R v R

This is my judgment on the appeal against findings of fact made by District Judge Bridson (hereafter “the Judge”) following a contested trial in private law proceedings before the Family Court sitting at Northampton. By way of a written application dated 23 September 2025 (sealed on 24 September 2025) the Applicant mother seeks permission to appeal the decision to make the findings of fact. She challenges all of the findings made. The Respondent father resists the appeal.

HHJ McCabe considered the application and made case management directions on the papers on 26 September 2025. She listed the application for permission to appeal and the appeal to follow, if permission were granted, before me on 30 October 2025 with a time estimate of two days. No reasons were provided within the order. As a Designated Family Judge she was entitled to list the appeal before a judge of the High Court (given it is an appeal from a District Judge) if she considered the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice. The Applicant had sought for the matter to be listed before a High Court Judge if permission were granted. The Respondent appeared to take issue with the listing directions and asked for the application for permission to appeal be considered in the usual way by a Circuit Judge sitting in the Family Court and for the application for permission to appeal to be dismissed after consideration on the papers and without a hearing. No formal application was made to pursue this point and the allocation and listing were not re-considered.

At the appeal hearing Mr Feehan KC set out the appeal for the Applicant. Ms Wiley KC responded, resisting the appeal, on behalf of the Respondent. Both had filed lengthy skeleton arguments and various schedules. Although the three children were not parties to the appeal, counsel for their Guardian attended and filed a brief position statement. As they were not parties to the appeal I did not hear submissions from their counsel. I am grateful to Mr Feehan and Ms Wiley for their concise, clear submissions. I announced my decision to the parties, which was as follows:

I reserved my reasons for dismissing the appeal. I endeavour to briefly set out below my reasons for arriving at these conclusions.

Proceedings began by way of a child arrangements order application made by the Respondent on 7 August 2024. He sought a child arrangements order to spend time with his three children stating that the applicant had unilaterally ceased all contact between him and his children since Fathers’ Day on 16 June 2024. The three subject children were born in 2013 and twins born in 2014. I can take the background from the Judge’s clear judgment:

“5.

The parties began a relationship in 2009, though the mother says it was earlier it makes little practical difference to the issues before me today. They married in 2010. The father complains that from an early part in the marriage, the Maternal Grandmother was a constant feature in their relationship and at one point during the Covid Pandemic all the maternal family lived in the family home. During the course of the marriage, the parties have born three children the subject of this application. X was born via IVF treatment in the UK in 2013. There is a factual dispute as to the nature of the IVF sought in respect of the twins. The mother will say the father insisted on gender selection. This is disputed by the father who will say that it was the mother who sought this specialist facility, not in the UK, but only in America. As a result, the mother, the maternal grandmother and the maternal aunt travelled to Los Angeles to a clinic. The mother asserts that the father did not visit her there but it seems to me he must have visited to produce the specimens necessary for conception. There is a considerable factual dispute between the parties as to the support each offered the other following the birth of the twins to which I will return in early course.

6.

At the time of the marriage, the father had established a [redacted] business known [redacted]. Again, there is factual dispute between the parties as to the amount of work undertaken by the mother, but she believed she was a shareholder in 2011. The father says this could not be the case as he only took over ownership from his mother in 2012. He produces documentary evidence. However, in 2017 the mother became a 50% shareholder and the Company name changed to [redacted] Limited. It is this venture and other business ventures operated by the father which has funded the lifestyle of the family, paid for private schools for all three children and, on the case for the husband, has funded the extended maternal family to a very large extent (disputed by the maternal grandmother, maternal aunt and the mother). As the business built and new ventures added, the father spent as much time as he could at home. This is disputed by the mother who says he was rarely with the children and preferred to spend time on his own.

7.

The mother has long been focussed on the educational needs of all three children such that the Nursery and the GP expressed concerns.

8.

