G (A Child) (Abduction: Poland), Re

I am concerned with an application under the 1980 Hague Convention for the summary return of a four-year old boy, G, to Poland.

I will begin by announcing my decision which is that I will order G’s return to Poland. I will now explain my reasons for that decision.

G and both his parentsare Ukrainian. In March 2022 Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine and a week after the start of that invasion, G, his mother, his maternal grandmother and members of his extended paternal family left Ukraine and moved to Poland. The father initially remained in Ukraine, but he joined G and the mother in Poland in September 2022.

The parents separated in late 2023 or early 2024. At that time G was in the primary care of his mother with assistance provided by the maternal grandmother.

In 2024, following the diagnosis of issues with his back, the father travelled to the UK where his mother and sister (G’s paternal grandmother and aunt) are living for treatment. The father asked the mother if G could come with him to the UK. She agreed on the understanding that the trip would be for up to three months. G and the father travelled to the UK on 28 October 2024, initially returning to Poland on 18 November. A week later, on 25 November, they travelled back to England and have remained here ever since.

The mother attempted to persuade the father to return G to Poland. In March 2025 she obtained a visa entitling her to travel to the UK and she came to England in May for a fortnight. G stayed with her during this period, but the father retained his passport and refused to permit G to return to Poland with the mother. The mother subsequently issued proceedings under the 1980 Hague Convention seeking G’s summary return to Poland on 11 August 2025 and that application comes before me today for final determination.

The mother is represented by Mr Sam Wallace of counsel; the father by Ms Emily Rayner of counsel. I am grateful to both counsel for their submissions and assistance in this matter.

At the commencement of the hearing yesterday, Ms Rayner, on behalf of the father, made an application for an adjournment The basis of the application was that the father wished to instruct new solicitors as he considered that his existing solicitors had failed to put across the seriousness of his concerns about the conditions that G would face if a return was ordered. I refused the application which was made without any notice or formal application and at far too late a stage. These are summary proceedings and I was not prepared to permit their delay, given the father has had plenty of opportunity to file evidence in defence to the application.

Turning then to the nature of the dispute between the parties. It is common ground between the parties that for the purposes of the 1980 Convention:

This is therefore a case where I am required by the 1980 Convention to order G’s summary return to Poland unless I am satisfied that the father has made out one of the exceptions to the obligation to return that are found under Art 13 of the Convention.

Here, the father relies on Art 13(b) of the Convention. This provides as follows:

It is important that the limited nature of an application for summary return under the 1980 Convention is properly understood. The father’s case at times appeared to focus on wider questions of welfare and where, and with whom, G should live. I made clear to the parties in the course of the hearing, and do so again now, that the application before me is not to decide where G should ultimately live. As Mostyn J made clear in B v B [2014] EWHC 1804 (Fam):

“2.

The Hague Convention of 1980 is arguably the most successful ever international treaty and it has over 90 subscribers to it, over half the countries in the world. The underlying and central foundation of the Convention is that, where a child has been unilaterally removed from the land of her habitual residence in breach of someone's rights of custody, then she should be swiftly returned to that country for the courts of that country to decide on her long-term future.

3.

There are very few exceptions to this and the exceptions that do exist have to be interpreted very narrowly in order that the central premise of the Convention is not fatally undermined. It is important to understand what the Convention does not do. The Convention does not order a child who has been removed in the circumstances I have described to live with anybody. The Convention does not provide that the parent who is left behind should, on the return of the child, have contact or access in any particular way. The Convention does not provide that, when an order for return to the child's homeland is made, the child should stay there indefinitely. All the Convention provides is that the child should be returned for the specific purpose and limited period to enable the court of her homeland to decide on her long-term future. That is all it decides.”

Counsel have referred me to a number of authorities on the operation of Art 13(b), although I do not understand there to be any significant difference between them on the applicable law. The following is a summary of the relevant principles identified from the cases that have been drawn to my attention:

The father’s position is that if I order G’s return to Poland there is a grave risk that such a return will expose him to physical or psychological harm or place him in an intolerable situation. In summary, the father relies upon the following matters:

The specific concerns raised by the father are as follows:

He also alleges that the mother does not plan to stay in Poland. He refers to a conversation that he says took place when the mother was visiting England in May of this year, in which she is said to have told him that her longer-term plan was to move to Portugal where she would get a nanny to look after G.

Ms Rayner does not seek to contend that each of these factors, viewed individually would necessarily give rise to an Art 13(b) defence. However, she invites me to view them cumulatively and argues that when they are seen in that way, they are sufficient to ground the father’s Art 13(b) defence.

