NI v AD

The applicant wife is represented by Max Lewis and Rosie Vorri. The respondent husband is represented by Edward Boydell KC.

Before me are the parties’ cross-applications for financial relief upon their divorce.

I have heard oral evidence from both parties and two forensic accountants, Jon Dodge, instructed as a single joint expert, and Andrew Strickland, instructed by the husband pursuant to a Daniels v Walker application.

The wife has incurred costs of £336,075.

The husband has incurred costs of £587,841. He has paid the wife’s costs and has paid all the experts’ costs and makes complaint that notwithstanding his payment the wife has failed to meet court directions in the preparation of this case. This costs expenditure is compounded by the fact that the parties are also involved in Children Act proceedings. There was a 4-day hearing in November 2024. The total legal costs, largely met by the husband, are approximately £1.3 million.

At the PTR, which I heard, these proceedings were held up by an application from the wife’s previous solicitors, Lawrence Stephens, to join these proceedings because she had not paid their bill. A resolution was reached such that they did not join, but I did on that occasion make a limited costs order against the wife.

The wife is 37 and the husband is 47. They married in Country A in May 2011. The wife followed the husband to this country, where he lived, in January 2012 upon approval of her visa. They have three children: X (11), Y (9) and Z (8).

When they started to cohabit they lived in the husband’s mother’s house (his father having died before they married.) That remained their home until 2016. They then lived in rental properties. They bought a large property Property A in September 2018 (for £1.9 million) with the intention of renovating it and then living in it. That did not happen. Indeed the refurbishments had not started by the time they separated. Shortly before separation they lived abroad, in Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

The parties separated in 2019. It has therefore been 6 years since separation, and it was a marriage of a few months more than 8 years. They have lived in different rental properties since then. The husband is currently living back in his mother’s home. The wife and children have been living in Hounslow. X has started secondary school at PL College, near Area A. It is a private religious school, with relatively modest fees. As a consequence of the journey the mother makes with X to that school, I am told, the younger children have been unable to get to what had been their schools and have been instead attending school on-line. Again, a private religious school. The wife wants on the conclusion of these proceedings to buy a property in the Ealing area to enable her to get all the children to school.

The wife has just finished a psychology degree at university. She will graduate in January 2026 but, subject to an appeal from her, she will not get an honours degree because she has not completed her dissertation. She tells me in her written evidence that she wants to take a part-time teacher training course in 2026 before becoming a primary school teaching assistant in 2028. Her earning capacity is one of the issues in this case and I will consider it further below. I do note here that it would be odd to have done a teacher training course only to become a teaching assistant rather than a teacher. She tells me her English is not good.

The husband works with his brothers – AE and AF - in a number of business ventures, under the umbrella of Company A, to do with Product A. This will need to be explored more fully. In short, AF holds a licence agreement (arising because the central business was his idea) which enables him to take a large part of the profits from one of the subsidiary businesses (save he has not been able to actually withdraw the money while there has been a Covid loan to the business). Mr Lewis sets out in his opening note that ‘one of the main focusses at trial is the degree to which AF has or will keep not only Company A afloat, but H personally.’

The husband suffered a serious injury in September 2020 (after the parties separated) . He has broadly recovered from the injury now, but it added complication and delay to the parties’ separation. It is his case that his long-term health will be affected by what has happened.

The wife issued this application in Form A in August 2022. She was slow to file her Form E such that the First Appointment was not heard until much later, the 20 June 2023. In October 2023 (which was to have been an FDR) the parties agreed further directions and provision was made for a private FDR. That was missed because of delay in filing Mr Dodge’s report. There was a further directions appointment in February 2024, but the case appeared to fall out of the court’s listing regime for a period of time thereafter. Following a hearing before DJ Mulkis in December 2024 it was allocated to be heard by a High Court judge.

Complaint is made by Mr Boydell of the repeated failure on the wife’s part to comply with court orders made for the efficient conduct of these proceedings. The wife tells me that she did not have the funds to meet her costs.

