Cheshire West and Chester Council v X & Ors

This hearing relates to the interests of Z. He is over 10 years’ old.

His solicitor is Ruth Hetherington. He is represented by Matthew Rogan who takes his instructions from the children's guardian allocated by CAFCASS, CG.

CG has been allocated as his Children’s Guardian since the proceedings in 2019 and has the advantage of witnessing his development across that period.

The local authority, Cheshire West and Chester Borough Council are represented by Helen Crowell. Z’s allocated social worker is SW1. She has been allocated since 31 January 2025. Prior to that, SW2 was allocated originally from 14 November 2021 with SW3 bridging a gap between different periods of allocation until SW2 went on maternity leave in February 2025. The team leader is TM, who gave evidence at the hearing in place of SW1 who was ill and unable to do so.

Z’s mother is X. She is represented by Catherine Rimmer.

Z’s father is Y. He is represented by Helen Wrenn and Elizabeth Brennan.

The relevant background to these proceedings has been set out in a document which was agreed by parties at the previous court hearing and appears in the bundle [A10]. I set it out here, with some amendment, by way of record.

There is an extensive history of involvement with the family. There were private law proceedings in 2012, 2015 and 2019 and public law proceedings in 2013 and 2021. I shall focus primarily to the events from 31 October 2019 onward, which led to private law proceedings, which ultimately became public law proceedings under case no. LV21C00335.

Z was initially subject to public law proceedings following an allegation of non-accidental injury in 2013. HHJ Barnett heard the proceedings and the decision is summarised in DJ Gordon’s 2021 judgment as follows [G55]: -

“HHJ Barnett exonerated the mother in his findings and found that Z had been injured whilst in the care of father and father's family. These were difficult proceedings for the family, and whilst the father and paternal grandparents tell the Court in their evidence that there are no hard feelings, the Court, on balance, finds this very difficult to believe. Mother's evidence directly opposed that of the paternal grandmother, and Mother's evidence was accepted by the judge.”

From 2012 until 2019, there was a shared care arrangement in place for Z. There was a disagreement on this date over who would be caring for Z, and he remained in his father’s care. This incident is addressed in DJ Gordon’s judgment of 11 November 2021 [G51].

The mother commenced private law proceedings on 8 November 2019.

Contact between Z and his mother was ordered to take place; however, Z refused to engage. The local authority was directed to prepare a report under s. 37 CA 1989 to investigate whether it should issue public law proceedings or not. This report raised possible concerns of “parental alienation” such that a child in need plan was recommended. The Local Authority did not issue proceedings however.

Following receipt of the s. 37 report, the Court gave the parties permission to instruct and rely upon the report of a psychologist, Dr Evans, to assess the family. The local authority was asked to prepare an addendum to their s. 37 report following receipt of the psychological assessment. In the meantime, the parties were required to continue to try to promote contact.

In November 2020, the court made a further s. 37 direction accompanied with an interim care order to Cheshire West and Chester Council.

The Local Authority issued care proceedings in February 2021 (case no. LV21C00335) seeking removal of Z from his father’s care into a “neutral” placement.

In March 2021, the Court sanctioned Z’s removal from his father’s care into foster care.

The father sought to appeal this decision but was unsuccessful [G52]. Owing to the child’s presentation on removal, he was placed in a residential placement that had been identified rather than a foster placement.

Within the proceedings, Dr Evans was directed to undertake a psychological assessment of the family. Her report was dated 10 May 2021 [G14-G42].Dr Evans made recommendations at paragraph 114 of her report as follows: -

A care order was granted, following a contested hearing and judgment, in November 2021. The continued placement of Z in residential care was authorised and permission granted to refuse contact with his parents pursuant to s.34(4) CA 1989.

District Judge Gordon gave a judgment [G51], of which I highlight the following sections:-

The court made a final care order and approved the care plan, which involved therapeutic intervention for Z to help him re-establish a relationship with the maternal family [G95].

The father sought to appeal the decision of DJ Gordon. I refused permission to appeal on paper and subsequently at an oral hearing.

Following the conclusion of the care proceedings, the Local Authority agreed to fund therapeutic support for the parents with the aim of rebuilding their relationship. It was envisaged that eventually Z would be included within the therapy sessions and following the same, updating parenting assessments would be completed to consider Z returning to his parents’ respective care.

Z engaged well with an art therapist in his residential placement between April 2022 and December 2022. Attempts were made whilst in his residential placement to discuss Z’s mother, as recommended by Dr Evans, but these interventions did not lead to a willingness by Z to engage in any contact with his mother.

Z’s views around contact with his father also began to vacillate. Z engaged in video calls with his father for a period but began to disengage from contact in [2022] [F8].

Z refused all contact with his father from on or around April 2023, until mid-2024 [F9].

The parents engaged with a programme of therapy with a therapist in May 2022 for a period of over 12 months. Following another matter in which the Local Authority were involved and in which criticisms were made of the therapist, the Local Authority no longer considered it appropriate for Z to be introduced to his parents’ therapy.

Z transitioned from his residential placement to a foster care placement matched to his needs, in [2023] and commenced high school in September 2023 (having previously refused to engage with education). This move initially appeared to be very positive for Z.

Z’s direct contact with his father remained sporadic and had only taken place once in April 2024 [F1], June 2024 [F12] and August 2024 [F14] despite Z being offered weekly and twice weekly contact during the school holidays to try to rebuild his relationship with his father.

In December 2023, the father made an application for contact with a child in care (LV23C01675). The father also applied for an assessment by an Independent Social Worker on 1 February 2024.

The matter came before DJ Gordon on 2 February 2024. DJ Gordon dismissed the father’s applications at the first hearing, having had the benefit of a statement from the local authority and an analysis by the guardian at that hearing [F26].

By this stage, the local authority had confirmed its decision not to introduce Z into his parents’ therapy. The local authority confirmed at this hearing that its intention was to commission an updating psychological assessment of Z, given the length of time that had passed since Dr Evans’s assessment in 2021. The local authority confirmed that an updating parenting assessment of the father would be undertaken following the psychological report. It was known to the parents at this stage that Z did not agree to them having a copy of the report, and that the local authority’s sole instruction would proceed on this basis.

The local authority instructed a psychologist, Dr Jaime Craig to complete an assessment of Z. That assessment is dated March 2024. Z has remained consistent in his view that he did not want the contents of the report to be shared with either of his parents. In consultation with Dr Craig, a summary of the report was prepared by the allocated social worker, SW2 and it was provided to the parents on 12 March 2024 [E1].

Originally, the local authority and the children's guardian opposed that report being provided to the parents. The father objected to non-disclosure of the report. After a contested hearing, I directed the report to be provided to the parents. The terms of my judgment have been transcribed and published. I will not repeat them.

Unfortunately, Z’s foster placement broke down. From June 2024, Z moved to his current placement, CH children’s home.

The Local Authority completed an updating parenting assessment of Y, dated 17 September 2024 [C1]. The assessment, which was prepared by the then allocated social worker, SW2, concluded negatively. In substance, it was stated that a rehabilitation plan was inappropriate, given Z’s presentation surrounding family time, and his wishes and feelings to remain living in his children’s home. Z would be offered monthly family time with both parents separately, supported by two staff members, should he wish to attend. Z would not be actively encouraged to attend; as such contact would need to be led by him.

I would highlight the following from the report [C16-C17]: -

“Since coming into care, Z has struggled with his emotional wellbeing, specifically feelings of anxiety, which he describes as having a sickly feeling in his stomach and worries about needing to use the toilet. His Carers have noticed a clear link surrounding family time, whereby these anxieties are heightened, sometimes resulting in Z feeling unable to attend family time. This tells us, that Z may not feel comfortable during these times.

Social Workers and carers regularly check in with Z, regarding his wishes and feelings, in relation to his care plan. Although Z generally can present as confident, chatty and relaxed, however when asked about family time and future plans to potentially return to his father’s care, Z physically shuts down. He can become very emotional, overwhelmed and angry during these conversations, often adopting the foetal position, holding his head in his hands. Again, this presentation contradicts Z's initial wishes and feelings whereby he stated, ‘I want to live with my Dad’.”

Within her conclusion, she said this [C17]: -

“This parenting assessment was completed over several months, to ensure that Y could demonstrate his ability to prioritise appointments, meetings and having the opportunity to observe family times. Unfortunately, due to Z's wishes and feelings, the assessment did not go as planned, as we were unable to increase family time or progress into the community in order to have the opportunities to observe their relationship, as Z declined this offer.

Whilst I commend Mr Y for the commitment he has shown to his son over the years, there are still on-going concerns with regards to his parenting style and ability to work with the Local Authority. Mr Y has engaged in all the Local Authority has recommended, prioritising all appointments and meetings. The evidence demonstrates that Mr Y is unable to implement this learning into practice, understand and accept Z's views and needs, whilst sadly demonstrating an inability to work collaboratively with the Local Authority in respect to Z's care plan. Any suggestions made by the Local Authority continue to be met with opposition and in turn have continued to undermine Z's care plan, by not adhering to written agreements and expectations in place, which have impacted upon Z's education, placement, relationships and his emotional wellbeing. This is impacting upon our ability to progress their relationship and ultimately, Z's care plan.

The key issues and concerns the Local Authority initially had, have been discussed at length through-out the assessment, and whilst it is positive that Mr Y, is now able to take some accountability for Z's circumstances, it would seem that Z's emotional wellbeing, continues to be significantly negatively impacted by his father’s behaviour. Mr Y appears to be in denial about Z's presentation following family time, often insinuating that professionals are not being truthful, as [o]pposed to accepting that his son could be triggered by him. Mr Y has questioned the Local Authorities [sic.] ability to promote family time on several occasions over the years, not recognising that family time is led by Z and at his pace, as opposed to meeting Mr Y’s needs.

There are many strengths highlighted throughout the assessment, however the vulnerabilities do outweigh the strengths.”

Dr Craig was consulted about this issue [C16]. Dr Craig expressed the view that Z’s support network, carers and social worker need to stop asking Z his wishes and feelings surrounding family time; instead, Z should be told that he can see his parents at the family centre, once per month supported by staff should he choose to attend on the day; and if not, he will not be questioned or encouraged. Contact needs to be led by Z and he should not be under any pressure around it. Z is trying to express his feelings, but feels unable physically to verbalise this, due to fear of either upsetting his father or fear of how his father may respond.

The father made a further application for contact with a child in care on 12 December 2024, which initiated the instant proceedings.

The Local Authority then made its applications.

The applications were listed for final hearing in May 2025 but upon the application of the children’s guardian, I agreed to grant permission for a full assessment of Z by Dr Craig to inform the way ahead in the hope of building a consensus. It was a final attempt within proceedings to achieve an improvement for this troubled young person, languishing in a prison of anxiety. Although I was realistic about the father’s likely response, I harboured a small hope that he would reflect. Sadly, when the matter returned to Court on 12 August 2025, it became apparent that the father did not agree to anything; even the continuation of the undertaking he had given, which had brought a measure of comfort to his son. This was despite the father stating in his statement, dated 9 April 2025 [C108] that “[i]f Z says he doesn't want to see me to the Guardian, or indeed the Judge, I will accept this and will not pursue my application any further…” Consequently, a final hearing was listed commencing 5 November 2025 for 3 days.

The issues listed for determination at this final hearing are as follows: -

The local authority, mother and the children’s guardian were agreed that the father’s application should be dismissed. They supported the making of orders as sought by the local authority by the time of final submissions.

The father originally disputed all of the orders sought against him. During the course of the father giving evidence and prior to final submissions, his position changed. Firstly, he reflected on the evidence and sought leave to withdraw his application for contact. Secondly, he agreed to the making of an order pursuant to section 91(14) CA 1989 until Z’s 16^th birthday. Secondly, at the start of submissions, Ms Wrenn confirmed that he had further reflected on the evidence of the Children’s Guardian and agreed to the making of an injunction order under the Family Law Act 1996 and to the making of an order under the inherent jurisdiction to restrict his parental responsibility. The one remaining dispute was the length of the latter two orders: the father agreed that the orders should run until Z’s 15^th birthday as opposed to his 16^th birthday.

Accordingly, the contested issue was narrow but to determine that issue and to satisfy myself that the orders were appropriate it is necessary to set the context in which such orders are required.

Z’s welfare is my paramount consideration and I have considered the welfare checklist in reaching my conclusions. I have, where appropriate, had regard to the relevant law in relation to each of the orders which I intend to make.

