C (A Child) (Care Orders, Section 20 Accommodation, and Deprivation of Liberty), Re

This judgment was initially delivered in private.

The young person who is the subject of the applications before me is C. C was born in early 2011. She is 15 years old. C’s parents are M and F.

I have two applications before me. They are (i) an application for a public law order and (ii) an application for a Deprivation of Liberty Order.

The applicant is the London Borough of X, the local authority. Within both applications C is represented by a solicitor, and a Guardian has been appointed to represent her best interests.

I have had the benefit of meeting C over the video link on more than one occasion. I met with her in the presence of her solicitor and Guardian immediately prior to the hearing before me on 15 April 2026. A note of that meeting has been approved by me and was circulated to all parties and their representatives before the hearing began.

The hearing before me on 15 April 2026 was listed as an Issues Resolution/Early Final Hearing in the public law proceedings and for a hearing of the application for a Deprivation Liberty order which application had been consolidated with the public law proceedings.

All parties agreed that the issues could be determined on submissions and that I should resolve all the issues that day. I agreed. Having heard those submissions, I adjourned to give this reserved judgment. I did so because of the important issues I needed to determine and so that C should have a written record of what I decided and why I had come to those conclusions.

C was placed with M and F mid-2010s and was adopted by them the following year. At the time they adopted her, they were aware that adopting children who had experienced significant trauma would carry high care needs and difficult behaviours. They had had proper training through the adoption process and felt able, with help and support, to meet any such behaviours that may arise. When C started exhibiting difficult behaviours, they actively sought help and support for her. They sourced their own support and services and turned to the local authority for additional help.

Children’s Services first became aware of the family in 2018 when they offered support to assist with the evident significant deterioration with C’s emotional wellbeing.

C’s behaviours started to escalate and began to pose a significant risk to herself and others. Some of her behaviours were in response to her parents but some to actions and inactions of professionals. By about 2023 C was absconding from the family home, self-harming and saying she heard voices which told her to kill her parents.

M and F accepted all the professional support and advice that was given but they state that few actual interventions were provided by CAMHs, education or social services. The Guardian, in my judgment, rightly states that the provision of support was insufficient at that time to meet C’s needs. M and F sought a specialist team- and requested an assessment from them which led to a proposed package of therapeutic support. Whilst funding for that package was waiting approval, in early 2024 C seriously assaulted one of her parents with a weapon and was removed from home. Two days later, C was remanded into local authority care.

It is accepted by the local authority that for her first several months in care, C experienced multiple placement breakdowns in unregulated settings, hospital admissions and high-risk behaviours. In addition, C has experienced further emotional harm as a result of feeling unprotected from abuse by adults charged with her care.

Four months after removal, C moved to Placement A, a therapeutic residential setting. There, approximately two months after arriving, C obtained access to life history documents about her birth family. C should not have had access to them and certainly should not have been able to read them without support being in place to assist her to process the information and manage her emotional responses. The unauthorised and uncontrolled access to those documents had a devastating impact upon her.

That same month C became extremely dysregulated, assaulting a member of staff at her placement with a weapon. She was charged with further criminal offences and remanded to Secure Accommodation Unit B.

Within days, C pleaded guilty to wounding with intent to cause GBH (relating to the incident in the family home); threats to kill and attempted wounding to cause GBH x 2 (l relating to the incident in the placement). She was remanded to Secure Accommodation Unit B. Soon after , C received an 18-month custodial sentence. She remained at Secure Accommodation Unit B. At the unit, C made significant progress. Her behaviour stabilised, she re-engaged with education and her emotional well-being improved.

In the early part of 2025 C’s parents wrote to the local authority expressing that C had benefitted from and felt safe under the highly boundaried regime at Secure Accommodation Unit B and from the high staff ratio there. They properly raised concerns that transition from the Unit to her new placement needed to be carefully handled and pre-planned. Sadly, what happened was that the local authority found that an appropriate placement proved hard to find and the secure unit would not permit C to stay beyond the period of her sentence. In the event, a placement was found for C but at the last minute and C moved without any adequate transitional period.

C was released from custody and placed at Placement C. Her placement there was secured by a S20 agreement with her parents and a Deprivation of Liberty order made by me. Shortly thereafter, C was taken to Hospital D. She was suffering from acute distress. She refused food and fluids, had auditory command hallucinations and body image concerns. After 10 days of inadequate nutrition and hydration, C was detained under S2 Mental Health Act. Subsequently C was detained under S3 of the Mental Health Act. Even within that context C continued to try to self-harm by various means. C’s behaviours posed a significant risk of significant harm to herself. By the time the application was made for a public law order in relation to C, the local authority rightly considered that the acute hospital ward where C was detained was not in C’s welfare interests. On the ward she had experienced the death of another inpatient and witnessed emergency care being given to a baby. C needed to be protected from such trauma and to be placed where the measures to safeguard her were tailored to her needs.

