Jessica Bradley v CM & Ors

This is the only one of the four cases in which there is a published judgment: In the matter of C a child [2025] EWFC 47(B) handed down by HHJ Hale on 4 March 2025. He said “In more than 17 years of experience as a fulltime judge … I cannot recall a case as difficult and depressing as this one.” C had been the subject of litigation in the Family Court “practically constantly for nearly nine years.” C’s parents never married and they separated when C was three years old. CF has since married. A final child arrangements order was made in 2017 for C to live with her mother and spend time with her father. CM suspended C’s family time with her father later that year prompting enforcement proceedings. A further child arrangements order was made in 2018 and the father issued another enforcement application in 2022. CM then made allegations against the father alleging assaults by him and his wife against C as well as allegations of neglect by way of food restriction.

The case was heard by HHJ Trotter-Jackson who gave judgment in January 2023. She received expert evidence from Dr Downs. In the transcript of the judgment with which I have been provided, the Judge said:

“Dr Downs…. has concluded that [C] should live with her father and have contact with her mother, on the basis of her conclusions that the mother is parentally alienating [C] from the applicant father. The Guardian supports that being the applicant father’s position and says if the residence is to be transferred there should be a short suspension of contact, effectively to allow [C] to be in with the father, and, then, contact resume on a supervised basis.”

Both parents and the child, through her guardian, were represented at the hearing before HHJ Trotter-Jackson as they were later before HHJ Hale. HHJ Trotter-Jackson found that “Dr Downs was an expert witness aware of her duties to the Court, giving evidence in an even handed and nuanced fashion and that her sole intention was to assist the Court with the issues before them.” The Judge found that the mother, CM, had “constructed” an alleged assault by CF on their daughter, purporting to rely on a photograph of bruising to C’s face which did not come from the time when she alleged the assault had taken place. She had not witnessed the assault and no witnesses were before the court. The Judge found that the mother had manipulated C into making another assault allegation against CF. The alleged assault by CF’s wife was an accident: she was unpacking kitchen items when a jug caught C in the mouth. The Judge found that CM “deliberately imbued this mundane domestic incident with a sinister significance it should never have had.” None of the mother’s allegations were established and the Judge found that the mother herself had made various false allegations to the police and had sought “to alienate [CF] from the child’s life since separation.” The Judge found that C parroted her mother’s views about CF and his relationship with his wife.

It is important to emphasise that these findings have not been reversed on appeal nor were they questioned in the subsequent judgment of HHJ Hale. They were made after a full, contested hearing at which CM was represented. The case that CM made false allegations was tested and found to be proved.

C had been living with her mother but HHJ Trotter-Jackson made a welfare decision to make a new child arrangements order for C to live with her father.

By the time the later judgment of HHJ Hale was handed down in March 2025, C was steadfastly maintaining that she wished to live with her mother. C continued to make what HHJ Hale described as “unsubstantiated” allegations that CF and his wife were hitting her. The father was reporting troubling accounts by C of what her mother had asked her to do by way of some kind of revenge on CF and his wife. HHJ Hale noted that plans for therapeutic interventions had not been put into practice. HHJ Hale received further evidence from Dr Downs as well as from Cafcass. He heard evidence from the parents. He carefully weighed the welfare evidence and concluded:

“The plan as envisaged by the Guardian, Dr Downes [sic.] and Judge Trotter Jackson has inevitably only been partially successful to the extent that the process of alienation has been interrupted, the father and daughter relationship appears to have been reestablished and there is a more solid foundation on which to build for the future through regular family time. It has however failed in the sense that as far as I am concerned it has not and will not address C's ongoing emotional and psychological needs.

The transition back to the mother should be facilitated as smoothly as possible as soon as practicable and ideally with minimal acrimony. If there is a gap between C leaving one school and starting another steps should be taken to have work sent home with her so that she does not fall behind.”

There were some further hearings following HHJ Hale’s judgment but the proceedings appear now to have concluded. Dr Downs produced four reports: on 8 February 2022, on 18 April 2022 (answering questions), on 15 February 2024, and on 24 June 2024. There are a number of Cafcass reports from a total of three different officers and guardians: 7 January 2021, 1 July 2022, 20 December 2022, 25 July 2024, 20 January 2025, and 25 September 2025. The last report was tellingly marked “Number of weeks in proceedings: 284 weeks”.

A few years after the breakdown of the parents’ relationship and their separation, GHF made an application for a child arrangements order in respect of GG and HH seeking a shared lives with arrangement. The children were living with GHM and were hostile to spending time with their father. GG referred to him as being “evil”. In 2020, GG suffered a significant mental health crisis. HH said that his father did not understand his dairy allergy. HH had undergone many medical investigations including for suspected allergies. The court sanctioned reports from a paediatrician and from Dr Downs.

I have been provided with two reports from Dr Downs in the proceedings dated 24 June 2021 and 20 August 2021. In her first report she concluded:

“2.1

…Results suggest [the children] are both struggling with acknowledging their feelings, especially in relation to their family. Results also suggest the use of splitting which is a psychological defence used to manage internal tension. Splitting is known to feature in a number of personality disorders and, should the current situation continue, it is likely to have a significant impact on their psychological, emotional and social development and their ability to form and sustain healthy relationships in the future. Should the present situation continue, the children will be at increased risk for developing mental health/psychiatric problems in the future.

2.2.

In my opinion the children are being alienated in relation to their father. It is likely that they are picking up on the emotional reactions of their mother and they will be aware of there being consequences on their mother of their having contact with their father.”

The expert paediatrician advised that HH’s “healthcare over the first years of his life has been exceptionally complicated both with a number of proven or ‘true’ medical conditions and also a number of references to unproven or unconfirmed conditions.” The father alleged that the mother was fabricating or inducing illness as well as alienating the children against him.

After prolonged proceedings and evidence gathering, a finding of fact hearing was timetabled with a Dispute Resolution Hearing listed before HHJ Hale in January 2022. At that hearing GHF was permitted to withdraw his application. He was represented by Counsel, GHM by Leading Counsel. The parties agreed, and the court recorded that neither would disclose the expert reports of the paediatrician and Dr Downs to the children’s schools or doctors without their joint written agreement or direction of the Court. The father agreed jointly to fund psychiatric or psychological assessment of GG. The guardian recommended family therapy. That concluded the proceedings. There was no written judgment. There have therefore been no court findings on the parties’ allegations against each other.

EFF is a national of a country within the EU (Country X). EFM is British. The parties met and began a relationship in Country X where they lived together with the two children until they separated in 2017. In September 2017 the court in Country X ordered that the father was to have contact with the children who were living with the mother. By early 2020, the children were spending alternate weekends with the father. In March 2020 the mother relocated with the children to England. The father sought a return order under the Hague Convention 1980. The mother made allegations of domestic abuse and an assault on their daughter which he denied. In September 2020, a consent order was made by the High Court that the children should reside in England with the mother who would make the children available to spend time with the father. In fact, very limited contact took place and face to face contact ceased.

The issue of child arrangements came before the Family Court at Leeds and before HHJ Kloss who handed down an unpublished judgment dated 9 February 2022. The mother did not pursue allegations of abuse against the father and accepted that the children would be safe in his care. However, the children had expressed wishes not to see their father.

The Judge considered it in the children’s best interests to begin therapeutic work and to seek to overcome their resistance to seeing and spending time with their father which appeared not to have any rational basis or justification. Accordingly, Dr Downs was instructed. In her report dated 30 January 2023 she concluded:

“The evidence is suggestive of the children’s expressed wishes and feelings not being representative of their true wishes and feelings due to their having been placed under pressure to align with their mother and devalue/reject their father. There is also evidence of both children using the psychological defence of splitting in order to manage the tension of being drawn into the dysfunctional dynamics of their parents relationship.”

There are three Cafcass reports/letters within the proceedings, dated 19 August 2021, 27 April 2022 and 15 September 2022. The third includes images of handwritten letters from the children to the Judge. On 14 August 2023, HHJ Kloss made a consent order. The mother and the guardian were all represented. The father was a litigant in person. The consent order was for the children to live with the mother and spend defined, unsupervised family time with the father. The parents also entered into a parenting agreement.

The child, DD, was born shortly before the first Covid lockdown and in the months following her birth contact between her and her father was sporadic. By the age of 18 months there was no contact at all. Mediation between the parents failed to resolve matters and DDF made an application for a child arrangements order. There were delays in the proceedings for various reasons but eventually supervised contact was arranged. DDM made an allegation against DDF to the police of rape by “stealthing” (the practice of removing a condom without consent during intercourse). She also alleged that he abused drugs. Nevertheless, interim unsupervised contact was to be gradually introduced by court order in early 2025. The matter then came before HHJ Greenan who handed down her unpublished judgment on 29 August 2025.

The court had the benefit of five Cafcass reports dated 7 January 2022, 10 January 2024, 5 January 2024 , 18 March 2024, and 15 April 2024, and one report from Dr Downs dated 26 November 2024. HHJ Greenan made a child arrangements order. DD would remain living with her mother but would spend defined unsupervised time with the father in the community. There would be handovers facilitated by named third parties and the father undertook not to use illegal drugs or be under their influence before or during his family time with DD.

In one statement in the proceedings, DDM alleged, “it has been proven beyond all doubt that [DDF] is a convicted killer, a rapist and a drug addict”. In the proceedings she openly offered to pay the father £15,000 to ”walk away”.

In her court ordered report of 26 November 2024, Dr Downs identified narcissistic and histrionic personality traits in both parents. DD had said to Dr Downs that she did not have a daddy even though she was observed to have a good bond with him at contact sessions. Dr Downs advised:

“There is no evidence to suggest that her mother has intentionally negatively influenced [DD] in relation to her father but she may have picked up on emotional reactions of her mother or may have overheard conversations in relation to her father.”

HHJ Greenan concluded that:

“The mother is devoted to [DD] and her care for her daughter is compromised only by her unwillingness to accept that she should have a father in her life.”

In a fifth case, Ms Bradley made an email request to the relevant court for sight of a report by Dr Downs given in the proceedings. Although I only have the email exchange between Ms Bradley and the court, it appears that she was provided with that report without any notice to the parties and without access to the report being the subject of any application (beyond an email request) or even, perhaps, without any judicial involvement. Ms Bradley attended a hearing before HHJ Trotter-Jackson on 8 April 2024. She was given a copy of a Transparency Order before she observed the hearing. The following day Ms Bradley asked the clerk for HHJ Trotter-Jackson which documents she was entitled to see. There was a delayed response but after chasing emails from Ms Bradley, the clerk sent her the relevant paragraph from the Transparency Order referring to access to position statements, orders, and the indices to court bundles. On the same afternoon Ms Bradley then asked for sight of a copy of the psychological report in the case (by Dr Downs) and it was sent to her eighty minutes later. This is the report in the case of Lucy which was quoted by Ms Bradley in her article in The Tribune in which she refers to the child and her mother by the fictitious names of Lucy and Rosie. The email exchange does not indicate any judicial involvement in the decision to provide Ms Bradley with Dr Downs’s report and, very importantly, no permission was expressly given to publish or communicate any of its contents.