Firstly, as I shall explain, Z is an extremely vulnerable young person as a result of the care he has received. He is a young person crying out for help so that he can access education, feel able to leave his home and find a route to enable him to pursue his burgeoning ambition. He is not attending school at present and has been suffering from a fear of leaving his property in part, arising out of managing this medical condition and anxiety. At times, within these proceedings, he has appeared under siege. He continues to require therapeutic work to address the impact of his parenting and his time in care to offer him some support to be able to develop as a person. He needs to avoid being in the middle of parental acrimony or unbidden attempts to contact him by his parents or extended family members. He needs to be able to engage in therapeutic work without his father trying to discover information about it or to interfere in any way with it. The primary factor is the imperative of taking steps to address Z’s therapeutic needs and allow him to continue to address his fears and anxiety through reassurance that his father will not undermine that progress, deliberately or inadvertently.

The second factor is the father. He accepted in his evidence that he has a distrust of the local authority, which, in my judgment, continues to feed his approach despite there being evidence that the local authority have sought to promote his relationship with Z and to seek to support both parents by arranging the provision of therapy for both of them to address their parenting. The father feels that he is blamed unfairly for conduct which is said to impact Z and feels that his role has been undermined. The critical feature of his behaviour is his propensity, deliberately or not, to manipulate professionals and Z out of his obvious desire to see his son but also his lack of ability to reflect upon the impact of his actions. Z recognises in his father that unpredictability despite his obvious love for his father. In my judgment, the orders are necessary to protect Z, as he seeks to undertake therapeutic work and to develop in an age-appropriate way, from the unpredictable and harmful elements of his father’s behaviour.

Having regard to the history of the case and recent events, particularly the unplanned meeting between Z and his father at a [shop] close to his care home on 12 November 2024, I am satisfied that the local authority have proved the father has been responsible for deliberate conduct which has had a significant impact upon Z.

Nonetheless, I give the father some credit for belatedly listening to the compelling evidence of Dr Craig and the social care professionals in seeking permission to withdraw his application for contact. Contact is not the priority at this stage and insofar as it will develop, that development will be led by Z. He is fully aware that Z will be supported to have contact, ideally with both of his parents, when he wishes to do so. The order granting the local authority permission to refuse contact under section 34 (4) CA 1989 will continue.

Accordingly, I grant permission to the father to withdraw his application for contact.

Secondly, I agree that it is vital for Z to enjoy some respite from litigation which has punctuated much of his life. He needs a break from providing formally his wishes and feelings in the knowledge that there is ongoing litigation which may impact him. Again, I give the father credit for accepting the benefit to his son of there being a filter for any future application before it is served on any other party for further consideration. Accordingly, I make such an order in the terms of the draft prepared by the local authority for the purposes of final submissions.

Thirdly, the father originally gave an undertaking in May 2025 promising not to contact Z or to enter within exclusion zones around Z’s care home or school. The evidence is clear that Z has felt reassured by the existence of such a promise. It has helped to enable him to leave the property after the events of 12 November 2024 when he encountered his father at a local [shop]. Given the potential length of therapy and the need to ensure there is a significant level of reassurance offered to Z, I regard the duration of the order as properly set until Z’s 16^th birthday. The package is intended to ensure there is a period where he will enjoy stability to support his active engagement in therapy, the improvement and management of his symptoms of anxiety and his education.

Fourthly, it is necessary to avoid the risk of the therapeutic work being undermined by the father making subject access requests to health (including CAMHS) or education without the consent of the local authority. That forms part of the local authority being able to manage the level of information they provide to the parents about the detail of the therapy which they propose to put in place for Z. Decisions around that may be taken without consultation and the relevant provision of information to the father in order to address the risk that the process may be undermined by him or by the provision of information to him beyond that which Z is content with. Accordingly, I approve the restrictions as sought by the local authority within their draft order prepared prior to final submissions including the identification of areas where information and consultation must continue to be undertaken. Again, it is necessary to make that order until Z’s 16^th birthday for similar reasons to those already mentioned. In this case, however, I cannot exaggerate the significance to Z of him being able to access therapy, access the community and access education so that he has the hope of enjoying a life which has not been blighted.

Finally, Z has required the active assistance of therapeutic work for a number of years. There have been challenges but it is now imperative that the local authority, hopefully in conjunction with CAMHS, deliver appropriate therapeutic work providing an holistic plan to address all of his needs. I do not doubt for one moment the ability or competence of SW1 or TM, who have been frustrated by the problems in obtaining clear answers from CAMHS. However, the local authority chose to ignore my exhortation at the hearing in August 2025 to twin-track the search for an appropriate therapist. The result is that CAMHS have not confirmed what work they will do with Z and when that work will start. He could be on a waiting list for psychological assistance for up to 15 months. The local authority did not search for a suitable private provider either to manage the situation without CAMHS involvement or to work in conjunction with them until 22 October 2025. What the court received was an inadequate explanation about that issue in the evidence of SW1. Z was left with nothing despite undertaking an assessment with CAMHS on 23 September 2025. There was no investigation into whether a psychological service could work with elements of CAMHS or whether work could be undertaken to build Z’s confidence so that he was more willing to leave the home to engage in therapy. In hindsight, the local authority accept that they should have given proper consideration to these matters at the time. The frustration is that they were aware of the court’s concern about the urgent need for progress. There were aware of the need to file a therapeutic plan and a plan for life story work by 22 October 2025 (later extended to 29 October 2025). In this case, they were fully aware that the dates provided by CAMHS were not guarantees and there was a real risk that there would be a significant and unacceptable delay in CAMHS offering any service. They were aware that Z’s anxiety and the panic attacks he has been experiencing were increasing over recent months. In my judgment, this deserved a better response from the local authority and I criticise them for their failure to recognise the urgency and severity of the issues in failing to take proper steps from the start to build a psychological plan for Z.

I direct that a copy of this judgment shall be provided to the Executive Director of Children and Families, Amanda Perraton so that she can consider this criticism and consider what oversight is required by her of the therapeutic plans for Z and what learning can be taken from it, including the apparent inability of CAMHS to recognise Z’s needs and to offer effective and prompt psychological care.

TM is an experienced and highly competent team manager. She gave evidence in the stead of SW1, who was unfortunately unwell. She had a good grip of the case and prepared a statement early in the case and an update on the day of the final hearing regarding recent information about the plan for Z’s therapy. She explained the reasoning of the local authority for promoting the plan for sourcing therapeutic work through CAMHS and was realistic in acknowledging the problems which had been caused by the failure to advance a contingency plan in good time.

The father was a difficult person to assess. In some ways, he betrayed a remarkable level of ignorance about the case and the impact of issues upon his son. It is clear Z’s condition leads him to distrust the local authority to a significant degree. A reasonable observer would note the efforts the local authority have taken to promote contact when Z has expressed a wish to participate. They have promoted therapeutic work with both parents. I accept that he loves his son and has shown significant commitment to him. I do not regard him as a malicious individual but his actions are at times misguided and he is capable of dishonesty. In other words, overall, whilst his actions may appear genuine from his perspective, there is a manipulative and dishonest aspect to his character as originally reflected in the judgment of District Judge Gordon. In my judgment, at times, he struggles and is often unwilling to accept the impact of his behaviour on Z and the professionals working to support him.

CG has been Z’s Guardian over a long period. Alongside Ms Hetherington, his solicitor, they have advocated cogently and forcefully for his voice to be heard within the proceedings. CG gave a balanced account of the issues demonstrating an objective and analytical approach to the issues.

There has been an intense focus in the written evidence of the interactions between the father, the local authority and Z. However, the factual basis relevant to the applications may be summarised simply.

The Local Authority rely upon what they submit are “established and incontrovertible” facts, namely: -

I accept that concise summary as being an accurate reflection of the position.

The Local Authority submit that given the agreed evidence of Dr Craig, they seek simply to prove a factual basis for the making of an injunction order by way of deliberate conduct amounting to “molestation” by the father. To that end they seek to rely upon a select number of allegations [A95].

Before turning to the schedule of allegations, I observe that they are no more than a self-selected illustration of the overall allegation made by the local authority that the father is apt to undermine and/or manipulate Z. This poses a direct risk to Z’s ability to gain a sense of stability and to engage in therapy. He was described by TM as a parent who consistently pushed and occasionally stepped over boundaries set by the local authority. However, in my judgment, the key incident which had the most significant impact upon Z in recent times and illustrates the problems with the father’s behaviour is the incident on 12 November 2024 (“the shop encounter”).

Nonetheless, by way of context, I shall deal with the other allegations before turning to the shop encounter. Ultimately, the real issue is whether the father by his attitude and actions poses a risk to Z, which requires orders to be made to secure Z’s welfare as he begins a therapeutic journey of recovery.

The burden of proving the facts upon which it relies rests upon the local authority. The standard of proof they must meet is the balance of probability.

In Re BR (Proof of Facts) [2015] EWFC 41, Peter Jackson, J (as he then was) summarised the relevant general principles. The fundamental elements may be expressed thus (Footnote: ¹): -

When evaluating the father, I have considered his demeanour in the witness box.  I have sought to take account of the contemporary documentation, the written evidence and the ordinary process of reasoning including consistency or inconsistency informing an holistic assessment of his evidence and ultimately of its reliability. Many honest witnesses may provide inconsistent evidence and the contrary may be true of a witness intent on deception. Ultimately, the Court must evaluate the evidence and establish its assessment of the reliability of the witness and the quality of the evidence given within the compass of the body of evidence put before it.

In undertaking this task, I would gratefully adopt the analysis of Peter Jackson, LJ in Re B-M (Children: Findings of Fact) [2021] EWCA Civ 1371 at paragraphs 25-30: -

“25.

No judge would consider it proper to reach a conclusion about a witness’s credibility based solely on the way that he or she gives evidence, at least in any normal circumstances. The ordinary process of reasoning will draw the judge to consider a number of other matters, such as the consistency of the account with known facts, with previous accounts given by the witness, with other evidence, and with the overall probabilities. However, in a case where the facts are not likely to be primarily found in contemporaneous documents the assessment of credibility can quite properly include the impression made upon the court by the witness, with due allowance being made for the pressures that may arise from the process of giving evidence. Indeed in family cases, where the question is not only ‘what happened in the past?’ but also ‘what may happen in the future?’, a witness’s demeanour may offer important information to the court about what sort of a person the witness truly is, and consequently whether an account of past events or future intentions is likely to be reliable.

26.

I therefore respectfully agree with what Macur LJ said in Re M (Children)at [12], with emphasis on the word ‘solely’:

“It is obviously a counsel of perfection but seems to me advisable that any judge appraising witnesses in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute should warn themselves to guard against an assessment solely by virtue of their behaviour in the witness box and to expressly indicate that they have done so.”

That was a case where the trial judge’s decision to refuse even supervised contact was based unduly on a father’s manner of giving evidence.

27.

The same approach was taken by this court in a family case: Re A [2020] EWCA Civ 1230, where a finding of unlawful killing by poisoning was based upon recollection of a very brief event years earlier. At [36], King LJ noted that in Kogan, the court had emphasised the need for a balanced approach to the significance of oral evidence regardless of jurisdiction and that, although it was a copyright dispute between former partners, the judgment had wider implications. She added:

“40.

I do not seek in any way to undermine the importance of oral evidence in family cases, or the long-held view that judges at first instance have a significant advantage over the judges on appeal in having seen and heard the witnesses give evidence and be subjected to cross-examination (Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] WL 477307, [1999] 2 FLR 763 at 784). As Baker J said in in Gloucestershire CC v RH and others at [42], it is essential that the judge forms a view as to the credibility of each of the witnesses, to which end oral evidence will be of great importance in enabling the court to discover what occurred, and in assessing the reliability of the witness.

41.

The court must, however, be mindful of the fallibility of memory and the pressures of giving evidence. The relative significance of oral and contemporaneous evidence will vary from case to case. What is important, as was highlighted in Kogan, is that the court assesses all the evidence in a manner suited to the case before it and does not inappropriately elevate one kind of evidence over another.

43.

In the present case, the mother was giving evidence about an incident which had lasted only a few seconds seven years before, in circumstances where her recollection was taking place in the aftermath of unimaginably traumatic events. Those features alone would highlight the need for this critical evidence to be assessed in its proper place, alongside contemporaneous documentary evidence, and any evidence upon which undoubted, or probable, reliance could be placed.”

28.