The relationship between the parents had, on the father’s case become strained not only due to the financial demands of the maternal extended family but also during Covid the entire maternal family came to live in the family home including the maternal grandmother, the maternal aunt and her son [X] and the maternal grandfather. Again, there is factual dispute between the parties as to when the maternal grandmother ceased to live in the home. What is clear on the written evidence is that towards the end of 2023 relationships were strained. There were arguments and shouting. It would seem that the catalyst for the parents was a Rugby event at [redacted] on 10th February 2024. The father’s evidence was that he had thought there were two tickets available and invited his wife. In fact, there was only one ticket available. When told the mother became highly distressed.

9.

There was a further incident which provoked concern for the mother. The [business] had won a European Award as a [redacted]. The mother felt she had been left isolated from this prestigious award.

10.

In April 2024, the mother holidayed with the paternal grandmother and the children in Turkey for a period of 10 days. Upon her return the mother filed an online report of domestic abuse. There followed police telephone calls via the maternal grandmother’s telephone whilst in the car with the children. By 6th May 2024, the father left the family home. On the next day, the mother transferred circa £110,000 from a joint account with her mother to a variety of people.

11.

Some contact continued to take place until 16th June 2024. The father has not now seen the children for 14 months, despite the employment of Independent Social Workers and Ward Andrews to facilitate contact. The children have been rude to their father in indirect contact and made allegations against him to which I will turn in the evidence. The financial breakdown of the marriage has caused further strain and both parents have expended considerable funds in legal costs in the present proceedings and the financial remedy proceedings.

12.

In the present case there are allegations of financial control, physical and emotional abuse of her and the children against the father. There are allegations of alienation against the mother.

The Judge, in an order dated 21 January 2025, determined a five day fact finding hearing was necessary. She made a variety of directions including striking out some of the Applicant’s allegations. She listed the trial for 17 June 2025 with a time estimate of five days. At paragraphs 7 and 8 of her order she noted the Applicant had made allegations of domestic abuse and therefore she found the applicant was vulnerable for the purposes of FPR Part 3A and that her participation was likely to be affected. She set out detailed participation directions which she directed must be provided by the court office to both security and the usher. She made four participation directions which were: a. separate entrances to, and waiting areas in, the court building; b. measures to prevent the Respondent from seeing the Applicant within the court building or its precincts; c. measures to ensure security took steps to prevent the parties meeting unless in the hearing; and d. measures to permit the Applicant to participate in court from behind a screen.

Leading counsel before me were trial counsel. At the trial, Mr Feehan’s appeal skeleton argument states the following took place:

“Despite the fact that F was the applicant in the proceedings and was making serious allegations against M, the judge ruled that M would give evidence first. She was cross- examined across 3 days of what was initially a 5-day hearing window. On two occasions leading counsel for M drew to the judge’s attention that (i) according to the FPR 2010, M was to be treated as a vulnerable witness and that (ii) the questions and manner of cross- examination were in breach of the guidelines mandated by practice direction and the advocates’ toolkit. The judge dismissed the objections. On the second day of questioning, M was unable to continue after a further period of questioning conducted in breach of the guidance and suffered and emotional breakdown in a conference room outside court. The questioning was on any view persistent and aggressive. At the beginning of day 3, counsel for M provided the court with a document setting out the relevant guidance and pointing out the breaches of it. Questioning continued in breach of the guidelines when the first question put to M was that her breakdown the previous day had been fabricated.

The case was unable to be completed in the 5-day time estimate and a further 2 days were listed in early July to hear the evidence of the father. Thereafter written submissions were filed and after some further additional delay a draft judgment was circulated on 25 August 2025. The solicitors acting for M filed a document setting out factual errors in the judgment running to 9 pages preceding the formal hand down of the judgment on 2 September; none save for 5 (dealt with later in this document) were accepted by the judge.”