More generally the father is concerned that a return to Poland would be disruptive for G. The father points out that G is currently being provided with speech and language therapy in the UK, is registered with a GP, is on a waiting list for a psychologist and has just started school. The father considers that G will not obtain such wide-ranging support in Poland. Ultimately, the father argues that G has now been in England for a year. He is settled here. He would struggle to assimilate in Poland. It is not his “home” country, and if a return were ordered and it would cause him harm. In making this argument Ms Rayner recognises both (1) that an Art 12 settlement defence is not open to the father on the facts of this case, and (2) that this court is required to act through the framework of the 1980 Hague Convention. This is not a welfare decision to which section 1(1) Children Act 1989 applies. Instead, Ms Rayner’s argument is a broader one; that the overall impact of a return on G is itself a further factor to be taken into account, alongside the other points that she has made, and which should lead the court to the conclusion that the father’s Art 13(b) defence has been made out in this case.

In support of his case the father has exhibited a number of letters evidencing the medical and other support that G is receiving in England. These letters themselves raise a number of questions about the information that the father has provided to the professionals providing support to G, as they appear to suggest that he witnessed specific traumatic incidents during his time in Ukraine. Thus, a letter from G’s GP practice dated 14 January 2025 states “Unfortunately during his early life he has been witness to many unspeakable traumas and losses”. A further letter dated 4 March 2025 from the same writer claims “Before he moved to England he witnessed severe trauma during the war in Ukraine”. A letter from G’s head teacher dated 16 July 2025 refers to G continuing “to suffer trauma resulting from his experiences in Ukraine”. A letter from a Health Visitor dated 20 July 2025 states “G and his father have come here from war torn Ukraine, his mother was still in Ukraine but his parents have now separated and his mother is living in a different country. G has already had so much trauma and disruption in his young life, witnessing the war, his parents separating and coming to a different country.” A report of an initial assessment of G from CAMHS dated 27 February 2025 refers to G having being referred to that service by his GP with (among other things) “presenting issues PTSD related trauma and loss symptoms (flashbacks, nightmares and trauma-induced phobias based on experience of the war in Ukraine) separation and social anxiety” A letter of support dated 22 April 2025 from a local charity which assists Ukrainian refugees refers to what is said in the CAMHS letter set out above.

The difficulty with these letters is that G was not exposed to the Ukraine war in the manner that has been suggested. He and his mother left Ukraine within a week of the Russian invasion. She did not remain there as the Health Visitor was apparently told. Whilst I do not discount the effects on G of the anxiety that was doubtless felt by his parents in the opening days of the war, or of the disruption that he will have experienced as a result of his family being displaced to Poland, these events took place when he was just over a year old. Moreover, and importantly, it is not suggested by either parent in their evidence that G was at any time exposed directly to the war or to any violent or traumatic incident, let alone to the “many unspeakable traumas and losses” and “severe trauma” referred to by his GP, which appears to have formed the basis for the later assessments of G. The only source for this information to the GP must have been the father, and I am left with the conclusion that the father has deliberately sought to exaggerate G’s experiences of the war in Ukraine in his dealings with professionals in this country. I note further that although the professionals also make reference to G experiencing separation anxiety, they do not appear to have been told by the father that he had retained G in England without the mother’s consent.

There are other elements of what is reported in these letters that are, simply, untrue. For example, the letter from the local charity dated 22 April 2025 which appears to have been written in support of an application for housing for the father and G states that G and his father need to avoid public places such as parks etc, and that G, as a consequence of a postnatal injury and recent concussion cannot use a bus, car or other kinds of public transport. The mother in her evidence has provided a number of videos which I have watched. These show G with his father on bicycles in public spaces and playing in a playground. She has also provided other videos of G catching a bus and travelling on a train.

Notwithstanding these points, Ms Rayner urges me to accept the conclusions about G’s condition within these reports as accurate. I cannot go that far. Although I am willing to accept that these reports accurately describe what the professionals were told and observed about G, I do not consider that I can, with any certainty, rely on their conclusions as to the cause of any conditions that they observed. For example, although the CAMHS letter refers to G having separation and social anxiety, I cannot have any confidence as to the cause of this; given that CAMHS have been presented with a false narrative of G’s life to date and do not appear to have been told about the circumstances under which G came to live with his father and was separated from his mother.

The father’s own position is that he is unable to return to Poland with G. He is currently waiting for medical treatment for his back in England and he has his mother and sister living here who can provide him with support. His case is that in Poland he would have no support network and would not be able to work or to afford anywhere to live. He seeks the following undertakings from the mother as protective measures if a return is ordered:

However, it is the father’s position that even if the mother were willing to agree to all the protective measures he has proposed, he would still contend that a return should be refused under Art 13(b).