Of course in the present case, the issue concerned an alleged course of conduct spread across years. I do not accept that the Judge should have been driven by the dicta in the cases cited by the Appellants to exclude the impressions created by the manner in which B and C gave their evidence. In family cases at least, that would not only be unrealistic but, as I have said, may deprive a judge of valuable insights. There will be cases where the manner in which evidence is given about such personal matters will properly assume prominence. As Munby LJ said in Re A (A Child) (No. 2) [2011] EWCA Civ. 12 said at [104] in a passage described by the Judge as of considerable assistance in the present case:

“Any judge who has had to conduct a fact-finding hearing such as this is likely to have had experience of a witness - as here a woman deposing to serious domestic violence and grave sexual abuse - whose evidence, although shot through with unreliability as to details, with gross exaggeration and even with lies, is nonetheless compelling and convincing as to the central core... Yet through all the lies, as experience teaches, one may nonetheless be left with a powerful conviction that on the essentials the witness is telling the truth, perhaps because of the way in which she gives her evidence, perhaps because of a number of small points which, although trivial in themselves, nonetheless suddenly illuminate the underlying realities.”

29.

Still further, demeanour is likely to be of real importance when the court is assessing the recorded interviews or live evidence of children. Here, it is not only entitled but expected to consider the child’s demeanour as part of the process of assessing credibility, and the accumulated experience of listening to children’s accounts sensitises the decision-maker to the many indicators of sound and unsound allegations.

30.

None of this will be news to specialist family judges and in future I would hope that in conventional family cases any submissions that unduly labour arguments based upon the dicta that I have been considering will receive appropriately short shrift.”

In this case, the Local Authority rely upon case notes regarding events in 2023 and 2024. The witnesses have not been called to give evidence in order to manage the proceedings in furtherance of the overriding objective. Accordingly, the hearsay evidence must be weighed appropriately in the context of the other evidence.

In Westminster City Council v M, F and H [2017] EWHC 518 (Fam), Hayden, J put the matter in this way: -

“23.

Perhaps most importantly, sight must not be lost of the fact that these are public law care proceedings, where the guiding philosophy of the Court is investigative, non adversarial, sui generis.  Driven by its obligation to regard the welfare of the subject child as the paramount consideration, the Family Court will instinctively permit a board range of evidence in order ultimately to weigh and assess its quality and worth in the context of the evidence as a whole.

24.

A Local Authority faced with allegations of this kind is simply not going to be in a position to call as a witness every nurse, doctor or teacher who makes a note (usually recorded contemporaneously) in order to provide what Ms Bazley identifies as ‘the best quality of evidence on each individual point’.  The maternal being considered here, spans a number of years and is qualitatively of a different complexion to witness statements taken on key issues.  These are largely clinical and nursing notes which provide contextual material by which the central evidential conflicts may be resolved.

25.

The Local Authority must, ultimately, assess the manner in which it considers it can most efficiently, fairly and proportionately establish its case.  The weight to be given to records, which may be disputed by the parents, will depend, along with other factors, on the Court’s assessment of their credibility generally.  Here, the reliability of the hearsay material may be tested in many ways e.g. do similar issues arise in the records of a variety of unconnected individuals?  If so, that will plainly enhance their reliability.  Is it likely that a particular professional e.g. nurse or doctor would not merely have inaccurately recorded what a parent said but noted the exact opposite of what it is contended was said?  The reaction of witnesses (not just the parents), during the course of oral evidence, to recorded material which conflicts with their own account will also form a crucial aspect of this multifaceted evaluative exercise.  At the conclusion of this forensic process, evidence can emerge and frequently does, which readily complies with the qualitative criterion emphasised in Re A [(A Child) (Fact finding hearing: speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12].”

During his helpful summary of the law relating to the admissibility and weight to be accorded to hearsay evidence in children cases, Hayden J made the following observation at paragraph 18: -

“The Court will always want to analyse the cogency and weight of hearsay evidence. Section 4 [Civil Evidence Act 1995] provides guidance as to the considerations relevant in weighing hearsay evidence. In estimating the weight (if any) to be given to hearsay evidence in civil proceedings the court shall have regard to any circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or otherwise of the evidence. Regard may be had, in particular, to the following—

(a)

whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a witness;

(b)

whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the matters stated;

(c)

whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay;

(d)

whether any person involved had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters;

(e)

whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration with another or for a particular purpose;

(f)

whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight."

I have borne those matters in mind when assessing the weight to be given to the hearsay evidence.

I have steadfastly avoided the assumption that because I did not believe a witness on one fact means that they must have lied on another.  I have sought to evaluate why they may have lied in accordance with the approach adopted in Re H-C [2016] AC 746.

I now turn to the subsidiary facts, which are said to illuminate the father’s behaviour.

“On 17 May 2024, Z’s foster carer discovered a hidden mobile phone which the father had been paying to top up [C41] [F29]. This pressure for increased contact from the father led to Z refusing to attend school as he was worried his father would ‘turn up at school and get into trouble’ [C66].”

On 16 May 2024, the foster carer indicated that she did not feel able to supervise the telephone contact any longer “as a result of untruths being told” [C41]. It is likely that she was under pressure at that stage given that history informs us that the placement broke down by [June 2024].

The case note, dated 17 May 2024 at 15.18 was prepared by SW2 [F29; chronology at C41]: -

“[Foster carer] reported that since you haven’t spoken to your Dad, you have been lovely, she has noticed a real change in your personality and behaviour. FC explained to you that she does not feel able to supervise the calls between you and your Dad, due to her feeling vulnerable, following on from emails from your Dad regarding things that have been said during the calls. [Foster carer] does not feel your Dad is being honest, she feels it is leaving you in a vulnerable position too. You asked if [redacted], could supervised the calls, but understood that she too would be left in a vulnerable position, so you didn't ask further. [Foster carer] showed you the emails between her and your Dad, whereby your Dad has said that you had said something during a call, you said, "I did not say that". [Foster carer] said, I know you didn't mate, I was sat with you. You then said, "But I would lie for my Dad".

Later, you were discussing School. You said, "I am scared they will turn up and get in to trouble". This is exactly what we had thought, you were feeling, although you have not shared this until now. It must be a really difficult feeling for you, however we can support you to attend school.

You then said, "Can I show you [something], but you're not going to like it?" You went and got a phone you have been hiding and been communicating with your Dad on. You said he has topped it up for you…” (emphasis supplied).

I accept that was written based on a telephone call between SW2 and the foster carer.

The father’s response to this allegation [C90/35 and C121/145] is that this was not true. The phone in question has not been produced and therefore he has been denied the means to interrogate whether it was topped up by him or not. The father suggested that he had never been asked about it in an email at the time. He did not believe the foster carer was telling the truth.

In my judgment, whilst the case note is written to Z, the information within it was given by the foster carer following a conversation which she had with Z. I recognise that there are degrees of hearsay involved in assessing this information. I have not heard any oral evidence about what was said. The father has not been able to challenge that account. However, the relevant facts are conspicuous leaving little doubt as to misinterpretation. They fall within the context of my overall assessment of the father. I am unclear why the foster carer would have any reason deliberately to falsify the account nor why Z would falsify the account which he provided to her. I find it improbable that any negative feelings she had towards the father or the pressure that was being placed upon the placement would provide a premise for such action. Whilst the opportunity to consider the phone itself would potentially offer important relevant evidence as to whether the father topped up the credit, the allegation must simply be more likely than not to be true. On balance, I find that this is an example of the type of conduct (topping up the hidden phone) which the father would and did engage in (see Dr Craig’s discussion with Z at 17.33/ E137 about the discovery of “the second phone”).

“On 21 June 2024, the father told Z at family time that he would be home “within six weeks”, despite the father’s parenting assessment not having started yet. This provision of inaccurate information caused Z emotional harm by providing him with unrealistic deadlines and expectations, and impacted Z’s relationship with his social worker [C67-C68] [F31]”.

The case note, dated 25 June 2024 was created by a placement staff member at 16.21. It related to supervised contact between Z and his father which took place on 21 June 2024 at 16.00 [F30; chronology at C67]. It includes the following information: -

“[Redacted]

Any concerns noted

You and dad were talking about court dates and your dad stated that it would be six weeks and you would be home, you replied no they said it would be about ten as you have a six-week course to do then it has to go back to court. Your dad told you he has done the six-week course and has started the other so it would be sooner. Your dad told you not to worry about this and re-directed the conversation…”

Father’s response [C93/49] is a denial: “I did not tell Z he would be returning home in 6 weeks. I would not have said this to him. I knew at the time the parenting assessment was going to take longer as it hadn’t even started. It was due to start on 08.07.2024. I told Z it would be 4 to 6 weeks for the Parenting Assessment to be done because Z had said to me that the social worker had told him it would take 2 weeks.”

I do not make any finding on this issue as sought. I think there is room for misinterpretation of what occurred and the note does not suggest a detailed recollection of how the conversation began or what Z had said to the father. It is possible that there was some clumsiness of language used by the father but I do not regard this as a significant feature.

It is alleged that the father has continued to give Z excessive amounts of gifts and cards (both in number and in cost) and has not adhered to working agreements in respect of gift-buying, or requests to provide receipts [C32], which has caused Z emotional distress due to feeling like his father is trying to “buy his love” and/or “buy his affection” [C9; C12]; [E88; E89]. There is also an allied allegation about the father providing an iPhone 16 to him.

In my judgment, a disproportionate amount of time and significance was attached to this issue. TM did not have direct knowledge of the issues in the main. For example, she asserted in good faith that receipts had not been provided on a particular occasion but further checking revealed that they had been provided by the father (although to a different person). I accept that the father and the extended maternal family have a strong interest in sending cards and presents to Z. There is a balance to be struck between cards and gifts providing a positive message to Z as against overburdening him with excessive sentiment (17 cards for Valentine’s Day is an obvious example of such excess) or quantity of gifts. There is also a balance to be struck between the parents so that they are perceived as equal parts of Z’s life. Z does not want to be or feel competed over (see his comments to Dr Craig within the report, dated 8 March 2024 at 25.7 [E95]). Z continues to have a negative impression of the feelings his mother has for him and it is important symbolically to challenge that impression.

Controlling or managing this issue so that is does not cause emotional upset to Z is an aspect of parental responsibility vested in the local authority pursuant to the making of a care order under section 33(3) CA 1989. The current model involves financial limits on presents from the parents and a total limit (£20) for family members. No system will be immune to the risk of manipulation by a parent if that is what is desired but there is scope, in my judgment, for improvement. Given that Z is now [age redacted], it may be helpful for him to be given money to spend or to select some presents for his parents to buy jointly. Equally, it may be that the extended family can simply assist the parents in purchasing a limited number of presents. The sending of a simple card or cards from the wider extended family may be acceptable to Z or may be excessive. Whilst the father is concerned that the current limits are unreasonable, ultimately, the local authority are entitled to establish arrangements because the issue is one which is at risk of causing Z to suffer emotionally given his vulnerability, divided loyalties and expressed wishes and feelings.

Thus, I do not approve the current working agreement, which the father states he did not read before signing. It is not a matter which requires my approval and it is open to argument as to its effectiveness compared to alternatives such as those I have mentioned or others. I suggest Z may have his own views about this. Fundamentally, this arrangement should endeavour not to be a cause for further dispute, vagueness or confusion. It requires a balanced approach and sensitive handling from all sides.

“On two occasions, the father has attended Z’s school to observe Z, and has confirmed to Z he was ‘seeing if [Z] got home ok’ as it ‘sounded like [Z was] not happy with FC’s family.’ [E142-E143]. This has caused Z anxiety about his father ‘showing up’ at his school again in the future [E145]. The allegation derives from comments made by Z.”

The source of this information is a discussion between Dr Craig and Z [E142/18.27 – 18.29]: -

“18.27.

I wondered with him if he felt that other people were causing him to be concerned about his father or influencing him with their views. However, he told me that he had himself seen what he thought was his dad’s car at his school on two occasions. When he spoke to his dad, his dad had acknowledged that he had done this, ‘he said oh yes I was just seeing if you got home ok…he said, I went to court that day and it sounded like you were not happy with FC’s family.’

18.28.

His dad had also said he was making sure that FC had picked him up, his dad pointing out that FC had only come at 3.30 when it should have been 3.15. However, Z explained that this was usual as FC had to pick up someone else first.

18.29.