As is required by the FPR the findings of fact made by the Judge are set out in her order dated 2 September 2025, as follows:

The findings of fact are supported by a comprehensive and coherent judgment of 138 paragraphs. It is not necessary to set out detailed passage of the judgment (with a few exceptions to which I will return below). It sets out: the jurisdiction; the background; the case for the parties; the evidence (written and oral); a summary of the closing submissions; the applicable legal principles and 51 paragraphs of analysis and discussion. It deals with some of the procedural matters which give rise to the Applicant’s first ground of appeal. Paragraph three of the judgment states inter alia:

“For today’s purposes I have been provided with a Main Bundle (MB, 1715 pages) and a Supplementary Bundle (SB, 1118 pages). In addition, I have received additional pieces of evidence as the case has proceeded including updated School Reports, Tesco Credit Card statements, Position Statements, Draft LOI to a Metadata analyst, Draft LOI to a GP surgery, a Chronology (83 pages). The case was originally listed over a five-day period but that time estimate had to be extended by an extra two days to conclude the evidence. The hearing has been a face-to-face hearing subject of special measures given the allegations of domestic abuse. The case was also interrupted on day two due to the level of distress of the mother when answering questions put to her by Ms Wiley KC. I agreed that the matter could not proceed on that day. The mother then produced a cognitive assessment of her from 2021 produced in support of her appeal against a refusal to grant a nursing qualification. Both Counsel agreed it that the Advocates Toolkit would be used and whilst there has been some complaint by Mr Feehan KC that Ms Wiley KC has not observed the principles in the toolkit, I have sought to address those issues as they have arisen. In addition, I have provided breaks where necessary to ensure the process is fair.”

The applicant has six grounds of appeal against the fact finding of the Judge. These are:

Family Proceedings Rule 30.12 (3) states:

“The appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was:

(a)

wrong; or

(b)

unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.”

To add to the background to this ground of appeal, I have the transcript of the Judge’s reasons for refusing permission to appeal on 2 September 2025. She said this:

“So far is the grounds of appeal upon which the respondent relies, firstly as to ground 1, I failed to observe the published guidance in respect of vulnerable witnesses, this was a matter touched upon very early on in my judgment and, indeed, in the hearing, after the mother produced a report, a cognitive report about her abilities. I, as I have said in my judgment, dealt with the issues as to the use of the Toolkit as they were raised by counsel Mr Feehan KC on behalf of the mother. I agree with Miss Wiley that a counsel only meeting was held with me when Mr Feehan entirely accepted that the hearing should proceed and that the mother’s right to a fair trial had not been undermined. I do not accept, therefore, that is a valid ground of appeal.”

Mr Feehan’s detailed skeleton argument makes the following main points:

At the appeal hearing he helpfully developed this submission in large measure by taking me through the written transcript of the evidence. He accepted, in answer to a question from me, that it was not necessary for me to hear the tape recording of the evidence and that his appeal could be advanced only on the basis of the written transcript. When asked what the breaches of PD 3AA amounted to, Mr Feehan was clear it was only his submission that the cross-examination of the Applicant did not comply with the Advocates’ Toolkit.

Ms Wiley’s team produced a schedule entitled “Chronology of Special Measures At Fact-Finding Hearing.” Effectively this is the Respondent’s answer to this ground of the appeal. It is a compelling document. Ms Wiley submits the Judge conducted an entirely fair hearing throughout and intervened as and when necessary to assist the Applicant to give her evidence. Breaks were offered. The Judge remined counsel to slow the pace of questioning. An adjournment was provided.

To resolve this ground of appeal I have had regard to the written transcript of the evidence. It is nearly 1, 000 pages. I have read some of it and time was spent at the hearing going through it whilst Mr Feehan made submissions. After the Applicant was unable to continue with her evidence on day two, the court adjourned unto day three. At the outset of the hearing on day three, the Judge met leading counsel in chambers. I set out some of the transcript of this part of the hearing as it illuminates the issues, the Applicant’s complaint and the Judge’s approach to them.

“MR. FEEHAN:…..The position is that we are not seeking an adjournment and I am not setting this up for an appeal. What I am doing is pointing out to the court because I have to, because my duties are set out in the guidance, that where I say there has been non-compliance with the guidance I have to say so. The highlighted portions of the toolkits that I put before the court make it counsel's duty to say when they say there has been non-compliance with guidance. Now, in relation to guidance about learning disabilities, it was known the mother was dyslexic, we did not know about her processing speeds. The guidance for vulnerable witnesses, however, is very similar to the guidance for witnesses with learning disabilities.

