C (A Child) (Art. 13(b) – return to Romania), Re

On 13 March 2025, C, a girl born in 2022, was removed to England from Romania by her mother, without the agreement of the father.

The father now seeks an order for the summary return of C to Romania under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980 (“the Convention”). The application is opposed by the mother, relying on Article 13(b) of the Convention. The mother alleges that the father has subjected her to a catalogue of physical and sexual abuse, including the forced consumption of illicit drugs and attempting to force her into prostitution. Some of those allegations have been accepted by the Romanian courts.

Article 13(b) provides a discretionary exception to the principle of summary return under the Convention. It provides, where relevant that:

“…the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that…

(b)

there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”

While denying the allegations made by the mother, the father accepts that, in principle and taken at their highest, her allegations could be capable of demonstrating that a risk of grave harm to C has been established for the purposes of Article 13(b). His case is that adequate and effective protective measures are available in Romania, both on a structural level, and because he will take steps to facilitate the so-called “soft landing” of the mother and C upon their return.

The principal controversial issue in these proceedings is therefore whether, taking the mother’s allegations at their highest, there will be adequate and effective measures of protection available in Romania such that, if C’s return is ordered, she will “not be called upon to face an intolerable situation when she gets home” for the purposes of Article 13(b) (In re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, per Lady Hale at para. 35).

The mother and the father are citizens of Romania. They met in 2021, and by the end of that year had moved to England to look for work. C was born here in the summer of 2022. She is a citizen of Romania. Her birth was later registered with the Romanian authorities. The father returned to Romania shortly before her birth, but by the end of 2022 both parents had returned to the country and cohabited in their own rented apartment from early 2023 onwards. There was a period in 2023 when C remained in Romania with the paternal family while the parents returned to England, but by late 2023 they had both returned to Romania. They separated permanently in March 2024.

It is the mother’s case that the father was abusive towards her during their relationship, particularly from the time they cohabited alone in Romania. She contends that this included regular physical beating, including kicks and slaps to the face and other parts of her body, being forced to take drugs, and being financially abusive in relation to what she earned from her employment. The mother also alleges that the father subjected her to acts of sexual assault and rape, threatened to prostitute her, and threatened members of her own family, from whom he had sought to isolate her. The father prevented her from having her own telephone and sought to control all aspects of her life, she says. The mother alleges that on one occasion, the father forced her out of a ground floor window while she was fully naked. The father arranged for his criminal associates to wait for the mother outside her parents’ house, threatening that her family would come to significant harm in the event she sought to enlist the assistance of the police.

The mother has provided transcripts of telephone calls with her own mother and the father’s ex-partner which, on her case, were made at or around the same time as the incidents that she now alleges took place. In the telephone calls, according to the transcripts, the mother gives accounts that are broadly consistent with those she now gives to this court. The father’s ex-partner is also recorded as having said that she experienced similar conduct from the father when she was in a relationship with him.

The mother has already litigated some of the allegations she makes against the father in these proceedings in Romania, and has obtained findings of fact that he was abusive towards her in many of the ways she claims in this court. Those findings led to the imposition by the Romanian courts of the protection order outlined above.

On 18 March 2024, the mother obtained a 12-month “protection order” against the father in the Romanian courts, having successfully established a series of allegations of domestic abuse against him. A protection order appears to correspond, at least in broad terms, to a non-molestation order issued in this jurisdiction. The order of the Romanian court did not prevent the father from having contact with C, but prohibited him from going within 100 metres of the mother, and imposed a number of additional protective measures to which I shall turn in due course. An order for C to live with the mother and spend time with the father was made. The mother made an initial application for interim relocation with C to England; the Romanian court refused that application in April 2024.

In February 2025, the mother renewed her application to the Romanian court for an interim order permitting her to relocate to England with C, for six months. The application was initially successful, but the father appealed, and by a decision handed down in March 2025, the appeal was allowed. On the same day as the appeal decision was given, and shortly before the 12-month protection order issued against the father in 2024 was due to expire, the mother left Romania for England with C, where they both remain.

The father denies all allegations against him, although accepts that findings have been reached by the Romanian courts. He has made counter-allegations against the mother and her family.

By an application sealed on 11 February 2026, the father applied to this court for an order for the summary return of C.

By an order dated 13 May 2026, Arbuthnot J refused the mother’s application for a Part 25 expert in relation to the provision available in Romania to protect victims of domestic and sexual abuse, and the adequacy or otherwise of the in-country protective measures available.

