says that F became increasingly suspicious and controlling of her. In May 2022, whilst M was heavily pregnant, she and F went on holiday to Sri Lanka. M says that she would wake up to find F looking at her phone and that he then took her phone, deleted her social media accounts and changed her passwords. M has produced messages between herself and F’s brother in which she requests that F return her personal items including her phone and expresses concern about F misusing her private information. M says that on one occasion, in a hotel bedroom, F slapped her face causing a small cut and then removed his belt and started hitting her with it. M seeks findings about these matters. F says that M’s phone was old and needed to be changed but denies interfering with it. In oral evidence, F asserted, apparently for the first time, that there had been a virus on M’s phone. F denies assaulting M.

M further alleges that F forced her to undergo three gender examinations whilst she was pregnant and that he openly expressed his disappointment that their unborn child was female. F denies all of this.

LM was born in the USA. M and F had travelled there for M’s master’s degree graduation ceremony. They family returned to the UAE. LM lived with M who subsequently returned to work. F remained living in a separate city but was involved in LM’s care.

M had previously confided in F that she herself had been the subject of FGM. F says that M had told him on another occasion that FGM “is something that must be done”. M denies saying that. In November 2022, F says that he overheard a conversation between M and MGM during which they were discussing how it would be best for LM to undergo FGM at a young age to avoid her having painful memories. Both M and MGM firmly deny having this conversation. Both M and MGM have expressed revolt at the idea of LM being subjected to FGM.

In early February 2023, F took LM out of the UAE for a period in excess of five weeks. M says that he did so without informing M or seeking her consent, and she seeks a finding to that effect. M says that it was only through contact with F’s sister who lives in Sudan that M discovered that F had in fact taken LM to Sudan. M has produced messages which show M asking F’s sister when F had gone to Sudan. F says that he took LM to Sudan so that she could receive treatment for nappy rash and that M had consented to this. F has produced a letter from a clinician in Sudan which appears to record the prescription of low-key treatment for nappy rash. M, who works in the healthcare sector, says that she was managing LM’s nappy rash, and has produced a letter from a clinician in the UAE showing that she had sought treatment on 30 January 2023. F told me that the journey time from the UAE to Sudan included approximately four to five hours on a plane. F insisted that LM was comfortable whilst travelling to Sudan, despite her nappy rash.

It emerged during cross-examination of F by Mr Lamb, that for about sixteen days of this five-week period, F had returned to the UAE and had left LM in the care of his sister, who LM barely knew. F was extremely reluctant to explain why he had returned to the UAE, insisting that it was an extremely personal matter. When pressed further, he said that it had been to do with some corruption allegations relating to his former employment.

In June 2023, F noticed that LM had a small burn to her arm. He messaged M who explained that LM had accidentally touched a pan, adding that this sort of accident could happen “to every single child”. F responded: “burn by pan? this is neglect”.

For LM’s second birthday, M had planned a celebration at M’s sister’s house. F arrived and said he wished to take LM to see his family. The celebration was cut short. The next day, F told M that he wanted sole custody of LM. M refused. M says that F tried forcibly to grab LM from her and a security guard intervened and directed them to the nearest Police station. M says that the Police were unwilling to get involved.

LM then lived with F until she was removed from the UAE in November 2024. During this period, M travelled to F’s home to see LM at the weekends. M says that F was generally obstructive and hostile: F sought to pressurise M into giving up her job and moving in with F; F threatened to disclose private information about M (which M says F had obtained from her phone in Sri Lanka, as described above); there were times when M arrived to find that F and LM were not there; on occasions, F locked M and LM in his property; on occasions, F refused to allow M into his property when she brought her parents with her; on one occasion, F became angry and threw a glass to the floor in front of LM; on one occasion, F attempted to damage M’s car with a shovel; on one occasion, F told M that husbands kill their wives for behaving as she did. F disputes all of these allegations.

