Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before:
The Honourable Mr Justice Harrison
Re C (A Child) (Abduction: Grave Risk: Asylum Claim: Child’s objections)
JUDGMENT
The father was represented by Mr Michael Gration KC and Ms Nadia Campbell-Brunton
The mother was represented by MsLubeya Ramadhan
The child (acting through his children’s guardian) was represented by Mr Christopher Osborne
Hearing dates: 10, 11 and 12 November 2025
This judgment was handed down by distribution by email at 10.30am on 17 December 2025.
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
MR JUSTICE HARRISON:
Introduction
This is an application under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (‘the 1980 Hague Convention’). The application concerns a boy to whom I shall refer as ‘C’, a US national who is now aged 10. The applicant, C’s father, applies for his summary return to the jurisdiction of the USA and specifically the State of Ohio. The application has been resisted by C’s mother.
The father is represented by Mr Michael Gration KC and Ms Nadia Campbell-Brunton. The mother is represented by Ms Lubeya Ramadhan. C is also a party to the proceedings acting through his children's guardian, Ms Daisy Veitch. He has been represented by Mr Christopher Osborne from Cafcass Legal. I am grateful to all counsel and solicitors for the assistance they have provided me in this difficult case.
The father's case is that in August 2024 he agreed with the mother that C could travel to England for a holiday. C was supposed to return to Ohio by 23 August 2024, but instead of returning him the mother retained him in England. Based upon evidence that has subsequently come to light, the father alleges that he was deceived into providing his consent for the trip. He says that when the mother travelled with C to England, she did so with no intention of returning him. Accordingly, her actions amounted to a wrongful removal for the purposes of Article 3 of the 1980 convention. Alternatively, her refusal to return C at the end of the month was a wrongful retention.
The mother denies travelling to England with the intention alleged by the father. She does however accept that her actions amount to a wrongful retention. She seeks to resist the father’s application on 2 bases:
She asserts that there is a grave risk that C’s return would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation; and
She further asserts that C objects to returning and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which the court should take account of his views.
In order to determine this application I heard submissions on behalf of each of the parties. I also heard brief oral evidence from Ms Veitch during which she amplified some of the matters addressed in her report.
Following her arrival in the United Kingdom with C, the mother made a claim for asylum on her behalf and C’s. These claims were rejected by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘SSHD’) in August 2025. As matters stand neither the mother nor C has any right, from an immigration perspective, to remain in this jurisdiction. The mother has appealed the SSHD's decision. I have not been provided with any information as to the basis of her appeal. Nor do I know when the appeal is likely to be heard.
Background
The father is a U.S. National who lives in Ohio. He is now aged 33. He has a son from a previous relationship who is now aged 14. This boy lives with his mother in South Carolina and spends time with the father periodically.
The mother is also a US national. She previously lived in Ohio. Since August 2024 she has been living in a town in the North of England along with her new husband (‘Mr X’), their two-year-old daughter (‘R’), and C.
The parents never married. They met in 2014 and had a short relationship which ended when the mother was pregnant with C. Following the birth, C lived with his mother and spent, at most, a limited amount of time with his father (the mother’s case is that he was not in contact at all).
In 2019, the mother first met Mr X. He was living in England and she in Ohio. They met through their shared interest in video games which they played together remotely. The mother says that C too enjoyed playing games with them, especially Minecraft.
In 2020 (when C was aged 4), the father made an application for visitation to the Court of Common Pleas of Sandusky County, Ohio, Juvenile Division (‘the Ohio Family Court’). The application was resisted by the mother who made allegations against the father that he had abandoned C and committed multiple acts of domestic abuse. These allegations were not accepted by the court, which heard oral evidence from each of the parties and from the paternal grandfather. The court concluded that it was in C’s best interests to make an order for visitation on a gradually increasing basis with overnight stays commencing by the end of the year. With effect from 20 December 2020, C’s time with his father would be governed by the terms of the ‘Standard Parenting Time Order’ applicable to the Ohio Family Court. This includes provision for stays on alternate weekends and lengthy stays during a child’s school holidays.
Thereafter, the father had contact in accordance with the order.
On 8 March 2021, the mother’s relationship with Mr X changed; according to her, the two of them began ‘dating’, although the geography of their homes meant that theirs was ‘a long distance relationship’. Video gaming continued to be a feature of their lives together.
Meanwhile, C was continuing to have contact with the father. According to the mother, C did not enjoy this and would return from his stays upset. She specifically alleges that following a visit in July 2021, C returned to her with a red mark across his face and a ‘bright red’ ear, injuries she claims were inflicted by the father. She made a report to the police but no action was taken. The father denies the allegation.
C started school in September 2021. I have seen reports from the 2021/22 academic year which suggest that he was repeatedly dysregulated over the course of that year to the extent that at one point he was suspended from taking the school bus. According to the mother, C reported to teachers ‘multiple times’ being assaulted by the father; she says that reports were made to child protection services, but no action was taken. Again, these allegations are denied by the father.
On 1 March 2022, Mr X came to Ohio for a month, staying in an hotel. The mother and C spent the whole of the month with him apart from the two visitation weekends C spent with the father. The mother was working night shifts at a factory and sleeping during the day. Mr X helped out by looking after C while she was asleep. During the course of that month, the mother and Mr X became engaged. According to the mother, three months later, on 17 June 2022, they married. I note, however, that the Home Office has questioned the validity of this marriage after the mother failed to provide a marriage certificate.
In July 2022, according to the mother C called her while staying with his father to complain that he was ‘starving’. She claims that she instructed him to wake his sleeping father and that when he did so she could hear the father swearing at his son. The father denies that this occurred.
In May 2023, the mother gave birth to her daughter, R. I assume from the evidence that Mr X had moved in to live with her and that the couple and C had been living together in the period leading up to the birth. Mr X remained living with the mother afterwards. It appears, however, that he failed to take steps to regularise his immigration position.
In May 2024, the mother approached the father to seek his permission to take C to the United Kingdom for a limited period. The father initially refused to sign a form authorising a new passport to be obtained for C unless the mother set out in writing the venue and dates for her trip, including her return date. She explained to the father that the purpose of the trip was to visit Mr X’s mother who was seriously unwell.