On 13 October 2025, the local authority issued public law proceedings in relation to C. They were allocated to me.

On 16 October 2025, I granted the local authority an interim care order. At that time C was at Hospital D where she was detained under S3 Mental Health Act 1983.

On 16 October 2025, the parties agreed the final threshold criteria for the purposes of the public law proceedings. Having considered all the evidence filed in the public law proceedings and that in the Deprivation of Liberty proceedings, I decided that the agreed threshold criteria was supported by the evidence before me. Accordingly, I formally found on the balance of probabilities that the particulars of threshold were proven as a matter of fact and endorsed the agreed threshold criteria which I considered met the justice of the case, accurately reflected the evidence and was necessary and proportionate. The relevant date upon which the threshold criteria were met was the date upon which protective measures were first taken in relation to C in 2024, and C was remanded into local authority custody. As at that date C was beyond parental control.

Towards the end of 2025 C moved from hospital to a CQC-registered community placement, Placement E. It is a solo placement with 3:1 staffing arrangement including a registered mental health nurse. There she has engaged with education and with psychological therapy through a highly specialist NHS autism service. The placement was made by the local authority under an interim care order and the restrictions on C’s liberty has been sanctioned by me making a Deprivation of Liberty order. Within that framework C has made significant progress. She is on the whole fairly settled but there remain periods of dysregulation when C is anxious or nervous or has difficult phone calls with her birth family. When she is dysregulated C places herself and others at risk of significant physical harm.

The local authorityseeks a final care order and a Deprivation of Liberty Order. From their perspective C’s engagement with education and therapy is at a relatively early stage. Any change now t would risk disturbing the stability that has been achieved. They say C still needs her liberty to be restricted to keep her safe. There is a step-down plan, but the stage has yet to be reached where it is appropriate to embark on such a plan. There are still occasions when C places herself at risk of significant harm. Initially the local authority sought a Deprivation of Liberty order for 6 months but later, upon reading the Guardian’s report, they considered that a 12-month order was in C’s best interests. The local authority accepts that it is a fine balance between what C would internalise versus the need to keep the Deprivation of Liberty order under Court review. Given that the order is permissive and there will be two Child in Care reviews within the 12-month period, the local authority considers, on balance, that a 12-month order would be in C’s best interests. If things go well and C also feels that she no longer requires a Deprivation of Liberty order, then the local authority could return to court to vary or discharge the order. Having a 12-month order would mean that there is not a further Court hearing looming over C in 6 months’ time.

The local authority argue that C’s current placement is best secured under a final care order. S20 consent would not provide the local authority with parental responsibility for C which they say they require given her high level of complex needs. They argue that S20 consent could be withdrawn or restricted at any time. That could destabilise the current plan.

The local authority say they require parental responsibility to make timely, consistent and child focused decisions for C about her placement, the therapeutic interventions she needs, her education, her safeguarding and her long term future. On behalf of the local authority, it is also submitted that they need a final care order to manage the risks identified. It was argued on the local authority’s behalf that whilst a care order should not be needed to enable a young person to access the support and services they need, service providers are often more willing to work with a young person who is under a care order and for whom the local authority hold overriding parental responsibility.

The local authority submit that M and F’s concern that their parental responsibility would be overridden by the local authority and they would be sidelined, can be mitigated by a memorandum of understanding between the local authority and C’s parents about how they would share parental responsibility in the future. That understanding has been reduced to writing and is before me

The local authority stated within their evidence before me, though not pursued in submissions on behalf of the local authority, that reliance on S20 would limit the local authority’s ability to maintain and vary the existing Deprivation of Liberty order. That is an erroneous argument. It ignores the free-standing nature of an application for a Deprivation of Liberty order. In many cases in the List, a Deprivation of Liberty order is often applied for by a Local Authority when a child is in State care by virtue of parental consent under S20 Children Act 1989. Within those proceedings, applications to vary can be and are often made. The ability of the Local Authority to apply for, maintain and vary the restrictions under the Deprivation of Liberty order is not dependent on the local authority having parental responsibility under a care order. Further I do not consider their need to monitor and review the necessity of the continuation of the restrictions permitted under any Deprivation of Liberty order is dependent on C being the subject to a Care order. C would be a looked after child if she were to be accommodated by the local authority under S20 CA 1989. It would be incumbent on the local authority to monitor and review the necessity of maintaining the restrictions. At all times it is the least restrictive option that should be in place and the restriction should be proportionate to the risk whether the young person is in state care under a care order or S20 CA 1989.