The matter came before me on the 28 March 2025, and, by consent Mr Strickland was instructed. There was an FDR in June 2025 which did not settle the case. It then came before me for a PTR on the 30 September 2025. Controversially in her section 25 statement the wife made, for the first time, an allegation of non-disclosure against the husband, and potentially an allegation of conduct. There was in place a consensual direction recording that she was not going to rely on conduct. I made a further direction in the terms of the consensual direction preventing the wife running an allegation of conduct. While noting that the non-disclosure allegation was made late in the proceedings, and that there had been in place a direction to require the point to be clearly set out if it were to be taken prior to the FDR, I declined to strike out the paragraph in which she made the allegation of non-disclosure.

There is no reference to a non-disclosure case in the terms of the wife’s allegation in her section 25 statement in Mr Lewis’s position statement for this hearing. He did however point out that he has discovered (while preparing the position statement) that a subsidiary of Company B (which is a subsidiary of Company A), Company C, has been recently sold. The sale had happened on the 1 October 2025, but had been expected (I subsequently heard) from May 2025 when heads of agreement had been signed. It is clearly a matter, as was accepted by Mr Boydell, that should have been drawn to the wife’s attention, the court’s attention, and the forensic accountants’ attention much earlier.

I note that Mr Lewis tells me that in the Children Act proceedings findings were made that the relationship between the parties was ‘characterised by coercive control by the father and his family’.

There have been a number of interim maintenance and legal service payment orders. The most recent maintenance pending suit order (of the 28 March 2025) was by consent and provided for the wife to be paid her rent (£5000pm), most utilities, and £4000 pm, as well as school fees and a one-off £6000 for a holiday to Australia.

At the time of the parties’ marriage the brothers ran a shop together. From this AF had the idea of Product X. He secured the IP rights for Product X in 2012. The spray was originally marketed by a company, Company D. That did not involve the husband or his other brother. The people who played a part in it with AF were L, M and N.

Company E was used in 2014 to replace Company D. The relationship with L had broken down. The shares in Company E were held by AF, M and N. AF had 58% of the shares. It was funded by a remortgage of the brothers’ mother’s house. The husband was brought into Company E as an employee to keep an eye on his mother’s money. He left the shop towards the end of 2014. AE subsequently joined him in Company E.

In 2015 Company A was founded to hold AF’s shares in Company E. These were not transferred until March 2016, after the licence agreement referred to below had been concluded. The shares in Company A are held as to 1/3 by each of AD, AE and AF.

In January 2016 AF entered into a licence agreement with Company E, AF was subsequently replaced as the licensor by Company F, a company of which AF was the ultimate beneficial owner . (In 2018 this was replaced by a Country B company, Company G at about the time AF moved to Country B.) The licence agreement is as to 20% of the revenue of specified products.

The business grew and from 2017 Company A started to buy out the shares of the other owners of Company E, and started to declare dividends. It is now the majority shareholder of Company E. It has 95% of it.

Further held by Company A are other businesses, materially:

These have been loss making and have been funded by Company A, or the Husband’s brother, AF.

There was a very substantial difference between the parties as to the value of the husband’s interest in Company A in the ES2 provided at the start of the hearing. (I record that the dispute as set out in the ES2 is prior to having received expert evidence on the impact of the sale of Company C.) The wife puts it at nearly £14 million while the husband puts it at some £6 million. They also disagree about how the husband’s director’s loan account (DLA) should be treated such that, taking the DLA into account, the wife puts the husband’s business interests at some £8.8 million and the husband puts it at -£1.8 million.

The differences derived broadly from the following points:

The husband tells me that the DLA derives from the costs of Property A renovation, living costs (for him, the wife and the children), legal fees (both his and the wife’s), and costs for contact supervision.