On 24 May 2024 the parents signed an agreement for the mother to take C to England from 5 to 23 August 2024. Following this, the father signed the passport application for C which had previously been presented to him. This stated: ‘[Name of father], give my consent to the issuance of the United States passport to the minor child named on this application. My consent is unconditional with regards to validity and travel.’ The mother claims that she believed that this form of words gave her permission to relocate with C for as long as she wished. I have not heard the mother give evidence, but I regret to say that I am unable to accept that she did in fact believe this; I find it more likely than not that this asserted belief is something she has invented to justify her actions. It is wholly inconsistent with the fact that on her own case the father had refused to sign the passport form unless the mother signed a separate document specifying her dates of travel. Moreover the 2020 order contained a requirement for the mother to give notice of any intended relocation. I find it inconceivable that she would not have been aware of this.
In July 2024, it is common ground (although not set out in the evidence) that C came to stay with the father for a period of four weeks in accordance with the 2020 order.
On 6 August 2024, the mother, Mr X and the two children, C and R, left the US arriving in England the following day. As the Ohio Family Court later found, the mother had no genuine intention of returning C to England on the date she left. The father’s consent to travel had been procured by deception and accordingly, in my judgment, this was a wrongful removal. The Ohio court’s finding was based primarily upon the oral evidence of Mr X. He made clear that he was an immigration overstayer who would not have been permitted to re-enter the USA; he knew that the mother would not return without him. Within these proceedings and notwithstanding the findings of the Ohio Family Court, the mother has continued untruthfully to maintain that her decision to remain in England was only made following her arrival in England.
Following her arrival in England, without consulting the father, the mother decided to enrol C in a local school in the town where she is currently residing.
On 21 October 2024, the mother filed with the Ohio Family Court a notice of a change of address. This information was communicated by the court to the father.
On 23 October 2024 the father filed two motions with the Ohio Family Court: one for a change of custody and another for contempt of court.
The case was listed for a pre-trial hearing on 19 December 2024. Both parties attended the hearing; the mother was permitted to do so remotely. The court listed the matter for hearing on 6 March 2025 and directed the mother to bring the child to court for an ‘in camera’; this comprises a meeting with the judge and forms part of the procedure in Ohio. It would appear that such meetings are required to be undertaken in person, not remotely.
On 19 December 2024 the mother filed her claims for asylum in this jurisdiction. It does not appear that she informed either the father or the Ohio Family Court until sometime later that she had taken this step.
On 3 March 2025, the mother filed a motion with the Ohio Family Court requesting permission to attend the forthcoming hearing remotely. She referred to the fact that she had made an asylum application and that the passports were held by the Home Office. Permission for remote attendance was not granted, although a direction was made that if she failed to attend in person she must attend by Zoom.
At the hearing on 6 March 2025, the mother appeared remotely seated on a sofa with C. Apart from speaking very briefly with C, the court declined, for reasons of confidentiality, the mother’s suggestion that the previously directed ‘in camera’ could be held remotely.
The trial proceeded with the mother being unrepresented. It was recorded that she had failed to take steps to have counsel appointed and that she waived her right to have counsel act for her. The court heard oral evidence from six witnesses: the father, Mr X’s father, the father’s wife, the paternal grandmother, the mother and Mr X (the latter two and, I assume Mr X’s father, gave evidence remotely). Various documents were admitted as exhibits.
The court’s ultimate conclusions were that (1) the mother was in contempt of court, and (2) it was in C’s best interests to grant the father’s motion for a change of custody. The mother was sentenced to 10 days imprisonment for contempt on the basis that she could purge her contempt by returning the child to Ohio on or before 9 May 2025. An order was made requiring her to report to a specified County Jail at 10am on 9 May 2025. These decisions have not been appealed.
In reaching its decision to change C’s custody, the court considered a list of factors mandated by the Ohio legislation similar to the welfare checklist contained in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989. The court was unable, however, to consider C’s wishes and feelings as the mother had breached the order requiring him to be brought for the ‘in camera’ meeting. The record of the decision sets out some of the matters which were taken into account, including the following:
Mr X’s father was disdainful of the mother, describing her as a pathological liar; the mother and Mr X were living in a home owned by him and he had provided some financial support. The mother and her father-in-law had a relationship which was ‘nothing short of toxic’ with ‘obvious power struggles that undoubtedly extend to [C]’. Mr X’s father testified that the mother ‘has an air of defiance about her and the stress she causes in the house affects everyone’.
C and his step-mother have a good relationship. She has witnessed the father discipline him appropriately and their relationship overall is good.
C has a relationship with his maternal grandmother which is ‘appropriate and eventful’.
All witnesses testified to C’s ‘constant use of the phone games’. C may need some intervention or counselling to address this. His behaviours have grown into ‘outbursts’ which indicate he needs assistance.
C had attended school in Ohio where he was ‘acclimated’. There had been a number of absences from school in England; C had recently been in trouble for hitting another child in the face; the mother was putting C in a taxi alone to travel to his English school.
The mother had a history of being uncooperative with visitation in addition to her unilateral relocation with C.
C had been ‘uprooted from his life and taken under false pretenses (sic) to another country making all relationships, stability, structure and security eviscerated.’
The mother did not appreciate the seriousness of her actions. Moreover, ‘[s]he does not appreciate [C’s] tender age and development in testifying that she keeps him updated on all facts of this case.’
‘The father testified that [C] seems mentally distracted and coached’ during telephone calls and that [C] is being estranged from him'.
‘The personalities of the parents could not be more different’. The mother was ‘outspoken and overbearing’ whereas the father was ‘mild mannered and quiet’.
If C returned to the US, he could resume at his former school and the paternal grandmother would be able to assist with childcare before and after school.
The mother did not comply with the order made by the Ohio Family Court. She opted instead to maintain her pursuit of the claims for asylum.
On 23 July 2025, the father issued his application in this jurisdiction under the 1980 Hague Convention. There were various case management hearings before the matter came to be listed for a final hearing before me on 10, 11 and 12 November 2025.
