A v B & Ors

This is the final hearing of the parties’ cross applications for the return of their children: the mother, A, wants the parties’ elder child C (aged 8½) returned from Egypt to this country; the father, B, wants the parties’ younger child, D (aged 3½) returned from this county to Egypt.

The background to this application is set out in the judgment I delivered on the 16 June 2025. On that occasion I determined that I had jurisdiction to hear this matter, even though both children, I found, were habitually resident in Egypt. I made findings of fact on many of the issues between the parties but I decided that I could not on that occasion fairly make either of the summary return orders then sought, so I put the return order off for further consideration and the recommendations of Ms Odze (the children’s guardian) as to the children’s welfare in the light of my findings.

I shall repeat the background in summary form below.

It was a matter of particular concern to me in June 2025 that if I provided for both the children to be in Egypt the father would have, under Egyptian law, control over them (guardianship), even though, as he pointed out, they would normally live with the mother until they are 16 years old (custody). I was troubled by the father’s submission that I could have confidence in ‘soft-landing provisions’ he was proposing to protect the mother and her relationship with the children in Egypt because he would enter into an agreement in this jurisdiction which would allow issues as to relocation of the children, the division of the children’s time, all matters involving the exercise of parental responsibility, and financial matters relating to the children to be determined (a) by that agreement, (b) by an international arbitrator where a future dispute might arise, and (c) in accordance with some form of children’s best interests test. That agreement could effectively become part of Egyptian law, he submitted, because it could be made an order of the Egyptian court before D returned.

I heard at that hearing the evidence of Dr Ian Edge (an expert in Egyptian law) who set out how such an agreement would work, and where its pitfalls might lie. He did think such a scheme could hold, but he was clear to me that the security to the mother that it might be thought to present was vulnerable, for example the father was able to make an application to the Egyptian court that the mother was immoral, which would allow that court to take control of the litigation and put aside the arbitration provisions. Ultimately he felt it was a matter of trust: could the court trust the father (and his family) to honour the agreement, or might he, once the children were back in Egypt, attack the agreement and thereby undo the soft-landing he proposed.

I did not have that level of trust in the father, and I was conscious of the time delay in drawing up the agreement, appointing an arbitrator, and resolving what the law was that would be applied to determine the children’s best interest, so, I resolved that I would hear the return applications on a non-summary basis myself in this jurisdiction. The agreement however would remain important to give the mother confidence in the soft-landing provision the father was proposing to facilitate the mother’s return (if she were to go with D) and provide a framework to determine other issues between the parties as they might arise if she and D were to return to Egypt.

At this hearing the mother has been represented by Ms Chokowry (who was her junior counsel at the last hearing). She has changed solicitors to Dawson Cornwell. That is because the father did not meet the orders that I had made to meet her legal costs (something for which he says he cannot be properly blamed). Fortunately she was able to get legal aid (emergency at first). The father has represented himself. He had been represented by leading counsel and Vardags, (changing briefly to Kingsley Napley) but he says he has been unable to meet their fees. He has, despite my request that he should be present, given his evidence and argued his case from Egypt. Putting it shortly, and colloquially, that is because he has ‘jumped bail’ which had been imposed on him as a consequence of an FCA investigation in this country. That investigation followed my hearing in this matter in July. Despite having a difficult case to run the father has presented his arguments to me calmly. The children have been represented through their guardian, Ms Odze. She has been represented by Henry Lamb instructed by Creighton and Partners. Ms Odze agrees with the mother that C should be returned from Egypt to live with the mother and D should stay here with the mother.

Mr Lamb, as at the last hearing, has helpfully prepared a summary of the most important facts that make up the background to this application. That is the basis of what follows, but I have altered it as I consider appropriate.

There have been a number of striking developments since the last hearing which arworth drawing out from that summary:

It is also notable that there has been no development in securing the soft-landing provisions that he had proposed, and the possibility of securing an order fixing an agreement reached here in Egyptian law must now be considered in the context of the proceedings brought in Egypt by the father’s mother.