The mother denies or downplays the allegations that the father has made against her.

The mother also denies that G will not get appropriate support in Poland. The mother is paying Polish social security contributions (and has exhibited documents in support of this) and G will have access to the healthcare system in that country if I order his return. She makes the point that he was receiving speech and language therapy and assistance from a neuropsychologist in Poland before he was taken to England and through Mr Wallace the mother confirmed to me that she would be happy to undertake that these sessions should resume if G was returned to Poland.

She also denies that she would ever lash out at G. She accepts that she sent the text message relied upon by the father but explains that this was sent in the context of an argument over money (the father was refusing to give the mother her half share of the proceeds of the family car). She also denies that the message was ever intended to suggest that she might inflict physical violence on G, rather she was trying to say that she would be tired and might not speak to G in a nice way.

Although the father has complained that the mother has taken foreign holidays rather than visited G in England, the mother points out that of the holidays that she has had, one took place during the initial three month period when G was in England with her agreement, whilst she asked the father to let G accompany her on a second holiday which he refused. She visited G in England in May 2025 once she was able to get a visa to enter the UK. She accepts that she has had a discussion with the father about relocating with G to Portugal but argues that this was an alternative option that she proposed in an attempt to meet the father’s objections to G living in Poland and learning Polish. She is committed to living in Poland; has a good job and has recently extended the lease on her apartment.

On behalf of the mother, Mr Wallace made a number of points about the father’s credibility. In addition to drawing my attention to the letters from the various medical professionals relied on by the father which I have already mentioned, Mr Wallace also points out that there is no contemporaneous evidence of any complaint by the father to the police or social services in Poland in relation to the care that G was receiving by the mother. No specific incident of the maternal grandmother’s alleged alcoholism is identified other than one which took place prior to G’s birth (although there is a mention of alcoholism in the GP’s letter of 4 March 2025 which appears to conflate the father’s allegations against the mother and the maternal grandmother into complaints against a single individual). Mr Wallace notes that prior to the parties’ separation the father was willing to leave G in the mother’s sole care for long periods of time, as he was a lorry driver who would be away for six weeks in every eight, and even after their separation he left G in the mother’s care for nearly a year until he took him to England in October and November 2024.

Mr Wallace also identified evidence that G has been actively cared for by the mother. I have seen videos of the mother playing with G in Poland. Mr Wallace also relies on reports from the neuropsychologist and speech and language therapist that G had been seeing in Poland. These documents were disclosed late, as a result of an error by the mother’s solicitors. However, I permitted their inclusion in the bundle as they seemed to me to be relevant third party evidence as to G’s position whilst in Poland. Ms Rayner urges me to be cautious about these documents, arguing that they (and a psychotherapist’s report in relation to the mother) have all been produced since the commencement of these proceedings. Whilst Ms Rayner is correct about the dates upon which these reports have been prepared, these are reports prepared by professionals and (as with the letters relied upon by the father), I consider that I can rely upon them as accurately recording what the professional was told and observed.

G’s speech and language therapist describes G as attending sessions between 12 Julya and 21 October 2024. She states:

“At the beginning of our work, the boy showed significant emotional attachment to his mother: he would often approach and hug her during sessions. His father also attended some of the sessions, he supported the process, and participated by observing the child’s progress.”

She describes G as highly interested in the work that was being done and demonstrating positive emotional dynamics and sufficient intellectual capabilities. The neuropsychologist says similar things. Her report states

“His parents and grandmother were actively involved in raising the child. A strong emotional attachment to his mother should be especially noted, she clearly played an important role in forming his sense of security and trust. Overall, G demonstrated positive dynamics of development, he was friendly, open to interaction, adapted well to new conditions, and actively developed his cognitive skills.”

The mother’s psychotherapist had been consulted by the mother who was described as having:

“…recurring difficulties in building and maintaining personal boundaries. She reports a high sense of responsibility for others, a tendency to neglect her own needs, difficulty refusing requests, and fear of causing negative reactions from others.”

The mother’s psychotherapist observed the mother interacting with G and records:

“When her child entered the therapeutic space, the client immediately redirected her attention to him, recognised his needs and responded appropriately. The child demonstrated a sense of safety. In interactions with his mother, he first positioned himself on her lap and only thereafter articulated his desires and needs. His speech was age appropriate and his requests were clearly expressed… A healthy attachment between mother and child was observed.”

My conclusions are based on the totality of the evidence that has been presented to me and upon the written arguments and oral submissions made by both counsel.