On 8 August 2025 the Home Office wrote to the mother communicating the SSHD’s decision that her claims for asylum had been refused. It had been determined that she did not qualify for refugee status, humanitarian protection, permission to stay on the basis of her family and private life or discretionary leave. The same decision was made in relation to C’s asylum claim. In assessing the mother’s claim, the decision maker rejected her suggestion that she had been subjected to a corrupt legal process in the USA and that she was at risk of harm from the father. It was determined that she had ‘provided inconsistent evidence without a reasonable explanation as well as a lack of detail’. Doubts were raised about her credibility.
The Home Office decision maker also referred to various sources of protection available to the mother in Ohio including 900 specific law enforcement agencies, a Family Violence Prevention Centre and the potential to apply for restraining orders.
At the hearing on 12 November 2025, I determined that before making a decision it was necessary to obtain expert evidence as to relevant matters of Ohio law. This has now been provided to the Court in the form of a report from a US attorney, Mr Gus Dahlberg of Babbitt and Dahlberg Law LCC (see further below).
The evidence of the children’s guardian
Ms Daisy Veitch is an Officer of the Cafcass High Court Team. She was appointed as C’s guardian after C was joined as a party to the proceedings on 21 August 2025. She has prepared a report dated 5 November 2025 addressing C’s wishes and feelings and his maturity. As well as reviewing the written evidence, Ms Veitch undertook safeguarding checks, consulted with the local authority for the area in which C is currently residing, obtained information from C’s school and interviewed C for 2 hours on 17 September 2025 at the Cafcass offices in London. She also conducted video interviews with each of the parents.
The enquiries made by Ms Veitch established that neither parent has a criminal record in this jurisdiction. Although the father has historical convictions in the US, Ms Veitch observes that these will have been known to the Ohio Family Court and were not deemed to be a barrier to custody orders being made in his favour or a relevant safeguarding concern.
As for the involvement of the local authority, Ms Veitch noted as follows in her report:
“[C] is currently receiving statutory support from [the local authority] under a Child in Need plan… An assessment was completed which identified concerns about the family dynamics between the adults in [C]’s and his sister’s lives, and the impact of this on the children. In particular, worries have been raised by the professional network about a dysfunctional and potentially controlling dynamic between [the mother] and her in-laws, and between [Mr X’s father] and [the mother].”
The school provided information that C has a 91.67% attendance rate which was described as ‘satisfactory but could be improved’. He is receiving emotional literacy support. The school reported that he ‘can become emotionally dysregulated and overwhelmed due to his personal family situation at times’. Socially, C has settled into school well and maintained good relationships with his peers and adults. He is well presented at school. He has been identified by the school as having special educational needs, primarily relating to his social, emotional and mental health. He is working at a level below the expected standard for a pupil his age. While the school reported ‘good communication’ with the mother, they also said the following:
“we are concerned about how much [C] discloses to us about his family situation, speaking as an adult. We feel he knows too much information about his Mum’s difficulties and needs”
Before her interview with C, Ms Veitch held an introductory meeting with him and his mother on video. During that meeting, Ms Veitch explained her role and the nature of the decision to be made by the court. As noted by Ms Veitch:
“When I mentioned that one possible outcome was for [C] to return to the USA, [the mother] immediately put her arm around [C] and said “shh, its ok, its ok’’. I had not observed any difference in [C]’s presentation at the mention of his
father and America and was concerned about the impact of his mother’s
somewhat pre-emptive reassurance. To me, this appeared to give [C] the
impression that the subjects of his father and the USA, are ones which he
should feel distressed about and require comfort from.”
The mother accompanied [C] to his in-person interview with Ms Veitch. Ms Veitch said the following about the mother’s interactions with her son on that day:
“Many of their interactions were warm and appropriate, and I observed a close and trusting relationship between them. [The mother] gave [C] verbal prompts
and encouragement to engage with me by himself. However, I was later
advised by reception staff that whilst I was meeting [C], [the mother] was
presenting as increasingly agitated in the waiting area. She was anxious about
the prospect of missing their pre-booked train, as the session was taking longer
than anticipated, and asked staff several times to interrupt our session. Once I
was informed of this, I brought my meeting with [C] to an end. However, as
they were leaving the building, I saw and heard [the mother] shout loudly at
[C], ‘LEAVE, NOW!’. This startled reception staff and was loud enough to be overheard by other children and families. [C] did not react beyond following his mother’s instructions and leaving the building.”
Ms Veitch describes C as a ‘sweet and sensitive boy who thrives on individual adult attention’. He could become easily distracted and engaged more readily in active play than when required to sit still. He spoke with enthusiasm about the video game, Fortnite, telling Ms Veitch that his interest in ‘shooter games’ originates in seeing his mother play these with his step-father. His preferred games all have age ratings of 12+, ‘teen’ or ‘mature’ as a consequence of their violent content. During the interview, C repeatedly referred to his step-father as ‘Dad’ and to the father as ‘my biological dad’. He gave a description of the occasion when the mother alleges that, on her instruction, C woke his father as he was starving. He spoke in positive terms about his maternal grandmother, but his descriptions of his father were entirely negative:
“I was horrible when I start seeing my biological dad. I acted out, spitting and biting people. The police had to be called”
“I'm afraid that I am being taken away. They are trying to get my mom done for
kidnapping even though she didn't, because I have a little sister. My biological
dad is trying to get me taken away and my mom will get sent to prison.”
When Ms Veitch asked C how he knew about such matters, he responded: ‘I am told because I have to know for a reason. So I am prepared in case it does happen’. Ms Veitch’s opinion, with which I agree, was that this comment had ‘an especially adult tone and turn of phrase, as though [C] was repeating things he had heard an adult say.’
C described life in the USA as ‘horrible’, but struggled to elaborate on this. He was eventually able to identify certain aspects of his life there which he liked and missed, including the food. He described his former school as ‘OK’, but added that he did not really have any friends. He spoke of missing his grandparents and one of their cats in particular, who has died since he left the USA.
Consistent with my finding about a wrongful removal, C told Ms Veitch that he knew in advance about the move from the USA, explaining that ‘it was about my biological dad’. While he did not initially take to life in the UK, C now feels better about it and expressed a preference for the school he now attends where he has made friends.