There is also a substantial difference between the parties as to the husband’s potential income from Company A as recorded in the ES2. The husband relies on a net figure of £144,000. That is described as net salary in the ES2, but it is described as a dividend in his section 25 statement. (After I raised a query about this, it has been concluded that all his income is by way of dividend, and he has no salary. The different tax rules for a dividend meant that the net income was changed to £168,000.) The wife started with £144,000 (as a net salary) and then adds a net dividend of £1.3 million. Mr Dodge was asked to opine on sustainable income from Company A. The figure of £1.3 million derives from what is called scenario 2 in Mr Dodge’s report. That scenario envisages no dividends going to AF but, in accordance with what has happened previously (averaged over a few years) £1.1 million going to the husband, £500,000 going to AE and the balance of the sum that Mr Dodge considers could be taken as a dividend being divided between AE and the husband. That would give the husband a gross £2.155 million, or net £1.3 million. The reason that Mr Dodge advances this scenario is that AF has not taken a dividend historically, having received in the order of £5m from the royalty payments. Mr Dodge also advances a scenario 1, where each brother takes an equal dividend in accordance with their shareholding. That generates a gross figure of £1.24 million or £750,000 net. This will need to be considered further below.

In consideration of the dividends point it needs to be noted that prior to June 2024 Company A was not entitled to grant dividends over £360,000 as part of the Covid loan conditions. That condition no longer applies as the Covid loan has been repaid.

It should be noted that the valuation exercise for the business interests is dated as of the 31 December 2023. More recent accounts have not been provided.

The parties jointly own Property A, Harrow. This was to be their matrimonial home after renovation but it has never been used as such. It was bought in 2018 for £1.9 million and soon after the parties moved to live in Country C and then Country D. When they returned in 2019 they separated. The husband has run the works on the property without consultation with the wife. He has funded them by a director’s loan account from Company A. They are not finished. It now has an agreed value of £4.1 million and a net value of £2.7 million.

The husband has a small rental property, Property B, in Harrow. That has equity of about £53,000. If the mortgage is taken into account there is no profit on the rental.

There are some debts (other than the DLA): the husband says he has debts of about £115,000 – largest parts being credit card debts and money owing to HMRC. The wife says she has debts of about £100,000 the biggest part of which is a student loan and legal fees, to her previous solicitors Lawrence Stephens.

I shall work through the ES2 below when setting out the financial resources as I have found them to be. I have indicated to the parties that in relation to some small differences between the parties as to account balances I have taken the view that they relate to updating and I am going to take the figure provided by the party in whose name the accounts are.

The wife seeks:

The husband proposes:

This case has been argued, as to the evidence given by the parties, on a needs basis. The big issue between the parties does appear to be the scale of the resources against which I should assess those needs. The wife however through Mr Lewis maintains that this is a sharing case, or at least the higher of needs and sharing. In relation to the anticipated argument that much of the wealth is derived post-separation I am referred to GA v EL (no 2) [2023] EWFC 206.

Mr Boydell is clear that needs is the proper approach. He reminds me this is a short marriage and that the success of Company A largely arises after the parties separated. On his account as to the value of the assets, it is necessarily a needs case.

I will make findings on the issues as to business valuations before determining the proper approach. I do note however that where, as here, it is common ground that the husband will not be able to rehouse other than in rented property because the assets he will be retaining are illiquid, then the parties’ reasonable needs are likely to play a very heavy part in my determination.

I do remind myself that in making my decision I need to consider the matters set out in section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. My first consideration shall be the welfare of any child of the family, while a minor, and I will be considering the financial resources including earning capacity, the financial needs and obligations, the standard of living before the breakdown of the marriage, the age of the parties and duration of the marriage, any disability, and contributions including future contributions looking after the family.

I heard oral evidence from the wife. She had the benefit of a translator but she rarely needed to use the translator.

She was obviously distressed for much of her evidence.

Instead of answering questions straightforwardly she was almost always keen to explain, as she saw it, why she and her case were right. I will analyse each of the important issues below (housing need, income needs and earning capacity), but I do note here that her evidence was more convincing when she argued that the children deserved better, rather than she could not manage on what the husband was proposing.

I hold in mind that a finding has been made that she has been subject to coercive and controlling behaviour when considering her distress and her desire to make sure that her side of an issue was put fully.

It was her case that the parties had a high standard of living at the end of the marriage. On their return to this country they moved into a flat on a well known street, albeit a small flat owned by a sister of the husband. The children, she said, expected things such as swimming pools and big gardens. They had encountered them on visits to Property A, where the husband’s brother, AE, had been living for a while. (It is now empty as the final steps of the renovation are undertaken).