In April 2024, M went to see LM at F’s house. M says that she wanted to take LM out of the house; she knocked on the door to F’s room whilst holding LM in her arms; F opened the door and was angry; F put his face up close to M’s and started shouting; M pushed him away; F then pulled M’s hair, pushed her to the ground, took LM off M, and dragged M out of the house. M says she called MGU who advised her to contact the Police. When the Police attended, M says that F refused to hand over LM to her and the Police advised her to go to hospital. The hospital record notes: “The patient claims assault by beating. Upon clinical examination, there is swelling in the arm, pain in the neck, and bruising. Necessary treatment was administered, and the patient was discharged from the hospital.” F denies assaulting M. He questions the veracity of the medical report, though his reasons for doing so were far from clear. F says that, in fact, it was M who assaulted him with a broom and he sustained injuries. He was also seen at hospital. F has produced a report which does not verify any injury to him but notes F’s allegation of physical assault and description of shoulder pain. M says that this was a complete fabrication by F. MGU confirmed M’s account of her having contacted him on this and other occasions reporting some of F’s alleged behaviours. MGU says that he sought, unsuccessfully, to mediate with F and his family.

M applied to the local Family Court in the UAE. On 27 April 2024, a custody order was made in M’s favour and F was required to hand LM over to M’s care. F’s appeal against that order was unsuccessful. Further orders were made in M’s local Family Court and then in F’s local Family Court, authorising the Police to implement the order. F did not comply. Documentation relating to proceedings in the UAE appears to be incomplete. F has been critical of the process adopted, but it appears that he provided the court with a detailed “memorandum” to which M responded. F’s memorandum has not been produced, but the court bundle includes M’s response to it. It appears from the incomplete documentation that F raised his alleged concerns about M’s neglect of LM, including the failure to treat LM’s nappy rash which he said necessitated the trip to Sudan, but made no mention of concerns about FGM. It further appears that M raised her concerns about F’s alleged domestic abuse including physical abuse and humiliating behaviours, though not in all the detail subsequently described within these proceedings.

The orders made in the UAE included a travel ban. At the time it was understood that LM only had a US passport. Unbeknownst to M and the authorities, F had obtained a Sudanese passport for LM.

LM’s last contact with M before these proceedings began was in October 2024. F was due to hand LM over to the Police on 14 November 2024. He did not and instead removed LM from the UAE using her Sudanese passport.

In evidence, F was adamant that M had made no attempt to contact him after his removal of LM. Records were then produced which showed multiple attempted calls and messages from M. F did not respond until 17 December 2024, when he sent a message which included the following: “My soul is a sacrifice for [LM]; I give you good news that [LM] is doing very well, she is fine and she misses seeing you. Why did you cut yourself off from us? . . .”. M continued to call and message, but these were largely unanswered by F.

Following LM’s removal, M promptly informed the Police in the UAE and restored the matter to F’s local Family Court in the UAE. Some mediation attempts were made involving family members. In around March 2025, M sought to withdraw the enforcement proceedings in the UAE in the hope that this would make it more likely F would return LM to the UAE. The custody order remained in place.

Criminal proceedings were brought against F in the UAE. There is some uncertainty about the current status of those proceedings. It appears that F is the subject of a fine equivalent to approximately £1000 but the Public Prosecution in the UAE applied for an increased penalty, and it is thought that F may also be the subject of a three-six month prison sentence.

At no point did F tell M where he and LM were located. In the days, weeks and months following LM’s removal, M made extensive enquiries via the authorities in the UAE, Sudan and Qatar and via personal contacts in various countries. In May 2025, M discovered that F had renewed his Sudanese passport in the UK in January 2025. M then contacted UK authorities and applied unsuccessfully for a visa to allow her to travel to the UK to make her own inquiries. Ultimately, M was informed by a member of the Sudanese community in the UK that there had been a sighting of F and LM.

On 06 February 2025, F applied for asylum for himself and LM. The basis of F’s claim was that he could not return to the UAE because his residence permit had been cancelled, and if he returned to Sudan he feared that he would be homeless and his life would be in danger due to the ongoing conflict. F provided information to the Home Office in the form of a screening interview on 15 February 2025, a statement dated 22 May 2025 and an asylum interview on 27 May 2025.

On 11 June 2025, the Home Office wrote to F informing him of their decision and reasons. F and LM did not qualify for refugee status because “a) There is no real risk of harm because, by your own account, you have only ever visited Sudan twice for a holiday, and you have never faced any direct persecution from anyone within Sudan. b) Your main fear is the general situation in Sudan, and not direct persecution”. F and LM did however qualify for humanitarian protection because “you would be subject to serious harm if you returned to your country of origin.” F and LM were granted permission to stay in the UK until 10 June 2030. They can apply to extend their stay in the UK before this permission ends.