C was clearly aware that his parents do not get on: ‘I just know, they don't like each other. When [the father] comes around [the mother] doesn't go near him’. He was unable to articulate how he feels about this, saying ‘I don’t know’ in a flat voice, whilst ‘looking sad and sinking low into his chair’. Ms Veitch rightly observed that C is ‘negatively affected by how conflicted his parents are’.
C expressed a clear wish to remain in England and was aware that a return to the USA would entail a move to his father’s care. He said that he would feel scared about returning, primarily at the prospect of his mother being in trouble and going to jail. He made clear that he did not want to speak to his father, expressing his belief that he is ‘trying to get my mom done for kidnapping’. In a letter to the judge, he articulated that he is scared about returning and the prospect of separation from his mother, sister and step-father.
As to the question of C’s maturity, Ms Veitch formed the view that he is vulnerable emotionally and intellectually and that ‘he is unlikely to have a maturity which fully aligns with his chronological age’. Ms Veitch further opined that C ‘presents as influenced by his knowledge of the proceedings’. His fear about his mother’s potential incarceration is likely to contribute to his anxiety and fears about a return. She noted that he uses adult language about his father and that his account about not being fed at his father’s home was ‘very similar’ to the mother’s account of the same incident.
Overall, Ms Veitch considered that C did not object to returning to the USA per se; rather his objection was linked to his fear that a return would lead to his mother’s incarceration and his being placed in the care of the father.
In the concluding section of the report, Ms Veitch made clear that it was desirable to achieve a ‘soft landing’ in the event of a return, if possible avoiding the mother going to prison. In addition to the protective measures offered by the father already (which include, non-molestation undertakings and a commitment to pay for flights and not attend the airport upon a return), Ms Veitch considered that he should undertake not to separate C from his mother’s care pending further consideration of the matter by the Ohio Family Court.
Ms Veitch commented that upon any return C will be confronted with very different circumstances from those he left behind. It would be a return to his father’s home. Such a change would be disruptive and might even be a source of emotional harm. She further considered that C would undoubtedly find a separation from his mother and sister ‘upsetting and confusing’, although this was not a case where the children had built up a longstanding sibling bond of shared experiences. These negative aspects of a return, in Ms Veitch’s view, need to be balanced against the impact of him being retained overseas and the effect this would have on his relationships with his father, his grandparents on both sides, his cousins and his paternal brother.
Ms Veitch considered that if the mother and C’s allegations were true, C would be at risk of physical and emotional harm in the event of a return. She acknowledged, however, that there has been a recent welfare judgment from the Ohio Family Court in which a change of residence was determined as being in C’s best interests.
In the event of a return being ordered, Ms Veitch indicated that she would make a referral to child protection services in Ohio.
In her oral evidence, Ms Veitch confirmed the content of her report. She reiterated that it would be helpful for C if the mother accompanied him on a return and if measures could be put in place to achieve a soft landing.
Mr Dahlberg’s report
Mr Dahlberg was asked to address various issues including:
The status and enforceability in Ohio of undertakings given to the English Court;
The likelihood of the mother being arrested on arrival in the USA;
The potential to suspend the mother’s prison sentence;
The potential for enforcement and suspension of the existing custody order in favour of the father.
Addressing the question of undertakings, Ms Dahlberg said the following:
“Presuming that Father’s proposed undertakings were included in an order or other decree issued by your family court that is otherwise valid under U.K. law, it is my opinion that the [Ohio Family Court] would likely recognize such an order as an enforceable foreign judgment under the principle of comity. The proposed undertakings would be consistent with interim or temporary orders issued in a juvenile child custody matter pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure, and do not purport to make any final resolution of the underlying question of custody. Recognizing such orders would be harmonious with Ohio public policy. There is no suggestion of any denial of due process of law nor that such orders would be obtained by fraud, nor that your family court lacks jurisdiction to make such orders.
The specific proposals included in Father’s proposed undertakings are in the nature of interim or temporary orders – that he obtain one-way tickets for Mother and the minor child to return to Ohio, that he not be present at the airport upon their arrival and that a particular location be used for exchange of the minor child, that the parties communicate via a particular communications platform, that he would not harass Mother, and that the underlying order granting him custody would not be enforced pending further hearing(s) in Ohio. Each presumes that the Ohio court would have the opportunity to make further
amendments or modifications to such orders in the future, if necessary. Father’s promise or representation that he would not “institute or support any criminal proceedings brought to punish” would not necessarily bind an Ohio court from independently pursuing such claims or charges, but as noted below, I think it extremely unlikely that Mother would face such criminal action under these circumstances. Such an action would almost certainly be dependent on Father’s participation, and Father’s failure to abide by his own representations in that event would potentially open him to civil liability in the custody proceedings before the Juvenile Court.
To the extent that these representations remain only that and are not otherwise
incorporated into an order or decree issued by your family court, Ohio courts would not generally consider them to be binding or enforceable in their current form, and they would simply be treated as Father’s position. It would still require independent court action before any legal requirement or obligation would attach.
An Ohio court could adopt the proposed undertakings as its own order and
incorporate them into a temporary order which would bind the parties, either by agreement or in a process under Ohio Juv.R. 13. While the specifics of that process would be up to the court, such temporary orders are often issued by a juvenile court after consideration of the parties’ respective positions as submitted to the court upon written affidavits regarding their respective positions and requests.”
Mr Dahlberg considers it unlikely that the mother would be arrested upon a return, provided she returned with C. She has been found guilty of a ‘civil’ as opposed to ‘criminal’ contempt; sanctions for civil contempt are intended to be remedial rather than punitive. A belated return would to Ohio would constitute compliance. Mr Dahlberg’s experience is that enforcement of penal sentences in private civil matters is ‘rare’; it is more likely that the court would impose other sanctions such as an award of costs to make future timely compliance more likely. He considers it unlikely that a state prosecutor would become involved in the matter. As for the suspension of the mother’s sentence, Mr Dahlberg considers that the issue of whether the sanction of imprisonment remained necessary could be addressed in the light of her compliance at a later hearing. He states the following in his report:
“More specifically, if Father’s proposed undertakings are adopted in an order issued by either your family court or an Ohio court (particularly his representation not to support any criminal proceedings against Mother or to enforce the custody order on an interim basis), I believe that there is virtually no chance that Mother would be subject to arrest upon her return. The Ohio court would likely treat such an order as a temporary suspension of the contempt sentence and reserve any further action or revision for a further, future hearing.”