If, as appears, the report was given to Ms Bradley without notice to the parties in the case and without judicial involvement, that was clearly a serious error. I shall comment on the procedure on application for access to documents from the court record below, but on any view the provision of a psychological report was not covered by the Transparency Order. Furthermore, provision of the report to Ms Bradley did not give her permission to publish any of its contents. I emphasise that I only have the email exchange. I have not seen the court file in the case of Lucy and Rosie. There may have been judicial permission given to see and quote from the report either in the Transparency Order or after Ms Bradley’s email request. Without such permission, publication from Dr Downs’ report might be a contempt of court.

In the recent decision in X and Y v BBC [2025] EWCA Civ 824 the Court of Appeal considered an appeal against an order granting journalists access to various documents relating to care proceedings and permission to report the contents of those documents subject to certain limitations and restrictions designed to protect, as far as possible, the interests and rights of the children. The judgment begins:

“[1] This appeal is about access to the Court file under the principle of open justice as identified in Dring(on behalf of the Asbestos Victims Support Groups Forum UK) v Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd (Media Lawyers Association intervening) [2019] UKSC 38; [2020] AC 629 (“Dring”). The purpose of this short judgment is to address a matter of general importance, namely to emphasise the limits of the open justice principle, specifically in the context of care proceedings under the Children Act 1989 (“the CA”).

[2] Open justice is a fundamental constitutional principle. The underlying rationale is the need to allow the media and the public access to information about the work done in Courts and tribunals so that not only individual decisions but also the operation of the Courts and tribunals more generally can be subjected to appropriate scrutiny. Allowing such scrutiny serves the public interest by keeping a check on the way in which judges behave, enabling the public to understand how cases are decided, and ensuring public confidence in the system of public justice. To serve these ends, procedural rules, in particular CPR Part 5.4C and FPR r.12.73 PD12G, make provision for non-party access to Court documents or communications between the Court and a party or another person. The open justice principle may also require that media or public access be given to a wider range of documents than those prescribed by the rules (unless prohibited by the rules).”

With respect, FPR r12.73 concerns communication of information relating to proceedings held in private, not access to documents on the court file. Access to documents on the court file is governed by FPR r29.12. Of course, a reporter may well seek access to a document on the Court file in order to communicate its contents but, as Ms Bradley’s application in relation to the Cafcass reports demonstrates, that is not necessarily so. Furthermore, there are separate rules within the FPR concerning access to documents on the one hand, and communication of information from family proceedings held in private (whether private law or public law proceedings) on the other.

As to access to documents on the court file, PD12R and the template Transparency Order to which it refers, do not permit a reporter (who has attended a hearing) access to documents including those on the court file other than:

However, PD12R and the template Transparency Order set out what will be provided to a reporter on request but do not preclude the court from granting a reporter access to other documents. Family Procedure Rules r29.12 provides:

“(1)

Except as provided by this rule or by any other rule or Practice Direction, no document or copy of a document filed or lodged in the Court office shall be open to inspection by any person without the permission of the Court, and no copy of any such document or copy shall be taken by, or issued to, any person without such permission.

(2)

A copy of an order made in open Court will be issued to any person who requests it.

(3)

Subject to rules 14.24 and 29.1(2) and to any direction given by the Court, a party to any family proceedings, or the legal representative, children’s guardian or litigation friend for a party in any family proceedings, may have a search made for, and may inspect, and obtain a copy of, any document or copy of a document filed or lodged in the Court office in those proceedings.”

Hence, a journalist, like any other non-party, is entitled to apply to the court for permission to inspect any document on the court file. Ms Bradley seeks permission to inspect the reports, final orders, and unpublished judgments because of her interest in investigating how the Family Court deals with and has dealt with allegations of alienating behaviour by parents, in particular when domestic abuse has been alleged by that parent against the other parent and when expert evidence has been obtained.

In Newman v Southampton City Council & oths [2021] EWCA Civ 437; [2021] 1

In Newman, a journalist had applied, with the support of the mother in the case, for access to a wide range of documents on the court file of a family case held in private. Roberts J had granted permission for access to certain documents including psychiatric and psychological assessments of the mother, but the journalist appealed the refusal to grant access to a wider range of documents. The journalist was only seeking access, not to publish from the documents. King LJ held:

“[69] The information sought by Ms Newman is as an investigative journalist. Her request for access to the documents has been put in a number of different ways but is aimed at obtaining access to the source material which informed the decision-making process that led to the events which culminated in the making of a placement order. That source material contains the most sensitive and personal material in relation to a child who suffered a number of developmental and other difficulties even before the trauma of her removal from her mother’s care for three years. The judge, in considering that aspect of the application which was in relation to M’s medical records, properly said (at para 136):

“In considering where the balance lies, it seems to me that the overarching factor which I have to weigh in the balance is whether it is in M’s overall best interests to release to a journalist the most intimate details of her own and her mother’s medical records even if the dissemination goes no further than that. Such a step would represent a clear Court-directed intrusion of this child’s most basic and fundamental rights to a private family life. If those rights are to be the subject of Court-sanctioned interference, there has to be a proper justification.”

[70] In my judgment the judge was entitled to conclude at para 129 that the information now available through the various judgments is significant in terms of background detail and content, but that that is the case does not, without more, necessarily justify giving further access to the child’s private information to a journalist “albeit that she is an individual who is entitled to this Court’s respect for her professional endeavours”.

As to the communication of information from family proceedings held in private, FPR r12.73(1) provides that:

"For the purposes of the law relating to contempt of Court, information relating to proceedings held in private (whether or not contained in a document filed with the Court) may be communicated –

…

(b)

where the Court gives permission, including as provided for under rule 12.73A."

FPR PD12R only applies when a reporter attends a Court hearing in accordance with r27.11 and PD27B and that hearing is a specified hearing. It has no application therefore when no reporter attends. The stated aim of PD12R is to "support Reporters being able to report on what they see and hear in Court in accordance with the terms of a Transparency Order ("the transparency principle")”. By FPR r27.11 accredited reporters are "duly accredited representatives of news gathering and reporting organisations" and a legal blogger is "a duly authorised lawyer attending for journalistic, research or public legal educational purposes." It is important to emphasise that a person who blogs about the law or about a case they have observed is not a "legal blogger" unless they come within that narrow definition. Under FPR r27.11 reporters are permitted to attend a hearing held in private. It is important to emphasise that the template Transparency Order allows a reporter to report on proceedings they have attended and to publish from the documents they have been given access to under the order.

FPR PD27B provides:

“2.3

The provisions of the rules permitting the attendance of media representatives or duly authorised lawyers and the disclosure to third parties of information relating to the proceedings do not entitle a media representative to receive or peruse Court documents referred to in the course of evidence, submissions or judgment without the permission of the Court or otherwise in accordance with Part 12, Chapter 7 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and Practice Direction 12G (rules relating to disclosure to third parties). (This is in contrast to the position in civil proceedings, where the Court sits in public and where members of the public are entitled to seek copies of certain documents).

2.4

The question of attendance of media representatives or duly authorised lawyers at hearings in family proceedings to which rule 27.11 and this guidance apply must be distinguished from statutory restrictions on publication and disclosure of information relating to proceedings, which continue to apply and are unaffected by the rule and this guidance.

2.4A Practice Direction 12R and Practice Direction 14G make provision in relation to the making of transparency orders, detailing what may or may not be published from the proceedings to the public at large, or a section of the public, when a media representative or duly accredited lawyer attends a hearing as provided for in rule 27.11.

2.5

The prohibition in section 97(2) of the Children Act 1989, on publishing material intended to or likely to identify a child as being involved in proceedings or the address or school of any such child, is limited to the duration of the proceedings. However, the limitations imposed by section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 on publication of information relating to certain proceedings in private apply during and after the proceedings. In addition, in proceedings to which s.97(2) of the Children Act 1989 applies the Court should continue to consider at the conclusion of the proceedings whether there are any outstanding welfare issues which require a continuation of the protection afforded during the course of the proceedings by that provision.”

In X and Y v BBC (above) the Court of Appeal referred to the following passages from Dring (above):

“41.

The constitutional principle of open justice applies to all Courts and tribunals exercising the judicial power of the state. It follows that, unless inconsistent with statute or the rules of Court, all Courts and tribunals have an inherent jurisdiction to determine what that principle requires in terms of access to documents or other information placed before the Court or tribunal in question. The extent of any access permitted by the Court’s rules is not determinative (save to the extent that they may contain a valid prohibition). It is not correct to talk in terms of limits to the Court’s jurisdiction when what is in fact in question is how that jurisdiction should be exercised in the particular case.

42.

The principal purposes of the open justice principle are twofold and there may well be others. The first is to enable public scrutiny of the way in which Courts decide cases - to hold the judges to account for the decisions they make and to enable the public to have confidence that they are doing their job properly. In A vBritish Broadcasting Corpn, Lord Reed reminded us of the comment of Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, in Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, 475, that the two Acts of the Scottish Parliament passed in 1693 requiring that both civil and criminal cases be heard “with open doors”, “bore testimony to a determination to secure civil liberties against the judges as well as against the Crown” (para 24).

43.

But the second goes beyond the policing of individual Courts and judges. It is to enable the public to understand how the justice system works and why decisions are taken. For this they have to be in a position to understand the issues and the evidence adduced in support of the parties’ cases. In the olden days, as has often been said, the general practice was that all the argument and the evidence was placed before the Court orally. Documents would be read out. The modern practice is quite different. Much more of the argument and evidence is reduced into writing before the hearing takes place. Often, documents are not read out. It is difficult, if not impossible, in many cases, especially complicated civil cases, to know what is going on unless you have access to the written material.”

The Court of Appeal in X and Y v BBC then held at paras. [21] to [26]:

“[21] The Court in Dring thus identified two main purposes of the open justice principle, namely: (i) to enable public scrutiny of the way in which the Courts decide cases so as to provide public accountability and secure public confidence; and (ii) to enable public understanding of the justice system. Whilst the Court recognised that its identification of these purposes might not be exhaustive, the core aim is to ensure appropriate transparency for the work of the Courts and tribunals and the judges who sit in them.

[22] As is apparent from decisions such as Newman v Southampton City Council [2021] EWCA Civ 437; [2021] 1 WLR 2900 (at [48] and [49]), it is important to understand and respect the limits of the open justice principle in this context. Court files may contain a great deal of information that is commercially sensitive or confidential or (as in this case) personal and private. The open justice principle does not extend to affording third parties access to such information for reasons unconnected with examining the work of the Courts and tribunals and the judges who sit in them.