DISTRICT JUDGE BRIDSON: Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Feehan, but why on earth has not your client told her solicitors about this previously?

MR. FEEHAN: I do not think she thought it was relevant. I think she gets along in ordinary life perfectly well. As the guidance says very clearly, communication ordinarily in society and within families is different from what happens in court. What has happened is, I will be saying to you in submissions, if it is said that the long pauses that Ms. Wiley has adverted to on a number of occasions, in front of the witness, if that is going to be said because she is trying to think of lies to respond to the questions, I would be saying to you that this is the problem with vulnerable witnesses and this is what the research actually says happens. It is important for you to have that before you. I am not seeking an adjournment because I think it is remediable, because I think putting that material before you enables you to consider it in good faith and properly and looking at how she gave her evidence. I am certainly saying that from now on that guidance must be strictly adhered to and that she must be given space and time. She must be given an opportunity to consider documents, and to answer her questions in her own way. That guidance even says sometimes they do not answer the question they have been asked. What you do not do is say, "answer the question", you say, "okay, I understand that, I just want to take you back, I just want to say this was my question and if you just consider that and answer the question, just think of that question and answer that question again." It is a matter of tone and style, but it is actually set out in the guidance as to how to do it.

DISTRICT JUDGE BRIDSON: I know I interrupted twice.

MR. FEEHAN: Yes.

DISTRICT JUDGE BRIDSON: Because she was going round the houses and not answering the question.

MR. FEEHAN: Yes.

DISTRICT JUDGE BRIDSON: That is twice, Mr. Feehan.

MR. FEEHAN: Yes.

DISTRICT JUDGE BRIDSON: I do not think I did it in an aggressive way.

MR. FEEHAN: No no, please do not think I am criticising you. I have made critical comments about the way Ms. Wiley asked those questions. Ms. Wiley must be, is aware of the toolkits, is aware of the need to avoid unnecessary repetition, is aware of the need not to ask compound questions, is aware of the need to give people space and time, is aware of the need when it is obvious a person is struggling to think of a different way of doing it and to adapt their style accordingly. That is all in the guidance. That did not happen.

DISTRICT JUDGE BRIDSON: I was going to say, many of the criticisms you make of Ms. Wiley are her setting the background to questions she is going to ask.

MR. FEEHAN: They are ----

DISTRICT JUDGE BRIDSON: And the witness is entitled to know which element of her evidence that Ms. Wiley is asking questions about.

MR. FEEHAN: That is certainly, true, judge. The guidance is very clear about how to do it. It is done neutrally. It is done slowly and carefully. It is done shortly. "I am going to ask you about X. Did X do this? What did you say to X? Did you tell X to do something?" It is that way of dealing with vulnerable witnesses, not a long preamble followed by a sharp question at the end. I accept that what Ms. Wiley has been doing is with any other witness perfectly acceptable, but the reasons why there are research and evidence-based toolkits which we are mandated to abide by, by the regulations, is that vulnerable witnesses act in a different way to ordinary witnesses.

………..

MR. FEEHAN: I am absolutely not -- please do not think that I do not want the father's case to be fully and properly put. The point I make is simply about the way in which we as advocates are mandated to approach vulnerable witness cases and sometimes it does mean, as the guidance says, having to change tack halfway through the evidence or during the evidence or during the case or realising what the difficulty is and having then to act accordingly. I repeat, I am not seeking an adjournment. I will criticise but do not say it has been wholly unfair or irremediably unfair how things happened on the first day. I do say that from now on we must abide by the guidance, which means giving her time. We had the suggestion yesterday of taking her to a document, we now have two laptops so she can look at every document she needs to look at. We can, if necessary, read it out to her in court so she both follows and hears it, but she needs that time to answer the questions. It is fairly simple practical steps that we seek. I am really not trying to cause trouble in this case, but a vulnerable witness is necessarily disadvantaged and these rules are all about counteracting that disadvantage.