As for the custody order in the father’s favour, Mr Dahlberg’s experience is that, absent allegations that a child faces serious or imminent physical danger, it is rare for law enforcement agencies to enforce such orders. The normal route of enforcement entails making an application to court. It is possible to obtain a temporary suspension of a custody order by filing a motion with the court although there is no guarantee that such an order would be approved. A motion for suspension filed on an emergency basis would generally be listed for consideration between 30 and 45 days after the date of filing. It is possible for motions to be filed electronically and for hearings to take place by Zoom, although probable in this case that the court would require in person attendance.
The law
Overview of the 1980 Hague Convention
The aims and objectives of the 1980 Convention are recorded in its preamble and in Article 1. They can be summarised as follows:
To protect children from the harmful effects of being subject to a wrongful removal or retention.
To ensure the prompt return of abducted children to the country of their habitual residence.
To respect rights of custody and rights of access held in one Contracting State in other Contracting States.
One of the ways in which the Convention is intended to secure its objectives is by deterring would-be abductors from wrongfully removing or retaining children.
The welfare of the child is not 'the paramount consideration' under the 1980 Convention. However, the preamble records the general principle that 'the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody '. In Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27 it was held by the Supreme Court that each of the following is 'a primary consideration ' in Convention proceedings:
The best interests of the children subject to the proceedings;
The best interests of children generally.
Wrongful removal
In order to engage the machinery of the 1980 Hague Convention, it is necessary for the applicant to demonstrate that the child has been subject to either a wrongful removal or a wrongful retention.
Article 3 of the Hague Convention provides that:
"The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where:
it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State."
Article 5(a) provides that " for the purposes of the Convention 'rights of custody' shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence".
In this case it is common ground that C has been subject to either a wrongful removal or a wrongful retention for the purposes of Article 3 of the 1980 Hague Convention. Although it makes no difference to the outcome, I have made a finding that this is a case involving a wrongful removal, rather than a retention.
Article 12: the obligation to return
Where it is established that there has been a wrongful removal or retention and an application for return is made within 12 months of the date of the wrongful act (as is the case here), Article 12 of the 1980 Convention obliges the court to make an order for the child to be returned forthwith to the country of his habitual residence immediately prior to the removal or retention, unless one of the exceptions in Article 13 applies.
Article 13
The burden is on the person resisting a return to establish an exception under Article 13. The two which arise for consideration in this case are Article 13(b) (the ‘grave risk’ exception) and Article 13(2) (the ‘child objections’ exception). If an exception is established the court has a discretion about whether to order a return, although in the case of Article 13(b) it has been held that it would be ‘inconceivable’ to order a return despite the existence of a grave risk.
Article 13(b)
The leading authorities on Article 13(b) are Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27 ('Re E') and Re S (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2012] UKSC 10. The core principles expressed in those cases have been refined by the Court of Appeal in subsequent cases. A helpful summary of the key principles and the approach to be adopted was set out by Baker LJ in Re IG (A Child) (Child Abduction: habitual residence: Article 13 (b)) [2021] EWCA 1123 (' Re IG' ) at paragraph 47:
The terms of Article 13(b) are by their very nature restricted in their scope. The defence has a high threshold, demonstrated by the use of the words "grave" and "intolerable".
The focus is on the child. The issue is the risk to the child in the event of his or her return.
The separation of the child from the abducting parent can establish the required grave risk.
When the allegations on which the abducting parent relies to establish grave risk are disputed, the court should first establish whether, if they are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. If so, the court must then establish how the child can be protected from the risk.
In assessing these matters, the court must be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Hague process. It will rarely be appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under Article 13(b) and so neither the allegations nor their rebuttal are usually tested in cross-examination.
That does not mean, however, that no evaluative assessment of the allegations should be undertaken by the court. The court must examine in concrete terms the situation in which the child would be on return. In analysing whether the allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk, the judge will have to consider whether the evidence enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that they do.
If the judge concludes that the allegations would potentially establish the existence of an Article 13(b) risk, he or she must then carefully consider whether and how the risk can be addressed or sufficiently ameliorated so that the child will not be exposed to the risk.
In many cases, sufficient protection will be afforded by extracting undertakings from the applicant as to the conditions in which the child will live when he returns and by relying on the courts of the requesting State to protect him once he is there.
In deciding what weight can be placed on undertakings, the court has to take into account the extent to which they are likely to be effective, both in terms of compliance and in terms of the consequences, including remedies for enforcement in the requesting State, in the absence of compliance.
As has been made clear by the Practice Guidance on "Case Management and Mediation of International Child Abduction Proceedings" issued by the President of the Family Division on 13 March 2018, the question of specific protective measures must be addressed at the earliest opportunity, including by obtaining information as to the protective measures that are available, or could be put in place, to meet the alleged identified risks."
As the President, Sir Andrew McFarlane, and Upper Tribunal Judge V Mandalia explained in Re HR (Parallel Child Abduction and Asylum Proceedings) [2024] EWHC 1626 (Fam) at paragraphs 25 and 26
“Where, in a Hague case, there are disputed issues of fact in relation to Art 13(b), the conventional approach is that described by Baroness Hale at paragraph [36] of Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] UKSC 27, so that the court will consider whether, if the allegations were true, they would establish a grave risk under Art 13(b). If so, then the court will go on to look at how the child may be protected from that risk and, if the protective measures are not sufficient, the court may have to do the best that it can to resolve the disputed issues. It has, however, been held that a court is not bound to follow the Re E approach in every case. In Re K (1980 Hague Convention: Lithuania) [2015] EWCA Civ 720, Black LJ (as she then was) considered the Re E process and concluded (at paragraph [53]):
‘I do not accept that a judge is bound to take this approach if the evidence before the court enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that the allegations give rise to an Article 13(b) risk.’