Mr Boydell did demonstrate in cross examination that at a time when the wife said she had no money to enable her to litigate she spent £3,500 on jewellery for herself and gifted money to a sister of hers. He did demonstrate that even after a recital recorded to a court order that she would not spend further on the husband’s credit (which she could do by her PayPal account), she had continued to spend on it. And, further that she had racked up significant parking fines, which she had expected the husband to meet (which he had done).

The husband was called on to explain the sale of Company C and why he had not told the court and the wife about it. It was his case that the sale was for shares in the buying company, Company H. These were valued at £6 million by that company but there had been no independent assessment of the value of the shares by him or his brothers because they were just pleased to get rid of a loss-making business. He considered the new shares a speculative holding. He was less clear how debt of Company C owing either to one of the other companies or his brother, AF (whether from his investment company or personally) would be dealt with on the sale, save that he did not think that debt had been forgiven. It struck me as odd that he did not know how the debt was treated in the deal. (The experts subsequently confirmed to me that Company C’s debt to the other companies and AF was forgiven on the sale.)

He said that he had intended to tell the wife and the court about the sale. That was a very odd answer in that his section 25 statement was silent on it and he had put in a further statement in October 2025, after the sale, in which he remained silent about the sale. Indeed he remained silent about it until it was raised by Mr Lewis in the run up to the hearing.

It is inevitable that I must conclude that he is not telling the truth about this. I do bear in mind that might be because he considered it insignificant, and that revealing it would generate more cost. It might be because he considered that it would be harmful to his case and he was hoping it would not come out. Given that it must have been obvious to him that a sale for £6 million, even if it were for shares and the value of the shares was untested, was likely to indicate a value above zero, I conclude that he concealed the sale because he considered it likely to be harmful to his case.

The husband was pressed by both me and Mr Lewis as to his plans to repay the Directors Loan Account, now standing at some £5.6 million. He had said that he intended to do this from dividends at the conclusion of the hearing but at the same time he said he expected his gross dividends to be about £250,000. I was incredulous as to how he could repay a debt of £5.6 million from £250,000 a year. I pressed the husband as to the tax which the business would need to pay as a consequence of the DLA if it were not repaid.

The husband answered that he hoped there would be some rise in the dividend payment but said that there had been no more than general aspirational conversations about the repayment of the loan.

Again, I struggle to understand why the repayment of such a debt, generating, as the accountancy experts confirmed it would, a tax charge to Company A at 33.75% of its size was something in relation to which there was no plan. I conclude that the husband is not being open on this issue. I do note that I am told that on the repayment of the DLA the tax paid by the company can be reclaimed.

Save for these points, the husband gave his evidence in an apparently open and co-operative way.

The husband was pressed about his access to luxury cars. He drives a valuable 4x4 Cadillac provided for him by Company E (he suggested it would cost about $100,000) and there were a range of top end cars that were held by a subsidiary company for a ‘taxi’ business. These he related have been mainly sold off, that business having failed, but a Rolls Royce, a Ferrari and a Lamborghini are retained for marketing purposes. He accepted if he were going to a work event he may get the use of one of these.

The husband was pressed about why he had stopped renting a valuable flat (where he had lived after separation) and returned to live with his mother. It was suggested that was just optics for these proceedings. He denied that. He said he had not renewed the lease because he had hoped proceedings would be sorted out and he could look for somewhere near the children, but that hope failed and he just moved back to live with his mother pending resolution of the proceedings.

The balance of his evidence I will consider below when I consider housing and income needs.

I heard from Mr Dodge and Mr Strickland concurrently. (They were ‘hot tubbed’.)

I was impressed by the professional and helpful evidence of both of them.

In relation to the sale of Company C, after the production of a contemporary share sale document, both concluded that the best value of Company C, at the date of the sale was £6 million. They both agreed that there was nothing left of value in Company B. There was some disagreement as to the value that should be put on Company B in their reports. Mr Strickland took the view that because the valuation date for the report was December 2023 an October 2025 value was inappropriate. Two things would have changed: (a) more money would have come out of Company A to fund Company B – so we ran the risk because of the different dates in missing that deduction in value to Company A, and (b) investment into Company C could have increased its value. Mr Dodge pointed out that Company A was making profit, so the value for that would not be standing still either.