This had made him feel quite nervous and he thought it was strange, “it was a bit weird he was there.” He told me that it was because of this that he had stopped

wanting to talk to his dad. When asked about what the nervousness was about, he explained that he was worried that his dad would get out of the car and try and talk to him and that this would be an “awkward moment.” He did not think that his dad might try and take him away or get him into the car.”

The allegation is not tied to any specific date although the father suggested he had given an explanation of his whereabouts on a specific date (14 November) to the then allocated social worker, SW2. The information was conveyed during the psychological assessment and there is no expansion or clarity around it. The significance, in my judgment, lies in the sense that Z feels that his father is apt to invade his safe space to his emotional detriment.

On 14 November 2023 [C7], Z said his paternal cousin had turned up at school, encouraging Z to see his father which caused Z to feel threatened and scared. Z believed that his father had made his cousin do this, which he found upsetting.

On balance, noting the limitations of the evidence and the fact this is a hearsay account, which has not been tested, I find it is likely that the father said the words attributed to him or at least similar to them to Z. I can find no good reason to doubt why Z would offer to Dr Craig such a clear account of what his father had said to him. There is no basis to suggest Z would invent that comment. The father’s comment served to confirm Z’s suspicions that the car he had seen belonged to his father. That realisation impacted his sense of security.

It is alleged that on 12 November 2024, the father approached Z in a shop in [redacted], close to Z’s placement and suggested that Z’s behaviour in refusing to attend family time had caused the father to fail his parenting assessment [C69] [F27]. This conduct from the father led to Z becoming distressed and refusing to leave his placement.

The case note relating to this incident was created by SW2 on 13 November 2024 at 10.37 [F26 - 27]. It appears to be based on an email received from a member of the placement staff, “PS”, who accompanied Z during a visit to the shop in question: -

“Z, today we popped to the local [shop] round the corner from CH as you wanted some ingredients for baking, when inside, your dad approached you and began chatting to you. This appeared to make you jump and you moved to stand behind PS. You went very quiet and kept your head down. Dad was asking you if you had been attending school and you shook your head. He then went on to explain the parenting assessment situation and said ‘I want you to know I didn't fail because of me, I failed because of you, because you won't attend family time, so SW2 (your social worker) won't pass me. You're coming to the next one, aren't you?’ You looked at PS, dropped your head again and nodded, still stood behind PS.

…

Your Dad then said that you need to make sure you speak to CA (your previous advocate) as he is attending court in 2 weeks' time. Z, you looked at PS again appearing to be unsure on how to respond so PS said that it was time to get going.

You said bye to your dad and watched whilst he purchased his item before heading to the till with ours. Whilst PS was paying for the shopping, you consistently watched the door of the shop. PS asked if you were ok, and you shrugged your shoulders. As we walked out the shop, you stated to PS that you thought you had seen him sat in his car when we pulled in but convinced yourself that it was your mind playing tricks on you as there was ‘no reason’ for him to be there.

You went on to explain that you think he may work in [redacted] but still do not understand, as you said Acid Reflux runs in the family, so your dad never drinks fizzy drinks, but was purchasing a large bottle of Cherry Coke. You asked PS to wait for your dad to leave [shop] before leaving, to make sure that he doesn't follow.

Driving back to CH, we were a few cars behind your dad and you stated that he must know where you live but you don't know how, because you have never told him and wouldn't want him to know.

You said to PS "I do love him, because he's my dad, but I am just confused and in shock." PS explained to you that this is a completely normal way to feel, and that we all know you love him.

PS explained to you that it is important for you to remember, that whether you attend family time or not, is entirely up to you. PS said that it is your decision to make, not anybody else's, and that you will not be in trouble, if you decide not to go. You appeared reassured by this and thanked PS.

You asked PS if it was possible that we leave for school 5 minutes later in the morning and staff pick you up 5 minutes early at the end of the day due to feeling concerned that your cousins and Auntie would now begin showing up and you didn't want to see them. PS explained that we can leave early in the morning, however you will be attending football club anyway so you would be in before the day starts. This appeared to reassure you.

We then arrived home, and you watched the road whilst PS unlocked the front door. We went inside and you asked PS to go and tell M (manager of the home) what had happened and to contact SW2. PS reassured you that this was the plan anyway. You then sat on the sofa and waited. M then came out of the office, and you explained what happened to M and how it made you feel, the same way that you explained to PS.

Staff reassured you that you are safe at CH, and that you can talk to us about anything on your mind.

You chatted with staff [redacted] about how this made you feel, and you stated that you sometimes feel as though you want to live with your dad but then your dad "does things like this" and stated that you didn't like it. You stated that you feel as though your dad has many personalities, but you prefer his playful one and not the serious one that you encountered today. You then went onto express your concerns around school again and stated that it was this time last year where your ‘favourite’ cousin [had] shown up at the school. Staff member asked whether this was the reason you had not been going to school as you knew it was around this time last year, you said ‘maybe.’

You then told [staff member] about your dad buying a gecko, you stated that you feel he had only done this to persuade you to come and live with him. You stated that dad had told you that in 2 weeks you will be going to court and then be going to live with him again. Staff member explained that she was not aware of any other further court proceedings and that you will not be going to live with dad in two weeks. You told staff members that dad had told you to "get CA". Staff member explained that your dad is aware CA has left his role to go to another post, however, staff member said that if you would like another advocate, not for court but for you to talk about your feelings this can be arranged. Z, you stated that you didn't want one.

Whilst you were speaking to staff member and M, they tried to encourage you to talk more about why you don't want to see dad, staff member explained that she is aware how much your dad means to you so when you seen him in the shop why didn't you run up to him and give him a hug, staff member said that this is what we are finding confusing. You stated that you weren't sure and again mentioned his different personalities and today he was serious. Staff again assured you that they would support you going in and out of school and will collect you from reception if this would be better for you as you had a positive chat today with school staff did not want you to feel put off by the idea of returning to school due to seeing your dad today. You appeared to be more relaxed that staff would collect you from reception.

The conversation was left there, and it was decided that you would go to the Christmas markets at [redacted] for a hot chocolate after tea, however stated that you would only go as long as your house peers attend with you, as if you bump into Dad again, he is less likely to come over when you are with another house peer.

When returning home, you became frustrated at bedtime and explained to staff that you won't be going into school tomorrow as you are "uncomfortable" about the thought of your dad and cousins waiting there for you. Staff reassured you that we could take you into reception so that you will know that you are safe however you explained that even seeing them, would "annoy and upset you". You began shouting and making comments to staff about their appearance due to feeling frustrated about not having your tv, so staff gave you some space to calm down” (emphasis supplied).

Z refused to go to school on 13 November 2024. On 14 November 2024, CH reported that Z appeared to be visibly terrified [C45].

By 12 December 2024, the father had completed his application for contact to Z.

In his discussion with Dr Craig, the following is noted [18.35 – 18.36/ E144]: -

“18.35.

When we later spoke what it was like seeing his dad in a local shop, he told me that some of the things his dad had said to him there his dad would not have been able to say in supervised family time, “he said I should talk to [independent advocate] and [that] CA was going to court in a couple of weeks.” Z told me it felt like his dad was trying to get him to tell CA to ‘rethink things’ or to get him to ‘restart things’ to do with his dad having failed a parenting test, “they said he was not fit…he got annoyed.” [I later heard from placement staff that Z had been directly blamed by his dad for failing the parenting assessment. I am unable to confirm this.]

18.36.

His account was of an uncomfortable conversation with his dad, but he contrasted this difficult interaction with some of the conversations that they had had whilst talking on Xbox, which had been quite good. However, he described these changing over time, his dad was telling him he missed him and then began asking him to go back and live with him. This again felt like pressure.”

At paragraph 17.22 [E136], Dr Craig says this: -

“He has talked about finding the experience of bumping into his dad in a local shop difficult and described feeling like his dad had blamed him for failing his parenting assessment because Z was refusing to see him. Z talked about there being ‘two different types of dad’, seeing an ‘angry’ dad that time which he did not like.”

The father [C102/74; see also C107/ 91-92] describes this as a chance meeting: -

“In relation to the 12.11.2024 and me bumping into Z at [the shop] – this was in the afternoon when Z should have been at school. I was at [the shop] to get a drink. I had been to [redacted] with my brother and my sister. Z wasn’t hiding behind the placement staff. Me and Z did have a chat and I showed him some photos on my phone. We talked about why he wasn’t in school and the placement staff member said this was a work in progress. Z asked why I had left [him] at the Unit and said I hadn’t. I think I said the professionals had told me that he wanted to stay in his placement. After this allegation I did go in and speak to the store manager at Tesco the next day and asked to see the CCTV to see if this showed that Z was hiding behind the placement staff member. The manager did go and look at the CCTV and said that she couldn't see Z hiding behind the female member of staff. I was informed I would need to request the information as part of a Subject Access Request, which I did. Tesco confirmed they needed permission from the social worker, which she would not give” (emphasis supplied).

During his oral evidence, the father asserted that the comments made by PS were not true. The father was asked why he attended that particular shop having been to [redacted] when his home is in [redacted] in the opposite direction. The father did not give any explanation of his whereabouts within his written evidence but described in his oral evidence going with his brother to drop off a set of keys for a vehicle at “[redacted] way” – he appeared to have little or no comprehension of his destination. He was hopelessly vague about the destination, suggesting it was about “8 miles” but claiming not to know the area. His written statement states that he went to [redacted], which serves a variety of refreshments, with 2 family members, his brother and sister. I find his suggestion that he was at this particular shop simply to buy a drink as implausible.

He denies [C127/159] mentioning his parenting assessment or blaming Z for the outcome of it: -

“…I didn’t think that Z looked physically scared and was placing himself behind a member of staff or that he was draining in complexion. In relation to when Z returned home, he felt like he was being blamed for the outcome of the Parenting Assessment - I didn't mention my Parenting Assessment to him. I would never blame Z for failing my Parenting Assessment. Z had in fact been speaking to me for quite a while before the staff member came over and I introduced myself as Z's father. I was showing Z photos on my phone. The therapist, [redacted], also told me that if I ever bumped into Z, I should not ignore him.”

When the Guardian spoke to Z in her April 2025 analysis, he said this: -

“27.

Z is reported to have bumped into his dad in a shop on 12/11/2024. Z reported to his solicitor and I that this felt “off” as he thought that his dad may have been following them. Z reported that his dad said things that he probably would not have got away with if he had been in a supervised contact centre. When I asked Z about this, he listed many appropriate aspects of the conversation and then told me that his dad shouted across Tesco “make sure you speak to CA (advocate) because we’re going to Court in two weeks”. Z recalls people looking around at him in Tesco. Z told us that this has left him feeling worried and unsettled. Z finds it “weird” and “unpredictable” that his dad would be there.”

In my judgment, the key issue is one of pressure. The father’s behaviour is conditioned by his desire to have a relationship with his son and in doing so he places pressure on Z to respond accordingly. If I assume for the purposes of argument that this was a chance encounter, one might ask whether it was a good idea for the father to stop close to Z’s home? If I assume further for the purposes of argument that it was reasonable to stop close to Z’s home, then for the father not to confine his comments to a brief greeting and some form of positive comment before seeking to leave raises a question about the quality of his behaviour. In the context known to the father, he should have done precisely that. It is inconceivable to me how he thought it appropriate to engage in conversation as alleged. If true it would be a grossly inappropriate set of behaviours, demonstrating a profound lack of insight into the likely impact of that behaviour upon Z. It would demonstrate a broader picture of a parent desperate to have a relationship with their son but incapable or unwilling to take responsibility for the impact of their actions. It would amply justify Z’s views that his father was unpredictable. In this case, the father would need to take full responsibility for his own failings and for the impact of that upon his son and to demonstrate the ability to act appropriately. In my judgment, this incident did impact Z and his attendance at school. It has been a significant component, at the very least, of a period of decline for Z.

In my judgment, the allegation is likely to be true. I have considered the weight to be attached to the case note derived from the email sent by “PS” in the context of the other evidence, including my assessment of the father. I find it incredible to suggest that the account was a fabrication. There is no reason for the quoted remarks to be anything other than a reasonable attempt to convey what the father had said to Z. His behaviour is consistent with the history and my overall assessment of him as a witness. Z described him as serious and angry. This conduct reveals the risk he poses to the ability of his son to address his desperate need for therapy in the hope of accessing the community and education.