In Re A (Children) (Abduction Article 13(b)) [2021] EWCA (Civ) 939, Moylan LJ reviewed the approach to be taken in the light, in part, of Black LJ's approach in Re K. Moylan LJ explained:
‘I would emphasise that Black LJ was referring to discounting the possibility that the allegations would give rise to an Art 13(b) risk. She was not otherwise diverging from the approach set out in Re E. It is also clear that she was referring to the end of the spectrum, namely when the court was able confidently to discount the possibility that the allegations gave rise to an Art 13(b) risk.’ [emphasis as original]”
The President and Mr Mandalia in Re HR also referred to a further passage Re A, which provides a reminder as to the need for caution when a court evaluates the evidence in the context of Article 13(b). At paragraph 97, Moylan LJ said:
"if the court does not follow the approach referred to above, it would create the inevitable prospect of the court's evaluation falling between two stools. The court's "process of reasoning", to adopt the expression used by Lord Wilson in Re S, at [22], would not include either (a) considering the risks to the child or children if the allegations were true; nor (b) confidently discounting the possibility that the allegations gave rise to an Article 13(b) risk. The court would, rather, by adopting something of a middle course, be likely to be distracted from considering the second element of the Re E approach, namely "how the child can be protected against the risk" which the allegations, if true, would potentially establish."
I have borne that note of caution firmly in mind in undertaking my evaluation in this case.
On behalf of the mother, Ms Ramadhan has drawn my attention to the judgment of Cobb J (as he then was) sitting in the Court of Appeal in Re T (Abduction: Protective measures: Agreement to return) [2023] EWCA Civ 1415. He there drew attention to a number of matters concerning protective measures which Ms Ramadhan has helpfully summarised as follows:
The requirement for parties to address protective measures early in the process;
The importance of the court identifying early in the proceedings what case management directions need to be made, so that at the final hearing the court has the information necessary to make an informed assessment of the efficacy of protective measures;
The need for the court to be satisfied, when necessary for the purposes of determining whether to make a summary return order, that the proposed protective measures are going to be sufficiently effective in the requesting state to address the article 13(b) risks;
The status of undertakings containing protective measures, and their recognition in foreign states;
The distinction between ‘protective measures’ and ‘soft landing’ or ‘safe harbour’ provisions.
Child Objections
The second paragraph of Article 13 of the 1980 Convention provides that the court may refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that:
“the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” (my emphasis)
The leading authorities on what is often referred to as the child's objections exception are Re M (Republic of Ireland) (Child's Objections) (Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015] EWCA Civ 26 (‘Re M (Republic of Ireland’), Re F (Child's Objections) [2015] EWCA Civ 1022 (‘Re F’) and, so far as the exercise of discretion is Re M (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55 (‘Re M (Zimbabwe)’). The principles derived from those authorities have been considered and helpfully summarised in a number of cases, including by Williams J in Re Q & V (1980 Hague Convention and Inherent Jurisdiction Summary Return) [2019] EWHC 490 (Fam) (‘Re Q and V’) at paragraph 50 and by MacDonald J in B v P [2017] EWHC 3577 (Fam).
The cases clearly establish that in considering the child objections exception it is necessary for three separate questions to be addressed:
Does the child object to being returned?
Has the child attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his views?
And, if and only if (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative,
Should the court exercise its resulting discretion in favour of or against ordering a return?
The first question is therefore whether the child objects to being returned. As to this, the authorities establish that:
Whether a child objects is a question of fact: Re M (Republic of Ireland).
The examination of this issue should be straightforward and robust as opposed to ‘over-intellectualised’. It does not involve consideration a compulsory checklist: Re M (Republic of Ireland).
An objection can be validly contrasted with a preference or wish: Re M (Republic of Ireland).
The word ‘objection’ requires no further definition. Glosses such as ‘a Convention objection’ or ‘a wholesale objection’ are to be avoided: Re F.
Issues such as the nature and strength of the objections do not fall for consideration under this head, although these matters are highly relevant to any discretion which the court may have to exercise: Re M (Republic of Ireland).
A child will not be held to have an objection if they are merely parroting the views of a parent and do not personally object to a return: Re M (Republic of Ireland).
Although it has been suggested that the objection should relate to ‘the country’ to which the child is to return as opposed to ‘a particular carer’, this distinction should not be taken too literally: Re M (Republic of Ireland); Re Q and V. The real question, in my judgment, is whether the child objects to ‘being returned’ pursuant to Article 12 and what this will encompass. Hence:
Where a return will entail the child being placed with a particular person, no valid distinction can be drawn between the child’s views about the person and the country more generally: Re M (Republic of Ireland). The same principle applies, in my judgment, where (as here) there is a real and imminent prospect of the child being placed with a particular person in the near future.
It is possible for a child to hold generally positive views about their country of origin while still objecting to a return. By way of example, in some cases their objections may relate to their schooling situation; in others they may object to returning to a situation where they were enmeshed in their parents’ conflict; in yet others they may have become so settled in the new country that they object to being uprooted once again (see, for example, Re W (Abduction: Child Objections) [2010] EWCA Civ 520 where these factors all formed the basis of the children’s objections).
Accordingly, a child may not object to returning to their home country to have contact with their left behind parent while still ‘objecting’ to a return for the purposes of Article 12: In re S (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1993] Fam 242.
As for the second question, whether the child has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his view, the authorities establish that:
Taking account of a child’s views does not mean that they will necessarily be upheld: Re M (Republic of Ireland); accordingly, this is a relatively low threshold requirement.
The courts will generally take account of the views of children aged seven and older who have a maturity commensurate with their age: Re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51.
In some circumstances, especially in cases involving older siblings, the courts have taken into account the objections of children as young as six: Re W (Abduction: Child Objections) [2010] EWCA Civ 520 (‘Re W’).
As for the exercise of any discretion which may arise:
Discretion is ‘at large’; it is not the case that a court will only refuse a return in exceptional circumstances: Re M (Zimbabwe).
There is no exhaustive list of factors to be considered; the range of relevant considerations may be wider than a discretion arising in the context of other Article 13 exceptions: Re M (Zimbabwe).
The policy of the Convention is always relevant, but the weight it carries will vary from case to case: Re M (Zimbabwe).
Convention policy carries particular weight in cases where the taking or retaining parent is not the child’s primary carer, for example following a period of holiday contact: Re HB (Abduction: Children’s Objections) [1997] 1 FLR 392.
Policy considerations carry less weight in cases where there has been delay in the issue of proceedings: Re M (Zimbabwe); Re W.