At this stage in my judgment, I will summarise the main themes of each party’s submissions, without setting them out in their entirety. I will return to the substance of each party’s submissions to the extent necessary to reach and give reasons for my findings, below.

It is common ground that C was habitually resident in Romania upon her removal by the mother, and that the father had custody rights in relation to her for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, but for the applicability of one of the exceptions to a return order established by the Convention, the court should, in principle, proceed to make an order for the return of C.

The mother contends that she was subjected to such horrific abuse at the hands of the father and his family in Romania that no protective measures in that country would be sufficient to guard against the risk of C being exposed to a grave risk of harm or otherwise be placed in an intolerable situation for the purposes of Article 13(b).

The mother’s case is that the approach of the Romanian courts to making an order to enable the father to spend time with C, despite the extensive findings of abuse reached against him in relation to the mother, demonstrates that adequate and effective measures of protection are not available in that jurisdiction. At para. 28(e)(i) of his position statement, Mr Marnham submits that the decision of the Romanian court dated 9 April 2025 “fails to accord with the approach to domestic abuse in this jurisdiction”. That submission is advanced on the basis that the Romanian court characterised the abuse experienced by the mother as merely situational, since it took place “in the marital home” (see page D125). Accordingly, it is the mother’s case that she has rebutted the presumption that “the administrative, judicial and social service authorities of the requesting State are equally as adept in protecting children as they are in the requested state” (per McDonald J in G v D (Art 13(b): Absence of Protective Measures) [2020] EWHC 1476 (Fam), [2021] 1 FLR 36 at para. 39).

As set out above, the mother’s application to rely on expert evidence was refused by Arbuthnot J on 13 May 2026. The mother included within the bundle a number of published articles addressing the position of female victims of domestic abuse in Romania. Mr Marnham rightly confirmed to the court that he did not seek to place express reliance on those documents; they were not expert reports, and it is not clear, on the material available to this court, how reliable their contents were, or how qualified their authors were to offer the opinions included within those articles. I have considered them but, as accepted by Mr Marnham, they attract little (if any) weight in my analysis. At their highest, they demonstrate that some concerns have been raised about the ability of some women in Romania to access the support and protection services they need having experienced domestic abuse. The articles do not take the analysis I must perform in these proceedings further.

The father advanced no real challenge to the credibility or otherwise of the mother’s allegations, while emphasising that he rejects them. He accepts that in Romania he was made the subject of a protection order, and that in the course of those proceedings, findings were reached against him by the Romanian courts. He does not accept those findings, but does not seek to go behind them. Put simply, his case is that there are adequate and effective measures of protection that would be, and have already been, available to the mother in Romania such that the Article 13(b) exception is not engaged. The mother, he submits, has already demonstrated that she has obtained effective redress from the police, children’s services and the courts in Romania. She successfully obtained a protection order against him, and allowed it to expire without renewing it. The judgments of the Romanian courts, the father submits, are well reasoned and extensive. The terms of the protection order obtained by the mother were effective in protecting her from the father. While there was a single occasion when the father inadvertently entered the hundred metre exclusion zone imposed on him around the mother, he informed the police, and no harm came to the mother. The Romanian courts are seized of these proceedings, and are well placed to provide the mother with the adequate and effective protection that she needs, he submits.

The father additionally offers a range of undertakings to assist with the mother’s return to Romania. They are set out below. The father also offers a range of “soft landing” measures, including meeting the costs of return flights, and a monthly contribution towards the mother’s maintenance costs, which initially will be fixed at a level that is approximately double that which is likely to be imposed by the Romanian authorities. The father also offers to pay the mother the first month of maintenance support in advance before she leaves England.

Article 1(a) of the Convention establishes that an objective of the Convention is “to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed or retained in any Contracting State…”.

Whether a child has been “wrongfully” removed is governed by Article 3 of the Convention:

“The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –

a)

it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

b)

at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.”

The substantive obligation upon a Contracting State to return a child wrongfully removed may be found in Article 12 of the Convention; the text is well known, and it is not necessary to cite it here. The substantive obligation to return is subject to a number of exceptions, including the Article 13(b) exception, quoted at para. 3, above.

The leading authorities concerning the application of Article 13(b) include In re E and Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2012] UKSC 10, [2012] 2 FLR 442. There are other authorities which I need not set out in detail. In Re IG (Child Abduction: Habitual Residence: Article 13(b)) [2021] EWCA Civ 1123, Baker LJ summarised the relevant principles in the following terms:

“47.