This application was brought on 29 October 2025. A Tipstaff Location Order was made and swiftly executed. At subsequent hearings, LM was made a ward of court and was joined as a party with Ms Gwynne appointed as her Children’s Guardian pursuant to Family Procedure Rules 2010, rule 16.4; directions were made in relation to the disclosure of documentation relating to F’s protection claim for himself and LM; permission was granted for the joint instruction of Ms Hamade and Dr Edge to provide expert opinion; F’s application for permission to obtain expert evidence in relation to FGM was refused; the matter was timetabled through to a final hearing commencing 08 June 2026.

On 21 February 2026, F sent M a series of messages in which it appeared to M that F was threatening to share private information about her. Later that day, F subsequently posted a series of updates attaching material which included a photo of a page of M’s private diary. M says that F obtained some of this information when he took M’s phone in Sri Lanka. F told me that he had taken a photo of M’s diary when he had come across it by chance. He maintained his denial of having accessed information from M’s phone. He denied that these posts were intended to cause distress to M. His reasons for making the posts were far from clear.

In accordance with the order made by Garrido J on 20 November 2025, contact between LM and M resumed in the form of video contact three times per week. M secured a visa permitting her to travel to the UK in May 2026. The Guardian observed contact on 18 May 2026. Although LM did not appreciate that M was her mother, the Guardian noted positive interactions between LM and M, with LM spontaneously telling M that she loved her. The Guardian recommended that direct contact should increase and include overnight contact. F proposed a more gradual progression and opposed overnight contact. At the Pre-Trial Review before Hayden J on 22 May 2026, contact was ordered in accordance with the Guardian’s proposals.

The subject child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration.

The court is likely to find it appropriate to consider the first six aspects of the welfare checklist in s.1(3) of the Children Act 1989.

It is for the court to determine the extent to which it may be necessary to inquire into aspects of the welfare checklist or other disputed matters.

Where domestic abuse is alleged, the court must consider whether in light of Practice Direction 12J (of the Family Procedure Rules 2010), an inquiry should be conducted into the disputed allegations and, if so, how extensive that inquiry should be.

Issues of habitual residence and wrongful removal will feed into the court’s welfare evaluation but are by no means determinative of outcome.

Para 327 provides that an application for asylum “is a claim by a person to be recognised as a refugee under the Refugee Convention on the basis that it would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention for them to be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom, . . .”.

Para 334 provides that an asylum applicant will be granted refugee status if “they are a refugee, as defined in Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention”.

Para 327EA provides that a claim for humanitarian protection “is a request by a person for international protection due to a claim that if they are removed from or required to leave the UK, they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm (as defined in paragraph 339CA) in their country of origin, and they are unable, or owing to such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.”

Para 327EC provides that if someone makes a claim for humanitarian protection, they will be deemed to have made an application for asylum, and if the application for refugee status is refused, then the SSHD will go on to consider the claim as a claim for humanitarian protection.

Para 339C provides that an unsuccessful asylum applicant will be granted humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom if the SSHD is satisfied that: “substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the asylum applicant concerned, if returned to the country of origin, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country”.

Para 339CA provides that, for the purposes of para 339C, serious harm consists of:

Para 339QB provides that where the SSHD has granted an asylum applicant humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C following an asylum claim or further submissions made on or before 1 March 2026, the asylum applicant will be granted permission to stay on a protection route which will be valid for a minimum period of 5 years.

At [19], that the principle of non-refoulement is enshrined in several international treaties which the UK has ratified and “the term bears slightly different meanings in different contexts”. Those international treaties are (a) the Refugee Convention, (b) The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 (‘UNCAT’), (c) The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (‘ICCPR’) and (d) the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (‘ECHR’).

At [20], that by reference to the Refugee Convention: “Article 33(1) has long been interpreted by the courts of this country as prohibiting not only the direct return of refugees to the country where they fear persecution, but also their indirect return via a third country”.

At [23], that by reference to the ECHR, since the Strasbourg decision in Soering v UK (App no 14038/88) (1989) 11 EHRR 439, the duty of the contracting parties under Art 3 (‘prohibition on torture’) imports an obligation not to remove persons to other states where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be at real risk of such ill-treatment.