TheFinal Care Planfor C is at D22 in the bundle. It is for C to remain at Placement E with a Deprivation of Liberty order in place. A sustained period of stability is said to be required before any move to a residential placement can be considered. C’s education is currently provided by a home tutor who is available for 3 hours a day although C currently choses a shorter period. The local authority is working to update C’s ECHP and once finalised begin consultations with schools about C returning to school. Her plan makes provision for contact with her family and her birth family.

The Deprivationof Liberty Ordersought initially by the local authority was for 6 months but after reading the Guardian’s Analysis they sought a 12-month order. There is a step-down plan within the bundle which envisages a formal review of restrictions every 12 weeks.

C’s parents accept that C cannot live with them at present but hope that they, with support, can work towards C’s return to the family home, initially for sleepovers. It is their stated case that they would prefer interim orders, but they would agree to S20 CA 1989 accommodation with a Deprivation of Liberty order.

C’s parents ask me to extend the care proceedings until such point as there is more clarity around C’s care plan, contact progression and ultimate destination. They say that making a final care order would send the wrong message to C. However well explained, they agree with Dr White (instructed expert Consultant Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist) and one of C’s treating psychiatrists that a final care order is likely to confuse C. They acknowledge the dilemma of meeting C’s need to be part of the family and the possibility that I may make a care order at the conclusion of the public law proceedings. They consider it essential that C knows that they have not just signed her over to a care order which to her is going to look like permanent separation from her family. In argument on behalf of M and F it is acknowledged that I can only extend the statutory timetable if it is necessary to resolve the proceedings justly.

C’s parents acknowledge that C has made great progress since moving to Placement E. Her resolve to keep herself safe is evident. C wishes to live a normal life and feels inhibited from taking part in normal teenage social activities with carers present. That said, C’s parents accept that she does need to be contained to feel safe. They consider her to be hyper-vigilant to threat and vulnerable. However, with support and encouragement from her parents, C has been able to get out and do more activities.

C’s parents have on occasion been concerned about the impact of contact for C with her birth family and what that has exposed her to (arguments and rivalry). Nevertheless, they have felt and continue to feel strongly that to remove all contact could be more harmful and could send contact underground. Direct contact for C with her birth mother may be helpful in the future but they say that it will need to be planned carefully. When it is, they would expect to be informed about it, not least because of the potential impact on C’s sibling.

M and F submit that there is a real unknown about the duration of C’s stay at Placement E. C’s stay at Placement E is dependent on a permissive Deprivation of Liberty order being in place. C’s parents consider that there is a tension between C’s need for stability and the push to move forward to a more normal way of living. As the restrictions become unnecessary C will lose her stability and the support surrounding her that has enabled her to reach stability. A that moment the court’s scrutiny through proceedings will cease just as C enters a new placement. Hence it is argued that interim orders best meet C’s needs.

It is said that it is too early to conclude the care proceedings. Within 6 months time things may, they say, look very different. The care plan is deficient in that it does not have details about education or therapy for C. The step-down plan for the Deprivation of Liberty order is too slow. They submit that the focus should be on stepping down from 3:1 to 2: 1 with regular reviews.

C’s parents accept that they and C need social care’s help, but they do not see why the local authority requires a legal power to determine the extent to which they can exercise their parental responsibility. Making a final care order suggests the local authority are the decision-makers and they, her parents, are simply being kept informed. There is no need for the local authority to hold overriding parental responsibility. They have never unreasonably withheld their consent to date. M and F support a solid cohesive professional network being placed around C. They accept Dr White's recommendations.

The Guardianhas known C since the second half of 2025. The Guardian, on balance, recommends a final care order and a 12 months Deprivation of Liberty Order.

The Guardian in her final analysis sets out C’s wishes and feelings as of that date. It is clear that C would prefer a residential setting and a significant reduction in, and then removal of, the restrictions on her liberty. C wants to live a more normal life and have interaction with her peers. C would like more fluid contact arrangements and is resistant to scheduling too far in advance. In February 2026 C told her Guardian that she would wish equity between her contact, including face-to-face contact, with her family and birth family. C has told her Guardian that she agrees with the local authority. If her mother and the local authority have a dispute, then the local authority should make the decision. C considered that S20 placed her mother under considerable pressure to make decisions. C says that it’s nice to be annoyed with social services as they are an institution and she would rather be mad at them that at her mother. However, when C saw me on 15 April 2026, she did not want to express an opinion on whether I should make a care order and told me that she was impartial – I don’t want the guilt. C has been clear with her Guardian that making a care order would not change her relationship with her family.