MS. WILEY: May I just say this finally, yesterday, I think it was yesterday, it was said there was no problem with my cross-examination. I know we were in here talking about other matters but I would like that re-emphasised. If it is now being said it has to be done in a different way, I will be guided by the court and not Mr. Feehan. I am not going to make a problem about it, but I do want that marker in the sand as well that mother's own team did not have a difficulty with mother's cross-examination.

DISTRICT JUDGE BRIDSON: Yes.

MS. WILEY: And they are not seeking an adjournment.

DISTRICT JUDGE BRIDSON: Well, Mr. Feehan, I have no doubt you will interrupt if you think that the toolkit has been not applied properly, and you can do that.

MR. FEEHAN: Thank you.”

The hearing then resumed with the parties with an argument about privilege. The transcript shows that Ms Wiley’s cross-examination of the applicant resumed on page 159 and continued until page 314. Whilst giving evidence, the Applicant had her solicitor sit beside her to assist her with the bundles. Mr Feehan occasionally asked for a document to be shown to his client which took place. He asked for a few ten minute breaks which were granted. The lunch adjournment takes place. Mr Feehan asks for a further break shortly after lunch and the Judge agrees. On an occasion Mr Feehan says: “Can we just, thinking about the Toolkit, just a breath.” Ms Wiley responds that the Toolkit is being followed and the questioning continues. On occasion Mr Feehan asks for bundle references to be repeated. The witness asks to take some pain relief but states she does not want a break. The Judge agrees to her request. The transcript records that in the afternoon, the Applicant is crying and the transcript records Mr Feehan saying “please”. The Judge asks this witness if she would like to step outside and have a ten minute break. She responds that she does not and states: “I just want to get this over and done with”. The Judge disagrees and rises. The Applicant had a short break. Towards the end of the cross-examination and the Applicant asks how many more questions there will be. Ms Wiley responds: “not too many”. The Judge asks if the Applicant is alright to carry on. She states she would prefer to “Finish today and not drag it on”. The Judge states: “Again, I am keener to have you given the best available evidence” The Applicant is told there is fifteen to twenty minutes left and state her preference to carry on. Mr Feehan raised a point about the unfairness of the implication in a question. The questioning continues. The cross-examination ends. The judge agrees to adjourn any re-examination to the next day. The transcript records on day four, Mr Feehan had no re-examination. I add that the topics for cross-examination were personal and difficult.

I granted permission to consider the role of the Advocates’ Toolkit in the context of questioning vulnerable witnesses, seen in the specific context of FPR PD Rule 3A and PD3AA. This seemed a compelling enough reason to grant permission to hear the appeal. Fairness is essential. Fairness to vulnerable parties is particularly important. Nonetheless, I can set out my conclusions with brevity. The obligations on both the court and the parties contained within FPR Rule 3A and PD3AA are clear and need no further elucidation from me. The Judge determined the Applicant was a vulnerable witness in her January 2025 order. Paragraph 5.7 of PD3AA sets out the expectation that advocates should be familiar with the techniques being employed by the Advocates’ toolkit. No more; no less. Any trial judge must consider the Rules and the Practice Direction and the overall fairness of the proceedings. The Toolkit is guidance particularly aimed at advocates and litigants in person. It should normally be followed.

Turning to the particular facts of this case I am entirely persuaded this ground of appeal must be dismissed. The Judge had to deal with rather fraught parties and difficult emotional issues, given the allegations made. In January 2025, she correctly determined: (i) the need for fact finding; (ii) the Applicant’s designation as vulnerable; (iii) her duty to consider FPR Rule 3A and PD 3AA; (iv) the need for participation directions. No appeal was made and no further applications were made in respect of participation directions.

