Donovan Sappleton v R1 & Anor

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 1782 (Fam)

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Donovan Sappleton v R1 & Anor

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 1782 (Fam)

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1782 (Fam)
Case No: ZW22P01272
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 11/05/2026

Before:

THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE LIEVEN

Between:

Donovan Sappleton

Applicant

- and –

R1

R2

Respondents

The Applicant appeared in person

Mr Joshua Hitchens instructed by Janes Solicitors LLP appeared on behalf of the First Respondent

The Second Respondent did not appear and was not represented

Hearing dates: 11 May 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was delivered orally ex tempore, and the transcript has been approved.

.............................

THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE LIEVEN

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

The Honourable Mrs Justice Lieven:

1.

This is an application by Mr Sappleton for permission under Family Procedure Rules, Rule 37.3 and 37.4 to pursue contempt proceedings against R1, and R2.

2.

The applicant, who I will call "S" was represented before me initially by Mr Michael-Ihunde of counsel who had produced the skeleton argument. Mr Michael-Ihunde withdrew from representation part-way through the hearing saying that he was professionally embarrassed. I will return to Mr Michael-Ihunde’s role below.

3.

S then conducted the case himself. It was clear that he was more familiar with the papers than Mr Michael-Ihunde was. I determined that it was appropriate to continue the case, and, in fact, S did not apply to adjourn. Firstly, S was very familiar with the case himself. Secondly, given that the application was in my view even at that stage, highly likely to be an abuse of process, I was very unwilling to adjourn and allow the proceedings to continue, in effect, as a form of further harassment of the first respondent.

4.

The first respondent, R1, was represented by Mr Hitchens. The second respondent. R2, who is R1’s father was not present, not represented and, according to Mr Hitchens, unaware of the proceedings, having not been served.

5.

The background to this case is that S and R1 are the parents of a boy called D. D has been the subject of proceedings in the East London Family Court between the parents. I have seen three judgments of HHJ Atkinson at East London Family Court. I note that HHJ Atkinson is the Designated Family Judge at that court and so an extremely experienced Family Court judge.

6.

The three judgments are firstly, 7 August 2024 when S applied for the judge to recuse herself. Secondly, a judgment dated 7 October 2024 which deals with the substantive application. Thirdly, a judgment dated 25 March 2025 where the judge made a partial costs award against S.

7.

A brief flavour of the background of that case by reference to HHJ Atkinson's judgments can be taken from the costs judgment of 25 March 2025 where HHJ Atkinson says:

"The litigation in which I became involved commenced in 2022. The father retained D in his care in circumstances in which he had, up until then, been residing with his mother. The father retained D at the end of his summer holidays and unilaterally enrolled him in another school. I should add that the father lives in the north of England and the mother in the south of England.

As a result of this unilateral act, the mother issued an application for the return of D and also for an order prohibiting the father from enrolling the child at another school. In November 2022, counsel was instructed to attend a hearing before the court. D was returned to the care of his mother eventually but within the same proceedings, the father sought orders that D should live with him permanently as he was subject to abuse and neglect in the care of his mother. There were six specific allegations of abusive behaviour made.

Following a lengthy fact finding hearing, I found none of those allegations made out. It was the mother's case from the outset that the allegations were completely without foundation and that the father's dogged insistence to pursue them was clear evidence that he was using the litigation to control her and he was harassing her through the litigation and through the constant complaints that he had made about her care of D virtually every time D was in his father's company."

8.

The judge's assessment of the father's litigation conduct emerges most clearly from the judgment of 7 October 2024 in the substantive judgment. I will read part of paragraphs [9] and [10]:

"9.

Furthermore, the relentless way in which every complaint made by D is pursued with the authorities, the litigation behaviour and the history of this case establishes a clear pattern on the part of the father which itself creates an emotionally abusive environment for his son.

10.

On the evidence before me, I am quite satisfied that the endless referrals and the proceedings have been weaponised by the father and are part of a strategy of relentless pursuit of the mother. This behaviour on his part does amount to harassment, in my judgment, and it is controlling of her."

9.

It perhaps, in the light of those comments, is hardly surprising that the judge -- and this is summarised at paragraph [6] of the judgment -- said:

"I am quite satisfied that the allegations made by the father against the mother are not proven."

10.

Those brief extracts from HHJ Atkinson's judgments are highly relevant to my assessment of whether permission should be granted. They are also highly relevant because they should have put Mr Michael-Ihunde on clear notice of the risk that this application was itself abusive and was being made for a collateral purpose.

11.

Throughout the proceedings, S has made a series of applications to the High Court, each one of which has been certified as being totally without merit. On 11 December 2024, Peel J refused permission to appeal HHJ Atkinson's refusal to recuse herself and certified the application for permission as totally without merit. On 13 October 2025, Garrido J refused permission to appeal HHJ Atkinson's costs decision of 25 March 2025 and certified the application for permission as totally without merit. On 3 February 2026, Peel J refused permission to appeal the final charging order issued on 14 November 2025. His Lordship ordered that S should have no right to an oral renewal on the basis that the application was totally without merit. On 4 February 2026, Peel J, again refused permission to appeal the final order of HHJ Atkinson. He again found that the application was totally without merit.