There is not argument but that my decision as to which ‘return’ order I make should be based on the welfare of the children, and I am therefore guided by the welfare check list.

I am reminded, by Ms Chokowry of the importance of giving myself a Lucas direction on the facts of this case. I do. That a party has lied on one issue does not mean that they have lied on another, and that a party had lied does not mean that there may not be strength in their case. It might be that they have lied for an unrelated reason, or to strengthen an already strong case.

To summarise it, the mother’s case is that:

The father’s case, in summary, is that:

The Guardian says to me, in summary:

I intend here to give only general reflections as to how the parties appeared. Where I need to determine factual points I will do so below and at that stage deal with matters of detail.

The mother impressed me as to how assured and competent she seemed in the face of the twin disasters of C remaining in Egypt and the failure of the father to provide for her as envisaged and ordered. She gave evidence clearly. She acknowledged the importance of the father to the children. When I had seen her before I had characterised her as nervous. That is no longer an appropriate epithet. I agree with the comment of Mr Lamb, that she has rallied in the face of the difficulties confronting her.

The father showed no hint of the anger on which I commented last time in his evidence. He is articulate and clearly able. There were however repeated occasions when he took a rather literal or narrow approach to a question which made it appear that he was cavilling rather than answering. I conclude that he was on occasions seeking to avoid making concessions rather than presenting a valid alternative perspective.

Ms Odze made it clear that she was outraged by the father’s allegation that she had agreed with him that it was a good idea to return C to Egypt in August this year. Further, she was clear that she considered the father to be dishonest in other regards. Notwithstanding her strength of feeling she presented her evidence in such a way that I had no reason to believe that strength of feeling had caused her to wrongly balance the factors in the case.

I do not need to make findings on all the matters raised in closing by the parties. I do however need to deal with the following to deal fairly with the case:

Having made findings on these issues, I will then turn to the weighing of the factors set out in the welfare checklist.

Financial abuse or lack of provision a consequence of Chancery Proceedings. The father says that the injunction made against him in the Chancery Division is proprietary so he could not just pay money to the mother, notwithstanding that he was allowed £18,000 a month as personal expenditure. Before the mother could use the money she (as someone on notice of the injunction) would need to be satisfied that it was really his money and not money that properly belonged to the company in administration. This same problem, he says, means that money he has advanced to lawyers in this jurisdiction has just had to sit in their account and cannot be used. It would cost more to assess whether it can be used than the value it has.

The mother points not merely to the fact that she has not received the money due but, (1) she has been summoned for non-payment of council tax in relation to their joint property in August, before the civil injunction; (2) again in August she was chased because he had not paid the mortgage on their jointly owned property; (3) even in July the father had failed to pay the nursery fees so D was turned away. The father unrealistically suggested to me that the mother should have been paying the mortgage and the council tax, and he was unaware of the outstanding nursery fees.

It was put to the father that he was intending to raise £75,000 as a bond as part of his soft-landing provisions and there would be some tens of thousands of pounds required to get Dr Edge to draw up the agreement in this country and convert it into an Egyptian order to make his proposals work. He said that members of his family would be prepared to find the money for that so that should still be possible. When pressed as to why members of his family would be prepared to pay that money, but not prepared to assist in providing food for D or a roof over his head, he answered that his family were prepared to take steps to ensure that D came back to Egypt. He was pressed as to how, if the injunction was the critical problem, and he had notice of the injunction, he was able to spend money freely in Egypt. His answer was that the funds he had in Egypt were not funds caught by the proprietary terms of the injunction because they did not come from the funds that he is alleged to have taken from his business.

I am not making a finding for contempt in this judgment. My decision is on the balance of probabilities. I find it was open to the father to have found a way to have got funds to the mother, had he wanted to do so. He could have returned the matter back to the Chancery Division judge and asked him to set up a legitimate route. He could have advanced money from Egypt to other family members and pressed them to pay the mother. I find that the father found the civil injunction a convenient excuse to stop paying and accordingly took no steps to find a way round the problem. I do therefore conclude that this is a form of financial abuse.