[23] The Supreme Court in Dring made clear that a non-party has no right of access to the Court file; the Court’s permission is required. It is incumbent on the person seeking access to documents under the open justice principle to explain (i) why he seeks access and (ii) “how granting him access would advance the open justice principle”: see [45].

[24] In this case, the BBC’s amended explanation explained why it wanted access to the file but said nothing about how this would advance open justice. The limits that we have identified were overlooked, and the judge’s approach to the application of the open justice principle was wrong in law. The objective of the BBC, whilst undoubtedly part of a legitimate journalistic investigation, was neither to scrutinise the way in which Courts decide cases, nor to enable the public to understand how the justice system works and decisions are made. It was not in any way designed to throw light on the workings of the family Courts and their judges.

[25]The central error into which the judge fell was to define the (family) justice system as encompassing not only the work of the Courts but also (independently of the Courts) the operations of local authorities and other state agencies working with children, and then to apply the principles identified in Dring to the entire (family) justice system as so defined.

[26] That is not what Dring is about. The application of open justice principles is confined to the system of justice in the narrow sense. Disclosure for one of the purposes identified in Dring may incidentally facilitate scrutiny of decision-making by local authorities and other public bodies. But enabling such scrutiny is not itself a purpose which requires or justifies disclosure under the open justice principle.”

All the hearings in the Family Court with which I am concerned were Children Act proceedings held in private. The law on what may or may not be communicated or published in relation to Children Act proceedings held in private is not easily stated. By CA 1989, s97, in relation to proceedings under that Act:

“(2)

No person shall publish to the public at large or any section of the public any material which is intended, or likely, to identify—

(a)

any child as being involved in any proceedings before the High Court, a county Court or a magistrates' Court in which any power under this Act or the Adoption and Children Act 2002 may be exercised by the Court with respect to that or any other child; or

(b)

an address or school as being that of a child involved in any such proceedings."

Contravention of these requirements is a criminal offence but by s 97(4):

"(4)

The Court or the Lord Chancellor may, if satisfied that the welfare of the child requires it and, in the case of the Lord Chancellor, if the Lord Chief Justice agrees, by order dispense with the requirements of subsection (2) to such extent as may be specified in the order."

Following Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878, the effect of s97 ends with the conclusion of proceedings.

By the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (“AJA 1960”), s12:

"s12 Publication of information relating to proceedings in private.

(1)

The publication of information relating to proceedings before any Court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of Court except in the following cases, that is to say—

(a)

where the proceedings—

(i)

relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors;

(ii)

are brought under the Children Act 1989 or the Adoption and Children Act 2002; or …

(2)

Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, the publication of the text or a summary of the whole or part of an order made by a Court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of Court except where the Court (having power to do so) expressly prohibits the publication.

…

(4)

Nothing in this section shall be construed as implying that any publication is punishable as contempt of Court which would not be so punishable apart from this section (and in particular where the publication is not so punishable by reason of being authorised by rules of Court)."

The s12 provisions continue after the conclusion of the proceedings subject to the power of the court to vary them under its inherent jurisdiction (see below).

It is not easy to articulate in simple terms what s12 does and does not prevent a person from publishing. Munby J considered the issue in Re: B (A Child) (Disclosure) [2004] 2 FLR 142. He held at [65] and [66]:

"Of crucial importance in the present case is Wilson J's decision in X v Dempster. Analysing the previous authorities, he summarised matters at p 898 (this has now, of course, to be read subject to section 97(2) of the Children Act 1989):

"[E]vents in the lives of the children in the present case which are already in the public domain or which do not relate to the proceedings can be the subject of publication.

Furthermore certain material which might well qualify in a loose sense as information relating to the proceedings can be published because the prohibition is to be construed not loosely but strictly and by direct reference to the mischief at which it is directed. Thus, in the absence of a specific injunction, the following can be published:

(a)

the fact, if it be the case, that a child is a ward of Court and is the subject of wardship proceedings or that a child is the subject of residence or other proceedings under the Children Act 1989 or of proceedings relating wholly or mainly to his maintenance or upbringing … ;

(b)

the name, address or photograph of such a child as is mentioned in (a) … ;

(c)

the name, address or photograph of the parties (or, if the child is a party, the other parties) to such proceedings as are mentioned in (a) … ;

(d)

the date, time or place of a past or future hearing of such proceedings … ;

(e)

the nature of the dispute in such proceedings … ;

(f)

anything which has been seen or heard by a person conducting himself lawfully in the public corridor or other public precincts outside the Court in which the hearing in private is taking place … ; and

(g)

the text or summary of the whole or part of any order made in such proceedings …

So much for what can be published notwithstanding section 12. What is it that cannot be published? In the first place it is quite clear that the effect of section 12 is to prohibit the publication of accounts of what has gone on in front of the judge sitting in private, as also the publication of documents such as affidavits, witness statements, reports, position statements, skeleton arguments or other documents filed in the proceedings, transcripts or notes of the evidence or submissions, and transcripts or notes of the judgment. (I emphasise that this list is not necessarily exhaustive.) Section 12 likewise prohibits the publication of extracts or quotations from such documents: Official Solicitor v News Group Newspapers; also the publication of summaries: X v Dempster at p 898. It is also quite clear in my judgment that the prohibition in section 12 applies equally whether or not the information or the document being published has been anonymised."

In her recent judgment in M v F & Anor [2025] EWHC 801 (Fam), Harris J confirmed that the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to permit or restrict publication of information relating to proceedings which would otherwise be governed by AJA 1960, s12. She adopted the judgment of the Court of Appeal in C (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 798, [2017] 2 FLR 105, in which Lord Dyson MR considered the jurisdictional basis of such orders and was unconvinced that it could be derived from FPR r12.73. However, he held at [12]:

" I am in no doubt that the Court does have the power to order the disclosure of part or all of what takes place in private proceedings (including any judgment made by the Court during the course of or at end of the proceedings). In my view the Court has that power under its inherent jurisdiction. It had that power before the incorporation of the Convention by the Human Rights Act 1998: see Kent County Council v The Mother, The Father, B [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam) at paras 83 to 86 where Munby J summarised the relevant jurisprudence. The Court continues to have that jurisdiction following the incorporation of the Convention. The domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence is reflected in the Practice Guidance (Family Courts: Transparency) [2014] 1 WLR 230 ("the Practice Guidance") issued by Sir James Munby P in relation to the publication of judgments in family Courts and the Court of Protection. See also per McFarlane LJ in In Re W (Children) (Care Proceedings: Publicity) [2016] 4 WLR 39 at paras 32 to 40."

Any such exercise of the inherent jurisdiction involves consideration of the open justice principle, and the Convention rights engaged, in particular Articles 8 and 10. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states:

"Right to respect for private and family life

1.

Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2.

There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

Article 10 states:

"Freedom of expression

1.

Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting television or cinema enterprises.

2.

The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."

Section 12 (1) and (4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provide that:

" Freedom of expression.

(1)

This section applies if a Court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression.

(4)

The Court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the respondent claims, or which appear to the Court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such material) to (a) the extent to which (i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public, or (ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published, [and] (b) any relevant privacy code."

In In re S [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 AC 593 Lord Steyn set out four propositions to be applied when considering the interplay between Articles 8 and 10:

“The interplay between articles 8 and 10 has been illuminated by the opinions of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2AC 457. For present purposes the decision of the House on the facts of Campbell and the differences between the majority and the minority are not material. What does, however, emerge clearly from the opinions are four propositions. First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test.”

In Tickle and Summers v BBC and Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 42, The Master of the Rolls re-iterated the open justice principle and held at para. [45]:

“This principle is applicable as much in family proceedings as in any other proceedings. The statutory limitations contained in section 12 of the AJA 1960 and section 97 do not displace the open justice principle or create any separate “shielded justice” environment. They provide a degree of privacy for certain proceedings relating to children according to their terms. Munby J explained at [83]-[86] in Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam), [2004] 2 FLR 142 (Re B) the Court’s jurisdiction to relax and increase the statutory restrictions on reporting, and the reasons for those restrictions.”

And at para. [49]:

“I would record and approve what Nicklin J said in PMC [PMC v Cwm Taf Morgannwg UHB [2025] EWHC 2969 (KB)], where he refused an application for the anonymity of a child claimant to a clinical negligence claim. I have already mentioned that the judge said he disagreed with a part of the dictum. Nicklin J said this at [41]:

“Whilst, in a very broad sense, in assessing the engaged convention rights on any application for a derogation from open justice, the Court is carrying out a ‘balance’ between them, the scales do not start evenly balanced. The Court must start from the position that very substantial weight must be accorded to open justice. Any balance starts with a very clear presumption in favour of open justice unless and until that is displaced and outweighed by a sufficiently countervailing justification. That is not to give a presumptive priority to Article 10 (or open justice), it is simply a recognition of the context in which the Re S ‘balance’ is being carried out.”

The application of the process of considering the principle of open justice and competing Article 8 and Article 10 rights to children proceedings was considered in Re J (A Child) [2013] EWHC 2694 (Fam), by Sir James Munby P:

"The Court has power both to relax and to add to the "automatic restraints". In exercising this jurisdiction the Court must conduct the "balancing exercise" described in In re S … and in A Local Authority v W …. This necessitates what Lord Steyn in Re S, [17], called "an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case". There are, typically, a number of competing interests engaged, protected by arts 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention. I incorporate in this judgment, without further elaboration or quotation, the analyses which I set out in Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam); [2004] 2 FLR 142, at [93], and in Re Webster … at [80]. As Lord Steyn pointed out in Re S, [25], it is "necessary to measure the nature of the impact … on the child" of what is in prospect. Indeed, the interests of the child, although not paramount, must be a primary consideration, that is, they must be considered first though they can, of course, be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations: ZH (Tanzania) …."

In Re W (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 113, the Court of Appeal held at para. [36]:

“… any presumption or principle in favour of open justice which applies generally to Court proceedings does not apply to proceedings that are held in private and which relate to children. The default position in such cases is to the contrary and is, as I have described, as a matter of statute and the rules, one which prohibits the publication of any information relating to the proceedings. That default position, which is designed to protect children, can, where appropriate, be modified by a judge upon the application of a party or the media. It has in any event been tempered by the President's transparency initiative, the purpose of which is to allow greater public access to, and understanding of, the work of the family Courts.”

In the same case, McFarlane LJ raised the question, without needing to answer it, of whether the child’s welfare was the paramount consideration on an application for permission to communicate or publish information relating to family proceedings held in private, or whether it was only a primary consideration. In Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878, applying Re Z (a minor) (Freedom of Publication) [1997] Fam 1, the Court of Appeal held that where the issue concerned the upbringing of a minor, their welfare was the paramount consideration. It seems to me that the current applications are not about the upbringing of any child but that they do concern the welfare of the children involved.