12.

S's application to commit the first and second respondents to prison was made on 10 December 2025. It initially came before HHJ Atkinson and she transferred it appropriately to the High Court. Mr Hitchens, in his skeleton argument, points out that in breach of Rule 37.5, the application was not personally served and was made in the wrong court. It was not supported by an affidavit, the affidavit filed by S only having been made some months thereafter.

13.

The test for whether permission ought to be granted for contempt proceedings is set out in Zurich Insurance Plc v Romaine [2019] EWCA Civ 851. The relevant test set out in the Zurich case is that:

(a)

there is a discretion to grant permission which should be exercised with great caution;

(b)

there must be a strong prima facie case against the respondent;

(c)

the court should consider whether the public interest requires committal proceedings to be brought, this being a public and not a private remedy;

(d)

such proceedings must be proportionate and in accordance with the overriding objective;

(e)

the false statements alleged must have been significant in the proceedings and the respondent understood the likely effect of the statements and the use to which they would be put;

(f)

the court must give reasons in making a decision but be careful to avoid pre-judging or prejudicing the outcome of any potential final hearing of the proceedings;

(g)

only limited weight should be attached to likely penalty;

(h)

a failure to warn the respondent at the earliest opportunity of the fact that he may have committed a contempt is a matter which the court may take into account.

14.

As a general principle, committal orders should be treated as remedies of the last resort and, importantly, in Family cases, they should be considered to be the very last resort. (See Ansah v Ansah [1977] 1 WLR 760).

15.

In the alternative to refusing permission, not least because it is not entirely clear in respect of the four breaches alleged as to whether they require permission, Mr Hitchens submits that I should strike out the application in any event under the inherent jurisdiction in accordance with Family Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 37A, paragraph 2. That paragraph which reflects the general common law states:

"2.

Striking out and procedural defects.

(1)

On application by the respondent or on its own initiative, the court may strike out a contempt application if it appears to the court --

(a)

that the application and the evidence served in support of it disclose no reasonable ground for alleging that the respondent is guilty of a contempt of court;

(b)

that the application is an abuse of the court’s process or, if made in existing proceedings, is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of those proceedings; or

(c)

that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.

(2)

The court may waive any procedural defect in the commencement or conduct of a contempt application if satisfied that no injustice has been caused to the respondent by the defect."

16.

It was said in Tinkler v Ferguson [2021] EWCA Civ 18 that the power to strike out a claim as an abuse of process is a flexible power unconfined by narrow rules. There are two recognised categories of abusive applications. Firstly, those where the claim has no real prospect of success and secondly, where it would be a waste of resources for the litigation to be continued.

17.

As far as wasteful litigation abuse is concerned, it is important to have regard to the decision in Sectorguard Plc and Dienne [2009] EWHC 2693 (Ch) where it was said at paragraph [44] by Briggs J (as he then was):

"It is now established in the light of the new culture introduced by the CPR and in particular the requirements of proportionality referred to in CPR 1.1(2 )as part of the overriding objective that it is an abuse of process to pursue litigation where the value to the litigant of a successful outcome is so small as to make the exercise pointless viewed against the expenditure of court time and the parties' time and money engaged by the undertaking. (See Jameel v Dow Jones per Lord Phillips). The concept that the disproportionate pursuit of pointless litigation is an abuse takes on added force in connection with committal applications. Such proceedings are a typical form of satellite litigation and, not infrequently, give rise to the risk of an application of the parties' and the court's time and resources otherwise than for the purpose of the fair, expeditious and economic determination of the underlying disputes and therefore contrary to the overriding objective as set out in CPR 1.1. The court's case management powers are to be exercised so as to give effect to the overriding objective and by CPR 1.4(2)(h), the court is required to consider whether the likely benefit of taking a particular step justifies the cost of taking it. Furthermore, paragraph [5] of the contempt practice direction makes express reference to the court's case management powers in the context of applications to strike out committal proceedings."

18.

Those principles were followed in the case of Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank PJSC v Maksimov [2014] EWHC 4370 (Comm) by the then Hamblen J. He said at paragraph [22}:

"I respectfully endorse those comments. An increasing amount of this court's time is being taken up with contempt applications. Claimants should give careful consideration to proportionality in relation to the bringing and continuance of such proceedings. In appropriate cases, respondents should give consideration to applying to strike out such applications for abuse of process. The court should be astute to detect when contempt proceedings are not being pursued for legitimate aims. Adverse costs orders may follow where claimants bring disproportionate contempt applications."

Those words, in my view, have particular relevance in the Family jurisdiction.

19.