The Guardian tells the court that C’s wishes and feelings should be considered within the context of Dr White’s assessment that C lacks the capacity to weigh all relevant factors and make an informed decision.

The Guardian relies on Dr White’s report and his opinion that stability is the single most important therapeutic requirement for C at this stage. The Guardian acknowledges that C’s educational needs are not currently being fulfilled as C does not engage fully with the 3 hour a day home tutoring provided. C is however going to visit a school shortly. C’s ECHP has being updated and 3 or 4 specialist providers are expressing interest in her. There is structure around C’s contact with her family but not with her birth family who have a much more limited understanding of C’s complex needs.

C’s Guardian, as do the local authority and her parents, tell me that C’s needs can only be met by living away from her family home. The Guardian considers that I have sufficient information to make a final care order. In the Guardian’s view the making of a care order will not alter the support and interventions to be provided to C and her family nor in the Guardian’s view will it impact on C’s position within the family. The Guardian acknowledges that S.20 agreement would be the least interventionist approach, as it would not result in the local authority sharing parental responsibility with M and F. While the Guardian is satisfied that C’s parents are unlikely to withdraw their consent unless very concerned about children’s services decision making, she does consider there may be a time when they consider this the only avenue left open to them to influence the care C receives. A withdrawal of consent and further public law proceedings would be destabilising and stressful for C. External agencies will continue to engage with M and F whether a care order is made or not.

The Guardian acknowledges that C’s care plan will change over time. C will either need to move to a placement that can accommodate her with and without restrictions under a Deprivation of Liberty order or C’s current placement will need to be retained without a Deprivation of Liberty order before C transitions to her next placement. The Guardian consider that 12 months is realistic for C to achieve living without any restrictions. Repeated returns to court are not, she says, in C’s best interests. The pace of step down is slower than C would wish and her Guardian urges the local authority to revisit the step-down plan with input from C. The Guardian considers that C will be better settled in her current placement if she does not consider that a better option is still being searched for.

Dr Oliver White, Consultant Psychiatrist, initially prepared a report in relation to C for the criminal proceedings. His initial report is from 2024. It is based on an assessment of C in the first half of 2024 when she was due to appear before the Criminal Court. It is Dr White’s opinion, which I accept, that C has a reactive attachment disorder. This has developed in the context of her early childhood adversity, specifically neglect and exposure to domestic violence and unstable caregiving during her first three years. It results in her complex relationship with M and F; contradictory positions of seeking closeness and comfort to rejection and hostility. C’s early adverse childhood experiences and resulting reactive attachment disorder also impact negatively on her sensory integration. In his opinion at that time C presented with some possible neurodiversity and he recommended further assessment. Dr Oliver White’s addendum report is dated 19 November 2024. His opinion remained as before. He recommended multi-agency intervention and support in the context of her reactive attachment disorder, which is her primary mental disorder. Dr White recommended continued contact between C and her parents but advised that it needed to be carefully risk managed given the then current risk assessment and C’s then ongoing clear and consistent expression of wanting to seriously harm and kill the parent she had assaulted.

C has since had a multi-agency neurodevelopment assessment. That concluded in January 2025 that C fully meets the criteria for the diagnosis of ASD. The diagnosis of ADHD was also cautiously made. The report concluded as follows:

Within the report a number of recommendations are made about how C should be approached by professionals and steps that can be taken to enable C to cope. They include remembering the impact that trauma has had on C; advance warning of change wherever possible; approaching C in an informed manner; giving her clear and consistent messages; and where possible giving C choices to help her maintain her sense of agency.

Shortly thereafter, in March 2025, C was the subject of an Educational Psychologists report which had been commissioned by the local authority’s SEN Panel to update C’s EHCP. The recommendation was that C’s educational package should replicate in so far as possible the systems and approaches which had been used at Secure Accommodation Unit B.

In June 2025, C whilst an inpatient at Hospital D had a Child and Adolescent Eating Disorder Assessment.. It concluded that C’s history of a fluctuating pattern of eating difficulties is best understood as disordered eating.

The next month a specialist NHS autism provision, assessed C on the ward at Hospital D. Within that assessment it is stated that C found it difficult to accept her diagnosis of autism but more accepting of her diagnosis of ADHD.