On my review of the caselaw, the more recent authorities subsequent to Re W re-assert the open justice principle as the starting point when considering the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to vary the “automatic restraints” on reporting imposed by statue, even in cases involving children.

Drawing these threads together:

Dr Proudman, for the Applicant, rightly reminded the court that it could not editorialise: if permission is given to a reporter to have access to and publish from a psychological report then, beyond prohibitions on identification of the children or family members, the court ought not to dictate how the reporter writes or broadcasts about it. To do otherwise would be a wholly unjustifiable interference with the reporter’s Article 10 rights. Nor may the court assume that a journalist given permission to publish from documents from the court file would be irresponsible: the court ought to proceed on the basis that reporters will be ethical and responsible – see for example Tickle and Summers v BBC and Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 42. It follows, however, that in considering the Article 8 rights of those written about in a psychological report, the court has to be mindful that, unless expressly prohibited, any part of the report could be reported if permission to report were given.

Dr Proudman noted that in A Father v A Mother [2023] EWHC 3068 (Fam) Judd J recorded:

“[37] As I set out at the beginning of this judgment, all the parties to the wardship proceedings agreed that the Court bundles in this case could be provided to the three journalists who have attended these hearings. All agreed that the journalists could quote and report from those documents including the Cafcass reports subject to the names of the parties, or any members of the family being kept anonymous.

[38] This was not contentious, nor was a provision that the journalists should not disclose copies of the bundle to anyone else, save any lawyer instructed by them or, in the case of Ms Summers and Mr Israel, their editors.”

It would be open to the parties in a case to agree on such matters (although it would still be a matter for the court whether permission to see documents from the court file and to report on them should be given). As it happens, in none of the four cases before me is there agreement amongst all the parties that the documents sought by Ms Bradley should be provided to her or that their contents may be published.

In SE20P00892, CM supports the application but CF opposes it. The guardian for C opposes the application.

In SEP00879, GHM supports the application. GHF opposes it. There is no guardian for the children, one of whom turned 18 before this judgment was handed down. After hearing submissions I decided that communication should be made directly to the children who were given, by me, some basic information about the application. They separately responded that they supported the application provided that their names were not published.

In LS21P00748, EFM ultimately supported the application after some prevarication. EFF opposed it. The guardian did not have opportunity to speak to the children before the hearing due to the mother’s opposition to her doing so. I later directed, with the mother’s consent, that the guardian’s solicitor should approach the children for their views. She did so, for which I am grateful. Each child told her that they did not oppose the application so long as their names were not published.

In LS21P01669, DDM supported the application but DDF opposed it. DD is too young to understand the application or express a view about it. Her guardian opposed the application.

Ms Wilson, for Dr Downs, submitted that after very careful consideration, and the experience of the Reporting Pilot, the Family Rule Committee decided upon the balance to be struck when providing documents to reporters. The documents to be provided are those set out in PD12R. She suggested that the court should not interfere with that balanced approach. Dr Downs opposes any extension to allow for the provision of her reports to the Applicant and opposes permission being given to her to publish from them.

Ms Wilson and counsel for the guardians all expressed deep concern about the very personal nature of the information contained within Dr Downs’ reports and the Cafcass reports. I would add that the children whose views I have elicited may well not know what the reports contain by way of their parents’ allegations against each other, or the histories given by their parents about their relationship. The children who were the subject of these reports were encouraged to be open with Dr Downs. If extracts from the reports (or even the whole of each report) were published then the material would be available for anyone to read for years to come. It was submitted that, even if the extracts were anonymised, the court could not effectively protect the children from jigsaw identification.

Ms Wilson also questioned what she categorised as confusion on the part of the Applicant. Dr Downs had not diagnosed parental alienation syndrome in any of her reports in these four sets of proceedings. It was the diagnosis of parental alienation syndrome which the FJC and others have called “pseudo-scientific”. Neither the FJC nor the higher courts have said that there is no such thing as alienating behaviour by parents. There is a legitimate role for a psychologist, keeping within their area of expertise, to carry out psychological assessments of the children and parents and to advise the court on psychological factors within the family.

Ms Wilson also questioned the objectivity of the Applicant. The Applicant’s article in The Tribune showed, she submitted, that Dr Downs was being criticised as having a fixed view on alienating behaviour even before the Applicant had seen the reports in these cases.

This concern was echoed in the Position Statement submitted by GHF who was similarly concerned that Ms Bradley’s article in The Tribune showed a fixed view hostile to fathers in cases in which alienating behaviour had been alleged, in particular an insinuation that they are all perpetrators of domestic abuse. He impressed upon the court the delicate nature of his ongoing relationship with HH and the potential impact on the children of having their private lives subject to public comment, even if they were anonymised. GHF also questions the legitimacy of a retrospective application by a journalist who did not attend any of the hearings in the proceedings in which he and his children were involved. CF has expressed similar views in a position statement. He believes that publication of the reports would seriously interfere with his and the child’s Article 8 rights and only allow the Applicant to pursue a line which is biased against fathers and the notion of alienating behaviours.

All four mothers in the four cases have written to the court to support the application. They each believe that it is in the public interest for the processes by which expert evidence is given to the court and the court makes decisions should be transparent.

In relation both to the application for access to documents from the court file and the application for permission to publish the contents of those documents, the starting point is the principle of open justice. I need not repeat what has been said in many cases in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal about its importance. I am fully satisfied that the objectives of the applications before me are “(i) to enable public scrutiny of the way in which the courts decide cases so as to provide public accountability and secure public confidence; and (ii) to enable public understanding of the justice system” (X and Y v BBC (above)).

In relation to the balancing exercise, the first two claims by the Applicant that I find established in these four cases are:

The Applicant impresses on the court the importance of her claim to her Article 10 right of freedom of expression. Although none of the mothers expressed a wish to speak publicly about their cases, I note their firm views that transparency in respect of the issues raised in their respective cases is in the public interest.

All those working in the Family Court will be aware of the significant number of cases in which accusations of parental alienation are raised in response to allegations of domestic abuse or as an explanation for a child’s resistance to spending time with the parent with whom they are not living. There has been much attention paid within the family justice system to (i) the way in which the court should address allegations of parental alienation in particular when domestic abuse allegations have been made against the parent from whom a child is said to have been alienated, and (ii) the role of expert opinion evidence in relation to the issue. Attention has fallen not just on how such allegations are addressed currently, and the role of expert witnesses now, but also on how these questions have been addressed in the past. After all, welfare decisions based on findings of parental alienation can have lifelong implications for the children concerned and their parents.

In Re C (Parental Alienation) [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam) the President of the Family Division addressed the question of the qualifications and registration of expert psychologists providing expert opinion evidence to the court on the issue of parental alienation. He also observed at para. [103]:

“Most family judges have, for some time, regarded the label of ‘parental alienation’, and the suggestion that there may be a diagnosable syndrome of that name, as being unhelpful. What is important, as with domestic abuse, is the particular behaviour that is found to have taken place within the individual family before the Court, and the impact that that behaviour may have had on the relationship of a child with either or both of his/her parents. In this regard, the identification of ‘alienating behaviour’ should be the Court’s focus, rather than any quest to determine whether the label ‘parental alienation’ can be applied. “

The Family Justice Council published “Guidance on responding to a child’s unexplained reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent and allegations of alienating behaviour” in December 2024 in which it said:

A child’s reluctance, resistance or refusal to spend time with a parent is often alleged to be a result of ‘parental alienation’. Despite the lack of research evidence, and international condemnation, reference is still made to the discredited concept of ‘parental alienation syndrome’. For the avoidance of doubt, the Family Justice Council (FJC) recognises that ‘parental alienation syndrome’ has no evidential basis and is considered a harmful pseudo-science. Concepts of ‘parental alienation syndrome’ and ‘parental alienation’ are increasingly exploited within family litigation.

… there are concerns that its use as a term, or any associated terms such as ‘alienating behaviours’, accords it misplaced legitimacy. Whilst this is a concern, it remains an allegation which the family Courts in England and Wales are increasingly asked to consider and act upon. The purpose of this guidance is to assist with navigation of the existing system, drawing together best practice in relation to the law as it stands against a backdrop of an increasing number of cases in which these allegations are raised.

In producing this guidance, the Family Justice Council does not seek to add legitimacy to the concept of ‘parental alienation’. It has carefully weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of referencing the issue and has responded to the overwhelming call for clarity and guidance as to how these complex cases are best approached. This guidance will therefore refer to a child’s unexplained ‘reluctance, resistance and refusal’ to spend time with a parent (RRR – see Glossary above) wherever possible. However, because it addresses calls from across the sector for practical guidance on how allegations of Alienating Behaviours are responded to, this term will also be used for necessary clarity where psychological manipulation by a parent has resulted in RRR.

“This guidance acknowledges that where found the harm of Alienating Behaviours to a child can be significant and enduring, akin to other forms of emotional/psychological child abuse. Alienating Behaviours range in intensity and their impact on children, but these harms can be far reaching. They can affect a child’s emotional, social and psychological development. Severed relationships and growing up with a false narrative can also have a harmful impact on a child’s identity, self-worth and sense of safety in the world. Whilst the focus here is on the welfare outcomes for children, it is also important to recognise the very significant emotional impact on parents of the loss of a relationship with a child.”

At paragraph 10 of the Guidance, the FJC identified three issues the Court should address before making a finding of alienating behaviour:

“(i)

the child is reluctant, resisting or refusing to engage in a relationship with a parent or carer.

(ii)

The reluctance, resistance or refusal is not consequent on the actions of that parent towards the child, or the other parent, which may therefore be an appropriate justified reaction by the child, or is not caused by any other factor, such as the child alignment, affinity, or attachment.

(iii)

The other parent has engaged in behaviours that have directly or indirectly impacted on the child, leading to the child’s reluctance, resistance or refusal to engage in a relationship with that parent.”

In O v C [2025] EWFC 334, Judd J considered an application to set aside findings made five years previously on the basis of evidence from an expert witness called Melanie Gill. Judd J recognised that the District Judge in question had not had the benefit of the FJC’s report but held that his finding (which amounted to a finding of parental alienation) “cannot be regarded as a finding that has proper status today.”

Having found that there is a significant public interest in understanding how the issue of alienating behaviour is and has been addressed in the Family Court, there are three aspects of the Applicant’s approach that I do not accept.

The first is that the Applicant’s belief that Dr Downs has pedalled a pseudo-scientific diagnosis of a syndrome is not correct. In her undated position statement, Ms Bradley states:

“I believe my access to these documents is strongly in the public interest, particularly transparency, to promote understanding of what the family Court process entails, ensuring justice and fair treatment for all, and securing the best use of public resources. It is particularly of public interest due to the recent attention on parental alienation syndrome, and the Family Justice Council recently recognising that ‘parental alienation syndrome’ has no evidential basis and is considered a harmful pseudo-science.”