C’s removal before the 21 August 2025 hearing. C had travelled to this country with the father from Egypt pursuant to an interim contact order that I had made, providing for her to see D and her mother, and the father to see D. (I note that the father had not agreed that contact could take place without him being present.) It was on learning that the father had been arrested and had bail conditions imposed on him which prevented him leaving the country that the mother urged that C should not leave this country. That was on the basis that both parents were now here and so it made sense for C to be here. The father had a conversation with Ms Odze on the 15 August 2025 when he explained why he thought it would be better for C to return – her school was about to start its new term, amongst other things. Ms Odze’s case is that she asked him to put his proposals in writing. He says that his and her positions ‘aligned’ during that call. The father did put his proposals in writing within a few hours. On that day the mother’s solicitors asked that no steps be taken in the meantime, and later that day they said they opposed the plan. On the 18 August the Guardian said she opposed the plan. On the same day an application was made to me. That day a hearing was listed on the 21 August. On the evening of the 18 August the father’s sister took C to Egypt.

The father says that he was quite entitled to arrange that because C was only here for contact. The mother and the Guardian say that this was deliberately putting C beyond the reach of the court, and preventing the court making a best interests decision. It is clear that all are in some senses right. I had invited an application for an interim order when listing the hearing on the 21 August. None had been sought. The trip had been arranged as a contact trip. It had been intended and indeed as initially set up directed that C would return to Egypt after the contact. It was however obvious to everyone that circumstances had changed. There was obvious force (not necessarily compelling force but weighty nonetheless) in an argument that she should now stay here because both her parents were here. The father, I find, took the step of having his sister take C back to Egypt to prevent the court requiring her to stay here.

The guardian is outraged by the father’s presentation of their position ‘aligning’ during the phone call on the 15 August. The father’s choice of the word align reflects the fact that he is well aware, I find, that there was no agreement expressed by the guardian with his place to return C. She did express views that returning C would be possible, referring to her own experience using unescorted minor services on airplanes. She might have expressed the view that there was benefit in C not missing school. It is clear that she did not express agreement to his plan on a balanced consideration of all the issues. She asked for his proposals to be put in writing, which happened. It is notable that in his written proposals the father does not assert that the Guardian had expressed agreement. The father’s assertion that their views aligned is an attempt to justify an action for which he knew he would be criticised.

Failure to return C. The father has not complied with my two orders that C should be returned. Again I note this is not a committal application. His case is that he cannot return her himself. He cannot get back to this country, he says, because he has no passport – that having been taken off him when he was arrested – and given he is British he cannot get a visa to an Egyptian passport. This is risible. It is inconceivable that in circumstances where an authority in this country has imposed bail conditions on him to keep him in the country they would not, if he approached them, find a way to enable him to return. He has produced no evidence that he has made such an approach. He says that he cannot get anyone else to return C because under Egyptian law an unaccompanied Egyptian minor requires a travel permit from the Passports, Immigration and Nationality Administration. None will be granted, because, as a consequence of the proceedings brought by his mother in Egypt in relation to the children, there is in place a travel ban.

There is no evidence before me sufficient to lead me to say that is wrong. I do not have the ban as issued from the court but there is a letter from an Egyptian lawyer which says there is such a ban. However, there are two very powerful arguments to say that this is not the full story. (1) The father is a man of obvious ingenuity when it comes to travelling between countries. After his passport was seized and he entered into bail conditions not to leave the country he got himself over to Northern Ireland, crossed the border to Eire, and then got emergency travel documents to get himself back to Egypt. (2) The proceedings brought by his mother appear to have the deliberate effect of thwarting the order of this court. It is clear that the father could, if his family co-operated, have found a way to honour my return orders.