S relies on four alleged breaches. Firstly, he alleges that R1 fabricated an assault allegation and produced false photographic evidence. This relates to what S says was an alleged assault on the maternal grandmother on 14 May 2020. In his skeleton argument, the way Mr Michael-ihunde put this, paragraph [21]:

"R1 fabricated an allegation that S assaulted the maternal grandmother on 14 May 2020. In her witness statement, dated 5 July 2021, she produced an image of bruised arm into the bundle as evidence of an assault alleged to have been caused by S to the maternal grandmother."

Paragraph [23]:

"During cross-examination at the August 2024 fact finding hearing, the first respondent maintained that the assault took place and confirmed she had informed the social worker about it."

20.

However, when I considered this evidence and asked Mr Michael-Ihunde for particulars of it, firstly, he could point to nothing in R1's witness statement in the relevant proceedings where she had alleged assault. Indeed, the passage in R1's witness statement, apparently relied upon by S, reads as follows:

"On 14 May 2020, [REDCATED] CSC [I assume that is Children's Services] confirmed if I went to the father's property and called the police, this would automatically generate a report to CSC. I later attended father's property and called the police, notifying them of the difficulty I was having with the father returning the child to my care and that he does not have parental responsibility. The police were unable to assist and a referral was made to CSC."

21.

It will be immediately apparent that R1's witness statement does not allege an assault and when I took Mr Michael-Ihunde to these passages, he accepted that there was no evidence that R1 had alleged the assault or exhibited the photograph to her witness statement alleging the assault.

22.

Secondly, no transcript has been produced of what R1 is supposed to have said to the judge. Thirdly, S relies on police records but having looked at the police records, the highest that goes is a record that the CCTV does not show an assault. As Mr Hitchens says, the police records have been heavily redacted so it is not possible to tell what else may or may not have been said.

23.

In those circumstances, I have no hesitation in refusing permission, having applied the test in Zurich. There is nothing here which comes close to there being a strongly arguable case, given the paucity of the evidence that R1 fabricated any evidence or made the allegation she is alleged to have done.

24.

The second allegation is that R1 deliberately misled the court regarding court ordered contact. This allegation appears to turn on S saying that R1 had told the court she did not know where the child was in January 2024, but he says R1 did know where the child was and, indeed, contacted the hotel where S and the child were. However, again, there is no transcript to support this allegation. In those circumstances, there is simply no prospect of S making this point good even if it came close to the test in Zurich of being a matter which must have been significant in the proceedings.

25.

Again, I have no hesitation in refusing permission on this matter, given that the allegation is not sufficiently clear, the matter is hopeless without a transcript and ,in any event, the allegation is insufficiently serious to come close to meeting the Zurich test.

26.

Allegation 3, if it were possible, is even weaker. This concerns an injury or some marks underneath the child's eye. S says that R1 gave two inconsistent versions of the circumstances of this injury and that she did not tell the truth to the court. I believe the underlying allegation is that R1 was encouraging the child to give a false account.

27.

However, yet again, there is no transcript of the alleged evidence. S's underlying case appears to be that the mother caused the mark but that is plainly not an allegation which could meet the Zurich test because HHJ Atkinson had expressly said that she was "untroubled" by the mark. Further, S does not say how R1's evidence has changed. So, this allegation, applying the Zurich test, is completely hopeless.

28.

The fourth allegation is that S alleges that R1 misled the court about how many counselling sessions she had had. He says that R1 told the court she had had 12 counselling sessions whereas, in truth, she had only had 6. I have to say, this ground verges on the ludicrous for a contempt application. It appears that what it really turns on is what was meant by counselling sessions, hardly a matter which was sufficiently significant to found a sensible contempt application.

29.

Further, in any event, it is not at all clear to me in the absence of much clearer evidence that there is even a prima facie case, let alone a strong prima facie case that R1 misled the court.

30.

For all those reasons, I have no hesitation in refusing permission for contempt proceedings to be brought.

31.

However, the matter goes further than that because, in any event, this is an application where it is plainly appropriate to strike it out. In my view, this application is a blatant abuse of process. It is a very clear example of the weaponisation of contempt proceedings to extend the coercive use of litigation and harassment in a way that the court should be astute to prevent.

32.

I have referred above to Hamblen J's judgment in Maksimov, that the court must be quick to detect where contempt is being pursued for illegitimate aims. That approach is particularly important for the courts in Family cases where there is a considerable tendency for abusive partners to use the court as an instrument of harassment and coercive control. The court must be astute to prevent itself being used in that way.

33.

The reasons I give for that conclusion are, firstly, that HHJ Atkinson had already found that S had been using proceedings to harass R1. Secondly, that S has made four applications to the High Court, all of which have been dismissed as totally without merit. Thirdly, that for the reasons I have set out above, all the alleged breaches are extremely weak and do not come close to being matters of sufficient import as to meet the Zurich test. Fourthly, again as I have explained above, all the allegations are made without proper evidence.Finally, it appears, although I have not, I admit, delved into this matter in great detail, that there has been a failure to follow the proper procedural steps.

34.

For all those reasons, this is a clear case for strike out, quite apart from the refusal of permission.

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