The child’s welfare is a relevant consideration: Re M (Zimbabwe). In this context, the court is not restricted to examining matters related to forum and can consider the child’s short and long-term welfare more widely although it must do so within the confines of the summary process and not as part of a full welfare enquiry: Re S (A Child) (Habitual Residence and Child’s Objections) (Brazil) [2015] EWCA Civ 2 (‘Re S (Brazil)’).
Other matters the court may need to consider include (Re M (Zimbabwe)):
The nature and strength of the child’s objections;
The extent to which the objections are ‘authentically [the child’s own]’ or the product of influence by the abducting parent;
The extent to which the child’s objections coincide or at odd with the child’s welfare.
The older the child, the greater the weight that will be given to their objections: Re M (Zimbabwe); Re W.
Although it is generally undesirable to exercise the discretion so as to separate siblings this is by no means an absolute rule: see, for example, Re S (Brazil).
Cases involving a parallel asylum claim
The position in Hague Convention cases arising in the context of unresolved claims for asylum by the taking parent and the child was considered by in G v G [2021] UKSC 9. It was there held by the Supreme Court that, although the existence of an asylum claim did not prevent the High Court from determining an application under the 1980 Hague Convention, any return order could not be implemented until the asylum process, including any appeals, had concluded with a rejection of the claim.
The law has, however, evolved since G v G. The current position was comprehensively reviewed by Garrido J in Re K (Children) (Application for return orders: Concurrent asylum claims) [2025] EWHC 450 (Fam). I respectfully agree with his analysis, which it is unnecessary for me to repeat, and with his conclusion at paragraph 42 that:
“the operation of immigration and asylum law no longer prevents the High Court from implementing a decision to return a child to another State before their asylum claim here has been determined by the SSHD, provided that the general principle of non-refoulement is upheld. That general principle permits return to either the country of nationality, if there is no risk of persecution, or a safe third country. In exercise of its 1980 Hague Convention or inherent welfare jurisdiction, the High Court can make those determinations of risk and safety when considering holistically, as it must, whether to order a return.”
The parties’ positions
Father
The father’s case is simple. He says that this was a clear wrongful removal to a jurisdiction with which C had no prior connection and where he has no right to remain. There has been a full welfare hearing in Ohio and the Court has determined that it is in his best interests to return there and be placed in the custody of the father.
In light of that determination and the evidence more generally, it cannot be said that the grave risk exception is established. In any event, and without prejudice to that overarching contention, the father proposes a number of protective measures in the form of undertakings which will ensure that any return takes place on the basis of the type of ‘soft landing’ advocated by the guardian.
Mr Gration KC does not accept that C’s expressed views can be said to amount to an objection to returning, but submits that in any event any discretion should be exercised in favour of a return.
The mother
As I have already recorded, the mother accepts that she is responsible for a wrongful act for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention (albeit not that which I have found) and that, subject to Article 13, this triggers the obligation to return under Article 12.
Ms Ramadhan submits that Article 13(b) is established as a return would likely entail C being placed in the care of the father who, on the mother’s case, has abused C physically and emotionally. C would also be harmed by her potential incarceration.
The mother further submits that C clearly objects to returning to the USA. She argues that the strength of his objections, the fact that they are rooted in the reality of what a return is likely to entail, his age and considerations related to his overall welfare are factors which in combination outweigh any policy considerations and should lead the court to exercise its discretion against ordering a return. She further relies upon the fact that a return will require C to be separated from his sister and step-father as additional reasons for refusing to order a return.
In the alternative, Ms Ramadhan submits that in the event that the court makes a return order it must be on the basis of stipulations that the father:
pays for the return flights for the mother and C;
does not take any steps to institute or voluntarily support civil or criminal proceedings for the mother’s punishment, arising out of the alleged wrongful retention of C in August 2024;
actively works with the police to ensure that the mother is not arrested on arrival;
does not commence or support criminal proceedings for child abduction in Ohio;
does not attend at the airport of arrival when she and C arrive in the USA;
does not communicate directly with the mother save for the purposes of making arrangements for C pending the first inter partes hearing in the Ohio Family Court seised with welfare issues relating to C;
does not to seek to separate C from the mother’s care pending that first inter partes hearing;
does not intimidate, threaten, harass or use or threaten violence against the mother and/or C and does not instruct or encourage any other person to do so;
Ms Ramadhan submits that protective measures need to be binding and enforceable prior to any return taking effect and that ‘as a minimum’ the undertakings need to be contained in an English court order. She further submits, however, that even this step would be insufficient and that prior to a return taking place the parties should jointly obtain an interim order in Ohio which incorporates her proposed stipulations.
The guardian
The guardian does not advocate positively in favour of either party’s position. Mr Osborne helpfully draws attention to a number of features of the evidence relevant to the determinations I have to make. He also emphasises the guardian’s evidence about the desirability of a ‘soft landing’. On behalf of the guardian, he submits, however, that even if the return were to take place on the basis of a ‘hard landing’ (i.e. with the mother being sent to prison and C being placed immediately in his father’s care) this would not amount to an intolerable situation for Article 13(b) purposes.
Analysis and conclusions
Article 13(b)
I find that Article 13(b) is not satisfied in this case. In my judgment, this is a case which falls at the end of the spectrum where the court can confidently discount the possibility of an Article 13(b) risk arising.
In reaching that view I attach considerable weight to the fact that there have been two hearings in the Ohio Family Court at which the mother has made allegations against the father which have been considered by the court. Earlier this year the court, having heard evidence from a number of witnesses, gave a fully reasoned judgment explaining why it was in C’s best interests to be removed from the mother’s care and placed in the care of the father. That judgment has not been appealed.
It is not my function to undertake a review of the Ohio Family Court’s welfare decision, but the evidence provided by the guardian in these proceedings (which I have summarised above), in my judgment lends support to what was decided. Her evidence strongly suggests that C is being subjected to a degree of influence by his mother which is causing him harm and which wholly undermines the reliability of complaints he makes about his father.