Humanitarian protection is a subsidiary form of protection which may be granted to those who have failed to establish that they are refugees.

The prohibition on refoulement applies principally to refugees and those with pending protection claims.

There is no automatic prohibition on refoulement in cases where a person has been granted humanitarian protection, but such a person may not be refouled if to do so would involve a breach of their rights under ECHR Art 3 (‘prohibition on torture’).

When the court is considering whether to make and /or implement a return order under the inherent jurisdiction, where the subject child is a dependant upon a grant of humanitarian protection:

LM could lawfully enter UAE with M at any time on a visitor’s visa. This would allow LM to stay for 90 days within any 180-day period. During that time, M could apply for a dependant resident visa for LM. Because M and F are still married, the UAE authorities may require a “No Objection Certificate” (NOC) from F, though it is very possible that, as M says she has been advised, the custody order in M’s favour would obviate the requirement for a NOC.

If M were to lose her job and not secure alternative employment in the UAE, then her resident visa would expire although it may be possible for her extended family in the UAE to act as sponsor for M and LM which would allow them to remain resident. If that were not possible, then M and LM would be required to leave the UAE. The authorities in the UAE would not recognise the humanitarian protection (with regard to Sudan) which had been granted by the UK Government. If the only option for M and LM was to travel to Sudan, then it might be possible for them to claim asylum in the UAE but this is a long and complex process with no certainty of success.

The main route for F to return to the UAE would be for him to obtain new employment there. He would be required first to resolve the outstanding issues relating to criminal sanctions.

If LM were returned to the UAE, F could apply to the local Family Court in the UAE. If he were to pursue custody of LM, it is unlikely that he would succeed as he would have to demonstrate a change of circumstances and that it was in LM’s best interests for her not to live with M.

F could provide no cogent explanation for why he had not mentioned the risk of FGM at all in the Family Court proceedings in the UAE.

In his asylum interview, F had said that he had removed LM from the UAE in November 2024 and had taken her to Malaysia because he had wanted to expose her to a different culture. F had failed to inform the Home Office about the orders made in the UAE requiring him to hand LM over to M. F denied that he had been deliberately withholding information from the Home Office.

F also denied that he had lied or at best told half-truths during his asylum interview, when he had said that M had not joined him in the UK because she was working and that he did still speak to her sometimes.

In oral evidence, F said that he did not know whether his own mother had been subjected to FGM and could not explain why, during his Home Office interview for the purposes of his asylum claim, he had said that she had been.

Nor could F explain why, in the same interview, he had said that the risk to LM of FGM came from the community in Sudan and had made no mention of there being a risk from M and her family in the UAE.

F could not explain why, if there had been a risk from the community in Sudan, he had nonetheless left LM in Sudan for some sixteen days whilst he returned to the UAE.

F’s evidence about conversations which he had either had with M or had overheard M having with MGM was rambling and incoherent.

It was put to F that his concerns about FGM were entirely fabricated and that the issue had nothing at all to do with his decision to remove LM from the UAE. F’s denial rang hollow.

Ms Gwynne observed that LM “presents with a wonderful sense of energy and enthusiasm for life” and that she “appears to understand as many words in English as she does in Arabic”.

Ms Gwynne noted that: “Whilst it is clear that [LM] and her father do enjoy a close relationship, and that [F] is able to meet her basic needs and promote many aspects of her intellectual development, it is significantly less clear what value, if any, [F] places on [LM]’s relationship with her mother.”

Ms Gwynne expressed concern about F’s lack of insight into LM’s emotional needs and the impact of his actions on LM in terms of instability and the loss of her relationships with M and the maternal family.

Ms Gwynne noted how, during the first observed contact on 18 May 2026, “[LM] responded very well to her mother and there was some lovely interaction. Whilst I was watching on, [LM] was not interested in interacting with me and very happy to focus on playing with her mother and the toys in the room, including some age-appropriate gifts which [M] had bought for her.” Subsequent contacts progressed well.