In addition to the above, C’s then-treating Consultant Clinical Psychologist, prepared a report dated 3 November 2025 which has been disclosed into these proceedings . In her clinical and expert opinion C is suffering from Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), but this needs to be very carefully considered in the context of her other difficulties and in particular the neurodevelopmental problems and her very disrupted attachment relationships. The psychologist

The psychologist recommended that C should have the opportunity to process her traumatic experiences in the future but that at that time it would activate emotional distress and will heighten negative conditions . It was better in their opinion to wait for C to stabilise in the community before she began that process. According to the psychologist C’s prognosis was good once she received the appropriate therapy for Complex PTSD. C would benefit from building

Within these proceedings Dr White has provided an updating report based on his examination of C on 14 January 2026. His final opinion is as follows:

The last expert assessment within these court proceedings has been provided by the specialist autism intervention provision. It is dated 3 April 2026. It is a positive report detailing the progress C and her parents have made. Within her report the author notes the engagement of M and F who have attended all meetings to support with planning the next steps for C. I am told that C has engaged well with the individual therapy . She has had twelve sessions but unfortunately her therapist, with whom she has a good relationship has been unwell recently and therapy has been paused to await the therapists return; that being considered a better way forward than the engagement of a new therapist. C’s ECHP has been edited and parallel planning alongside current schooling is being explored. C has had regular sessions with a Speech and Language therapist to improve her receptive and expressive abilities. M and F have attended weekly therapy sessions to support them to understand C’s neurodiversity. They aim to support C in a positive self-view in the future.

My analysis is based on a holistic appraisal of all the evidence before me.

I find that C is a young woman who has suffered numerous traumas in her life. Before her adoption by M and F, C had already experienced neglect, domestic abuse, parental substance misuse and multiple foster placements.

C was placed with M and F together with her sibling in the 2010s. She was adopted by them the next calendar year. The four of them are a loving family unit of which C is very much a part. Her parents have remained supportive of her throughout. They love her dearly and that love is reciprocated. C has a special relationship with her sibling, and it is hoped that soon direct contact with him can be reintroduced.

C’s parents have maintained contact with C wherever she has been placed. C rings her parents daily, often multiple times a day. They visited her at Secure Accommodation Unit B and at Hospital D. There have been occasions when C has stopped contact with her family. For instance, after, her parents went with C’s sibling on a much-needed holiday, C would not speak to them for 6 weeks. C has never articulated why she would not speak to them, but it is, I find, likely that she felt rejected and excluded. Even during periods when C has not wanted to see her parents, they have been there for her - they have regularly dropped off essential items for her and home cooked food and checked her phone.

On 5 December 2025 C said she did not want to spend time alone with her mother. C feared she would be held responsible if her mother was harmed. C loves her mother and expresses that love but also worries that in periods of dysregulation she may harm her. C has spent time with her father and her grandparents at the placement and time with her father in the community. In addition, C has spent time with her family at a shopping centre. Face to face contact currently takes place in accordance with specialist advice, every other Saturday with occasional additional visits. C, I was told, was looking forward to a trip with friends and family to the London Eye and a meal in China Town to celebrate her birthday.

Throughout the criminal proceedings, the proceedings in the Deprivation of Liberty List and these public law proceedings, M and F have always exercised their parental responsibility for C with her best interests at the front and centre of their decision making. Rightly the local authority has accepted that M and F have always behaved in that manner. I find that there is no reason to think that they would behave otherwise in the future. Their commitment to C has been unwavering. M and F have been, and I am sure will remain, powerful and responsible advocates for C. The Guardian describes both parents as being able to communicate effectively with the numerous services involved in care planning for C. C’s parents have shown that they are capable of attending all meetings with professionals and engaging with those working with C. There is no history here of any disruptive behaviours from C’s parents which has interfered with or delayed planning for C. The local authority accepts, as do I, that M and F’s unfailing commitment to C is an important protective factor for her.

The evidence before me, which I accept, is that the relationship between C and her parents, particularly one of them is complex. Given C’s early life experiences and, in particular, her reactive attachment disorder (see above), that is to be expected. It is not her parents' fault nor is its C’s fault, but it is the reality of the situation. M and F accept that they are unable to meet C’s care needs at the moment. They hope that as progress continues to be made and that with the aid of the therapeutic intervention now in place, C will return to the family home in the future, at least for sleepovers. They are supportive of C’s wish to be in a more normal environment, such as a residential placement, but there is no evidence before me that they intend to proceed towards that goal at a pace which is contrary to the professional advice that is given. M and F are realistic in their understanding of the work that needs to be done by all parties, them included, before C’s aspirations can become a reality.

I find and factor into my decision making that C has experienced numerous adverse childhood experiences. I have already mentioned her early childhood and the trauma she suffered prior to being placed with M and F. That has been compounded by her experiences in hospital under section, in police stations and court rooms as part of the criminal process and numerous placements moves once she was a looked after child which did not meet her need.