The relevant principles are, in summary, as follows.

(1)

The terms of Article 13(b) are by their very nature restricted in their scope. The defence has a high threshold, demonstrated by the use of the words ‘grave’ and ‘intolerable’.

(2)

The focus is on the child. The issue is the risk to the child in the event of his or her return.

(3)

The separation of the child from the abducting parent can establish the required grave risk.

(4)

When the allegations on which the abducting parent relies to establish grave risk are disputed, the court should first establish whether, if they are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. If so, the court must then establish how the child can be protected from the risk.

(5)

In assessing these matters, the court must be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Hague process. It will rarely be appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under Article 13(b) and so neither the allegations nor their rebuttal are usually tested in cross-examination.

(6)

That does not mean, however, that no evaluative assessment of the allegations should be undertaken by the court. The court must examine in concrete terms the situation in which the child would be on return. In analysing whether the allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk, the judge will have to consider whether the evidence enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that they do.

(7)

If the judge concludes that the allegations would potentially establish the existence of an Article 13(b) risk, he or she must then carefully consider whether and how the risk can be addressed or sufficiently ameliorated so that the child will not be exposed to the risk.

(8)

In many cases, sufficient protection will be afforded by extracting undertakings from the applicant as to the conditions in which the child will live when he returns and by relying on the courts of the requesting State to protect him once he is there.

(9)

In deciding what weight can be placed on undertakings, the court has to take into account the extent to which they are likely to be effective, both in terms of compliance and in terms of the consequences, including remedies for enforcement in the requesting State, in the absence of compliance.

(10)

As has been made clear by the Practice Guidance on ‘Case Management and Mediation of International Child Abduction Proceedings’ issued by the President of the Family Division on 13 March 2018, the question of specific protective measures must be addressed at the earliest opportunity, including by obtaining information as to the protective measures that are available, or could be put in place, to meet the alleged identified risks.”

I was also taken to In re B (A Child) [2025] EWCA Civ 1603, per Cobb LJ (as he then was), and L v P [2023] EWHC 1676 (Fam)which specifically addressed the adequacy or otherwise of the protective measures available in Romania.

It is necessary first to address the nature and gravity of the risk the mother claims that she and C will face on account of the father and his family in Romania. This is a prospective assessment of risk based on the father’s alleged (and, pursuant to the findings of the Romanian courts, established) past conduct, and that of his family.

While the analysis in this judgment is conducted on the footing that the mother’s allegations are to be taken at their highest, an evaluative assessment is nevertheless required to determine whether the allegations are of sufficient substance and detail to give rise to the claimed grave risk.

Of course, I have not heard oral evidence, and this application has been brought pursuant to a summary procedure. Accordingly, I approach the evidence relied upon by the mother to establish the allegations with an appropriate degree of caution. Within those confines, I consider the allegations relied upon by the mother to be detailed and plausible. They are internally consistent and have been made in an externally consistent manner. The mother’s father (C’s maternal grandfather) has provided a statement in which he describes the father’s mother (C’s paternal grandmother) stating that the women in a family must be prepared to engage in prostitution if it benefits the family. That is a further consistent feature of the overall evidential landscape relied upon by the mother.

Of course, the provenance of the recordings of the telephone and video calls made by the mother to the father’s ex-partner and her own mother, of which I only have undated transcripts, is not clear. There is no evidence before the court as to how the mother came to record those conversations, which naturally gives rise to the possibility that the recordings are, in some way, self-serving. Nevertheless, the transcripts feature a plausible level of detail, and have not been the subject of any significant challenge by the father (although, I should emphasise, he rejects the allegations). Similarly, the other evidence, such as that of the maternal grandfather, has not been tested. But it does have a plausible level of detail that is consistent with the overall case advanced by the mother.

The mother has provided photographs of what appear to be cuts to her leg, and an image of her face that appears to have some bruising. Within the parameters of this summary process, the allegations are both reasoned and reasonable.