I found it striking that immediately prior to the wrongful removal C spent a month being cared for by the father. There has been no suggestion by the mother that C was unhappy over the course of that month or that anything untoward occurred. It is remarkable, therefore, that C was completely unable to say anything positive about his father when he was interviewed by Ms Veitch. I also found his use of the term ‘biological’ father concerning. It suggests that his sense of identity is being undermined in his mother’s care.
It is also relevant to take into account that the mother’s complaints have been the subject of investigation by the SSHD who rejected her claims for asylum and for C. The threshold for successfully establishing a claim for refugee status is that the risk of persecution in the state in question is ‘real’, a lower threshold than the ‘grave’ risk which must be established under Article 13(b).
I accept the submission made on behalf of the guardian that even without the proposed protective measures, Article 13(b) would not be satisfied. If a return were to take place on the basis of a ‘hard landing’, C would no doubt find this difficult, but he would not be exposed to an intolerable situation. In my judgment, the difficulties he would face would be relatively short term and comparable to those experienced by children in cases where a court makes orders involving a transfer of residence to remove the child from exposure to alienating behaviour.
In any event, that scenario will not arise in this case. The father has proposed a number of measures, in line with the guardian’s recommendation, to ensure that C will not face the type of hard landing which the mother fears.
Within the context of Article 13(b), I am further entitled to have regard to the mother’s ability to seek assistance from the authorities in Ohio following a return.
Child objections
The guardian expressed a degree of hesitation about whether C’s views could be said to amount to ‘an objection’ to a return as the root of his objection lie in his complaints about his father and his wish not to be separated from his mother; save for expressing a preference for his school in England he did not raise any significant issues about his former life in the USA more generally. In my judgment, such hesitation is unwarranted.
I entirely accept the mother’s submission that C’s expressed views do amount to an objection. Without any soft landing measures, this would be a case in which a return to the USA would be indistinguishable from a return to his father’s care. Even with the proposed soft landing measures, the prospect of C being separated from his mother in the near future is real: there is a judgment to this effect which has not been appealed. The mother is likely to have to demonstrate that there are reasons for the court to depart from the welfare decision it made just a few months ago. In my judgment, it would be wrong to disregard the objections which C has articulated in such circumstances.
All parties rightly accept that, at the age of 10, C is above the threshold at which his views should be taken into account.
This means that I have a discretion as to whether a return should be ordered.
This is a case in which the mother deceived the father into giving her permission to have a holiday in England. In breach of that agreement and a pre-existing court order, she decided to cause C to relocate to a country with which he had no prior connection. In these circumstances, the policy of the Convention must carry significant weight, even though this was an abduction by a primary carer. That weight is reduced, but in my judgment only slightly, by the father’s delay of nearly a year before he initiated proceedings here; it is relevant in this regard that in the intervening period the father actively sought to procure C’s return through proceedings in the Ohio Family Court. It would not have been necessary for him to make this application at all if the mother had obeyed the order made by that court in the father’s favour.
By contrast, I consider that C’s objections carry relatively little weight. He is aged 10, and is not therefore of an age where his objections would be likely, without more, to carry substantial or overriding weight; moreover, he has the maturity of a younger child. Additionally, as I have already found, he has been subjected to significant and harmful influence by his mother and this considerably undermines the reliability of what he has said. I would not go so far as to say that his views are not authentic, but I do consider that they have been formed largely as a consequence of the pernicious emotional environment in which he has been living. I further consider that they are inconsistent with his welfare.
In my judgment it is clearly in C’s interests to return to the USA even if this results in him being separated from his mother as his primary carer. If nothing else, he needs to be able to enjoy a relationship with both of his parents and for so long as he remains in England his ability to do so with his father is being seriously undermined. He has relatives on both sides in the USA. The Ohio Family Court has already made a welfare determination. It would be contrary to C’s interests for the English court to embark upon a full welfare investigation with a risk of arriving at an inconsistent judgment. If the mother seeks to overturn the welfare conclusions of the Ohio court, it is far better for C that this be done through further modification proceedings in Ohio. Otherwise there exists a prospect that C may never be allowed to visit his home country as the mother would fear enforcement of the existing order.
A return may well result in C becoming separated from his sister in the near future, but the two of them are not close in age and will in any event be able to have regular contact going forwards. The potential detriment of such a separation is outweighed by the welfare advantages of a return which include the restoration of relations with C’s paternal relatives.
I will therefore exercise my discretion in favour of ordering a return.
Even though I do not find that a return on the basis of a ‘hard landing’ would be intolerable for C, I do consider that returning in such circumstances would be contrary to his interests. In the exercise of my discretion, therefore, I propose to direct that the return should take place on the basis of undertakings proposed by the father.
On the basis of the evidence of Mr Dahlberg, I am satisfied that if these undertakings are incorporated as an integral part of the return order it is highly probable that this will have the effect of ensuring in practice that:
The mother is not arrested or sent to prison; and
C is not separated from the mother pending further consideration by the Ohio Court;
I accept that these risks would be reduced still further if the undertakings were incorporated into an order of the Ohio Family Court; this would reduce the risks from ones which are low to ones which are very low. The advantage of minimising the risks still further needs to be balanced against the detriment to C of delaying the process to achieve this. It would require the parties to engage lawyers to draw up a motion and prepare an agreed draft order. This would then have to be submitted to court, with the probability that the motion would be allocated a listing four to six weeks later. Assuming the proposed order was approved, there would be a further delay while arrangements were made for C then to return. There is a real prospect that by going down this route, C’s return would not take place for several months. Following his return, there would need to be a yet further interim hearing in Ohio to consider whether the custody order should continue to be suspended beyond the initial period following a return.
I also consider it to be in C’s interests for the return to take place over the Christmas holidays to enable him to enjoy part of the holiday in the USA before returning to school at the start of next term. It will be more difficult for him if he has to start school in the middle of term.
Subject to any observations which Mr Dahlberg may make as to the drafting of the order, I propose that the father’s undertakings should be set out in a schedule to the order. Within the body of the order, I will make an order which obliges the father to comply with his undertakings and will also make it clear that the return order is made upon the basis of the father’s undertakings and a requirement that he complies with them. I will further require the father to lodge a copy of my order incorporating his undertakings with the Ohio Family Court as well as providing a copy to the relevant police force.
I grant the parties permission to raise further questions with Mr Dahlberg as to the drafting of the order.