I accept the local authority's evidence that C’s presentation is shaped by the interplay between her neurodiversity, post-traumatic stress disorder, numerous adverse childhood experiences and an attachment disorder. Since her discharge from hospital, C has continued to present a high risk of self-harm. Whilst the overall frequency of incidents has diminished and is diminishing, the triggers are unpredictable and the consequences grave and life threatening.

C is engaging well with therapy. It is clear to me that she has insight into her behaviours and their causes. She told me her current placement feels like a half-way house. She wants to be in a therapeutic children's home with her peers and to feel more normal. That is consistent with what she said in her Child in Care Review. C also feels that her current restrictions on her liberty are excessive. She has demonstrated she says that can be trusted in the community without the current level of supervision. C would like to be moved to a Pupil Referral Unit or other specialist school reflecting her desire to have a greater degree of normality. C finds the current 3-hour private tuition sessions excessive. I have taken C’s wishes and feelings into account. I have weighed them in the balance in the light of her age and understanding. I accept the Guardian’s evidence about C’s ability to weigh information in the balance. I must also consider her wishes and feelings in the context in which C currently finds herself and her complex needs. I hope C will understand that whilst I have taken her views into account, they are not determinative.

Following the data breach referred to in the above chronology, C made contact with her birth mother and her birth uncle. She is now aware that she has other siblings and is in contact with them. In the second half of 2025 C formally requested to be placed within her birth family. C’s biological uncle put himself forward to care for her, but the initial assessment was negative. He has not challenged that assessment. Having read that assessment I consider that whilst he may have wanted to care for C, his offer to do so was never realistic.

C has been open with her parents about her contact with her birth family. I accept her parents’ evidence that C is relieved that she can talk to them about her contact with them. Her parents have agreed to work with professionals to manage C’s contact with her birth family rather than stop it. Contact for C with her birth family has on occasion distressed her. At the start of this year, C told her social worker that she had witnessed a domestically abusive incident between her birth mother and her partner whilst on a video call with her birth mother. C wants to see her birth mother and have direct contact with her. However, in my view that will need careful thought and will need to be introduced only when C is emotionally ready and there is a package of support in place to manage and support C before and after it takes place.

M and F argue that the statutory time limit should be extended to enable me to determine the case justly and that I should make an interim care order. Accordingly, I have reminded myself of S32 CA 1989. In my judgment, extending the proceedings is likely to impact adversely on C who needs stability and certainty. The period of proposed adjournment would be approximately 6 months as C continues to make progress. It is argued that C’s placement may change as may her contact needs and her educational setting. However, I consider that any such changes will be part of C’s ongoing journey. In the circumstances of this case, C’s care plan is , I consider. likely to be a dynamic document for a longer period than 6 months. It will need to change as C continues to make progress with therapy and her needs change.

I do not consider I need any further evidence before I decide whether or not to make a care order. In addition, I have reminded myself of an old but still valid House of Lords decision Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementations) [2002] 2 AC 291 at paragraphs 89 – 102 wherein at paragraph 102 it is stated that:

In my judgment, it is not necessary for this court to extend the statutory time limit to enable the court to monitor the progression of her care plan. In that regard paragraph 28 of Re S (above)is pertinent:

I have reminded myself of S1 CA 1989 and applied all the factors in S1(3) CA 1989. In balancing the factors, I have taken into account C’s wishes and feelings in light of her age and understanding. I accept Dr White’s opinion in relation to C’s capacity. I have no doubt that C wishes to return to a more normal way of living. I factor in that C has insight into her behaviours and her problems and that her periods of dysregulation are far less frequent now. However, when they do occur, she places herself and others at risk of significant and potentially life-threatening harm. I have to factor in that her current placement is meeting her needs well and that there she is making progress. I, like all the parties before me, accept Dr White’s opinion that C needs stability and predictability. I find that she experiences that at Placement E. I acknowledge and factor in that as C continues to engage with therapy, there will come a point when (i) the Deprivation of Liberty restrictions are no longer needed and (ii) when her needs will be best met in a residential unit with other young people of similar age. Those two issues are linked but they are not dependent on each other. Thus, it may become in C’s best interests to remain at Placement E without a Deprivation of Liberty order or to move to a residential placement with fewer restrictions on her liberty in place. However, I find that we are not at that point yet. Currently, C needs to continue to benefit from the safety and security she has found in Placement E. Any move from Placement E needs to be planned with an appropriate period of transition. Any planning will need to take into account the transfer of the therapeutic interventions she needs. It is only in that way that seamless care can be provided, and C can continue to make progress. Accordingly, I approve the current care plan which meets C’s current needs. In particular it meets her needs for stability and predictability.