Most significantly, some of the mother’s allegations have been the subject of positive findings of fact reached by the courts in Romania. The judgment of the Civil Section of the court local to where the mother and father lived in Romania reached findings against the father in its judgment dated 18 March 2024 determining (and granting) the mother’s application for a protection order. In the findings section of the judgment, the court held:

“In the reasoning, it was shown that between October 2021 and 08.03.2024, the parties had a cohabiting relationship, and [the mother] was repeatedly physically assaulted by [the father]. On 14.12.2023, while in England, the defendant cut the [mother] on her right thigh with a kitchen knife and then rubbed salt into the wound. It was also shown that from 15.12.2023, when they returned to Romania, the [father] assaulted the [mother] on a daily basis, and on 08.03.2024, he punched her in the head. It was specified that the assaults took place in the presence of the minor [C].”

The judgment continues:

“The relationship between the parties is tense, with the evidence presented showing that the [mother] was subjected to violence that endangered her physical and mental integrity.”

And later:

“In this case, the Court finds with certainty that the present conflict between the parties goes beyond the limits of a simple family conflict, requiring the intervention of the State to correct abusive behaviours, as the manifestations of the tense relationship between the parties are such as to justify the creation of a state of danger to the physical and mental integrity of the [mother] and requiring the protective measure requested.

Thus, although the [mother] has not fully proven the nature and intensity of the violence perpetrated against her, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the defendant committed acts of physical and psychological violence against the [mother], both on 08.03.2024, and previously, during their cohabitation.”

In a judgment dated 26 April 2024 addressing the question of interim custody, a different constitution of the same court commented on the above findings in the following terms:

“Reviewing the civil Judgment no… 18.03.2024 passed by the Court of First Instance in case no. [omitted], the court finds that it has been established with res judicata authority that the [father] committed acts of physical and verbal violence against the [mother] both on 08.03.2024 and previously, during the relationship, causing [the mother] bruises, cuts, and a deviated nasal septum. In the same decision, the court held that no acts of physical and mental violence against the minor [C] were proved, so the court held that the parties have the burden of proving such acts of violence in the present case.”

The appeal judgment of 13 March 2025 features the following findings, at internal page 11:

“…the Court also takes into account the fact that the [mother] was asked to engage in prostitution or theft in order to earn an income, as evidenced by the recording submitted in the case file, an aspect that cannot be overlooked by the Court in its analysis of the state of danger. Thus, it can be seen that the [father’s] mother is dissatisfied with the reaction of the victim’s parents, arguing that ‘...if prostitution no, stealing no, working no, what kind of person are you...’, aspects that confirm the statements of the [mother]’s witness regarding the fact that he was contacted by the defendant’s uncle, who told him to take the [mother] from England, because otherwise the [father] would ‘force her to prostitute’.”

While it appears that not all of the allegations made by the mother against the father were accepted by the Romanian courts, that does not enable me confidently to discount those remaining allegations for the purposes of considering Article 13(b). First, I doubt that it would be appropriate to discount allegations made for the purposes of an Article 13(b) assessment on the basis that they appeared not to have been accepted two years previously by a court in the requesting state; that approach would go against the grain of that required by the Supreme Court in Re E. Secondly, I cannot assume that the evidence before this court is identical to that which was before the Romanian courts. It is not clear which allegations were accepted, and which were rejected. The test for this court is not whether it can fall in behind findings reached by a court in the requesting state, but to determine whether it can confidently discount the allegations. As set out above, these allegations cannot confidently be discounted.

For the purposes of this analysis, therefore, I accept the full spectrum of the allegations made by the mother against the father. I will refer to the allegations as though they are substantiated as a matter of fact, while noting that that is an assumption made for the purposes of this analysis.

The mother’s allegations demonstrate that, unless addressed by adequate and effective protective measures, the father’s past conduct gives rise to a real and substantial risk that his enduring violent and abusive attitude towards the mother would be repeated. There is no question of the mother separating from C; if C returns, it will be with the mother, in relation to whom there is a lives-with order made in Romania. Some of the father’s abuse against the mother was committed in the presence of the daughter, leading to a very high risk of psychological harm for C, if not physical harm if caught up as a bystander in the father’s repeated and sustained violent abuse of the mother. All of the abuse will have impacted the mother’s ability, as C’s primary carer, to provide her with the safe, loving and trauma-free environment that she deserves. If the father’s actions towards the mother were to be continued in the same vein upon the mother and C returning, I consider that the grave harm threshold would be passed. Moreover, C is now considerably older than she was at the point the Romanian court made the protection order. She will be more aware of what is going on. The psychological risk is now greater on account of her increased understanding and awareness of what takes place around her.