In fairness to the father, by the time of final submissions, he was able take advice and agree to the orders being made. However, even to that extent, his failure to recognise the importance of the arrangements being in place until Z’s 16^th birthday reveals a truth about the father’s behaviour. He continues to seek to avoid or to minimise any restrictions placed upon him because, at heart, he believes Z should see him, probably live with him and that his responsibility for this state of affairs is far more limited than he is willing to accept. Until he can accept the true measure of his part in the pitiful state Z finds himself, his judgement and his actions will remain a potential source of risk for Z.

The Court has been assisted by the opinion evidence of Dr Jaime Craig, Chartered Consultant Clinical Psychologist [E65, E20, E34, E45] particularly in the form of his reports, dated 10 June 2025 [E108] and an addendum, dated 3 July 2025 [E153].

He has not attended for cross-examination because his evidence is not challenged. Recital 5 to the Order made on 12 August 2025 provides that [B246]: “Dr Craig’s evidence is not challenged by any party and is therefore accepted by the parties. No party applies for Dr Craig to be called to give oral evidence.”

Accordingly, I intend to highlight a number of the relevant passages within his final reports, which inform my assessment of the issues in the case: -

“4.4.

I am concerned that Z’s life is significantly restricted by his anxieties and at present there is little prospect of this changing unless the conditions around him triggering such anxieties can be changed.

4.5.

He demonstrates clear very anxiety and obsessional compulsive symptoms for which treatment – possibly a combination of psychological and medical (medication) is indicated. He experiences physical symptoms of anxiety, tending to internalise, especially stomach and bowel symptoms (reflux/cramps/urgency/pain).

4.6.

He has developed very avoidant ways of managing these anxieties, which will have exacerbated them and developed his own obsessional rules and hypervigilant behaviours to try and avoid anxiety which bring short term relief but perpetuate the anxiety symptoms and the belief that there are things to fear.

4.7.

These then feed into an additional anxiety – of having a toileting accident – which he manages by further checking – e.g., sitting for longer on the toilet to ensure he feels ‘empty’, being anxious if he does not get this reassurance. He also has a wariness of using public / school toilets, due to some uncomfortable experiences and evident suspicion – but also the pressure of being rushed/embarrassed by others being aware. All this reinforces an anxious ‘need’ not to leave or be far from his placement.

4.8.

In a similar way, he has developed an anxiety of going out in public which is in part related to trying to avoid stomach / bowel symptoms but also avoiding anxiety inducing situations with somewhat paranoid anxious thoughts about being watched and/or abducted. He also shared checking behaviour with a slightly paranoid tone if he needs to use a public toilet, checking for cameras.

4.9.

He described unpleasant intrusive thoughts about people watching or kidnapping or even trying to kill him, generally at nighttime, which are reduced by his checking behaviours. He described a dislike of being in open spaces with lots of people, particularly if they are less familiar.

4.10.

Z’s anxieties have gained more of a foothold and become more paranoid in tone over time and have developed an obsessive-compulsive pattern. He has engaged in checking of windows / doors and hypervigilance around his placement and asked for adults in placement to check also. Some of this appeared a concern for their welfare as well as his own – but [he] is very wary about sharing any ideas about the source of threat.”

As to the role of the father, he said this: -

“4.14.

It is important to remember, that this is a young person who we know has been given an idea that one of his primary carers was ‘dangerous or unworthy’ by the other and it seems likely has been around adult conversations in which there is the potential for him to hear fearful ideas about adults who should be a source of security and safety.

4.15.

In parallel to this he has several times and to several people referenced an anxiety about the pressure of coming into contact with his father in the community and although reticent demonstrates this anxiety and avoidance in his actions and choices (e.g., in relation to accepting offers of family time).

4.16.

There remains in my view a clear pattern of his anxiety symptoms being increased by ideas (however triggered) of the paternal family being near or attempting to contact him. Indeed, even when he has reported enjoying these interactions and sought them out, his anxieties seem to grow in response to perceived increasing demand/pressure.

4.17.

Specifically, he told me about being put under uncomfortable direct pressure to return to his dad’s care and to plead his father’s case via his advocate. Z is evidently inclined to suspicion about his father’s actions – in both of assessments of him my impression is that he bases this on what he sees. I have never come to the view that someone like a social worker has caused him to mistrust his father which appears to be the father’s fear.

4.18.

Whilst Z struggles to articulate what he fears would happen if he did come into contact with his father and was bullish about not fearing him physically – I did not doubt that this was a genuine source of anxiety for him. We need to listen not just to what Z says but what he does.

4.19.

When I explored this with him directly Z explains his anxiety in relation to his father in terms of what he felt was his father’s unpredictability, not knowing how his father will act if he sees him and being unnerved by his father being in places he does not expect.

4.20.

Despite remaining very loyal and keen to avoid any overt criticism of his father, being very concerned about his father’s feelings - he acknowledged to me as he did in my previous assessment that he does not trust his father.

As to the future management of contact, he says this: -

As to what can be done to promote such contact alongside therapeutic input: -

“5.17.

Opinion – At the present time any direct efforts or steps to promote a relationship with either parent are unlikely to be successful or improve his mental health and engagement in his day-to-day age-appropriate functioning including education. There are however things that reduce the likelihood of this ever improving which include active or inadvertent exposure to real or perceived pressure or surveillance/intrusion from family members.

5.18.

The therapeutic work should in time assist him with an understanding of his life and relationships underpinned by the factual matrix determined by the court. There may be fears about family members that are unfounded that can be addressed; however, it would be harmful to attempt to persuade a child that they can/should trust someone, or was in error mistrusting someone if they continue to act in way that feels untrustworthy towards them.

5.19.

The clinician will need to be able to assist Z with challenging any unrealistic anxious ideas about his family as they emerge in the work especially if they feed into persecutory ideas but also validate fears that are based in reality and his experiences, particularly those about coming into contact with them in the community. Importantly to be effective such reassurance needs to be plausible. If Z thinks them unlikely, they will not help him.

5.20.

It will also not assist him if he is exposed to contradictory accounts and encouragement to distrust those responsible for his care. He must be protected from anything that causes him to mistrust those who are caring for him or his trust in social care professionals responsible for his wellbeing – that is harmful.

5.21.

Z remains very resistant to changing the beliefs he has absorbed about his mother and her care of him, although it was interesting that some of the certainty about how he views her appears to be loosened as he experiences her not attempting to intrude/push him at the same time as he perceives more of this from his father.

5.22.

The timing of this will need to be informed by the response to therapeutic work and will need to be paced in such a way that this does not derail the pressing need to improve his mental health functioning and engage in everyday life. As such I do not recommend that this work goes in advance of efforts to equip Z with the tools to overcome anxieties, resist checking and reengage with life in school and with friends etc. He needs some ‘wins’ in overcoming his anxieties.”

He does not recommend that contact should be the focus of therapy: -

“6.18.

Opinion – At the present time I would not recommend a focus on contact as a means to build a relationship with family members but suggest that this remains something that Z knows will be supported and facilitated if he requests it and only then.

6.19.

I need to reinforce here that the focus must in my view stay on a plan that repairs Z’s mental health functioning not on repairing relationships with family members he does not trust. I am worried that in persisting with a focus on restoring family time we are ignoring serious mental health deterioration for this young man and I am concerned that shifting the focus to repairing trust in his relationships will unhelpfully divert efforts away from his recovery and maintain a pressure on him to meet the needs of others which makes his recovery very unlikely.”

As to Z’s general therapeutic needs: -

“6.2.

Opinion – Z urgently requires skilled assistance in understanding and overcoming his anxiety and OCD symptoms from someone who is experienced in the modality of therapy with the best evidence base for these difficulties which is cognitive behavioural therapy (which needs to include exposure and response prevention) but who is also able to work with wider system around him in education and placement to ensure a co-ordinated plan (not just someone to work as an individual therapist).

…

6.5.

For these reasons, I would recommend that an experienced clinical psychologist is commissioned directly to work with Z and consult to / advise the system around him. This work is well within the skillset of a clinical psychologist who would also be able to work in collaboration with those in physical health in the continence service.

6.6.

It is extremely disappointing and hard to understand the position of the CAMHS service in refusing a service. The professionals, skills and expertise he requires to assist him sit within CAMHS provision. It may also be necessary to consider medication to assist with anxiety symptoms if psychological treatments are unsuccessful alone (usually SSRI – see NICE guidelines) and of course this expertise would be with the medical professionals in a CAMHS service, not a clinical psychologist or therapist and it is unlikely that a GP would take on such prescribing for a child.

6.7.

In her report CG (28.04.25) notes that the GP and CAMHS have declined to intervene ‘unless Z’s unresolved childhood trauma is addressed’. It is difficult to understand such a response from child mental health specialists. Any work with him on his anxieties and compulsions would necessarily explore the background to his anxious thoughts from his earlier experiences, so I think it unlikely that CAMHS are refusing involvement on that basis.

6.8.

It may be that the references to them refusing to do so until the trauma he has experienced is resolved relates to the ongoing challenge he experiences due to the actions of those around him potentially activating trauma – in particular the hypervigilance to coming into contact with his father in the community, allegedly fearing being followed by him or put under pressure by him.

6.9.

It would be unsafe to work therapeutically with Z on such a worry if it was not possible to reassure him that these things would not happen again in an unpredictable or unplanned way. This may ask too much of him and the therapy – this is why those making decisions about Z need to take steps to provide him with this concrete reassurance. However best practice is that even when as in this case, there are persisting psychosocial risk factors such as family discord interventions for these aspects should be considered but the young person will still require evidence‑based treatments for their OCD symptoms.

6.10.

Importantly Z is unlikely to engage meaningfully in a therapeutic relationship if he fears the content will be shared with his parents without his agreement.

6.11.

He is unlikely to engage in a therapeutic relationship with the aim of restoring his relationship with his parents, which he does not seek at this time. As it would be unethical to not be transparent about this being a therapeutic goal, it cannot be one without Z agreeing to it.”

As to Z’s educational needs, he says this: -

“6.13.

Opinion – I am very concerned that the context for this child does not yet support him to meet his academic potential and limits his social potential. This has a very serious impact on his life chances and requires action.

6.14.

Overcoming his reluctance to attend school is central part of the above therapeutic plan given the longstanding problems with school attendance in relation to his anxiety symptoms. He requires this plan to be co-ordinated with his placement and school.

6.15.

Importantly I heard about a difference of opinion between them about how much Z should be ‘given in to’ or ‘pushed’ to persist with facing anxieties – graded exposure. They need help to be on the same page in their therapeutic plan and that requires a robust and experienced clinician holding the reins and advising the system. Overcoming longstanding anxiety-based school reluctance requires careful balancing of encouragement to persist with a sense of agency and control for the young person. They need to be actively involved in agreeing the plan, once the rationale is clear to them and confident that the amount of ‘push’ will be as agreed and they won’t be ambushed by changes in expectations from the agreed

step wise plan.

6.16.

Many of the things placement and school have tried to implement have the right elements, but they are not yet co-ordinated and as there is no evidence-based therapeutic input for Z to help him overcome anxious thoughts and manage his physical symptoms.”

As to Z’s primary need, he says this: -

“7.1.

Opinion – What is very clear is that the optimism which meant that a foster placement was appropriate is no longer evident. Indeed, Z’s improved presentation was a feature of his foster placement until this was destabilised through mistrust. I am aware that there are competing explanations about who was responsible for it, but the key feature was a breakdown in the security and trust he felt in that placement. What is sad is that Z is now reluctant to acknowledge and retain what was objectively positive from this care experience.

7.2.

In the breakdown period and since that time there has been a very clear deterioration in his emotional, social and psychological presentation. It is disappointing that subsequent rebuilding of trust and security in his current placement has again been threatened from Z’s account by external forces.

7.3.

Z needs a placement in which he can be confident he is safe and will be protected from such pressures. In my opinion [were] it not for these external pressures and the impact that they have on the sustainability of a foster care placement, Z would not require a residential children’s home placement due to his own needs. He is not particularly challenging. Inevitably a residential home placement means he is placed alongside older teenagers with their own vulnerabilities and risks.

7.4.

To restate my opinion, his primary need is for security in his placement and for all the adults around him to be able to work in open collaboration – anything else merely feeds his mistrust. I am unable to comment on if either parent can play a positive role in this but that will need to be determined in any ongoing care plan.”