At the trial, she acceded to the requests made by Mr Feehan. There was an adjournment from day two to three. There were multiple breaks. She agreed Ms Wiley should adhere to the Advocates’ Toolkit. She noted the need for the pace to be slowed. She required proper referencing of documents in the bundle. She permitted the Applicant’s solicitor to sit beside her to assist with the bundles. Even in circumstances where the Applicant stated she did not want a break, the Judge formed the view she would give better evidence after the assistance of a break. She permitted Mr Feehan to extensively state his case around the Toolkit in oral submissions on day two and day three. She also permitted him to file, and consider, his written submissions on the same issue. She considered them. At no stage did Mr Feehan state anything other than Ms Wiley should follow the Advocates’ Toolkit’s guidance. She extended the length of the trial by two days to fairly accommodate the issues which had arisen. Mr Feehan made limited interventions. Any limited intervention Mr Feehan made on day three appears to have been acceded to, as far as I can tell. The judgment deals with these issues. Consideration of the 2021 dyslexia report (provided mid-trial) took place. No proper explanation was made as to why this was produced mid-cross-examination and not dealt with as a reasonable adjustment in the context of a purported disability in January 2025 or at the outset of the trial. More fundamentally the report does not suggest reasonable adjustments and/or participation directions, other than those the Judge had implemented and continued to do so.

I am satisfied the experienced Judge complied with the rules and practice directions I have identified. She ensured the Applicant’s common law rights to a fair hearing were adhered to. She correctly identified that the Respondent’s leading counsel should be permitted to put her client’s case. That is a hallmark of our adversarial system. At no stage did she lose sight of the Applicant’s vulnerabilities. The Judge, correctly, applied the common law principles whilst protecting a vulnerable party. Ground one is dismissed.

Permission to appeal was refused in respect of grounds two to six. I can take them shortly.

Ground two states the Judge made factual errors and failed to correct them or did correct them but did not then properly, or at all, analyse how the corrected facts impacted on her analysis and findings. I have I mind Lewison LJ’s (with the agreement of Males and Snowden LJJ) approach set out in paragraph 2 of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48. The Judge circulated her draft judgment on 25 August 2025 and invited the usual suggested amendments. The Applicant’s legal team filed and served a table of factual corrections which ran to eleven pages. The judge held a hearing on 2 September 2025 to deal with hand down and consequential matters. She went through the issues raised by the Applicant. She did not find any of those amendments or the overall thrust of the Applicant’s post judgment case made any difference to her overall analysis or to her material findings of fact made against the Applicant. The Judge was in the unique place to carry this out. As an appellate judge having considered the skeleton arguments, the Applicant’s Schedule of corrections and the Judge’s judgment, I am not able to conclude that arguably these factual points could have led to a different analysis which would have led to the undermining of some or all of the findings of fact.

In the overall context of the findings made, in my judgement, the Applicant’s legal team have alighted on points of inconsequential detail that do not get near to their necessary task, namely of undermining the Judge’s findings of fact. For example, the Applicant’s appeal submissions cling on to details of minor factual issues in respect of her witness, AB. It is submitted some of these minor facts as found by the judge were wrong and, in turn, this error must have impacted on the judge’s assessment of credibility. Even if some of these details were incorrect, it was still for the Judge to assess the witness’s credibility after having listened to and read her evidence in the context of all the other evidence. There is no prospect the Judge, who diligently went about her task, would have formed a different view on credibility of AB which would have led to a different assessment of her and by extension the Applicant’s evidence and her other witnesses, and this, taken together or separately, would have undermined the other evidence analysed, which led the Judge to make her findings. This is not arguable. This ground of appeal must be dismissed as it has no prospect of success.

Ground three relates to metadata analysis and whether the Applicant had attempted to manipulate evidence in respect of the children’s medical records. This issue focused on paragraph 92 of the judgment which states:

“In my view there have been efforts on the part of the mother to manipulate the evidence. Her evidence as to retaining the medical records for 5 months was less than credible, though I accept the discrepancies between the mother’s version and that obtained by the father’s solicitors is innocuous. The mother and maternal grandmother’s disinclination to allow Metadata analysis of photographs and telephones leads me to infer their reliance on video evidence and photographic evidence is unreliable. A further point raised at the PTR was the need for an interpreter for the maternal grandmother. When I pointed out that the witness statement filed by the maternal grandmother was written in English and therefore did not comply with FPR PD22A, the application was not pursued. I found no language reservation in the evidence of the maternal grandmother.”