I therefore find that, but for the availability of adequate and effective protective measures, the Article 13(b) exception would be established in relation to C.

It is necessary to address whether any protective measures available in Romania would be sufficient to mitigate the risk that is otherwise established for the purposes of Article 13(b).

To establish the effectiveness of the protective measures available in Romania to secure C’s welfare, the father relies on the following factors:

While there is no expert evidence in these proceedings addressing the availability, adequacy and effectiveness of prospective protective measures in Romania, Mr Hepher relied on the upheld findings of Peel J in the decision under challenge in Re B. In those proceedings, the parties had instructed a single joint expert in Romanian law, Ms Eniko Fulop, to address the recognition and enforceability in Romania of protective measures and undertakings originating in another Hague jurisdiction. Cobb LJ summarised her conclusions in the following terms, at para. 53:

“i)

To be enforceable in Romania, undertakings given to an English court must be embodied in a judicial order of the English court and expressed as measures concerning the child's protection or welfare;

ii)

Under Romanian law, automatic recognition is not given to UK judgments under EU instruments; therefore recognition and enforcement proceeds solely under the 1996 Hague Convention to which both countries are signatories; most of the proposed protective measures in this case are within the scope of Article 3 of the 1996 Hague Convention and are capable of recognition and enforcement in Romania; others (such as the financial arrangements) can, it is assumed, be made enforceable under Romanian domestic law;

iii)

Any order of the English court must be submitted to the competent Romanian court for an exequatur (declaration of enforceability) under Article 26 of the 1996 Hague Convention; only after this declaration is granted does the order acquire enforceable effect in Romania. The procedure is summary in nature but is nonetheless mandatory;

iv)

Legal aid is available in Romania in family and protective-measure proceedings, subject to income-based eligibility.

v)

Protective measures designed to govern the father's conduct towards the mother and child are:

‘… paradigmatic examples of protective measures concerning the person of the child and his relationship with his parents. They would therefore be recognised by operation of law in Romania. Automatic recognition does not by itself permit coercive enforcement, but the necessary declaration of enforceability can be obtained by summary application’;

vi)

There is a jurisdiction by which the applicant can obtain urgent interim measures without the court being deemed to prejudge the merits:

‘The procedure is designed precisely for situations requiring immediate child protection, and may regulate the child's residence, contact arrangements, handover procedures, or restrictions on removal from the jurisdiction. Courts have frequently used this mechanism in cross-border family disputes’.

She confirms that victims of domestic abuse may apply for a protective order (ordin de protecție), which can include eviction of the aggressor, stay-away orders, restrictions on contact, and temporary custody arrangements. Courts have used this law to protect not only direct victims but also children exposed to domestic abuse. Importantly, it is possible to ensure that protective measures are in place in Romania before the physical return of the child and mother;

vii)

Although the father has indicated that he has withdrawn his criminal complaint (which is likely to terminate criminal proceedings in respect of those allegations), it would nonetheless be most prudent ‘for the mother to obtain official confirmation from the Prosecutor's Office that the file has been closed (clasare) before any return’.”

It is important to observe that the challenge in Re B to the Article 13(b) findings of Peel J lay primarily in the judge’s overall evaluative assessment, rather than the propositions of Romanian law and practice as found by the judge and summarised by Cobb LJ at para. 53. However, in those proceedings there was no challenge to the evidence of the single joint expert before the trial judge, and Cobb LJ held that he had been entitled to reach the findings that he did in relation to in-country protective measures (see paras 81 and 82). Neither party in these proceedings invited me to approach Romanian law and practice on any alternative basis to that summarised by Peel J in Re B.

General in-country provision and (ii) measures already accessed by the mother

Mr Marnham did not seek to persuade me to depart from the findings reached by Peel J in Re B about the general level of in-country provision for victims of domestic abuse in Romania. However, he submitted that the approach of the Romanian courts in the mother’s existing proceedings demonstrates that the presumption that the Romanian authorities “are equally as adept in protecting children as they are in the requested state” has been rebutted.

Mr Marnham submits that the Romanian courts irrationally made the equivalent of unsupervised “spend time with orders” in favour of the father, despite reaching significant adverse findings against him in relation to the mother, after a lengthy period of no contact, without stepped progression arrangements.

By way of a preliminary observation, I accept that the father’s past conduct plainly falls within the definition of domestic abuse contained in section 1(3) of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, at the very serious end of the spectrum. However, I reject Mr Marnham’s submission for the following reasons.