Dr Craig recommends [6.20] “the commissioning of a clinical psychologist immediately to work on his mental health functioning to assist him in re-engaging with his education and social life with peers, but all other areas being secondary to this and led by a review of his response to treatment. It is not possible to set a timescale for the other areas they will flow from the work on Z’s anxieties. Ultimately it may not be possible even in the medium to longer term to address these. This caution, with which I agree, that therapy is not always successful and may not restore relationships was acknowledged some time ago in the judgement (G96).”

Within his addendum assessment, he observed [5.1] that “the ideal situation would be that the CAMHS service would accept that they have a clear role as the multi-disciplinary team approach allows for a bringing together of skills and resources including psychological interventions and, when indicated, medication”.

However, he notes [5.2] that “any clinical psychologist working with Z would be able to liaise with local CAMHS services and the child’s GP to make a recommendation that medication may be required as part of an intervention plan. They would typically make such a recommendation following the opportunity to gauge engagement with and response to psychological treatment. Of course, I remain confused about the rationale for CAMHS refusing to offer a service, they will no doubt have pressures on the capacity of the service which restricts their offer locally so it may be that the treating clinical psychologist may face a similar response.”

In response to questions by the father, he opined that: -

Z spoke to Dr Craig about his anxiety in relation to his father [E145]: -

“18.41.

When we later discussed some of the anxious thoughts linked to his checking behaviour, which included fears of being abducted, he was clear that he did not think this would be his dad doing this and deflected this with his demeanour changing noting in quite a cocky manner, “oh no I’d batter my dad!” However, he acknowledged that he has specifically avoided situations where he might encounter his dad, in particular the local shop because of a fear of bumping into him. He told me that this would cause him to feel ‘shocked’ or ‘awkward’.

18.42.

He described this anxious feeling about his dad as feeling, “scared of the unknown…I can’t predict what he’ll do.” He described his dad as ‘unpredictable’ and told me that whilst he finds most people predictable, his dad having shown up at school and in a local shop had made him worry that he would keep on showing up, even though he is aware that he has not done this since.

18.43.

He also noted that he experiences acid reflux whenever he gets news about his family.”

At E141, Z explained to Dr Craig that “things were going well socially for him in the autumn term of 2024 until he became really nervous and withdrawn, explaining, ‘my dad kept popping up in places like school and stuff’” [18.17]. He described worrying that if he was walking in the community he might bump into his father but noted that he had gained some reassurance from the restrictions which had been put in place; “‘the court made a barrier thing… He cannot go in a certain perimeter’” [18.18]. Dr Craig observes that the exclusion zone was a “concrete reassurance” that there would not be unplanned contact with his father and thereby helpful to Z in overcoming his avoidance in order to make progress in his mental health functioning [E159/ 11.2].

As to his relationship with his father, the Local Authority rely upon what was said by Dr Craig in March 2024 [26.13/E97]: -

“26.13.

He thought it would be a matter of time and developing trust for him to want to speak to his dad and described waiting for him to mature and his Dad needing to realise that he cannot control his life. Sometimes the messages he gets in cards make him feel like he is under pressure which does not help. In video calls with his father, he had sometimes felt like his dad had the feeling he was going to come back and live with him, “I didn’t want to give him that false hope.” It was this uncomfortable feeling that led him to stop video calls with his Dad. The last one being in July 2023.”

This should convey to the father that he and the paternal family must meet Z on his terms. He is a vulnerable young person who has felt manipulated over much of his life. His views should be respected.

I intend to highlight a number of relevant paragraphs from this analysis.

At this time, she had been told that Z’s school attendance was 28.7% in that he had attended school on 77 out of 268 days. Following the October 2024 half-term, Z attended for 4 (half) days over a period of 5 weeks. He attended 3 days up until 16 December 2024 and had not attended since that time when he had spoken to a receptionist but not engaged in the curriculum.

Z told her that he was “worried about leaving his placement and he [had] only left the placement on a limited number of occasions since October 2024” [paragraph 29].

CG notes the clear need for Z to obtain support to allow him the opportunity to live a full life but he has encountered an inability to identify such support even via the GP or CAMHS. At that stage, Z said that he missed his friends and he liked school. He said that he wanted support to help him leave the house so that he can get back to school [paragraph 41]. CG was troubled by Z’s presentation. Her primary concern was his mental health and education, which threatened his short and long-term welfare [paragraph 68]. In simple terms, Z could not leave his placement due to the anxiety he was suffering. He described being in a lot of pain and his stomach hurting him when he leaves the house. This was impacting his social interactions, well-being and education. He struggled to tolerate challenging or uncomfortable feelings and situations. It was her view that support was urgently required to develop a therapeutic plan for him [paragraph 70].

It is disappointing to say the least to observe that he has not benefited from any co-ordinated approach to managing the issues. CG noted in April 2025 that there were “competing and debating views about the best strategies to manage Z’s behaviour … They desperately seek a treatment plan to help support Z to access the wider environment and engage with his education. This must be the priority for Z, he cannot continue as he is without significant detriment to short and long-term welfare” [paragraph 72].

In my judgment, delay in trying to secure the services of CAMHS, has merely compounded the harm to Z of being dislocated from any reasonable opportunity to engage in life.

The failure of CAMHS to act originally and to do so promptly since August 2025 raises questions about the functioning of a service whose aim is to help young people in need of such help.

She described Z’s wishes and feelings around spending time with his father as follows: -

“54.

Z advised his understanding is that he can see his father if he wants to, but at the moment he doesn’t want to, so he doesn’t have to. Z was clear that he might not always feel this way. Z told us that he loves his dad. When we tried to explore why Z doesn’t want to see his father, he told us about bumping into his dad at the shop (see above). Z wanted to clarify that he is not scared of his dad, but his dad is unpredictable, and he worries what he will do. When I asked Z what sort of things he was worried about, he replied that he didn’t know, but that was the point. Z then spoke about how he was able to predict what a lot of people would do but not his dad.

55.

Z asked whether he could be forced to see his dad. I confirmed that nobody could physically force Z.

56.

I spoke to Z about relationships with his family, these being important and that we would want these opportunities for him. Z confirmed that he knew when he leaves his placement, aged 18 he will have no-one, but was very matter of fact, stating, but that’s just the way it is. I challenged Z sensitively that it didn’t have to be that way and Z shrugged.

57.

In recapping with Z his wishes and feelings on this point, Z confirmed that the Judge could Order for him to see his dad, but he wouldn’t be going.”

At paragraph 38, she recalls the father telling her that if Z said he did not want to see him then whilst he would not be happy, he would walk away and not make any further application to the court. The reality is that despite there being clear evidence throughout 2025 of Z’s wishes and feelings, it is only in the midst of the final hearing that he accepted the appropriateness of withdrawing his application. That fact, in my judgment, in itself reveals a significant lack of insight and understanding on the part of the father.

CG records Z’s views about the making of an injunction order to provide an exclusion zone at paragraph 10 [E101]: -

“10.

In relation to the application made by the Local Authority for an injunction, Z said he thinks people higher up should decide this, but it might make him feel a bit better, but he is worried that his dad might need to work around the area where he lives. Z then said he would definitely want it around his school and where he lives, but he thinks the Judge should decide about this. Z said that if the Court decides to make an injunction and then his dad does it (be in seen in the excluded area), he will know for certain as to whether he is following him or not.”

By the time of her final analysis, there had been little change in Z’s ability to leave his placement on a consistent basis. He had continued to express a reluctance to spend time with any of his family. The placement staff had noticed that Z had become more argumentative and highly controlling. They were worried about him holding misogynistic views. Z’s wishes and feelings remained essentially unchanged.

When the Guardian spoke to Z after the hearing in May 2025, she recorded his response as follows [paragraph 20]: -

“Z was updated in respect of the decisions made by the Court. Z was told that everybody had agreed to him being assessed by Dr Craig which Z accepted and was pleased about. Z was also told about the exclusion zone. Z initially told us that he felt bad for his dad. We tried to reassure Z that his dad had agreed with this, because he had listened to how Z felt about being unsettled following their bumping in together at the shop. Z commented, ‘we both know we didn’t bump into one another’.”

CG records Z’s views as follows: -

“24.

Z is frustrated following the assessment with Dr Craig as he was hoping that there would be something in place that would be helping him by now. Z is aware that the GP had referred him to CAMHS, but he feels that they will not pick this up, because they haven’t done before. Z feels frustrated that the placement has arranged a holiday which he feels he cannot go on, because he continues to feel pain in his tummy at the thought of leaving the house.

25.

Z told me that school is terrible and that he has not been going.

26.

Z feels that the exclusion zone helps him a bit and would like this to continue.

27.

Z feels that a 91(14) Order should be made because he does not want to have to deal with any more Court proceedings. Z feels reassured, that his parents could still make an application, but would need permission by the Judge for it to be made.

28.

Z tells me sadly, that he will never spend time with his mum. I know it will be upsetting for his mum to read this as he referred to knowing that one of his parents (his mum) hates him and has given up on him. I have tried to reassure Z in as sensitive way as possible, that I don’t believe his mum hates him or has given up on him, but she is trying to respect his wishes and feelings.

29.

Z tells me that he does not currently want to see his dad. Z then said, he feels unsure. Z shared that when he has seen his dad in the past his tummy pain gets worse, and it’s been such a long time. Z isn’t ready but knows he can speak to his social worker or placement if he felt that he would want to see his dad. Z said when he did feel ready, a starting point could be on his Xbox.”

CG visited Z on 4 November 2025. He is described as showing “a level of maturity and understanding relating to his current circumstances which was commendable and impressive” [paragraph 4]. In a passage, which is painful to read, he is reported to have asked for help in these terms: -

“Z’s main focus however was upon CAMHS and the lack of progress. Z’s main question for the Judge was “can you ask the Judge to do something about CAMHS.” Z went on to say that “I need to see someone, because this is getting worser…I just need something, because I'm not doing the best.”

He had been assessed on 23 September 2025 by a practitioner from CAMHS and Z informed CG that “she was really kind and they said that they would sign me up for CBT and this would help with anxiety, stomach pains and going out. She said she was going to have a meeting to see if they could move me up the list, and if they did not, I would be waiting for a year and half. She said medication was not a good idea at this stage because it is addictive.”

Z told CG that he has had a panic attack “most days” during September and October 2025. He describes them as follows [paragraph 6]: -

“They were just happening randomly. I feel like I am leaving my body before it happens. Then CAMHS suggested grounding. When it happens I hate being in big rooms, I feel really vulnerable, I feel better in a closed space and wrapping a blanket around me. A lot of the time I am having the panic attacks in the bathroom and it makes my stomach really bad.”

The assessment of the impact of delay in CAMHS offering any therapeutic input or the local authority seeking to identify a co-ordinated therapeutic package must be seen in the lights of these observations. One can only agree with the observations of CG in paragraph 11: -

“The Guardian is extremely concerned that Z is in a placement where his anxiety is preventing him from leaving, and as such his anxiety levels and therapeutic needs as identified by Dr Craig, remain unmet. A coherent and cognisant therapeutic plan is key to unlocking the feelings that Z is currently experiencing and the Guardian cannot express enough the urgency that needs to be impressed upon the Local Authority, as corporate parent for Z, to address his therapeutic needs without further delay. Z cannot wait for CAMHS to address this issue.”

The reality, as I shall explain, is that there is no therapeutic plan available for the court to consider. There is no clarity around the timescales for CAMHS providing therapeutic support although it could be up to 15 months until an appointment is offered. There is no identification of a psychological service to provide appropriate support for Z. There is the prospect of a search for such a service taking place immediately and being progressed if an offer is not made by CAHMS within 6 weeks, although it is not known whether any such service could start work within that timescale. The only comfort I can draw from the pitiful picture is that by publishing this judgment and referring it to the Director of Children and Families that there will be oversight within the local authority of the implementation of this plan and an opportunity for the Director to raise the problems I have identified with CAMHS. The public will be left to ask the question whether this is a tolerable outcome for society?

Z was open to the local authority providing general updates to his parents on a monthly basis. The guardian maintained her view that a restriction to the father’s parental responsibility was necessary so that decisions can be made appropriately and without delay by the local authority. Z’s welfare, in her view, cannot be prejudiced due to the father’s inability to place Z’s welfare first and foremost in his mind when trying to make decisions for him.

I have quoted extensively from the expert analysis of Dr Craig. The local authority cannot have been in any doubt by June 2025 (and probably earlier) of the urgent need to engage in psychological support to assist Z with his mental health, his ability to access the environment and attend school.

CG emphasised the need to progress the therapeutic plan and avoid further delay for Z even if that required the provision of private therapeutic support in her analysis, dated 1 August 2025 [E168/24].