I should record that Dr Downs has not used the term “parental alienation syndrome” nor has she purported to diagnose such a syndrome in any of the reports that I have read that she gave in these four cases. Furthermore, investigation of allegations of alienating behaviours by a parent, including with the help of expert opinion from a psychologist, is a proper function of the Family Court and findings that the three elements identified by the FJC in its Guidance can be made if the evidence allows.

That does not mean that there is not a strong public interest in understanding how evidence such as hers is used by the court in cases where alienating behaviours are alleged or arise for consideration. Having read Dr Downs’s reports in the four cases before me, and seeing how they were used in the proceedings, there are clearly issues of considerable public interest which a reporter might justifiably seek to investigate and report upon. It is one thing for me, as a Judge who has seen the court files, to inform a reporter that Dr Downs has not diagnosed parental alienation syndrome (using that label) in her reports, but it is another for a reporter to see it for themselves. Furthermore, in my judgment it is irrelevant to the question of whether permission should be given to see and report on material from proceedings whether the court agrees or does not agree with the angle taken or likely to be taken by a journalist. I understand Dr Downs’ protest that she has been misrepresented in The Tribune article, but that is not a ground for depriving Ms Bradley of permission to see and publish from documents. Indeed, Ms Bradley’s misapprehension about Dr Downs having diagnosed parental alienation syndrome strengthens the case for providing her with the evidence in order to improve her understanding.

The second aspect of the Applicant’s approach that I do not accept is the suggestion - which I believe was shot through all of Dr Proudman’s submissions - that only unfettered access to all the documents sought could satisfy the principle of open justice and achieve the right balance of competing rights. Dr Proudman correctly identified that Article 8 rights have to be balanced with Article 10 rights, but the Applicant’s underlying assumption was that her own Article 10 rights can only be met by access to all the documents she seeks and permission to quote as she wishes from Dr Downs’ reports in any communications or publication. In fact, access by non-parties and/or reporters to court documents in cases heard in private is prohibited save for certain exceptions when permission is given by the court. Permission will not be given as a matter of course.

The third aspect of the Applicant’s submissions on Article 10 which I do not accept is that she did not make any distinction between a reporter who applies for access to and permission to report on documents having been present at a hearing, and one who applies having not attended a hearing. The Family Procedure Rule Committee considered the experience of the Transparency Reporting Pilot which had been running in the Family Court in certain areas. It considered where the balance should lie in relation to granting reporters access to documents. FPR PD12R did not come into force until earlier this year. The Family Court in Leeds, where two of the four cases with which I am concerned were heard, was one of the first pilot areas, the trial period beginning on 30 January 2023. However, whether during the pilot period or after PD12R came into effect, Transparency Orders can only be made, or only become effective, when an accredited journalist or legal blogger attends a hearing. The Family Procedure Rule Committee decided that only certain documents should be provided to reporters, on request, and then only when they have attended a hearing.

The applications herein, if allowed, would give Ms Bradley more access to evidence in cases in which she had not attended a hearing, than would be afforded by way of a Transparency order following the template, to a reporter who had attended a hearing. Of course, a reporter attending a hearing can make an application for access to documents on the court file such as expert reports under FPR r29.12 just as Ms Bradley has done, but they would be able to contend that they needed access to those documents in order to understand better the oral evidence of the expert which had been given at the hearing they had attended. In three of the cases before me, Ms Bradley did not attend any hearings and in two of the cases she has applied for extensive access to court documents long after the cases have concluded. The law may change in the future but at present, and at the time when all these four cases were heard and determined, they were held in private. If a reporter with no previous connection with a case, is given extensive access to documents in the court file on request long after the case has ended, then parties to family cases heard in private may well ask what was the point of hearing them in private? The position is different if a reporter attends a hearing. The parties know they are there and can make submissions there and then about the Transparency Order and access to documents. Even if the reporter subject to a Transparency Order applies for access to documents on the court file after the hearing, the Judge and the parties will still be engaged or recently engaged in the case.

Having noted some problematic aspects of the Applicant’s case on the claims to her Article 10 rights, I acknowledge a practical difficulty for reporters in asserting those rights. It is not possible for reporters to know from looking through court lists when issues such as alienating behaviours are going to be addressed. Court lists in the Family Court do not include information about the cases listed. Realistically, reporters will only attend a private hearing in the Family Court if (a) they have decided to attend a particular court on a particular day to see how the court operates (this is a rare occurrence but did happen occasionally during the pilot period); or (b) they have been given some information, often by a party in the case, that prompts them to attend. Hence, if a reporter is not alerted to a particular case, then they are extremely unlikely to be able to identify and attend a hearing of interest to them. Reporters and the organisations they work for do not have the resources to wait outside courtrooms in the Family Court on the off chance that a case of interest might be being heard that day. The chance of a journalist becoming aware of a matter of public interest in a case is of course reduced by the severe restrictions on parties communicating information relating to proceedings heard in private. Making Transparency Orders when journalists or legal bloggers attend a hearing will not assist the many journalists and bloggers who may become aware of a case of potential public interest only after the case has been heard.

Other than by the provision of information by a party, a journalist or legal blogger might learn about a case of public interest by reading a published judgment. Many judgments published on the National Archives and on the British and Irish Legal Information Institute websites can be found using the search term “parental alienation”. A good view of how the courts have dealt with the issue of alienating behaviour could be ascertained by reading those reports. But I appreciate that journalists wish to have a personal angle on an issue in order for it to attract the interest of their readers or viewers. In fact, in three of the cases before me Ms Bradley could not have known about them from reading a published judgment because there was none.

If transparency is to be effective then courts hearing family cases in private have (i) to publish judgments and (ii) to consider very carefully their response to applications by journalists or legal bloggers (and potentially any other non-party) who have not attended a hearing to have access to and permission to publish from documents on the court file. If few judgments are published and if permission were to be given only rarely, then transparency would be very limited. The introduction of Transparency Orders in family cases heard in private is of considerable significance but it only goes so far. The Reporting Pilot, the introduction of PD12R, and the encouragement by the President of the Family Division and others for greater transparency in the Family Court, may well lead to more applications such as the ones before me when reporters wish to assert their Article 10 rights in respect of cases that they have not attended.

The proceedings were heard in private. The parents and children can have approached assessments by Dr Downs and their dealings with Cafcass with an expectation that whilst the other parties and the Judge would know, no-one else would read what they had said unless the Judge decided to publish a judgment.

In SE20P00892, there is a published, anonymised judgment in which HHJ Hale addresses the contents of the reports from Dr Downs and Cafcass. To that extent some content of those reports and the authors’ opinions are already in the public domain. In the other three cases, thus far, no information about the cases, or the individuals concerned, is in the public domain. This judgment will be published but I have tailored the information I have included in the light of my determinations on the application.

The mothers in each case support the application. They are not troubled by the interference with their rights to a private and family life. Furthermore, although some of the mothers told the court that they do not want their children to be contacted to ascertain their views, they are willing for private information about their children, including from Dr Downs’ reports, to be put into the public domain.

No-one suggested that the children should be identified in any publication or communications. All agree that prohibitions on publishing or communicating information identifying or likely to identify the children in relation to the proceedings should be continued or imposed. It is also agreed that such prohibitions should extend to naming any member of their families or where they live or go to school.

Judges in family cases are very familiar with the risk of jigsaw identification. These four cases are private law, not public law cases, hence no party is a local authority. The risk that naming the local authority could add to the risk of jigsaw identification does not arise. However, it would be known that the cases were heard in the Family Court at Leeds and at Sheffield which narrows down the geographical location of the families involved. It would be known that each child was of a certain age and gender and was either an only child of the parents or had a single sibling of a certain age and gender. Some other personal details about the children and their parents are also included within the reports and so, if permission for access and publication were given, that information could be put into the public domain.

However, Judges in the Family Court, High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court frequently publish judgments which, whilst they anonymise the children and parents, contain personal information including ages (not dates of birth), gender, and, through naming the court, the general location in which they may well have lived at the time of the proceedings. Judgments also include other information: for example HHJ Hale’s published judgment refers to an incident at a pony club camp. Furthermore, journalists are well aware of their legal obligations not to publish information which would identify children as the subject of proceedings – see my judgment in Re BR (Transparency order: Finding of Fact Hearing) [2023] EWFC 9. The risk of jigsaw identification can be overstated: it is a risk which courts routinely take when publishing judgments in accordance with the guidance about anonymity made available to judges. It is a risk that arises when a Transparency Order is made or when courts in other jurisdictions allow reporting in cases involving children whose identities are to be protected.

In these cases, some of the contents of Dr Downs’ reports contain deeply sensitive material. I do not wish to specify what that material is but, for example, evidence about a child’s mental health would not ordinarily be shared with the public and information about the circumstances of a child’s conception might not ordinarily be shared with that child. However, information about a child’s mental health might well appear in an anonymised, published judgment and, outside litigation, children might well come to know about sensitive issues between their parents. It may be that the older children have already read Dr Downs’ reports in their own case or are aware of the issues raised in her reports. They have not told the court whether they know what is in the reports but, following the conclusions of the cases there is little the court can do to control what parents tell their children.

The expert and Cafcass reports include accusations by one parent against the other some of which have not been determined as proved or unproven by the court. Ms Bradley might choose to report the allegations without saying that they were disputed or had not been proved. Whilst the court should not adopt the role of being Ms Bradley’s editor, it has to consider the impact on the Article 8 rights of those involved, and the welfare consequences for the children, of the publication of unproven allegations, for example of domestic abuse.

In SE20P00879, the parties agreed, as was recorded in the final order, that they would not disclose the contents of Dr Downs’ reports to the children’s schools or doctors. That was one of the agreements reached when the father withdrew his application. It would be contrary to the spirit of that agreement for the court now to permit Ms Bradley not only to see but to publish from Dr Downs’ evidence in that case. GHM may now agree to a third party seeing the report but GHF does not. However, any publication would be anonymised and so the children’s schools or GP would not know that the publication was about them. Furthermore, it is open to me to restrict publication of those parts of the reports that contain particularly private or sensitive material.

Are the Article 8 rights of Dr Downs and the authors of the Cafcass reports engaged? Dr Downs’ reports include her CV and her professional address and contact details. Her CV is of relevance to the issues which the Applicant asserts are of public interest: it is information relevant to her qualifications for giving expert evidence, a matter which has exercised judges in other cases concerning other experts. Her qualifications are, at least to some extent, within the public domain on websites or professional registers. Her address and contact details are clearly private matters and are of no relevance to open justice and there is no public interest in including them in any publication about the four sets of proceedings. Otherwise, provision or publication from her reports would not interfere with her Article 8 rights, substantially or at all. Likewise, provision of the Cafcass reports to the Applicant (without publication, for which she does not seek permission) would not interfere with the authors’ Article 8 rights, substantially or at all.