Both confirmed that the sale did not otherwise affect their respective positions. They had already taken out the debts owing from Company B to Company A.

As to the relevant multiple for the valuation of Company E, Mr Dodge was subject to cross examination by Mr Boydell in particular as to the fact that the comparables that were relied on were not proper comparables, and that he had increased the multiple from an arithmetical average even of those he relied upon. That did not cause him to change his position. Ultimately he said the multiple was a matter of experience, feel and expertise rather than strict arithmetic.

He was also cross examined as to why he had broken down his valuation into the major component business, and how this would have the effect of plumping up the EBITDA for Company E. He answered, convincingly, that the businesses would be sold separately. Mr Strickland had followed the same approach.

As to Company I, Mr Strickland was subject to cross examination by Mr Lewis. Mr Lewis put to him that it was not sensible to value the business at less than its net assets, stock in effect. Mr Strickland first answered that given that it was loss making and the plan appeared to keep it going then it did not have the value of the stock. The losses would consume that value over time. On reflection he changed his position to say that a rational owner would sell off the stock, unless they considered that the business was really worth more than the stock, so it should be valued at the stock, less winding up costs. These could be substantial, including redundancies, getting out of leases, and a reduction in value of the stock through discounted sale.

As to income, Mr Dodge was cross examined by Mr Boydell. He agreed with him that there could be a third scenario to the two outlined above whereby the available income was divided equally between the two brother, AE and the husband, rather than skewed in the husband’s favour by reference to what had been withdrawn (including by loan) over the last few years.

Company E multiplier: one expert tells me 7.5 and the other 8.5. Mr Dodge’s range is 7.5 to 8.5. Mr Strickland did not advance a range. Mr Boydell’s attack on the comparables would have had more force if Mr Strickland had found some different comparables. I have no doubt that each expert was trying to assist the court and was relying on their expertise in the figure that they advanced. I consider I have no good reason to prefer one to the other and so adopt 8 as the multiplier.

Company B valuation, or more accurately the value of the new shares in Company H acquired on the 1 October 2025: Mr Boydell advanced a figure of £4,468,000 having deducted the losses as he can best assess the for Company B from December 2023. Mr Lewis advances £6 million.

This is a nice logical point. If money has come out of Company A to fund Company B then there is an argument for accounting for that somewhere. There are two problems with it: (1) a large part of the forecast loss was depreciation of Company B not money coming out of Company A; (2) Company A has continued to make a profit since December 2023. Mr Lewis has told me that Company A made a profit post tax in 2024 of some £600,000 – which would have been after any loss of Company B (unless that was funded by AF, which would obviously not result in a need for me to account for it). I cannot in fairness add in losses of part when there appear to have been profits for the whole even after those losses.

This is an issue on which it is appropriate for me to take a practical approach. I have been using the December 2023 valuation as an approximation to a current valuation. My job is to consider the assets as they are now. Mr Boydell urged caution on me. He was unable to resist my observation that if his client had wanted a cautious approach to be taken he should have informed everyone promptly of the impending transaction so the accountants could have considered the overall impact on a current valuation. I am therefore going to be using the £6 million figure.

Company I valuation: Mr Boydell in the light of the change in the evidence of Strickland values this at the net asset value (£5,102,348) reduced to reflect the losses (as best he can assess them) since December 2023, so down to £2,519,265. Mr Lewis puts the figure at the net asset value but agreed with me that this needed to be discounted to reflect winding up costs – as Mr Strickland had suggested. I take the view that I prefer Mr Strickland’s revised position to a simple net asset value – that, is, consider what would be left after a winding up. I think these costs will be significant - mostly the value is in stock and that will need to be discounted, there are leases which will have time to run, there will be the costs of laying off members of staff. I appreciate that this is rough and ready but I will reduce the figure by 40% to £3,061,408.