I do need however to pause and reflect further on the Egyptian proceedings. I directed the father to produce all documents to which he had access or were in his possession in relation to these proceedings by my order of the 2 October 2025. Virtually nothing has been produced. His evidence was that the mother could have got the documents herself. He says he has produced what he has. I do not consider this a full answer. It is his mother that is bringing the proceedings. It is part of his case that he has a good relationship with his family. When pressed he said inconsistent things: (1) that he and his mother did not discuss the proceedings, and (2) that what his mother was aiming to achieve was a custody order in her own favour which she would then allocate as to one week with him and one week with the mother on her return. He and his mother clearly do talk about these proceedings, and I find that the father has been a powerful influence on her bringing those proceedings.

Caused C to deceive. There are many points that Mr Lamb draws to my attention, but for my purposes I need focus on only two.

First the meeting between C and the Guardian on the 4 August 2025. This was three days after the father’s arrest at the airport. The Guardian observed that C was quiet and subdued. C however made no mention of the arrest of her father. The arrest must have been an unusual event in her life. It is highly likely that it is something that would have bothered her. The father accepts that he had told C not to talk about him. It is obvious that he told her that because he had not told the mother and the guardian about the arrest. He did not want C revealing it. Albeit by causing her to be silent on a point rather than causing her to lie about a point, his instruction to her is drawing C into his deception. It is not in her best interest.

Second, on the 26 August 2025, when it is known that C has returned to Egypt but not known that the father has, the Guardian spoke to C on the phone and asked her how she was. She said she was not very good because she was there without her parents. The father said (through counsel) at the hearing on the 29 August 2025 when I enquired how this could have happened, that ‘he asked C not to tell the Guardian that he was in Egypt’. That is recorded as a recital to the order. He now says that all he instructed her to do was not talk about him. That shift in his position, even if right, does not make what he has done any better. C has clearly been led to deceive the Guardian at his prompting. That is not in her best interest.

Soft-landing provisions. The father has proposed throughout these proceedings that he can enable the mother to safely to return to Cairo without fear that he will use the power he might otherwise have under Egyptian law to take the children from her and seek her punishment for taking D to England without his consent. The ‘fleshed out’ version of the provisions is in his statement of the 17 September 2025. It includes such things as:

Once agreement had been reached then it was his suggestion that the agreement would be embodied in a court order of the Egyptian court which would bind the hands of the Egyptian authorities.

When this matter was last before me in May and June this year I heard from Dr Edge on this scheme. My record of his evidence is found at paragraphs 38 to 43 of my judgment. I will repeat here paragraph 42:

It is apparent now that I cannot rely on the integrity of the father or his family to comply with the agreement. Notwithstanding the security clearance the father asserts he has or his position in the financial industry he is under investigation for misappropriation of company funds. He has left the country contrary to his bail conditions. He has taken steps to prevent the court making an effective decision as to where C should live. He has deceived me as to where he was. He has given me a false promise to remain in the jurisdiction. He has not returned C when ordered to do so. He has not paid the financial support that he told me he would or that I ordered he should. His mother, on his case, has taken it upon herself to start proceedings in Egypt which thwart my order for C’s return. He has further (as highlighted by Mr Lamb) expressed himself in written communication between the parents in strong terms as to the immorality of the mother, including referring to her as evil.

I cannot rely on him to honour an agreement reached here. It is all too likely that he will take what steps are necessary to get D back to Egypt and then proceed to pick and choose as suits him from the terms of any agreement reached here.

I turn now to welfare considerations and will follow section 1(3) of the Children Act, noting first some involvement in the child’s life of each parent will further their welfare. No one has argued to the contrary here.

Wishes and feelings: C has a poor relationship with her mother. This has its roots in being left behind in Egypt when her mother left with D. (I have made findings as to the circumstances in my June judgment and will not repeat them here.) She has made clear she does not want to move to England and live with her mother, but stay in Egypt with her father. I must bear in mind when I consider her views that she has been encouraged to deceive the Guardian by the father, and that he has ensured that she has had no time with the mother without him also being present. His negative view of the mother will have influenced her. Nonetheless were I to oblige her to move it will be difficult at least in the short term. D’s views have not been canvassed.