The order made at the hearing before me on 12 August 2025 directed the local to file a statement by 22 October 2025 detailing the therapeutic plan for Z and the plan for life story work [B245/12]. In terms which bear repeating, the following recital was included in the order [B246/6]: -

“6.

The court is extremely concerned about the welfare of this child and considers that he urgently requires the therapeutic and potentially medical support (medication) identified in Dr Craig’s June 2024 assessment. The court has made a direction for this order to be provided to CAMHS, and CAMHS in turn to provide information to the court, which the court requires to ascertain whether the child is getting or is likely to receive the support he is assessed as requiring and in what timescales.”

The Court directed CAMHS to provide relevant information to the Local Authority by 26 August 2025 [B245/13]. The local authority did not seek an urgent hearing in the event of non-compliance or issue a witness summons as provided in the order.

Late on 3 November 2025, I received an email from Ms Crowell, following the Advocates’ Meeting, inviting me to request CAMHS to attend the final hearing. I had not at that stage been referred to my order or why this request had come so late in the day and I responded later that evening by declining to do so.

The letter provided by CAMHS (JG, Team Manager) is dated 20 August 2025 [F32]. It confirmed that Z had had an initial triage appointment on 8 August 2025 and that his assessment by MHP (Mental Health Practitioner) was scheduled for 16 September 2025. There is no clear information about timescales for medication and therapeutic intervention save an indication that young people with moderate to severe mental health needs are prioritised on waiting lists. This response could not offer any insight into the extent of any delay in the event that CAMHS were willing to offer services to Z. In my judgment, this should have alerted the local authority to the importance of considering the impact upon Z of any further delay.

Z’s assessment ultimately took place on 23 September 2025.

The statement prepared by the allocated social worker, SW1, dated 29 October 2025 [C340] is the response to the direction. This includes a detailed chronology of contact with CAMHS, notably entries on 7 October 2025, 16 October 2025 and 21 October 2025 [C344]. However, CAMHS had still not provided the desired clarity by the time of the filing of the statement.

It was not until 22 October 2025 that SW1 had a telephone discussion with a psychological service recommended by Dr Craig ([redacted]). SW1 received a response to her initial telephone call indicating that there was not “any capacity within the team to take the work on at this time.” There is no clarity within the statement as to what this phrase means. It is not clear whether the barrier is (a) the need to conduct sessions at the children’s home; (b) the need to contribute by way of guidance to those working with Z and provide ongoing life story work; (c) or a delay because of capacity and if so, the extent of that delay. None of these issues are explored by SW1 nor the availability of any other psychologist or psychological service to work separately from or in conjunction with CAMHS.

SW1 notes [paragraph 2.4] that CAMHS are best placed to support Z as “not only do they have the expertise required as Dr Craig states, but they would also be required to be a part of the wider system around Z within education and placement to ensure a co-ordinated plan as Dr Craig recommends. Z requires a local service that he can access with ease and that can be involved in the planning and reintegration back into education. If Z is assessed to benefit from medication, he will require a clinician [who] can oversee potentially an ongoing prescription, alongside the therapeutic intervention which could be achieved by CAMHs. I have reservations regarding a commissioned service being able to maintain this in the long-term if it is required, however, this will continue to be explored as a possibility.”

The problem is that despite the difficulties, nothing was being done to address Z’s therapeutic needs. In this case, the best outcome is standing in the way of any support being provided to Z. The continued delay serves only to imperil Z’s development. It is not neutral and the lack of any contingency plan is a significant failing in the care planning for Z. I accept that the Local Authority have chased CAMHS for progress. However, I detect a largely ‘wait and see’ approach from the Local Authority with insufficient impetus behind the imperative of supporting Z outside of CAMHS if required. The urgency was readily apparent to all parties.

The plan for life story work was absent from the statement. It is relegated to a commitment to seek advice and guidance on the delivery of such work and to retain it as an action point within his care plan [3.1/C348].

SW1 notes that Z is now receiving 2 hours of education each day at home with his tutor in addition to a timetable of online learning with his carers at home. Z has appeared open to the suggestion of moving the tuition to the school building for the afternoon but he suggested that he would like support with his anxiety to enable him to do so. Z has spoken positively about his future and engaging in further education. Z has also had a one night stay over at a caravan during the school holidays with a carer and has gone out on a drive in a car on a few occasions, although he did not feel able to leave the car. In contrast, perhaps, to the information provided by Z to CG, SW1 suggests that Z has reported to her having what he regards as 2 anxiety attacks at home during the last 6 weeks in which he has become very anxious at night and needed his carers to stay with him until he became calm [C348/ 4.1 – 4.1].

On the first day of the final hearing, I received an updated statement from TM, dated 5 November 2025 [S1] and further information from CAMHS received that day [S5; S6].

TM stated that CAMHS had told the local authority in the week prior that the waiting list for therapy for Z is likely to be around 15 months although a subsequent email received at 11.06 on 5 November 2025 suggested that was a conservative estimate and it could be “a few months less” (email at S5). The email raises its own concerns given that Z is described as “her” and his Complex Needs Escalation Support Tool, one of the measures used by CAMHS to establish need (or ration it as I might suggest is equally apt to describe its use) was “currently showing as green (routine care).” I can only comprehend Z’s needs as routine as a relative term within a spectrum of significant need.

The letter from CAMHS, dated 6 November 2025 [S6] provides a fuller picture. MHP observes [S11] that: -

“Z demonstrates very clear signs of anxiety and obsessional compulsive symptoms for which treatment – possibly trauma-based CBT as a starting point is indicated. I reflect that Z has had talking therapies in the past which from description appears to be narrative based. However, on reflection – this has been very difficult for Z to explore when he hasn’t any strategies to rely on to reduce the distress and discomfort that is generated from recalling difficult and traumatic memories.

Z experiences physical symptoms of anxiety, such as stomach and bowel symptoms (reflux/cramps/urgency/pain). As a maladaptive coping strategy – Z has developed obsessional rules and hypervigilant behaviours to try and avoid anxiety which brings short term relief but perpetuates anxiety that has worsened over time and led to a significant loss in functioning. This has impacted on his engagement in education and the wider community.

Of paramount importance, Z requires timely support to improve his mental health and everyday functioning. He requires support to develop a toolkit to combat intrusive and unhelpful thoughts to achieve this. There are contextualised factors to consider alongside this which need to be carefully considered and I would suggest this takes place in a multi professional context working closely with school and placement to ensure a consistent response and approach across all settings to help Z feel safe and contained outside of the home where he is currently significantly isolated.”

This reflects the opinion of Dr Craig, although the overall content of the letter, including issues with sleep presents a worrying picture.

TM goes on to describe a number of meetings due to be held on 13 November 2025 and 27 November 2025 to discuss Z, the offer from CAMHS and the timescales within which CAMHS are willing to support Z and whether there is an appropriate way to support Z in the interim by way of a private provider.

Within this process, TM has agreed to review the position with [redacted] and alternative services via the Access to Resource Team. At paragraph 2.8, she says this:-

“2.8

The local authority’s intention is to twin track a contingency plan and identify a private service which could provide the therapy to Z alongside the above ongoing enquiries with CAMHS. If by 6 weeks from this hearing (the week commencing 15 December) a concrete therapeutic offer from CAMHS has not been provided, or an offer has been provided but involves timescales which are outside of Z’s best interests (such as the 15 months suggested above), the local authority would commit to implementing private therapy at that time if an appropriate provider has been identified.”

I accept that the local authority continue to advocate firmly on behalf of Z with CAMHS. The social care professionals understand the imperative need for this work. They have found themselves in a maze trying to obtain clarity about the nature and timescales of work which CAMHS are designed to provide working within a multi-agency framework. However, they are realists. They always knew there was a risk of delay in awaiting a formulation and offer from CAMHS. In my judgment, they paid insufficient attention to the impact of the continuing delay in providing any support for Z in circumstances where he had been asking for help for months. The issue was not one of finance. It was not one of workload. It was a failure of decision-making to ensure that investigations were pursued and ongoing from the start to seek a source of support for Z.

Given the absence of any objection to the making of the orders proposed, I shall address the issues concisely.

The Local Authority seek an order as follows: -

“1.

Until [redacted], the local authority is not required to consult the father, Y, in respect of decision-making relating to Z, save for a minimum of updates being provided at twice-yearly meetings for Z’s Child Looked After Reviews.

2.

Until [redacted], the local authority is permitted to withhold from Y the detail of the therapy Z is accessing, including the name of the practitioner and the location of any appointments, as well as the content of what is discussed in therapy. Y shall be informed only of i) the type of therapy Z is accessing, and ii) in general terms, its progress, timescales, and whether it is going well.

3.

Until the expiry of the orders in paragraphs 1 and 2 on [redacted], the local authority must notify and consult the father, Y, in the following instances:

a.

In the event of a placement breakdown or any planned change of placement;

b.

If Z self-harms, is seriously ill, requires hospital admission, or in the case of any other serious medical treatment;

c.

If there is any change of Z’s school or college;

d.

If there is a plan for Z to spend over 4 weeks out of the country.

4.

Until [redacted], the father, Y, is not permitted to access Z’s health, education, and social care records, by subject access request or otherwise, without the written consent of the local authority.”

I am satisfied for the purposes s. 100 (3) and (4) CA 1989, that I should grant leave to the local authority to apply for relief under the inherent jurisdiction because it is not possible to regulate this issue otherwise within statute and there is reasonable cause to believe that absent the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction there is a real possibility of Z suffering significant harm owing to his vulnerability, the imperative need for him to achieve stability and engagement in a therapeutic plan and the risk that actions by the father may undermine that progress. It is necessary to restrict his parental responsibility in this way pending Z reaching his 16^th birthday given that this is the last opportunity to help and support Z to progress properly as he wishes to do in his life. He must be able to engage in therapy without his father being given detailed information about it or what he says within it.

In these circumstances, there is no dispute that the Court has the jurisdiction to make the orders sought. In analysing the duties on the Local Authority to consult with the parents and provide information to them in the course of decision-making, focus must turn to sections 22 and 26 CA 1989. I gratefully adopt the summary given by Gwynneth Knowles, J in A Local Authority v X and Y [2018] EWHC 451 (Fam) at paragraphs 50 - 57: -

“50.

Section 100 of the Act places restrictions on the use of the inherent jurisdiction by local authorities. Section 3 reads as follows:

(3)

No application for any exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction with respect to children may be made by a local authority unless the authority have obtained the leave of the court.

(4)

The court may only grant leave if it is satisfied that –

(a)

the result which the authority wish to achieve could not be achieved through the making of any order of a kind to which subsection (5) applies; and

(b)

there is reasonable cause to believe that if the court's inherent jurisdiction is not exercised with respect to the child he is likely to suffer significant harm.

(5)

This subsection applies to any order –

(a)

made otherwise than in the exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction; and

(b)

which the local authority is entitled to apply for (assuming, in the case of any application which may only be made with leave, that leave is granted).

The local authority sought a declaration under the inherent jurisdiction that the girls' welfare was inconsistent with any obligation set out in the Act to consult with, refer to, and/or inform their father in relation to any aspect of their progress, development and/or well-being whilst the girls remained in the care of the local authority. Additionally, the local authority also sought a declaration that, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, the failure of the local authority to consult with, refer to, and/or inform their father about any aspect of the girls' progress, development and/or well-being would amount to a reasonable excuse pursuant to Section 84 of the Act.

51.

Section 22 of the Act is headed 'General duty of local authority in relation to children looked after by them'. Section 22(4) provides that:

“Before making any decision with respect to a child whom they are looking after, or proposing to look after, a local authority shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, ascertain the wishes and feelings of (a) the child; (b) his parents …”

There is thus a statutory duty upon the local authority to ascertain the wishes and feelings of the father regarding any matter to be decided about the girls. Section 26 of the Act permits the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring the case of each child who is being looked after by a local authority to be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of the regulations. The regulations require the local authority, before conducting any review of a child in care's well-being, to seek the views of the child and his parents. It follows obviously that the local authority would need to keep the child's parents fully informed otherwise the views of the parents would be of little value.

52.