Minority Discount: this I record is not an accountancy issue in that it is a matter of fact for me to determine, but it is part of the valuation exercise that has been undertaken by the accountants. In the circumstances of this case the issue is not one which requires complicated findings on my part. Both parties are assuming that the business will carry on and the husband will continue to draw his income from it. It is obvious that on a sale agreed by the three brothers there will be a 1/3 division of the sale proceeds in accordance with the shareholding. If the husband were forced to sell now to a third party, a third party that would require a discount because the third party would be at a significant disadvantage to the brothers in the running of the business. There is no evidence to suggest that either of the brothers would buy the husband’s shares.

The minority discount, which is put by both experts at 30%, is not relevant to the circumstances that I am being invited to consider. It is at best some sort of indicator to me of the illiquidity discount that might be appropriate.

Husband’s income: Mr Dodge had provided in his report two different scenarios for the husband’s sustainable income from Company A, and then in evidence outlined a third. Mr Lewis opts for scenario 2. Mr Boydell takes a different account that I will outline below. It is right that the husband had said to Mr Dodge that AF does not receive a dividend (to which he would be entitled) because he receives the licence fee. The dividend pot is shared between him and AE. I consider that this concession, and the fact that this is what has happened in the past, is good and solid reason for me to find that this this will continue to happen in the future, notwithstanding that this level of dividend is not something to which the husband is legally entitled. I do not however go with Mr Dodge to scenario 2. The point the husband makes to Mr Dodge is as to sharing of dividends - not drawings. Mr Dodge has relied in his calculations on the extra director’s loan the husband has had in the calculations he relies on for his scenario 2. A loan is different from dividends. I do need to acknowledge that even the dividends have been uneven as between AE and the husband in the past. I do however hold back from making an assumption that not only exceeds the husband’s legal entitlement by assuming AF will receive no dividends, but also that AE will get less than the husband on an ongoing basis. So I conclude on scenario 3. I note that this gives a gross income figure, using Mr Dodge’s approach of half of £3,710,000 = £1,855,000 p.a., and net income of £1,125,058 p.a.

Mr Boydell advances a figure of net income for the husband of £168,101 based on a gross dividend figure of £250,000. There was no evidence from Mr Strickland to suggest that Mr Dodge is wrong in his assessment that the sustainable pot that is available to be distributed as income is £3.7 million and there was no argument from Mr Boydell that Mr Dodge was wrong in that assessment.

The difference here is that the husband’s case as put in closing was that he would need to repay the DLA of £5.6 million by what dividends might be allocated to him over and above the £250,000 figure. So for my purposes I should treat him as having merely the £168,000 which is the net amount resulting from dividends of £250,000.

This presents a number of problems:

The way that I will deal with this is by sticking to my assessment as set out above as to the sustainable drawings, and when considering maintenance claims bear in mind that the husband does have the debt of £5.6 million and I can predict that there will be pressure, but, in the light of his oral evidence, not overwhelming pressure on him to pay that back.

On this point I should note two further things:

The wife has child benefit of about £2,250. She, in Mr Lewis’s note, accepts that she will be able to adjust to the breakdown of the marriage such that she does not require maintenance in 13 years. That is timed to when the youngest child will finish university, should he go to university, on a ‘straight through’ basis.

Having listened to her evidence I remain of the view that her position that she would take a part-time course to train to be a primary school teacher, before becoming a teaching assistant in 2028, earning, she said, some £13,000 to £15,000 is not a reasonable course. If the wife is training to be a teacher it would be reasonable to expect her to be a teacher. If she is to be a teaching assistant she can do that now rather than wait till 2028.

Further, when she was cross examined, she acknowledged that there were ways that she could train to be a teacher while working as an unqualified teacher.

The starting salary for a teacher, is I am told by Mr Boydell, gross £43,500. He found tables demonstrating that an unqualified teacher (as the wife would be if she were training on the job) would receive, at the bottom of the pay range, £26,800. And, for completeness, he produced a document showing that a teaching assistant would receive £24,400 (albeit in Cambridgeshire).

The wife responded in her evidence to the pay-scale argument by saying that the reality was different, and in reality she would be paid less. Mr Boydell’s response, which was not challenged, is that the salaries are fixed in the state sector.