First, the principles of judicial comity and mutual recognition which underpin the 1980 Convention mean that this court should be slow to sit in judgment on a court of equivalent jurisdiction in another Contracting State. That is not to say that “proven inadequacies in… particular cases” cannot form a basis to rebut the presumption of adeptness where the evidence permits such a finding (see G v D at para. 39, quoting International Movement of Children: Law, Practice and Procedure 2nd Edt. at paragraph 24.55), but where (as here) the challenge is to the evaluative assessment conducted by the court with jurisdiction in the requesting state, particular caution on the part of this court is required, and a particularly high threshold would need to be surpassed before concluding that there have been “proven inadequacies” in judicial decisions already taken in the requesting state.

Secondly, even in this jurisdiction established findings of abuse are not necessarily a bar to direct contact taking place in any event. Practice Direction 12J of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 requires a court to assess the relevance of allegations of abuse to the issues before the court. See the guidance at paras 16 to 20 of PD12J, in particular that at para. 17(g), which requires the court to consider:

“(g)

whether the nature and extent of the allegations, if proved, would be relevant to the issue before the court…”.

Further guidance is given in relation to interim contact in relation to (at that stage) unsubstantiated allegations of abuse (see paras 25 to 27B) and substantive findings of abuse, once established (see para. 36ff). The approach to be taken to deciding whether a fact-finding hearing is required in order to determine applications for child arrangements orders requires the court to consider (i) the relevance of such prospective findings, (ii) the purpose of seeking to establish such findings, and (iii) whether it is necessary to hold a fact-finding hearing, bearing in mind the relevance to the disputed issues before the court if the allegations are proved. See, for example, Re H-N [2021] EWCA Civ 448 at para. 37, and K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468 at para. 41.

The domestic approach to allegations and findings of domestic abuse is such that “[it] does not, however, mean in every case where there is an allegation of, even very serious, domestic abuse it will be either appropriate or necessary for there to be a finding of fact hearing” (para. 139, Re H-N). That is because there will be cases where even proven domestic abuse will not necessarily act as a bar to contact. It follows that this jurisdiction countenances the possibility that even very serious allegations of abuse against one parent, if established, do not necessarily form an absolute bar to the abusive parent having direct contact with a child. See para. 37 of PD12J.

Thirdly, in approaching the questions before it, the appeal constitution of the Civil Court in Romania expressly stated that its approach was governed by the best interests of the child (see page D124). That is an approach that accords entirely with that taken in this jurisdiction. The extract of the court’s judgment that is most vehemently criticised by Mr Marnham is the following, at page D125, quoted in its context, with emphasis added to highlight the sentence relied upon by the mother:

“In this regard, the court notes that the violence perpetrated by the [father] against his former partner during their consensual relationship does not currently pose a risk to the child, especially since this reprehensible behaviour occurred mainly during the period when the parties were in a couple relationship.

The witness proposed by the [mother] did not highlight any acts of violence that had been committed in the present. As mentioned, the disagreements between the parties happened when they were together, with the witness X saying that the disputes mostly happened in the marital home, which is no longer the case since the parties ended their cohabitation relationship.

Furthermore, the court finds that the evidence presented in the case does not indicate that acts of violence were committed against the child C.

On the contrary, the evidence shows that the father wishes to be involved in the care and upbringing of the child and has expressed his desire to have an emotional bond with his daughter, expressing his dissatisfaction during the proceedings that his former partner does not allow him to see his daughter.”

Even on the footing that it would be appropriate for this court to scrutinise the approach of the Romanian court, properly understood this passage is not authority for the proposition Mr Marnham seeks to establish. First, this part of the judgment is concerned with restricting the father’s parental responsibility, rather than determining contact arrangements. Secondly, the focus on violence previously taking place in the marital home is not, as submitted by Mr Marnham, a “minimising characterisation”, but an expression of the risk factors which led to the violence taking place in the past. The court found that the risk had abated in light of the relationship coming to an end: “The witness proposed by the [mother] did not highlight any acts of violence that had been committed in the present.” Finally, the court found that none of the acts of violence had taken place against C. For those reasons the court concluded that the father’s parental responsibility should continue to be exercised jointly by both parents.

I therefore find that nothing in the Romanian court’s approach to the father’s continuing exercise of parental responsibility in relation to C gives rise to a reason to depart from the assumption that the authorities in that jurisdiction are equally adept at addressing C’s welfare needs as they would be in England and Wales.