Ms Rayner accepts, and I agree, that the points raised by the father in his evidence would not, when considered individually, give rise to an Art 13(b) defence. However, she invites me to consider them cumulatively and argues that when I do so there is a sufficient picture of neglect, of developmental delay and of the difficulties that G would face in seeking to assimilate back in Poland, so as to satisfy the court that there is a grave risk that G’s return to Poland would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation.

In considering the father’s case, I am required first to analyse whether his allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk required under Art 13(b) and this requires me to consider whether the overall evidence enables me confidently to discount the possibility that they do.

Here I am not satisfied that the evidence provided by the father in support of his allegations is of either sufficient detail or substance to give rise to the grave risks required by Art 13(b). Although the father makes the general allegation that the maternal grandmother abuses alcohol, the only incident which he has sought to link to this alleged misuse took place before G was born. He has not identified a single occasion when G is alleged to have been left in the sole care of the maternal grandmother whilst she was unfit to care for him. There is no evidence of contemporaneous complaint to the mother, to the police, or to Polish social services about the alleged risk to G, and no evidence that G has been placed at risk by the maternal grandmother, let alone come to any harm in her care.

The same can be said about the father’s allegations of the mother’s neglect. Some of the smaller points that he has made, such as the fact that G was left to sleep at lunchtime in his pushchair rather than his bed are admitted by the mother, but in my view fall well short of establishing anything like the grave risk of harm required by Art 13(b). The more serious allegations are denied by the mother and again, there is nothing beyond the father’s bare assertions to support his case. There are no contemporaneous complaints which would provide corroboration of his allegations. Further, the evidence that has been provided by the mother from the Polish professionals is supportive of there having been a close bond between the mother and G before he was wrongly retained in England.

I accept, because this is common ground, that G has a delay in his speech and language. However, this was being addressed in Poland before he was brought to England, and the mother has indicated that she will restart this therapy in Poland if I order a return. I do not consider that his return would present a grave risk of harm on this ground either. I also accept the mother’s evidence (which the father has not sought to contradict) that she is paying social security contributions in Poland and that G will be entitled to healthcare there if he returns.

Nor do I consider that the mere fact of a return would be a source of a grave risk of harm or intolerability. I accept that there would be some disruption to G as he got used to life in Poland again. He would need to start at a new kindergarten and having been living with his father, he would need to get used to living with his mother again. However, I do not consider that any of this goes beyond the rough and tumble that is inevitable when a return order is made. He would be returning to live with his mother who had been his primary carer for the first three years of his life, and he would be returning to the same apartment in a country where he had previously lived for 2 and half years. He has already experienced the Polish kindergarten system. None of this will be new or unfamiliar to him.

In my judgment, the lack of detail to the father’s allegations and the complete absence of any corroborative evidence means that I can confidently discount the possibility that there is substance to the father’s allegations as to the risks posed to G by the mother and maternal grandmother. Overall, I am not satisfied that the father’s arguments, either individually or cumulatively satisfy the high threshold of Art 13(b) and I therefore find that the defence has not been made out.

In any event, I understand that the mother remains willing to undertake:

Whilst not being a matter which is capable of forming a binding undertaking (given the difficulty of determining whether it has been broken), the mother is also willing to provide an assurance to the court that she will minimise the time that G spends in the maternal grandmother’s sole care. Given (1) that the mother primarily wishes to rely on the grandmother to provide care for G for the hour between the end of the school day and her finishing work, and (2) the terms of the undertaking that she is providing not to leave G in the maternal grandmother’s care if she has been drinking alcohol, I do not consider that it is also necessary for me to insist on a further undertaking from the mother not to leave G in the maternal grandmother’s sole care at any time.

In my judgment, even if I am wrong and the father’s arguments, taken cumulatively, are capable of presenting a grave risk of harm or intolerability to G, I consider that these undertakings would be sufficient to ameliorate any risk to him. I am also entitled to take into account that the authorities in Poland have child protection measures available to them, should any issues arise in that jurisdiction.

Taking all matters into account, I am not satisfied that the father has made out his Art 13(b) defence. Accordingly, under the 1980 Hague Convention I am required to make an order for G’s return to Poland and will hear counsel in a moment on the precise terms of that order.

I make clear, as I have already mentioned, that this decision is not a final determination on matters of G’s welfare, and if there remain issues in dispute, these will now be matters for the Polish courts.

Finally, I should record that this judgment, although delivered orally, has been read from a prepared draft judgment that requires only typographical correction. I will perfect that draft and circulate it to the parties later today. I therefore direct that there is no need for a separate transcript of this judgment to be prepared. The approved judgment, when circulated, should be translated into Russian for the benefit of the parents.

That is my judgment.