I have to consider this issue in the round. The wife is primary carer for 3 children. Two of them are still at primary school. The wife is likely to achieve a degree without honours. I consider that her English is strong now, but might need some improvement. I find that a reasonable trajectory for her career would be a year as a teaching assistant, two years as an unqualified teacher, while training on the job, and then a job as a teacher. I do not think that I can assume that she will be full time, for the first three years of this plan, in part because of her children (the youngest of whom is 8), in part because of the need to train on top of being teacher. I therefore assess her at a little less than 2/3 of the figures advanced by Mr Boydell. That will be in round terms £16,000 gross for the first three years (about £14,500 net), and then the £43,500 gross (about £30,000 net).

In the light of the above I have worked through the ES2 and attach my own version.

This largely follows the ES2 provided for me at the beginning of the hearing. I have adopted the parties’ own positions as to the balances in their respective accounts. It makes little difference and I assume they have the more up to date versions.

I make the following comments:

What is apparent is that this case is really about some £2.7 million of liquid funds arising from the sale of Property A which will be needed to provide accommodation and some £3.8 million of illiquid funds which generate a substantial income.

If I were to use the minority discount as a device to balance liquidity and illiquidity at 30% of £15.1 m (the husband’s interest in the Company A) it would be £4.53 million. I cannot simply knock that off the £3.8 million because of course the CGT would fall and the DLA could be met from the proceeds of sale rather than taking more dividends and paying tax on them. Running through those steps on the excel sheet which has my ES2 I note that would leave me with a figure of about £2.56 million for business assets. That is just arithmetic, but it does appear to me that there is good argument for saying in this case that £2.7 million liquid is worth more than £3.8 million illiquid.

In the light of this assessment of the financial resources I consider that I should approach this case on a needs basis, but needs having in mind the level of the resources. There is no easy balance between the different nature of these assets, save to say it is likely the wife will have the bulk of the liquid capital to provide accommodation for her and the children and the husband will have the illiquid assets. The illiquid assets will allow him to generate, albeit with post-separation labour, the money to pay for accommodation needs for himself and the children, when with him, and income to meet his needs and their needs and potentially those of the wife.

The husband proposes properties for the wife and children in Area B and Area A, close to PL College. He envisages he will rent. The wife has proposed properties for herself in Area C and Area D. She too envisages the husband will rent. Her properties are larger that the husband has proposed. Before stamp duty the wife’s suggested property cost about £2.5 million (though she has one more expensive) and the husband’s about £1.5 million (though he has some cheaper).

It is clear that the husband’s particulars are more conveniently located than the wife’s bearing in mind the elder child’s school and the primary school suggested for the younger two.

It is also clear that the husband’s particulars are less attractive that the wife’s and tighter on space both internally and in the garden.

Bearing in mind the level of resources on the husband’s side (albeit illiquid), the purchase of Property A for £1.9 million with the intention of developing it and making it into a matrimonial home, and noting the cost of the redevelopment that has taken place (some £2.5 million), and reflecting on the husband’s level of income, I do conclude that the husband’s particulars are on the tight side. On the other hand it does strike me that by opting for Ealing and Acton the wife would be paying more than buying nearer PL College.

I conclude that about £2 million would meet her housing needs. Stamp duty on that would be another £153,000 and there will be moving costs, so I would allow £2.2 million for the cost of her accommodation.

The husband says (in closing) the wife needs c. £90,000 p.a. for her and the children once she is in a mortgage free property. The wife says the figure is about £180,000 p.a. She does, as I have said accept that in 13 years, when the youngest child will have left university (without any gap year), she will have had time to become self-sufficient.

The husband in his Form E advanced a figure of about £200,000 p.a. for himself and the children. There are some points of difference between the parties’ needs, given the medical care he needs on the one hand, and him being spared the cost of a car on the other. Nonetheless it is a comparable figure and a marker of standard of living.

Mr Boydell does rightly point out that this outgoing schedule was before the damage done to the parties’ finances by litigation on two fronts, the renovation of Property A and the consequential build-up of the DLA.

Mr Boydell relies on the fact that the wife managed, with her utilities and rent paid, on £4,000 a month, i.e. £48,000 pa.

