And
IN THE FAMILY COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before :
Mr Justice Williams
Between :
London Borough of Barking and Dagenham | Applicant |
- and - | |
Mother Father C E | 1st Respondent 2nd Respondent 3rdRespondent 4th Respondent |
M 5th Respondent
Mr Chris Stevenson (instructed by Legal Services) for the Applicant
Mr Tom Wilson (instructed by Freemans Solicitors) for the First Respondent
Second Respondent (not in attendance)
Ms Susan George (instructed by ITN Solicitors) for the Third to Fifth Respondents
Hearing dates: 27th -28th October 2025
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10:30am on November 5th 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
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This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.
Mr Justice Williams:
I have before me applications relating to three children
Care proceedings in relation to all 3 (C, E & M) who are now aged 14, 12 and 10
Inherent jurisdiction proceedings in relation to the 14-year-old relating to serious medical treatment.
The care proceedings commenced on 29 May 2025 when it came to the knowledge of the Local Authority that C had been left in hospital and that both C and M were in England with no one who was able to care for them; the father having been refused re-entry to England from France along with E. The mother’s whereabouts was unknown; subsequently it came to light that she is in the Middle East having left the children in the care of the father in Africa in or about 2022 and not having seen them since.
This hearing has been listed to deal with jurisdiction. The Local Authority, the mother and the Guardian all filed detailed and very helpful Skeleton Arguments on the point. The father has not engaged with the proceedings although he has contact with the children and is in occasional contact with professionals including this morning with the Guardian. His attitude has varied from abusive to bizarre, but he is clearly aware of the proceedings, has been provided with the information necessary to exercise his right to non-means and non-merits legal aid with specialist solicitors; that right being an adjunct of care proceedings.
It emerged from the Skeleton Arguments that although there were some differences in approach all ultimately agreed that the court had jurisdiction of some form ranging from that under Art 5 1996 HC to that under Art 11 1996 HC. The differences emerged from the very skimpy evidence available to the parties and the court on which to evaluate matters of fact relevant to jurisdiction and differences of perspective on how one should approach Lord Wilsons proposition that where interpretation of the facts might reasonably yield both a conclusion that a child has a habitual residence and that he lacks any habitual residence that the court should adopt the former. After brief exchanges with counsel for the parties it appeared to me – and the parties concurred – that the highly unusual ‘facts’ of this case best fitted within Article 6(2) of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention; namely that their habitual residence could not be established. In such circumstances where the children are present in the jurisdiction the court has the same jurisdiction as it would for children present as a consequence of being a refugee which is the jurisdiction identified in Art 5(1) 1996 HC;’ namely a habitual residence jurisdiction.
This conclusion seems to me to best fit the ‘facts’ of the case because the facts which can be established on a more probable than not basis are so limited and so general in nature that it is not possible to undertake the comparative evaluation of potentially competing countries of habitual residence. A fog of obscurity prevents any meaningful factual evaluation. Although extensive efforts have been made to collate information from the parents, the children, the state authorities in this country and through seeking information under Chapter V of the 1996 HC from the Netherlands and from relevant Embassies the pool of evidence remains pitifully shallow, and the factual landscape remains obscured in fog.
What can be discerned is as follows
The father and mother are both Ugandan in origin.
In about 2005 the father was refused entry to the UK. At some point prior to this he had a child, D, with O both of whom subsequently were residing in England in 2025.
At some point thereafter the father acquired refuges status in the Netherlands and subsequently acquired Dutch citizenship.
Between 2009 and 2015 the father and mother had 4 children – seemingly in Uganda.
In early 2022 the mother left Uganda for the UAE to work; she says in order to seek some financial security for the family. As the father maintains he is a wealthy businessman there is a gulf here which cannot be bridged at present, In the UAE she secured a visa allowing her to work there which expires in 2026. Thereafter she maintained contact with the children via the father until at last early 2025.
After the mother left the father and the children left Uganda, in uncertain circumstances (there is some suggestion it was linked to the father being persecuted in Uganda but given he seems to have secured refugee status in the Netherlands prior to 2009 this seems improbable. Thereafter he and the children lived in Tanzania and Kenya until early 2025 when he, C, E and M left for the Netherlands, leaving the oldest child behind with grandparents. The mother says the plan was to relocate to the Netherlands and to acquire citizenship for the children.