Physical, emotional and educational needs: the father points to the much greater financial security he can offer. This however has only been achieved by ‘jumping bail’. Were he to have remained here his financial situation would be as vulnerable as the mother’s. His assets have been frozen by an order of the Chancery Division. He is under investigation of the FCA which may result in serious criminal charges. He appears to be able to enjoy financial stability only by putting himself beyond the reach of the English court. I cannot consider that a stable position. The mother has access to much less money. She will be reliant on the state, at least in part. Nonetheless she can make adequate provision, and it comes with much less jeopardy. As to emotional needs: both children should be together and should have a good relationship with both parents. The father has not shown himself as sensitive to C’s emotional needs by not allowing her to have any time alone with her mother. As to educational needs: C’s education will be disrupted by her returning to this country. If the father were to meet private school fees for her again the disruption could be lessened. It does not appear realistic to envisage that will happen. D’s educational needs could be met either in Egypt or England.

Likely effect of any change in circumstances: whichever child is moved country will find the change disruptive. As C is older the disruption is likely to be greater for her.

Age, sex, background: save for the point made above I do not see that this bears on the case.

Any harm: C did suffer harm when mother left her in Egypt. She is now suffering harm by her father’s involvement of her in the process of this litigation. Further she will suffer harm, as the Guardian relates, if she is not able to reform her relationship with her mother soon. The father is preventing her from doing so.

Capability of each parent: the mother impressed me as the more capable parent – she could acknowledge what has happened and saw advantages nonetheless in the children preserving a relationship with the father. The father looked to blame the mother at every turn. There is also some force in the Guardian’s point that the mother had been the children’s primary carer before the parties’ separation.

Range of powers: Realistically, I am limited to the ‘return orders’ on the basis that neither parent will move with the children. The father will not return here. He wants access to his money which he will not have in this jurisdiction. The mother will not move to Egypt. She has good reason to be concerned that whatever agreement is put in place before she returns the father will undo it after she goes back. I have to acknowledge that if (as seems to be in their best interest) I am to make an order premised on the children being together that will be either both here with their mother, or both in Egypt with their father. I will need to elect a country and make provision for video contact with the other parent. There might be a third country where both can travel for time with the children but I do not have evidence before me to try and determine a mechanism for preventing abduction from that country (or indeed the father finding that he is caught in the third country in some way for jumping bail in this country).

The evidence is clear and, as Ms Odze reminds me, accepted by the mother and the father that D and C should live together. Choosing as I must then between D returning to Egypt or C returning here the option is straightforward. C should return here. I can look at this in two different ways:

This case had been finely balanced in June. It is not so now. It is right that a move of C to this country will be disruptive but it is the only way that she will be able to repair her relationship with her mother, and it would be folly to risk moving D to Egypt. The mother, if she followed, would find herself powerless to do anything other than comply with the father’s will. The best interests of the children would be lost. And if she stayed here, her relationship with both children would be rendered nugatory.

As a matter of courtesy to him I will consider now those parts of the father’s case (as summarised by me) that I have not expressly dealt with above.

I will make an order for C to be returned. I would allow two weeks to enable the father to take steps to lift any legal impediment. She will live with the mother on her return. The current indirect contact should continue until her return.

I will further make an order for daily video contact after the return between the father and the children for about 20 minutes but longer should the call be going well and shorter if the children want to end it. The contact should be without the mother present and can be both children simultaneously or one followed by the other as the children prefer.

There can be such further or other contact as the parties agree in writing, subject always to provisions being made to prevent abduction. This remains subject to the court retaining the power to direct how contact should take place if there is no agreement between the parties.

I will direct that D’s old UK passport should be returned to the mother from the father’s old solicitors, Vardags.

I will not make C a ward of court. If she is not returned as I am ordering an application can be made, to me for her to be made a ward. I will consider it on the papers and may make an order for her to be warded on the papers, but will in any event list the matter for directions to effect compliance with this order.

The order I make can be disclosed to the FCA. If there is non-compliance I will consider disclosing a summary of these proceedings to the FCA and would ask (a) the Children’s Guardian’s lawyers to draft the summary and (b) the father and the mother to indicate to what they object in the summary.