The four cases concern a total of six children. Two have turned 18 between the hearing and the handing down of this judgment, one is 15, one 13, one 12, and one is aged 5. I considered it important to hear the voices of the children where they have sufficient maturity and understanding to express a view on the application. I was concerned that it could be detrimental to the young people involved if this decision was made without their knowledge. However, the exercise has left me with some reservations about having done so.

Firstly, it has been very difficult to protect confidential information about the children and the adult parties from others in their own case and the other cases. This is a practical difficulty and protection of confidentiality has not been 100% successful.

All the children who have expressed a view are either supportive or at least do not oppose the application in their case provided that their anonymity is preserved. I am satisfied that in expressing those views the children and young persons involved were aware of the issues raised by the applications and the consequences of allowing the applications. Their responses cast a different light on submissions made in this and other cases about the chilling effect on psychological or other similar assessments of children or adults of knowing that the expert’s reports might be published. Likewise, I am not bound to accept submissions that a child’s knowledge that deeply personal matters are published will be harmful to them in the future or at least will risk harm to them. The elder children have expressed views which tend to show that they would not be at all harmed by personal information about them being published provided that it was suitably anonymised.

Nevertheless, I have to exercise caution about the stated views of the young people concerned. I have not investigated to what extent their views are their own or are influenced by a parent. In the context of these four cases, in which different courts variously expressed concerns about the influence of one or both parents on the children’s views and behaviour, I must be cautious before accepting the children’s views as being wholly independent. Some of the children, even as young adults, might not fully appreciate how their views have been moulded. I gave an opportunity to the parties in the relevant cases to respond to the young persons’ views about the application. I emphasise that I can make no finding – having not investigated – whether their views are wholly independent or are influenced by a parent, but I have to be aware of the possibility of influence in these cases.

Indeed, although I have not asked Ms Bradley about her “sources” because I did not consider it appropriate to do so, I am troubled by the following possibility which might arise in a similar case if not in these four. It is possible that after long and hostile litigation a parent dissatisfied with certain aspects of the proceedings or the outcome itself, could contact a journalist seeking to continue to argue her case beyond the conclusion of the proceedings. The journalist could then make an application of the kind before me. In order to deal with the application fairly, as I hope to have done, the court might well seek the children’s views on the application thereby creating further litigation involving the children. Yet again the children might find themselves involved in court proceedings, caught between two parents with opposing views. As one of the two eldest young people wrote to this court: “Leave me in peace.” If a journalist makes an application long after proceedings have concluded then it is likely that there will be no guardian in place to represent the children on the application. That is the case in SE20P00879. The court was fortunate that there were guardians still carrying out a role in SE20P00892 and LS32P01669 and that in LS21P00748, although proceedings ended in August 2023, the guardian who acted for the children in those proceedings agreed to act in this application. I am very grateful to all the guardians for their assistance. But in cases where there is no guardian to act for the children on a journalist’s application, there is no-one available to act in their interests or to provide a protective buffer between the court process and the children. In all four sets of Children Act proceedings the children had been joined as parties and guardians appointed which itself gives an indication of the sensitive nature of the proceedings. In many private family law proceedings the children are not joined as parties and no guardian is appointed. Appointing a guardian for the purpose only of responding to a journalist’s application has implications for resources and delay. Thus, involving the children and young persons in a journalist’s application is problematic. Nevertheless, seeking the young persons’ views seemed to me to be appropriate given that the applications concerned their Article 8 rights and was relevant to their welfare, but by doing so the court has pulled them back into litigation and the tensions between their parents. As it is, having obtained their views, I must take them into account.

It was submitted to me by CM that I have to be cautious about the views of the guardians who are all from Cafcass. Ms Bradley seeks access to the Cafcass reports in each set of proceedings and so, it was suggested, there is a potential conflict of interest: Cafcass might want to avoid scrutiny of their own work. This application has become complicated enough without yet further investigation of whether some other body should act on behalf of the children. I trust the professionalism of Cafcass and its officers to represent what they believe to be the best interests of the children. I am not persuaded that there is any conflict of interest nor that, viewed objectively and reasonably, there could be any perception of bias on the part of the guardians in these cases.

The guardians have all submitted that the application should be refused having regard to the risk of harmful consequences to the children. It was submitted on behalf of the guardian for the children EE and FF, whose mother, EFM was opposed to the guardian speaking to the children about the application (although she fully supported the application itself):

“Disclosure carries real risks of harm and identification. The mother says that the children are “visibly distressed” at even the prospect of meeting with the Guardian. If children of these ages exhibit such high levels of distress at the prospect of discussing Court applications, then the Guardian cannot see how the sharing of documents related to those proceedings would do anything other than cause significantly high levels of further distress and anxiety. In such circumstances [the Guardian] submits that Article 10 does not outweigh Article 8.”

Ms Stanbury for the guardian in SE20P00892, makes a strong submission about the effect of this application on C, the child in that case, who has already been the subject of prolonged and acrimonious litigation between her parents:

“As HHJ Hale noted, [C] probably cannot remember a time when she was not the subject of litigation. This has already been harmful to her. The long-term effect of that litigation, and its impact upon her identity and her emotional wellbeing, is yet to be fully seen. The Court has made significant efforts to try to limit future litigation regarding [C] but has struggled to do so. Notwithstanding the Section 91 (14) order made in March 2025, [C] was subject to another set of proceedings within months of that order being made. This present application, supported by [C]’s mother, perpetuates the situation. Granting Ms Bradley’s application is likely to lead to a further article, permanently available online, which continues to centre on [C] as the subject of litigation, in perpetuity.”

A similar point can be made in relation to all four sets of proceedings. They have in common not just Dr Downs as an expert witness, but also that all the children were at the centre of long, bitter, parental disputes. As a generality, it is better for children for delay to be avoided and for acrimonious family litigation to end. These applications, made after final hearings and in two cases long after proceedings have concluded, prolong or re-start litigation involving these children. However, the application has been made – the court cannot turn back the clock. Whilst the guardians may be concerned that the application itself has drawn the children back into litigation, the decision for the court involves consideration of whether further harm and interference with their Convention rights will be caused to any of them by granting the applications for access to documents and permission to publish from some of them.

The President of the Family Division issued “Publication of Judgments – Practice Guidance” in June 2024. In it he said:

“3.1.

The starting point is the principle of open justice. It is generally in the public interest for judgments to be published, even where they arise from private proceedings, and even where there is no particular public interest in the individual case / judgment - subject to any countervailing Article 8 issues, which may justify some anonymisation but do not necessarily preclude publication entirely.”

The President indicated that a Circuit Judge might be expected to publish five to ten judgments a year. This is not a target but an indication of the likely frequency of publication. He recognised the practical difficulties involved in publication, in particular given the heavy workload on Judges, practitioners, and the court administration. It is important to provide adequate support and time for judges in the Family Court to prepare judgments for publication and to publish them. However, where there is already a written judgment or a transcript of an oral judgment in a case addressing issues of public interest, then there is good reason to publish it. Even though some of the judgments to which I shall now refer pre-dated that guidance, there was earlier guidance from 2014 which advised publication of any prepared written judgment following findings of fact in relation to allegations of serious harm, including emotional harm. That guidance would also suggest that the judgments in these cases should be published.

For all the concerns raised in the applications before me about harm being caused to the children by publishing material of a deeply personal nature, even if anonymised, the fact is that published judgments in family cases routinely include such material. Judges should not include in their published judgments certain information such as details of sexual abuse, but it is not uncommon for judgments to refer to acrimony within parental relationships, coercive and controlling behaviour by one or other parent, alcoholism, drug abuse, criminal involvement, child neglect and other forms of child abuse. Realistically, the children in those cases, if not when young then when older, may read those judgments knowing who the anonymised persons are. In any event, whether there is a published judgment or not, they will be aware, or will become aware, of the issues aired in the proceedings because those are the issues affecting their lives and the lives of their parents. Those children did not choose to be involved in litigation or to have judgments written about them which include personal information, but that is an inevitable consequence of publishing judgments in furtherance of the principle of open justice.

There is a published judgment in SE20P00892. In it, HHJ Hale gave a summary of Dr Downs’ written and oral evidence and analysed her evidence alongside other evidence in the case. He did not follow her recommendations. That means that much of Dr Downs’ opinion evidence in that case is already in the public domain. The fact that there is a published judgment affects the arguments for publication of Dr Downs’ reports or extracts of them. There is no prohibition on using the published judgment. Reporters and the public can already see what she said and how her evidence influenced the court. Would it add significantly to public understanding to see the words Dr Downs’ used? On the other hand, there is already public access to information given to Dr Downs and the court about the child and her parents in this case. What would otherwise be private details about them are already in the public domain. That weakens the argument, based on protecting the Article 8 rights of the father and the child (the mother consenting to publication) and the welfare of the child, against publishing from Dr Downs’ reports. The same reasoning applies to the Cafcass reports, although Ms Bradley does not seek to publish them, she does seek access to them. But she already has some knowledge of their contents from the published judgment.

In the same case there was an earlier judgment given by HHJ Trotter-Jackson in January 2023. The impact of Dr Downs’ evidence was perhaps most obviously reflected in that judgment. HHJ Hale did not follow Dr Downs’ recommendations but HHJ Trotter-Jackson did make findings about the mother’s conduct which, reinforced by Dr Downs’ evidence and the Guardian’s position, led to a welfare decision to move C from living with her mother to go to live with her father. There is a transcript of that judgment approved by the Judge but not anonymised. If it were anonymised (using the cyphers C, CM and CF so that it is consistent with this judgment) then publication of a suitably anonymised version of the judgment of HHJ Trotter-Jackson dated 27 January 2023 would:

There is no published judgment in any of the other three cases but there are two written judgments on the court files:

At present there is no information in the public domain about those cases and so publication of the judgments of HHJ Kloss and HHJ Greenan, suitably anonymised, would publish significant information about the family for the first time. However, publication of both judgments would be in line with the President’s Guidance in 2024 about publication of judgments (and the earlier guidance in 2014). It would serve the public interest by giving a full picture of the fact finding exercise in LS21P00748 and of the final decisions in LS21P01669. In the latter case it would further understanding of how Dr Downs’ expert evidence was used. In the former case the judgment preceded the obtaining of a report from Dr Downs but publication would show why the court considered that an expert report was required. Publication of those judgments would not be contrary to the expectations that the parties should have had on embarking on litigation – it ought to be foreseeable to any party involved in litigation in the Family Court, even when hearings are in private, that an anonymised judgment might be published.

There is no judgment to publish in SE20P00879 because the father withdrew his application, the parties agreed a final order and there was no need for the court to hear evidence or to make any determinations.