Little to nothing is known of what lives the children led in the Netherlands. The only information that has emerged via ‘Co-Operation’ requests under Chapter V of the 1996 HC is that on 8 April 2025 Dutch National identity cards were issued for the children which suggests they are now Dutch citizens but on 10 April 2025 they spent the night in a police station who made an onward referral to what appears to be child welfare authorities who were thereafter unable to contact the father and closed their file. The police recorded that the father had arrived in the Netherlands with 4 children and without money or work.
The father and children probably arrived in the UK on 25 April 2025 although records only refer to the father and E arriving on that date. Why they came is unclear – Border Force records and the father suggest they came in order to seek medical treatment for C. They stayed with the father’s ex Ms O and his son D.
On 10 May C was taken to hospital. Because of serious concerns about her health, she was referred to UCLH. The father and children visited her but by 27 May 2025 the father and E appear to have left England and when they sought to return on 29 May 2025 Border Force refused them entry as the father told them he was only here to seek medical treatment for C.
On 29 May 2025 the LA issued proceedings, ICOs were made and M moved to foster cares. When C was discharged from hospital on 2 June 2025 she joined M in the foster placement.
On 7 July 2025 the LA issued an application in relation to serious medical treatment of C. Since then, C has been under-going treatment. UCLH agreed to waive any charges.
Since then, the children have remained living with foster carers. The father is now believed to be back in Kenya with E. The mother has no right to enter the UK and would need to apply for a visa. The children both say they wish to return to live with their father.
Extracting from this any clear sense of the place which “reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment’ as at either the 29 May 2025 or the 7 July 2025 is not possible on the evidence before me. Although I am alive to Lord Wilson’s guidance on interpretation of differing pathways I am ultimately left in such a state of uncertainty of where the children might have had some sufficient integration in a social and family environment as at the relevant dates that I am left unable to establish C, E or M’s habitual residence. C’s views are relevant to the determination as she is an adolescent child in accordance with the Supreme Court dicta in Re LC. She wants to be with her father wherever he is. There is no sense that she regards herself as integrated in England. Whilst Uganda appears likely to have been their country of habitual residence prior to their departure in 2022 there is insufficient evidence to identify Tanzania, Kenya, the Netherlands or England as having become their country of habitual residence as there is insufficient evidence to show that they had become sufficiently integrated in a social and family environment in any of those states and nor is an comparative exercise currently possible to determine whether, if they were habitually resident in Tanzania, Kenya or the Netherlands, that those roots have been superseded by roots put down in England.
In respect of E the jurisdictional position is clear as he is no longer in the jurisdiction and has not been since about 25 May 2025. The courts of England and Wales have no jurisdiction over him as he is neither habitually resident here, or present here or of UK nationality. The LA have permission to withdraw their application in respect of E.
Section 3C of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (inserted by s.1 of the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020) provides:
‘The 1996 Hague Convention shall have the force of law in the United Kingdom.’
The approach to determining jurisdiction in public law proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 is now well-established and was confirmed by Moylan LJ in Hackney London Borough Council v P [2024] 2 WLR 1163. The jurisdictional provisions in the Family Law Act 1986 do not apply to public law proceedings pursuant to Part IV CA 1989 ([18] and [63]). The provisions of the Hague Convention 1996 do apply [92]. Nor do the provisions of the Family Law Act 1986 apply to inherent jurisdiction proceedings relating to serious medical treatment, but the Hague Convention 1996 will apply.
In respect of C and M it not being possible to establish their habitual residence they fall within the ambit of Art 6(2) of the 1996 Hague Convention and so this court has jurisdiction as it would under Art 5 1996 HC.
It is of course possible that as time passes by that the children might become sufficiently integrated into a social and family environment in England that they become habitually resident here and the fact of such integration may be relevant to welfare decisions although the potential transition from Art 6(2) jurisdiction to ‘true’ habitual residence jurisdiction will likely be of limited (if any) importance unless an alternative habitual residence jurisdiction emerges from the fog.
I therefore conclude that the court has the complete jurisdiction conferred by Art 6(2) and Art 5 (1) rather than an attenuated jurisdiction under Art 11 in respect of both C and M and that the care and inherent jurisdiction proceedings should continue to their welfare stage.
That is my judgment.