Ms Gwynne noted that there is a degree of stability for LM in the UK in terms of accommodation, education and friends and observed: “[LM] has no active memory of her previous life in the UAE, and a return would be akin to a relocation to a new country for her and she would experience changes to her education, peer friendships and assimilation to a different social and geographical environment to that she is now accustomed to living in the UK.” Ms Gwynne continued: “However, it is also my view that much of this stability in the UK is still only ‘surface level’ for [LM]. The family is housed in temporary accommodation and could be asked to move at any time. Prior to this, [LM] spent around six months living in an asylum hotel with her father as they progressed through the system. [LM] is now attending her fourth nursery setting in the past 18 months, having attended a full-time nursery in Malaysia for around five weeks, and now three different nurseries in the UK. Her immigration status remains temporary. I consider that it is also possible that [F] may seek to move on from England with [LM] if he had access again to their travel documents because it sems that he is someone who enjoys travel and frequent moves, often at short notice and even whilst under the spotlight of the court during the previous proceedings in the UAE.”

Whilst LM presents “so robustly and as a largely unaffected young child”, Ms Gwynne cautioned against making assumptions in relation to LM’s resilience. She expressed the firm view that “the instability she has experienced will have a lasting impact even if we are not seeing the consequences right now”. In addition to the instability, Ms Gwynne noted other vulnerabilities for LM: her parents’ separation, her asylum-seeking status, repeat family court proceedings, her exposure to parental conflict and possible domestic abuse. Ms Gwynne considered that these experiences “underline her need for certainty and stability in her care arrangements to have the best possible chance of achieving well into her later childhood and adolescence.”

Whilst noting that M’s status in the UAE is vulnerable to a degree because she is Sudanese, Ms Gwynne anticipates that M would be “well placed to overcome any future obstacles” given her expertise in the healthcare sector and support from the maternal family.

Ms Gwynne acknowledged the importance of the determination of the key factual disputes. In her view, F’s removal of LM from the UAE is “very difficult to justify . . . unless [LM] was at significant risk of harm remaining there.” If domestic abuse findings are made against F, then “this raises a concern that [F]’s abduction of [LM] from the UAE was an extension of this controlling attitude towards the mother and a deliberate disruption of her emotional attachment with [LM].”

Balancing the competing welfare considerations for LM, and subject to the court’s findings, Ms Gwynne considers that it is in [LM]’s best interests for her to return to the UAE. She observes: “I acknowledge that this may well bring immediate upset and confusion for [LM] to be separated from her father who has been her primary carer for the entirety of her living memory, but it is my view that the long-term benefit for [LM] over the next 13 years of childhood outweighs the inevitable disruption she will face upon a return.”

If a return order is made, Ms Gwynne advocates for a “swift handover to her mother’s care in the UK”, noting “I would be concerned that if [F] is responsible for affecting her return there would be considerable risk of him absconding with [LM] given the background to this case.”

Whilst I will address F’s allegations against M first, I emphasise that my findings in relation to all of the cross-allegations have been reached after an holistic review of all the written and oral evidence, keeping the fundamental fact-finding principles well in mind.

My conclusions in respect of the disputed facts can be stated relatively shortly. As set out above, M’s account is corroborated to some degree by other evidence: contemporaneous messages and phone records; police and medical records; the written and oral evidence of MGM and MGU. In stark contrast, F’s account is largely uncorroborated. Furthermore, I found M (and MGM and MGU) to be essentially honest witnesses, whereas I found F to be wholly unreliable.

LM was removed in breach of multiple Family Court orders made in the UAE.

This was the second time that F had removed LM from the UAE without M’s knowledge or consent: I am satisfied that he had done so in February 2023 when he took LM to Sudan for over five weeks, leaving her there with family she barely knew for some sixteen days.

Following the abduction in November 2024, F took over four weeks to reassure M that LM was alive and well; F never once told M of their whereabouts.

F requiring M to undergo three gender examinations during pregnancy.

F assaulting M in Sri Lanka whilst she was heavily pregnant; this involved F slapping M’s face causing a small cut and then hitting her with his belt.

F removing M’s phone in Sri Lanka; F copying M’s personal information, deleting her social media accounts and changing her passwords.

F abducting LM to Sudan in February 2023.

F insisting that LM’s first birthday celebrations should be halted to suit his demands.

F’s insistence, from around LM’s first birthday, that LM should live with him in the UAE.

Whilst LM was living with F in the UAE:

F assaulting M on 15 April 2024; this involved shouting in M’s face, pulling M’s hair and pushing her to the ground whilst she was holding LM, and F then taking LM and dragging M along the floor and out of his flat; this caused M to sustain swelling in the arm, pain in the neck, and bruising.