I will deal with this figure in very broad terms, and consider it in the light of the findings I have made as to the husband’s income – remembering always that he has a large DLA which will need to be repaid and he will need to meet his own accommodation and living costs from his income, as well as school fees.

Broadly I consider the figure of £120,000 pa appropriate for the wife and children. It is necessary to mark out the figures for the children because they will be payable for different durations. I put that figure at £10,000 per child per annum. (I would direct that when they are at university child maintenance is paid as to 1/3 to the wife and 2/3 to the child.) That leaves £90,000 as needed by the wife.

The interim maintenance will be in place until the sale of Property A. Then in relation to spousal maintenance I would deduct the £14,500 (net salary) and £2,200 (child benefit) from the £90,000 giving £73,300 or in round terms £6,100 per month for 3 years. It then reduces by £15,500 per annum (the increase of earnings) to £57,800 per annum in round terms £4,800 per month.

As to the duration of the spousal income provision. I bear in mind the length of the marriage. I do note that there is a statutory steer towards a clean break. I note that the husband’s capitalise calculations are predicated on 11 years. In closing Mr Boydell clarified that the provision was to cover the wife till the conclusion of the first year at university of the youngest child on a ‘straight through basis’. Although I cannot assume that he would apply the same logic with my different figures I consider that there is sense to his timing. The spousal maintenance will last till June 2036.

At the level of housing needs that I have found appropriate for the wife (£2.2 million) and the level of spousal income provision that I have found meets her needs there is not available capital to capitalise her claim. The case will be broadly a division of the proceeds of sale of Property A and a periodical payments order.

The wife has a debt to Lawrence Stephens of £38,302 and owes £4,500 as a costs order I made. I will not take my costs order into account. I made that order because I considered her conduct in relation to the debt to Lawrence Stephens warranted it. She can absorb that cost herself.

She wants funds to pay the £38,302. They are costs arising because of these proceedings between the parties. They are a debt she will have to meet. The husband argues that her conduct in these proceedings, in particular multiple delays that she has caused by not producing her Form E, warrant her needing to deal with this sum. As Mr Lewis pointed out the husband’s own litigation conduct has now meant he cannot run that argument. I agree. I will factor them into the money that the wife is to recover from Property A.

I note that I am leaving the wife with her student loan. This, as I understand it, does not require immediate payment and will be met by gradual payment from income once that has exceeded a certain threshold.

There is an issue which was not explored as to whether the husband should meet university costs as well as school fees. I have already said that he should carry on paying child maintenance while the child is at university. I am not going to require him at this stage to meet university costs. Given the ages of the children and the consequent uncertainty as to what costs might be and how they might be met that will need to be considered nearer the time. As things stand it does appear that he is likely to have the much bigger income and so if it falls at that time for one of the parents to meet the costs it is likely to be him. I entirely anticipate that if he can readily afford those costs he will agree then.

The parties shall get on and sell Property A as soon as it is ready for sale. I do bear in mind that the husband will want to get on with this because of the mortgage on the property.

The proceeds shall be divided equally. That will give them each £1,360,442 according to the agreed figures provided to me.

The wife’s capital needs have been assessed by me at £2.2 million + £38,302 = £2,238,302. She needs a further £877,860 above half the proceeds of the house. That is to be paid to her by lump sum from the husband’s share. It will leave him with about £482,500 depending on how much the property sells for.

The interim maintenance and arrangements will continue until sale thereafter the husband shall pay:

I believe it is for me to determine when the wife should pay the costs order to Lawrence Stephens, I would provisionally direct that she pay that upon the sale of Property A. I do not know whether it is for me to direct when she pays her remaining fees to them, if it is, then I would provisionally direct at the same time. I would ask that her solicitors communicate these provisional conclusions to Lawrence Stephen and invite them to prepare brief written submissions if they want different timing.

If I look at the net effect of this proposal I am leaving the husband with £3.7 million (his own resources of which £3.8 million is illiquid) and £482,500 from the matrimonial home and the wife with £2.23 million (from the house) and -£80,000 from her own resources. I am also leaving the husband with a very substantial income but a large DLA and a significant maintenance liability and I am leaving the wife in receipt of significant maintenance.

I conclude that overall this order is fair in the circumstances of this case.