In a similar vein, this court must respect the approach of the Romanian courts to C’s child arrangements. While the mother may disagree with the outcome of that court’s analysis, it would be both crude and cursory for this court to extrapolate from the final child arrangements made by the Civil Court a conclusion that there has been a proven inadequacy in its approach. This is for the reasons set out below.

First, the Civil Court had the benefit of a “psychosocial investigation report” which:

“Shows that the counter plaintiff provides adequate living conditions for the child, a safe family environment in which the parties’ daughter enjoys emotional security and is well cared for.”

The Romanian court therefore had the advantage of considering expert evidence addressing C’s welfare.

Secondly, the court concluded that, in light of C’s age and her “strong attachment to her mother”, it would not be in her best interests to establish residence with the father, and made a lives-with order in favour of the mother.

Thirdly, when addressing the issue of contact with the father, the court expressly directed itself in accordance with the relevant principles of international law pertaining to the best interests of children, and the need for both parents to have contact with a child. See page D127:

“Regarding the father's subsidiary request to have personal contact with the child, the court notes that in international law, visiting rights are regulated by art. 9 para. 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, according to which, in the event of the child's separation from one of the parents by a measure ordered under the law, the child has the right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, unless this is contrary to the best interests of the child.

This article, corroborated with art. 7 (concerning the right of the child to know and be cared for by the parents) and art. 18 (establishing the principle that both parents have joint responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child, being primarily responsible), lead to the conclusion that, unless proven otherwise, the continued involvement of both parents in the child's life is in the child's best interests.”

The judgment continues by addressing the bases upon which contact may be restricted, conducting a careful survey of the domestic legal framework under the applicable Romanian and ECHR law. It is not necessary to refer in further detail to that analysis in this judgment, other than to observe that it is careful, and tailored to the facts of the case, and based on the evidence the court had considered and heard (which is an advantage that this court does not have).

Against that background, the fact that the father’s permitted time with C was not supervised or phased in initially was a matter that was pre-eminently for the courts in Romania to determine. There is no basis for this court to conclude that the decision of the Civil Court was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the court’s treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, lack of consistency, or failure to take into account some material factor which undermines the cogency of its conclusion. Equally, there is no basis to conclude that the final order of the Civil Court was an order that no reasonable court could have made.

These findings were reached by the Civil Court in the context of the mother having previously obtained a protection order against the father, prohibiting him from being within 100 metres of her. The order also required the father to wear an electronic tag for a period. The father accepts that on one occasion he broke the requirements of the order by speaking directly to the mother; the incident was reported to the police, and ‘words of advice’ (my paraphrase) were given. The mother chose not to renew the protection order on the basis that “I didn’t want to revisit [the father’s] abuse” and she wanted a fresh start in the United Kingdom (see para. 32 of her witness statement). It follows that the reason there are currently no protective measures in force in Romania is because the mother chose not to apply to renew them, rather than because of any systemic or other failings in the protective measures available to her in Romania.

I also note that the mother was able successfully to secure the intervention of children’s services in Romania on a same-day basis in March 2024, when, following an incident, the father had insisted that C be conveyed to his care. As the mother writes at para. 25 of her statement, C was returned to her by Romanian Children’s Services on the same day on an urgent basis.

Finally, and significantly, as found by the Romanian courts, the father’s abuse of the mother came to an end when the relationship ended. The protection order was (save for a minor breach about which the father was spoken to by the police) effective in securing the protection of the mother.

Undertakings offered by the father and (iv) soft-landing measures

At para. 44 of his statement, the father offers the following undertakings:

In principle, I consider that these undertakings and soft-landing measures would be sufficient to ensure that the Article 13(b) threshold is not, in practice, met, when taken with the in-country provision available to the mother.

In relation to undertaking (i), I consider that it is essential for the father to provide confirmation from the Romanian prosecutor’s office that there are not, and will not be, any criminal proceedings brought against the mother in relation to her removing C from Romania. Provided such confirmation is obtained, I consider this undertaking to be reliable.

In relation to undertakings (ii) and (v), by definition the father must act on his word before any return to Romania takes place. He would need to fund return flights for the mother and C, and would have to pay the first instalment of the double monthly maintenance before she leaves this jurisdiction. If he does not do so, any return order will not be effective.