The Judge does not say the Applicant attempted to manipulate the medical records. She accepted discrepancies in respect of the medical evidence were innocuous. The Judge’s wider view that the Applicant had sought to manipulate the evidence was one open to her. Reading paragraph 92 as a whole and in the context of the lengthy judgment, the Judge is not making a finding that the Applicant manipulated the medical records, but rather the evidence generally. She was entitled to form that conclusion and gave reasons for this legitimate view in paragraph 92. The Applicant’s legal team have become overly focused on: (i) the dispute over the metadata analysis and the GP records; and (ii) the disproportionate litigation around these issues, that it has influenced how they read the judgment. This ground has no prospect of success and permissions is refused.

This is a reasons challenge to the Judge’s view the Applicant colluded with other witnesses. The short answer to this is found across the judge’s detailed analysis having heard the witness at paragraph 92 to 99. It is clear she gave reasons. The Applicant should be capable of understanding the reasons given by the Judge and therefore she knows why she lost on these issues. Permission is refused.

This ground states the Judge failed to holistically analyse the evidence and inappropriately confined herself to the Scott Schedules. This is not a promising start to the ground of appeal, given the detail and structure of the judgment. The Judge’s summary of the law, which she clearly applied stated the following inter alia (my emphasis in underline):

“'Coercive behaviour' means an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim;

'controlling behaviour' means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour."

I accept that specific incidents, rather than being seen as free-standing matters, may be part of a wider pattern of abuse or controlling or coercive behaviour. Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal) [2017] EWCA Civ 2121 (paragraph 61):

"Few relationships lack instances of bad behaviour on the part of one or both parties at some time and it is a rare family case that does not contain complaints by one party against the other, and often complaints are made by both. Yet not all such behaviour will amount to 'domestic abuse', where 'coercive behaviour' is defined as behaviour that is 'used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim…' and 'controlling behaviour' as behaviour 'designed to make a person subordinate…' In cases where the alleged behaviour does not have this character it is likely to be unnecessary and disproportionate for detailed findings of fact to be made about the complaints; indeed, in such cases it will not be in the interests of the child or of justice for the court to allow itself to become another battleground for adult conflict."

ABV CD [2023] EWFC 165. The principles I distil from the authority are as follows: -

The court will apply the civil standard of proof in deciding on whether a party’s allegations are true

• The court must have regard to all of the evidence and not be tied unduly to the “pleaded case” of a Scott schedule particularly where the court has limited the contents of that schedule.”

Mr Feehan’s skeleton argument acknowledges the Judge gave herself the correct directions but he submits she failed to follow her own legal principles. I am not clear what facts are said should have been found but were not. Or how this submission undermines the Judge’s evaluation of the written and oral evidence, her reasoned analysis which lead her to make her findings. No proper case is put forward. This ground has no prospect of success.

This ground is a challenge to the fact finding made that the Applicant obstructed contact with the Respondent and that the Judge had failed to consider evidence from a therapist who had supervised contact. This relates to some reports from an Independent Social Worker. The Judge read her evidence. She was not called as a witness. The Judge, I am told, watched videos of the children and contact. The Judge had been presiding over these proceedings for a long time. She referred to this social worker’s evidence at paragraphs 21-23 of the judgment. There is no reason to suppose she did not have it in mind. In any event, this finding must be seen in the context of the Judge’s views on the credibility of the Applicant and her witnesses, their collusion and her other findings. Such a finding is clearly not plainly wrong and nor is there any prospect of this being established. Permission to appeal is refused.

The appeal must be dismissed. The Applicant received a fair hearing.

The Respondent seeks his costs of the appeal in the sum of £ 59, 451.60. He has set out his reasons for this in a submissions dated 7 November 2025 in accordance with directions I made in court at the conclusion of the appeal hearing. The Applicant’s solicitor states this submission was never received by them. Should they wish to oppose liability for costs and/or make submissions on the quantum of costs they must do so in writing, limited to ten pages, by 4pm 12 December 2025 and thereafter the matter shall be summarily determined on the papers.