The care plan will remain the same for C whether she is under a final care order or voluntarily accommodated. I consider it is in C’s best interests. The real issue in this case is not C’s care plan. It is whether I should make a care order or not. In that regard, I remind myself that just because the threshold condition is met, it does not automatically follow that a care order is necessary. Further, the fact that threshold has been crossed does not mean that the parents have been culpable in any way. Here the threshold has been satisfied on the basis of C being beyond parental control but that must be seen in the context of her complex needs which arise from her adverse childhood experiences, none of which are attributable to her parents. Further, I remind myself that just because an interim care order has been in place since October 2025, it does not necessarily mean that I should make a final care order.

Before I make a care order, I have to consider all the factors in S1 CA 1989 including the no order principle in S1(5) CA 1989. I have to apply all those factors to the evidence as it is before me today not at the date that the threshold condition was met. I have to make a proportionality cross check. C and her parents’ Article 8 rights are engaged and ought not to be interfered with unless it is lawful, necessary and proportionate to do so.

In argument I was referred to Re S (A Child) and Re W (A Child) (s20 accommodation) [2023] EWCA Civ 1 in which the Court of Appeal considered the interplay between care orders which have been made pursuant to section 31 CA 1989 and the voluntary accommodation of children in need under section 20 CA 1989. The issue in that case was whether and in what circumstances, the threshold criteria having been established and there being in place an agreed care plan, the court should decline to make an order under section 31 CA 1989 and instead should make no order in accordance with the 'no order' principle as set out in section 1(5) CA 1989.

To answer that question King LJ, giving the lead judgment, considered the comparative roles of care orders and accommodation under S20 CA 1989 at paragraphs 38-62. That led King LJ to state at paragraph 62 and 63:

In my judgment C’s case is one of those cases where a care order is not needed and C can be properly accommodated by the local authority under S20 CA 1989 to which her parents’ consent. On the facts of this case, a care order is neither necessary nor proportionate. The making of a public law order would be significant intrusion into the family life of C and her parents. The background I have already set out above, demonstrates that C’s parents have provided loving support for C and have ensured her needs are met in what for them must have been difficult and traumatic circumstances. On the facts of this case, C’s parents have made child focused decisions throughout that have been in C’s best interests. They have engaged meaningfully with the multi-disciplinary team that supports C and provides her with therapy. They have never acted in any way to disrupt the services and support C needs. In October 2025 when I made the interim care order, it was needed because of the uncertainty that then existed about how C would react to her new placement, how the dynamic would work between C and her parents off the ward and how the team around C would operate. There were, to put it briefly, then unknown and untested plans. What has happened since is that the parents have continued to exercise their parental responsibility completely appropriately. There has been no instance when the local authority has had to exercise their overriding parental responsibility under S33 CA 1989. Despite an interim order being in place, the reality is that the case has been worked in true partnership and there is nothing in the papers before me to suggest that will not continue. That partnership has not come about because there is an order is in place but because the parents have made child-focused, responsible decisions at every turn and want to act in partnership. C has expressed concern that S20 accommodation places too much responsibility on her mother. That is an example of C wishing to protect her mother and it is to C’s credit that she expresses that view. However, M does not want to have that responsibility removed from her. She, loving C as I know she does, wishes to parent C and has demonstrated that she is able to do so in a manner which focuses on C’s best interests. M and F currently disagree with the speed and proposed monitoring of the proposed step-down plan. The disagreements have been raised appropriately. They fall within the band of reasonable opinions on the facts of this case. The evidence of past behaviours suggests that those disagreements will be worked through with the input of the MDT and that when considering the speed of step down, all (including M and F) will put C’s best interests front and centre of their decision-making.