In relation to undertaking (iii), the conduct of the father previously gives me cause to question whether he could be trusted in this regard. Taking the mother’s case at its highest, his wider family network have been involved in threatening her and have played a part in her decision to flee Romania with C. I consider that the way to secure the reliability of this undertaking is to permit the mother to keep details of her return arrangements confidential from the father. I am satisfied that it would be possible for the father to meet the costs of the return flights without the details of the specific arrangements being revealed to him by the mother.

There are two caveats, however. First, the father’s undertakings not to molest (etc.) the mother should not be conditional upon the mother making a cross-undertaking to the same effect. If the father has grounds to obtain such an order domestically in Romania, he may do so if so advised. However, bearing in mind the purpose of Article 13(b), any in-country protective measures proposed by him should not be conditional upon the mother, an identified victim of domestic abuse, being required to make cross-undertakings of this sort. The mother has already secured a protection order in Romania against the father on the basis of significant findings of fact against him, and there was no suggestion in those proceedings of cross-findings being reached against the mother. The father will need to undertake not to molest (etc.) the mother unilaterally, without such an undertaking being conditional upon any cross assurances given by the mother. I also consider that the father must register this aspect of his undertakings with the relevant court in Romania under the exequatur procedure before any return order takes effect.

Secondly, the mother should not have to undertake not to make a without notice application to the courts in Romania. In light of the Article 13(b) risk which I have found to be established but for the presence of in-country protective measures, it would not be appropriate to make the mother’s enjoyment of those measures subject to her agreeing not to avail herself of a key feature of Romania’s in-country protection architecture.

Matters specific to the mother’s circumstances

The mother will return to her own support network in Romania. She and C will return to the care of her grandmother and have access to a family home there. C will be accommodated with the mother; the mother already benefits from a lives-with order made by the court in Romania, and there is no suggestion on the materials before me that that has changed or will change. The father has undertaken not to molest or otherwise harass the mother, and it will be open to the mother to apply for a protection order as she has done previously. I consider that the father can be trusted to abide by the terms of his undertaking in this respect, and that he would also abide by the terms of any protection order subsequently issued by the Romanian courts. While I note that there were isolated breaches of the protection order previously in force (see paras 27 and 28 of the mother’s witness statement), those were reported to the police, and the father was spoken to. The mother does not report any significant breach of that order previously, still less breaches which would lead to the Article 13(b) threshold being met.

In the unlikely event that the father breaches his undertakings and secures the removal from the mother of C into his care absent a Romanian court order, I find that the mother would be able to obtain effective relief in Romania. The previous approach of the Romanian courts was to ascribe significance to the emotional bond between C and the mother; with the passage of time, that bond can only have increased, and on the material before me, it is unlikely that the father would succeed in seeking unilaterally to secure a change of residence for C in his favour. Where the father unilaterally removed C from the mother’s care previously, she was returned on an urgent, same-day basis by the authorities.

Drawing this analysis together, I must examine the in-country protective measures holistically, rather than in an isolated or linear fashion.

I consider that Romania has an established and effective system for the protection of victims of domestic abuse. The chronology of what took place in Romania prior to the commencement of these proceedings demonstrates that where necessary, urgent, same-day steps can be taken to secure the safety of the child, as took place in relation to C previously.

The mother will return to Romania on a date and time, and to a location, not known to the father. Once she has returned to her family home, she will be able to make contact with the father with a view to resuming her participation in the Romanian custody proceedings. By his undertakings to this court, coupled with the direction that any return order is only effective once the father has registered those undertakings (or otherwise applied for an equivalent order) in Romania, the risk of a repeat of what has taken place in the past is diminished to a significant extent.

I accept that an enforced return of C to Romania will be a deeply unpleasant experience for the mother. It will be disruptive for both of them. It will subject the mother to the prospect of the very litigation which she plainly sought to avoid by relocating to this jurisdiction. These factors, unpleasant as they are, do not amount to “a grave risk” of the requisite harm or an otherwise intolerable situation for the purposes of article 13(b) of the Convention. The mother will have her support network, and will benefit from the financial support of the father, which will initially be at a level greater than that which would ordinarily be mandated by Romanian law.

Drawing this analysis together, I conclude that the mother has not established that C’s return would entail a grave risk that C would be exposed to physical or psychological harm, or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation.

I grant the father’s application for the return of C to Romania. The mother has not established that the Article 13(b) exception is engaged.

I will invite the parties to draft a suitable order.

That is the judgment of the court.