F’s breach of multiple Family Court orders in UAE.

F obtaining a Sudanese passport for LM without informing M so that he could evade a travel ban.

F’s delay in informing M that LM was safe and well, and his failure to inform M of their whereabouts.

F’s failure to promote contact between LM and M until ordered to do so by this court.

F’s posting in February 2026 of M’s private information, including a copy of an extract from her diary.

The decision whether or not to make a return order will have a profound impact on LM and her parents in the short, medium and long term. It is nonetheless a decision which, in light of my findings in respect of the disputed facts and the Guardian’s careful written and oral evidence which I accept, a relatively straightforward decision.

LM’s welfare is of course my paramount consideration.

Wishes and feelings: LM is too young to express a view, but I proceed on the basis that she would wish to be able to enjoy a positive relationship with both of her parents.

Needs; Age, Sex, Background: LM has all the needs of a child of her age. But in light of her life experiences to date, she has a profound need for certainty and stability in her care arrangements, and to able to enjoy a safe and meaningful relationship with both of her parents.

Change of Circumstances: If LM were to return to live with M in the UAE, this would involve considerable short-term disruption for her: she is rebuilding her relationship with M and does not yet fully understand that M is her mother; she will have no recollection of the UAE or of her wider maternal family who live there; a new home; new nursery / school; loss of peer relationships in the UK. It would also involve a huge change in her relationship with F who may or may not be willing and/or able to join her in the UAE. This relationship is very important for LM. From living with F day-to-day, LM’s contact with F may be limited to supervised video contact. If LM were to remain with F in the UK, this disruption would be avoided. However, I agree with the Guardian when she describes the current level of stability enjoyed by LM as somewhat “surface level” and points to the instability which has characterised much of LM’s time with F since she was removed from the UAE, and the potential for further disruption if she were to remain in his care.

Harm / Risk of Harm: In light of my findings, LM has suffered very serious emotional harm as a result of being caught up in and otherwise exposed to F’s abusive behaviours. In his evidence, F displayed a total lack of empathy and understanding as to the harm that he had caused. Whilst he insisted that he would promote LM’s relationship with M in the future, and emphasised how he had recently co-operated with M to ensure that LM could enjoy contact with M during this hearing and before M returned to the UAE, I was left with no confidence whatsoever that F could be relied upon once these proceedings had ended.

LM has not suffered any harm in M’s care and there is no cogent evidence to suggest that she would be at risk of doing so. I am mindful that LM has been granted humanitarian protection in the UK, and that the prospects of similar protection being granted in the UAE are remote. I have given careful consideration to the risk of LM being deported to Sudan. On all the evidence, I consider it highly unlikely that M and LM would ever be required to leave the UAE, but I am confident that if that were to happen, M would ensure that LM was kept safe and that her needs were met.

Capacity of Parent: M has demonstrated unwavering commitment to LM and has done so through some very dark times. In doing so, M has demonstrated her resilience. I am satisfied that M is alive to the challenges that lie ahead if LM were to return to her care in the UAE and is capable of meeting those challenges. F has demonstrated that he is able to meet LM’s basic physical and educational needs. Sadly, he has shown that is quite unable to meet her emotional needs.

For the avoidance of any doubt, for the reasons set out above, I reject F’s argument that a return order would risk breaching LM’s rights under ECHR Arts 2 and/or 3.

ECHR Art 8 is plainly engaged. A return order, with its impact on LM’s relationship with F, would clearly involve a significant interference with the Art 8 rights of LM and F.

Standing back and balancing the pros and cons of each option side by side, I am satisfied that the disadvantages of a return order, being the short-term disruption for LM and longer-term impact on LM’s relationship with F, are amply outweighed by the advantages of such an order. It is the only outcome which will keep LM safe from further serious emotional harm. It offers by far the better prospect of meeting LM’s emotional needs. The consequent interference in the ECHR Art 8 rights of LM and F is necessary and proportionate in LM’s welfare interests.

Accordingly, I make a return order.

On all the evidence that I have read and heard, F has an unfortunate track record of acting selfishly and impulsively, and with a disregard for court orders. I share the Guardian’s concerns (noted at para 103(10) above). I direct that there should now be a swift handover of LM from F to M. I will hear counsel in relation to consequential directions.