The breadth of section 26 of the Act was described by Hayden J in these terms [Re O (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 1169]:

“[27] … The objective of the process here is to ensure not only that there is proper planning but that the plan for the child continues to be the correct one, developing and evolving as the child's needs change. It is to fortify the rigour of review that the section imposes a wide-ranging duty to consult, not least with the parents. Even a parent who has behaved egregiously may nonetheless have some important contribution to make in the future. The requirement to solicit the views of a parent is not contingent upon a moral judgement of parental behaviour; it is there to promote the paramount objective of the statute as a whole, i.e. the welfare of the child. These duties are a statutory recognition of the need appropriately to fetter the corporate parent…”

I accept that analysis and note that Hayden J agreed that a local authority could only be absolved from its duty to consult and to provide information to a parent in “exceptional circumstances”, approving the judgment of Coleridge J in Re C (Care: Consultation With Parents Not In Child's Best Interests) [2005] EWHC 3390 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 787 [see paragraphs 28 and 29 of Re O].

53.

Section 84 of the Act provides, by way of enforcement, that:

“If the Secretary of State is satisfied that any local authority has failed without reasonable excuse to comply with any of the duties imposed on them by, or under, [the Children Act 1989] he may make an order declaring that authority to be in default with respect to that duty.”

Subparagraphs (2), (3) and (4) set out the consequent provisions if such a failure by the local authority is established.

54.

The declaratory relief sought by the local authority was considered by Coleridge J in Re C (Care: Consultation With Parents Not In Child's Best Interests) [2005] EWHC 3390 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 787. Coleridge J granted the relief sought in a case where the father had raped and indecently assaulted the child aged nearly 13 years and where the father was serving a sentence of 11 years' imprisonment for those offences. The child concerned did not want the father to be informed or consulted at all in relation to her future and had obtained an order discharging the father's parental responsibility. Nevertheless, the local authority was obliged to consult and inform parents about their plans for a child in care even after parental responsibility had been discharged. Coleridge J held as follows:

“[30] The conclusions that I have come to are really these: the considerations which govern the dismissal of this father from further involvement in the proceedings, and the granting of the declarations seemed to me to be the same. Indeed, there is little point in him remaining a party if he is not going to be given any information; indeed, it would be impractical for him to remain a party if he was not going to be given information.

[31] The second pivotal point, of course, is that this application is decided, first and foremost, on the basis of s.1 of the Children Act 1989 - that is to say, what is in S's best interests. Of course, hers are not the only interests, but they are the ones which are of paramount concern to the court.

[32] The third factor, self evidently, is that it is a very exceptional case only which would attract this kind of relief. Self evidently - and it hardly needs the human rights legislation to remind one - a parent is entitled to be fully involved, normally, in the decision-making process relating to his, or her, child, and if not to be involved, then at least informed about it. However, insofar as that engages the father's rights to family life, then by the same token it engages S's rights to privacy and a family life stop

[33] In my judgement, in this situation, her rights come very much further up the queue than the father's. I have to balance the rights as between the two of them. I am afraid to say that S's must overwhelm all others. It seems to me that if S was an adult now, who had been subjected to the behaviour which led to this father's imprisonment, and that as an adult she was to say, in circumstances where she needed, for instance, treatment that she did not want the perpetrator of those actions to be consulted, even if it was a parent, no one, for one moment, would suggest that such a person should be consulted. It so happens that this individual is not an adult, but should different considerations apply to this child when I am told she is intelligent and articulate; when her decisions and views seem to me to be entirely understandable and rational and objectively sensible? Thirdly, she has a mother who is fully involved in her life, albeit that she is not in this country, and a guardian, so long as these proceedings are underway, who is more than able to protect her interests, and indeed has been doing so.

[34] The next matter which I have to place in the balance is that there is no question, as there is in the adoption cases, of any very significant decision being made by the local authority. This is not a case where it is being suggested the child should be adopted, or moved out of the country, for instance. It is merely a question of the details of this child's life being worked out by the local authority under the umbrella of a care order.

[35] At the end of the day, standing back, I have come to the conclusion in similar circumstances and for similar reasons, as I did in relation to the application to discharge the father's parental responsibility, that this father has, as matters stand, forfeited consideration of his rights in relation to making decisions about this child's future. I cannot think that he can usefully participate in discussions about what is in S's best interests in circumstances where he has in the past wholly disregarded them, and in circumstances where the child desperately wants him not to be involved…”

55.

I have decided that I should grant permission to the local authority to apply for the declarations it seeks with respect to its duties pursuant to sections 22 and 26 of the Act. I am satisfied that the grounds set out in s.100(4) are made out in that (a) such declarations are only available by exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction and (b) there is reasonable cause to believe that if the court's inherent jurisdiction was not exercised with respect to the girls, they are likely to suffer significant harm. That harm would be the emotional and psychological harm consequent upon them knowing, either at the time or at some later date, that their father had been given information about their circumstances and that his views about their welfare had been solicited. I also cannot exclude the harm which might arise if the father were to use the information given to him by the local authority in an attempt to contact the girls either directly or indirectly.

56.

The circumstances of this case are, in my view, directly comparable to those considered by Coleridge J in Re C. As in that case, the father here has been convicted of serious sexual offences against both girls and is currently serving a lengthy sentence of imprisonment. What differentiates that case from the circumstances here is that both girls have not been able to express a view about whether their father should be involved in local authority decision-making about their welfare. It seems to me from the evidence that, if both girls were to be asked that question, both would be vehemently opposed to their father's involvement in their future. In the past, both have expressed great fear about their father knowing either of their whereabouts or information about them. Sadly, both girls' mother is not involved in their lives but they have a Children's Guardian in these proceedings who is more than capable of protecting their interests and has done so. As is clear by reason of the application to revoke the placement orders, the local authority's plan for the girls does not involve adoption. It also does not involve a move to another country.

57.

I have come to the conclusion that I should grant the relief sought by the local authority with respect to the father's involvement in the girls' lives. Nevertheless, as Coleridge J did in Re C, I have decided that the father should be given information about any life-threatening medical emergency experienced by either of the girls whilst they remain the subjects of care orders to the local authority. I leave to the discretion of the local authority the precise information which the father should be given if such an emergency were to arise. Such a course is not now opposed by the local authority or by the Children's Guardian.”

The proposed orders in this case reflect the fact that all parties agree that the mischief is the provision of information by the Local Authority, which might undermine the therapeutic plan (inclusive of the detail of the therapy itself). The right to receive information and contribute to the statutory reviews is otherwise unaffected.

The rather more novel order is the restriction on the making by the father of Subject Access Requests. However, it is, in my judgment, an incident of Parental Responsibility and is aimed at addressing the same mischief. Clearly, it would seemingly protect against the risk of the school, the Education Authority, CAMHS and the NHS being obliged to provide information to the father which might undo the purpose of this order. I am therefore content to make the order proposed and require service of the order upon relevant third parties. It perhaps goes without saying but in my judgment, this relief is necessary, proportionate and in the best interests of Z in circumstances which demand no less. In that sense, I regard them as ‘exceptional’.

Given my findings of the father’s deliberate conduct and the effect of it upon Z and the evidence relating to the health, safety and well-being of Z (s. 42(5) FLA 1996; Re T (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 1889), it is just to make a non-molestation order in the terms sought by the Local Authority until his 16^th birthday. I have jurisdiction so to order under s.42(2)(b) FLA 1996 within the extant family proceedings.

The father consents to the making of the order and to that extent does not seek to argue that the facts do not justify such protection. However, the findings made amount to deliberate conduct which has had a detrimental emotional impact upon Z. The ambit of the order is designed to reassure Z and to build upon the undertakings which the father had previously offered to the Court.

The proposed draft order would specifically forbid the father from initiating or making contact with Z “unless such contact is initiated by Z”. I would caution the father to be careful in the event that Z contacts him out of the blue to ensure this is reported forthwith to the local authority. He faces arrest if there are grounds to believe he initiated the contact in any way by himself or by instructing or encouraging another person to do so.

The proposed order also creates an exclusion zone around Z’s care home and school. This is important to provide reassurance to him. Again, this is an extension of the original undertakings offered by the father.

The Local Authority seek an order in the following terms: -

“1.

Pursuant to section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 no application for an order that relates to Z pursuant to section 34 or section 39 Children Act 1989 shall be made by Y without the court’s permission until [redacted].

2.

During the currency of the s.91(14) order, any applications that Y makes in respect of the child, Z, shall be listed before HHJ Pates if available.

3.

Any application for permission shall be considered by HHJ Pates and shall not be served on the other parties in the first instance. The court may make an initial determination of the merits of the application for leave, without an oral hearing.

4.

If the court refuses the application for leave on the merits after considering the same on the papers, Y may, within 7 days of receipt of notice of the court’s decision, request an oral hearing.

5.

If the court’s preliminary consideration of the merits is such that permission for the substantive application may be granted, i) the court shall consider whether it is appropriate to notify and/or serve Cafcass, and ii) the local authority and the mother shall then be served and given an opportunity to raise any objections to permission being granted, either in writing or by requesting an oral hearing.

6.

The child shall not be notified of any applications for leave.

7.The local authority shall be notified by the court if there is any unsuccessful application for permission by Y.”

Section 91(14) CA 1989 provides that “[o]n disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may (whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application) order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court.”

Section 91A(2) CA 1989 provides that the circumstances in which the court may make a 91(14) order include, among others, where the court is satisfied that the making of an application would put the child concerned at risk of harm.

Section 91A(3) defines ‘harm’ by reference to the ill-treatment or the impairment of physical or mental health.

Practice Direction 12Q provides detailed guidance about the exercise of this power:

“2.1

Section 91(14) orders are available to prevent a person from making future applications under the 1989 Act without leave of the court. They are a protective filter made by the court, in the interests of children.

2.2

The court has a discretion to determine the circumstances in which an order would be appropriate. These circumstances may be many and varied. They include circumstances where an application would put the child concerned, or another individual, at risk of harm (as provided in section 91A), such as psychological or emotional harm. The welfare of the child is paramount.

2.3

These circumstances can also include where one party has made repeated and unreasonable applications; where a period of respite is needed following litigation; where a period of time is needed for certain actions to be taken for the protection of the child or other person; or where a person’s conduct overall is such that an order is merited to protect the welfare of the child directly, or indirectly due to damaging effects on a parent carer. Such conduct could include harassment, or other oppressive or distressing behaviour beyond or within the proceedings including via social media and e-mail, and via third parties. Such conduct might also constitute domestic abuse.

2.4

A future application could also be part of a pattern of coercive or controlling behaviour or other domestic abuse toward the victim, such that a section 91(14) order is also merited due to the risk of harm to the child or other individual.

2.5

There is no definition in section 91A of who the other individual could be that could be put at risk of harm. However, it is most likely to be, but is not limited to, another person who has parental responsibility for the child and/or is living with or has contact with the child, or any other individual who would be a prospective respondent to a future application.

2.6

In proceedings in which domestic abuse is alleged or proven, or in which there are allegations or evidence of other harm to a child or other individual, the court should give early and ongoing consideration to whether it would be appropriate to make a section 91(14) order on disposal of the application, even if an application for such an order has not been made (since the court may make an order of its own motion – see section 91A(5)).

2.7

Section 91(14) orders are a protective filter – not a bar on applications – and there is considerable scope for their use in appropriate cases. Proceedings under the 1989 Act should not be used as a means of harassment or coercive control, or further abuse against a victim of domestic abuse or other person, and the court should therefore give due consideration to whether a future application would have such an impact” (emphasis supplied).”

Again, I am grateful to adopt the summary of those provisions provided by Gwynneth Knowles, J in A Local Authority v F and Others [2022] EWFC 127.

I have considered the scope of the order in accordance with paragraph 3.6 of PD 12Q.

In my judgment, the proposed order provides a necessary degree of protection against the risk of disruptive further applications. Such applications are at risk of drawing Z into the midst of dispute, requiring him to provide formally his wishes and feelings and risks undermining stability and engagement in a plan of therapy. It is necessary to provide a sufficient period to provide reassurance to him and in my judgment, that is best reflected by an order which will last until his 16^th birthday.

I accept the expert social care evidence of SW1, TM and the Children’s Guardian, CG allied to the expert psychological opinion evidence of Dr Craig that it is inappropriate to focus on contact at this stage. Contact must be led by Z at a point when he feels ready to do so having received support for his physical and mental health. The father accepts that it is inappropriate at this stage to seek an order for contact by which Z would be provided with a telephone through which to contact his father. The father seeks leave to withdraw his application for contact and I grant that leave.

That is my judgment.

A draft of this judgment was sent to the advocates by email on 13 November 2025.