The standard or “template” Transparency Order which has been issued permits provision to a reporter present at a hearing, on request, of “suitably anonymised orders within the case.” In that respect it goes beyond what the provisions of PD12R say should be in the template order, paragraph 6.2 of which does not refer to court orders being provided to reporters. FPR r29.12 provides that “A copy of an order made in open court will be issued to any person who requests it” [emphasis added]. The Applicant applies for access to final orders made in the four cases heard in private. She was present at a hearing in SE20P00892 and, under the Transparency Order made in that case, would have been entitled on request to provision of any “suitably anonymised orders within the case.” She did not make that request at the time but I take into account her right to have been provided with those orders on request.

Other journalists attended hearings in the applications before me. One requested provision of the suitably anonymised orders within the case. That gives rise to a practical problem and an issue of resources and proportionality. I have seen the court files in the four cases. In total there are well over 50 orders and none of them is anonymised. I am unsure why the template transparency order is drafted to go beyond the provisions of PD12R but the provision of all orders within a case would be an onerous task and one that would not further the understanding of the reporter. Many are routine case management directions. As none is presently anonymised, the process of anonymising all of them would be arduous. The court could take the narrow view and respond to the reporter’s request by saying that whilst there are many orders, none of them is suitably anonymised and so the reporter may not be provided with them. That would hardly be in the spirit of open justice and the transparency provisions.

Ms Bradley’s request is a more modest one – she seeks copies of the final orders made in the four cases. In SE20P00879, the final order is of particular importance to understanding the case and the issues raised because there is no judgment. In LS21P00748, understanding of the case and the issues with which Ms Bradley is concerned is furthered by a combination of the fact finding judgment in February 2022 and the later final consent order.

Dr Downs’ substantive reports are long – they tend to be upwards of 90 pages. She includes detailed accounts of the conversations she has had with parents and children within the body of her reports. She sets out the results of any psychological testing she has performed. She responds to specific questions put to her by the parties. As would be expected, she includes details of adults’ accounts of their own childhoods, their personal and relationship histories, and their perspectives on their relationship with the children’s other parent. These are personal accounts given to an expert witness with the ultimate purpose of assisting the court to determine what child arrangements should be made in the best interests of the children concerned. The adults and children assessed by Dr Downs did not expect what they told her would be published to a wider readership beyond the proceedings, nor did Dr Downs.

The court may only permit a person to put expert evidence before it if it is of the opinion that the expert evidence is necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings (FPR r25.4). Expert psychological evidence will tend to be of less assistance to the court if the parents or children who are the subjects of such evidence are not candid with the expert. As a generality, parents and children may be less candid with an expert if they fear that what they say will be read by a wider audience beyond the Judge and those directly involved in the proceedings. That said, they will, or should, be aware that what they say to an expert will become known to the Judge who may include it in a published judgment.

Parents and professionals would be cautious about sharing some of the information within Dr Downs’ reports with the subject children for fear of causing them emotional or psychological harm. A parent might well have told Dr Downs something about their relationship with the child’s other parent which they would not wish to reveal to their child. Some such information is within judgments given in the cases with which I am concerned, some is not.

In one of the four cases, Dr Downs’ written evidence includes an email from the mother expressing her anxiety that she had said too much to Dr Downs about her relationship with a close relative. She was concerned about the impact of the information becoming known to them. In this as in the other three cases, Dr Downs’ reports include information from those she has assessed about third parties who have had no “right of reply”. I have to be mindful of the potential impact of even anonymised publication on those third parties and of their Convention rights.

Within the four cases there are numerous Cafcass reports from several different Cafcass officers. They are in conventional form, including accounts of discussions with the parents and the relevant children, information from schools and other third parties, and recommendations to the court about child arrangements. Some reports include letters from the children to the judges hearing their cases.

Some of the Cafcass reports repeat some of the contents of Dr Downs’ evidence and other expert evidence, as well as personal information about the parents and children.

Ms Bradley initially made her application for access to documents from the court file by email requests to the court. In three of the cases Ms Bradley had not attended any hearings and no transparency orders had been made. When unrepresented, she asked for the courts to make “retrospective transparency orders”. The FPR do not recognise any such orders. A Transparency Order may be made when a reporter attends a hearing. It sets out what documents a reporter who attends a hearing may be given on request. Any application by that reporter for sight of other documents on the court file, or by a journalist or legal blogger who has not attended a hearing, is an application for the court to give permission for access to documents from the court file in accordance with FPR r29.12. Any such application should be made in accordance with FPR Part 18 and, subject to any different court order, must be served on all the parties to the existing or concluded proceedings. In exercising its case management powers the court may dispense with the need for a formal application or notice. If a reporter at a hearing were to seek access to a particular document, then, if all parties are present and can make submissions on the request, then the court might well dispense with the need for a formal application. In contrast, where a journalist applies for extensive access to court documents months or even years after the proceedings have concluded, then the court is unlikely to dispense with the need for a formal application to be served on the parties.

In accordance with Dring, an applicant should explain (i) why they seek access and (ii) how granting them access would advance the open justice principle.

A Transparency Order gives permission to a reporter attending a hearing to communicate or publish information from the proceedings subject to certain conditions. To the extent specified in the Transparency Order, it revises the effect of AJA 1960 s12 (and may revise the effect of CA 1989 s97 depending on the wording of the Order). As already noted, the FPR do not provide for any power to authorise publication of information from the proceedings beyond that provided by PD 12R and FPR rr12.73(2) and r12.73A. Any application to extend permission to communicate or publish information from the proceedings is an application for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. The application would ordinarily be made to the High Court on form C66 and be made on notice unless the court orders otherwise.

In the present applications I dispensed with the need for formal applications but did insist on notice being given to all the parties in the existing or concluded proceedings. I have wrestled with the question of how notice of an application might be given to children who were parties to concluded proceedings, and how they might participate in the application. When substantive proceedings have concluded some time ago, the children are unlikely to have a guardian acting for them. Giving them notice of the application is liable to drag them back into litigation which might in itself be harmful to them and might expose them to more parental conflict or to a risk of parental manipulation. On the other hand, the application will engage issues concerning their Article 8 rights and best interests. It could be emotionally harmful to them to make decisions without having listened to their voices. In all four cases before me the children were joined as parties but in most private law family cases, children are not made parties. How should their interests be protected and their voices heard on an application for access to documents from the court file? The view I have taken in the cases before me is that I did need to hear the views of those children old enough and with sufficient maturity to express their views. Hence, those children had to be contacted and given information about the application, through a guardian or directly, so that their voices could be heard. Others may take a different view in a different case.

As from 1 January 2026 a pilot scheme is operating in certain other courts in other jurisdictions. CPR PD51ZH provides that in those pilot courts, subject to any contrary court order, access shall be given to non-parties to documents on the court file which are “public domain documents”. These include expert reports used or referred to at a hearing in public. The pilot does not apply to family proceedings and it does not apply to documents used or referred to at hearings in private. Nevertheless, as transparency becomes embedded in family proceedings, a mechanism similar to that set out in CPR PD51ZH, suitably adapted, might be piloted. In any event, applications of the kind made by Ms Bradley may well become more common. Someone or some body able to take an overview of all relevant considerations and implications, might consider whether guidance on procedures for making applications of the kind made in the present case is required and what that guidance should be. In the meantime, I seek only to refer to the procedure as it has been adopted in the applications before me. Any formal guidance, applicable more widely, is for others to give.

Ms Bradley’s application is made in four sets of family proceedings heard in private. They have all now concluded and so CA 1989 s97 no longer applies. A Transparency Order was made in SE20P00892 by which the effect of AJA 1960 s12 was varied to allow for the provision to her, on request, of “documents drafted by advocates (or litigants if a party is self-representing): i.e. Case outlines, skeleton arguments, summaries, position statements threshold documents and chronologies; any indices from the court bundle; and any suitably anonymised orders within the case.”

The Transparency Order in SE20P00892 does not permit Ms Bradley access to other documents on the court file nor does it permit her to quote or publish from those other documents. There is also a final judgment published in that case. In the other three cases there are no Transparency Orders and so she, like everyone else, is currently subject to the unvaried provisions of AJA 1960 s12.

Hence Ms Bradley’s application for access in each set of proceedings to the expert psychological reports of Dr Maria Downs, the Cafcass reports, and all final orders and judgments, and for permission to publish and communicate the contents of Dr Downs’ reports as well as the final orders and judgments, comprises:

An analysis of the legal framework (above) demonstrates that the court’s approach to the two elements of the application is similar. With the starting point of open justice, I need to analyse the competing claims for Article 8 and Article 10 rights whilst having regard to the welfare of the subject children as a primary consideration. However, in doing so:

I have concluded that the applications clearly engage the open justice principle and that open justice would be served by allowing the applications. I am satisfied that there is a strong public interest in furthering understanding of how courts hearing private family cases deal with issues not just of alienating behaviour but also of the strong resistance of some children to spending time with the parent with whom, following parental separation, they do not live. The use of expert psychological evidence in such cases is also of considerable public interest. These four cases were heard in private and the Applicant was not present at any hearings in three of them. The cases share a common expert, Dr Downs, and some common issues. Those issues, and expert evidence given in cases in which those issues have arisen, have been the subject of consideration in important court decisions and by the FJC, and they have been the subject of widespread public comment including criticisms of the courts. The Applicant has a legitimate interest in investigating how expert evidence was used in these four cases and how the courts addressed the common issues. In three of the cases there is no other means by which the Applicant can gain an understanding of those matters. In SE20P00892, there is a published judgment but there is also an earlier, unpublished judgment without access to which there cannot be a full understanding of why the court decided to remove the children from the care of their mother and then reversed that decision two years later. Without transparency the Family Court cannot be fully accountable for the decisions its judges make, decisions which can have lifelong implications for the families involved.

The risk of jigsaw identification can never be eliminated. Usually, the greatest risk is that someone who knows the family or knows of it through some other means than the court proceedings, recognises an identifying fact or facts from a report on the proceedings. The court cannot prevent the wider family, friends, neighbours, acquaintances, teachers, family doctors or others from knowing information about the family. What AJA 1960 s12 and CA 1989 s97 seek to prevent is the dissemination of information relating to the proceedings or that the children are involved in proceedings (and their home address and school). Even in the three cases in which, so far, there has been no published judgment, some people acquainted with the family will already know that the children have been involved in proceedings. Others will not know but will know that there has been a hostile parental separation. In those many private family law cases in which judgments are published, Judges trust that anonymisation is sufficient to prevent identification of the children as being the subject of the proceedings. The risk of jigsaw identification and the risk of emotional harm to the children from knowing that they are the anonymised subjects of a published judgment exist but they are considered to be at an acceptably low level such that they should not interfere with the publication of judgments in the furtherance of open justice. Accordingly, in the absence of particular circumstances which would give rise to a specific risk of harm to a child or an unjustifiable interference with a person’s Article 8 rights, where there is a strong public interest in publication of a judgment, and the Judge has handed down a judgment in writing, or given an oral judgment which can be transcribed and approved, then the judgment should be published in a suitably anonymised form. To proceed otherwise would be clearly contrary to the principle of open justice.