There is always a theoretical risk that a parent consenting to S20 accommodation will withdraw that consent and I have to factor that into this case. The Guardian is satisfied that C’s parents are unlikely to withdraw their consent unless they are very concerned about children’s services’ decision-making. Nevertheless, she does consider there may be a time when they consider this the only avenue left open to them to influence the care C receives. That is said by the Guardian to justify making a care order as any withdrawal of consent would be destabilising for C and contrary to her best interests. However, I find on the facts of this case C’s parents are unlikely to act in a peremptory or irrational manner. Their decision making is likely to be child focused and that should a time come where they consider withholding consent to accommodation that decision will be made with C’s welfare at the heart of their decision making and , on the evidence to date, only after consultation with all the relevant professionals working to support and help C and after consideration of all the options then available. Dr White, in his latest report, stated that future care planning should prioritise emotional continuity, predictable routines, meaningful activity, and coordinated multi-agency working. The overriding objective should be the provision of sustained psychological containment and relational safety, rather than definitive or time-driven placement or legal outcomes.Given the manner in which M and F have made decisions to date, that can, I find, be achieved by the parents and local authority working in partnership.This court, on the evidence before it, has confidence in M and F continuing to make best interest decisions in relation to C just as they have throughout the history of this case. That they have been child focused throughout is further evidenced by the manner in which they reacted to C having made contact with her birth family and having contact with them. Again, they have made child focused decisions and have acted in C’ s best interests. There is no need in this case for the local authority to have parental responsibility to arrange contact for C with the birth family. M and F are, I find, likely to accept the advice of the MDT providing services to C. The emotional continuity, predictability and coordinated multi-agency work that C needs is dependent on partnership working not the making of a care order to be made. The local authority has submitted that a care order is necessary for the local authority to provide the services and support C needs as some service providers are more likely to offer their services if a care order in place. In my judgment, no child should be made subject to a care order simply to ensure they receive the service provision they need and to which they are entitled. S17 CA 1989 is concerned with the provision of services for children in need, their families and others. Further C was detained under S3 Mental Health Act 1983 for 6 months. Thus, S117 Mental Health Act after care should be available to C.

I now turn to consider the making of the Deprivation of Liberty order. In Re T (Inherent Jurisdiction: Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] EWCA Civ 307 Baker LJ set out the relevant legal framework at paragraphs at paragraphs 5-28.

Applying the relevant principles to the facts of this case, I am satisfied that the local authority could not achieve the result it seeks without the making of an order by this court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction and that there is reasonable cause to believe that if the inherent jurisdiction was not exercised C is likely to suffer significant harm. Accordingly, I permit the local authority to invoke the inherent jurisdiction.

The essential components of deprivation of liberty were identified by the ECtHR in Storck v Germany [2005] 43 EHRR6. In C’s case the restrictions proposed amount to containment within the meaning of Storck limb (a)- Cheshire West v Chester Council v P [2014] AC 896 applied. The restrictions are to be imposed by the State and limb (c) of Storck (above) is clearly met. C does not consent to the restrictions. C’s parents have not consented to the restrictions, nor should they be asked to do so. The dynamic between C and her parents is complex. C does not wish to have her liberty restricted and, if her parents were to consent to her deprivation of liberty that would risk the relationship between C and her parents being damaged. Thus, there is no valid consent and limb (b) of Storck is met. The restrictions proposed thus amount to a deprivation of C’s liberty.

I consider that the restrictions the local authority asks me to authorise are necessary and proportionate to the risk of harm in this case. In coming to that decision, I acknowledge that C’s emotional regulation has improved. However, there are still periods of dysregulation. Although they now occur less frequently, when dysregulated the risk C poses to herself and others from her behaviours is grave and potentially life threatening. It cannot be predicted when the period of dysregulation will occur because the triggers may vary and they cannot always be predicted with accuracy. I therefore authorise the restrictions sought. Having made a holistic evaluation of the evidence, the restrictions are clearly in her best interests as they are required to keep her safe from grave, possibly, life threatening harm.

That leads me to consider the period during which the restrictions should be authorised. C wants no restricts and a return to normality as soon as possible. Her parents say a two-month order is all that is necessary. The local authority and the Guardian argue for a 12-month order. I acknowledge that the step-down plan allows for MDT reviews every 12 weeks unless a significant change of circumstances requires an earlier review.

I remind myself that any order must be necessary and proportionate. When considering the length of any order I may make, I have reminded myself of the maximum period a child may be held in secure accommodation under Regulations 11 and 12 of the Secure Accommodation Regulations 1991. Whilst the regulations are concerned with accommodation under S25 CA 1989, I consider the statutory time limits to provide a useful touchstone when considering the proportionality of the duration of the proposed order. Further I factor into my decision making that with continued therapeutic input and engagement from C and her parents, it is likely that the episodes of dysregulation will continue to become less frequent and the need for an order will lessen. However, it is also likely that there will be bumps along the way before there is no longer any need for an order. In making my determination I have factored in the step-down plan. I also have taken into account C’s wishes and feelings. I acknowledge that C very much wants to go on a three-day residential course in August. Against that I factor in that a permissive order does not prevent that happening nor does it prevent C living a more normal life. All parties in this case ultimately want what C wants which is for her to live more normal life commensurate with her age. However, I have to factor against that the continuing risk that C poses to herself and sometimes others. There is a real need to keep her safe. In the circumstances I have decided that it is necessary and proportionate to make a six-month final order. The order is permissive not mandatory. Any application of the restriction must always be the least restrictive.

That is my judgment.