In determining whether other considerations such as the welfare of the children and their and others’ Article 8 rights might justify refusing the application for access to judgments, orders, and documents, or publication from them or of information from the proceedings, the following matters are of particular importance:

It is not open to me to direct other judges to publish their judgments, but in respect of the judgments of HHJ Trotter-Jackson in SE20P00892 in January 2023, HHJ Kloss in LS21P00748 in February 2022, and HHJ Greenan in LS21P01669 in August 2025, I have concluded that:

Ms Bradley has established to my satisfaction that there is a strong public interest both in providing her with the judgments and in publishing them subject to the normal conditions of anonymity. Rather than giving her permission to communicate or publish the contents of the three judgments, it would be preferable for the Judges concerned to approve suitably anonymised judgments and for those to be published on the National Archives and provided to Ms Bradley and everyone else by that means. They would then be available to all to read. Given that the decision herein might be appealed, I cannot invite publication of the judgments prior to handing down this judgment but, once handed down, I intend to provide a copy of this judgment to the three judges concerned. I shall invite them to publish their judgments using the anonymisation used herein, including anonymisation of the EU country in LS21P00748.

At the time when the three judges handed down their judgments, they did not know of any journalistic interest in the cases they were deciding. There is now. The issues raised in the proceedings are of significant public interest, the rights to privacy and family life and the children’s welfare can be sufficiently protected by anonymisation, and the open justice principle dictates that the anonymised judgments should be published.

I am satisfied that the following orders should be provided to Ms Bradley once they have been suitably anonymised:

There are well over 50 other orders in the four cases. Many of them concern minor case management issues. It would not further understanding of the case nor the right to freedom of expression or the open justice principle to direct that all the orders be anonymised and provided to Ms Bradley. It would be a disproportionate exercise and an undue burden on HMCTS, or a party given the task, to prepare so many anonymised orders to be given to the Applicant or the observing journalist who attended hearings before me. The orders that I shall direct be provided shall be anonymised by the guardian’s representatives in the three cases where there is a guardian acting and, in SE20P00879, by the court. Anonymisation shall be in accordance with the cyphers used in this judgment. Those orders may be also provided to the journalists who attended the hearings in this application. The template Transparency Order may well go further (and further than PD12R), but I am taking a pragmatic approach to a practical problem which nevertheless serves the open justice principle and does not adversely affect reporters’ understanding of the four cases. I shall restrict the provision of orders to those listed above. Once published, the written judgments in the cases will also be available to those reporters.

The template Transparency Order permits a reporter to see (on request) and to publish or quote from any suitably anonymised orders in the case. There is a Transparency Order in SE20P00892 which follows the template, and Ms Bradley attended a hearing in that case. None of the orders that I have seen have been anonymised. On a narrow view she is not entitled to see or quote from those orders which have not been anonymised. On a wider view she is entitled to be provided with all orders in the case and they require anonymisation before they are provided to her. As noted, the process of anonymisation would be a major undertaking in that case (there are over 30 orders in that case alone). Ms Bradley has only sought copies of final orders. I am granting that application in SE20P00892 and the other cases. Whilst she did not attend the other three cases, I am satisfied that it would further her understanding and the open justice principle for her to be provided with anonymised copies of the final orders and for her to be given permission to quote or publish from those anonymised orders. That would have been the order made had she attended a hearing in the Leeds cases (when either the Transparency reporting Pilot was in operation or PD12R was in force). The pilot was not operating in Sheffield in January 2022 but, there being no judgment handed down in that case in January 2022, sight of the order is needed to further understanding of that case and publication from it should be permitted in my judgment in furtherance of the open justice principle and having regard to the competing claims under Articles 8 and 10 and the welfare of the children. In any event the applications she has made were made in the four sets of proceedings and hearings of her applications have been attended by other journalists. I have made Transparency Orders following their attendances and those follow the template, allowing sight of anonymised orders in the case. It would be odd to deprive the Applicant of orders which other journalists are permitted to see on request. For the reasons given I shall limit the orders they can see to the final orders listed above. All my Transparency Orders will require amendment accordingly.

As to the reports of Dr Downs, I am satisfied that all reports should be provided to Ms Bradley but that it is necessary and proportionate to restrict publication of the contents of those reports. Provision of the reports to Ms Bradley will advance open justice. Ms Bradley is an accredited journalist with an interest in the issues raised by the four sets of proceedings, in particular how issues of alienating behaviour are addressed by the court and the use of expert evidence in such cases. I hope that the three written judgments referred to above will provide Ms Bradley with greater understanding of the cases in which they were handed down, but there is no judgment in the fourth case, and in the three cases in which judgments are or should be made available, the provision of the expert’s reports will give her an overview of the expert opinions and how they were used by the courts in all four cases. I do not regard the provision of Dr Downs’ reports to this journalist as constituting a significant interference with the Article 8 rights of the subjects of those reports or others, in particular since I shall restrict what Ms Bradley can publish from the reports. Likewise, although I am mindful of the agreement reached by the parties in SE20P00879 not to show Dr Downs’ evidence to the children’s schools or doctors, Ms Bradley falls into a different category, no harm will come to the children from her seeing the evidence, and she will only be permitted to report on limited parts of the evidence and when anonymising the children and adults.

After very careful consideration I have decided to limit what Ms Bradley may publish from Dr Downs’ reports. I accept that there is a strong public interest in understanding how the courts have used the expert evidence of Dr Downs but that can be met by permitting the publication from her reports of the summaries of her conclusions and those parts where she responds to questions about child arrangements. Those are the parts that directly engage with the issues Ms Bradley has an interest in. They are highly relevant to the issue of how the courts dealt with the expert evidence in these cases involving children’s resistance to spending time with their fathers following parental separation. Alongside the publication of judgments in the cases, where available, public understanding will be advanced by allowing publication to that extent. The balance shifts when considering those parts of her reports where she deals with her psychological assessments of individual parents and children. Those parts of her reports largely concern very private information given by those individuals to her, her psychological assessments, and her recommendations for therapy. In my judgment, there is a strong public interest in maintaining confidentiality in respect of those elements of her reports. In order fully to assist the court, those persons subject to expert assessment need to be confident that their private thoughts and feelings will be shared only with the other parties, professionals within the proceedings, and the court. The mothers may not object to publication of private information that they gave Dr Downs but the fathers do and other third parties referred to have had no opportunity to consent to or to oppose publication. I take into account the older children’s wishes and feelings but I am mindful of their involvement in prolonged proceedings and the hostile relations between their parents which have been found to have had a harmful impact upon them. For those children, including those who will be adults at the time when this judgment is handed down, I acknowledge that I am making a decision which is contrary to their wishes but I have to balance a wide range of matters of which their wishes are but one part. For those children under 18 at the time of the handing down of this judgment, their wishes are not the same as their best interests and their best interests are a primary consideration for this court. For the younger children, the guardians involved firmly oppose the public airing of material within Dr Downs’ reports which would ordinarily be of a confidential and private nature. In my judgement Ms Bradley’s Article 10 rights are not significantly restricted by prohibiting the publication of the information within Dr Downs’ assessments but prohibition is itself in the public interest and it gives necessary and proportionate protection of individuals’ Article 8 rights.

Examining all matters in the round I am not satisfied that the open justice principle would be advanced by permitting unrestricted publication from psychological reports on the adults and children in these cases. It would not significantly aid public understanding of the important issues of how the courts deal with issues of alienating behaviour and the use of expert evidence in those cases. Publication in these four cases of (i) judgments, where available, (ii) final orders, (iii) Dr Downs’ own summaries of her conclusions, and (iv) those parts of her reports that directly address the child arrangements, but not permitting publication of (v) other parts of Dr Downs’ reports including her detailed psychological assessment, will advance open justice whilst achieving the right balance of the competing claims for Article 8 and Article 10 rights and giving primary consideration to the welfare of the children who remain children.

With those conclusions having been reached, I shall permit publication and quotation from the following parts of Dr Downs’ reports:

Ms Bradley is permitted to quote or publish from Dr Downs’ CVs in the iterations attached to any of her reports and from her declarations at the end of her reports. But she may not publish or quote from Dr Downs’ home or professional address or contact details. Her professional contact details may be discoverable but criticism of Dr Downs has already been made in one article by Ms Bradley and may be made again. I see no need to invade Dr Downs’ right to a private and family life any further than is necessary for the purpose of advancing the Article 10 claims and the open justice principle. Publication of her contact details would not further open justice.

Any publication or communication of information relating to the four sets of proceedings, including as permitted from Dr Downs’ reports, shall be subject to conditions that I shall set out in orders protecting the identification of the children as the subjects of the proceedings. In line with the Transparency Order already made by HHJ Hale in SE20 P00892, I shall order that no person may publish any information relating to the proceedings to the public or a section of it, which includes:

The children and members of their family shall be anonymised in accordance with the cyphers used in this judgment.

Applying the same reasoning as set out in respect of provision of Dr Downs’ reports to the Applicant, I permit Ms Bradley to have access to the Cafcass reports in each case. No application is made to publish or quote from those reports and no such permission is given.

These orders are made on an application by one journalist. Permission to have access to documents from the court file is given to Ms Bradley only.

I emphasise that the determinations I have made are not at all dependent on whether I agree with way in which Ms Bradley chooses to investigate or report on the four sets of proceedings. I have already referred to Ms Bradley’s article in The Tribune and noted that whilst the “diagnosis” of parental alienation syndrome has been labelled a “harmful pseudo-science”, Dr Downs has not made that diagnosis in any of these four cases. But it is not for me to dictate how a journalist should write about a case, only whether she should be permitted to see certain documents and to communicate their contents and/or publish information in and about the proceedings. The court is neither endorsing nor criticising any publications about the four cases. Similarly, the fact that I am permitting access to and publication from Dr Downs’ reports must not be interpreted as any implicit criticism of her or her work in these or any other cases. The merits of her evidence are not in issue before me.

It seems to me that there may be other similar applications by journalists in relation to other cases in the future – they may wish to report on issues raised in cases that have been heard in private which they have not attended. FPR r27.11, r12.73, r12.73A, and PD12R provide journalists with an important but narrow window into family proceedings. Applications of the kind made by Ms Bradley seek to widen the ability to investigate and report on family proceedings. The court can address such applications on the basis of the current rules and established legal principles but, as this application and this long judgment demonstrate, a great deal of effort and thought is required when such applications are pursued. The tension between open justice and the protection of children’s welfare is not easy to resolve. FPR PD12R does not cover situations when an accredited journalist or legal blogger has not attended a hearing but wishes to see documents on the court file and to publish from them and more generally in relation to the proceedings. It would be helpful to have guidance and/or a streamlined procedure to apply to such cases.

I am very grateful to Dr Proudman for acting pro bono for Ms Bradley and to all Counsel and other representatives in this case, as well as those litigants in person who participated, for their assistance to the court.